Case Study: Kharkiv Offensive – View from the Commander’s Sight

Szerzők

  • Takács Márk

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35926/HDR.2023.1-2.3

Kulcsszavak:

infantry, tactical-level of war, Ukraine, Russia, offensive, penetration, delaying action

Absztrakt

The offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in early September 2022 in the Kharkiv Region is an outstanding achievement and marks a significant cornerstone in the story of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The goal of this study is not to retell the story of this operation and not to invent something that already exists, but to present this historically significant military operation from the view of the tactical-level infantry commander. At which level, after all, wars are decided.

Információk a szerzőről

Takács Márk

officer of the Hungarian Defence Forces. His current position is assistant lecturer at the University of Public Service.

Hivatkozások

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Megjelent

2023-11-28

Hogyan kell idézni

Takács, M. (2023). Case Study: Kharkiv Offensive – View from the Commander’s Sight. Honvédségi Szemle – Hungarian Defence Review, 151(1-2), 34–69. https://doi.org/10.35926/HDR.2023.1-2.3

Folyóirat szám

Rovat

Military Science in Theory and Practice