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FOR THE HOMELAND



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PREFACE

This special issue of the Defence Review is continuing a recently established tradition among Hungarian Military Science journals. It is turning into an international forum, where our national military personnel and a growing number of worldwide partners from the US to Germany can share their views. Our purpose is to provide our readers with the most recent information on and analysis of the latest events, because military science must not ignore the events and phenomena that influence our perception of security and everyday life.

First, we take a look on the trends and current possibilities and problems of contemporary Hungarian military science, by showing the scientific life in the HDF Research Centres, presenting their research topics and their performance in 2015. We must emphasise that – in addition to their scientific work – our Research Centres’ military personnel have also participated in the defence tasks of the HDF like “Határozott Fellépés” (Determined Stand) and “Közös Akarat” (Common Will) operations.

Since the last issue was published in 2015, world-shaking events have occurred. One of the most important problems the international community is currently facing is the increasingly global reach of terrorism. For an understanding of the complexity of the threats, the analysis of the recent terror attacks by Peter Á. Kiss is an essential source. Other authors address the Islamic State’s terrorist organisation and Muslim radicalization. Migration and its effects inspired our authors to share their opinions in connection with security policy. In Hungary, soldiers have supported the border guards and police forces to control the migration crisis at the state borders since September 2015, Tamás Kender and György Nógrádi provide answers on how to respond to this challenge. Other global security risks are also in the sights of our authors. Georg Schmidt and Ákos Treszkai discuss such essential aspects of security risks as the effects of war on public health or water supplies in Africa. In this special issue, we are also taking a close look at the tension between the Turkish and Russian militaries and other aspects of (post-)modern warfighting, such as electronic warfare.

I am proudly presenting this issue as a product of our researchers’ national and international contributions and I hope that not only military specialists but also civilian experts will find these papers more than useful.

*Lieutenant General Zoltán Orosz,
Deputy Chief of Defence, Hungarian Defence Forces*

Lt. Gen. Zoltán Orosz:

SCIENTIFIC LIFE AT THE RESEARCH CENTRES OF THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES IN 2015

ABSTRACT: Scientific research has always been very important for the Hungarian Defence Forces. In recent years a network of military research institutions has been developed in order to serve as an institutional framework for science activities directly supporting the interests of the HDF. This research and innovation network has met the expectations but some of its elements require further revision and development. This paper analyses the activity and circumstances of the research centres.

KEYWORDS: Hungarian Defence Forces, research institution, scientific research

There has always been a need in the Hungarian Defence Forces for directly applicable results of scientific analysis of experiences of recent wars and military operations that can be used in military training and education. Voluntary and proactive research has always supported the complicated process of conversion of the HDF. Scientific work is important for today's military leaders, as it supports the debates, reveals problems and supports decision makers. On the other hand, lack of information and lack of knowledge of advanced protocols could lead to serious mistakes. The recently founded Research Centres have always confronted the senior leadership of the armed forces with the aspects of science, offering an unbiased opinion on those questions that cannot be answered by the strict hierarchical organization itself.

Although researchers in the field of military science have met some obstacles recently,¹ for the dedicated and enthusiastic soldiers and civilian experts the Research Centres continue to offer opportunities for serious professional work. The centralized organization of military research synthesizes the efforts, organizes cooperation between institutions separated by organizational structure and location, provides a professional forum, connects various fields, and through cooperation with other scientific areas it contributes to the reputation of military theory in the eyes of society.

The spectrum of the research activity of the Centres covers all the areas of military science. We can be proud of the diversity of research topics, because that shows us that military science is an integrating discipline.² This is why we have to endeavour to strengthen the connection with all those institutes and associations that have the same profile.

The HDF cares about publishing its new scientific results not only in print, but on live forums, too. Our Research Centres organize dozens of events every year: professional forums, conferences, workshops and seminars. We are trying to find ways to draw the attention of college and university students to our research, because they are the next generation of

¹ Szenes, Z.: Akadémiai viták a hadtudomány struktúrájáról. (Academic Debates about the Structure of Military Science.) *Hadtudomány*, XXIII./3–4. 2013, 63.

² Szabó, M.: A Hadtudományi Bizottság múltja – a hadtudomány jelene. (The Past of the Military Science Committee and the Future of Military Science.) *Magyar Tudomány*, 2007/12., 1543.

professional intellectuals, experts and decision-makers.³ This is why the education of new generations is so important for the HDF: we have to participate in their training by revealing future challenges, new and practically applicable knowledge that can be used in our national and allied commitments. Military science, though it utilizes the results of basic and applied researches, is basically a practical science: in essence, all military activity is based on experience gained in the field. Military science appears as research result and practical experience as well, that gets incorporated as principles and rules into the system of military knowledge and practice. As Clausewitz says: „[...] for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit when they do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far, but kept near to experience, which is their proper soil”.⁴ This is why it is so important for our military scientists to seek modern practical examples and experience, and build applicable theories upon them.

At this moment, the Hungarian Defence Forces have six certified Research Centres (the Institute and Museum of Military History, the HDF Joint Force Command Science Centre, the HDF Geoinformation Service, the Science Board of the Military National Security Service, the HDF Medical Centre, and the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Centre). They work in 14 fields of the military sciences that cover almost all of the areas defined by Zoltán Szenes.⁵

MOD INSTITUTE AND MUSEUM OF MILITARY HISTORY

The Institute is one of the oldest and most prestigious Research Centres of Hungary. The spectrum of its research embraces wide areas of history, especially military history. Their research priorities during the last year were the projects in connection with the centenary of the WW I: theatre of war researches in the regions of Gorlice, Przemysl and Isonzo. Additionally, as part of the commemoration, they are setting up a new permanent exhibition. Another important project is the early modern guild database (1526-1761) that is executed with the support of National Scientific Research Programmes (OTKA). The deployments of the Hungarian regiments of the Army of the Habsburg Empire in the Hungarian Reform Era (1825-1848) is a further notable research project. Another featured project, supported by the National Cultural Foundation, is the life of Colonel Lajos Kazinczy (1820-1849). Besides these mainstream projects, there are many ongoing individual research topics in the fields of archaeology (e.g. the archaeological research of the battlefields of the Turkish Era or field research in Zrínyi-Újvár), history of the military press (field journals during WWI; history of the Field Journal in Przemysl, 1914-1915) and military history (biographies, memoirs, bequests, research on prisoners of war). A monograph on General Artúr Görgei is in preparation for the 200th anniversary of his birth.

All these activities are executed by the staff of 60 research personnel of the Institute. Fifty seven percent of the staff (34 experts) have advanced scientific degrees, four of them are Doctors of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (DSc), 30 persons hold a PhD or the equivalent Candidate of Sciences (CSc). Two employees are still studying in a doctoral programme, and four are preparing to defend their doctoral theses.

³ Ludovika Szabadegyetem 2015/2016. http://uni-nke.hu/szolgalatasok/ludovika-szabadegyetem/ludovika-szabadegyetem-2015-2016-ii_-szemeszter (Accessed on: 10. 03. 2016.)

⁴ Clausewitz: On war. <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Intro.htm> (Accessed on: 10. 03. 2016.)

⁵ Szenes, Z.: *Op.cit.* 64.

The researchers of the Institute had 208 publications in 2015 and presented their results at 249 lectures. Besides 23 books, 59 book chapters, 52 papers and 74 other written publications, 24 presentations at local and international conferences and 104 scientific lectures show the very active research work of the Institute.

Based on their own projects, 13 exhibitions were organised as popular science activities, eight in the Museum of Military History, four in external locations in Hungary, and one abroad. The Institute organized three scientific conferences: two of them were parts of the centennial commemoration of WWI (The Catastrophe at Przemysl and the Breakthrough at Gorlice in 1915; and Daily Life in Wartime), and there was one scientific workshop on the bicentennial of the closure of the Napoleonic wars. The Institute publishes its own scientific journals, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* (Military Science Proceedings) and *Hadtörténelmi Múzeum Értesítője* (Notices of the Museum of Military History), regularly.

The Institute runs seven projects supported by the National Cultural Foundation. Over two thirds of the staff is provided with computers, the others use their own notebooks. In the long term it may cause some problems that half of these computers run on MS Windows XP.

Almost half of the Institute staff (46%) regularly gives lectures at the most prestigious universities of Hungary.

Higher Education Institute	Teaching fellows from the staff of IMMH
Eötvös Loránd University	18
Hungarian University of Fine Arts	3
Pázmány Péter Catholic University	2
Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary	2
National University of Public Service	2
University of Pécs	1

Figure 1. *Teaching in HEIs by the staff of the IMMH*

MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

The traditional research areas of the Service are the theories of national security, tradecraft, analysis and evaluation, besides theories of security, security policy and international relations.

The main goal of the Scientific Board of the Service for 2015 was the clarification of the legal questions concerning the scientific qualification of the Research Centre, which publishes the Service's scientific journals and organizes conferences. The Science Board also placed considerable emphasis on planning scientific projects, support to the teaching and research work of the National Security Institute of the National University of Public Service, and the representation of the Military National Security Service at scientific events for 2015. These tasks were executed by the research staff of the Service: six experts with advanced scientific degrees (PhD) and eleven in doctoral programmes.

The biggest challenge for the Service during the last year was that due to legislative changes in 2014 the qualification as a research centre was revoked, therefore the Scientific Board started a review of the regulation on qualification. As a temporary solution, in view of the existing legislation, the Service could include the research function in its articles of incorporation.

As a scientific forum, the Service publishes three journals: *Felderítő Szemle* (Intelligence Review), *Szakmai Szemle* (Tradecraft Review), and the *National Security Review*. The Review was first published in 2015, its antecedent was the Tradecraft Review. This periodical was not listed among the standard journals of military science earlier, so the amendment was initiated at the Military Science Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. There were 115 papers published in these journals in 2015, the researchers of the Service have published 23 papers and presented 9 lectures at conferences. In addition six lectures were delivered during the popular science event "The Night of Researchers".

In cooperation with the National Security Institute of the National University of Public Service the Service organized a conference last year on intercultural and religious differences in the current conflicts on 23 April, and initiated another one with the Counter Terrorism Centre about the financial background of terrorism.

Traditionally, the staff of the Research Centre participates in the work of the National Security Institute of the National University of Public Service: they deliver lectures at the BSc and MSc courses, two colleagues serve as supervisors at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences at the National University of Public Service, and one at the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences at the Universitas Budensis.

The greatest virtues of the Research Centre are the professional acknowledgement and quality-oriented work, but in 2015 other tasks of the Service and the previous negative changes in legislation caused significant disruptions in scientific work.

HDF GEOINFORMATION SERVICE

The Service is responsible for all meteorological and cartographic support of the Hungarian Defence Forces, and for research activities of this scientific area. Its projects - due to the low number of researchers mainly themes pursued individually by the staff - consist of both basic and applied research. The high level, organized control reanimated the Service's scientific life, therefore in 2015 science management became viable again. At the same time, it remained a problem that the reputation of the research and the researchers did not improve. The number of PhD students did not increase, because it was difficult to encourage the organization and the individuals.

The research staff consists of two members with PhD degrees, two in a doctoral programme, two who have just finished their studies, and one is an aspirant. Accordingly, the publication performance of the Service developed as it follows: one book, one dissertation, five conference papers, and six papers were published in 2015 by the research staff of the Service. Additionally, they have satisfied both the planned and contingency geographic requirements of the Hungarian Defence Forces by providing such maps of Africa and Middle East which meet scientific standards. Their results were disseminated at conferences as well, that lead to the Geoinformation conference "GIS in the Army", in cooperation with ESRI Magyarország Kft on 4 June, 2015. The staff of the Service, despite their low number, make a vital contribution to scientific activity in professional organizations: the researchers are members of eleven associations, although they teach only in military courses topics like cartography, GPS and military geography.

HDF MEDICAL CENTRE

There are two institutes inside the Medical Centre with noteworthy research activities. The Laboratory Institute of Defence Health was established within its current structure in 2015, in order to provide laboratory support under standardized control, optimally using the equipment and human resources, for all the special military health care tasks that are not included with basic, specialist and hospital care system but are necessary to execute the tasks of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

One of its traditional functions is medical research that has been carried out for 50 years in the predecessor institutes in the areas of radiobiology, military medicine, pathophysiology and toxicology. A part of the basic and applied research (radiobiological topics, detection of biological and chemical agents) is related to NBC protection, a conventional task of the army. Another part is the examination of the medical problems related to military life (combat injuries, wound healing, and infections). In 2015 the development of drug and alcohol screening was a significant area of research in cooperation with the Forensic Science Institute in Budapest and the Hungarian Institute for Forensic Sciences. The Toxicology and Environmental Analysis Department of the Laboratory Institute conducted significant research on chronic intoxication mechanism, targeting the factors influencing the emergence and seriousness of poisoning from toxic chemical agents and industrial toxic compounds, and additionally on the treatments and prophylactic medicines.

All personnel of the Radiobiological Subsection of the Military Pathophysiology Department had been replaced by the end of 2015, so only three people continue the development of the system of military application of biological dosimetry (mainly the micro nucleus frequency analysis and chromosome aberration analysis). They are studying the mechanism of chemicals amending and protecting from radiation. This is why – in cooperation with the MoD Military Technology Institute – they developed a radio-toxicological personal kit.

The Pathophysiology Laboratory conducts research in the area of toxicological analyses, targeting the theoretical recognition of adsorption processes that make the detection of bacteria more difficult, besides it does the analysis of the military significance and hazards of nanomaterials, furthermore there are still ongoing researches on virology and sepsis. In continuous cooperation with the Traumatology and Hand Surgery Department of the Medical Faculty of the University of Debrecen there are common projects on ischemic-reperfusion damages occurring during ischemic extremity surgery.

The current researches of the Health Promotional Department of the Military Epidemiological Service have three main directions. Firstly, the examination of the efficiency of the Williams Life Skills training on stress control and communication development, in accordance with the protocols of international efficiency tests. Secondly, they are analysing the connection between mental endurance and health behaviour. Not least, the Department analyses the motivational factors influencing the Military Physical Training Programme's efficiency and success. In addition, they continuously conduct statistical surveys and analyse the data of the screening database to monitor the military personnel's health conditions.

Besides the medical topics, the library of the Medical Centre has its own research interests in its own scientific field. The library is a fundamental information base of the Centre's research activity.

The Medical Centre employs 19 personnel in research positions, 32 percent (6 persons) have scientific degrees (PhD or CSc).

	Number of employees	Candidate (CSc)	PhD
Laboratory Institute of Defence Health	12	1	3
Health Promotional Department of the Military Epidemiological Service	6	0	1
Scientific Library	1	0	1
Total	19	1	5

Figure 2.: *Research personnel of the Medical Centre in 2015*

Considering the publishing activity of the Research Centre, it has significant results in its research fields, mainly in forums providing quick dissemination possibilities, so one book chapter, nine papers, eleven lectures, five posters and one popular science publication were published in 2015. The Centre also publishes a journal (Honvédorvos – Military Doctor), a prestigious periodical.

	book chapter	paper	lecture	poster	other	total
Laboratory Institute of Defence Health	1	5		4		10
Health Promotional Department of the Military Epidemiological Service		1	9	1		11
Scientific Library		3	2		1	6
Total	1	9	11	5	1	27

Figure 3.: *The publications of the Medical Centre in 2015*

The Institute and its predecessors have always striven to integrate their special research laboratory capabilities into basic health care. Their analytical equipment is capable of diagnosing special poisoning (e.g. heavy metals, antifreezes, and methanol), drug and acute and chronic alcohol consumption. The pathophysiological facilities can diagnose special haematological diseases and rare allergies. The research personnel strives to use their competence in special situations and catastrophes (proving suspected radiological damage caused by depleted uranium projectiles, sludge spill catastrophe etc.).

HDF JOINT FORCES COMMAND

The research staff consists of two individuals with PhD degree and four studying in doctoral programmes. In 2015 scientific activity had to be subordinated to the tasks and challenges affecting the entire HDF, especially the JFC. Despite the difficulties, their own professional forum, journal *Sereg-szemle* (Army Review) has been published on time. They published a book on African terrorist and separatist movements in cooperation with the Geoinformation Service and the Research Centre of the General Staff of the HDF, and also organized two conferences in 2015.

RESEARCH CENTRE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF HDF

This is the youngest scientific institute of the HDF, founded in 2014, as the Department of Doctrinal Analysis and Evaluation of the Training and Doctrinal Centre. Its primary research areas are military leadership, military training, logistics, military organization and recruitment, security policy and terrorism. These fields directly support the GS in its strategic and operational duties. One of the functions planned for the Department when it was established was to coordinate all scientific activities within the HDF. In addition to their scientific work, the military personnel of the Centre also participate in the defence tasks of the HDF.

The Department has a staff of eleven. Six persons are engaged in scientific work. Four researchers have PhDs, and one is studying in a doctoral programme. Six reserve officers are affiliated to the Centre (five with PhD degrees and one PhD candidate), and there are three external researchers and interns from various universities (University of Szeged, National University of Public Service, Corvinus University).

In 2015 the staff published five books and 28 papers. Furthermore, they served as peer reviewers for several papers (both in English and in Hungarian) for scientific publications. They delivered lectures in such prestigious universities as the University of Szeged and the National University of Public Service. They also presented 28 papers at national and international conferences. The Centre edits both the Hungarian and English language versions of the HDF's flagship scientific journal, the renewed *Honvédségi Szemle*⁶ (*Defence Review*⁷). The Centre also organized two conferences in 2015, one on the Mediterranean (May, 2015) and one on Africa's security policy (November, 2015). A significant work of the staff is their contribution to the *Dictionary of Military Terms* with 8,417 entries, revising the latest edition of 1995. Various country studies (Somalia, Central African Republic) and its book on the Islamic State⁸ have increased the Centre's international reputation. The Centre has good cooperation with the Confucius Institute that includes Chinese language courses, and is organizing a conference on China in May, 2016.

A featured project of the Centre was the "Defence Force 2020" on the future security situation and an attempt to define the characteristics of possible future conflicts, with proposals on doctrinal development.

The Library of the Ministry of Defence was transferred to the Research Centre in June, 2014. Since then, it has developed significantly, thanks to applications to tenders and cooperation projects, its collection has grown, and the number of its periodicals has reached 79. A new Chinese section was added as a result of cooperation agreements. The library's holdings and its services are also available to civil universities and research institutes. The Library is a place of popular science: they have organized eight book launches in 2015.

⁶ The journal's topics have been changed, more Hungarian and foreign specialists have been invited into the editorial board, the number of imprints have been reduced and it became permanently available in electronic formats. Its English-language version is published semi-annually.

⁷ *Defence Review*. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/53627/hsz_kulonszam.pdf (Accessed on: 22. 03. 2016.)

⁸ Besenyő, J. et al. (eds.): *Islám Állam – Terrorizmus 2.0. (Islamic State – Terrorism 2.0.) Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely, Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2016.*

SUMMARY

Research Centre	Number of research staff	DSc	CSc	PhD	doctoral programme students	doctoral candidates	Percentage of staff with scientific degrees
IMMH	60	4	7	23	2	4	56.67
NMSS	20	0	0	6	11	3	30.00
GEOS	7	0	0	2	4	1	28.57
MC	19	0	1	5	4	0	31.58
JFC	6	0	0	2	4	0	33.33
GS	11	0	0	4	1	1	36.36
total	123	4	8	42	26	9	43.90

Figure 4.: *Research Personnel of the Centres*

Research Centre	Book	Chapter	Paper	Presentation	Dissertation	Poster	Other publications	Lectures (popular science)	conferences and exhibitions	publications total	Number of personnel	Publications per capita
IMMS	23	59	52	128	0	0	74	112	16	464	60	7.73
NMSS	0	0	23	9	0	0	0	6	1	39	20	1.95
GEOS	1	0	11	17	1	0	0	0	0	30	7	4.28
MC	0	1	9	11	0	5	1	0	0	27	19	1.42
JFC	1	0	8	14	0	0	0	1	2	26	6	4.33
GS	5	5	23	28	0	0	0	0	2	63	11	5.72
total	30	65	126	207	1	5	75	119	21	649	123	5.27

Figure 5.: *Publications of the Research Centres of the HDF*

The Research Centres did an impressive work in 2015, performing above their capabilities, and also participating in the most significant military tasks of the HDF, operations “Határozott Fellépés” (Resolute Action) and “Közös Akarat” (Common Will), which had nothing to do with theoretical science. The strength of these Centres is their cooperation abilities and their high motivation. However, as the next scientific generation is developing, due to the indifferent reputation for military research and scientific work in general, and the replacement of retiring researchers in particular, scientific work within the HDF will face a serious problem. The Centres have different infrastructural backgrounds, but they need to be improved in the long term. Due to the specialization of responsibilities and the narrowly focused research fields, there are only limited external funding resources available. For the future it will be necessary to improve the regulatory framework that governs the unified

operation of the Research Centres, in order to synchronize their scientific work and improve cooperation among them, such as the Centres' participation in publishing doctoral thesis topic proposals and evaluating the applications of PhD students.

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Péter Á. Kiss:

FIRST THOUGHTS ABOUT THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN PARIS AND BRUSSELS

ABSTRACT: There is a clearly identifiable thread of improvement in tactical and operational skills which runs through the attacks in London in 2005, through Mumbai in 2008 to Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016. This paper tracks these improvements.

KEYWORDS: Paris, Brussels, Mumbai, London, Islamic State,

As yet there have been few comprehensive (professional, scholarly) analyses of the terrorist attacks that took place recently in Paris and Brussels, and I cannot use such classified material as I may have available on the subject. Therefore I must rely on somewhat more doubtful sources: reports in the daily press and in cyberspace, the “chatter” among professionals, information I gathered in the past while conducting research for other projects, and – most doubtful of all – previously acquired knowledge. As a result, this paper is not as carefully footnoted as the subject demands and deserves. In the near future I shall expand it into a proper scientific analysis, but for now I must answer to the demands of the editorial deadline.

Several authoritative sources have pointed out the similarities between the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and those in Paris in 2015.¹ I would go one step further: a clearly identifiable thread of improvement in tactical and operational skills runs through the attacks in London (July 7 2005), Mumbai (November 26-29 2008), Paris (November 13 2015) and Brussels (March 22 2016). It shows a steady improvement not only in such basic skills as bombs that work reliably (not a guaranteed outcome in improvised explosive devices), but also in planning, operational security and tradecraft – in short, professionalism.

THE ATTACKS

In each case small teams carried out a series of carefully planned, carefully timed attacks at several locations. Four suicide bombers hit three subway trains and a double-decker bus in London. In Mumbai ten men carried out 12 attacks, using explosives and automatic rifles. In Paris three teams of suicide bombers and riflemen hit six locations. In Brussels, where the terrorists seem to have acted in some haste, two suicide bombers hit the Brussels airport, while a third hit a metro station in central Brussels, close to the European Commission headquarters.

In each case the targets were selected to cause a large number of casualties, and they also had some symbolic significance. Opulent hotels, cafes, a cinema, a Jewish community center

¹ B. Riedel: Modeled on Mumbai? Why the 2008 India attack is the best way to understand Paris. Brookings, Washington D.C. November 14, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/14-paris-attacks-mumbai-isis-terrorism-riedel>; E. Bakker – L. van der Heide: Mumbai-Style Attacks in Paris. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 14 November 2015. <http://icct.nl/publication/paris-mumbai-style-attacks-with-a-different-outcome/>; M. Hafeez: Why the 26/11 Mumbai strike and Paris attacks are similar. Times of India, November 15, 2015. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city>

in Mumbai; athletic events, bars, restaurants and a music hall in Paris – all places where men and women mix freely, drink alcohol and enjoy frivolous entertainment. In London and Brussels the attackers disrupted the public transport system, and one of Europe's busiest airports. In Brussels they also paralyzed the capital of the European Union for several days.

Multiple attacks at several locations not only hindered a swift and effective response by the emergency services and security forces, but also guaranteed that at least part of the mission would be successful.² Both in Paris and in Brussels some perpetrators lost their nerve, discarded their explosive devices, and escaped the scene. Nevertheless, the attacks that did take place caused sufficient damage and casualties to achieve the terrorists' purpose. The attack locations were so widely separated, that they could not be treated as a single containable event.

Operational security was sufficiently developed to keep the police and the security services in the dark long enough to plan, prepare and execute the operations. The terrorists in Mumbai used mobile phones (with SIM cards obtained in India), as well as satellite phones to communicate with each other and with their controllers in Pakistan. Some of these communications were intercepted by the Indian authorities, but due to the pace of events the information thus obtained was not immediately useable.

Instead of encrypted communications, which could have triggered scrutiny by the police, the terrorists in Paris and Brussels relied on “burner phones” – cheap cell phones (purchased anonymously or with fake documents) that were used for one or two calls only, then discarded. In the Bataclan concert hall they used phones seized from the hostages.³ The short conversations – whether in Arabic or French – were lost among the thousands of calls that are initiated every minute in a busy metropolis. Since the survival of the attackers was not an issue, they did not have to make plans and advance arrangements for escape routes or safe houses. This certainly made planning a much simpler task, and contributed to operational security because the number of people involved in the operation could be kept relatively small. The lack of planning for the aftermath eroded operational security when some of the perpetrators survived. This became apparent only when two perpetrators in Paris and one in Brussels did survive, and had to improvise their escape. The traces they left behind when looking for a hiding place led to the death of one and the arrest of the other two.⁴

The centralized control of the emergency services and of the security forces was not flexible enough. The response of the authorities was confused at first – more so in Mumbai,

² Brian A. Jackson – D. R. Frelinger: *Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2009, 14.

³ G. Moody: Paris terrorists used burner phones, not encryption, to evade detection. *Ars Technica*. Mar 21, 2016. <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/paris-terrorist-attacks-burner-phones-not-encryption/>

⁴ G. Miller – S. Mekhennet: One woman helped the mastermind of the Paris attacks. The other turned him in. *The Washington Post*. April 10 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/one-woman-helped-the-mastermind-of-the-paris-attacks-the-other-turned-him-in/2016/04/10/66bce472-fc47-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_story.html; Paris attacks suspect Salah Abdeslam shot and arrested in Brussels. *The Guardian*. March 18, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/paris-attacks-suspect-salah-abdeslam-wounded-in-brussels-terror-raid-reports>; Mohamed Abrini admits to being 'man in the hat' at Brussels airport. *The Guardian*. April 9, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/09/paris-attacks-suspect-mohamed-abrini-charged-with-terrorist-murders>

than elsewhere.⁵ In London the Gold Coordinating Committee (the body of senior figures of the government, the emergency services, the military, and the transport system) convened over two and a half hours after the first bomb went off. Meanwhile fire trucks and ambulances were dispatched to locations where no emergency existed. In Paris, the antiterrorist unit reached the Bataclan concert hall after a half-hour delay, because it had first deployed to a location where the attack had already been over. In Mumbai the specialist anti-terrorist response unit, the National Security Guard arrived on the scene nearly 12 hours after the first attacks had occurred.

THE ATTACKERS

There are clear qualitative jumps in individual tactical skill from the London bombings to Mumbai and beyond. The London bombers, for all their dedication, were really just gifted amateurs at best. They were also quite lucky: the explosive they used was triacetone-triperoxide (TATP), with hexamethylene-triperoxide-diamine (HMTD) for the detonators. These are easily made from commonly available materials, but they are very dangerous compounds, yet the bombers managed to make them, pack them into bombs, transport the bombs to the target locations and detonate them.⁶ Although one (possibly two) of them had received some training in Pakistan, their technical and tactical skill sets were quite limited: the operation essentially consisted of making four explosive devices, transporting them to crowded places and setting them off. In the preparation phase they took minimal precautions to hide their activities apart from being careful about mobile phone communications.

The terrorists in Mumbai belonged in an entirely different class. They were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure), a Pakistani jihadist organization, whose primary aim is to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Indian rule. They were recruited in Pakistan, and trained for months, specifically for this operation. Their fighting skills were comparable to well-trained professional soldiers. They managed to keep Indian security forces (not known for their timidity) at bay for sixty hours, and all but one went down fighting.

In Paris and Brussels attackers we see another qualitative jump. For years now young (and sometimes not so young) European Muslims have been travelling to the Middle East to fight in the ranks of one or another jihadist organization, and since the declaration of the Caliphate their numbers have increased significantly. As their numbers have grown so has the concern of European national security and law enforcement organizations about their return. For one thing, the sheer number of the volunteers⁷ is a problem even if their

⁵ Response to Paris Attacks Points to Weaknesses in French Police Structure. The New York Times. December 31, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/world/europe/response-to-paris-attacks-points-to-weaknesses-in-french-police-structure.html?_r=0; In the line of duty. The Guardian. July 21, 2005. <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2005/jul/21/attackonlondon.terrorism2>; A. Rabasa – R. D. Blackwill – P. Chalk – K. Cragin – C. Ch. Fair – B. A. Jackson – B. M. Jenkins – S. G. Jones – N. Shestak – A. J. Tellis: The Lessons of Mumbai. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009.

⁶ There has been some speculation that there was a fifth individual involved (a „master bombmaker”), who guided them through the process. While it is possible, the investigations have not confirmed this so far. Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, London. Intelligence and Security Committee. May 2009.

⁷ The number of western volunteers fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State is somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000. D. Byman – J. Shapiro: Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Brookings Institution, 2014. 9., 11.

return home is just a slow trickle. Returning individually or in small groups they have little difficulty avoiding official attention, and once they are at home, they can disappear in the Muslim communities where they grew up, they can organize their own networks, and mount their own operations. The Paris and Brussels attacks fully justified these concerns. The attackers were veterans of the Islamic State's wars, and likely graduates of its training programs for its foreign fighters. They formed a tightly knit, autonomous group that required little or no external guidance to plan, prepare and execute a truly complex operation. Their operational security was good enough to keep them below the radar of the authorities until their operation was completed. At least in the short term, the professionalism, tactical skills and destructive power of terrorists are likely to develop even further, as more veterans return to Europe from the battlefields of the Middle East.

THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN CONTROL

In the thinking of most westerners, effective, highly destructive, organized violence goes hand in hand with a centralized, pyramidal organization. When we see a handful of men causing carnage and devastation out of all proportion to the resources available to them, we tend to think that they are just the tip of the spear – the strike force (or one of many strike forces) directed by a centrally controlled, resource-rich organization. There is a very good reason for this: in war, as well as in more peaceful pursuits, the pyramidal organization (with some supplemental networking) has served the west admirably for hundreds of years. Islamist terrorism follows a different model – the self-organizing network of networks. If there is such a thing as “central direction,” it amounts to general guidance on desirable targets – now the “far enemy,” now the “near enemy,” some tactical advice, assistance with technical matters, and some training opportunities. Three of the London bombers were of Pakistani origin, and visited there several times. The fourth bomber, of Jamaican origin, may also have visited Pakistan. Now it is known that one (or perhaps two) of them had received some specific training in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and had some contacts with al-Qaeda operatives. Sometime before the operation two of them had been in contact with known radicals in the United Kingdom.⁸ All this suggests that the attacks were inspired by al-Qaeda or a similar violent radical group, but not that they were controlled from abroad.

The Mumbai attack was planned and prepared in, and probably controlled from, Pakistan by Lashkar e-Taiba operatives. A more important question is whether the Pakistani government, or one of its agencies was involved. Indian sources immediately claimed, that ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence – Pakistan's omnipotent security service) was involved. But subsequent actions (investigations and arrests) by Pakistani authorities cast doubt on this assessment. In any case, Indian sources see Pakistani involvement behind every terrorist operation that takes place in India. On the other hand, Lashkar e-Taiba is still operating relatively freely in Pakistan.

For Paris and Brussels the Islamic State claimed responsibility. This was something new: although the Islamic State has declared its intention to recover all Islamic lands (including those in central and southern Europe), so far it has concentrated its resources against its enemies in the Middle East. However, as the coalition against the Islamic State began to degrade the Caliphate's fighting forces, constrict its economic base, and recapture important cities and territories, some specialists have predicted a shift in the Islamic State's strategy

⁸ Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Op. cit.

to an international offensive.⁹ The foreign fighters would be the most reliable instruments of this strategic shift: they have been thoroughly brutalized in the service of the Caliphate; they have acquired such organizational, technical and tactical skills as are needed to launch independent operations; and as citizens of EU member states, they have local networks of relatives, friends and acquaintances already in place and can move easily within the Union. It is unclear, whether the attacks were indeed controlled from Caliphate territory, or the attackers were executing a mission-type order that left the details up to them.

INTELLIGENCE

Serious criticism has been levelled at the French and Belgian police and intelligence services. The identities of most of the perpetrators had been known to them; in some cases they had even monitored their activities periodically. They had received warnings from other services as well about impending attacks and the movements of dangerous individuals. In spite of all this information available to them, the services still remained oblivious to the threat. They did not pick up even hints of an operations being prepared. Some of the criticism is certainly justified, but – having served as an intelligence specialist for much of my military career – I cannot help but defend the profession.

Raw intelligence information comes from many sources, and has many forms: photos and videos, documents, tapes or transcripts of wiretaps, intercepted correspondence, decoded radio transmissions, agents' reports, news items, interrogation reports, communications from other intelligence organizations, and a thousand others. These elements best resemble the tiles of hundreds of puzzles which a crazed toy-store owner scattered about the floor of his shop. The useful pieces must be separated from this pile, in order to put together pictures that can be analyzed and evaluated. The work is further complicated by the strict – and sometimes excessive – compartmentalization and secretiveness of intelligence organizations. Those who collect the information (agents, interrogators, intercept operators, and other) pick out only individual pieces from the pile, but they usually do not see the picture it belongs to, let alone the whole gallery of pictures: putting together the pieces is the task of the analyst. Furthermore, the collector and the analyst hardly ever meet – they seldom communicate even by messages. Thus, the pictures come together slowly and gradually, and it is nearly impossible to identify the one piece of information that tips the see-saw from the “we do not know” position to the “we know for certain.” Thus, it is not at all unusual to have all (or most) the pieces of the puzzle, but since they are held in separate compartments, it is too late by the time the picture comes together.

In any case, a warning about an impending attack, to be carried out by some adherents of a terrorist organization, against some symbolic target, sometime in the near future, somewhere in the country is not very useful. Without specifics it just confirms what the country's services already know. Since the number of potential terrorists is fairly large,

⁹ Future ISIL Operations in West Could Resemble Disrupted Belgian Plot. Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis. May 13, 2015. <http://www.real.gr/Files/Articles/Document/463561.pdf>; For the Hungarian professional audience a book published recently by the General Staff's research arm sounded the first warning (although there may have been earlier classified reports as well). Besenyő J. – Prantner Z. – Speidl B. – Vogel D.: *Az Iszlám Állam: Terrorizmus 2.0 – Történet, ideológia, propaganda* (The Islamic State: Terrorism 2.0 – History, Ideology, Propaganda). Budapest: Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff; Kossuth Publishers, 2016.

while the available manpower to keep them under observation is limited, the services are at a disadvantage. They must fall back on periodic surveillance, periodic wiretaps, or just hope. Throwing a comprehensive security net over the whole country may have been an appropriate response a hundred years ago, but today it cannot work for more than a day or two: the components of a modern state's economy, infrastructure and administration are so thoroughly interlocked, that a security lockdown would paralyze all society in a short time. And, again, the shortage of manpower must be considered. Only actionable intelligence is of any use – and in these cases it was not available.

The best intelligence and the most stringent security measures notwithstanding, we must realize that the terrorists have the initiative, they have the time, and they can always find targets that have the three requisites: vulnerability, symbolic value and a lot of potential victims. As the Irish Republican Army's statement read after an attack that was successful in terms of casualties and symbolism, but failed to kill its intended target: "Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always."¹⁰ The European Union's counterterrorism strategy also recognizes this calculus, when it warns that "we cannot reduce the risk of terrorist attacks to zero."¹¹ However, this logic is turned upside down when a particular operations is planned, prepared and executed: the terrorists must complete every phase flawlessly, while the security forces have to be successful in penetrating only any one of the phases, and they can disrupt the operation as a result, and they also have a good chance to roll up the whole organization.¹²

There can be no question, that the terrorists were thoroughly lucky in London, Mumbai, Paris and Brussels. That should not detract us from the fact that Europe is more secure from terrorism today than it was in the seventies and eighties. In the course of the past 10 years or so the member states of the European Union have put in place comprehensive administrative and security arrangements. Cross-border cooperation among the law enforcement and internal security organizations – although far from perfect – has contributed to the ability of the security forces to make the life of the terrorists more difficult: it is more difficult to obtain arms and explosives, it is more difficult to disappear, and there is a good chance of operations being disrupted. In fact, the authorities have disrupted several terrorist operations in the planning or preparation phase throughout Europe, arrested would be terrorists, and destroyed a number of terrorist teams.¹³

Following the Paris and Brussels attacks security officials and politicians all over Europe have started calling for broader authority to monitor communications and financial transactions, compel communications companies to provide access to encrypted material, and generally expand social control. It is hard to see the logic of this demand: according to the available information the terrorists were not relying on encrypted messages, but on ordinary mobile phone calls. Piling on restrictions on civil liberties (and monitoring conversations) is a restriction of privacy, an essential civil liberty.

¹⁰ The intended target of the bomb blast was the Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher. 1984: Tory Cabinet in Brighton bomb blast. BBC On this Day 1950–2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_2531000/2531583.stm

¹¹ The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Council of the European Union, Brussels. November 30, 2005. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>

¹² Brian A. Jackson – D. R. Frelinger: Op. cit.

¹³ B. Devoic: The post-9/11 European Union Counterterrorism Response: Legal-Institutional Framework. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012, 99–115. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27798/12Dec_Bozenko_Devoic.pdf?sequence=1

THE MIGRANT CONNECTION

The migrant “crisis” of 2015 has not only clouded the issue of the terrorist threat, but has also made devising the appropriate response somewhat more difficult. European politicians – and to a lesser extent American ones as well – seized upon it to promote their own agenda, regardless of facts or the long-term interests of society. In the process they managed to conflate the various categories of people on the move – migrants, refugees, asylum seekers – into just one category, the sinister “migrants.” The debate coalesced around the dangers the migrants represent, and two diametrically opposite narratives have emerged.¹⁴ The conservative voices – especially those of right-wing populists – have been raising the alarm about the migrants’ unassimilable culture, their propensity for violence, their attitude towards women, the health risks they bring with them, and, above all, the possibility of half a million terrorists flooding Europe. The liberal view dismisses these concerns as entirely unfounded and emphasizes only the potential benefits of large-scale migration. As a result of the debate, xenophobia has increased not only in the affected countries, but also in countries that had not been affected by the migrant flow at all.

In fact, both narratives are wrong – or rather, both contain a measure of truth, but the reality is somewhere in the middle between them. The concerns of the conservatives are justified, but exaggerated. By the same token, the benefits of migration are real, but they have significant social, economic and political cost as well. For the relatively narrow scope of this essay, we can leave aside the questions of assimilation, culture, and the like. It is sufficient to consider only the idea that the migrants represent a significant and immediate terrorist threat.

In the first place, most migrants (and not just the refugees from the Syria-Iraq border region) are not the likely perpetrators, but the victims of terrorism. They are fleeing combat zones or the anarchy of failed states, where they had ample opportunity to experience terror themselves. In the second place, the Islamic State has not made any effort so far to export its brand of radical Islam – at least not by sending out masses of its votaries. On the contrary, it has been calling on all Muslims to abandon their life in infidel lands and move to the Caliphate to fight in its wars.¹⁵

Quite aside from the real or imagined terrorist threat, the populists who keep hammering away at the idea that Europe’s external borders must be defended do have a valid point – although “controlled” is probably a more appropriate word than “defended.” The migrants have proven to be quite adept at breaching the hastily erected border fences, but the frontiers are not “attacked” by anyone in the dictionary sense of the word. The idea of thousands – or even hundreds – of hard-core terrorists among the refugees is nonsense – but that is not to say that lack of adequate border controls do not represent security risk for the European Union. Aside from the real risk of criminals, traffickers, carriers of exotic infectious diseases, returning IS veterans can also hide among the flood of migrants. These represent the most acute security threat: they are trained, motivated, ideologically committed.

The potential threat the migrants represent will be realized only if the host societies neglect them, as they have done in the past. If no attempt is made to integrate them into the host society from the day of their arrival, if they are just released into the already large

¹⁴ D. L. Byman: Do Syrian refugees pose a terrorism threat? Brookings. October 27, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/10/27-syrian-refugees-terrorism-threat-byman>; Besenyő J.: Not the Invention of Isis: Terrorists among Immigrants. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*. 2015/1. 5–20.

¹⁵ As discussed above, the Islamic State’s focus may be changing, as the Caliphate keeps losing manpower and territory.

Muslim communities to fend for themselves, they are likely to face the same problems as earlier immigrant groups. And they are likely to find the same solution: alienation, identity in religion, and escape into violent radicalism.

THE QUESTION OF SELF-DEFENCE

A common feature of Mumbai and Paris, as well as several other attacks carried out by other radical Islamist organizations, is shooting as many victims as possible, before the terrorists escape, or (more frequently) fall in a firefight with the security forces. The Chechen terrorists in Beslan, the al-Shabaab fighters in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi employed much the same tactics. So did the Norwegian lone wolf terrorist Anders Breivik on Utoya island. In none of these cases were the victims able to defend themselves: restrictive rules on the possession of firearms all but guaranteed that once the attackers were in position, they would be the only ones armed. Like wolves in the sheepfold, they could take their time killing their victims, knowing that those had no chance to strike back.

There is nothing a citizen can do when he is in the path of an explosion – his survival is a matter of luck. But when he is being shot at, he has a good chance to survive, if he can shoot back. But in most of Europe he cannot, because he is denied the right to be armed in public. Paternalistic governments have disarmed the citizens, and promised to protect them from violence. There can be no question that they have done a lot to keep this promise for many years. But far fewer people would have died in the Bataclan, if one or two in the audience had been armed.

A FIFTH COLUMN

The operations discussed here confirm the conclusion of several politically incorrect security specialists: the large, closely knit Muslim communities in Europe's large cities are developing into separate societies, serve as hotbeds of Islamist radicalism, and provide shelter, resources and recruits for the international jihad. It is easy (and partly justified) to blame the Muslims for this. But, in fact, the votaries of radical Islam only expanded into a political and social vacuum left by the host societies, which accepted large numbers of Muslim immigrants, but neglected to take steps to assimilate (or at least integrate) them. Corrosive ideologies (political correctness, cultural and moral relativism), economic interests and political expediency have played their part in the process that led to the current situation. It remains to be seen, whether Europe will do better this time. If not, the fifth column will just grow larger, and shall be ever more difficult to monitor.

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Ferenc Kaiser – Péter Tálas:

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

ABSTRACT: Terrorism is a form of organised political violence. Like other forms of political violence, it accompanied the history of mankind from the moment on when human communities became organised into political entities. The authors discuss political violence when its aim is to reach a certain political goal. Lots of citizens are of the opinion that the state only rarely represents their direct political interests. Thus political violence is not only justified, but on the contrary, it is necessary to reach their political aims. Numerous governments of the world share the view that the implementation of political violence and intimidation of citizens is necessary to maintain the state, to ensure the living conditions of communities on a solid basis. It is also publicly known that one of the primary tasks of the state is to defend its citizens against the political violence of another state. Among the organised forms of political violence, terrorism is the one which is the most exposed to the subjective judgement of citizens; therefore, it is necessary to define its local value, place and features as one of the many possible forms. This is why the first chapter shortly introduces the different forms of political violence.

KEYWORDS: political violence, terrorism, conventional war, al-Qaeda, 9/11 attacks, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Muslim countries, hijacking, definitions, guerrillas, pogrom, ethnic cleansing, conventions, coup d'état

ABOUT POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The classification of political violence can be done according to the initiator and the aim of the violence. Initiators of political violence can, first of all, be states, or their citizens. States have the monopoly to legitimate political violence, i.e. they are allowed to apply violence governed by laws against their citizens to maintain the state to ensure the living conditions of individuals and communities. Through centuries war meant armed conflicts almost exclusively between states. Only the 20th century saw it extended to participants other than states. Historical experience also reveals that against state violence or against violence applied by other citizens, citizens themselves regularly use political violence.¹

Among the forms of political violence between states war is the most important one. The forms of war practiced during peace are cloak and dagger operations and punitive strikes.² In its most general term war is the aggression of states against other states waged by a regular army of a given size. It is organised and planned; one precondition of its execution is a

¹ D. Gregory – A. Pred (Editors): *Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror and Political Violence*. New York and London: Routledge, 2007, 1–6.

² Example for cloak and dagger operation was the elimination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, or the attempt of the Americans to salvage the wreck of the Soviet K-129 submarine in the Pacific Ocean in 1974. Example for punitive strike was the 1998 hit on Afghan basis of al-Qaeda by the US as a response to attacks on US embassies.

The classification of political violence

		Target	
		State	Citizen
Initiator	State	War Cloak and dagger operations Punitive strikes State supported terrorism	Law enforcement Legal oppression Illegal oppression (state terror) Targeted killing
	Citizen	Mutiny Revolt Rebellion Revolution Guerrilla war Coup d'État	Mutiny Civil war Vigilante terrorism Racist pogrom Ethnic cleansing Terrorism

huge and functioning bureaucracy. States may recourse to a lower level of violence such as limited air strikes, raids by special operations units, murder of state agents of the enemy. Although wars of the previous century were labelled in many ways by so-called experts (e.g. trench, asymmetric, ethnic, revolutionary, guerrilla, war by proxy, local, cold, justified, unjustified, cyber, limited, manoeuvre, national liberation, people's, nuclear, partisan, offensive, terrorist, totalitarian, defensive, world),³ the kernel of war as formulated by Carl von Clausewitz remains unchanged as it is organised violence, instrumental in character to force one's will upon the other.⁴

³ Trench warfare (World War I, 1914–1918), asymmetric (war of the weak against the strong, most of the conflicts after 1945), ethnic (war fought on ethnic grounds, Yugoslav wars, 1991–1995), revolutionary (wars of the French revolution, 1792–1795), guerrilla (certain periods of the Chinese civil war, 1927–1949, Indochinese war, Afghanistan war against Soviet occupation, 1979–1989), war by proxy (Korean war, 1950–1953, Vietnam war, 1954–1975), local (limited to a given area, Iraq-Iran war, 1980–1988, Kosovo war, 1998–1999), cold (The period between 1947 and 1991 with the rivalry of the USA and the Soviet Union), justified (International law recognizes two cases of justified war: 1. defensive warfare when a state attacks another state, the state attacked has the right for defence. 2. Wars approved by the UN Security Council when states under the auspices of the UN make steps towards the state), unjustified (any other war not falling within the scope of justified wars), cyber warfare (warfare in the cyber world, totality of the actions carried out there, the aim of which is to protect the own electronic, espionage and network system and to disturb, block and to stop such systems of the enemy), limited (war kept in a given framework regarding its aims, instruments and territory, e.g. the first Gulf war 1991, airborne war against Yugoslavia 1999), manoeuvre (World War II, 1939–1945), national liberation (e.g. Yugoslav national liberation war, 1941–1945, Algerian war, 1954–1962), people's (originally the Chinese strategy of a mixture of manoeuvre and guerrilla war adopted by Mao Zedong, taken over by others e.g. Cuba, Nepal, Nicaragua), nuclear (fought with nuclear weapons), partisan (fought by partisans, members of an irregular troop fighting on a given territory against the prevailing dictatorship or against occupation), offensive (a war which is prohibited and sanctioned by international law), terrorist (revolt strategy exercised by terrorists), totalitarian (war fought with nuclear or mass destructive weapons, using most of the social energies and resources for military goals), defensive (known as justified war), world (a coherent series of conflicts affecting at least three continents and two oceans, and the number of states participating is more than half of the states on the continent affected). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: War. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Book I – On the Nature of War, Chapter 1.: What is War? <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html#a> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

In the opinion of experts of political violence, state supported terrorism is a form of violence among states. It means that the government sponsors paramilitary groups so that they commit terrorist attacks against its enemies.⁵

Lawful political violence of the states against citizens is not discussed in detail (enforcement of law, legal oppression in state of emergency), only those forms that are subject to serious debates. One of them is illegal oppression, often called state terror by politicians and the media. The science of political violence and international law commonly accept the view of not using the notion of state terrorism. First of all, because state violence monopoly is regarded lawful, and experts do not wish to deepen the international debate over terrorism. Thus the distance to state terrorism does not mean that the science and international law is not able to definitely differentiate between lawful and unlawful state violence (that is when the state threatens, terrorizes its own citizens in illegal ways), but the latter is discussed and sanctioned in the field of human and citizenship rights and regarded as crime against humanity.⁶

Targeted killing is a separate form of state violence committed against citizens.⁷ This method has been known for a long time and became a point of argument after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 as pursuing the leaders of al Qaeda international law does not regulate targeted killing. Opinions differ concerning the acceptance of targeted killing. Some legal experts accept targeted killing under certain conditions and circumstances (war conflict, capture of the person is difficult) although they emphasize that it cannot harm the sovereignty of the state where it is carried out.⁸ Contrary to international legal aid organisations and

⁵ Example of state supported terrorism is Syria's and Iran's support of Hezbollah and Hamas committing terrorist attacks, or when the Stasi, former security service of the German Democratic Republic supported the Red Army Faction in FRG. India and Pakistan in conflict because of Kashmir support armed groups which commit terror attacks on the territory of the other country or against its interests. Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism. Bureau of Counterterrorism. <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁶ International law regulates crimes against humanity on the basis of the Rome Statutes adopted in 1998. The problem roots back to the Nuremberg trials after World War II, when victorious powers were in trouble because there was no legal basis for the prosecution of some of the crimes committed by Nazis. For example it was the case when the state committed the crime not against citizens of the other belligerent state but against its own citizens. The Convention on Genocide was only adopted in 1948. At the time of the Nuremberg Trials there were no international conventions commonly elaborated regulating the prosecution of crimes against humanity, American, English, Soviet and French prosecutors proceeded in the framework of the International Military Tribunal. The judgments meant precedents for later proceedings, e.g. Eichmann case (1961), Barbie case (1987), Touvier case (1994). In 1968 the New York Convention ruled that crimes against humanity like war crimes never lapse. In 1998 with the participation of 120 states the Rome Statute was adopted which regulates on international level the crime of genocide, war crimes, the crime of aggression and the crimes against humanity as well. Earlier at the time of the prosecution of Rwanda and Yugoslav crimes tribunals were established under UN authorization, later the Hague International Criminal Court was created. According to the Statutes of the Courts crimes against humanity can be committed not only during a war but in peacetime too, thus this is not an exclusion any more. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁷ Targeted killing is used by the Israeli state particularly against leaders of the Hamas. Israeli Supreme Court Judgment. HCJ769/02 13 December 2006, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.htm (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁸ G. P. McGovern: Targeted Violence: A Statistical and Tactical Analysis of Assassinations, Contract Killings and Kidnapping. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2010. https://uscrow.org/download/warfare/close_protection/Targeted%20Violence.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

the European Parliament, targeted killing is a capital punishment without court proceedings therefore it is contrary to the relevant international law even during war time.⁹

A violent political action of citizens against the state, its representatives and its institutions is mutiny or revolt. Mutiny is the spontaneous violent action of members of a formally set hierarchical structure (e.g. officers of lower rank, sailors) against the superior or against his/her decisions. Although mutiny can be preceded by a certain planning (collusion), its participants, the number of whom is usually small, are not organised in hierarchy.¹⁰ Because it is not preceded by conspiracy, many scholars doubt whether mutiny can be regarded as a form of political violence. Revolt is more intense than mutiny. It is a spontaneous violence of the crowd usually against definite decisions of a (state) institution. Although it is less organised than mutiny, the number of participants taking part in it is higher. It is important to note that revolt does not aim at the overthrowing of the constitutional system. Participants only wish to restore the original situation.¹¹

Rebellion is a form of political violence. Its organised nature is undisputable. As rebellion roots in the general dissatisfaction with the administration, its political and social objectives are more general and therefore more people can join it. Although rebellion is usually not planned in advance, in contrast to mutiny and revolt it establishes institutions such as committees and negotiating groups. Thus participants of a rebellion do not strive to overthrow constitutional order but more likely they are interested in restoring it.

The most well-known form of political violence initiated by citizens is revolution, the definition of which does not underlie a consensus. The most general term for revolution is a prepared and organised political violence aiming at significant, structural changes in politics, economy and social life. The most well-known political revolutions are the civil revolutions (1640 English, 1776 American, 1789 French, 1848 Europeans), the Socialist revolutions (1917 Russian, 1949 Chinese, 1959 Cuban), the Anti-communist revolutions (1956 Hungarian, 1968 Czechoslovakian, 1980-81 Polish, 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe) and the Islamic revolution (1979 in Iran). The Renaissance and the Reformation are regarded by scholars as cultural revolutions, whereas because of certain inventions one can also speak about technological revolutions such as the Neolithic, the industrial, and the digital. In this essay the authors focus on political revolutions of the Modern Age.

Political revolutions might differ significantly. They do need a thorough, long and underground preparation. Their main aim is the violent seizure of political power and are mostly followed by a mass movement. Most of the time revolutionary violence lasts for a short time, but can be of great intensity. The leader of the revolution is usually a political organisation or a party. This recruits, educates and organises the revolutionary cadres in the preparatory phase of the revolution. Not all the activities of the leader of the revolution are illegal as he can make propaganda most of the time legally. Political revolution can be described shortly as an upheaval organised from below, presuming a number of participants,

⁹ B7-0345/2011 European Parliament Motion for a Resolution 26.5.2011. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B7-2011-0345+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

¹⁰ Army Act 1955 c. 18 Section 31 Mutiny. <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/3-4/18/section/31> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

¹¹ L. Westra: *Revolt Against Authority*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, 18., 94.

the preparatory period that might be quite long, but its direct violent period of confrontation is relatively short.¹²

Coup d'état is the violent conduct of citizens against the state, which occurs quickly and is organised in secret on high level of the state hierarchy. It is done by a small number of participants and generally happens with little violence. A coup d'état is successful only if its perpetrators are supported by the army or some significant law enforcement organisation. Edward Luttwak, who wrote a whole book on coup d'état with the title *Coup d'État: a practical Handbook*, gave the following definition: “[a] coup consists of the infiltration of a small, but critical, segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.”¹³

Although a civil war is a fight of social groups for the seizure of power, it is defined as the violent action of citizens against the state. A civil war has to comply with at least four criteria laid down in the Geneva conventions of 1949: the party in revolt has to possess authority within a determinate territory; the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the population within a determinate portion of the national territory; the de jure government or a third party has recognized the insurgents as belligerents, and the government deploys the regular army against the party in revolt. The Geneva Conventions do not define civil war, only state that it is an armed conflict fought not by states.¹⁴ James D. Fearon defined this form of organized political violence, according to him civil war is “a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the centre or in a region, or to change government policies.”¹⁵ We can also add that some scholars regard the number of victims as one condition for civil war. Errol Henderson and David Singer regard civil war as an armed conflict fought for a longer period of time, primarily inland, having at least 1,000 casualties a year and a government facing an insurgent party apt to efficient protection.¹⁶ Others speak about civil war even in case of 100-100 casualties on side of the parties.¹⁷

The army of the United States added one more criterion to the ones of the Geneva conventions: “A war between factions of the same country; there are five criteria for international recognition of this status: the contestants must control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military operations.”¹⁸

Guerrilla war is discussed separately although it is more like a specific form of warfare than a separate form of political violence. The word guerrilla means little war and as a form of warfare it is a war fought with small formations against a stronger enemy. It is probably an older form of war than conventional war. The opinions of experts who deal with political

¹² G. Pettee: Revolution – Typology and Process. In: C. Friedrich (editor): Revolution. New Brunswick and London: Aldin Transaction, 2009. 10–34.

¹³ E. Luttwak: Coup d'État: a practical Handbook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. 27.

¹⁴ IV Geneva Convention: Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva 12 August 1949. 35–36. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-IV.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

¹⁵ J. Fearon: Iraq's Civil War. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2007-03-01/iraqs-civil-war> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

¹⁶ E. Henderson – D. Singer: Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37. / No. 3. (2000), 275–299.

¹⁷ A. Hironaka: Neverending Wars. The International Community, Weak States and the Perpetuation of Civil War. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2005, 3.

¹⁸ Departments of the Army and Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20. 2007. Glossary-1. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc4.pdf> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

violence differ concerning the aim of guerrilla war. Some presume final victory through wearing out the enemy, whereas others think that it is only an interim period of the struggle until setting up a regular army. The substance of guerrilla war is to avoid the direct, decisive battle. It is a war of long duration, consisting of many small clashes, which compensate for the scarcity of manpower, arms and equipment and hinders the unfolding of the army of the government. From a tactical point of view participants of guerrilla wars practise a warfare similar to that of a conventional army, namely to its infantry.¹⁹

Law enforcement vigilance, racist pogrom, and ethnic cleansing are special forms of political violence of citizens against citizens. Law enforcement vigilance is an officially not permitted attempt to control crime, which as the vigilance committee²⁰ known from the time of the American Civil War shows, implies violence against ethnic or other political minorities and as such it is crime. Pogrom, which originates from the Russian word meaning destruction is a violent activity committed by a group of people or by a crowd and trends towards a minority and is undirected (but not necessarily spontaneous).²¹ Ethnic cleansing is the violent and purposeful expulsion of an ethnic group from a specific territory to change the ethnic composition of a given region. In the interpretation of international ad hoc law courts ethnic cleansing means the violent and quick expulsion of the members of an ethnic group which is accompanied with plunder, setting fire to their properties, arrests, executions and usually committing crimes against humanity. According to other interpretations, each systematic, extruding policy can be regarded as ethnic cleansing when members of a population inhabiting a territory are forced to leave the territory.²²

Until now the authors tried to define the main characteristics of different political violence. It is important to realize that organised political violence can appear or change in one single conflict as well. In Chechnya the following political violence can be observed from the start of the first Chechen war in 1994 until the wind-up of the Russian antiterrorist operation in 2009: war (1994-1996, 1999-2000), guerrilla war (1994-1996, 1999-2000), civil war (1999-2000), targeted killings (2001-2009), and terrorism (1999-2009).²³

ON THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

The word terror originates from the Latin *terror* meaning fright, scare, and it gained the meaning we know in the time of the French Revolution. The notion *Regime de la Terror* dates back to that time used to characterize the Jacobin dictatorship and also *terror blanche*, white terror, from the time of the return of the Bourbons.²⁴

¹⁹ C. Schmitt: Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of Political. New York: Thelos Press Publishing, 2007. 10–22.

²⁰ Vigilance committee is an organised body without legal authorization to maintain order and enforce punishment when legal law enforcement bodies visible fail to comply with their tasks. At the time of the American Civil War such groups were formed in the South to terrorize and control Afro-American and abolitionists and to repulse the attack of the Union. W. C. Culbertson: Vigilantism: Political History of Private Power in America. New York – Westport, Connecticut – London: Greenwood Press, 1990. 18–27.

²¹ N. Atkin – M. Biddis – F. Tallett: The Wiley-Blackwell Dictionary of Modern European History since 1789. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 324–325.

²² M. Mann: The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge – New York – Melbourne – Madrid – Cape Town – Singapore – São Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 1–33.

²³ J. Russell: Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror'. London – New York: Routledge, 2007.

²⁴ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Terrorism. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/terrorism/> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

Although terrorism does not have an internationally accepted consensual definition, it does not mean that its content cannot be described exactly. Common elements of the different definitions of terrorism are the use of violence and threat with violence, political objectives, the intention of raising fear, its use against civilians and non-combatants, and perpetrators (groups or individuals) below state level.²⁵ Lacking a common definition there are two methods to define terrorism. On the one hand it lays down what is not characteristic for terrorism and on the other hand it tries to describe the concept taking into account the features of terrorist activities. According to the first one, national liberation and independence fight against foreign occupation, criminalization of steps towards creation and reorganisation of democracy and the rule of law and of humanitarian pieces of law are excluded from the scope of terrorism. Furthermore it expresses that terrorism cannot be bound with any religion, nationality or culture and cannot be justified that terrorist attacks are committed under the auspices thereof. According to the other approach terrorism is an indiscriminate violent attack committed because of political intention, mainly against innocent victims. Moreover, terrorism is violence committed by subnational groups or by secret agents without any selection.

There is quite a broad consensus about the actions the criminal law deems as acts committed with terrorist methods (e.g. murder, hostage taking, aircraft hijacking, car bombing, suicide bombing, assassinations and mass killings) and what it regards as terrorist activities (e.g. belonging to a terrorist group as member or leader, financial or other support of terrorist activities and organisations, threatening the public, damaging the vital private and public services and systems).

²⁵ Here are some terrorism definitions of terrorism databases: "Terrorism occurs when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack civilians or non-combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence." (Worldwide Incident Tracking System – WITS) K. Letendre – C. L. Fincher – R. Thornhill: Parasite Stress, Collectivism and Human Warfare. In: Shackelford, T. K. – Weekes-Shackelford, V. A. (editors): *The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide and War*. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 355.

"Terrorism is violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity." (RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents – RDWTI) RAND RDWTI: Database Scope. <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about/scope.html> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

Global Terrorism Database (GTD) criteria: 1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator. 2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence including property violence, as well as violence against people. 3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism. 4. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change. 5. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met. 6. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). Global Terrorism Database: Data Collection Methodology. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

The lack of a consensual definition does not mean that international organizations do not have well-defined terrorism concepts.

NATO defines terrorism as: “*The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.*”²⁶

The European Union, instead of having a definition, has a list of so-called acts to be penalized severely (e.g. murder, assault, hostage taking, racket, production of weapons, committing of attacks, and the threat with acts listed above). In the interpretation of the EU these actions are to be regarded terrorist actions if they are committed to threaten the population severely, to force a government or an international organization to implement an action or refrain from it, to shake or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social system of a country or of an international organization. The EU also defined the circle of crimes attached to terrorist activities such as public incitement to commit terrorist crimes, recruitment and training for terrorist goals, severe theft, racket, forging of official documents in order to commit terrorist crimes belong hereby.²⁷

Characteristics of terrorism, guerrilla war, and conventional war

	Conventional war	Guerrilla	Terrorism
Unit size in battle	Large (armies, corps, divisions)	Medium (platoons, companies, battalions)	Small (usually less than ten persons)
Weapons	Full range of military hardware (air force, armour, artillery, etc.)	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well	Handguns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons, e.g., car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs
Tactics	Usually joint operations involving several military branches	Commando-type tactics	Specialized tactics: kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, barricade, hostage, etc.
Targets	Mostly military units, industrial and transportation infrastructure	Mostly military, police and administration staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents and the public at large
Intended impact	Physical destruction	Mainly physical attrition of the enemy	Psychological coercion
Control of territory	Yes	Yes	No
Uniform	Wear uniform	Often wear uniform	Do not wear uniform
Recognition of war zones	War limited to recognized geographical	War limited to the country in strife	No recognized war zones. Operations carried out worldwide

²⁶ NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism, Annex A: Definitions. <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism-annex.htm> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²⁷ Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 2002/475/JHA. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002F0475> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

	Conventional war	Guerrilla	Terrorism
International legality	Yes, if conducted by rules	Yes, if conducted by rules	No
Domestic legality	Yes	No	No

Source: Ariel MERARI: *Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency*, IN: *Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 5, No. 4. Winter 1993. London, Frank Cass, <http://skyjack.co.il/pdf/Terrorism-as-a-strategy-of-insurgency.pdf> retrieved 2015-12-15*

In the above table with the help of Ariel Merari some differences between conventional war, guerrilla war and terrorism are pointed out. This is necessary because forms of political violence are often mixed up in the media and in political discussions, too.

International studies classify terrorism according to area of operation, target orientation and motivation. The authors differentiate by area of operation:

- local/national terrorism, which extends its activities to one part of the country or to one country (e.g. Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Irish Republican Army, Ku-Klux-Klan);
- sub-regional terrorism, the activities of which extend to two or more countries (e.g. one part of the Palestinian armed groups, Chechen and South-Caucasian armed organisations);
- regional terrorism, which are activities affecting one region (e.g. Near East, Maghreb, Southeast Asia) (e.g. Kurdistan Workers' Party, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jemaah Islamiah);
- international terrorism, which are activities spreading to one or more regions (e.g. Black September in the '70s)
- global terrorism affecting several remote continents (e.g. Asia, Africa, America) (e.g. al Qaeda)

It is important to realize that since 11 September 2001 even the broader public encounters the manifestations of global terrorism. The overwhelming majority of terrorist groups belong to national or sub-regional terrorism today. It is quite easy to specify its area of operation which is of utmost importance for the fight against terrorism. The international media often mentions global terrorism, whereas in fact there are only one or two organisations which occasionally do have a global range (e.g. al Qaeda or ISIL/ISIS). Those preparing, supporting and committing terrorist crimes can be individuals not belonging to any group or organisation. They are the so-called lone wolves (e.g. Anders Bering Breivik, perpetrator of the Oslo/Utoya attacks). There can be purely military/armed groups (e.g. the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades), and organisations having both a political and a military wing (e.g. Hamas, Hezbollah). These latter are the most problematic for politicians and authorities fighting against terrorism as they usually have significant mass bases and resources.

As regarding objective orientation and motivation the studies on terrorism identify too many types of terrorism, which often only exist in theory (e.g. ethnic, cultural, chemical, biological, nuclear, catastrophic, environmental catastrophe, cyber, information, industrial, media, urban, provincial, inland, foreign, etc.). International organizations have their own separate classification for easier orientation. The EU distinguishes terrorism occurring in its

member states the following way: religious (previously Islamist), separatist, extreme right, extreme left and so-called single issue (thematic).²⁸

The number of strategic terrorist attacks was about 2,900 between 2004 and 2011. (There were roughly 87,500 terror attacks worldwide in the same period.) The strategic attacks are normally followed by huge media coverage, they spread fear, and usually the number of victims in these attacks is high (between 2004 and 2011 45% of the victims died in these attacks). Strategic terror attacks are of high importance because the media coverage and political discourse about them determines the terrorism perception of the average citizen. Our image on terrorism, similar to security, is formed by subjective (media, political discourse) and objective (data, facts) factors. It is important that the two approaches do not diverge significantly.²⁹

ON PERIODS OF TERRORISM

Though terrorism has always been present in the history of mankind, relevant literature only starts to mention it from the French Revolution, from the time when the concept of terrorism became well-known. From the point of view of terrorism previous eras are prehistoric. Since 1789 terrorism has had three remarkable periods: classical, modern and postmodern. Next the most important characteristics of these periods will be shortly outlined taking into account the goals and targets of terrorists, characteristics of the *modus operandi* of terror acts and on the most significant international events in the field of combating terrorism.

Classical period of terrorism is the period between the French Revolution and 1968. There are no estimates how many terror attacks were committed during the 170 years of this period. The authors would not receive an exact data even if they systematically reviewed the contemporary press, because newspapers, particularly in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, only reported so-called strategic terror attacks. In addition, as originally terrorism was defined as the state terror of the Jacobin period of the French revolution, numerous historians list the political violence of the totalitarian regimes and dictatorships against their own citizens to the category of (state) terrorism. As indicated above, the authors list the terror of totalitarian and dictatorship regimes to crimes against humanity and to war crimes. If one regards the classical period of terrorism this way, principally and generally terrorists and terrorist groups committed assassinations and attacks against the highest level of representatives of power (monarchs, presidents, ministers, representatives, ambassadors etc.) in belief and with the aim that through their actions they are able to change the existing political system. Anarchists propagating the idea of Socialist and Communist equality³⁰ among the political movements of the 19th century, and revolting against the arbitrary of

²⁸ TESAT-2014 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014. EUROPOL. https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37, 53. (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²⁹ Tálás, P.: The terror threat of the World between 2004 and 2011, Part I. (in Hungarian) http://netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/svkk-elemzesek-2012-9-a-vilag-terrorfenyegetettsegenek-alakulasa-2004-es-2011-kozott-i-talas-p.original.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁰ An anarchist assassin killed the Russian tsar, Alexander II, the French president, Carnot, Elisabeth (Sissy) empress-consort of Austria and queen-consort of Hungary, and the American president, McKinley – just to mention the most famous cases. G. Chainland – A. Blin: The “Golden Age” of Terrorism. In: G. Chainland – A. Blin (editors): *The History of Terrorism from antiquity to al Qaeda*. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 2007, 177–178. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/177/177597_History%20of%20Ter.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

Russian tsars (narodniks, nihilists, bakunists) used terrorism as a political violence. In the beginning of the 20th century nationalist and separatist movements (in Southeast Europe, Northern Ireland, and on Palestinian mandate territories) also used this form of political violence. From the 1930s terrorism of the regimes of Hitler and Stalin overshadowed other terrorisms in Europe. The era between the world wars and especially after World War II, terror attacks promoting independence movements became more and more conspicuous.³¹

The international fight against terrorism began in the classical period of terrorism. The first known Act relating to the extradition of terrorists was the so-called Belgian assassination clause of 1856 which ordered that the perpetrators of assassinations against rulers have to be extradited.³² The first draft bill in which the concept of terrorism appeared was adapted only in 1930. The 1934 Marseille assassination of Alexander, Yugoslavian king and Barthou, French minister for foreign affairs gave a new boost to international cooperation. As a consequence, in 1937 under the auspices of the League of Nations a draft convention on the prevention of terrorism and on punishment of perpetrators of terrorist acts was prepared and signed by 24 countries, but finally it did not enter into force because of the lack of ratification.³³

The first international convention against terrorism was the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 which laid down and regulated the protection of diplomats.³⁴ Two years later the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts committed on Board Aircraft was adopted as a response to proliferation of hijackings.³⁵ The aim of the convention was to lay down the rules governing jurisdiction (as a main rule it is the state of registration which exercises jurisdiction), and the powers of the aircraft commander (the commander is responsible for the security on board of the aircraft).³⁶

The modern era of terrorism is the period between 1968 and 11 September 2001 in which time the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), using retrospective methods, counted more than 71,000 terror acts.³⁷ 1968 meant a turning point in the history of terrorism. On the one hand,

³¹ B. Hoffman: *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 3–16.

³² In 1854 those trying to kill Napoleon III fled to Belgium. The Belgian government because of the generally accepted view that perpetrators of political crimes cannot be extradited refused the extradition of the perpetrators. On the pressure of the French emperor Belgium adopted an Act on 22 March, 1856 ruling that “There shall be not considered as a political crime or an act connected with such a crime an attack upon the person of the head of a foreign government or of a member of his family, when the attack takes the form of either murder, assassination or poisoning.” This clause is attached to the extradition agreements with the same wording therefore it is called the Belgian *attentat* clause. I. Zanotti: *Extradition in Multilateral Treaties and Conventions*. Leiden–Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, 57.

³³ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. League of Nations. <http://dl.wdl.org/11579/service/11579.pdf> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁴ Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961. Article 45. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁵ The first hijacking was in Peru in February 1931. The first hijacking with casualties was in the USA in October 1939. The number of hijackings increased after the Cuban revolution in 1959 partly because of those wishing to leave the USA and partly thanks to those fleeing to Cuba escaping extradition. In 1969 there were 82 “skyjacking”, the largest number in a year. B. Raman: *Plane Hijacking: in Perspective*, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 103. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper103> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁶ Multilateral Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv1.pdf> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁷ Global Terrorism Database. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

Latin American rebels began their urban guerrilla fight³⁸, on the other hand, Palestinians used terrorism for the first time as a tool to introduce the Palestinian question to the broad public.³⁹ As political leaders received more protection, targets of terrorists became actual and symbolic representatives of power and civilians as well. Instead of an absolute regime change the aim of terrorists became to spread fear, extort the implementation of political demands, call public attention to certain unsettled political questions, social problems, and political racket. While in the classical era assassins committed crimes by using tucks, pistols or bombs with the aim to kill the target person, in the modern era hostage taking, kidnapping, hijacking of vehicles (planes, ships) appeared, i.e. solutions that are suitable for political racket. The altered objectives changed the nature of terror organisations and the role of the media concerning terrorism. Whilst earlier terrorist groups had only few members and operated strictly illegally, in the modern era of terrorism organisations appeared that have many members, a significant social support and considerable resources. Today organisations are not merely armed, but are also formidable and sometimes legal political groups. Earlier the role of the media was limited. It reported only the outcome of attacks and spread fear. In the modern era it became the tool of the political marketing of terrorists and that of “publicity” of political negotiations.⁴⁰ As a consequence, in the modern era of terrorism the “productive” and “unproductive” terrorist actions became separated. Actions that helped to achieve the objectives of terrorist organisations and their followers were separated from actions, which eliminated terrorists from achieving their political goals.⁴¹ The conviction of the public deepened that although methods of terrorists are not acceptable, their demands can be legitimate.

On the onset of the modern era of terrorism in Europe the left wing Anti-capitalists (e.g. the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, the French Action Directe, the Greek Revolutionary Organisation November 17), nationalists and separatists (the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA, the Corsican FLNC), and the different Middle East (especially Palestinian) armed groups used terrorist methods. The Iranian revolution in 1979 did not only give rise to radical Shia Islamic groups (e.g. Hezbollah) but to radical Sunni Islam groups (e.g. Hamas) too, and it strengthened Islamist terrorism as a whole.⁴² Its representatives were assisted by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 not only by

³⁸ The theory of which appeared in Carlos Marighella's book *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* published in the summer of 1969. [http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/COIN/Insurgent%20Principles%20and%20Practices/Mini-Manual%20of%20the%20Urban%20Guerrilla%20-%20Carlos%20Marighella%20\(1969\).pdf](http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/COIN/Insurgent%20Principles%20and%20Practices/Mini-Manual%20of%20the%20Urban%20Guerrilla%20-%20Carlos%20Marighella%20(1969).pdf) (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁹ The first action was committed by three activists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on July 23, 1968 when taking the El Al flight from Rome to Tel-Aviv and diverting it to Algeria with 38 passengers on board. After long negotiations on August 31 passengers, crew and hijackers left freely. D. B. Green: *This Day in Jewish History The First and Only El Al Hijacking*. Haaretz, July 23, 2013. <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/premium-1.537402> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁰ Ganor, B.: *Trends in Modern International Terrorism*. In: D. Weisburd – Th. E. Fucht – I. Hakimi – L. M. Mock – S. Perry (eds): *To Protect and to Serve Policing in an Age of Terrorism*. Dordrecht–Heidelberg–London–New York: Springer, 2006, 11–13., 24–27.

⁴¹ Although politics is not willing to recognise but there were victorious terror organisations in the history of terrorism. Palestine Liberation Organisation chaired by Yaser Arafat, African National Congress presided by Nelson Mandela, Kosovo Liberation Army led by Hashim Thaçi are obviously such organisations but ETA fighting for the autonomy and independence of Basque is also one of them. Hoffman, B.: *op. cit.*

⁴² H. Ballz: *Military Organizations in Western Europe*. In: R. D. Law (editor): *The Routledge History of Terrorism*. London – New York: Routledge, 2015, 297–307.

mobilizing the Muslim states against the occupation but by the financial, armed and training support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to the Pakistan opposition. This way the (future) radical Islam was strengthened and internationalized. This meant a serious danger after Soviet troops left Afghanistan (1989) and after the foundation of al Qaeda (1988-1989).⁴³

The international law began to deal with terrorism in the modern era of terrorism. Between 1968 and 2001 the following eleven international conventions were adopted concerning terrorism:⁴⁴

- 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft elaborating the principle to ‘extradite or to punish’;
- 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation which broadens and refines the types of acts endangering aircrafts;
- 1973 New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents which extends protection to not regular diplomats;
- 1979 New York International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages the adoption of which was accelerated by the hostage taking of the German Red Army Faction in Stockholm in 1975 and the action in Entebbe in 1976;⁴⁵
- 1980 Vienna Multilateral Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which orders the protection of material necessary to produce nuclear energy;⁴⁶
- 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation which was adopted following the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985.⁴⁷

⁴³ Among those fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan there were about 10,000 so called Afghan Arabs most of with Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni origin. The most famous among them was Osama bin Laden. Following the occupation the majority of these warriors returned home and with the experience, ideology and arms destabilized the power at home. M. M. Hafez, Jihad After Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans Phenomenon. CTC Sentinel. Vol 1. Issue 4. 2008, 1–2.

⁴⁴ International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism. New York: United Nations, 2008. III. https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Int_Instruments_Prevention_and_Suppression_Int_Terrorism/Publication_-_English_-_08-25503_text.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁵ On 27 June 1976 two German and two Palestinian terrorists (members of the Baader-Meinhof and PLF) hijacked Air France flight 139, an Airbus A300B4 flying from Athens to Paris. The plane with 246 passengers and 12 crew members on board flew from the Israeli Tel Aviv to Paris with a land in Athens. Hijackers armed with grenades and small arms diverted the flight to Entebbe, capital city of Uganda, where three more terrorists joined them. Hijackers demanded the release of 53 detainees imprisoned in Israel and Europe. On 4 July about 100 commandos of the Israeli army freed 102 out of the 106 Israeli hostages and killed the seven terrorists and 20-45 Ugandan soldiers attacking them. M. J. Carlson, SOF Planning for Uncertainty: Creative Thinking in Dynamic Environment. Master’s Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, 1998. 29–40. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32614/98Dec_Carlson.pdf?sequence=1 (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁶ No. 24 631 Multilateral convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv6.pdf> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁷ On 7 October, 1985, four members of the Palestine Liberation Front took control of the 23 600 GRT cruise ship MS ACHILLE LAURO with 750 Austrian, Italian, American, French and West-German passengers and 350 members of the crew on board. On 8 October the hijackers killed 69-year-old disabled Jewish-American passenger Leon Klinghoffer. The hijackers anchored the ship on international waters near Alexandria. On 10 October the United Nations Security Council in a unanimous resolution condemned the hijacking of the vessel and the murder of the passenger. Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak allowed the terrorists to leave the country. The plane carrying the four hijackers was intercepted by four American fighter aircrafts and directed to land at Sigonella, a NATO base in Sicily. An Italian court convicted the hijackers to prison sentence. M. K. Bohn: The Achille Lauro hijacking: lessons in the politics and prejudice of terrorism. Washington: Potomac Books

- 1988 Montreal Supplementary Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation which extended the protection to airports as well;
- 1988 Rome Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf;
- 1991 Montreal Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection the adoption of which was accelerated by the Lockerbie disaster on 21 December, 1988;⁴⁸
- 1997 New York Convention for the Suppression of Terrorists Bombings specifies the targets of terrorist attacks. Furthermore it contains that terrorism cannot be justified with political and ideological reasons and is a considerable step to standardize the relevant jurisdiction of states concerning terrorism;
- 1999 New York International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism which opened a new way in the fight against terrorism by obstructing financing and by economical impairment;

Some experts on terrorism have the opinion that with the 11 September 2001 attacks a new period started in the history of terrorism. In this postmodern era of terrorism the public faced the fact for the first time that terrorism had become a global issue. It must be emphasized that the global character of terror threat does not mean that the states are threatened in the same way and that national and sub-regional terrorism, which can be exactly specified, have still a significant role. Globalization means that there are few terrorist groups which are able to organise and commit terror attacks far from their centre.⁴⁹

Taking into account the features of postmodern era, four characteristics have to be mentioned. First, because of the reinforced protection of political leaders and representatives of the politics the main targets of the attacks are innocent civilians. Second, the real and virtual spreading of fear became significant among the goals of terrorists. Third, the endeavour to change the whole political system reappeared among the goals. Fourth, terrorism appears in the media more often than ever before. Some experts list the appearance of suicide assassins, but such assassins have been committing attacks since the '80s albeit the number of attacks committed by them increased radically in the 2000s.⁵⁰ There are many explanations for the increase, some believe that terror organisations use this method because it is very efficient, others think that the proliferation of the ideological effect of Islam martyrdom leads to the increase of the number of such assassins.⁵¹ Some even think that suicide assassins come from among those who are motivated not by politics or ideology but by personal disappointment.⁵²

Inc: 2004. XI-96. <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=754tx71-98cC&pg=PA6&hl=hu#v=onepage&q&f=false> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁸ On 21 December, 1988 Libyan assassins bombed the Pan Am Boeing 747 flying from London to New York killing 259 on board (among them 4 Hungarians and 189 Americans) and 11 Lockerbie residents. Report on the accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dunfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988. Department of Transport Air Accidents Investigation Branch., 1990, 1–4. https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990_N739PA.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁹ B. Ganor (editor): *Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends Scenarios and Future Trends*. Herzliya: ICT, 2006.

⁵⁰ B. Ganor: *Trends in Modern International Terrorism*. Op. cit.

⁵¹ It has to be mentioned that as a prejudice international public opinion connects suicide attacks almost exclusively to Islam terrorists the method was often used by the nationalist Tamil Tigers.

⁵² Between 1981 and 2006 there were 1,200 suicide assassinations in the world (4% of the attacks) which had 16.725 casualties (35%). Most of the suicide assassinations were committed in Iraq (651), Israel (217), Sri Lanka (93), Pakistan (49), Lebanon (48), Afghanistan (35), and in Russia (28). WITS data's.

Similarly, many regard the increase in the number of attacks with a lot of victims a characteristic feature. Some explain it as a strive to the so-called mass destruction terrorism, others are on the opinion that today's terrorists receive a huge media coverage only in the case of an attack with considerable toll. Arguments can be found for both explanations. It is true that the 2,900 terrorist attacks having more than 5 casualties between 2004 and 2011 make up only 4% of the attacks but killed 45% of the victims. On the other hand the terrorists themselves try to receive more media coverage (see: simultaneous bombings, recording of the attacks by the perpetrators themselves) in order to spread fear which towers over the real devastation of the attack. As a consequence, the largest terror organisations get to the leading news of the news channels even if their threat is only verbal or virtual and no action follows it. This was the effect of the terror attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States and that of the attacks in 2004 in Madrid and in 2005 in London, Europe. The social fear of terrorism remained very high for ages even if it was not justified by the actual number of terrorist actions.⁵³

Although without doubt the Islam terrorism prevails the postmodern era of terrorism, but not to the extent that is suggested by Western politics and media. Not even in the case when the majority of strategic terrorist attacks committed in the United States and Europe is connected to radical Islamists (9/11, Madrid, London). It was quite misleading that Afghan and Iraqi political violent acts until 2006 were rated to the category of terrorism by Western politics although they fall into the category of civil war or guerrilla war. In addition, in Afghanistan and Iraq even the international community contributed to the proliferation of political violence, at least by not being able to set up stabile governments instead of the ones overthrown. It is more comprehensive to take into account that in the years gone by 45.79% of all the terror attacks worldwide was committed in these countries with 56.1% of killed and 56.97% injured. Moreover, Pakistan can be listed here as well where the events in Afghanistan and the missile attacks of the American army contributed to the increase of terror threat.⁵⁴ If we take Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan out of the Muslim countries, the share of the Muslim countries is not so high which would justify the public opinion's view on the threat of Islam terrorism. Without these countries the share of the Muslim world in assassinations is only 24.48%, in the number of killed is 21.14% and in the number of injured is 21.77%. It is not a particularly high share taking into account that 23-26% of the world population is of Muslim religion. In addition, according to statistics only 1% of the victims killed in attacks in the Muslim world is not Muslim.⁵⁵

The difference between the subjective (perception) and the objective (factual) terrorism image is astonishing particularly in the United States and in Europe. In the United States it is well demonstrated by the fact that according to surveys until 2006-2007 the Americans regarded terrorism as the most dangerous threat, though North America was the least threatened region in the world. Europeans regarded Islam terrorism the most dangerous though most of the attacks after 2001 were committed because of separatist reasons. It is true that until 2011, the attack in Oslo/Utoya the two bombing attacks committed by Islamists (Madrid,

⁵³ WITS data's.

⁵⁴ Between 2004 and 2011 attacks committed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan made up for 55.37% of the world total, 65.52% of those killed and 66.45% of those injured. WITS data's.

⁵⁵ WITS data's.

London) had most of the casualties in Europe. Moreover, so many victims that in the year given Spain and the United Kingdom got amongst the ten countries most endangered by terrorism.⁵⁶

The more than a half decade of postmodern period of terrorism was determined by the fight against terrorism evocated by the USA. But this did not appear in international conventions as before because only one convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005, was adopted.⁵⁷ It appeared rather in international cooperation against Islam terrorism which was implemented on a bilateral basis. Subsequently international studies regard steps against terrorism as overreaction or a mistake (e.g. the Iraqi war, limitation of freedom rights). It is incontestable that the infrastructure, instrument and cooperation system of the fight against terrorism both at national and international levels has gone through a considerable development over these years.

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⁵⁶ WITS data's.

⁵⁷ International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. United Nations. 2005. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv13.pdf> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

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TENDENCIES IN THE POLICY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

ABSTRACT: The Islamic State poses a grave threat not only in the Middle East but almost in the whole world. The wrong management of the Iraq and Syria crisis, the expansion of the radical political Islam, the growing jihadism contributed to the spreading of the Islamic State. The Islamic State is a guerrilla organization seeking to be a state by using terrorist methods. The present essay examines the threats of the Islamic State and its affiliates. The author analyses the policy of the internal function of this organization and raises the necessity of international cooperation in the fight against Islamic State.

KEYWORDS: Islamic State, affiliates, threats, Iraq, Syria, training

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) on the battlefields of the civil war in Syria, and its subsequent spectacular successes in conquering parts of Syria and Iraq, have achieved international attention. This organization is a reflection of the rise of radical political Islam in the Middle East over the last decades. Islam has always been a central component in the identity of the people of the Middle East. While Egypt, Iran and Turkey succeeded in maintaining a strong ethno-statist parallel identity, most of the Arab states have failed to use statist identities through their education system.

The Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the whole Middle East region, more broadly to Europe and to the United States as well. The Islamic State of today, which displays religious extremism and transnational tendencies, is the result of historic dynamism in the changing Arab civilization. Any long term look at the performance of the Arab states could reach the gloomy conclusion that their societies are doomed to poverty and political instability for a long while. The unsuccessful management of the Iraq and Syria crisis played an important role to its coming into existence.

ISIS's military successes in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the changes occurring in the Middle East and provide motivation for radical elements wishing to exploit these successes to expand the organization's regional influence. Several factors are at the base of the success of ISIS and other jihadist organizations:¹

- a) The structural and functional weaknesses of Arab nation states;
- b) The organizations' networked and decentralized structure, which makes it easier for them to operate, move, and sustain themselves in the region, and makes it more difficult for armies to confront;
- c) The ineffectiveness of the international community, first and foremost the United States, stemming from the lack of a solution and an unwillingness to become militarily involved;

¹ E. Inbar: Iran Remains the Threat in the Middle East. BESA Center Perspectives. Paper No. 272, October 19, 2014. <http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-remains-threat-middle-east/> (Accessed on: 20. 12. 2015.)

d) The erosion of the United States' image as a superpower and its ability to resolve regional problems.

THE SHAPING OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

The Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qaida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq.

The Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS/DAESH) emerged as a threat to the Middle East and the broader international community amid more than a decade of conflict in Iraq and more than four years of conflict in Syria. As of late 2015, the group commands tens of thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and has received pledges of support from affiliated groups in several countries across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The Islamic State's apocalyptic ideology, its revolutionary intent toward the strategically important Middle East, and its embrace of transnational terrorism have alarmed policy makers around the world and spurred global debate over strategies and policy options. I would like to emphasize the rapid emergence of affiliated organizations in the Middle East and Africa having (or not having) direct or indirect contacts with IS. In case of destruction (more exactly restriction) of IS in Iraq and Syria, the next challenge will be the activities of affiliate organizations such as Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, al Qaida in Sinai Peninsula, al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, al Shabaab and so on).

The wealth of information about the group indicates that the Islamic State's re-emergence in 2014, and especially its methods and goals, should not have come as a surprise, although the strength and scope of that re-emergence were rightfully shocking.

If we pose the question whether the Islamic State is really a state I assess that this entity is a guerrilla organization seeking to be a state by using terrorist and criminal methods.

Over the last four years, since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the Islamic State developed from an extremist marginal faction participating in the civil war to become the strongest, most ferocious, and best funded and best armed militia in the religious and ethnic war that is waged today in Syria and Iraq.² Even many Islam experts stated that this organization is neither Islamic nor a state at all.

The structures being established indicate that even if the actual leaders of IS are killed, the system has created a succession procedure that will allow it to survive, just like al-Qaeda survived the killing of Osama Bin Laden. Killing the leadership of IS is not the best method because there are many replacements and the organization is embedded in the Sunni population. Uprooting the IS phenomenon will be a long and arduous road.

According to U.S. officials, since early 2015 the Islamic State has been able to have tens of thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria and thousands elsewhere, but officials also have estimated that coalition air strikes and ground operations have killed thousands of IS personnel. Thousands of recruits have reportedly joined the organization since the start of coalition military operations in 2014, but U.S. officials have reported uncertainty about

² J. Neriah: The structure of the Islamic State (ISIS). <http://jcpa.org/structure-of-the-islamic-state/#sthash.mce152yP.dpuf> (Accessed on: 15. 04. 2014.)

casualty to replacement ratios and the overall extent and effects of attrition in IS ranks.³ As of July 2015, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) estimated publicly that as many as 25,000 individuals from more than 100 countries had travelled to Syria to engage in combat with various groups since 2011, including more than 4,500 Europeans and some U.S. citizens.⁴

Unfortunately I do not possess data concerning the European fighter's habit but I do have some information about the American recruits. According to a Program of Extremism of the George Washington University: (ISIS in America December 2015), as of the fall of 2015, U.S. authorities speak of some 250 Americans who travelled or attempted to travel to Syria/Iraq to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and of 900 active investigations against ISIS sympathizers in all 50 states. Seventy-one individuals have been charged with ISIS-related activities since March 2014. Fifty-six of them were arrested in 2015 alone, a record number of terrorism-related arrests for any year since 9/11. Of those charged:

- The average age is 26.
- 86% are male.
- Their activities were located in 21 states.
- 51% travelled or attempted to travel abroad.
- 27% were involved in plots to carry out attacks on U.S. soil.
- 55% were arrested in an operation involving an informant and/or an undercover agent.⁵

In the radicalisation and mobilization of sympathisers, social media plays a crucial role. American ISIS sympathizers are particularly active on Twitter, where they create accounts that often get suspended in a never-ending cat-and-mouse game. ISIS-related radicalization is not only limited to social media. While instances of purely web-driven, individual radicalization are numerous, in several cases U.S.-based individuals initially cultivated and later strengthened their interest in ISIS's narrative through face-to-face relationships. In most cases online and offline dynamics complement one another.

The spectrum of U.S.-based sympathizers' actual involvement with ISIS varies significantly, ranging from those who are merely inspired by its message to those few who reached mid-level leadership positions within the group. The situation is similar in Europe as well; perhaps the role of preacher is bigger.

IS AFFILIATES AND ADHERENTS⁶

Since 2014, some armed groups have recognized the Islamic State caliphate and pledged loyalty to Baghdadi. Groups in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Afghanistan, and Nigeria have used the Arabic word "*wilayah*" (state/province) to describe themselves as constituent members of a broader IS-led caliphate.

As of late 2015, the following IS adherents are the most significant and capable.

³ C. M. Blanchard – C. E. Humud: The Islamic State and U.S. policy. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf> (Accessed on: 06. 12. 2015.)

⁴ ODNI Spokesman Brian Hale quoted in B. Starr: A few dozen Americans' in ISIS ranks. CNN, July 15, 2015.

⁵ L. Vidino – S. Hughes: ISIS in America. <https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf> (Accessed on: 06. 12. 2015.)

⁶ Blanchard–Humud: The Islamic State and U.S. policy.

The Islamic State in Egypt (Sinai Province, Wilayah Sinai)

The Islamic State's local affiliate in the northern Sinai Peninsula was formerly known as *Ansar Bayt al Maqdis* (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem). It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its membership range from 500 to 1,000, and it is comprised of radicalized indigenous Bedouin Arabs, foreign fighters, and Palestinian militants. Among his armaments are man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) such as the 9K338 Igla-S, and Kornet anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems. The organization has claimed credit for destroying Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded in mid-air over the Sinai Peninsula on October 31, killing all 224 passengers aboard.

The Islamic State in Saudi Arabia (Wilayah Najd/Haramayn/Hijaz)

IS leaders threaten the kingdom's rulers directly and call on the group's supporters there to attack Shiites, Saudi security forces, and foreigners. IS supporters have claimed responsibility for several attacks e.g. suicide bombing attacks on Shia mosques in different parts of Saudi Arabia, in a Kuwaiti mosque, killing more than two dozen people and wounding hundreds. Saudi officials arrested more than 1,600 suspected IS supporters (including more than 400 in July 2015) and claim to have foiled several planned attacks.

The Islamic State has posed a unique political threat to Saudi Arabia in addition to the tangible security threats demonstrated by a series of deadly attacks inside the kingdom since late 2014. IS leaders claim to have established a caliphate to which all religious Sunni Muslims owe allegiance, directly challenging the legitimacy of Saudi leaders who have long claimed a unique role as Sunni leaders and supporters of particular Salafist interpretations of Sunni Islam. IS critiques of Saudi leaders may have resonance among some Saudis who have volunteered to fight for or contributed on behalf of Muslims in several conflicts involving other Muslims over the last three decades.

The Islamic State in Libya (Wilayah Tarabalus/Barqa/Fezzan)

Supporters of the Islamic State in Libya have announced *three* affiliated wilayah (provinces) corresponding to the country's three historic regions—*Wilayah Tarabalus* in the west, *Wilayah Barqa* in the east, and *Wilayah Fezzan* in the southwest. Some observers put the group's strength in Libya at several hundred to a few thousand fighters among a much larger community of Salafi-jihadist activists and fighters. Since late 2014, IS supporters have taken control of Muammar al Qadhafi's hometown Sirte and committed a series of atrocities against Christians and Libyan Muslim opponents. They also have launched attacks against forces from Misrata and neighbouring towns in an effort to push westward and southward. IS backers sought to impose their control on the eastern city of Darnah. There is no concrete data, but we can suppose that this organization can train people who could appear in Europe.

The Islamic State in Nigeria [West Africa Province (Wilayah Gharb Afriqiyah)]

Two of the most significant African insurgent groups – Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia – are looking to ISIS, possibly to gain momentum as both groups face the increased pressure of successful military operations against them. Islamist group Boko

Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS in early March 2015, more specifically to the ‘Caliph of Muslims’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The pledge coincided with successful operations against Boko Haram carried out by a coalition of Nigerian forces and neighbouring countries affected by Boko Haram violence.⁷ This northeast Nigeria-based Sunni insurgent terrorist group is widely known by the name *Boko Haram* (“western education is forbidden”). 5,500 in 2014 alone and more than 1.5 million people were displaced by related violence, which increasingly spread into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger in 2015. The group threatens civilian, state and international targets, including Western citizens being in the region. Boko Haram’s proclamation of allegiance to ISIS coincides with its ousting from key towns in north-eastern Nigeria. Meanwhile, Somalia’s al-Shabaab also appears to be flirting with the idea of associating itself with ISIS, having been seriously weakened by the African Union-led *Operation Indian Ocean* and US airstrikes targeting its leaders.

The Islamic State in Yemen (Wilayah al Yemen, Wilayah Al Bayda, Wilayah Aden-Abyan, Wilayah Shabwah)

In Yemen, militants who claim allegiance to the Islamic State have taken advantage of the ongoing war to repeatedly bomb mosques known for attracting worshippers of Zaydi Islam, an offshoot of Shia Islam (with legal traditions and religious practices which are similar to Sunni Islam). Islamic State terrorists have targeted supporters of the Houthi Movement, a predominately Zaydi armed militia and political group that aims to rule wide swaths of northern Yemen and restore the “Imamate.”

The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Wilayah Khorasan)

The Islamic State attempts to expand its reach in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. The Islamic State presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan appears to consist of individuals of more mainstream insurgent groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban, showing themselves as members of “The Islamic State of Khorasan Province,” or *Wilayah Khorasan*. This group differs from the so called Khorasan Group identified by U.S. officials as being an Al Qaeda affiliated cell seeking to conduct transnational terrorist attacks. It does not appear that Islamic State leadership has sent substantial numbers of fighters from Iraq and Syria into Afghanistan or Pakistan. The Islamic State’s presence and influence in Afghanistan remains in the exploratory stage.” It is known that there is a growing competition and conflict between the Taliban and Islamic State fighters.

THE IDEAS OF THE INTERNAL FUNCTIONING OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

To the development of the Islamic state it is a paramount requirement to be a state or to operate as a state. In December 2015 The Guardian revealed a 24-page document in which the organization outlines principles for governing a territory under the group’s control and strategy for becoming a viable state. According to the paper the ISIS does not stand on the basis of a mujahidin soldier fighting and bearing his arms, nor does it rest on da’wa (evange-

⁷ H. U. Neill: African insurgent groups look to ISIS as they face increasing pressure. <https://www.iiss.org/en/Topics/islamic-state/african-groups-isis-f2d1> (Accessed on: 06. 12. 2015.)

lising) in a mosque or a street, but rather it is a comprehensive system requiring the leaders of the ummah Muslim nation) to realise its concepts.⁸

Let us see how the Islamic State intends to be a state.

Proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate

On the expansion of the Islamic State, the state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur'anic constitution and a system to implement it, and there must not be suppression of the role of qualifications, skills of expertise and the training of the current generation on administering the state.

The proclamation of the renewal of the caliphate in Iraq in 2006 was the arbiter between division and separation as well as the glory of the Muslims. The proclamation of the caliphate was the result of the mujahedeens' realising the lack of advantage in fighting against the idolaters without the existence of a leader and caliph who could gather the Muslims under his banner and be a figure of strength for them. The document recognizes that America and its allies were able to destroy the caliphate project (the Islamic State of Iraq) to a great extent in Iraq after they established the Sunni Iraqi Sahwa forces. The deeds of the soldiers of the state thus became limited to security operations to strike American targets and their allies. The proclamation of the caliphate in Syria was a powerful blow that the agents of the west who were set on the direction of the Sahwat of Iraq by whom the west thought that it could put an end to the Islamic caliphate project as it had weakened it in Iraq did not expect.

Organisation of the individual and group

The document hails the muhajireen (in our understanding foreign fighters) coming from different parts of the world, by saying: „The majority of the first muhajireen came from the Gulf states and the Arabic Maghreb whose zeal for their religion urged them on, and among them were those with zeal for their Arab Sunni brothers without religious jihadist inhibition, and without there being for them prior expertise in global jihadi organisations”.

The next step was the migration from the states of the world after the proclamation of the caliphate, as no disbelieving state has remained which has not suffered from the migration of its youth to support the Islamic State which the soldiers of Joulani and the apostate Sahwa forces from the Free (Syrian) Army and others besides them rejected.

Later Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered to establish a first camp which included the new immigrants who had no deeply ingrained expertise and creed, near the prior borders for the Sykes-Picot “Iraq-Syria” lines.

The ideologists of the Islamic State attach a great importance to the formation of groups composed of the muhajireen from the western states in particular in view of the difficulty of linguistic communication in the beginning and launch stage and in view of the mutual understanding and precedence of coordination between some of the muhajireen from Chechnya and France to fight in single cells without the existence of any distinction for members (i.e. there was no differential treatment on the basis of ethnic identity).

⁸ The Isis papers: a masterplan for consolidating power. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamic-state-document-masterplan-for-power> (Accessed on: 19. 12. 2015.)

Organization of the provinces

If we were to see today the borders of the Islamic State and the borders of the Sunni regions, we would see them torn apart, besieged and persecuted, for there are the Shia from the south of Iraq, the Nusayris from the west of Syria, the Kurdish parties to their north, and the Druze to their south. The assets of the ummah (Islamic nation) are: its wealth, the nature of its land, its inhabitants and its water. The principal component and source of financing for all internal and external operations are: oil and natural gas and what the land possesses, including gold as a currency that does not deteriorate or decline, as well as trade routes from which they have no wealth and all of it should be the intervention of the Islamic State. The leaders of the Islamic state assess that the state cannot remain without the existence of the land that allows for its continuation and expansion, for the assets of the land are – the mountains, the agricultural lands, the sea and the river – for these natural assets are what makes the Islamic State acquire its importance and the importance of location. According to the views of Islamic ideologists, the agreement of the west in Sykes-Picot were established on the basis of depriving the Sunnis from those assets, as the mountains were granted to the Kurds, Druze and Alawites, the sea was granted to the Rafidites and Nusayris, while the river and what surrounds it in investment for the Jews and the agricultural lands under their administration. In their understanding the traitorous governments have tried to mislead the Sunni peoples in every Arab land. The Sunnis in Syria lived in a new ignorance after ignorance during the French occupation of their land as there was the Alawite government that planted its vices in every house, permitted the forbidden and made forbidden development and civilisation. In turn implementing the plans that include the return of the Muslim youth to their land and bringing together the skills from the land of the Muslims, and the going out of the state for specialised staff in their fields if they are not of those of the pact in Islam (i.e. Jews and Christians). This idea is a little bit similar to the return of the Jews to Israel after the II World War.

Preserving the capabilities (personnel and infrastructure) the Islamic State has been placing specialists in accounting and oversight over all production directorates in the Islamic State including establishments of oil, gas, archaeological areas and factories for manufacturing and production. ISIS establishes factories for local military and food production and independence from the monopoly of arms dealers for materials of necessity and cutting them off in the event of contravening the interests. It realises local needs and provides for them within the borders of the state in isolated safe zones and connecting trade routes inside the state through principal centres and beneficiary wings. It tries to reduce excess expenditure through the administration of the province; it must operate independently and be able to take its own decisions in matters concerning the province.

Administration of the projects

In parallel with military preparation in the lines of fighting and the camps, a committee is to be put in place to administer production projects and put in place plans to implement new investment projects.

The one who invests in the lands of the state is to be given comprehensive protection according to the agreement that arises with the observance of the interests of the Islamic State in production, exporting and prices.

It is not allowed to invest in the following projects:

- Oil products

It is not allowed for a person who has no pledge of allegiance to the caliph to invest in an oil or natural gas field or what has arisen from their production, but it is allowed besides that to produce derivatives after buying the crude products from the fields of the Islamic State, just as it is allowed to sell and deal in them inside and outside the state.

- Gold and antiquities

It is not allowed to excavate for gold or antiquities except by expressed agreement from the resources department, and all transferred and stored materials will be confiscated for the interest of the treasury.

But it is allowed to deal in gold not excavated from the ground according to the well-known aharia frameworks with immediate effect.

- Weapons

It is forbidden to establish factories to produce weapons and materials particular to them without granting of any explicit permits for the situation, just as it is forbidden to establish shops to sell public weapons besides personal weapons and deal in them without prior knowledge and agreement from the responsible military amir in the wilayah.

As for the other principal goods that also come under the crux of people's lives, the officials must know about all means of operation and production like dealing in water, flour and livestock.

External relations

It is known that until now no country on earth had recognised the Islamic State. External relations are the first foundation for building every nascent state, and they are among the foundations that show the strength and might of the state. They should constitute for it a general stance in everything that happens in the world with the people of Islam and be for it an external hand protecting its dealings.

According to sharia politics, the leadership is not allowed to adopt decisions to an ally with a state or implement an agreement with it if that violates sharia politics, as agreed on by the majority of ulama (religious scholars) and symbols of jihad. So indeed every agreement must include the following:

- The internal sovereignty of the Islamic State and not allowing for other states to intervene in matters of the Islamic rule or the general politics of the Islamic State.
- Protecting the borders of the Islamic State from every idolater, disbeliever, aggressor or even friend, for no army or other force is allowed to enter the borders of the Islamic State whatever the pretext.
- A provision that the (Islamic) State should be witness to good treatment of Muslims in its lands and mutual affection with Muslims in other areas of the world, and that it is not allowed to deal with another state that has a history of hostility to Islam's spread, the building of mosques and oppression of Muslims in its lands.
- A provision that the agreement should first be in the interest of the Muslims, not in the interest of the disbelievers.
- The agreement should not include any future provisions touching on the freedom and sovereignty of the Muslim state, and no bonds of debt or conditions of harmful exploitation even if in the future with regards to the matters of the state.

- There should be for the Muslims their rights and freedom within the state that is to enter into an agreement with them.
- All points of the agreement should be clear to the imam (the caliph) and those with him.

Training of the muhajireen

The military and jihadist training of the newcomers happens in three types of camps:

a) The preparatory camp is the first home and school of the mujahidin (soldier) in which his military and jihadist training sessions take place and he undergoes sufficient education in matters of his religion, life and jihad. For the mujahid on the day he joins the Islamic State, whether as a muhajir or from the ansar, the camp includes sharia sessions through which the mujahidin studies the fiqh (jurisprudence) of the rulings, Islamic doctrine, al-wala' and al-bara' (loyalty and disavowal), in addition to the arts of fighting and the arts of using weapons, with screening of every mujahid in a specialty in which he excels and completing his camp according to his skill in specific weapons.

b) Continuation camps

These are special camps for the mujahideen who lead in the jihad and those who are masters of expertise in managing and planning the battle in the beginning and end. The camp includes a 15-day physical preparation. This is an annual training session, and through that camp the mujahid comes upon the latest arts of using weapons, military planning and military technologies currently put forth in battles and weapons whose use by the enemy is anticipated, along with detailed commentary on the techniques of enemy use of the weapons, areas of their use, their strength and how the soldiers of the state can take advantage of them.

The training includes sharia sessions, doctrine and rulings, with special sessions in Islamic society and manners, and training on bearing light arms and the principles of use.

Outstanding individuals are selected from them for security portfolio assignments, including checkpoints, patrols and the various internal security units.

The camps' administration is responsible for planning, aims and results, and as the results of the camp should be in alignment with the aims and principles of the Islamic State, it has been necessary to establish a centre for the administration of the camps whose tasks are as follows:

1. Preparing special sharia sessions in the camps in coordination with the al-Buhuth and al-Eftaa [fatwa – legal opinion] committee.
2. Preparing educational programmes to teach the Arabic language and recitation of the Qur'an in coordination with the department of education for every province.
3. Preparing military programmes teaching the types of weapons and military tactics with the supervision of the military commander in every province.
4. Studying expenditures and allowances for every camp whose study and analysis are to be completed by the military leader or governor of every area according to the needs connected with every province and submitting the study to the province.
5. Overseeing the selection of the educational and training staff in the camp.
6. Putting in place detailed planning and programmes on the course of the battle.
7. Tracking the supervision of the camp according to the defined programmes.
8. Assessing the camp session and raising a report to the officials concerning the readiness of the session after the camp.

c) Preparation camp for children. There are special camps for the training of children.

Direction before the battle

After the completion of the special training session, the soldier remains in need of direction and tracking by the military commander for the mission or the sharia official accompanying him before the launching of the mujahidin to battle. The importance of the jihad, the martyrdom in the path of God to raise the banner of Islam and the caliphate as well the endurance on encountering the enemy are continuously mentioned following the decisions and instructions of the field commander during the battle. All this should be done during the readying and preparation for the battle.

Direction after the battle

In the event of victory, the director summons what came from the Prophet from sayings on the virtue of the mujahidin and their feelings that what they have accomplished aspires to be in the service of their religion and creed, with their being reminded to embrace the instructions coming from the battle leadership from the rulings of spoils and not adopting any decision to plunder the wealth of the people except by its rights and by explicit order from the commander responsible.

In the event of being broken, the direction should be on patience, reckoning and steadfastness on meeting the enemy while not heeding those having doubts and those who spread rumour and terror in the ranks of the soldiers.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE

The strategic objectives to degrade IS in Iraq and Syria are as follows:

- Conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against the terrorists.
- Work with the Iraqi government; expand efforts beyond protecting (military personnel) and humanitarian missions to hit ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offensive.
- Take direct military action against ISIL terrorists in Syria and in Iraq.
- Degrade ISIL's leadership, logistical and operational capability, and deny its sanctuary and resources to plan, prepare, and execute attacks.

The basic question is whether the military strikes are effective and adequate against the Islamic State. My answer is: the military actions are not enough, not effective but there is no other solution. "At a total cost of \$1.83 billion, DoD reports that, as of March 2015, nearly 3,000 airstrikes had been conducted in both Iraq and Syria as part of military operations coordinated among 14 coalition countries. Approximately 1,600 strikes have targeted ISIL positions in Iraq since August 8, 2014, and more than 1,200 have targeted ISIL in Syria since December 23, 2014. According to DoD, these strikes damaged or destroyed more than 150 oil and gas facilities, 441 ISIL staging areas, and nearly 1,700 buildings, among hundreds of other targets."⁹

Among the goals laid down for 2015 the most important are:

- Reducing ISIL's revenue from oil and assets it has plundered.
- Disrupting trade in looted cultural property in Iraq and Syria.

⁹ H. A. Cordesman: The First Inspector General Report on the Fight Against ISIL: A Public Relations Exercise without Meaningful Transparency. http://csis.org/files/publication/150501_commentary.pdf (Accessed on: 06. 12. 2015.)

- Limiting ISIL's ability to extort local populations.
- Stemming ISIL's gains from kidnapping for ransom.
- Disrupting the flow of external donations to the group.
- Enabling sanctions and prosecutions of ISIL financiers.

CONCLUSION

The Islamic State poses a military threat to the Arabic and Western world. The intention to become a world caliphate remains only a dream. In 2015 the organization was not able to gain more territories in Iraq and Syria or elsewhere, on the contrary, it lost important towns and villages thanks to the air strikes and other military and non-military actions. It is good news that the Islamic State did not succeed in gaining territories but there is bad news that the ideology represented by the organization is spreading in the Middle East and Africa. ISIS made the fight global with its threats and intents to go beyond the Middle East battlegrounds. Downplaying the ISIS threats as rhetoric is dangerous.

As we see from the goals mentioned above, there are some military objectives, but unfortunately there is no political understanding among the participants in the campaign against ISIS. As former Secretary of Defense Panetta warned: "Without a clear understanding of the mission and strategy behind the current 'bombing campaign' against ISIS, our nation faces a grave risk of a 30 year war".¹⁰ Military actions against ISIS must be a well-coordinated air, ground, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare approach, including the use of psychological operations against the opposing force.

One of the most significant dimensions of ISIS is the recruitment of foreign fighters from different countries around the world. After the start of the operation, ISIS can use these attacks as a rallying ground in order to recruit more people. Such a threat can only be prevented by an effective intelligence operation. The objectives of intelligence cooperation have to include preventing people from reaching Turkey in order to travel to other countries where they can meet with ISIS fighters.

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
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Szilveszter Póczik:

FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM THE BALKANS AND HUNGARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST¹

ABSTRACT: Hungary with its Muslim population of 25 % belongs to a region of Europe where Islam has no significant influence in spite of the fact that the country is only some 100 miles away from the Balkans where Islam is one of the most influential religions. In the total population on the Balkans of about 75 million, 15 millions are Muslims (N. Rózsa, 2010) who follow the Ottoman tradition, i.e. a more traditional form of Islam, less receptive in nature to modern radicalism. The majority of the Muslims on the Balkans are descendants of Orthodox or Catholic Christian believers who had converted voluntarily or under pressure to (Sunni) Islam.

KEYWORDS: ISIS, jihadism, counterterrorism, Balkans, Middle East, Hungary, Islam, Muslims, foreign fighters



Muslim population in Europe
Source: Kettani, 2010, graph by Kr. Justh

ISLAM COMMUNITIES AND RADICALIZATION ON THE BALKANS

Until now “about 500 ethnic Albanians from the Western Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012, predominantly joining the Islamic State and Ğabhat an-Nuĝra. Recent counterterrorism operations in Albania and Kosovo have shed some light on the structure and inner workings of this network. These efforts by local law enforcement agencies have revealed that the web of extremist actors primarily comprises a new generation of local fundamentalist clerics trained in the Middle East and closely affiliated with a number of foreign-funded Islamic charities and cultural associations” (Shtuni: 2015).

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In Albania some two thirds of the total population of 3.5 million are Muslims but due to the antireligious politics of the communist dictatorship under Enver Hoxha (O'Donnell, 1999) most of them do not practise the religion though in the last decades the intensification of religious life can be observed and radical Muslims won some place, too. Such was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo as well until the Yugoslavian civil war. In the neighboring countries some 2 million Albanian Muslims, (in Serbia and Kosovo 1,587,000, in Macedonia 506,000) are living in a region influenced by hardline nationalist, separatist and radical Islamist tendencies complemented with a military experience obtained during Kosovo's war of independence 1998 – 1999 (Lellio, 2006). This development anticipates the establishment of a great Albanian nation state in the very near future as the Albanian national liberation movement extended its activity to Macedonia and Serbia beyond Kosovo as well. In Kumanovo, the Albanian National Liberation Army attacked the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia in February 2001. Though the so called Ohrid Agreement² ended the armed conflict between the National Liberation Army and the Macedonian security forces and offered an autonomous status for the Albans living in the North-Western region, demonstrations and sporadic struggles started again in 2004 and 2014. Emissaries of the Muslim Brotherhood and foundations such as the al-Waqf al-Islāmī and Iršād have settled down in Chair, a district in Skopje. The Macedonian police and special security services are not able to control this part of the city. Over 50% of the Macedonian jihadists that have joined the Islamic State come from the Muslim community of Chair. Today some of them are returning to Macedonia. Albanian militant organizations are still active in neighboring Serbia as well. The Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac is an Albanian separatist militant insurgent group fighting for the independence of three municipalities: Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, the home to most of the Albanians in South-Serbia, adjacent to Kosovo (Kolarov, 2015).

This military experience and engagement is the reason why ISIS prefers to recruit Albanian fighters. According to the information given by Resul Rexhepit, one of the leaders of the Muslims in Kosovo, to the daily paper Bota Sot on 9th March 2015, ISIS offers 20-30 thousand euros as one-off support to every Albanian juvenile for joining the Dā'īsh fighters in Syria. According to intelligence sources 211 ethnic Albanian men fought either in Syria and/or Iraq... between 2012 and 2015 or were arrested and are being investigated for recruiting fighters or attempting to join terrorist groups” (Shtuni: 2015). 70 from Albania, 64 from Kosovo, 17 from Macedonia and 1 from Serbia fought in Syria and/or Iraq in the past three to four years. 49 of 152 were killed, 12 from Albania, 22 from Kosovo, 14 from Macedonia, and 1 from Serbia. 13 Albanian nationals traveled to Syria with their wives and 31 children. About 20 Kosovo Albanian families made the hiġra to live and fight in the Middle East region. It is reasonable to assume that more than 100 ethnic Albanian relatives of jihadists made the trip. In the year 2014, 29 fighters were killed. At least ten of the fighters belonged to the Albanian diaspora in Western Europe, five originating from Macedonia, and five originating from Kosovo. Their last residences were in Germany, Sweden, Norway, Austria, or Switzerland. Other fighters or would-be fighters were arrested before their travel to Syria

² The Ohrid Framework Agreement was the peace treaty signed by the government of Macedonia and representatives of the Albanian minority on 13. August 2001 that ended the armed conflict between the Albanian National Liberation Army and the Macedonian security forces. The agreement set the groundwork for improving the rights of ethnic Albanians. The text of the agreement see: <http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf>

or Iraq have resided in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Egypt. Two main categories of fighters can be distinguished: those with military experience and those with religious training. At least 14 of the fighters had previous warfare experience or military training. Among them there were 10 Kosovo Liberation Army and/or National Liberation Army veterans from the armed conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia, and 4 former Albanian Army Commandos (Shtuni, 2015).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 % of the total population of 3.7 million are Muslims who had no separate ethnic identity until the middle of the 19th century. They regarded themselves as Islamized Serbs or Croats. The Bosnian identity was much more a local territorial identity flavored with the religious identity of Islam and the non-religious cultural tradition influenced by Islam. These together formed the basis for a new state and a separate national identity that emerged from the Yugoslav Civil War. During the civil war some 3,000 Islamist / jihadist foreign fighters (*muğāhid* - *muğāhidūn*) as well as technical support and arms arrived from all over the Muslim world, particularly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the al-Qā'ida, to Bosnia to support the independence and the territorial integrity of the Bosnian state. Between 1994 and 1996 Iran transported over 5,000 tons of military equipment, i.e. two-thirds of the weaponry sent from abroad, to Bosnia during the war and sent also fighters (Savich, 2008). The first foreign *muğāhidūn* arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992. They recruited local youngsters, offering them training, uniforms and weapons, who imitated them in dress and behavior. In August 1993, the Bosnian government organized foreign volunteers into the battalion called El Mudžahid and offered them three camps in Zenica, Travnik and Orasac. Later El Mudžahid got integrated into the 7th Muslim Brigade (*Sedma muslimanska brigada*) of the 3rd Corps of the Bosnian Army.

Though according to the Dayton Peace Treaty the foreign fighters had to leave Bosnia, a number of foreign jihadists settled down in Bosnia and started families there. According to estimations around one thousand of them remained in Bosnia after the war (Zuidewijn & Bakker, 2014:6) as naturalized Bosnian citizens (Erjavec, 2009; Mustapha, 2013). They got new names and Bosnian citizenship but remained in close contact with the terrorist organizations in their original homelands. According to media information of 2007 the Bosnian authorities have revoked the citizenship of about 420 people (Wood, 2007) and only about 200 foreign-born militants remained in Bosnia. (The Shīi foreign advisors and fighters withdrew fully from Bosnia). The war radicalized the ethnic Bosnians, too. Due to the ethnic cleansings and forced migrations the earlier multiethnic regions and settlements with a cosmopolitan mentality became completely Islamized.

Serbia's hot spot in regard to the radicalization, terrorism and jihadism is the Sandžak region located in the border triangle of Montenegro and Kosovo. The historical administrative district of the former Ottoman Empire, called the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, is today split by the border between Serbia and Montenegro. In the southern part of the (Serbian) Sandžak the majority of the population is Bosnian Muslim. Due to the general poverty and political conflicts the Muslim majority of the Sandžak is receptive to radical ideologies. The presence and influence of foreign Islamic radicals and extremists in neighboring Kosovo and Bosnia is of particular concern to Serbian and Western intelligence agencies. According to officials of the Serbian intelligence services a close al-Qā'ida connection exists and the Sandžak region is becoming a new hotbed of radical Islam. Within the Sandžak's Muslim community an internal struggle concerning the territorial autonomy of the region is unfolding between Mufti Zukorlic supported by the Sandžak Islamic Community and the allies of Belgrade, and Mayor Sulejman Ugljanin and the Bosniak National Council. The risks are increased due to

the presence of Sandžak Bosniaks who fought in the Bosnian civil war. Up to 13,000 people from the Sandžak received Bosnian citizenship during the war (Oluic, 2008). Supposedly a group from Bosnia and South-West Serbia (Sandžak Group) was fighting in Syria in 2013. Two group members, Eldar Kundakovic and Adis Salihovic, under the nom de guerre Abū Bar‘a and Abū Mardī‘a, died during a bomb attack trying to free prisoners from the prison of as-Safīra, a jail near Aleppo. Another unit called In‘Ša‘ Allah Group having around 20 recruits from the Sandžak, including Novi Pazar is a sub-group of Ćabhat an-Nuṣra (Galli & al. 2013:5).³

In Bulgaria, the 1 million Muslims who represent 12 % of the total population are, in contrast to the other big Muslim communities of the Balkans, not the descendants of former Christians, but of ethnic Turks. Under communist dictator Todor Zhivkov they were subjects to assimilation attempts, therefore, more than 300,000 of them left the country for Turkey. This mass emigration reversed after the political change in 1990. Many Turks returned to Bulgaria keeping a close political and economical contact with Turkey. As a minority through their legal political party Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi with some 14% of the votes at national level they constitute an important factor in Bulgaria’s political life. “The Saudi foundation al-Waqf al-Islāmī mentioned above that is linked to al-Qā‘ida, too, has built several mosques in Bulgaria” but the investigation conducted in August 2004 has not found any evidence of terrorist activity”. The investigation has uncovered a shadowy network only, that finances mosques and schools that promote the radical teachings of Wahhabi Islam” (Buhrer Tavanier, 2005). Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria only one Bulgarian fighter has been known. (Zelin, 2013)

HUNGARY’S HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS TO ISLAM

Hungary as a cultural and political part of the Occident has for centuries been situated in the border region of three civilizations, namely the Western with its Roman styled social structure and religious traditions, the Eastern (Greek and Slavic) Orthodox Christianity, dominated by Byzantium and later by Russia, and of the Islamic civilization expanding from the southern part of the Balkans into Europe after Constantinople fell to Ottoman Sultan Mehmed on 29th May 1453 after a two-month siege (Runciman, 1990:84).

The occupation of the Carpathian Basin by Hungarian tribes at the turn of the 9-10th centuries and the subsequent founding of the Hungarian state may have been the indirect consequences of the conquest by Islam on the great steppe to the north of the Caucasus Mountains which generated a new wave of migration. As testified by written historical sources and the use of the Dirham (Arab coins) there was a great number of Islamic believers called in the documents – irrespective of their real ethnicity – Besermians, Ishmaelites, Khwarezmians or Saracens in the early Hungarian state. They played an important role in the economy as well as in other social functions, as treasurers, coiners, traders and soldiers, as mentioned in e.g. the *Regestrum Varadiense* (1208 - 1235). The largest Muslim communities lived in the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom, in Syrmia and the region where the Drava joins the Danube as well as around the towns of Pest, Hajdúböszörmény and Nyitra (today Nitra, Slovakia). The first Islamic author to speak in detail about the Muslim community in

³ <https://syriabashar.wordpress.com/2013/11/27/how-wahhabis-from-bosnia-and-sandzak-recruit-people-to-embrace-islam-and-to-come-to-syria/>

Hungary was Abū Ḥamīd al-Ġarnāṭī, who spent some three years in Hungary (called by him *Bashgird* or *Unkuriyya*) teaching and preaching to the Maghrebi descendents in the course of his travels between 1131 and 1153 (Al-Ġarnāṭī, 1985: 56-59). He described King Géza II as the friend of the Muslims. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (1179-1229) reported in his work *Kitāb Muḡam al-Buldān* (Dictionary of Countries) the presence of about 30 Muslim villages in Hungary.⁴ Under the pressure by the Popes of Rome and the Catholic Church in the period of the Crusades, Kings St. Ladislaus, Coloman and Andreas II passed laws against non-Christians. These laws subdued Islam by coercing Muslims to eat pork, to visit Christian churches and to intermarry with Christians, and prohibited to celebrate Friday and forbade them to bear public offices (e. g. the Golden Bull of 1222, the Treaty of Bereg of 1233, the Synod of Buda of 1279 etc.). These regulations pushing back Islam led to mass emigration of the Islamic community which found a new home in the territory of the Golden Horde (Kipchak Khanate) of the Tartars north of the Black Sea. But their descendant communities remember their Hungarian origins to this day (*kipçak macarlar*).

Hungary's second encounter and confrontation with Islam took place in the 15th century with the military operations and expansion of the Ottoman Empire (1526–1699) on the Balkans. By the 16th century, the Ottomans and Habsburgs had become the two powers rivaling for the domination of (Eastern) Central Europe. The Ottomans occupied the Balkans, the greatest part of Central Hungary and put Vienna under siege twice. On the Balkans they also managed to convert huge populations to Islam, particularly Albans and some of the Slavic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partly by settling numerous Muslim Turks and Arabs amongst them, partly by offering advantages as beneficiary taxation, access to public office positions and all professions, having gun rights etc. "The Ottoman conquest on the Balkan peninsula during the 14-15th centuries led to a massive expansion of Islam ... achieved by the influx of Turkic-speaking populations on the one hand, and by the gradual conversion of parts of the local Slavic population on the other. Today, some 8.4 million Muslims live in different countries throughout the Balkan region" (Merđjanova, 2007:35). In Hungary, perhaps because of the deeply rooted demotic Christian religiosity the conversion to Islam was not attractive. On the other hand, after 1699 the Islam cultural heritage in Hungary's regions occupied earlier by the Ottomans was systematically destroyed (Ferenci, 2010:123-130). Consequently, the reconquered Islamized populations became Christianized again.

In spite of the confessional tolerance, the relatively prosperous economy under the Ottoman rule the Hungarian peasant population was suffering from the periodical military campaigns, high taxes, slavery and the – in Hungary only sporadically applied - *devşirme*, i.e. the so called "blood tax" or "child collection". In the middle of the 14th century, Sultan Murad I built an army of slaves (*kapikulu*). The captive slaves were converted to Islam and trained for the Sultan's personal service. Although it was slavery since the Sultan had absolute power over them the Sultan's slaves had a high status. They had the chance to become the highest officers of the state and the military elite. In spite of the restriction on the enslavement of Muslims, Jews and Christians, young Christian boys from the Balkans were taken from their families, converted to Islam, and enlisted in the most famous branch of the *Kapıkulu*, and later in the Janissaries, a special soldier class of around 100,000 warriors of the Ottoman army that became a decisive faction amongst the military commanders of the

⁴ Yāqūt ibn 'Abd Allah ar-Rūmī al-Ḥamawī (يومرلا هللا دابع نبا ثوقاي يومحلا) : *Kitāb Muḡam al-Buldān* (جمع بابتك نادبل)

Ottoman forces and high administrators of the Empire. Some of the best known personalities, who were converted in such a fashion, were Pargali Damat Ibrahim Pasha and Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, both Grand Viziers under Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent. The interpreters and diplomats recruited this way, referred to as dragomans, were highly estimated in the Sultan's court (Ács, 1997). Though in Hungary "child collection" was not a common practice, free raiding troops of Tartars kidnapped children systematically to sell them on the slave markets (Inalcik, 1979:25-43). A late exotic result of such recruitment is the community of the Magyarabs (Hungaro-Arabs, or the tribe of Hungarians/Magyars) living along the Nile in Egypt and Sudan. They are of Hungarian ancestry dating back to the late 16th century (1517) when Hungarian soldiers of the Ottoman Empire were fighting in southern Egypt and a sub-unit of them led by General Ibrahim Sendjer el-Madgar remained there and intermarried with local Nubian women. They were discovered in 1935 by the Africa-researcher Hungarian Earl László Almásy and his co-worker, the German engineer Hansjoachim von der Esch (Esch, 1941). Their identity sets them apart from the surrounding Egyptians until today (Margittai, 2007:I-III), since they do not pray in the mosque and wear a hat instead of a fez or a turban. The Magyarabs live along the Nile, in Sudan around Wadi Halfa, and in Egypt around Aswan in the villages of Mağarab-irki, Mağararti, Mağariyya, Mağar-nirki, Hillit el-Mağarab. Some 400 of them live in Cairo.

After a period of 352 years, by 1878 most of the Balkans was liberated from Ottoman rule. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy received great power acknowledgement with the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the administration thereof, and also obtained the right to station garrisons in the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, which remained under Ottoman administration. A state of relative stability followed. The Austro-Hungarian authorities were able to embark on a number of social and administrative reforms. To dissipate rising South Slav nationalism, the Habsburg rule represented by the Hungarian Governor Benjámín Kállay between 1882 and 1903 did much to codify laws, to introduce new political practices and to contribute to the modernization that strengthened the sympathy of the locals for Hungary. In 1881 Austria-Hungary obtained the German and the Russian approval to the annexation of these provinces, finally, Austria-Hungary annexed them on 6th October 1908.

Austria-Hungary in its new extension had some 600,000 Muslim (of the Hanafī legal school) citizens but according to the 1910 census Hungary had 553 (179 Turks and 319 Bosniaks) citizens only. The Austrian and Ottoman empires had no common borders any more that allowed both for the coordination of their interests and for their alliance during the First World War. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Islam gradually became an "accepted" and later a "recognized" confession. In 1879, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina received the right of free religious practice in a decree which was extended to Hungary, too, in 1895 (Act XLIII. § I). The legislator declared Islam in 1916 (Act XVII) a "recognized" religion. Upon the proposal by the City Hall Budapest a Mosque Building Committee was established.

In the course of the 19th century there was a growing interest in Islam and the connections to the Islamic world became increasingly intensive. The first Hungarian translation of the Quran was published in 1831 in Kassa (today Kosice, Slovakia). After the Hungarian War of Independence against the Habsburgs in 1848-1849, several Hungarian officers sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire and served in its army or civil administration. It was Count Ödön Széchenyi who organized the first fire brigade in Istanbul and General Józef Zachariasz Bem (Murad Paşa) who did the same in Aleppo. The public opinion at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was determined by three, partly contradictory factors. On the one hand, sympathy for the "sick man of Europe" as Tsar Nicholas I of Russia described the Ottoman

Empire (Lewis, 2001) was growing, because the Sultan supported the Hungarian anti-Habsburg liberation aspirations and offered asylum to the Hungarian insurgents after their defeats in the anti-Habsburg Independence Wars in 1711 and 1849 (Serin, 2008; Herman, 2002). On the other hand, the romantic-historic novel “The Stars of Eger” written by Géza Gárdonyi taking place in the time of the Ottoman wars had a huge impact on the public.⁵ In his novel the renowned author described the Ottoman conquerors as bloodthirsty and greedy enemies of Christianity and humanity. The novel became obligatory reading at school and thus has influenced the perception of Islam to this day. The third factor was academic interest in Islam. The most noteworthy Hungarian scientist among other orientalists dealing with Islam was Ignác Isaak Yehuda Goldziher, a renowned scholar. In 1873 he went on a journey through Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and took the opportunity of attending lectures by Muslim sheiks in the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo. In 1890 he published his “Muhammedanische Studien” in which he showed how the Hadith reflected the legal and doctrinal controversies of the two centuries after Muhammad’s death more than the words of Mohamed himself. Goldziher was a strong believer in the view that Islamic law owes its origins to Roman Law. He represented Hungary at numerous international congresses and received the Large Gold Medal at the Stockholm Oriental Congress in 1889. His eminence in the sphere of scholarship was primarily due to his careful investigation of pre-Islamic and Islamic law, tradition, religion and poetry (Chisholm, 1911).

In World War I the Bosnian soldiers constituting four infantry regiments and a field rifle battalion were parts of the Austro-Hungarian infantry and fought bravely (Schachinger, 1994). A unit of 100 Bosnian and Albanian Muslim soldiers led by the highly decorated Hilmi Hussein Durić or Hüseyin Hilmi Dürük (Alibašić, 2004), the former chief imam of the Austro-Hungarian army, and Viktor Maderspach participated in the uprising in Western Hungary in the autumn of 1921 defending Hungary’s territories around Sopron against the Entente and the Treaty of Trianon (Sarkady, 2009). Durić became a Hungarian citizen with other Bosnians in 1927 and started in cooperation with Ismail Mehmedagić to organize Muslim cultural and confessional life in the Hungarian capital. He elaborated numerous plans for boosting Islam in Hungary, e. g. the founding of a Collegium Islamaticum. Among others he initiated the building of an Islamic Centre called Gül-Baba Hungarian Mohamedanian Confessional Community. In 1931 first the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islamic Religion Community was established, then in 1932 the Gül-Baba Cultural Committee came to being with Christian members as well, in order to collect donations for the Islamic community of Bosnians in Hungary. However, the contemporary newspapers refused the idea as a kind of foreign interference. In the same year, the first European Islamic Conference was held in Budapest (Ferenci, 2012). On behalf of the Hungarian government Durić as an envoy visited Egypt, Syria, Palestine and India. He died in 1940 (Popovic, 1995). In spite of his efforts the number of Muslims remained very small. In 1920 their number was 468, ten years later 291 only, and even these were, almost without exception, foreigners settled down in Budapest (Fazekas, 1996).

⁵ English translation under the title: G. F. Cushing (transl. and with an introd.): Eclipse of the crescent moon: a tale of the siege of Eger, 1552. 7th ed. Budapest, 2005. Turkish translation titled E. Salikoglu (transl.): Egri Yıldizlari. Istanbul, 2013.

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN HUNGARY IN THE RECENT DECADES AND TODAY

In the period of the early communist dictatorship between 1947 and 1956 all religions were persecuted for ideological reasons based on Marxist-Leninist dogmas, but in the subsequent era, Islam attracted a new interest for two reasons. The first reason was that a new generation of orientalists grew up who were working hard in the field of Islamic studies. The other reason was that beyond the few Muslims who came from the Palestine Liberation Organization and other revolutionary movements of the Third World seeking medical care and asylum, hundreds of young people arrived from partly or totally Muslim countries of Asia, North and Black Africa (e. g. Nigeria, Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia etc.) and the Middle East, which were in ideological, economic and/or military alliance with the Soviet Bloc, to study in Hungarian universities. Their number was rapidly increasing from the beginning of the period of the “new economic mechanism” declared in 1968 until the political change of 1989.

Though politically controlled by the Muslim Students Association, these students were not limited in practising their religion and celebrating their feasts in the student hostels. They made friends with Hungarians and even married Hungarian students, many of whom felt attracted to Islam. Some converted to Islam and together with their Muslim fellow students established formal Islamic communities: the first in 1985 at the University for Agricultural Sciences in the town of Gödöllő. This first community claimed to be the successor of the Independent Hungarian Autonomous Islam Religion Community of 1931. The community was approved by the contemporary State Office for Church Affairs as Hungary was seeking friendship with the semi-communist or socialist Muslim countries, and, at the same time, was looking for useful economic cooperation with capitalist Islamic states as well (Köbel, 2011).

Supported by the Muslim World League and Saudi Arabia, represented by Saudi Major-General Kamāl ibn Sirāḡ ad-Dīn al-Margālānī, the Hungarian Islamic Community was founded with 20 members on 15th August 1988 as a church of converted Muslims led by the agricultural engineer Balázs Mihálffy, who came to be called Šayh ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān (Ferenci, 2010:141). This community, which was registered by the Court of Budapest on 3rd July 1990, operated the first Islamic Center in Miskolc in 1993. Also other smaller Islamic religious communities were formed in other university towns. In October 2000, the Church of Muslims in Hungary⁶ led by dr. Zoltán Sulok and in 2003 the Islamic Church chaired by dr. Sāliḡ Tayšīr were registered. The latter has become the biggest Muslim community in Hungary with several foreign businessmen and student members.

Nowadays there are 5 meeting houses, 7 Islamic foundations and a number of associations led by foreign citizens, mostly businessmen, active in Hungary, but none of them seem to have a tendency for radicalization. On the contrary, they consider each other more as rivals than as potential allies, not so much for confessional, but for personal reasons. That is why they cooperate much more with communities adhering to other faiths than with each other (Linder 2004). Amongst the 25-30 thousand registered Muslims in Hungary (0.3% of the total population) about 4-5 thousand might be ethnic Hungarians, many of them converted wives. The biggest mosques are the Dar as Salam (House of Peace) of the Islamic Church, and the Budapest Mosque of the Church of the Muslims in Hungary headed by dr. Zoltán Sulok. Since 1980 two Quran translations have been published though there are other translations,

⁶ <http://iszlami.com/english>

too. In 2004 the Christian-Jewish Association started the Jewish-Christian-Muslim Free University to introduce the three great monotheistic world religions in comparison. The new Church Affairs Act of 2011 (Act CCVI of 2011 on the freedom of conscience and religion, and the legal status of religious confessions and communities) made the founding and operating of churches more difficult than it used to be by bounding their recognition to a minimum (10,000) of members. That is why the two biggest Muslim communities, the Hungarian Islamic Community and the Church of Hungarian Muslims founded the Hungarian Islamic Council in 2012 that represents the Muslims in Hungary now as an umbrella organization. Similarly restrictive regulations are in effect in the Czech and the Slovak Republic, where religious communities of at least 10 thousand and 20 thousand believers respectively are allowed to establish a church. That is why in Slovakia, for example, there is no registered Muslim religious organization, except for the Slovak Islamic Foundation (Islamska nadácia na Slovensku) which is a representative body of Muslims but not a church (Pap & Kitanics, 2014:300-301).

In the recent years Turkey started a campaign of re-Islamization and financed Islamic centers generously in the former communist, and consequently “atheistic”, South-Eastern Europe, particularly on the Balkans relying partly on local or immigrated Turkish groups, partly on genuine local Muslim believers (Korkut, 2010). The gigantic mosque planned for Tirana within the scope of this religious diplomacy will host 4,500 people, but several other mosques were built or renovated in the entire Balkans. After two failed attempts of constructing mosques in Hungary⁷, now two significant mosques are planned. The one in Budapest is planned upon the model of the Süleymaniye Mosque built by Mimar Sinan Pasha in Istanbul, and another one in the town of Debrecen. The latter is planned to be constructed in cooperation with the Yunus Emre Cultural Center founded by Turks settled in Hungary, the Hungarian Islamic Community and the Hungarian State as well as the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı).⁸ This is a new step in the friendly connections between Turkey and Hungary developing since the mid-1990s.

Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister (1965-1993) and President (1993-2000), Tansu Çiller, Prime Minister (1993-1996) and Necmettin Erbakan, Prime Minister (1996-1997) of Turkey were strong supporters of Hungary’s NATO accession and Hungary returned this favor by supporting Turkey’s EU aspirations. Nevertheless, Hungary’s Muslims are not fully satisfied. Dr. Zoltan Bolek, Chairman of the Hungarian Islamic Community warned the Ministry of Human Resources in a letter to turn to the Muslim World League with a complaint because of the anti-Islamic behavior by the Hungarian Government, and to initiate a boycott by the Islamic countries against Hungary. In 2015, Hungarian Islamic Community announced a ban (haram) to the ruling Hungarian government (of the Fidesz Party) because of its propaganda against the Moslem asylum seekers.

While Western European countries are seeking the explanation for the radicalization of their Muslim communities, in Hungary and other countries of the eastern part of Central Europe (Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland as well as the Baltic states) the opposite development should be explained. The reasons are to be found partly in the general political, social and economic conditions and trends in these countries, partly in the sociological structure of their Muslim populations and the interaction of these factors.

⁷ See: <http://koos.hu/2010/05/13/mosque-az-also-mecset-magyarorszagon-a-latvanytervek/>

⁸ See visualization: http://vigyazo.blog.hu/2015/05/15/ezt_a_hatalmas_mecsetet_epithetik_budapestre

First of all, the Muslim population in Hungary and the other countries mentioned above are very small and diverse (Rekawek, 2014). Contrary to Poland and Romania, Hungary does not even have an indigenous Muslim minority. In Hungary, therefore, all Muslims are immigrants, descendants of the same and converts of Hungarian ethnic background. Most of them are still former students coming from Muslim countries, who had been subjects of a careful selection procedure both by their homeland authorities and the security services of the target country supervised by the Soviet intelligence services themselves. The main selection principles were political reliability and intellectual preparedness for the university studies that were determined in most cases by the delegating country, and not by the applicant. The prospective students were predominantly males coming from families loyal to or closely linked with the central and local ruling administrative and military elite that followed the Marxist-Leninist dogma including its anti-religious attitude. In practice, they were, almost without exception, children of the secularized upper classes or upper middle classes increasingly distancing themselves from the rigorous interpretation of Islam out of conviction or political reasons, considering religion a threat to their political power. The approved study programs in the so called ‘brotherly’ countries were limited to technical sciences, engineering, economy and medical studies, but excluded the – potentially ideology based – human or social sciences. It meant that the student’s predispositions brought from home excluded or at least hindered any inclination to radicalism. Facing the – in spite of the Soviet rule – European (Western) liberties in everyday life, the liberal attitudes in social and family relationships, sexual life, the selection of wives and consorts, consuming alcohol, dressing, lack of centuries-old taboos etc., many of them felt attracted to irreligious life and the communist state supported that. Incompetent students were sent home shortly. The average 5-6, in case of medical doctors 6-9 years spent in Hungary with studies, while being deeply integrated in the intensive social environment of intellectual youth, became decisive for their way and view of life. Many of them got married partly out of love, partly aiming to remain and start a carrier in Hungary or later elsewhere in Europe, under more beneficial circumstances than in their homelands. Their links to their home countries became looser and looser. Therefore, Muslim students did not form a real community, neither at the moment of their arrival nor later, neither based on the common homelands nor based on Islam. It was much more the individual sympathy that interlinked Muslim persons and friends’ companies. These do exist even today in business connections. Enthusiastic believers constituted only a minority among Muslims, but no case of a spontaneous radicalization process is known (like that of Sayyid Qutb during his stay in the USA). Arabs and Sub-Saharan Africans were popular partners among Hungarian female students (however, less popular among the parents of the latter). For those who got married and usually got children very soon, their Hungarian families, i.e. their wives’ families and the administrative and business world (nursery, kindergarten, elementary school, working places for trainees, employment etc.) became the site of a secondary socialization decisive for their individual future that loosened or cut their habitual and emotional links to their Muslim homelands. These former students from Islamic countries became honorable family fathers and thanks to their qualifications high ranked professionals and/or businessmen fitting fully into the social context of their host country. Many of their wives and children met their Muslim parents-in-law and grandparents respectively only a couple of times, did not learn their language and grew up as Hungarians having all skills necessary to take a good start in life, and were devoid of the consciousness of having Muslim roots or solidarity with their fathers’ homelands. The situation was very similar in the case of the high number of divorces, too. In such cases the Muslim fathers

returned home, the Hungarian wives and the children remained in Hungary, or the Hungarian wives if they beforehand had followed their husbands to their Muslim homelands returned to Hungary with their children. Since the divorces took place a couple of months or years after the marriage, the children usually remained with their mothers. The conversion of wives to Islam was at that time neither customary nor necessary, not even in the homeland of the husbands as the countries in question were at that time more or less secular and seemingly tolerant in faith affairs. Nevertheless, in several cases Hungarian wives converted to Islam, got integrated into their husbands' families and the children got a dual education, including Arabic language and Islamic guidance. To sum it up, originally irreligious attitude, confessional indifference, mathematically oriented technical professions, long lasting high and stable social status and acceptance, a long lasting secondary socialization, deeply internalized secondary (European) values in the everyday and professional life as well as a flexible personality saved the majority of Muslims in Hungary from radicalization. However, it should be added that when former Muslim students were young, Islamic radicalism was still unknown in Europe as it was the period of modernization experiments in the developing countries. The former Muslim students belong today in the senior generation of 50-60 years or older. Their children are in the age group of 30-35 years and are similarly highly positioned so their en mass radicalization is improbable.

It is to be mentioned that in spite of the rigorous selection during the communist period quite a few Muslim students abandoned their university education and settled down in Hungary, mostly through marriage. They financed their life from the so called shadow economy, i.e. peripheral or quasi illegal business activities partly tolerated for political reasons by the communist dictatorship. These, however, were more single cases than a mass phenomenon. Since then, these activities have been transformed on the one hand into legal businesses, or, on the other hand into the per excellence organized crime, such as illegal currency exchange on the street, money laundering, trade of imported products without paying tariffs and taxes, illegal drug and arms trade, human trafficking, exploitation of prostitutes etc. Violent crimes, in which Muslims were involved as perpetrators or victims (e. g. Nađi Awad, Bassam Trache etc.) were probably the results of business or gang rivalry.

In the second period of the Yugoslav Civil War, i.e. in the so called Bosnian War (6th April 1992 – 14th December 1995), 48,000 Bosniaks, mostly Muslims, were fleeing to and seeking asylum in Hungary from the brutal ethnic cleansing by the aggressive Serb nationalists. They were accommodated together with further 20,000 other asylum seekers from the Balkans in the 32 provisional refugee camps established in Hungary's southern border region (Póczik, 1999:297). Nevertheless, the greatest part of the South-Slav refugees, including the Muslim Bosniaks, had disappeared by the end of the 1990s, the majority of them returned home and a minor part migrated to Western Europe.

Hungary acceded to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967 in 1989 (March 1) maintaining the restriction of excluding asylum seekers from outside Europe from the local refugee procedure and from the social care offered in Hungary. This restriction was dissolved because of constitutional and human right concerns in Act CXXXIX. of 1997 on Refugee Rights. This Act opened Hungary's borders for the refugees from the Middle and Far East as well as South Asia and Africa. Due to that the structure of immigration including refugees has changed substantially. More and more refugees arrived from the conflict zones, mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria. Nowadays about 2,500-3,500 African immigrants – mainly from North, Central and West Africa – are living in Hungary, constituting 2 % of all immigrants (Glied, 2011:192). Turks and Iranians, in much smaller

numbers, have also arrived with economic goals, seeking investment opportunities or employment in business, catering industry, entertainment or other trades, or seeking asylum.

Hungary's integration into the EU in 2004 attracted a smaller new wave of young Palestinians, Yemenis, Syrians, mainly from the Aleppo and Idlib regions and Africans as well. Their number is slowly growing, at about 25% per year. The majority of them are Muslims. They and their families bring stricter and more vital Muslim traditions from home, determining everyday life, including obligatory worship, eating rules and dress code for man and woman as well as gender hierarchy, than the Muslim students in the communist era did. Due to the liberalization of social roles, ethnic Hungarian women having Muslim husbands increasingly decide to convert to Islam and to subjugate themselves to the *šarī'a* and the Islamic rules of life, even within Hungary. It means that they either have a dual identity or reject their ethnic identity to the benefit of the Muslim identity. Based on general experiences, in these circles the risk of radicalization seems to be higher, even if in Hungary there is no evidence available for that.

The latest large immigration wave of Muslims to Hungary starting in 2012 from Kosovo and lasting until today triggered a panic in the Hungarian state administration since until November of 2015 some 180,000 refugee applications have been submitted (455 accepted).

Registered refugee applicants in Hungary	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	1,693	2,157	18,900	42,777	176,903

Citizenship	2011	2012	2013	2014
Afghanistan	649	880	2,328	8,796
Kosovo	211	226	6,212	21,453
Syria	91	145	977	6,857

Source: Hungarian Office for Immigration and Citizenship (BÁH)⁹

Although in Hungary the total number of refugee applications showed a twentyfold growth and that of the refugee applications from Kosovo a hundredfold growth in the period of time from 2012 to 2014, the target country for the refugees is not Hungary but much more Germany or other welfare states in Western Europe. Moreover, in accordance with the Dublin III rules the applicants have to submit their refugee request in the first EU country they enter to get at least the theoretical possibility to migrate forth later. That is why the immigrating Muslim asylum seekers are not going to increase the Muslim population of Hungary significantly. Still, the possibility of the presence of radically minded people, adventurers, or foreign agents with special knowledge and mission among the refugees has to be taken into account.

In Hungary there were and there are no huge and concentrated Islamic neighborhoods, so-called parallel societies, comparable to the great cities of Western Europe, and there is no intensive Muslim community life beyond the religious events. Islam in Hungary does

⁹ http://www.bmah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu

not work like a civilization as it would do in normal circumstances in a Muslim country (Póczik, 2011:21) but like a mini-religion on the cultural periphery separated from all other relevant social actors and interactions: it is spiritual but not habitual. Also that is why the Hungarian Muslims do not show any signs of radicalization. Despite contrary whispers it is to be concluded that Islamist propaganda might be present only in a very limited circle.

It is to be remarked that the Islamic communities are under continuous and rigorous intelligence observation partly to protect them from racist activities, partly to filter out the impact of radicals and their ideologies. That is why there are no widely known radical preachers, no massive Islamist radical propaganda and no violent excesses or outrages. Since the National Counterterrorism Center (TEK) was founded in 2010 (Governmental Regulation No. 232/2010.VIII.19.) the intelligence activities and operative counterterrorism measures have been concentrated in one hand. In cooperation with the Muslim communities the TEK prevented some radical Islamist leaders from arriving and pursuing radical Salafist propaganda in Hungary and hindered a number of juveniles from Western Europe and elsewhere in their travel to join the ISIS. Also, the TEK made efforts to filter out agents or potential terrorists, sent by the ISIS or other terrorist organizations to Europe, from the huge migration flow of 2014-2015 (Besenyő, 2015:6).

Regrettably, some occurrences lead to the conclusion that the heritage of the totalitarian dictatorship having the tendency to arbitrary usage of police for political goals beyond the frameworks of legality is partly still an active impact factor. In the spring of 2004, the police arrested the Palestinian dentist dr. Šālih Taysīr with a Jordanian citizenship, the imam of the Islam Church, and accused him of planning an attack against Israeli President Moshe Katzav during his visit to Hungary. The National Security Service kept dr. Taysīr under surveillance for a longer time before his incarceration, but the visit by the Israeli President offered a good occasion to present him a potential Hungarian Muslim terrorist. Dr. Taysīr spent more than two months in pretrial detention, but the prosecutors could find no evidence against him.¹⁰ This action and the ruthless media campaign against dr. Taysīr prompted the representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to complain to the Minister of Foreign Affairs because of the anti-Islamic incitement in Hungary.

Although the Muslim groups do not seem to be receptive to radical ideas, the sources of social radicalization in general do exist in other social strata. The traditional far right ideologies are in prosperity fuelled by the massive sinking of the lower middle class youth whose parents were social winners in the two decades of the communist era. This disappointed youth, prone to radicalism, is mobilized as the riots in 2006 showed, by far right ideas or a special mixture of far right and far left ideas as nationalism, irredentism, anticapitalism, antiliberalism, xenophobia, general safety and social justice (Póczik, 2015).

UNCERTAIN INFORMATION ON (MUSLIM) FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM HUNGARY

Concerning foreign fighters, in the media reports and public opinion different news circle around but none of these can be trusted. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, nor the Counterterrorism Center (TEK) has information about Hungarian citizens serving as soldiers in Syria or Iraq. The data in official statistics published on the website of the

¹⁰ Megszüntették a palesztin fogorvos elleni eljárást <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20040915megszuntettek.html>

Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed 40 Hungarian citizens fighting and 5 dead, but the figures have not been updated and have become unavailable since. A video filmed by Yāsīn Abū Riyād and published on 3th May 2013 on Youtube showed the Hungarian Ali Martyr Brigade¹¹ shooting with a mortar aimed at the pro-government Šabbīḥa unit (The Ghosts) in Aleppo's suburbs Nabl and Zahra¹². In June of 2013 the webnews Index referring to the data by the freedomfalconofsyria blog¹³ reported 11 Hungarian pro-Assad fighters killed in Syria who were "all members of the neo-Nazi Hungarian Guard Movement" and further 4 killed with Syrian-Hungarian dual citizenship amongst the rebels, as well as 10-12 Hungarian Guard members being imprisoned in Damascus. Dr. Zoltán Bolek, Chairman of the Hungarian Islamic Community and dr. Zoltan Sulok, Chairman of the Church of Muslims in Hungary said in the interview made for the same report that they were not aware of any Muslims from Hungary fighting in Syria. The interviewed former members of the Hungarian Guard dissolved by the court said there were former professional soldiers, mercenaries and soldiers of the French Foreign Legion in the Guard who perhaps serve in Syria for money.¹⁴ The leftist website www.rosszabbik.com also reported, referring to Syrian sources, that the Hungarian Guard was involved in the Syria War on Baššār al-Asad's side and had lost 11 fighters by June 2013.¹⁵ The online tabloid blikk.hu reported on 26th June 2013 that there were Hungarian fighters on both the government's and the rebel's side who fought each other, and published a photo of 8 probably Hungarian citizens or persons residing in Hungary.¹⁶ According to the opinion of some native Syrians residing in Hungary, the participation of the Hungarian Guard's members in the civil war on Asad's side is quite unlikely.

On June 27th 2013 blikk.hu reported – referring to an anonymous informant from Damascus - that 93 Hungarian fighters were active in Islamist militias (6 in the Ġabhat an-Nuṣra) fighting against Asad, but only 12 of them were of Arab origin. The other 81 were antifascists who went to Syria to fight against the Hungarian fighters of the extreme rightwing Hungarian Guard supporting Asad and killed 11 of them in the battle around the Airport of Damascus.¹⁷ Márton Gyöngyösi, foreign affairs expert of the Jobbik Party, who was the founder of the Hungarian Guard, commented that even if this was true at all the Guard's members were participating in the war as private persons and not on behalf of the Party. He said the Jobbik Party was in principle a supporter of Asad, but had no connection to his government. On the contrary, in the study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Flashpoint Global Partners (Zelin & Kohlmann & al-Khourī, 2013) as well as the ICCT Report (Bakker & al. 2013) no Hungarian foreign fighter is mentioned.¹⁸

¹¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8t-Yn4yqQY> حةي بشل لاقاعم فصقب موقت يرجم ال عديءشلا ءبتيك ءارهزل او لبن يف

¹² Šabbīḥa حةي بشل (al-Jaysh al-Sha'bi – the People's Army) are armed Alawite groups in support of the Assad government of Syria.

¹³ <https://securecdn.disqus.com/uploads/mediaembed/images/527/2969/original.jpg>; <https://securecdn.disqus.com/uploads/mediaembed/images/524/1408/original.jpg>

¹⁴ http://index.hu/kulfold/2013/06/26/harcolnak-e_magyarok_sziriaban/

¹⁵ <https://rosszabbikblog.wordpress.com/2013/06/18/nem-vicc-a-kerdes-komoly-sziriaban-mar-gyilkol-a-magyar-garda/>

¹⁶ <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/krimi/egymasra-lonek-a-magyarok-sziriaban/d18pgx7>

¹⁷ <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/nem-kerne-kzsoldot-a-magyarok-a-szirektol/e4wgdtm>

¹⁸ <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Bakker-Paulussen-Entenmann-Dealing-With-European-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>

On 29 September of 2013 TV channel ATV published a video report in which two native Syrian fighters from Hungary were presented. Commander Muṣṭafa ‘Abd Allah and Muḥammad ‘Abd Allah (probably codenames) were interviewed in Aleppo. They were members of the Idlib-based Suqūr al-Islām (Suqoor al-Islam / Suqour al-Sham - Eagles of Islam), which belonged to the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Both were fluent in Hungarian, reported to have lived almost 20 years in Hungary and left their wives and children in Hungary for the time of the war. Each of them said that he returned to Hungary every month.¹⁹

In January 2014, the Israeli Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a paper on the Internet in which “about” 12 Hungarian fighters are mentioned without details, with the remark “according to an estimate of Hungarian intelligence published in the local media”.²⁰ In February 2014, a study published on the web estimated the figure of Hungarian participants in the Syrian war at 12 (Ehrenfeld, 2014). In June 2014 the Soufan Group’s study mentioned Hungary among the “other states from which citizens or residents are reported to have gone to fight in Syria” (Barrett, 2014:13). In August 2014 the tabloid blikk.hu reported that in 2013 almost 100 persons from Hungary joined the rebels in Syria²¹, but another academic study from November 2014 did not mention any Hungarians (Byman – Shapiro, 2014:11). In the updated version of the Soufan Group’s Report of 2015 on foreign fighters, no new data are available concerning Hungary (Barrett, 2015:10).



A map purportedly showing the areas ISIS plans to have under its control within five years

Source: Besenyő J. et. al.: *Az Iszlám Állam: Terrorizmus 2.0 – Történet, ideológia, propaganda.* Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 2015. 185.

It can be concluded that in reality some 10-15 Hungarian citizens might be fighting in Syria but more precise data are not available. A number of them are certainly no jihadists but professional mercenaries, who used to serve earlier in the French Foreign Legion or in the Yugoslav civil war. It can be predicted that the present situation in Hungary and in other

¹⁹ Novák András Szíriából ATV Világhíradó Extra 2013. 09. 29. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77Bj2QSR10g>

²⁰ Foreign fighters from Western countries in the ranks of the rebel organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad in Syria: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20616/E_208_13_409304481.pdf (<http://www.atv.hu/kulfold/20140822-magyarok-is-harcolnak-az-islam-terroristak-kozott/pwymh0h>)

²¹ <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/kulfold/magyarok-is-harcolnak-az-islam-terroristak-kozott/pwymh0h>

countries of Central Eastern Europe is temporary and can and would change in a minute. The terrorist threat in these countries is growing. As NATO members they cannot avoid getting involved in the present war(s) in the Middle East. Hungary is on ISIS' target list of war, since a great part of Hungarian territory belonged to the Ottoman Empire for 150 years, therefore, it still counts as part of the *dār al-Islām* and as such an area under foreign domination, which has to be liberated.

With Western Europe presently overcrowded with immigrants, Central Eastern Europe, including Hungary, cannot avoid becoming new targets of the (legal and illegal) immigration waves from the Muslim countries of South-East Asia, the Middle East, North-Africa and the Sub-Sahara as well as of the Balkans. These migration routes are well known and the "migration-business" is run by well trained – partly Muslim – organized criminal networks settled party in Hungary and in the surrounding countries (Póczik, 2008:393-406). Consequently, the unfiltered and relatively young immigrating Muslim population and the number of (mainly female) converts is expected to grow and to become a double rooted or rootless Muslim generation in the coming decades, similar to the problematic young generation of Muslims in Western Europe's metropolises. Because of the general identity crisis in Hungary the time is likely not far when many converted Muslims will follow the example of Muriel Degauque, Samantha Lewthwaite or the ethnic Hungarian Croatian citizen Irén Horák, alias Amina, the former wife of Anwār al-'Awlaqī, the killed leader of al-Qā'ida in Yemen. Amina declared after the death of her husband to be a jihadist who wished to die as a suicide bomber.²²

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²² <http://rtl.hu/rtklklub/fokusz/magyar-a-vilag-egyik-legkeresettebb-terroristanoje>

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Col. István Resperger – Bálint Somkuti:

HYBRID WARFARE OR THE EVER CHANGING FACE OF WAR

“War is a chameleon.”
Carl von Clausewitz

ABSTRACT: *By assessing the views of several experts on the topic, the authors of this paper argue that hybrid warfare in the 21st century – conceived under various descriptions that prove to be equivalent in the final analysis – is a complex phenomenon that blurs the boundaries between war and peace, defies characterization in traditional terms and encompasses all aspects of life, being a reaction to changes in the current international environment.*

KEYWORDS: *hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, Fourth-Generation Warfare, grand strategy, non-linear warfare, military theory*

INTRODUCTION

Old words getting a new meaning are a sure sign of an ongoing transformation. It does not really matter whether this transformation obvious or hardly visible. When such age-old words as war get permanent prefixes or indices one can be sure that significant changes are underway. Let us not fool ourselves. Whatever definition is accepted to define armed and organized violence, war is here and probably will be here to stay. Widely accepted and well known phrases like “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” are yet to be refuted. As long as humanity remains what it is, and despite numerous efforts to alter it, it has shown little sign of changing in the recent millennia, conflicts will remain with us in the foreseeable future.

The way every society wages war mirrors its technological level, social system, historical experience, ruling ideology, financial possibilities and the limitations of the international relations upon it. The above mentioned thesis is true regardless being the subject of a study the ancient Sparta, the Roman Empire, the First French Republic or the Soviet Union. With the coming of the age of globalization after the end of the Cold War most aspects defining interest advancement underwent serious changes. Some countries were faster in adapting for a number of reasons. As the widely quoted – yet misinterpreted by most people – work by Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui states: “*strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes*”.¹ Non-governmental organizations, credit rating agencies and global media outlets, considered a non-issue by most western scholars, also contribute to the changes wars are fought nowadays and in the near future. The assumption, repeated many times by the authors, and disregarded by most who quote their work is that this “new” war will have no limits. No rules apply, no target is holy enough to be spared, no area - be it physical or cyber – is safe, there is no *hinterland* and no limits to

¹ L. Qiao – X. Wang: Unrestricted warfare. FBIS translation. 1.

wage a war at all. This total, yet at the same time limited warfare has already become part of the 21st century. This new way of war is not only about omnidirectionality, synchronicity and asymmetry,² but also about a war without limits, a war fought along long forgotten motivations, methods and fighters. The above situation seems to be incomprehensible for most western analysts.

The words of General Phillip Breedlove in an interview to a German magazine seem to reflect the recognition that this new way of war has been put into practice, however, this time not by a non-state actor but by Russia. In the interview published by *Die Welt* in August 2014,³ the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) speaking of Russian steps in Ukraine used the phrase hybrid warfare for the first time in public, at least in the recent years. The general summarized hybrid warfare as having DIME (diplomacy, information, military, economy) aspects.⁴ In our understanding this is almost identical to the GIGI (guerillas, information, globalized economy, ideology) of the revised theory of Fourth Generation Warfare. Yet, the above definition is not completely accepted even within the ranks of NATO, since, defying the SACEUR's opinion about hybrid warfare and threats, a 2015 NATO Review article denies even the existence of such "[...] *should forget about everything "hybrid" and focus on the specificity and the interconnectedness of the threats they face. Warfare, whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be subsumed into a single adjective. Any effective strategy should take this complex environment into account and find ways to navigate it without oversimplifying.*"⁵

Based on the above the aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to compare different opinions with the original authors of hybrid warfare and secondly, to provide a different take on contemporary influence advancement, proving that present day grand strategy, hybrid warfare, non-linear warfare and Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) are synonymous, describing the very same phenomenon differently, if at all.

In the first part of the essay a short overview of the origins of the term hybrid warfare will be given, along with a summary of recent essays by various experts dealing with the issue.

In the second part the revised and expanded Fourth Generation Warfare and its connections as well as contradictions will be discussed in detail proving that advancing one's interests has undergone serious changes in the last decades. At the end of the paper, the conclusions section summarizes the efforts to create order in the ever-growing chaos of military terminology dealing with unconventional threats and challenges.

„A critique of 4GW is both fortuitous and important because it also provides us an opportunity to attack other unfounded assumptions that could influence U.S. strategy and military doctrine.”

Antulio J. Echevarria

² L. Qiao – X. Wang: Op. cit. 2.

³ 'Die Nato muss auf grüne Männchen vorbereitet sein' interview mit Gen Phillip Breedlove SACEUR. <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article131296429/Die-Nato-muss-auf-gruene-Maennchen-vorbereitet-sein.html> (Accessed on: 01. 12. 2015.)

⁴ NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nato-commander-breedlove-discusses-implications-of-hybrid-war> (Accessed on: 08. 05. 2015.)

⁵ D. Van Puyvelde: Hybrid war – does it even exist? <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/index.htm> (Accessed on: 2015. 12. 01.)

COINING HYBRID WARFARE

The term hybrid warfare traces its origins back to the first major US military operations of the 21st century, namely Operation Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. To our present knowledge hybrid warfare was coined by William (Bill) Nemeth in his thesis *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, way back in 2002.⁶ The author wrote about a hybrid (modern and ancient) society, which fights in a hybrid way using contemporary and old methods alike. His primary example was the Chechens, who fought fiercely against Russian armed forces in 1994-95 and 1999-2000.

Nemeth acknowledges that: “*Currently a large body of work exists regarding hybrid military forces under the rubric of Fourth Generation Warfare, New Warfare, or more conventional terms such as Low Intensity Conflict and Terrorism.*”⁷

The fact that the above work introduced the term in relation to the geopolitically unimportant Chechnya might explain its relatively little effect on military theory. Therefore most people connect coining hybrid warfare to Frank G. Hoffmann, and not to Bill Nemeth. Hoffmann started studying the reasons after the quick success of conventional warfare in both Afghanistan and Iraq and the inability of the armed forces to quell the following uprisings, which led to a serious theoretical debate.⁸

According to Hoffman: “*American illusions about our relative invulnerability and a military bias towards conventional battles were the first victims of 9/11 and the subsequent war in Iraq [and Afghanistan – the authors]. Kaplan’s Coming Anarchy has arrived with full force along with the culture and identity based divisions of Huntington ‘fault-line’ wars.*”⁹

Hoffman thinks the post-bipolar world has become much more complicated so its events cannot be made clearly distinct by using such old categories as small-big, regular-irregular.

He wrote “*We will most likely be facing hybrid challengers capable of conducting hybrid wars. [...] Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors [...] conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder*”¹⁰

His remarks and critiques are mostly aimed at oversimplifying military views, which try to confine all conflicts into neat and well described terms. In his earlier publications Hoffman wrote about neoclassical counter-insurgency, or complex irregular warfare, yet based on the experience of the full-fledged Iraqi insurgency, the ongoing problems of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 led him to formulate the theory of Hybrid War.

At the conclusion of his essay, summing up the new information related to the American armed forces’ planning, information gathering, doctrinal and organizational cultural adaptation he writes: “*We have to recognize, that perception matters more than results in the physical battlefield.*”¹¹

⁶ W. J. Nemeth: *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*. Master’s Thesis. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5865/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf?sequence=1 (Accessed on: 30. 11. 2015.)

⁷ W. J. Nemeth: Op. cit. 3.

⁸ F. Hoffmann: *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington, 2007.

⁹ F. Hoffmann: Op. cit. 55.

¹⁰ F. Hoffmann: Op. cit. 22.

¹¹ F. Hoffmann: Op. cit. 53.

Yet Hoffman's theory still concentrates on military issues only, and neglects most other challenges such as diplomatic, information-related, or economic factors. The authors agree with him, that in 21st century conflicts the most likely opponents of nation-states will be non-state actors, like Hezbollah, yet as the events leading to the annexation of the Crimea show not only new players can employ hybrid methods successfully.

The effect of the events in Crimea spurred immediate reaction even in the European Union to find ways countering this new threat. Following the Breedlove interview in August 2014 after a NATO-EDA meeting¹² EDA issued a paper on hybrid challenges and by May 2016 there might be a European plan about hybrid threats.¹³

Summing up the above it can be stated that since 2014 there has been an ongoing, sometimes emotionally overloaded debate about hybrid warfare, which along the way managed to completely deviate from the course set by the crafters' original ideas, even though these ideas can still be considered valid.

„[T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ...”

Basil Liddel-Hart

HYBRID WARFARE, NEW GENERATION WAR AND NON-LINEAR WAR

Following the lightning fast annexation of Crimea and the already mentioned Breedlove interview, a theoretical debate arose quickly about the phenomenon in the international as well as the Hungarian military press, about the rebirth of the hybrid warfare's definition, its interpretation and future implications. A work stands out from Hungarian publications.¹⁴ András Rác, a foreign relation expert's work was published first in Hungarian then in English: *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine*.¹⁵

His work is especially worth mentioning because it is written mostly from a civilian viewpoint. After a short historical overview of the events the author points to one often overlooked aspect.

¹² NATO Review. 18. 11. 2014. <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2014/Also-in-2014/Deterring-hybrid-warfare/EN/index.htm> (Accessed on: 08. 12. 2015.)

¹³ Hybrid Warfare. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/hybrid-warfare> (Accessed on: 08. 12. 2015.)

¹⁴ Porkoláb I.: A hadviseléssel kapcsolatos elméletek és elvek változása napjaink konfliktusainak tükrében. Honvédségi Szemle. 2014/6. 6–15. and Koós, G. - Szternák, Gy.: A katonai műveletek új formája – A hibrid műveletek. Szakmai Szemle. 2015/1. 120–137.

¹⁵ Rác A.: Oroszország hibrid háborúja Ukrajnában. Külügyi és Külkereskedelmi Intézet, 2014 and Rác A.: Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015. 3.

“From a methodological aspect research [of hybrid warfare] must follow induction, since hybrid warfare as it appears in Ukraine is a previously unknown phenomenon, at least unseen in practice before, therefore it is completely lacking literature. Because of the above theoretical assumptions have to be formulated based upon the experience of real life events.”¹⁶

The author deserves credits first, for recognizing the ongoing propaganda war, waged by both sides, which fact is often overlooked in most non-military writings dealing with the conflict. And second, for his efforts to have an unbiased picture of the ongoing events. The first chapter of his paper presents a short overview of asymmetrical warfare theory. After discussing the theoretical foundation of asymmetrical/guerilla warfare the author turns to describing the “Gerasimov-doctrine” – later to be presented in more detail, which term is first used in Hungarian by him. In the second part the details of hybrid warfare as applied in Ukraine are presented. Rácz’s paper is also notable for the first attempt (at least according to present knowledge), to give a framework of a hybrid operation splitting it into 3 steps (preparation, attack, consolidation) divided into 9 phases. While obviously genuine and creative, the presented method focuses narrowly on occupying territories and gives the overall impression of a military operation supported by public administrative and propaganda efforts. This assumption is wrong in our understanding of the events. In our view hybrid warfare in complete compliance with Bill Nemeth is the modern grand strategy, which is war’s reaction to the completely changed environment.

Credit must be given to him for identifying the underlying reasons of a possible hybrid operation, such as superiority of force by the attacker, a weak state as target, strong dislike toward the central government by the locals, significant ethnic minority, logistic support from outside, and media presence. Of course, the above factors help to fight a victorious hybrid war, but most can be replaced by other factors. For example ideology can be as varied as ethnic, religious, other ideological, party-affiliated or a combination of the above, not to mention countless guerilla organizations that have fought successfully for decades, while obviously being militarily and economically weaker than their opponents.

General Gerasimov wrote in his 2013 piece about the new generation of wars¹⁷, which are characterized by him as having a blurred boundary between war and peace, therefore the eruption or escalation of conflicts are not followed by declarations of war. Non-military means to achieve political and strategic objectives are more and more important, due to the fact that their efficiency is higher than those of military means. In his opinion this new warfare will be more prevalent in the future, including classical state-state conflicts. In this new and indirect approach a wide range of political, information-related, humanitarian and other non-military tools will be used in order to subdue the opponent, especially through propaganda means. In his conclusion he underlines that irrespectively of the opposing forces’ size or equipment modern environment enables victory, since in the 21st century all possible adversaries have weaknesses, which can be used to enforce their defeat.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ V. Gerasimov: *Cennoszty nauki v predvignyennyj*. <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632> (Accessed on: 05. 12. 2015.)

¹⁸ M. Galeotti: *The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War*. <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/> (Accessed on: 09. 08. 2015.)

Other Russian experts went further along their lines defined by Gen. Gerasimov coining non-linear wars,¹⁹ which describes future wars where everybody and everything is part of the struggle. The struggle encompasses all aspects of life blurring the lines of conflict. It is worth comparing the above with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation of Unrestricted Warfare's foreword quoting one of the authors Senior Colonel Qiao: *"the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."*

The above are in agreement with the definition of modified 4th generation warfare theory:

"Fourth generation warfare is an activity aimed at achieving clearly defined political goals. In most cases this activity is carried out through non-military means, by one or more organizations sharing a common ideology. Generally accepted rules about military activities do not confine their methods, which are applied in one or more areas simultaneously in a way that their effects strengthen or enable each other. To apply this method the following criteria are prerequisite: general human rights, non-governmental organizations, globalized economy, and information technological interconnectedness.

Its subareas are:

- global guerillas*
- information warfare, including cyber warfare*
- economic manipulation, financial maneuvers supported by media*
- ideological, human rights, and other perception-based operations*
- or a combination of the above by state and non-state actors alike"²⁰*

General Breedlove's definition of hybrid warfare: *"Under hybrid warfare usually we understand the use of special forces supported by cyber and information warfare and deception. The Russians occupied Crimea through this method and support Eastern Ukrainian rebels the same way, but this method is not a cure for all. The mixture is new but the ingredients are known to everybody"*²¹

"A war is a war is a war." Colonel Harry Summers

CONCLUSIONS

It cannot be stated enough times that the environment of any military operation, be it high or low intensity conflict, has changed significantly. Conventional warfare's tactics, techniques and procedures even when applied correctly can lead to disastrous consequences. The outcome of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, not to mention the 2006 Lebanon War has to be evaluated thoroughly and the findings rigorously applied both in military theory and practice. What is more, grand strategy, traditionally crafted by politicians, civilians that is, has also to be adjusted. Modern interest advancement is the continuation of politics by all means, to paraphrase Clausewitz.

Based on the above, it is easy to draw the conclusion: hybrid warfare is a reaction to the changes in current international environment in effect it is THE modern grand strategy. You may call it as you like hybrid or new generation war, non-linear, 4th generation or

¹⁹ N. Dubovickij: Bez nyeba. Russzkij Pionyer. 12 March 2014. <http://ruspioner.ru/honest/m/single/4131> (Accessed on: 25. 11. 2015.)

²⁰ Somkuti B.: A negyedik generációs hadviselés – az érdekvényesítés új lehetőségei. Doctoral dissertation. National University of Public Service, 2012, 93.

²¹ USAF General Phillip M Breedlove NATO Saceur in Jane' Defence Weekly. 15 April 2015, 34.

unrestricted warfare, or just simply war, since we all know that war is a phenomenon with the adaptation capabilities of a chameleon.

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Cpt. Zoltán Somodi:

WHY ARE MILITANT ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAN IN CENTRAL ASIA?

ABSTRACT: Militant Islamist movements cause insecurity and wage wars of different intensity in nearly every corner of the Islamic world. Some of them cooperate with each other, sometimes they share ideology and strategic goals, and sometimes they are rivals, or even enemies. These movements achieve different levels of success in the regions they operate in. This article analyses these differences in the Middle Eastern and Central Asian regions. The main factors that lead to different outcomes are Islamic identity, the nature of imperialism experienced by the respective regions, the nature of regime repression, and the policies of regional and global great powers in connection with these movements.

KEYWORDS: Islamism, terrorism, Middle East, Central Asia, Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hezbollah, Hamas, IMU

Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, and the start of the Global War on Terror, Islamist militancy has come to the focus of international security attention. Global Jihad became one of the main security concerns for the West. Before these attacks, militant Islamism for the average Westerner was a distant phenomenon mainly located in the Middle East and some other parts of the Muslim world.

The aim of this essay is to look into the causes of the difference between how these militant Islamist organizations are able to influence the political development of their respective regions. The criteria to define this impact can be different, ranging from coming to power, being a significant part of the political system or being able to wage a protracted war with significant popular support. On the other hand, it can be stated that the militant organization fails to achieve its goal if it is relatively easily suppressed without getting integrated into the political system and without significant concessions from the side of the legitimate government and also if it fails to achieve a solid popular support. In short, success means to mobilize enough support to achieve a deliberate progress towards its strategic goals.

A useful framework to evaluate the relative mobilization success of these movements is social movement theory and its adaptation to the Islamist rebellions by Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz. Not only is it possible to find the causes of the terrorists' rebellious acts and militancy, but it also gives insight to some of the key aspects of their failures. Talking about the causes of Islamist militancy, the political process approach¹ also tells us about the reasons why these movements are less successful in Central Asia. They face institutional exclusion and repression in both regions, although the nature of this repression differs. This repression then forces the movements to build loosely structured exclusive

¹ M. M. Hafez: *Why Muslims Rebel*. London: Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

organizations and adapt anti-system frames,² but in this regard there is also a difference between Middle Eastern and Central Asian militant organizations. As this essay will argue, one of the main “ingredients” of the anti-system framing, the ethical justification is different in the two regions, and the reason for this is the difference between the religious identities of their populations. This difference is probably one of the main causes why militant Islamists of Central Asia achieve much less popular support than their counterparts in the Middle Eastern region. Other causes include the differences between the timing and targeting of government repression and international support provided for militant Islamist organization operating in the two regions.

COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Identity

In the case of militant Islamism the most important factor is that Islam plays a rather different role in the Middle East and Central Asia, and this difference has a direct effect on the mobilization success of militant Islamist movements. According to Hafez’s political process approach discussed above, one of the essential parts of rebellion is the articulation of anti-system frames, and one method to do this is by ethical justification.³ Religious identity is extremely important in this aspect, because it is the key moral background that can justify violence. The concept of Jihad can only be attractive to the potential recruits if they are influenced strongly enough by the Islamist doctrine it originates from. The mobilization potential depends on the success of the frame to resonate within a given community. Where the frame can rely on an indigenous identity or culture, its mobilization potential will be enhanced.⁴ In the Middle East, especially in the Arab world, the religious identity of the population is much stronger than that of the people in Central Asia and also much more supportive of militant Islamism.⁵ This has a number of reasons.

The fundamental one is the difference between the nature of Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia. The most influential school of interpretation (madhab) in Central Asia is the Hanafi school, which is considered to be the most tolerant of the four Sunni madhabs, philosophical and open to mysticism. This type of Central Asian Islam is less adherent to political activity and less supportive of Islamist radicalism. Sufism is also very important and influential in Central Asia, and it has historically incorporated local popular cults and animistic beliefs into its practices. Another element of Islam in Central Asia is the so-called “popular Islam” that has incorporated some elements from pre-Islamic shamanism, and is most apparent in the practice of pilgrimages to holy sites or mazars and the belief in the healing power of these holy sites.⁶ All these factors contribute to a rather different development in Islamic identity that is much less supportive of radical Islamism than the widespread Islam in the Middle East.

² Ibid.

³ M. M. Hafez: *Op. cit.*, 158.

⁴ Q. Wiktorowicz: *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, 16.

⁵ Besenyő J.: *Az Al-Kaida térnyerése a Maghreb régióban*. *Seregszemle*, 8/3. 2010, 148–154.

⁶ J. Gunn: *Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism and the state in Central Asia*. *Sociology of Religion*. 64/3. 2003, 389–410.

A second important factor that shapes divergent Islamic identities is the difference between the colonial experiences of the two regions. As Volpi argues, the colonial and mandate system in the Middle East and North Africa did not dismantle the indigenous religious authorities, instead used them as intermediaries between the local population and the colonial administration. The religious authorities were preserved but also marginalized under the colonial legal framework, which led to a dispute between Islamic political forces. In Central Asia, the Soviet imperial legacy was very different, because the regime repressed and eliminated indigenous traditional religious authorities, and imposed an official Islam that was only a cultural phenomenon. There was also no ground for inter-Islamic political discourse. The Islamist movement within the Soviet Union was separated from the mainstream Islamist thinking in the Middle East, therefore Central Asian Islamism did not contribute to political modernism after the end of the imperial era the same way as it did in the Middle East.⁷ In contrast, the Middle East preserved its Islamic identity to a much greater degree during the colonial period, and the people have maintained their Muslim character in the Arab world. Muslim culture was excluded from representation and confined to the cultural and private spheres, but it did not disappear. This is the background from which Islamism came to being in the Middle East.⁸

The third important aspect of identity is the national identity which is also different in the Middle East and Central Asia. National identity and its frustration is important in the perspective of popular support to radical Islamist organizations. The “fatal cocktail” of suicide terrorism includes not only the religious devotion but also frustrated nationalism, for example caused by foreign military occupation.⁹ This is the strongest ingredient that contributes to the successful mobilization of the most prominent Middle Eastern militant Islamist movements – Hamas and Hezbollah. It is obvious that the frustrated Palestinian and – after 1978 – Lebanese national identity contributed significantly to the appeal of these militant organizations, that can be sharply distinguished from transnational Islamist organizations in that they are fighting for a national agenda, in a geographically defined territory. They are even more motivated by these nationalist goals than by their religious fanaticism although religion is still an important factor in their overall motivation.¹⁰ In Olivier Roy’s classification they are either Islamist organizations (aiming to reach political power in a certain state and Islamize it from above) or neo-fundamentalists (lacking specific territorial or national determination and striving to establish an imaginary Caliphate over the entire umma), although there is no clear distinction between the two, it is rather a drift from the first to the second option for practical reasons – unsuccessful attempts to grab power.¹¹ In this classification, Hezbollah and Hamas are Islamist movements, and Hizb ut-Tahrir is a neo-fundamentalist movement.

On the other hand, Central Asian nationalisms are not frustrated by a foreign occupying force, and there is nothing like Israel – a fundamentally alien civilizational enclave – located in the heart of Central Asia on the territory of any Central Asian nation that could be looked

⁷ F. Volpi: Pathways of Islamist Mobilization against the State in the Middle East and Central Asia. In: R. Hinnebusch – S. N. Cummings: *Sovereignty after Empire: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2011, 242–259.

⁸ F. Burgat: *Face to Face with Political Islam*. London, New York, NY: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003, 45.

⁹ M. Crenshaw: *Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay*. *Security Studies*. 16/1. 2007, 133–162.

¹⁰ M. Ayoub: *The Many Faces of Political Islam*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008, 20–21.

¹¹ O. Roy: *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, 75–88.

upon and treated as a common target and justification for Jihad. As Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Qaeda emphasizes the clash of civilizations between Muslims and the West, their attempt to mobilize popular support with these frames will be only partially successful without significant enough nationalist grievances in the Central Asian region.

Imperial heritage

The state systems of the two regions under examination were created after imperial rule and they are the outcomes of policies of outside forces, not the natural result of indigenous political developments. However, there are significant differences between the processes of the creation of regional state systems by empires. In the Middle East, colonial powers (Great Britain and France) established a “maritime commercial empire” that was fundamentally different in its attributes from the Central Asian “land-based bureaucratic empire” created by Russia and the Soviet Union.¹² Great Britain and France utilized a divide-and-rule principle to divide the Middle East and North Africa into states in a way that deliberately ignored local identities. By excluding local elites from the imperial decision making and blocking integration with the core,¹³ these empires did not produce an assimilating identity so the local identities were preserved. However, because the artificial boundaries did not coincide with national identities, these states were subject to an ever recurring challenge from sub-state and supra-state identities. One of the important supra-state identities is the pan-Islamic identity that is the engine of Islamist movements. The division of the region into entities that are not concurrent with national communities causes the so called “state-to-nation incongruence”.¹⁴ In the Middle East the nation-to-state imbalance is high, leading to regional war-proneness in general, and stronger revisionist movements in particular.¹⁵ Militant Islamist movements are of course a good example of such revisionist movements.

By contrast, in Central Asia, the imperial heritage was rather different. The land-based bureaucratic empire, the Soviet Union sought to destroy the old indigenous ruling elites, and not to coopt them. The communists imposed a new common identity and allied themselves with the new, emerging ruling class, who had a stake in the imperial political life.¹⁶ This common identity – homo sovieticus – gradually marginalized homo islamicus. This imperial rule also differed from the Middle Eastern colonial empires in a sense that it did not entirely build its economic system on the outright exploitation of the colonies, and education and industrialization brought some benefits to the local economy. Central Asian nationalism was not frustrated by the imperial experience, and even before the empire collapsed, the Central Asian member states had a basic form of statehood within the borders of the Soviet Union. Their borders followed linguistic boundaries and at least tried to resemble national identities.¹⁷ Even though the Central Asian states also suffer from a certain degree of legitimacy deficit, in particular from sub-state identities, there is no supra-state identity comparable to

¹² S. N. Cummings – R. Hinnebusch: *Sovereignty after Empire: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ B. Miller: *Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity*. *Security Studies*. 15/4. 2006, 666.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ S. N. Cummings – R. Hinnebusch: *Op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

pan-Arabism or pan-Islam in Central Asia. Pan-Turkism never achieved such a great mobilizing power as pan-Arabism in the Middle East because the Central Asian nations never really shared a great imperial heritage that could be compared to the Arab Caliphate of the 7th century. A shared attribute of the great steppe empires was that they were more of tribal alliances and nomad hordes than homogenous ethnic groupings. Thus all in all, when the empire collapsed, the Central Asian states were reluctant to become independent, and their nationalist grievances were much smaller than it was common in the Middle East.

Regimes

In both regions, regimes are mostly autocratic and repressive towards Islamist movements. The level of authoritarianism varies slightly, but their exclusion from the political system contributes to the militancy of the Islamist movements. On the other hand, inclusion does not necessarily stop violence, as Hezbollah and Hamas, for example, are part of the political system but they have not stopped their violent activities. Because militant Islamists do not set their main strategic goal as “becoming part of the democratically elected political institutions”, this is only a station on the way towards their real objective. But their inclusion means that they have enough organizational and institutional resources, so their mobilization is more successful.

The most important aspect of regime repression is whether it is preemptive and selective, or reactive and indiscriminate in its nature.¹⁸ In this regard, the regimes in Central Asia have an advantage over the Middle Eastern ones, because since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the authoritarian Central Asian countries have inherited a milieu, where Islam itself was repressed by the Soviet government. After gaining independence they could start to repress Islamist opposition forces from a preemptive position. On the other hand, these regimes also put heavy emphasis on supporting a so called official Islam that is supportive to the government and the national idea. This way they are trying to undermine the transnational Islamist movements’ identity resources. However, even though these attempts were made by the governments, and the Islamist movements are under constant pressure by the regimes, which perceive them as the primary threat to their rule, there is an increase in the support towards Islamism, especially those movements that eschew violence (Hizb ut-Tahrir).¹⁹

External Powers

The role of state actors in the spread of militant Islam is profound. The financial and logistical support can be decisive for the ability of these movements to survive, achieve their goals, or can help governments effectively combat militants if external aid is directed towards them. In the Central Asian region there is no state actor that overtly supports any militant Islamist organization. On the contrary, they are threatened by Islamist mobilization and they are using their autocratic power structures to repress these movements. In the Middle East on the other hand, Iran supports the two most successful militant Islamist organizations, Hezbollah and Hamas, and this support cannot be ignored when we are trying to find the causes of relative success compared to Central Asia. Although there are sources that indicate Iranian

¹⁸ M. M. Hafez: *Op. cit.*

¹⁹ V. V. Naumkin: *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*. Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies. 2003, 4.

assistance provided to IMU,²⁰ this cannot be compared to the long standing relationship between Iran and its Islamist proxies in the Middle East. On the other hand, when it comes to international cooperation against militant Islam, there is a quite high level of cooperation between the three major powers, Russia, China and the United States in the Central Asian region, but much less in the Middle East. Central Asian militant Islam directly threatens the interests of all three of these powers, but China and Russia were not so much involved in the Middle Eastern counter-terrorist efforts. Russia's recent anti-ISIS campaign is not coordinated with the US and also counters some key American interests. China's regional policies that favor Iran as her regional ally, although not deliberately aimed at supporting militant Islam, point to that direction indirectly.

INTRODUCTION OF THE MILITANT ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS

Al-Qaeda

For the purpose of comparison between the Middle East and Central Asia, the analysis of Al-Qaeda activities in the two regions can be useful since this is one of the Islamist movements that is active in both regions. Al-Qaeda is the archetype of the global Jihadist non-state organization, an important representative of transnational militant Islam. It was founded by the late Osama bin Laden and most of its fighters were originally veterans of the Afghan-Soviet war from the 1980s. Later other Islamists joined from different countries who were fleeing persecution in their homelands and still later when the organization became more popular, "freelancers" joined its ranks to achieve financial or moral support.²¹ Al-Qaeda is a good example of the exclusive organizations that result from regime repression as a survival strategy. It is more of a network than a strict hierarchy, where the top leadership issues only a broad ideological guidance, but does not take part in operational planning²². In fact, the organization works in a somewhat similar fashion as a franchise.²³ Anyone can be an Al-Qaeda sub-group as long as they work within the same ideological framework and do not commit acts that are explicitly opposed by the Al-Qaeda leadership. This was the case with ISIS when it started to establish the Islamic State instead of focusing their effort on the far enemy. But Al-Qaeda's evolution takes this trajectory even further. By broadcasting their inflammatory rhetoric and ideology, the high level leaderships leaves it to the individual Jihadists to radicalize, and commit violent acts on their own initiative.²⁴

The ideology of Al-Qaeda is widely described with the word Wahhabism, although this is somewhat incorrect since this is an outside term used for the puritanical religious movement founded by Ibn Abd-al Wahhab in the 18th century. They consider themselves simply Sunnis who follow the teachings of Ibn Tayimiyya. This teaching is extremely intolerant to any innovation introduced in the religion after the third century of Islam and they consider

²⁰ R. Weitz: Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 27/6. 2010, 505–530.

²¹ M. M. Hafez: *Op. cit.* 185.

²² Kis-Benedek J. – Kenedli T.: A terrorfenyegetettség új tendenciái és lehetséges válaszlépések. *Szakmai Szemle*. 2015/1, 16–34.

²³ Ch. Hellmich: *Al-Qaeda: From Global Network to Local Franchise*. London & New York, NY: Zed Books, 2011.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

violence against Sufis and Shiites legitimate because they are heretics or apostates.²⁵ This is different from the Islam that is predominant in Central Asia and causes the movement's frames to resonate to a lesser extent there.

Hezbollah

The Lebanese Shiite militant organization began formulating after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon by seceding from the pro-Syrian Shiite militia AMAL. Their first significant attack was the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 240 US military personnel. The organization announced its manifesto in 1985, declaring its strategic goal as the obliteration of Israel and establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. This is an attribute that sharply distinguishes Hezbollah, alongside with Hamas, from Al-Qaeda, because their aims and activities fit into the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁶ The first attack committed against the US Marines was against a military target, which was seen as directly involved in the conflict. Although their ultimate political aim is to be the leader of the Muslim world,²⁷ Hezbollah as a militant Islamist movement does not share the global view of Jihad.²⁸ This is an important factor when we consider why Hezbollah is able to achieve greater mobilization among its constituency. As we saw, when the frustration of religious and nationalist identities overlap, the anti-system frames will resonate stronger.

Since its foundation, the leaders of Hezbollah have been followers of Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini. It means that Hezbollah has a close relationship and cooperation with the Shiite regional power Iran, which supports this militant organization with significant financial, logistic and military assistance. This relationship is mutually beneficial, since Hezbollah is one of the key instruments of projecting Iranian influence in the Middle East, being part of the "Shiite Crescent", or "HISH" (Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, Hamas) alliance.²⁹ Having a regional power behind its back, Hezbollah has a much more solid foundation and can have much more ambitious policies than Central Asian militant Islamist organizations.³⁰ However, Hezbollah is not simply a militant group. Apart from operating a number of charitable organizations, Hezbollah also takes part in electoral politics since 1992. Hezbollah has a dual strategy of resistance, on the one hand against the Lebanese government with peaceful and political means, and against Israel, where even the most violent acts are regarded justifiable.³¹ This points toward the importance of the nationalist grievance in Hezbollah's mobilization success, that makes it more capable to mobilize its supporters than its Central Asian counterparts, which cannot use a frustrated nationalist identity as a recruiting tool.

²⁵ Ch. Hellmich: *Op. cit.* 69.

²⁶ R. El Hussein: Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria. *Third World Quarterly*, 31:5. 2010. 803–815.

²⁷ L. Khatib: Hizbullah's Political Strategy. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 53/2. 2011, 61.

²⁸ M. Ayoub: *Op. cit.* 21.

²⁹ L. Fawcett: The Iraq War ten years on: Assessing the Fallout. *Foreign Affairs*, 89/2. 2013, 325–343.

³⁰ Besenyő J. - Gömöri R.: Christians in Syria and the civil war. In: *Panorama of global security environment* CENAA. 2014, 226.

³¹ R. El Hussein: *Op. cit.*

Hamas

With its origins in the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987, Hamas came to being as an opposition force on the Palestinian political landscape against the claim of the PLO to be the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. From that time on, Hamas was the most important force on the Islamist side within the Palestinian political life and opposition to the secular movements within the PLO. Hamas rejected the idea of the two-state solution and declared that its ultimate goal was to eradicate Israel from the face of the Earth. Later, however, this stance has changed over time. After Hamas entered the political arena, its approach to Israel became more pragmatic and the role of fanatic religious ideology decreased in their declarations.³² However, this change must be considered as a pragmatic approach to gain political power, and nothing more. Hamas officially never withdrew its uncompromising claim and only agreed to a truce (or *hudna*) if Israel retreated behind the 1967 lines.

During the years of the Intifada, Hamas and the other PLO factions were on the same side working together as allies, but with the Oslo Accords, the tension rose and Fatah leader Arafat was considered a traitor by Hamas.³³ Eventually this clash led to a Palestinian civil war that escalated mostly after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, although there is a dispute whether the Hamas-Fatah conflict is a real civil war. But most of these disputes are only about the definition what we can consider to be a civil war in terms of number of casualties and participants.³⁴ Here we can also highlight the importance of the nationalist motives in the mobilization success of Hamas, and the fact that it is inseparable from the struggle between Palestinians and Israelis over the territory of Palestine. Like Hezbollah, Hamas also participates in electoral politics, although at first it was reluctant to do so. But when the opportunity arose, and after Hamas leadership acknowledged that the boycott would not be beneficial for their popular support,³⁵ Hamas entered the 2006 PLC elections and achieved a surprise victory. Again similar to Hezbollah, Hamas also operates a wide variety of charities and provides social welfare services, in the field of healthcare and education. Together with Hezbollah they can be considered to be probably the world's most successful militant Islamist organizations. Both of them have a massive popular support and both are able to heavily influence the political life of the country they operate in.

Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The IMU was formally created in 1998, but its origins date back to the early 90s, when Tahir Yuldashev, a mullah from Namangan, Uzbekistan, broke with the Islamic Renaissance Party after it decided to go into electoral politics and renounced violence. Yuldashev and his followers fought in the Tajik civil war, then after the peace accord left the country and went to Afghanistan to help the Jihad led by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda there. Since then, the IMU had strong connections with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which they upheld until the US invasion in 2001, when the organization suffered a decisive blow and was almost

³² B. Long: The Hamas Agenda: How has it changed? *Middle East Policy*. 17/4. 2010, 132.

³³ D. Tuastad: Hamas-PLO Relations Before and After the Arab Spring. *Middle East Policy*. 20/3. 2013, 86–98.

³⁴ H. Sirriyeh: Is there a Palestinian Civil War? *The Concept and the Impact*. *Israel Affairs*. 17/02. 2011, 247–258.

³⁵ D. Tuastad: *Op. cit.* 89.

entirely wiped out.³⁶ Its military commander Juma Namangani was killed in action, but Yuldashev survived, and was leading his organization until his death by a US drone attack in 2009.

The main goal of IMU is to remove Islam Karimov from power and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, something similar to Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The ideological background of the movement is mostly Wahhabist but it is also influenced by Deobandism, a form of Islam that is popular in Pakistan and was that in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime,³⁷ although there were elements in its ideology that were unacceptable to Wahhabist theologians. Thus the movement was ideologically somewhat isolated from mainstream Salafist movements and can also be considered to be rooted in the local parallel Islam in Uzbekistan.³⁸ But even before the 9/11 attacks, the primary motivation of the group's activities were criminal and not ideological. The movement was so much involved in the Central Asian drug trade that at one point it controlled about 70% of the drug traffic moving to Kyrgyzstan, and it is likely that the main motivation behind the group's early terrorist activity was to cause unrest and instability in the border area to set conditions for drug trading activities.³⁹

IMU was first expelled from Uzbekistan in 1992 after the government banned the Adolat party. Then after the Tajik civil war came to an end, IMU activists went to Afghanistan where they got nearly annihilated by the invading US forces, and most of the fighters and the leadership fled to Pakistan. Having a limited influence on the insurgency in Afghanistan (especially in the northern areas), the movement is still "alive but not well".⁴⁰ This trajectory can hardly be interpreted as a success story of a widely supported and ideologically solid Islamist organization. The organization announced its disbandment in August 2015 and swore allegiance to the Islamic State.⁴¹ The reason for this, aside from the obvious similarities in their ideologies, might be that they are unable to achieve sufficient mobilization and operate effectively on their own. The states where IMU operated were able to suppress and expel it from their territories, and the situation is likely to remain the same in the future.⁴²

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami

This movement was founded in 1953 in East Jerusalem by religious scholar Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. Intended from the beginning to operate as a political party based on the idea of Islam, the party's main objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the whole Muslim world that would encompass the entire umma in one single entity.⁴³ To achieve this goal, Hizb ut-Tahrir propagates a radical, but non-violent change in society to abolish current regimes and social order, and introduce sharia at once, without gradual progress. After sharia is introduced and the Caliphate is established, the Caliph will declare and wage war against

³⁶ R. Weitz: *Storm Clouds over Central Asia?* 2010, 506.

³⁷ R. Weitz: *Op. cit.* 508.

³⁸ Stuart Horsman: *Themes in official discourses on terrorism in Central Asia.* *Third World Quarterly* 26:1, 2008, 199–213., 207.

³⁹ Tamara Makarenko: *Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade.* *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 6:3., 2002, 3.

⁴⁰ R. Weitz: *Op. cit.* 522.

⁴¹ Bruce Pannier: *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.* 08.23. <http://www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-imu-ghazi-uzbekistan-pakistan/27204379.html> (Accessed on: 2015. 10.22.)

⁴² R. Weitz: *Op. cit.*

⁴³ E. Karagiannis: *Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami.* *Europe-Asia Studies.* 58/2. 2006, 261–280.

all non-Muslims – a quite violent and ambitious plan in itself.⁴⁴ It also rejects participation in the democratic institutions and claims that sovereignty rests only with God and not the people. Because the movement refrains from violence and uses propaganda and preaching as their main *modus operandi*, it cannot be considered a “militant Islamist” movement *per se*.

There are two main reasons for still including it to the line of militant Islamists. First, even though they themselves do not commit violent acts, the propaganda messages and teachings that the movement spreads are considered to be instigating political violence and the regimes in Central Asia act accordingly – first and foremost Uzbekistan. Secondly, this cannot be surprising to any Westerner either – the effort to topple the constitutional order, with or without explicit violence is considered an act of crime against the state in most Western countries as well. The border between freedom of speech, minority rights, public order, state authority, and personal liberty is a topic of debate and a matter of interpretation in the liberal democracies too. Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir was not very far from being banned in the United Kingdom after the 2005 London bombings.⁴⁵ Thus, the perception of the Central Asian governments to include Hizb ut-Tahrir to the violent Islamist organizations or its violation of human rights in the process of suppressing it will not be criticized in detail here, just accepted as an existing condition for the purpose of examining its effects on the movement and its mobilization success.

Hizb ut-Tahrir is a real transnational movement, something similar to Al-Qaeda, but different in its non-violent means. It is active in the United States and Western Europe but also in the Middle East. Thus, the Uzbek regime claims that it is imported to Central Asia and not indigenous. This might be true, but Hizb ut-Tahrir is becoming more popular in Central Asia and manages to acquire its necessary resources within Uzbekistan and is less dependent on foreign support.⁴⁶ With the inability of the regimes to provide a viable solution to the economic problems and social modernization, the movement’s popularity is likely to increase in the future.⁴⁷

CONCLUSIONS

By comparing a variety of militant Islamist organizations that operate in both regions (Al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-Tahrir), and some that operate only in one of the regions (Hezbollah, Hamas and IMU), we can draw a few conclusions that describe the nature of Islamist mobilization in the respective regions:

The transnational militant Islamist organization (Al-Qaeda) achieves a greater degree of popular support in the Middle East than in Central Asia. Hizb ut-Tahrir as a non-violent organization is gaining support in some Central Asian countries, especially in Uzbekistan, partly because it renounces violence. The reason for this is the difference between the nature of Islam in the two regions and higher level of state-to-nation congruence in Central Asia. The risk for Central Asian governments might be that they will change their proactive and targeted repression to a more reactive and indiscriminate one, thus increasing the

⁴⁴ E. Karagiannis: *Op. cit.* 275.

⁴⁵ E. Karagiannis: *Op. cit.* 265.

⁴⁶ E. Karagiannis: *Op. cit.* 271.

⁴⁷ V. V. Naumkin: *Op. cit.* 4.

mobilization capabilities of non-violent, but ideologically extremist Islamist organizations – potentially generating more popular support for militant groups.⁴⁸

Those militant Islamist organizations that can build on a strong Islamic identity and a frustrated nationalist identity at the same time tend to be able to mobilize greater popular support and achieve more progress towards their strategic goals as opposed to those movements that can only rely on a thin layer of Islamic identity and a smaller nationalist frustration – as the example of Hezbollah and Hamas shows versus IMU. The Islamic diasporas in Western Europe experience the frustration of their religious and national identities at the same time. The majority lives in religious and ethnic enclaves, and face exclusion at many levels and because of various reasons. These circumstances provide fertile soil for militant Islamist mobilization.

The degree of outside state support given to Central Asian militant Islamist organizations is smaller than that in the Middle East. The causes for such support are not exclusively ideological, but driven by state interests and struggle for regional hegemony, however, in the end they have an effect on the mobilization and strategic success of militant Islamist organizations as well.

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⁴⁸ R. Weitz: Op. cit. 521.

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György Nógrádi:

NATIONAL DEFENCE WITH BARBED WIRE: THE MIGRATION CRISIS AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS

ABSTRACT: Migration is a long-standing phenomenon, which has constantly shaped the international relations through the years. Immigration generated massive economic, political and administrative changes both in the sending state and in the host country. Considering the emerging nations in the beginnings of history or analyzing the rapidly changing population statistics of the war-torn twentieth century, the only common fact is that after the new migration waves, a new international order emerged. The present immigration-flow – culminating in the summer and autumn of 2015 – has already presented its world-shaking impacts. Adapting to the new conditions is a huge challenge to the European continent. Our cohesive policy, the European solidarity, believed shared values and the doctrine of collective responsibility changed to helpless attempts and pointing at each other within a short time. In order to sustain the regional power of Europe, the countries must overcome the shock and assess the options for the solution of local problems (difficulties in settling down, finding employment or education) and for the handling of the instability in the Middle-East and in Africa. Hungary, as a station of the transit routes, came up with strong and independent thoughts regarding the wave of immigrants, which – from the EU's point of view – often looked like an act against the common thinking. The propaganda and the soft, diplomatic solutions alone could not reduce the exponentially raising number of migrants, thus in order to protect the country's borders, the leadership ordered the HDF to build a physical barrier. Several international leaders expressed their displeasure towards the fence, citing – among other things – the right to asylum and the EU solidarity commitments. In the present analysis I prove that the uncontrolled influx and growing terrorist threat could be linked to each other, thereby the physical barriers actually contributed to our country's protection. Furthermore, I present the latest wave of migration, the details of the ongoing difficulties and possibilities, besides; I analyze their expected impact on Europe's and Hungary's security.

KEYWORDS: Migration, Hungary, European Union, Middle-East, Africa, asylum, immigration, Schengen agreement, Dublin agreement, EURODAC, human trafficking, terrorism, ISIS, al-Nusra, Migration Aid, quota system.

THE BACKGROUND OF MIGRATION

Mass migration like the recent flow – that could not be seen since World War II – held a mirror for those who predicted peaceful international relations after the end of the Cold War with the new multi-polar world order. At the same time, neither is any evidence available for the clash of civilizations envisioned by Samuel P. Huntington. Theories, set up in the field of international relations, are seemingly helpless yet. Noticeably, neither international organizations or aid agencies nor peacekeepers were able to solve the destabilization and radicalization in several states of the Middle East and Africa.

Instead of conventional clashes, now the asymmetric warfare and the "new type of" terrorism are a particular threat to the region's security. However, in a number of states in the African continent (the most affected are Chad and Nigeria) and in destabilized parts of the Middle East (Syria, Iraq) terrorist organizations¹ operations pose traditional threat to the local population on a daily basis as well. The unstable – or failed – political leadership, the acute contrast between the tribes, and the radical ideology's spread contributed to the flourishing of terrorist organizations. Radical groups are not afraid of violence, mass killings or of making the "kafirs"² life impossible.³ In Africa, especially the Boko Haram and al-Qaeda units radicalized, in the Middle East activities of the "Islamic State" and its linked groups threaten the inhabitants and destabilize the states' weak administrative and political structure. Thereby, here is no question why hundred thousands of people decide to travel to the stable-looking European continent, where the rule of law applies and the economic prospects circulate freely.

Motivations of those arriving from Africa include that Africa as a whole experiences considerable economic development but social benefits in most countries are still minimal. Terrorist organizations' propaganda, internal political, tribal and other conflicts and the low living standards are clear drivers of radicalization.

According to the Migration Policy Institute, 284,975 asylum applications arrived in 2010 to the EU/EFTA countries. This amount began to grow in the following years, and amounted to 900 thousand people in 2015. While in 2010 most asylum seekers came from Afghanistan or from Russia, due to the changes of the international situation, a sharp increase in Syrian applications (from 5,600 to about 25 thousand) took place in 2012, and by the end of 2015 the number of Syrian refugees had reached 221 thousand. In addition, in 2014, Europe experienced a significant Eritrean and Nigerian immigration from Africa.⁴

According to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, compared to previous years, the number of migrants (and asylum-applicants) started to increase in 2010. Europe hosted the highest percentage of the 214.1 million arriving international migrants (an estimated 69.9 million persons).⁵

Simultaneously with the peak in demand, the human trafficking expanded and the number of groups, who were responsible (inter alia) for the organized human trafficking, increased. In an organized structure, the local smugglers in cooperation with transit countries' groups responsible for reception shipped and transported migrants several times a day.⁶ In contrast to most of the countries of origin, the European legal system and administration procedures

¹ Only in Africa 64 terror- and radical organizations operate. See Kiss Álmós Péter (ed.): *Afrikai terrorista- és szakadárszervezetek*. Budapest: Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely (HVK TKH), 2015, 4.

² Arabic term for unbeliever or infidel. It is used as a derogatory term.

³ Besenyő J. – Prantner Z. – Speidl B. – Vogel D.: *Az Iszlám Állam – Terrorizmus 2.0; Történet, ideológia, propaganda*. Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 2016, 60–81.

⁴ Asylum Applications in the EU/EFTA by Country, 2008–2015 (Q3). Migration Policy Institute. 2015. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2015-q3?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

⁵ International Migration Report. UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 2011. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2011.pdf> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

⁶ Migration from Africa to Europe. Global Initiative. 2014. <http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Migration%20from%20Africa%20to%20Europe%20-%20May%202014.pdf> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

ensured the basic conditions of living for the immigrants. This fact also contributed to the raise in migration statistics. Britain provides 53 dollars,⁷ France 81 dollars, Germany and Sweden roughly 50 dollars weekly in care for people, who acquired refugee status. Hungary granted a monthly aid of 7,000 Forints – 25 dollars – (and if someone didn't ask to receive the provided food service, an additional 1,000 Forints per day for meal), if someone's refugee story was well-based and their refugee application was sent for further detailed examination.⁸ This fact generated, that not only the residents of a war-affected country, but also the neighbouring states' citizens joined the influx. As a refugee status is only given to citizens of destabilized countries, many stated that they were from Syria. In fact, it was quite simple as there was no efficient controlling mechanism of the migration. European politics has always been a patron of the management of humanitarian issues, thus as the refugee crisis began, Germany – with the guidance of German Chancellor Angela Merkel – supported the reception of migrants in the midst of the crisis as well.

European conventions related to the migration, especially the Schengen, the Dublin agreement and the EURODAC system (making fingerprint-database compulsory) could not implement the theoretically well-established regulations. The external Schengen borders were under constant siege and faced the thousands of refugees in early 2014, the harmonized European legislation actually tilted. This change facilitated migration further, as – without any control – more people were able to travel to the European territories. However, the lack of control decreased the general security level in the region as radical persons could easily blend into the crowd. The Islamic State propaganda has repeatedly proclaimed that they sent thousands of loyalty members among migrants.⁹ Although national security services¹⁰ and statements of defence ministers¹¹ have not confirmed this pronouncement, they also acknowledged that there was a chance that some people who were linked to terrorist organizations could take advantage of the lack of control. While according to analyses, terrorist attacks could rather be linked to the second generation of immigrants,¹² in addition to the increase in the real threat in security sector, the general security perception changed significantly during the migration wave.

⁷ United Kingdom Country Report. Asylum Information Database, 2015. <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

⁸ Regular procedure Hungary. Asylum Information Database, 2015. <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/asylum-procedure/procedures/regular-procedure>, (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

⁹ 'Just wait...!' Islamic State reveals it has smuggled THOUSANDS of extremists into Europe. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/555434/Islamic-State-ISIS-Smuggler-THOUSANDS-Extremists-into-Europe-Refugees>, accessed on 17. February 2016.

¹⁰ Böröcz M.: Az illegális migráció és a terrorizmus közti összefüggések vizsgálata. http://tek.gov.hu/tt_pdf/2014/Borocz_Miklos_Az_illegalis_migracio.pdf (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

¹¹ Serbia's Interior Minister, Nebojsa Stefanovic claimed that "there were refugees who fought on the side of the armed insurgent groups, but not on the side of IS and none of them participated on any wanted list". http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=10&dd=15&nav_id=95732 (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

¹² Besenyő J.: Not the invention of ISIS: terrorists among immigrants. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, Volume 5. Number 1., 10. [http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2015.5.1\(1\)](http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2015.5.1(1)) (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

MIGRATION IN PRACTICE

Data

The latest wave of refugees began in parallel with the destabilization of Syria and Central-Africa around September 2013. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees data, in 2014 the number of forcibly displaced people grew to 59.5 million, which is the largest amount since the Second World War.¹³ In 2014, the EU registered 626,710 asylum applications a year, and this figure increased to 900¹⁴ thousand in 2015.¹⁵ Most of them came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. The majority of migrants are young and middle-aged men, but children are also present in large numbers.¹⁶ Germany can be mentioned as the primary destination, 30 percent of asylum applications are submitted there. Another 42 percent is registered in Hungary, France, Italy and Sweden combined. Considering the proportions of migrants compared to the population, Sweden tops the list with 1,570 refugees to 100 thousand people.¹⁷

Migrants arrived to European territories from seven main directions, but the smugglers' routes constantly adapted to the international regulations and environmental conditions. For example, the installation of the Hungarian barbed-wire fence generated a change, and the refugees reached Germany and Sweden via Croatia and Austria, instead of Hungary. The seven major migration routes – listed by the amount of migrants – are the following¹⁸:

- Eastern – Mediterranean route: The most used transit route of migrants from Turkey and the Middle-East, only through this a total of 885 thousand people arrived in Europe in 2015. Most of them travelled through the island of Lesbos. The amount of migrants started increasing radically in January 2015, e.g. in April 216 thousand people arrived here. Similarly to other routes, in November and December the amount of migrants decreased. Most of the people came from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia.
- Western-Balkan route: Across the sea to Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary (after the fence rather through Croatia) in the direction of Germany, more than 764,000 people were transferred.
- Middle- Mediterranean route: 153,946 people. The migration was continuous during the wave of 2014-2015. The route was used more often in 2014, in 2015 the focus shifted to the Western Balkan route. Most of the migrants are from Eritrea, Nigeria

¹³ Global Refugee Crisis, Region by Region. The New York Times. 26 August 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.html> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

¹⁴ Asylum Applications in the EU/EFTA by Country, 2008–2015 (Q3). Migration Policy Institute, 2015. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2015-q3?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

¹⁵ According to Eurostat data, more than 1.2 million people. Asylum and new asylum applicants – monthly data. EUROSTAT, 2016. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tps00189&language=en> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

¹⁶ Share of male (non-EU) asylum applicants in the EU-28, by age group and status of minors. EUROSTAT, 2014. [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Share_of_male_\(non-EU\)_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_age_group_and_status_of_minors_2014_\(%25\)_YB15_III.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Share_of_male_(non-EU)_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_age_group_and_status_of_minors_2014_(%25)_YB15_III.png) (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

¹⁷ 1. annex

¹⁸ Migratory routes map. Frontex, 2015. <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>, date of access: 17. February 2016. See also K. Kuschminder – J. de Bresser – M. Siegel: Irregular Migration Routes to Europe and Factors – Influencing Migrants' Destination Choices. Maastricht University, 2015. www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1436958842.pdf (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

and Somalia, who arrived in Libya at a collection point, from where they travelled by ships to Lampedusa or Malta. Due to the insufficient capacity of ships, disasters occurred¹⁹, for which the coastal states and FRONTEX units tried to find a solution.²⁰

- Western-Mediterranean route: 7,614 people. Refugees have arrived through Morocco to Spain since 2005. Most of them came from Algeria and conflict-torn states of sub-Saharan Africa.
- Eastern borders, through Romania and Ukraine: 1,920 people, mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.
- Western-Africa route: 874 people. From Senegal, Morocco and Mauritania to the Canaries was a frequently used route, but since the revision of security regulations through the transit countries and the sea, fewer migrants arrived to European territories this way.
- Italian cities in Puglia and Calabria: these transit cities also received some migrants due to their direct sea-connection. The traffic was less frequent compared to the previous routes, most of the migrants arrived from Egypt and Turkey.

The summer and autumn weather was favourable to the migration, as the people faced relatively few climate challenges through their journey. However, since the colder period arrived, the amount of migrants has decreased. It is expected that through the next spring period, the migrants who were yet left behind due to their financial situation will start their trip to Europe. The representatives of the Visegrad countries called attention to this fact after their meeting in February 2016.²¹

Finance and aid

Embarking on a trip to Europe requires significant expenditure from the migrants. Traffickers ask for an average of thousands of dollars – mostly through the hawala system²² – for a transport to Italy or Greece. The amount depends on the distance travelled, the road conditions, the level of control and the passenger himself as well.²³ A sub-Saharan pays approximately 800-1,000 dollars, Syrians 2,500 dollars, a Moroccan national 1,500 dollars to reach the

¹⁹ In April 2015 1,300 people drowned while trying to cross the sea to Lampedusa. Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries. UNHCR, 2015. [http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opensslPDFViewer.html?docid=56bb369c9&query=migrant sank](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opensslPDFViewer.html?docid=56bb369c9&query=migrant%20sank), (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

²⁰ In November 2014, FRONTEX's operation "Triton" took over the marine service instead of the previously reigning Italian-led "Operation Mare Nostrum". The enhanced protection of borders and complementing the Triton operations in May 2015, the EU launched the operation called "Operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia". This mainly focused on capturing human traffickers and detecting the smuggling routes.

²¹ V4 countries express their solidarity with the Balkan countries in the handling of the migration crisis. Czech Republic Government, 2016. URL: <http://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/joint-statement-on-migration-of-the-prime-ministers-of-the-visegrad-group-countries-140197/tmplid-81/> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

²² Payment system, functioning in North Africa and Western and South Asia. The transactions between the buyer and the seller are conducted through an agent (hawaladar). Since it is not associated with receipt of cash flows and can not be traced, it is much cheaper than the official transfer. See Kiss Á. P.: Felderítés és negyedik generációs hadviselés. VIII. évfolyam 4. szám (2009). 73.

²³ The UN High Commissioner for Refugees figures of between 400 and 2500 dollars.

Italian coasts, based on the Guardian's survey in April 2015.²⁴ In many cases, the migrants sold all their real estate and personal estate before the trip and saved several months' salary.²⁵ Those who still do not have enough liquid capital acquired the remaining amount through the delivery of drugs or committing other illegal activity.²⁶ According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) between 400 and 2,500 dollars are paid for the transfer from collecting points in Africa and the Middle-East to Europe.²⁷ From the Italian coast-long to Hungary the way is also crossed by trafficking routes. The fee can be multiple of the original sum. The Spiegel newspaper claimed that smugglers asked for 300-400 Euros for a trip from Hungary to Vienna, although the train from Budapest to Berlin is now available from 36 Euros.²⁸

Based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime data from 2008, even before the start of the migrant wave, smugglers gained 150 million dollars yearly from Africa to Europe transfers.²⁹

Refugees can only claim daily care within the country where the asylum request was submitted. Britain provides 53 dollars,³⁰ France 81 dollars, Germany and Sweden roughly 50 dollars' weekly care for people who acquired refugee status. In addition to the financial support of international organizations (for example UNHCR contributed with a total of 480 million dollars to the management of migrant crisis in 2015³¹) aid organizations provided help with food and supplies several times. Migration Aid, an organization based in Hungary, gathered one million Forints during the first weeks of the current migrant crisis to assist migrants, later they only accepted material contributions. Of that amount, and by the various contributions, daily hot food, clothes and other supplies could be covered. Tangible needs were advertised on their website every day, for example BKV passes, clothing, shoes and fruits. Of course many other aid organizations collected donations to improve the situation (eg. Migrant Offshore Aid Station, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent). These initiatives were supplemented by individual donations and the local relief organizations' work as well. Most transit stops provided free medical care, washing facilities and refugee camps.

²⁴ Libya's people smugglers: inside the trade that sells refugees hopes of a better life. The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/libyas-people-smugglers-how-will-they-catch-us-theyll-soon-move-on>, (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

²⁵ K. Koser: Why Migrant smuggling pays. International Migration. Vol. 46. No.2. 2008, 13. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00442.x/abstract> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

²⁶ Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Chapter 3, Smuggling of Migrants. In: UNODC: Issue Paper: Smuggling of Migrants by Sea, 12. http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_Smuggling_of_Migrants_by_Sea.pdf, (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

²⁷ Mediterranean migrant smugglers 'violent and audacious': agencies . UNHCR, 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=552f5d4e5> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

²⁸ Asylum's Dark Side: The Deadly Business of Human Smuggling. Spiegel.de. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/refugee-smuggling-a-big-business-in-the-balkans-a-1051461.html>, (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

²⁹ Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Chapter 3, Smuggling of Migrants.

³⁰ 10 truths about Europe's migrant crisis. The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/aug/10/10-truths-about-europes-refugee-crisis> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

³¹ UNHCR 2015 budgets for Europe (USD). UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d9346.html> (Accessed on: 19. 02. 2016.)

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE WAVE OF MIGRANTS

Social differences, terror threat

Because of the regional differences, immigrants may experience significant changes in terms of the norms and legal system and in everyday life as well. Whether the migrants are Christian, Muslim or Hindu, they need to adapt to the local circumstances in a short time, which is a major challenge after the stress of the migration period. We have to add, that social change can have positive results, immigrants 'refresh' demographic characteristics, since European Union member countries have very low birth- and high mortality rate, thereby the young manpower should be a solution to many economic and social problems (for example retirement difficulties).

Most of the arrivals were Muslim, according to the Pew Center research center estimates, compared to prior predictions, the proportion of Muslims in the European population will grow by 1.8 percent (thus it will reach 10.2%) until 2050.³² For long time Germany has been engaged in integrating the Muslim groups, the current amount of migrants will cause further difficulties in reaching the social balance. The religious and social differences generate ethnic tensions, due to which the members of the Muslim community could easily be the subject of discrimination and in the long run it may facilitate recruitment efforts of radical organizations.

As the example of France, Belgium and Germany shows,³³ the Muslim communities mostly concentrated in areas where the laws of Sharia apply and almost exclusively their own administration operates. This phenomenon is especially dangerous because radical messages spread more easily in closed communities.³⁴ Although I mentioned that second generation radicalization is more typical, the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 can be presented as an example that the current wave of migration also contains severe dangers. The perpetrators went to Paris in parallel with the unchecked migrant wave travelling through six European countries without any special control of their connections or previous actions. The necessary equipment for the Paris attacks required a well-structured organization. French President François Hollande's speech outlined the probable attack preparation chain: the attacks were ordered by the "Islamic State", the details were organized in Belgium (in Brussels' district inhabited by a majority of Muslims) and ultimately the terrorist attacks were carried out in France.³⁵ The Islamic State assumed responsibility for the attacks³⁶, thereby their propaganda was clearly demonstrated, in which they threatened the European region of sending trained terrorists and suicide bombers.

³² The future of world religions, Europe. Pew Research Center, 2015. <http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/europe/> (Accessed on: 17. 02. 2016.)

³³ In France, 750 „no-go” zones operate currently, in which approximately 5 millions of Muslims live without the central government's control. See: Atlas des Zones urbaines sensibles (Zus). SIG Politique de la Ville. 2010. <http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/Atlas/ZUS/> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

³⁴ Religious fundamentalism and radicalisation. EU Parliament, 2015. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-briefing-551342-Religious-fundamentalism-and-radicalisation-FINAL.pdf> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

³⁵ Paris attacks: Hollande blames Islamic State for act. BBC, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34820016> (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

³⁶ ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks 'First of the Storm'. New York Times, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html?_r=0 (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

Hungary's National Security Committee initiated a meeting on 9 February to discuss the security problems raised by the migration. Zsolt Molnar, chairman of the committee reported that there is no information on any emerging terrorist threat in Hungary.³⁷ However, statements by many European states did not support their views, as their national security organizations noticed terror-related suspects or proven terrorists among migrants.³⁸ Colonel Dr. János Besenyő mentions several examples of previously arrived migrants who were linked to radical groups in their sending countries and after their arrival, committed terrorist actions in Europe.³⁹ Thereby, to minimize the threat enhanced intelligence co-operation within the EU as well as access to law enforcement databases of both the sending and the neighbouring countries are important.

Health risk

The Middle Eastern and African situation, the low chances for everyday hygiene, the huge crowd and the exhaustion combined increased the risks of infections and included many hidden health risks. The uncontrolled status worsened the situation since in the crowd only one carrier is enough for a quite serious outbreak of epidemics.

According to the WHO survey, the migrants mostly received only emergency care. Where a broader scale was available for medical checks, due to language and other difficulties, they rather did not take advantage of the possibility.⁴⁰ The most common cases were accidents, hypothermia, burns, digestive problems, heart problems, or pregnancy. The children were more susceptible to infection and – as a result of bad living conditions – various skin rashes.

⁴¹ Featured health threat was therefore not detected.⁴²

The rapid spread of the devastating Ebola epidemic in Africa as well as HIV and other sexual infections raised fear therefore gradually more and more medical checkpoints were set up through the transit routes. Recognizing early infections, in the autumn of 2014 a border medical checkpoint was set up in Szeged where four to six doctors and paramedics worked 24/7. Chief medical officer Livia Báró, Head of Health Division of Csongrád County Police Department, said in a statement, that: "we are prepared to treat specific diseases, virus and infections that might appear on the border"⁴³

The statement of the Ministry of Human Resources in October 2015 mentioned a total of 9,705 migrants who were checked. Among them, 262 were tested positive for some major or

³⁷ Nemzetbiztonsági bizottság: szó nincs arról, hogy nőtt volna a terrorfenyegetettség. HVG, 2016. http://hvg.hu/itthon/20160209_Nemzetbiztonsagi_bizottsag_terrorfenyegetetseg_bombardiado (Accessed on: 18. 02. 2016.)

³⁸ Norway, for example, has already expressed in June 2015, that persons linked to al-Nusra and the Islamic State are among immigrants. Isis and Al Nusra militants found among UN refugees bound for Norway. IBT, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-al-nusra-militants-found-quota-un-refugees-bound-norway-1503983> (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

³⁹ Besenyő J.: Not the invention of ISIS: terrorists among immigrants.

⁴⁰ Public health aspects of migrant health: a review of the evidence on health status for undocumented migrants in the European Region. WHO, 10. http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/289255/WHO-HEN-Report-A5-3-Undocumented_FINAL-rev1.pdf?ua=1 (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

⁴¹ Ibid. 6–7.

⁴² Migration and health: key issues. WHO. <http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/migration-and-health/migrant-health-in-the-european-region/migration-and-health-key-issues>, (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

⁴³ Járányveszély kiiktatva. Zsaru Magazin. <http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/zsaru-magazin/jaranyveszely-kiiktatva> (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

minor infections. The tests resulted in 11 HIV, 72 Hepatitis B, 18 Hepatitis C and 33 Syphilis cases. Based on the data, infections were found in 2.7 percent of the checked migrants, 97.3 percent of the cases were negative.⁴⁴

Other difficulties

There are concerns that European reforms turned the economy towards more capital-intensive work instead of labour-intensive industries, so the moderately qualified migrants with language barriers cannot immediately fit in among the employees. Their education and language training will pay off in many years from now only, while few states are currently able to finance long-term investments. Even after their qualification it remains a question whether their education could be transferred back to the economy. The labour market has limited jobs and political will and decisions are needed for their expansion.

Since the quota system has been a question (since May 2015), our country has repeatedly protested against the number of migrants who have to be admitted. In September, EU policymakers agreed on the resettlement of 160 thousand refugees, but the „how to question” remained unregulated.⁴⁵ As Serbia is a safe third country, according to the reigning contracts, the resettlement would have to take place there. EU leading powers began to deal with the quota system because of solidarity, common planning and joint responsibility. The Visegrad countries and Austria, in agreement with Hungary, declared: they will regulate immigration thresholds nationally and will protect borders with restricted measures. In terms of the compulsory resettlement quotas, the Hungarian government started signature collection, which showed: it should not be a solution for the current crisis. The conflict exacerbated existing EU breakpoints, since the biggest host countries (Germany and Sweden) could not stand alone and deal with the crowds in the long run.

THE FENCE

Building a fence to defend a nation, an ideology or a territory is not a unique case in history. If we only look at the current crisis-related decisions, in 2014 on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, in Yambol Province, a 132-mile-long, three-meter-high fence was planned, of which a 33-kilometre section was completed in October 2015. The fence was aimed to control the hundreds of people from Turkey. The installation – no matter how short it is – had its effect, according to the information of Index, in 2013 11 thousand refugees crossed the Bulgarian-Turkish border, by 2014, this number had dropped to only six thousand.⁴⁶

The Greeks also started to build a fence in 2012 on the border with Turkey. The system is also three meters high and covers 12 kilometres of the border. Spain set up six-meter high fences on the border with Morocco (as Ceuta and Melilla cities were frequent transit stations).

⁴⁴ Menekültek százezeireből tízezret szűrték, 11-en HIV-esek. Index. http://index.hu/belfold/2015/10/03/menekult_migrans_kotelezo_szurovizsgalat_betegseg/ (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

⁴⁵ European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm (Accessed on: 20. 02. 2016.)

⁴⁶ Milyen lenne, ha tényleg vasfüggönyt húznának a menekültek ellen? Index, 2015. http://index.hu/kulfold/2015/06/09/europa_menekultek_vasfuggony_fidesz_bevandorlok_bulgaria_gorogorszag_spanyolorszag/ (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

The Hungarian technical closing of borders protects the Hungarian-Serbian and Croatian-Hungarian borders. The Hungarian Defence Forces completed the Hungarian-Serbian border section on September 17, the Hungarian-Croatian section was finished on 21 October. The government spent a total of 12 billion Forints from reserves. In addition to the loud propaganda against us, supporters were also present. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ex- NATO Secretary General said: "When through construction of the fence, the Hungarian government defended the Hungarian border, they did what Europe should have done".⁴⁷ According to the police records: once the technical barrier was completed the number of migrants dropped from 4-8 thousand a day to a few dozen.⁴⁸ After the completion of the fence, migrants – adapting to the conditions – reached Austria through Croatia and Slovenia, from where they travelled further to Germany.

On October 28, 2015 György Bakondi, the prime minister's chief adviser for homeland security said in an interview: thanks to the southern fence, we managed to minimize the number of illegal migrants.⁴⁹

After the Hungarian border fence was built, Austria also announced the establishment of a similar closing of borders on the Slovenian-Austrian border, whose main aim is not the suppression, but to guide the migrants toward the checkpoints. Building the fence was therefore a top priority decision as the number of migrants arriving in Hungary could not decrease without this step. This was not only a fundamental national defence task for the government, but an initial step for the revival of the failed (but extremely useful) Dublin III Regulation and the control systems.

CONCLUSION

The instability, generated by the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations is not only a local problem, but it poses a worldwide threat. The refugee crisis has shown that the European legal and administrative systems contain too many loopholes and deficits, the regulations must be taken under revision to ensure the security of the region. Europe's economy is not prepared for hundreds of thousands' care and integration. The medium and long-term solution is the creation of right pull-factors in the Middle East and African countries, repatriation must be grounded with an increase in local peacebuilding. In the short term it is understood that the tightening of border controls, the establishment of a migration database as well as enhanced law enforcement cooperation can guarantee most efficiently the filtering of radical or easily radicalized individuals.

For the elimination of the wide-range land and sea smuggling routes, the EU, NATO and the national teams are collectively responsible. Their enhanced intelligence and reconnaissance cooperation, continuous on-site presence, and decisive action against organized crime is a serious need. Special attention should be paid to the treatment of migrants and integration of those who required refugee status. It is also necessary to provide employment opportunities and expand the quality of education in the long run.

⁴⁷ Former NATO head: PM Orbán „did what Europe should have done” in the migrant crisis. <http://hungarytoday.hu/news/former-nato-head-pm-orban-europe-done-migrant-crisis-72562> (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

⁴⁸ Elfogott migránsok száma – dátum szerinti lekérdezés. <http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/elfogott-migransok-szama-lekerdezes?honap%255Bvalue%255D%255Byear%255D=2015&honap%255Bvalue%255D%255Bmonth%255D=10> (Accessed on: 21. 02. 2016.)

⁴⁹ Működik a déli biztonsági határzár. <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-kormanysozovo/hirek/mukodik-a-deli-biztonsagi-hatarzar> (Accessed on: 20. 02. 2016.)

Middle East and Africa remained violent, millions are forced to emigrate. Thereby as the weather conditions improve, the migrant wave is going to start again. Prices of the traffickers are likely to adapt to the financial conditions of migrants. The current wave was just the first, thousands of migrants are currently stationed in Turkey (mostly from Syria, the lower-skilled, poorer strata) are ready to join the migrant mass to Europe. Our country must continue to protect Europe's borders and need to enhance the cooperation and dialogue with the region's decision-makers. In order to maintain the countries' stability and our values, special measures are needed both at national and international levels. In the coming months Europe will have to protect its borders and territory with increased forces, restore the control of migrants and act against smugglers and organized-crime groups. We need measures to support the restoration of the statehood in Libya, Syria, Iraq and African countries (such as Chad, Nigeria, Somalia and Mali), through which we not only provide ad hoc local management, but also initiate a long-term stabilization process.

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ANNEX

State	Asylum applications (%)	Number of applicants
Germany	30.6	202,815
Sweden	12.3	81,325
Italy	9.7	64,625
France	9.7	64,310
Hungary	6.4	42,775
Great Britain	4.8	31,945
Austria	4.2	28,065
The Netherlands	3.7	24,535
Switzerland	3.6	23,770
Belgium	3.4	22,850
Denmark	2.2	14,715
Norway	1.7	11,480
Bulgaria	1.6	11,080
Greece	1.4	9,435
Poland	1.2	8,025
Spain	0.8	5,615
Finland	0.5	3,625
Cyprus	0.2	1,745
Romania	0.2	1,545
Ireland	0.2	1,450
Malta	0.2	1,350
Czech Republic	0.17	1,155
Luxembourg	0.17	1,150

State	Asylum applications (%)	Number of applicants
Croatia	0.06	450
Portugal	0.06	445
Lithuania	0.06	440
Slovenia	0.05	385
Latvia	0.05	375
Slovakia	0.04	330
Estonia	0.02	155
Total		661,965

Source: Eurostat, *Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual data (rounded)*

Lt. Col. Tamás Kender:

IS ROME FALLING? SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON MIGRATION AND DEFENCE¹

ABSTRACT: Apart from its conventional role of defending the country from invading enemy our Army is facing a quite different problem today. The soldiers support the internal security forces in taking control of the dramatic situation caused by hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilian people, migrants. The crisis does not seem to stop soon, and Europe should prepare for more problems to come in the near future. To handle these challenges there are many steps to take. One of them is improving security internally and externally, and those forces, including military, must be organized, equipped, trained and authorized to prevent and react to further crises.

KEYWORDS: Future challenges, migration crisis, military role in humanitarian crisis operations

INTRODUCTION

Europe is in trouble. While she's still struggling with the remnants of the financial crisis in hope of holding the euro-zone together, Russia's aggressive acts for hegemony threaten her nations, and desperate people of war-torn countries are swarming her borders seeking refuge.

Mass migration. One of the long-term challenges foreseen for the 21st century has become risk, then imminent threat just within the minute. How could this happen, one must ask. I think one reason for this could be the good old ostrich policy of the aging European civilization and the other is putting economic interests above all. People with more liberal heart believe that we can and we must avoid conflicts at all costs thinking that common sense makes common solution. On the other hand, conservatives say we are already at war just not a shooting one, yet.

This situation in Hungary is not different at all. Nevertheless we are one of the border countries if not target yet. The leading faction in Parliament requested the amendment of the law in order to make it possible to employ the Army for *defending* the border. There is a big difference between being attacked by one of our neighbors or by thousands of *refugees*. For such cases not just some law should be changed but the Constitution itself. This idea needs parliamentary support and resolution, which takes time to approve. The problem is to *employ* our Home Defence Forces *within* the country while not threatened by any kind of war *from the outside*. The fear of doing so keeps the military out of action, and our police forces are becoming more and more overwhelmed by the tasks relating to the crisis. When writing this article that was the situation. Then, in September, Hungarian parliament voted for employing the Hungarian Defence Forces in support of Police for assistance.²

¹ S. P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Európa, Budapest, 2008, 327.

² Hungarian Parliament modified laws concerning deployment of the military giving some more rights to use force in support of the police.

Is this situation new for Europe? I do not think so. Some 16 years ago about half a million refugees crossed the Albanian border just in a few weeks right after Serbia started an ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The Albanian government, having recognized the threat that they could not manage the crisis on their own, requested help. In 1999, NATO launched its first ever humanitarian emergency action in the Balkans called Operation Allied Harbor. That time the AMF (L)³ was the alliance's first response team, and started to deploy to the country just in two weeks as Albania Force (AFOR).⁴ With that deployment, I had the opportunity to face the developing humanitarian crisis directly, and to see how NATO would do everything in order to prevent the catastrophe.

Some of the experience I gathered there considering humanitarian crisis was especially true for Albania, but some of that – I think – was so general that one can use it for the current situation as well. Let us see some of them as follows:

- When tens of thousands of desperate people arrive to your country, just taking care of their basic needs, they can and would shake the economy. If there are more to come, that can bring your country down.
- One country – depending on the numbers – cannot solve the problem on its own. It needs multinational cooperation.
- International organizations – governmental or non-governmental – are very good at management, such as organizing and communicating, but they really need some *not-so-civilian* capabilities as well.
- Not all international organizations want to cooperate with the military, or at least not openly, until they are in serious trouble.
- Media is hungry for the show. They report what they think to be interesting to their audience and they shape the truth to fit their concept of truth.
- Not everyone falls under the *refugee* umbrella. That is why the collective category of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) is used in the official terminology.
- The *refugee* arriving is not always the person who he or she claims to be. This is a major security risk. To find out the real identity, however, also takes time, something you do not always have.
- When a large mass of people gathers in one place, it is very likely that their mood can change from good to bad in just seconds. If there are “active” persons agitating them, the crowd can be directed and used against anyone or anything.
- The DPREs have their own goals and will, so they are hard to be influenced by your.
- There are some capabilities that only the military possesses. One of them is the fast reaction to crises, the other is organizing things better than anyone. Not to mention the unique equipment, drill and discipline, which civilians lack.

Watching and listening the reports on the developing crisis today what comes to mind is that these points above are as true today as they were in 1999. There are two major differences, however, the *size* and the *place* of the situation. By *size* I mean the expected number of migrants, and the length of time we (the EU) still have to face and the area involved. Some estimates say 800K⁵ in some months, and some others say 4-5 million people set off

³ Allied Mobile Force (Land)

⁴ NATO Online Library Web edition. Vol. 47. No. 2. Summer 1999. 9–13. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-02.htm> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

⁵ Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum? BBC News. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

in a year⁶ to start a new exodus from their region of living. I believe that these are the first settlers at the gates of Europe, and the bulk is still to come. When talking about place, the problem gets larger and more complex considering that this one is happening throughout the continents and seems unstoppable today.

Naturally, this problem divides people, and there are sharp debates about solving the migrant crisis. One possible solution is the so-called *quota system*⁷, meaning that all European countries should host some thousands of refugees depending on their capacity. That could be an interesting idea just keeping in mind that most of the migrants are not refugees, and they are heading for Germany or some other northern European countries. While all nations are still arguing, the major issue for Hungary is *holding the gates*.⁸

Among other ideas, there are three major directions for doing that. One is to let everyone in and share the burden; the second suggests reinforcing the Schengen border by building fences to keep the bulk out and let only the *real refugees* in by selecting them from *economic migrants*; and the third one is to expand those fences as far as possible by deploying the military in Greece, and keep everyone out, or at least in place.⁹ What only a few leaders want to talk about is: *why* migration is happening exactly and what we should do to prevent it. To answer that question one of our – soldiers’ – first thought would be normally the military way, or in other words using force diplomacy to stabilize the region and keep migrants in their home country.

I think, however, that there is another problem to have a closer look on, such as: how will – the already happening – mass migration affect Europe and her defense? To answer that question, first I examine what culture really means, then how it changes, following that I name the risks and threats that migration might bring on the long run, finally I suggest roles and tasks for defense, that are not so *traditional* today.

CHANGING CULTURE

First, we must understand what *culture* means. We have many definitions and synonyms for the word. However, we also agree that the notion itself includes many other concepts, like beliefs, customs, arts of a particular society, group, place, or time; or a particular society that has its own beliefs, ways of life, art; or a way of thinking, behavior, or working that exist in a place or organization.¹⁰ Overall, we talk about three things, which belong together: people, their beliefs and their behavior. Huntington calls it *civilization*¹¹. In addition, this *people – beliefs – behavior* triangle binds to a geographic portion of the Earth, a region that has a particular role in the evolvement of that culture or civilization. Thus, if any one of these three (or four) changes, on that we might agree, it changes the whole. In addition, the civilizations are interfering with each other; they can group together or act against one or more of them. The reason for that can be either economical or cultural. According to Huntington, *nation*

⁶ Syrian refugees. <http://syrianrefugees.eu/> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

⁷ Migrant crisis: Opponents furious over new EU quotas. BBC News. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34331126>, (Accessed on: 22. 09. 2015.)

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Migrant crisis: Hungary to deploy military to secure borders. The Irish Times. <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/migrant-crisis-hungary-to-deploy-military-to-secure-borders-1.2359862> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

¹⁰ Webster II New Riverside University Dictionary. The Riverside Publishing Company, 1984.

¹¹ The culture characteristic of a particular time or place. (Merriam-webster dictionary.)

*states are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors*¹². These future conflicts, he talked about more than a decade ago, are happening today. *The world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest dangers for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations.*¹³

Time has proven that Huntington was right, or at least it seems so. What I think he did not consider, however, were the changes that might happen with the cultures affecting each other. When the American-led West destroyed the Iraqi conventional, eastern type power shell, thinking the Western culture is higher in rank, it started importing democracy to the region. With that, the West destabilized the Middle East and gave a kick to the birth of an Islam fundamentalist group, the Islamic State (IS). It seems today, that every bomb falling on IS targets does not just destroy them, but also has a controversial effect, strengthening hatred against the West.

Beside physical, civilizations fight with psychological weapons as well. Not long after Hungary joined NATO I got the opportunity to participate in a yearlong course in the US. My classmates were excited about having a former enemy in their class. One of their first questions was how I thought we had lost the Cold War. Was it their great military power or their even greater economy that challenged and brought the “Eastern Evil” onto knees? I surprised them with my answer, but I told what I felt then, and I still believe. I told them that their “secret weapon” was simply Hollywood, and that the victory was achieved by *culture* in a *cultural war*. When they were wondering the *how* I explained them that their military power was never really tested against the Soviet Bloc, and the results of that theoretical clash would have been – at least – questionable. Although Eastern economy was decades behind that of the Western countries, the majority of people felt quite good, or at least had not gone to the streets to protest since ‘56. After the so-called “consolidation” in the sixties, the theaters played more and more western, mostly American, movies showing the life overseas and *that* got attention. The majority of the people wanted to live like “Yankees”¹⁴.

It was the *socialist moral* those films affected the most. Therefore, it was the dream of a better life they had offered that caused the first cracks in the Berlin Wall.

Later that year, when G.W. Bush Jr. won the elections, during a session I challenged my classmates by asking what if a Latino, or Afro-American man had run for presidency. One of them answered smiling that a woman would beat him. Well, we all know today what happened a couple of years later.

Therefore, the reason for telling these stories here was to give some examples about the power of culture and its changes. As a result, we can ascertain that there are two major effects coming with those changes, one external and one internal. While a culture can overcome and change another one, it is changing inside as well.

One can ask how migration comes to this. Which continent if not the American is the best example of continuous movements of the population? Well, the United States was created by European settlers, and the continuous growth of its economy is based on migration. Thus, its population was continuously changing in numbers, ethnic composition and with that was changing its culture. These changes were not always happening peacefully. Examining

¹² S. P. Huntington: Op. cit. 41.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ That covered every American living in the US.

from an external point of view we can see how the arriving “higher culture” destroyed the indigenous people of the continent, then two strong nations waged a war for the country. Internally speaking the bloodiest civil war decided to free the Afro-American slaves, who later fought for their real freedom for decades. Basically, migrants with different ethnic background fought each other for survival and transformed their country into a superpower.

CHALLENGES AND THREATS – HISTORY RELOADED

In order to find out what challenges mass migration might bring to Europe there are numerous threats named by politicians and socio-political analysts today. These are grouped around two major concerns: terrorism and Islam radicalism. Two things, that many western Christian people fear the most. Moreover, that fear is sometimes artificially intensified by media.

However, I believe that there are longer-term effects and risks yet to come. The question, whether these effects are real threats or simple facts, is to be answered later at the end of this article. For that first, let us go back in time again.

When the Roman Empire started to grow via warring and diplomacy, it slowly expanded its political and cultural influence. However, this influence worked in both directions. Rome brought “civilization” to “barbarians” but also melted their culture into its own one. A day reaching its limits of expansion, the central government could not control the faraway provinces and neighbors with same efficiency anymore and the outer problems grew inner ones. There are many studies and theories for the reasons of the fall of the Western-Roman Empire. I believe that the next eight facts summarize them quite well:

- State wise Christianity and the loss of traditional values.
- Economic troubles and overreliance on slave labor.
- The rise of the Eastern Empire.
- Government corruption and political instability.
- Overexpansion and military overspending.
- The arrival of the Huns and the migration of the Barbarian tribes.
- Invasions by Barbarian tribes.
- Weakening of the Roman legions.¹⁵

In short, weakened by the internal economic and social crisis Rome became incapable of defending its borders, while the people of the colonized territories and the arriving ethnic groups became more autonomous, started to do their own politics and began uprisings against the central authorities.

Having a closer look on the current situation in Europe, we might find some similarities with those facts listed above. Let us run through them quickly:

- Globalization and economic interests win over national and traditional values.
- Just over a harsh economic crisis, the EU struggles to keep up the Euro zone and the member states have their own financial problems to fight.¹⁶
- Russia threatens her western neighbors with her both – economic and military – powers.
- The EU member states put their national interests above the common interests of the Union.

¹⁵ E. Andrews: 8 reasons why Rome fell. History. <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/8-reasons-why-rome-fell> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

¹⁶ Darvas Zs. – W. B. Guntram: Europe’s social problem and its implications for economic growth. <http://bruegel.org/2014/03/europes-social-problem-and-its-implications-for-economic-growth/> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

- Corruption is major problem within the governance in Europe.¹⁷
- Some nations have internal arguments about further EU membership and that initiates political instability.¹⁸
- There is no permanent EU force; military operations depend on the nations' willingness. That leads to overexpansion and military overspending by the single nations.

The mass migration has just started, but some of the receiving countries have already reached their financial and moral limits.¹⁹

I am sure that finding these parallels with Rome can generate some debate. My purpose with this comparison, however, was to emphasize what possible changes might come. To decide how these changes will change Europe, and with that our future, is still to be answered. Thus, I believe we must accept the fact that Europe is changing abruptly and we must prepare ourselves for it.

CHALLENGES BY MIGRATION TODAY

Humans have been wandering since Eden was closed for them or since the first apes crawled down the tree. However, causes for wandering have always been different. They left for the hope of a better life, for gaining profit, or just for the pure instinct of survival. The target geographical area was opted by its offering. Fertile soil, gold, food, or security. One of the most typical examples for that was – again – America, the land on which some understand the continent(s) and more thinks of the United States. As of today though, the European Union became almost as targeted by migration as the US, and the numbers are rising. Having a closer look on some statistics of the last decade of migration in Europe, we can get to the conclusion that the immigrants already arrived. Together with their descendants today and with the rising inflow of newcomers, the mix of indigenous and migrant populace of the nations in Europe has been changing so far a lot and it will have a greater change to suffer within one or two decades.

While all political analysts keep saying that the growing danger of terrorism is the major problem caused by the recent events of mass migration, I believe that there are greater challenges to come with the growing numbers of migrants from different cultures. The question is what happens when these cultures meet. Are they mixing up or clashing with each other? How do you react when you hear about two tribes, or ethnic groups starting a war somewhere in the African continent or in Asia? Imagine that their conflict happens to be in your region, or even in your country or city. Is it impossible? By the end of September this year (2015), there were some serious fights in camps hastily established for immigrants in Germany.²⁰

¹⁷ Migration and home affairs. EU comission. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/index_en.htm/ (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

¹⁸ Baroness Williams of Crosby: The EU: should Britain be in or out? The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/18/eu-britain-in-out-eu-referendum> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

¹⁹ D. Howden: A tale of two crises in Greece – coping with economic depression and refugees. The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/03/greece-islands-economic-depression-migration-kos> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

²⁰ M. Hall: More than 200 refugees from Syria and Afghanistan clash repeatedly in German asylum centre. The Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11904166/More-than-200-refugees-from-Syria-and-Afghanistan-clash-repeatedly-in-German-asylum-centre.html> (Accessed on: 03. 10. 2015.)
Over 200 asylum seekers clash in German refugee center. RT Question more. <https://www.rt.com/news/317229-refugees-clash-german-center/> (Accessed on: 03. 10. 2015.)

Even the settled can fight each other when assimilation does not work. The fall in 2005 was loud with the uprising in France; the Sun even compared Paris to Ramallah claiming there was Intifada there.²¹ French citizens, the children of migrants from Africa started aggressive demonstrations, and then fought against the government when a young Afro-French boy died when chased by the police.

The problems are the same in both cases. While a way too many people are unsatisfied with their fate, intolerance and impatience grow leading them to aggression. Then reading and hearing comments of *inlanders* on these events you can experience their sympathy to lessen and turn over to spurn. We can also see today that amongst the people of the “hosting society” migration raises fear, aggravates the conflict between the identities, and leads to racism and radicalism.²²

When Huntington stated that all future conflicts would be inflicted by culture or by the friction between cultures along the lines of friction, he must have been right about it. However, he thought these lines being well recognizable as a separation line between two or more greater civilizations. He even drew a map for better understanding.²³

However, the excessive numbers of migration today bring many different ethnic groups in Europe, who naturally seek their own kind there. The families are to join, new communities are to be born. Beside other problems – considering just the time factor – the speed of migration does not allow assimilation, so the communities keep their own living habits, custom, etc. Because of this, the different cultures are to be mixed up by the time, and the clear long lines are breaking up separating more, smaller ethnic groups. Thus, the old nation-state based European ethnic map will look more like a kaleidoscope with many-many small ethnic groups, like islands. With that, the lines of frictions will be within the countries, within the cities.

Is it really a challenge? Just think of the conflicts that are not coming from the outside in a conventional way, but generated from the inside by your own citizens. To be more chaotic just imagine that these groups are supported by other countries or other cultures. Such types of conflicts can last for days or even decades. Cyprus is still struggling with that kind of challenge that started many decades ago. How about Ukraine? Is there any real chance that the two so different cultures of western Ukrainian and the eastern – mostly Russian – orthodox Christians re-join as a country?

In Europe today there are nation states with about a two-thousand-year-long common history, born on the ruins of the Western Roman Empire. This old civilization started to shake, even if not everyone would admit it, when about half a million people took the road and departed their home country for Germany thinking it would be the Paradise, or at least the second best place on Earth. The question is: what will happen when they realize that they are somehow misled.

According to the examples above it seems to be likely that the first feelings are going to be disappointment, followed by rage. Then it would be easy to direct the wrath of the mass against anything or anyone. Then the problem comes of how to handle the situation. When there are some hundreds, or some thousands of people, like soccer fans, ultras, the police are to take care of them. When some hundred-thousand are there, police seems to be

²¹ Intifada in France. The Sun. <http://www.nysun.com/editorials/intifada-in-france/22526/> (Accessed on: 13. 07. 2015.)

²² Gazdag F.: Security Policy. Budapest, 2014, 28–30.

²³ S. P. Huntington: Op. cit. 22–23.

weak due to numbers and other reasons. Finally, if there are any weapons around, the only additional force to bring in is military. However, army does not naturally fit for this kind of mission that needs special abilities. While France has the Gendarmerie, and Italy has the Carabinieri, Hungary has a conventional army and very strict laws about its employment.

SHIFTING DEFENSE PARADIGM

The security system of Hungary is built on conventional defense against external and internal threats. The three means of that system; police, disaster relief and the military are clearly defined, distinguished and their roles are separated. However, cooperation is expected. Within the system, the mission of the Hungarian Defense Forces – as stated in law – is three-folded:

- defense of sovereignty of the territory (borders)
- participate in collective defense of the Alliance (Article 5 missions)
- participate in international missions (e.g. UN mandated peace operations)

One other major task is to participate in disaster relief operations.

That means that the defense in military terms must be directed against external threat. It is quite understandable that since the fall of socialist/communist regimes there has been no political/social will to employ military for defense purposes internally. The reasons for this are historical. Hungarian people have experienced the military forces' power on their skin before, as a tool to gain or regain power in 1920 and 56.

The recent events prove that Hungary – again – is responsible for one of Europe's borders on the “southern flank”, that happens to be also the border of “Schengen”. Today however the Osman Empire is not attacking. That threat would be too simple to answer. The excessively many unarmed people “invading” from the South raises difficult questions. Is this mass migration really a threat? If it is, is there any correct and collective European answer? What can and should the military as a means of the security system do in a situation like this?

Looking on migration as an external threat, Hungarian government used the Army's special capability of fast combat engineer work to establish a “border fence”, and then deployed forces along the border in order *to assist police* with the control of the crisis zone. So far the Ministry of Interior has had the overall responsibility, and the military supports it with its special capabilities, including medical, special recon, air patrol, engineering assistance, and reinforcing police patrols. There are assigned tactical units trained and equipped for Crowd and Riot Control (CRC) tasks, ready to support police on request. There is nothing new with these tasks because Hungarian soldiers deployed in the framework of international peace operations have already been doing these abroad. The novelty is that these actions are sanctioned by law, and soldiers are tasked to do this work on Hungarian soil. Is it defense, one could ask. I would say yes, part of it. Unconventional steps in an unconventional situation.

However, there is a more important question: does this end here? If we take into consideration challenges and threats described above, we can get to the conclusion that there are more to come that will need bold actions.

First, there are the *growing numbers*. The self-induced process of mass migration inflicts exponential increase. As an immediate solution, stopping immigrants on the border with troops might work, but I also think that this is a too late course of action and it takes too much time and resources. In order to stop the whirl I see only one solution, and that is to terminate the reason causing the exodus. One tool for that mission should be the military: boots on the ground to put an end to the problem, to eliminate the cause that forces people to leave their homes so desperately. Of course, this can be done with a comprehensive approach of

all the involved nations and today this seems impossible because of the different interests. Nevertheless, while Russians and the US keep arguing on who bombs whom in Syria, the IS expands, the Middle-East remains destabilized and migration will not stop. Besides, the demographic boom in the “third world” and the global climate change are multiplying factors of the numbers of migrants.

Second, *different cultures clash*, when it comes to share the same living space (or “lebensraum”²⁴). It seems that not everyone is so hospitable within the host nations, as it was announced earlier.²⁵ The growing revulsion indicates extreme actions, and up to now peaceful citizens attack unarmed civilians with repugnance. These conflicts are here, even though not all the media and politics do want to admit it.²⁶

To maintain security all European countries need vice foresight, valid intelligence and rapid reactions. For that, you might need more than just police forces.

Third, it seems that there are two different kinds of conflicts coming into life in Europe. One is the opposition that the different ethnics bear against each other and continue their fight when arrived and settled here. The other is the contest amongst people – locals and migrants – for work, education, and survival.

It is said to be good for the economy actually, and migration brings a boost. On the other hand, the already high rate of unemployment with the high numbers of untrained people arriving will rise, parallel with that of their dissatisfaction. These initially small-scale local conflicts can expand and threaten overall security very fast and very soon.

These conflicts can start with demonstrations, and then they might become fights between ethnic groups. If these conflicts escalate to uprisings, even civil wars might break out. Imagine when these conflicts erupt in a multicultural, multi-ethnic society and develop into cross-border fights. If it cannot be prevented, bold response is needed. Depending on the size and complexity of the conflict military assistance should be called for.

Finally, let us go back to the imminent threat. There are already more than half a million “freshly” arrived immigrants²⁷ – many of them with not so clear identity – and some tens of millions of former migrants and their descendants already settled and being citizens. The cultural differences between people have already resulted in small to larger conflicts in the well-developed countries. From Anders Breivik’s singular action²⁸ to the coordinated Charlie Hebdo attack or the earlier mentioned *intifada* in Paris prove that the lines between cultures are lines of friction and they are fragile.

Terrorist groups, like ISIL²⁹ or Al-Qaeda, or any extremist wing can aim at and gather unsatisfied people, who are receptive for ideas that offer them purpose or importance in life.

²⁴ The origins of the term comes from Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), german ethnographer as a word for human geography. Later became the Nazi Party’s motto and program for national politics.

²⁵ B. Benoit – N. Winning: Germany Feels Backlash for Welcoming. The Wall Street Journal. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-feels-backlash-for-welcoming-migrants-1441553068> (Accessed on: 06. 09. 2015.)

²⁶ Suspected arson attack on German refugee shelter. Al Jazeera. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/suspected-arson-attack-german-refugee-shelter-150825111621057.html> (Accessed on: 03. 10. 2015.)

²⁷ One million refugees’ may arrive in Germany this year. Al Jazeera. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/million-refugees-arrive-germany-year-150914101006005.html> (Accessed on: 14. 09. 2015.)

²⁸ He stated that his action was a meant against a ‘multicultural-Norway’. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9348675/Anders-Breivik-I-was-defending-the-Norwegian-people.html> (Accessed on: 14. 09. 2015.)

²⁹ Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Until today, thousands of people have crossed Europe's borders without real control, and we must take seriously this threat, as János Besenyő warns us in his essay.³⁰

One solution should be assimilation, and becoming a multicultural civilization. I think it used to work in the past until the incoming numbers overflowed the assimilation capacity in time and place. While the immigrants learned the language, accepted the law, and wanted to become part of the society some decades ago, today they are gathering together with their relatives, the same ethnic groups, and want to continue their previous life without assimilation. That is a challenge for the society. The different groups lacking assimilation are growing fast, and it is just a matter of time that they would clash. That means that conflicts are inevitable, and unavoidable. Therefore, challenges evolve into threats.

What seems to be a clear line between external and internal threats and what is separating military from police responsibilities, is becoming blurred. The problem must be approached in a comprehensive way. No single service of security, political or economic faction could resolve it alone. Although politicians try to avoid at all costs employing soldiers as long as possible, lagging decisions just deepen the problem. Itemizing the threats and understanding their nature help to sort out the mission and tasks which military could and should take part in:

- Intelligence;
- Information operations;
- Border control and defense;
- Area control;
- Crowd control;
- Separation of belligerent parties;
- Fast response and intervention;
- Out of area intervention³¹;
- Providing special military medical/health care, logistics, or Civil-Military Cooperation capabilities;
- and *inland counterinsurgency operations*.

Although the Army is not naturally organized for that kind of mission, it is partially trained and equipped to execute such tasks. It is also partially lacking the support of law and often the support of the public. I think this will change as soon as all countries in Europe recognize that the migrant crisis is just starting or so it seems. Therefore, the conventional thinking of defense must be shaped to respond to unconventional challenges. So far most of the military forces in Europe were deployed abroad to conduct these types of tasks. Funding these missions was too costly so most of the military has been withdrawn from the crisis-zones. As a result, the crises came to us and we have to face them here, whether we accept it or not.

As a first step, the police and the military can work together but they will not be capable of handling the situation in the long run. To solve the problem one course of action could be to give that mission to the military with the necessary resources. The other possibility is to build and task a military organization with police authority. The solution should be a force between the two with all capabilities that provide intelligence, control and fast response in force when necessary. That force is called *gendarmerie* and it will be *a must have* tool for internal or even cross-border and international security for countries still lacking this capability.

³⁰ Besenyő J.: Not the invention of ISIS: terrorists among immigrants. Journal of Security And Sustainability Issues. Volume 5, 2015.

³¹ Or Humanitarian Intervention. Sending troops to take actions in place where the crisis is to prevent further escalation.

I still believe that the best solution must be preventing mass migration by ensuring a livable place for everyone in their home country. It is not too late to stop the cross-continent wandering, yet. However, the exodus has begun and it does not seem to end soon. Until then we must think forward and make defensive steps to respond to security challenges externally and internally. As the first means of defense, the military must be organized, equipped, prepared and authorized to do the job.

IS THIS THE END?

Therefore, there are a few ideas about migration I wanted to share for better understanding. One is that migration is not necessarily a bad thing even if it has its side effects causing dramatic situations all along. Today it is happening whether we like it or not, and it is going on in such a great and still rising numbers and speed that it is called a “modern-age ethno-wandering” instead of migration.

The other idea is that culture is not carved in stone, but it is continuously changing. What is impossible today could be common sense tomorrow. When people interact as a result of migration, they affect each other; new ideas are born, habits and customs are shaping. The key is integration versus segregation. When this does not happen, frictions naturally occur, and these frictions are not always peaceful.

Third, when our society’s culture changes, with that many other things will change affecting issues related to our defense. The real question here is; how? Most researches today predict threats; organized crime, epidemic and, of course, terrorism as major problems caused by the high numbers of refugees, and illegal immigrants. The “Charly Hebdo attack” in Paris shocked the European community and politicians started to talk about the immigration problem when they realized that the attackers were French citizens, actually they were in-born descendants of immigrants who arrived in the country decades earlier. Is this a brand new problem? Six years ago, the UNICEF made a working paper on the descendants of immigrants in France³². I would rather call this a long-term effect.

Finally, when it comes to security, we realize how important the society’s perception is. Moreover, this perception can be influenced in many ways. Today, when people in Europe meet migration as a problem, they relate to their own and their community’s perception. To decide whether it is good or bad, I trust that everyone has his or her own opinion. What I would like to emphasize here is that *migration bears challenges that can turn over to risks and threats in time*. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for that something new is coming, we just do not do not understand it, yet. In order to be capable of handling that, the future military should open its mind for adapting to the unusual.

Huntington wrote that *avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics*.³³ I would like to add that the word *global* is changing more and more to *regional* and *local* (or national) today.³⁴ Some historians say that Rome might have fallen, but on its ruins Europe was born. I think, today Europe is following the same path and another world is coming to life. I hope that with preparing for it we can make this birth less painful.

³² UNICEF Innocenti Working Paper; The children of immigrants in France: the emergence of a second generation. 2009.

³³ S. P. Huntington: Op. cit. 16.

³⁴ As our region is becoming more multicultural, so our local politics is getting a multicivilizational character.

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Srdja Trifkovic:

GEOPOLITICS REDEEMED: ENHANCING THE REALIST DISCOURSE

ABSTRACT: The term „geopolitics“ has become a somewhat fuzzy concept in public discourse. Many commentators – even some notable experts – confuse geopolitics (a discipline and an analytical tool) with the international power relations and political processes of the world. Others – even such authoritative sources as Foreign Policy, the foremost US journal on world affairs – dilute the concept by considering factors (e.g. populism) that are more properly the province of political expediency. Geopolitics has always been, and shall remain, a discipline focused on the effects of human and physical geography on international politics, and an analytical tool for studying international relations through the prism of space, the resources in it, and the people inhabiting it. The author acknowledges that the geopolitical paradigm is not the only one whereby national strategy may be shaped, but he considers it the most appropriate one. He specifically warns against what he sees as a 'deterritorialized' and ideologically driven discourse, neglectful of geopolitical considerations, in the articulation and conduct of the foreign policy of the United States.

KEYWORDS: geopolitics, classical realism, international relations, United States, grand strategy, foreign affairs

CLEARING UP SOME CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

The noun “geopolitics” and the adjective “geopolitical” are increasingly present in the public discourse on foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic.¹ In principle this is a good thing: relating power interests to the imperatives of space and resources is essential to the analysis of world affairs which is free of ideological noise and foggy rhetoric (“shared European values,” “American exceptionalism,” “the international community,” etc).

The trouble is that many commentators – sometimes expert analysts among them – use *geopolitics* imprecisely or erroneously. For example, in January 2016 America’s foremost world affairs journal *Foreign Policy* placed the possible “rise of populism” at the top of its list of “notable geopolitical risks in the year ahead”:

The combination of the middle-class economic squeeze and Islamic extremism at home risks fueling the populist politics of xenophobia and anger surging across Europe and the United States. This could continue to weaken establishment politicians and empower those on the far left and far right, making both American and European foreign policies

¹ Google hits on those two words in media headlines has grown threefold over the past two years (survey by the author).

more unpredictable and diverting leaders from engagement abroad in favor of damage-control domestically.²

If it does become a significant process, the rise of populism may indeed have indirect *geopolitical consequences*, such as curtailing massive migration flows into Europe or contributing to the disintegration of an already enfeebled European Union. Nevertheless, the likely *political* consequences of the rise of populism – as itemized by *Foreign Policy* – cannot be described as “geopolitical” phenomena.

In May 2015 another respected journal, *The National Interest*, wrote that today’s most burning issues – from terrorism to climate change – “by definition cannot be solved with national approaches alone and require unprecedented cooperation among the world’s most influential countries”:

The problem, though, is that geopolitics is back. The world turns out to be a lot more red in tooth and claw than many had anticipated, and international cooperation is suffering as a result. Strategic rivalry is heating up... The return of geopolitics portends a rocky road for international cooperation, which has always depended on a convergence of great power interests.³

In this case the authors have clearly confused “geopolitics” – the *discipline* focused on the effects of human and physical geography on international politics, or the *method* of analyzing international relations through the prism of space, resources in it, and people inhabiting it – with the *process* of increasingly competitive power relations in today’s world. Geopolitics is *not* “back,” because it has never disappeared. It is precisely because of the permanence of underlying geopolitical realities that competitive power politics has made a comeback after a brief period of post-Cold War American dominance.

There are many similar examples from less authoritative sources.⁴ One influential culprit for the confusion is none other than Henry Kissinger. As a perceptive critic noted in a review of Kissinger’s *Diplomacy* over two decades ago, for the towering prophet of American realism “geopolitics” is often used as a euphemism for power politics: “Kissinger would have done better to have come clean and admitted that his subject was neither diplomacy nor geopolitics, as those terms are generally understood, but the subject that he has spent his life studying and much of it practicing: the politics of power.”⁵

Geopolitics needs to be freed from such semantic and conceptual confusion in order to release its potential as a discipline and as an analytical tool. As the study of international relations from the vantage point of space, the resources contained in that space, and the people inhabiting that space, geopolitics offers a truly global vision of the relationship between

² Unhappy New Year: The 10 Geopolitical Risks to Watch in 2016. *Foreign Policy*, January 7, 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/unhappy-new-year-the-10-geopolitical-risks-to-watch-in-2016> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

³ S. Patrick – I. Bennett: Geopolitics Is Back – and Global Governance Is Out. *The National Interest*, May 12, 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/geopolitics-back%E2%80%94global-governance-out-12868> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

⁴ For example, “In Geopolitical Twist, U.S. And Iran Could Soon Be Competing For Japanese Oil Market Share” a *Forbes* headline stated incongruously last January 11. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/01/11/in-geopolitical-twist-the-u-s-and-iran-could-soon-be-competing-for-japanese-oil-market-share/#4a522fa92f9f> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

⁵ M. Howard: *The World According to Henry: From Metternich to Me*. *Foreign Affairs*, 73/3. 1994, 133.

Raum and power.⁶ This sets geopolitics apart from the systems-theoretical, constructivist and liberal academic models of international relations, which for the most part have dubious empirical grounding and little scientific value.⁷ This is why geopolitics is viewed with suspicion and even outright hostility by many theorists of international relations, especially in the United States, who seem to be spending their careers knowing more and more about less and less. Contrary to their ahistoricist models – which are often adorned by “scientific” looking charts and graphs, and burdened by shaky intellectual assumptions and ideological dicta – the geopolitical approach assumes, and demonstrates, that the whole (ὅλον) of space, resources, people and power is more than the sum-total of its parts.

GEOPOLITICAL REALISM

The geopolitical paradigm complements the 20th century classical realist school (Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau) and its contemporary neorealist heirs (notably Kenneth Waltz). Competition, conflict, power, and space have been the basis of thinking about relations between men and the states they create for two and a half millennia, from Thucydides⁸ to Machiavelli,⁹ from Hobbes¹⁰ to our own time. Realism accepts that the world is imperfect, that violence is immanent to humankind, and that human nature is relatively constant. It does not discount the possibility that moral considerations may have a role in politics among nations, but it rejects abstract moralism in favor of prudence and rational calculus of power.

On the other hand, since the Enlightenment we have witnessed a sustained attempt to escape the immutable givens of human nature and social conflict, to assert that humankind is on the trajectory of linear historical progress, and to demonstrate that human nature is capable of being corrected through politics, education and indoctrination. The key tenet of the resulting liberal school of international relations is the notion that a conflict is not natural, that it can be overcome through political institutions which will relativize national sovereignty and promote interdependence and cooperation, and that moral principles should take precedence over state interests. For today’s intellectual heirs of Immanuel Kant¹¹ and John Stuart Mill,¹² the geopolitical paradigm is unduly pessimistic in its assumptions. Worse

⁶ Spatial understanding of power “provides the building stones needed to build a palace,” according to Halford Mackinder; cited in G. Parker: *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985, 120.

⁷ “Post-positivist,” “reflectivist” and various related exercises in academic scholastics are not worthy of mention.

⁸ Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* is much more than a chronicle of events. The assumptions present in the Athenians’ speech on the eve of the war (asserting the primacy of self-interest over morality) and the “Melian Dialogue” (“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”) have been present, in one form or another, in international relations ever since the 5th century BC. Thucydides was the first to introduce the notions of state actors, conflict and competition in an anarchic system, power and its balancing, security, and morality that have defined the realist tradition ever since.

⁹ Machiavelli broke ranks with his predecessors (Plato, Cicero, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas) by announcing that in his inquiries he was seeking “the effectual truth of the matter [of politics] rather than the imagined one.” (*The Prince*, Chapter XV)

¹⁰ Men are driven by “a perpetual and restless desire of power” for as long as they live. (*Leviathan* XI-2) Hobbes’ grim dictum that states “enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of invasion or assistance that may be given to invaders” (XIX-4) accurately reflects the spiral model (“security dilemma”) of international relations throughout recorded history.

¹¹ *Zum ewigen Frieden*. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. (Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.) 1796.

¹² See: G. Varouxakis: *Liberty Abroad: J. S. Mill on International Relations*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

still, it is also harmful because by focusing on competition, conflict, rivalry and power it supposedly contributes to their perpetuation. This is on par with criticizing medicine for its focus on germs and illnesses, and more generally for its acceptance of the frailty and vulnerability of the human body.

However, international relations remain geopolitically determined – from the Middle East to Ukraine, from the South China Sea to the Balkans – because mental constructs cannot trump reality. As a paradigmatic vision of international relations, geopolitics is neither “good” nor “bad” – it is a reflection of the permanence and importance of space, resources, power and will. As such, let us repeat, it stands in contrast to a major segment of the contemporary academic discipline of international relations which still abounds in theories neglectful of the importance of geography in its political and strategic dimensions.¹³ In the United States in particular, there is a tendency to treat geographic, historical and cultural differences between localities and peoples as unimportant, as “background noise” which distracts us from the serious task of model making.¹⁴ Writing in 2003, Christopher Fettweis (an American IR professor) went so far as to assert that, among the great powers at the top of the hierarchy of states, force is no longer an option to resolve differences:

Geopolitics as geo-strategy has assumptions of conflict at its root [but] today, since conflict between the strongest players is unthinkable, great power geo-strategy à la Mackinder, Spykman, Mahan, and Brzezinski, is obsolete. The implications of the obsolescence of major war have not begun to sink into either the theory or the practice international relations... Since geo-strategy is explicitly policy-oriented, Mackinderian descriptions of the world have the potential to be more dangerous than other outdated, baseless, and policy-ambivalent theories, which, by their academic nature, are easier to ignore and dismiss. It is hard to see how good policy can arise from a foundation of flawed theories and assumptions.¹⁵

Thirteen years later, what seems to be “obsolete” as well as “dangerous” is the belief in the qualitative, benign and progressive transformation of international relations. Similar claims have been made repeatedly following comprehensive peace settlements which ended major wars. This happened after Westphalia in 1648 (“a Christian and Universal Peace, perpetual, true and sincere”), after Vienna in 1815 (“the Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance which strove to consolidate human institutions and remedy their imperfections”), and after Versailles in 1919 (the League of Nations). The same happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (“the end of history”). What regularly follows is disillusionment and the return of geopolitical realism to the scene. Professor Fettweis, for one, appears to have realized that much over the past 13 years:

The U.S. fights wars abroad because it can, because it has the ability to do so, but part of that is, too, the U.S. recognizes and defines its interests so broadly that things that happen everywhere tend to show up on our radar screen... Everybody needs rivals to give life meaning, and that’s what we’re seeing internationally... One of the iron rules in

¹³ See: C. S. Grey: In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and his critics a hundred years on. In: B. W. Blouet (ed.): *Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West*. Abington and New York: Frank Cass, 2005, 19.

¹⁴ A. B. Murphy: Geography’s place in higher education in the United States. *Journal of Geography in Higher Education*, 31, 2007, 121–141.

¹⁵ C. J. Fettweis: Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: the Obsolescence of Great Power Politics. *Comparative Strategy*, 22/2, 2003, 123–124.

the international politics – it’s always true – that the other side, whoever the other side is, is always acting in its interests, it’s always just acting in pure power policy, what we would say “the other side is a realist.”¹⁶

Over the past quarter-century it has become evident that the competitive nature of the international system has not changed. From the realist point of view, after the Cold War it would have made sense for the U.S. to declare victory, disengage from permanent global entanglements, and “come home”; but American foreign-policy elites opted for the historically unprecedented model of unipolar global hegemony. This deterritorialized paradigm has simultaneously produced the tendency in Washington to equate any ideological obsession *du jour*, or any transient political objective in some faraway land, with America’s vital interests. In the absence of geopolitical prioritizing, literally anything could and does become a “vital interest.”

In December 2011, President Obama thus issued a directive elevating the rights and treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people abroad as “a priority in U.S. foreign policy.”¹⁷ In July 2011, the Hudson Institute declared that “the situation in Kyrgyzstan has a critical bearing on American national security.”¹⁸ A few months earlier Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, at the time the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that “a resolute US commitment to [Moldova’s territorial integrity] will ensure that we do not cede influence in a region of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy.”¹⁹ These and other similar statements are light years away from prioritizing issues and localities that affect the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position of the United States.

The list of such incongruities is long, and the problem continues to persist. (To wit, no leading contender for next November’s presidential election has offered a coherent understanding of “vital” American interests.) Having declared itself the leader of an imaginary “international community” in the 1990’s, the United States’ foreign policy elite developed a mindset, and accordingly proposed specific strategies and policies, which two leading neoconservative authors have hubristically characterized as America’s “benevolent global hegemony.”²⁰ In reality it was power politics on steroids, masked by the rhetoric of “promoting democracy,” “protecting human rights,” “building partnerships,” “defending shared values” etc.²¹

¹⁶ <http://www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/263777-is-us-military-budget> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

¹⁷ Obama Elevates Gay Rights as a Foreign Policy Priority. Voice of America News. December 5, 2011. <http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-elevates-gay-rights-as-a-foreign-policy-priority-135136743/174955.html> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.) Since its proclamation this “priority” has not manifested itself in American demands for the staging of “pride parades” in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf monarchies.

¹⁸ The Political Situation in Kyrgyzstan: Implications for the United States. Hudson Institute panel announcement. July 6, 2011. <http://www.hudson.org/events/1064-the-political-situation-in-kyrgyzstan-implications-for-the-united-states72011> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

¹⁹ Senator: Washington must pressure Russia on Moldova. Moldova AZI. February 8, 2011. <http://www.azi.md/en/story/16313> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

²⁰ R. Kagan – W. Kristol: Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 75/4, 1996.

²¹ See e.g. A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed World. Managing Global Insecurity Project. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008. It opens with the assertion that “the United States most of all must provide leadership for a global era... to renew American leadership, galvanize action against major threats, and refashion key institutions to reflect the need for partnership and legitimacy”.

GEOPOLITICAL VS. HEGEMONISTIC DISCOURSE

Geopolitical realism alone provides the foundation for a systematic, theoretically coherent, and practically applicable critique of the deterritorialized, ideologically driven American strategic doctrine. That doctrine's formal codification came in September 2002, with George W. Bush's *National Security Strategy*.²² It claimed the right of unilateral American action against "rogue states" and "potentially hostile powers," in pursuit of an end to "destructive national rivalries." Such audacious goals required the United States "to keep military strength beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace." The doctrine was inflexible in its failure to balance military and nonmilitary, short and long-term capabilities, at a time when the relative power of the United States *vis-à-vis* that of its real or potential global rivals was starting to decline. The absence of a geopolitics-based grand strategy produced flawed and costly policies. One example is provided by America's disastrous Iraqi venture: had Saddam stayed in power, Iraq would have continued to act as a significant regional check on the spread of Iranian influence – instead of becoming Iran's *de facto* ally, which it is today.

Bush's strategic doctrine was a blueprint for later disasters, especially when combined with the neoliberal interventionists' urge to "confront and defeat" not only "aggression" or threat thereof (fabricated in the case of Iraq), but also alleged or real violations of human rights resulting from internal conflicts. In the name of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) the U.S. took sides in conflicts which were irrelevant to any realist assessment of the American interest (Syria, Libya). The impulse to intervene did not recognize the limits of U.S. power and it did not correlate that power with the conventional state goals of security and prosperity. It was also hypocritical: "We never hear any R2P backers pushing for a military intervention in Gaza to protect the Palestinians from Israeli missiles," or to protect the repressed activists in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia.²³ Or, one may add, to shield Yemeni civilians from Saudi bombs, or to protect the Christian remnant from the "moderate" (i.e. non-ISIS) insurgents in Syria.

The Obama Administration provided a rehash of earlier concepts in its own *Defense Strategic Guidance* (DSG), unveiled in January 2012 as part of the broader programmatic document.²⁴ The DSG, which is still in force, claims that in the decades ahead it will be the task of the United States to "confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world." "Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region," it declares, "they will be capable of denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region." This reflects the continuing, chronic refusal of the policy-making community in Washington to establish a rational correlation between strategic ends and means, or to see America as a "normal" power pursuing limited political, economic, and military objectives in a world populated by other powers doing the same.

The hegemonic discourse on Syria in particular insists on the allegedly moral basis of U.S. policy, which is summarized in the old slogan "Bashar must go!" At the same time it avoids any serious consideration of the underlying geopolitical causes of the crisis. One is

²² The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House, 2002. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

²³ A. Loewensten: Western liberations are grotesque experiments – just look at Libya. *The Guardian*. July 31, 2014.

²⁴ Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/282223-defense-strategic-guidance.html> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

the desire of some key Sunni Muslim states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies) “to turn Syria into a permanent Sunni Muslim wedge dividing what they see as a putative Shiite-dominated crescent extending from Iran across Iraq and Syria into northern Lebanon.”²⁵ Another notion, closely connected to the first, is the ambition of Saudi Arabia and Qatar to build and control projected oil and gas pipelines from the Arabian Desert to the Mediterranean and southeastern Turkey.²⁶

The American role in Ukraine is another case in point. The hegemonic discourse routinely describes it as a principled defense of that young democracy’s right to pursue its freely decided-upon path of Euro-Atlantic integrations and to resist “Russian aggression.” The geopolitics-based approach sees Ukraine as a key disputed area of the Rimland surrounding the Eurasian Heartland, which motivated the United States government and its East European proxies to stage the Maidan and its aftermath.²⁷ It treats as axiomatic the notion that a sane U.S. relationship with Moscow needs to include our acceptance that Russia has certain security interests in her “near abroad” which are legitimized, from the Kremlin’s vantage point, by historical experience; and that the entire Maidan operation was unsurprisingly perceived as a direct challenge to those interests.²⁸

In the same vein China has geopolitical concerns in the South China Sea, and this is treated in Washington as a major challenge to U.S. interests in the region. For China, asserting control over the disputed zone of “Asia’s Mediterranean” is seen as a near-existential issue. To prevent this, a consistent hegemonic strategy would necessarily entail halting further American investment in the Chinese economy, reversing massive outsourcing of American manufacturing capacity to China over the past quarter-century, and erecting trade barriers against the continuing deluge of Chinese-made consumer products in American stores.²⁹ It would also necessitate uniting China’s regional foes under U.S. leadership – from Japan and South Korea in the north to the Philippines, Malaysia and even Vietnam in the south – which are not necessarily on friendly terms with each other. If all this is found to be unpalatable or impractical, however, then the alternative is pragmatic acceptance by the U.S. of the re-

²⁵ S. Trifkovic: Syria: No End Game in Sight. *Chronicles*, October 8, 2015. <https://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/syria-no-end-game-in-sight> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

²⁶ N. Ahmed: Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concern: Massacres of civilians are being exploited for narrow geopolitical competition to control Mideast oil, gas pipelines. *The Guardian*. August 30, 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

²⁷ In a CNN interview on April 12, 2014. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland denied any direct financial support to the rebels in the Maidan, but did acknowledge US involvement in Ukraine: “The United States has invested some five billion dollars in Ukraine since 1991 when it became an independent state again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And that money has been spent on supporting the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to have a strong, democratic government that represents their interests. But we certainly didn’t spend any money supporting the Maidan...” <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/04/20140423298186.html#ixzz40RvY1QIq> Accessed on: 02. 17. 2016.) See also: G. Sussmann – S. Krader: *Template Revolutions: Marketing U.S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe*. In: *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* Vol. 5/3, 91–112. and S. Milne: It’s not Russia that’s pushed Ukraine to the brink of war. *The Guardian*. April 30, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict> (Accessed on: 02. 20. 2015.)

²⁸ See: *Rethinking Russia: A Conversation With Russia Scholar Stephen F. Cohen*. *Huffington Post*, July 7, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-kovalik/rethinking-russia-a-conve_b_7744498.html (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

²⁹ S. Trifkovic: China’s Island-Building Challenge. *Chronicles*. June 1, 2015. <https://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/chinas-island-building-challenge> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

distribution of power and geopolitical influence in the Far East and Southeast Asia. On the global scale similarly realistic approach would require policies that seek to manage, rather than resist, the emerging multipolar structure.

It is strategically short-sighted, and in terms of any rational long-term security calculus it is counterproductive, for the U.S. to treat every spot on the globe as an area of vital American interest and to resist any change of regional power balances. Actively promoting an end to “destructive national rivalries” is an impossible task, verging on the insane. That much is clear to a geopolitical realist familiar with the phenomenon of imperial overreach through history. This fact is vehemently rejected by the neoliberal-neoconservative duopoly, however, to the detriment of America and the rest of the world.

In 2014 in Eastern Europe in particular, the Duopoly grabbed an opportunity to renew U.S. dominance along the European rimland and to subvert the Russo-German rapprochement with a latter-day version of Nicholas Spykman’s “anaconda strategy.”³⁰ This jeopardizes the prospects for a long-term civilizational partnership with Russia – a “northern alliance” which is sorely needed at a time of Europe’s real and present demographic danger, when old European nations are becoming objects of alien ambitions whether their governments see the danger or not.³¹

NO SOUND GRAND STRATEGY WITHOUT GEOPOLITICS

The failure of the policy-making community in Washington to accept the validity of the geopolitical-realist paradigm has resulted, and continues to result, in the absence of a coherent American grand strategy for the 21st century. Grand strategy is an overall blueprint for action that matches a state’s resources to its vital interests. A sound grand strategy enables a state to deploy its political, military, economic, and moral resources in a balanced and proportionate manner, in order to protect and enhance its security, and promote its well-being. It is the brains behind diplomacy and military power. It enables decision-makers to rank actual or potential hot spots by importance and not to consider them *ad-hoc*, in isolation from each other or outside of the broad picture.

Great Britain successfully pursued a geopolitically sound thalassocratic grand strategy during the two centuries that separated the War of the Spanish Succession from the Treaty of Versailles. That strategy had two pillars: the maintenance of a continental balance of power in Europe (whenever possible without major military commitments) and the development of a maritime trading empire, with unhindered access to vital resources and markets secured by a mighty navy. Britain’s crisis-response strategies – in the wars against Louis XIV, during the Seven Years’ War, in the wars against Napoleon, in the Crimean War, in the naval race with Germany, and notably during the July Crisis of 1914 – correlated to a grand strategy that, consciously or oftentimes instinctively, relied on an understanding of geopolitical realities and grand-strategic imperatives of a global trading power. Disputes over policy details could be contentious at times; on the fundamentals of higher strategy, however, the British political class maintained a consensus until after the Great War.

By contrast, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union before and after Stalin, were great powers devoid of grand strategy. Until the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler was a successful

³⁰ See S. Trifkovic: The Geopolitics of New Multipolarity, a lecture given at the IDC in Paris on May 27, 2014. <http://www.idc-europe.org/en/-The-geopolitics-of-new-Multipolarity-> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

³¹ Alfred Grabowski’s 90-year old term *kämpfendes Raumsubjekt* comes to mind.

opportunist; thereafter he turned into a doomed dilettante. Conquering an unconquerable eastern *Lebensraum*, while murdering and enslaving millions of *Untermenschen* in the process, was not a grand strategy but a nihilistic vision doomed to failure. It is therefore ironic that “geopolitics” is still claimed to have inspired Hitler: his apocalyptic vision of the *Rassenkampf* and eastern expansion was the exact opposite of a great continental axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo which was advocated by Karl Haushofer, the leading German geopolitician between the two world wars.³² The Nazis used geopolitical terminology without understanding geopolitics, just as Karl Marx used economic terminology without understanding economics.

Early Bolshevik leaders were prone to deterritorialized, ideologically driven discourse, hoping for a world revolution within years of their own triumph. Stalin, by contrast, was in essence a realist: the proclamation of “Socialism in one country” reflected his acceptance of geopolitical realities.³³ Having run out of ideological appeal abroad and economic and social dynamism at home during its final years, however, the Soviet Union could not win the Cold War. Its piecemeal strategies of keeping the “socialist camp” under coercive control, attempting to subvert the West, and promoting Marxist insurgencies in the Third World also reflected a “deterritorialized” approach that denied the validity of geopolitical paradigm (which was in any event unpalatable for ideological reasons). The cost was high: staging *ad-hoc* proactive crises (Cuba 1962) and reactive interventions (Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979) were no substitute for a grand strategy. From a realist perspective that Soviet grand strategy needed to be *defensive* to prolong the state’s life. Its Western adversaries recognized the extent of its fundamental weaknesses only toward the very end.

In its infancy, the American Republic was an autarkic continental power pursuing a grand strategy of limited objectives. Its geopolitical rationale was summed up by George Washington when he warned America to preserve her fortunate distance from the affairs of other countries and not to enter into lasting pacts with them: “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”³⁴ The same geopolitical vision was echoed by John Quincy Adams, who noted approvingly that America “has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings... But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.”³⁵ These were rational statements by geopolitical realists. They were comfortable with the idea of U.S. monopoly on power in the Western Hemisphere, but free from the present-day delusion that America herself is the deterritorialized embodiment of a body of universally applicable “values” and “principles.”

The conquest of the American West – a geopolitical fact of the highest order – and the concurrent growth of industrial capitalism created the conditions for a paradigm shift. It was

³² See: H. Heske: Karl Haushofer: His role in German Geopolitics and in Nazi Politics. *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6. 1987. 135–144.

³³ “We cannot do anything about geography, nor can you” Stalin told the Finnish delegation matter-of-factly on the eve of the 1939–1940 Winter War. “Since Leningrad cannot be moved away, the frontier must be further off.” Haushofer would have appreciated the logic.

³⁴ Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

³⁵ John Quincy Adams’s Warning Against the Search for “Monsters to Destroy” 1821, Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy, Mt Holyoke College. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jqadams.htm> (Accessed on: 02. 13. 2016.)

articulated in the strategic vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan at the end of the 19th century.³⁶ Mahan's emphasis on sea power signaled a reinvention of Manifest Destiny in the guise of imperialism. After the victory over Spain in 1898 America emerged as the third naval power in the world, with overseas possessions and protectorates outside the Western Hemisphere (The Philippines), with a network of bases and coaling stations. Her leaders' geopolitical vision, with its emphasis on sea power, came to resemble that of Great Britain. The parallel expansion of America's political, financial, and economic power – primarily in Latin America – fortified and extended her traditional hemispheric sphere of influence. The United States' power grew but America entered the 20th century without a mature grand strategy. Theodore Roosevelt changed that and made her a great power. In the process he also sowed the seeds of two costly heresies that persist to this day: the notion that the exportation of American values would have a redeeming effect on the rest of the world, and the tendency of the chief executive to bypass Congress while aggressively pursuing his foreign schemes.

The problem created by the mix of messianic notions of American exceptionalism and an excessive level of executive control over the use of the military persists to this day. The nature of the problem is obvious to a geopolitically-minded realist, but such objections run contrary to the hegemonistic, inside-the-Beltway mindset. Intoxicated by their notions of self-appointed global leadership, its initiates still hope to maintain open-ended full-spectrum dominance. To the detriment of America and the rest of the world, they are likely to continue to reject the warnings of Messrs. Kenneth Waltz³⁷ and John Mearsheimer³⁸ – two wise Americans who understand that redeeming geopolitical realism as a tool of analysis and as a distinct paradigm in foreign affairs is necessary in order to articulate and pursue strategically sound U.S. policies.

A realist assessment of the domestic balance of power in the United States indicates that, for many years to come, a deterritorialized and ideologically loaded paradigm of the neoconservative-neoliberal Duopoly will continue to prevail. Its operatives will continue to ignore the insights of geopolitical realism. Consequently, they will continue to threaten world peace and act to the detriment of the American interests.

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³⁶ A. Thayer Mahan: *The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1893.

³⁷ K. N. Waltz: *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.

³⁸ J. J. Mearsheimer: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton, 2001.

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Georg Schmidt:

WAR AND PUBLIC HEALTH: EFFECTS OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR ON THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM

ABSTRACT: This article highlights the major constraints of the Syrian public health system caused by the armed conflict since 2011. The pre-conflict health situation appeared to be good in terms of service and coverage. Various public health indicators put the Syrian Arab Republic on a par with other lower middle-income countries. However, the situation changed rapidly after the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. The ongoing fights clearly demand fatal casualties on the battlefield, and the public health system receives additional stress because of various other reasons.

Firstly, medical needs have changed because of the use of explosive weapons and the outbreak of specific infectious diseases. Not only hospitals but also paramedics, doctors and the overall emergency management structure have to adapt to this changes. Secondly, similar to other armed conflicts violence against health care workers, health care facilities and vital infrastructure is happening and deteriorates the situation even more. The armed conflict also triggered a high number of internally displaced people which generated an additional health care risk. Thirdly, restrictions in movement hinder the treatment of the chronically-ill and it remains unsure how many patients cannot access health care at the moment. Lastly, international sanctions and embargos hinder the importation of critical medical items and make it even more difficult to control the public health situation in Syria.

Considering the current constraints, negative long term consequences seem inevitable. At the moment of writing this paper it seems that there is no end of the conflict in sight and the situation might deteriorate in the future.

KEYWORDS: War and Public Health, Syrian Conflict, Syrian Arab Republic, Health Services, Armed Conflict

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing crisis in Syria is characterised by violence and fierce clashes in various regions of the country. This conflict is counting its fifth year and the consequences for the population seem extensive. It is estimated that the population has decreased from 23 million in 2011 to 17 million in 2014.¹

Before the conflict, the health system of the Syrian Arab Republic was considered to be good in terms of service and comparable to similar middle-income countries² (Jordan remains on the top of the ranking in the Middle East). It could be observed that various health indicators (e.g. life expectancy [see Figure 1] or infant mortality) improved significantly

¹ "The World Factbook: Syria". Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html> (Accessed on: 14. 11. 2015.)

² A. Abbara – Z. Sahoul – F. Fouad – A. Coutts – W. Maziak: The Effect of the Conflict on Syria's Health System and Human Resources for Health. *World Health & Population*, 16/1. 2015, 87–95.

over the last three decades.³ Some hospitals are comparable to European-type hospitals and even high cost medical devices (e.g. magnetic-resonance-imaging or computed-tomography-scanner) are in common use.




Figure 1 – “Life expectancy for male” in Syria in comparison to other countries.

Source: compiled from www.gapminder.org (last access 13. 11. 2015)

In 2010, the three most common causes of premature death appeared to be (i) ischemic heart disease, (ii) cerebrovascular disease and (iii) congenital anomalies.⁴ Presently in 2015 the most common cause of death is caused by the ongoing conflict, killing thousands of people.⁵ Ischemic heart disease and stroke remain under the top three reasons of death, taking second and third place. Consequently, cardiovascular diseases and diabetes remain the biggest health risk factors next to the consequences of war.

In general, the medical needs during armed conflicts coincide with the needs during peace-time and the main difference can be found in the quantity and the speed of medical emergencies.⁶ This drastic increase in quantity can be researched by investigating the current statistics for the Syrian Arab Republic. With a total of 7.6 million people internally displaced, at least 4 million refugees, 1 million injured people and already 220.000 deaths, this country counts more than 12.2 million affected people in the year 2015.⁷ However, the public health system deteriorates drastically in Syria and it remains unclear if it can adequately respond to those needs. Hospitals as well as paramedics and the overall emergency management structures needed to adapt within the last years and are still struggling to keep up with daily demands.

³ M. Kherallah – T. Alahfez – Z. Sahloul – K. D. Eddin – G. Jamil: Health Care in Syria before and During the Crisis. *Global Research News* 2/3. 2012, 51–53.

⁴ GBD Profile Syria: Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, And Risk Factors Study 2010, Seattle: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2010, 1–9.

⁵ Syrian Arab Republic: WHO statistical profile. WHO. http://who.int/gho/mortality_burden_disease/en/ (Accessed on: 12. 11. 2015.)

⁶ P. Merrin: The Health Care System. In: *Handbook on war and public health*. Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996, 301–332.

⁷ N. Ward: Regional Situation Report, September 2015. In: *WHO response to the Syrian crisis*, Geneva, WHO, 2015, 1–6.

This article highlights the major constraints and changes of the public health system caused by the armed conflict in Syria. For this purpose the present article utilises secondary data from the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Syrian Ministry of Health (MoH) and several publications by non-governmental humanitarian organisations (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross or Médecins Sans Frontières). Additionally, peer reviewed publications were utilised, accessed via ScienceDirect, GoogleScholar and PubMed. Papers were searched by the following key words: conflict and hospitals, public health Syria, armed conflict in Syria, Syrian conflict and health data in Syria.

EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011 the public health systems have undergone a constant decline. Various public health indicators have been on the downfall and constraints can be researched at various levels. Obviously, the conflict has a direct impact on public health by causing many war wounded or by destroying health care facilities. However, also indirect public health constraints can be observed in Syria (e.g. sanctions and embargos)⁸. Subsequently, this article will discuss direct and indirect public health consequences caused by the ongoing conflict.

DIRECT HEALTH CONSEQUENCES

At the outset, due to the use of explosive weapons and aerial bombings, health care facilities are overwhelmed by the amount of people they have to treat. Explosive weapons trigger mass-casualty-emergencies, furthermore provoke complications for paramedics, doctors (especially surgeons) and the overall emergency-management-mechanism⁹. Even worse, the WHO reports that only 42% of the Syrian hospitals are functioning in the year 2015.¹⁰

The emergency system of Syria in peace time was adequately prepared for the most common risks of death, just as well were their paramedics. The adjustment to mass-casualty-emergencies caused by explosive weapons constituted a serious attempt by the emergency management system. Moreover, the use of explosive weapons triggers an increase of amputations and therefore a need for physical rehabilitation programs. Antipersonnel mines and mortars seem to cause a high number of disabilities in this conflict.

Another limitation in public health can be researched in terms of violence against health care workers and the destruction of health care facilities. The Syrian conflict demonstrates that violence against health care is a serious humanitarian issue and 329 attacks against health care facilities have been documented so far.¹¹ Moreover, as the “Health Care in Danger Project” by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) revealed, health care facilities in armed conflicts are at a general increased risk for looting and pillage.¹² The Syrian conflict is no exception from this crude fact and in November 2015 as many as 48 volunteers

⁸ C. Murray: Armed conflict as a public health problem. *BMJ*, 324/7333, 2002, 346–349.

⁹ Health Care in Danger: Violent Incidents Affecting the Delivery of Health Care. Geneva: ICRC, 2015, 1–25.

¹⁰ N. Ward: op. cit.

¹¹ E. Baker – M. Heisler: Aleppo Abandoned: A Case Study on Health Care in Syria. New York: Physicians for Human Rights, 2015, 1–28.

¹² Health Care in Danger: op. cit.

of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) lost their lives whilst being on duty¹³. Moreover, the organisation “Physicians for Human Rights” published that 687 medical personnel have died since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011.¹⁴

Moreover, the conflict in Syria triggered a high number of internally displaced persons (IDP); IDP are understood as a part of the population who fled their homes but reside in the same country; in contrast to a refugee who is leaving the country of origin. Internal displacement of millions of people is causing additional stress for the public health system in Syria and overwhelms the capacity of several health care facilities which are not dimensioned for a high number of patients. Furthermore, there is an increased risk for specific public health problems amongst internally displaced persons: (i) increased mortality among high-risk groups (young children and elderly), (ii) the spread of communicable diseases, (iii) malnutrition and (iv) the risk of complications with untreated injuries.¹⁵

Furthermore, vital infrastructure undergoes an ongoing destruction, leading to a lack of shelter and unreliable energy sources. An insufficient power-supply constitutes one of the major constraints for health care facilities.

It appears difficult to run operating-theatres and vital medical devices with permanent power fluctuations. Humanitarian organisations calculate the minimum power requirements for a surgical hospital of 50 beds with 100 kVA.¹⁶ Consequently, electric generators are highly important to put clinics into operation. Since medical devices are not prepared to withstand iterative power cuts they brake down even more without proper electrical connection.

Ongoing clashes also influence continuous and clean water supply for clinical infrastructures. The minimum water requirements to operate a surgical hospital are 100 litres per patient daily.¹⁷ It remains difficult to provide hospitals with this high amount of water during armed conflict. Moreover, some vital medical devices are dependent on clean and proper water supply (e.g. dialysis machines or computed-tomography-scanners) therefore increase the calculated amount of necessary water.

INDIRECT HEALTH CONSEQUENCES

At the outset, public health constraints can be found in terms of accessibility and security. Since the outbreak of the conflict, there have always been people in the country without access to health care. Limitations are generated either because of security-reasons or restrictions in movement by the parties of conflict.¹⁸ An armed conflict has always implicated that certain regions are cut off from other parts of the country.¹⁹ Military checkpoints or the placement of antipersonnel mines is a common method to restrict the population from leaving certain

¹³ Brief Overview. Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). <http://sarc.sy/sarc-2015-brief-overview> (Accessed on: 20. 11. 2015.)

¹⁴ E. Baker – M. Heisler: *op. cit.*

¹⁵ M. Toole – R. Waldman: Refugees and Displaced Persons: War, Hunger, and Public Health. *Journal of American Medical Association*. 270/5. 1993, 600–605.

¹⁶ J. Hayward-Karlsson: Hospital Infrastructure. In: *Hospitals for war-wounded*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998, 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Syria and countries affected by the conflict: Humanitarian situations, needs and response. ICRC, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/field-newsletter/2013/12-syria-sarc-icrc-ifrc-newsletter.htm> (Accessed on: 13. 11. 2015.)

¹⁹ P. Merrin: *op. cit.*

areas. The United Nations (UN) estimated a total amount of three million people trapped in areas surrounded by ongoing fight.²⁰ Moreover, the destruction of infrastructure (e.g. roads, train tracks or bridges) leads to a serious limitation in movement and some parts of the population are sometimes trapped for several months.

This restriction in movement constitutes a severe constraint for the chronically sick population and they are forced to interrupt their treatment, leaving many people in a dire situation behind conflict lines. It was estimated that 226 patients per million inhabitants require constant dialysis treatment before the outbreak of the conflict and it remains unclear if these people can reach their therapy or not.²¹ Moreover, it can be observed that patients with life-threatening wounds are preferred in hospital-treatment compared to the chronically ill.²²

Moreover, Syria has been facing international sanctions since May 2011 which is causing further restrictions for the public health system.^{23, 24} Firstly, the Syrian Arab Republic applies the “Arab League Boycott of Israel”; which implies a boycott of every company based in or somehow related to Israel.²⁵ Secondly, the European Union (EU) imposed several sets of sanctions on Syria. These sanctions by the EU are supposed to target the Syrian government directly and to achieve repression.²⁶ However, current sanctions are also leading to importation-restrictions for critical medicines (e.g. medicine to treat cancer or heart diseases) and critical spare parts for medical devices.²⁷

Moreover, economic sanctions implicated an increase in prices for vitally important products. Prices of basic food sometimes doubled and tripled and simultaneously with a loss of income many families now struggle to upkeep their daily life. Additionally, inner state sanctions lead to an interruption of power and water lines. It appears that some areas in the country are cut off for several days.

Another constraint can be observed in a lack of medical staff. Comparable to other active conflict zones a large number of doctors in Syria have fled, got killed or got kidnapped in the past years.^{28, 29} In the year 2013 already 34 members of the Syrian Arab Red Cross were killed while performing their work.³⁰ Moreover, it is estimated that in Aleppo city (northern region of Syria) 95 % of doctors are missing due to the conflict.³¹ The provision of

²⁰ Syria crisis, 3 years on: the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement calls for an end to the humanitarian tragedy. ICRC, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/syria-icrc-ifrc-sarc-statement.htm> (Accessed on: 14. 11. 2015.)

²¹ A. Abbara – Z. Sahoul – F. Fouad – A. Coutts – W. Maziak: op. cit.

²² M. Kherallah – T. Alahfez – Z. Sahloul – K. D. Eddin – G. Jamil: op. cit.

²³ K. Sen – W. Al-Faisal – Y. Alsaleh: Syria: Effects of conflict and sanctions on public health. *Journal of Public Health*, 35/2., 2013, 195–199.

²⁴ M. Kherallah – T. Alahfez – Z. Sahloul – K. D. Eddin – G. Jamil: op. cit.

²⁵ M. A. Weiss: Arab League Boycott of Israel. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015, 1–13.

²⁶ C. Portela: The EU sanctions operation in Syria: Conflict management by other means. Singapore: Singapore Management University, 2012, 151–158.

²⁷ Weiss, M. A.: op. cit.

²⁸ M. Kherallah – T. Alahfez – Z. Sahloul – K. D. Eddin – G. Jamil: op. cit.

²⁹ R. I. Donaldson – P. Shanovich – P. Shetty – E. Clark – S. Aziz – M. Morton – T. Hasoon – G. Evans: A Survey of National Physicians Working in an Active Conflict Zone: The Challenges of Emergency Medical Care in Iraq. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*. 27/2., 2012, 153–161.

³⁰ Syria crisis, 3 years on: the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement calls for an end to the humanitarian tragedy.

³¹ E. Baker – M. Heisler: op. cit.

security for health staff can be investigated as one of the major concerns within this conflict and determines one of the main reasons why health care facilities are out of operation.

Previous studies in conflict zones display the same result and mention staffing shortage as one of the biggest challenges for hospitals during an armed conflict.³² Although a shortage of staff exists, it remains difficult for health facilities to adequately remunerate their remaining personnel. Financial constraints during armed conflict remain another common problem and have already been studied in previous conflicts (e.g. in the Split University Hospital during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina).³³

Additionally, the conflict facilitated the spread of infectious diseases like poliomyelitis, measles³⁴ and cutaneous leishmaniasis³⁵ (Leishmaniasis is a disease caused by parasites and transmitted via sandflies³⁶). In principle, the Syrian health system possessed adequate means to respond to such diseases and prevent them from spreading; besides, Leishmaniasis is classified as treatable and curable. However, as a consequence of the conflict the country failed to follow up on immunization programs, leaving the population vulnerable to preventable diseases. Even basic prevention facilities (e.g. bed nets to prevent the sandflies from biting) cannot be provided for all the population and the vaccination coverage decreased from 90% to 45% within three years (from 2010 to 2013).³⁷ These cases of leishmaniasis, measles and poliomyelitis in Syria are a perfect example of how a war can give way for easily treatable diseases.

Lastly, armed conflicts have always had a serious impact on the mental health of the population. The suffering of the population also extends well beyond the time of active warfare and therefore seems to cause long-term effects on public health.³⁸ It seems obvious that people, directly influenced by ongoing clashes, experience a large amount of stress and the risk for developing mental health disorders is high.

Moreover, the Syrian conflict already generated a high number of refugees; people are forced to leave their country and start a new life within a new culture and environment. These refugees are confronted with new languages, new bureaucratic environment as well as a new health care system. The process of being forced to leave a country and take on refugee status triggers a high amount of stress and negative mental health outcomes are likely.³⁹ At the moment it is estimated that more than 2.3 million people are affected by mental health problems and it might be difficult to recover for many of them.⁴⁰

³² R. I. Donaldson – P. Shanovich – P. Shetty – E. Clark – S. Aziz – M. Morton – T. Hasoon – G. Evans: *op. cit.*

³³ D. Marasovic – M. Grljusic – D. Miric – I. Music – M. Brzovic – I. Lukic: Health Care Relief to Neighbours: Split University Hospital during the 1991–1995 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Croat Med.* 43/2., 2002, 229–233.

³⁴ Syria: Measles epidemic signals growing humanitarian needs. MFS. <http://www.msf.org/article243/syria-measles-epidemic-signals-growing-humanitarian-needs> (Accessed on: 13. 11. 2015.)

³⁵ S. L. Sharara – S. S. Kanj: War and infectious diseases: challenges of the Syrian civil war. *Plos Pathogens.* 10/11., 2014, 1–4.

³⁶ Leishmaniasis: Fact sheet N°375. WHO. <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs375/en/> (Accessed on: 13. 11. 2015.)

³⁷ S. L. Sharara – S. S. Kanj: *op. cit.*

³⁸ H. A. Ghobarah – P. Huth – B. Russett: The post-war public health effects of civil conflict. *Social science & medicine* 59/4., 2004, 869–884.

³⁹ A-C. Hermansson – T. Timpka – M. Thyberg: The Mental Health of War-Wounded Refugees: An 8-Year Follow-up. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 190/6., 2002, 374–380.

⁴⁰ A. Abbara – Z. Sahoul – F. Fouad – A. Coutts – W. Maziak: *op. cit.*

CONCLUSION

The armed conflict in Syria is putting severe stress on the public health system. Medical needs have changed because of the use of explosive weapons and the outbreak of specific infectious diseases. Not only hospitals have to adapt to these changes but also paramedics and the general emergency management structure. Similarly to other armed conflicts, violence against health care workers, health care facilities, and vital infrastructure is happening and deteriorates the situation even more. The armed conflict also triggered a high number of IDP which generated an additional health care risk in Syria. Moreover, restrictions in movement hinder the treatment for the chronically-ill and it remains unclear how many people do not have access to health care.

Sanctions and embargos make it difficult to control the health situation in Syria. It is now difficult to import specific medicine or medical devices. It remains unsure if sanctions really make sense to stop an armed conflict. From a humanitarian point of view it seems clear that the blockage of medical items will worsen the health system even more.

Rebuilding Syria's public health system after the conflict will require a holistic strategy to tackle various constraints. The armed conflict has already destroyed the health developments of the past years and put the country several years back in development. Due to an inconsistency of data it remains difficult to fully estimate the effects of these events on the public health system. Methods to acquire data within an armed conflict are still not well developed therefore the actual situation might be even worse.

This article highlights that the armed conflict in Syria provokes both immediate and long-term damage to the public health systems; supposedly well beyond the duration of active fighting. Many people remain completely dependent on humanitarian organisations or fellow citizens.

At the moment of writing it seems that there is no end of the conflict in sight and the health situation might deteriorate in the future. It seems obvious that the armed conflict has significant consequences for public health systems.

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Col. Sándor Nagy:

DEFINING REGULATORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S AFRICAN POLICY AND ITS DILEMMAS

ABSTRACT: The recent time period causing extraordinary situation with the migration wave arriving from Africa raises some exceptionally important questions. These questions, however, can only receive justified answers if we know those documents and regulators which define the relationship of the European Union and African countries, particularly the relationship of Sub-Saharan African countries.

KEYWORDS: Democratic governing, human rights, stability, corruption, partnership, joint EU strategy, Member States' interest

INTRODUCTION

The democratization processes of the African countries and good governance, and at the same time support of the countries' economic and societal stability belong to the EU's priority for years. The latter also plays an important role in the activity of most European legal institutions' and in EU-African partnership programs.¹ However, observing Sub-Saharan countries, one may realize that the results are quite mixed. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which publishes governance adjudication of African countries every year, in 2010 (and since then) democratic governance on its own (has) displayed a significant decline in many countries; however, strangely in social and economic areas, development has been experienced.

Multiple factors provide an explanation for the discrepancies between democratization rhetoric and the realization of governance processes in real life. On the one hand, the internal problems of the African countries must be emphasized, such as evolved dangerous conflicts, the focal point of conflicts, political crisis situations, growing corruption and steady, exceptionally widespread poverty. On the other hand, the emerging inconsistencies under political cooperation must be highlighted, unsolved matters, including not only Africans, but also problems coming from the European side, which aggravate putting the productive and efficient principles into practice, and complicate any productive political partnership. At the same time, it can be observed that the political support of African democratic governance is the only efficient solution on both sides.

Due to the ratification of the European policy in the developed debate one must be aware of the most important challenges and the emerging possibilities equally in order to effectively support the African democratization processes and democratic governance. In order to achieve this goal, past experiences must be utilized to establish a more efficient policy. The Lisbon Agreement (01/12/2009), the establishment of the European External Action

¹ Besenyő J.: Új trend az afrikai békefenntartásban. Sereg Szemle, 7/2., 2009, 54–62. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/28301/s_sz_2009_2.pdf (Accessed on: ?)

Service (Service Européen pour l'Action extérieure² 01/12/ 2010), and the Third EU-African Summit in Tripoli (29-30/11/2010) must make the objects of investigation. The statesmen and governments of the two continents adopted the mutual strategy related to 2011-2013, the main tasks of which concern government and human rights.

Firstly, it is necessary to check the basic policies, institutions, and tools defining the European foreign policy in relation to the partnership with Africa. After that it is important to overview the contradictions and ambiguities within the member states of the EU in relation to the definition of the mutual program as well as the operation of the toolkit at their disposal.

THE EXISTENT TOOLKIT AND ACTION PLAN

It is rather difficult to create a mutual viewpoint around the handling of the more and more exasperating migration. On the other hand, there is a widespread toolkit at the disposal of the EU foreign policy in the subject of the African democratization and governing, which is one of the keystones of establishing stability. However, practice proves several of the deficiencies of African democratization. The people of the countries labeled as „Black Africa” have not started mass-migration towards Europe in the hope of a new and better life, which may be the very reason why not only precaution is crucial on the part of the EU member states, but also placing the strategic solution for handling several of their problems on the agenda. As proven by the recent past, it is inevitable to form a mutual viewpoint.

The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty, which came into effect on 01 December 2009, defines the mutual goals of the EU foreign policy such as „democracy, constitutional state, the fundamental general and indivisible human and freedom rights, the respect of human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, the respect of the principles of the ultimate documents of the United Nations and the international law”. The European foreign policy follows these trends through the cooperation aiming at development. The major goal in this field is to decrease the African poverty and its windup at the highest degree. In the present situation of increasing poverty throughout Africa the latter goal is rather illusional. This is one of the factors of the evolving migration wave.

² European External Action Service (Service Européen pour l'Action extérieure): The Lisbon Treaty provides that “in fulfilling its mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS)” (Article 27 § 3 TEU). By introducing the diplomatic service, the European Union will speak with one voice and hope to gain a real presence on the international stage. Since the beginning of 2011, the EEAS has therefore been the diplomatic service of the European Union, both in Brussels and abroad. <http://www.touteleurope.eu/l-union-europeenne/service-europeen-pour-l-action-exterieure.html>

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement³

The agreement between the EU and the African ACP⁴ countries was signed on 23 July 2000, where the tasks originating from the partnership are defined. The agreement determines the frameworks of the development of cooperation and the commercial connections between the European Union and the ACP member states. Paragraph 9 deals with the three most important elements of the partnership – human rights, democracy and the principles of the constitutional state. Additionally, it defines a fourth fundamental element, namely the appropriate handling of public affairs referring to the vast active and passive corruption in Africa. These four elements together serve as a positive inspiration for the internal affairs and the foreign policy of the member and the partner states. In this respect ACP-EU partnership can actively support the development of human rights, stabilising the constitutional state and the handling of public affairs. As far as financial issues are concerned, national and regional five-year plans in different regions are financed by the European Development Fund.

Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The joint strategy was approved at the 2nd African-EU summit in Lisbon on 08-09 December 2007, and it includes, among many others, the issues of democratic governance and human rights, which reappear here in the fundamental principles. The strategy reassures the possibility of global dialogues between the continents and the cooperation in different regions by the EU-African partnership.

The areas concerned are – the strengthening of local abilities, the protection of human rights, democratic principles, the issue of the constitutional state, equal access to justice, handling and protection of natural and mineral resources, fight against corruption, responsibility in handling public money, creating the necessary institutions or the reform of the existing ones, and the reform of the security sector.

At the Summit, the fundamental principle allowing the establishment of tools necessary for the new strategic partnership thus contributing to the implementation of the mutual strategic objectives and action plan defined here was accepted. Nevertheless, it must be noted that after the initial ambitions only few results have been obtained with the fewest outcomes in the area of democratic governing. The joint strategy faced several structural dysfunctional problems such as the dilution of the content of the mutual policy, thin intentions for approving the fundamental principles on both sides, and a highly clumsy institutional structure and its low efficiency. Hopes for a quick success also abated soon. However, it must be mentioned that these hindering factors in cooperating with African countries have been well-known. These are the factors that account for the poor outcome of joint strategy between 2008 and 2010.

³ Cotonou Partnership Agreement is an agreement between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries), an international treaty. In June 2000, it was signed in the largest city of Benin, in Cotonou, by 79 ACP countries and the European Union, the then fifteen Member States. The agreement came into force in 2000. <https://www.lonelyplanet.com/west-africa>

⁴ ACP: The ACP States (English abbreviation: African, Caribbean and Pacific) with the European Community and its successor, the European Union co-operation agreement binding third-world countries are the group. <http://www.acp.int/>

European Development Agreement

The so-called reference document approved in February 2006 has an essential importance being the first one to identify and define the mutual objectives to be followed in the fields of cooperation and development policy for EU and the member states. It reinforces the mutual values that the EU has to promote in its cooperation with the partnership countries. Some of these values introduced before are repeated such as “respecting human rights, peace, democracy, *“bonne gouvernance”*, the rule of law, solidarity, and fairness”. In the agreement, the EU is committed to increasing the financial support considering the member states and the efficiency in its own field... It should be noted that about half of the increased subsidies was intended for African countries by the EU. The Agreement underlines, repeating several times, that the fundamental task is to defend human rights and accelerate democratic processes in order to decrease poverty and start a lasting process of development. In order to develop governing, the characteristics of each country should be considered in a sort of mutual dialogue, highlighting the fight against corruption, the judiciary reform and the field of its availability to all.

The European Parliament’s resolution on reinforcing democracy in the foreign relations of the EU

The Resolution was approved on October 22, 2009, and beside others, it reminds “*although democratic states may differ, as it is realized in the framework of the EU, democracy is a universal value*”.

In accordance with this, its principles and fundamental elements are constant: the respect of fundamental freedom and human rights, rights of the participation in doing the matters of general concernment, suffrage and eligibility in regular and free elections, a plural party-system, the respect of rule of law, independent judicatory, the responsible and transparent treatment of the matters of general concernment, the free and independent media. The resolution underlines that *democracy is not to be exported or imported!*

The European Council’s statements considering the support of democracies in the EU’s foreign relations (higher consistency and efficiency)

It was in the document approved in December, 2009 where the EU’s action plan in supporting building democracy was determined in order to strengthen the efficiency and consistency of the activities carried out in the field. The Council supplemented its determination in the previously-mentioned topic of democracy export or import through stating that democracy is not to be enforced on anybody, and the Council keeps supporting the member countries’ strategy and program of development. The EU is to continue its efforts in supporting democracy and to help strengthen the capacities of governments, parliaments, state institutions, political participants, civil organizations, and any other participants. One of its aims is to efficiently contribute to lasting development, respect of human rights, democratic governing, the creation and stabilization of security, the education of the poor, and the creation of gender equality.

In support of the democracies in the future, the Council will use a much broader and more consistent approach. In the given situation the support of democracy is becoming a more complex task. It needs a multi-dimensional approach, and requires a much longer

period of time than in the past. It is also necessary to implement joint actions in consistent and planned coordination, not only at the level of the participants, but also through bringing in all the geographical environment of the organization.

It should be noted that the majority of the measures - already outlined in the similar material of 2006 - was also founded.

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights⁵

The program was launched in 2006 for non-EU Member States in order to support democracy and protection of human rights. As previously, the basic goal was the strengthening of human rights and fundamental freedom. In addition, it supports non-governmental organizations, regional and international organizations to undertake an active role in the protection of human rights and freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Keeping the credibility and transparency of democratic elections is a priority, for example, European election monitors cooperate with the delegates in order to help them. Another example is, in 2006, and in 2011 the EU mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which carried out this task with the purpose of checking the purity of elections.

Unlike the Cotonou Convention, which is in connection with the bilateral treaties, the IEDDH is a completely autonomous program because it can “help” without the consent of the governments. All participants can enjoy their own area of the EU’s support (for civil society, public or private-non-profit, regional or international organizations.) In this activity the financial framework 2007-2013, is more than a billion euros.

The number of players of African democracies to support is multiplied - which is an increasingly rising trend and has its own risk.

What could this be?

On the one hand, the rapid political changes can significantly shorten for the European and African participants the ideal time required. On the other hand, the large number of actors develops a controversial situation. It can lead to inconsistencies with the information and can be interpreted differently, so the original targets may become corrupted. For these reasons, it seems necessary to rationalize (reduce) the number of actors involved in the process, and put the targets and principles associated in the support of democratic governing. Instead of forming newer and newer organizations and related action plans in the future, we should implement plans by the effective use of the correct ones as well as the available abilities.

The Cotonou Contract and the mutual EU-African strategy ensure adequate bases for the above.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE MEMBER STATES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU

The definition and implementation of the European politics is at the mercy of the political actions dictated by the national interests of the member states. A certain type of debate can

⁵ The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) provides assistance to the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm_en

be and – known by the experience – is generated when defining the democratic values in accordance with the different economic, security and other interests of the states. Without monitoring all the possible factors there are three fields to be examined, such as economic interests, security policy and programs implemented at the level of international organizations.

The economic interests of the EU countries

The implementation of the diplomatic means in the protection of the economic interests of the countries is an everyday and accepted practice in international environment. We can state that there is a perceptible difference between the principles in the Cotonou Agreement and the practice of providing support to the democratic African governments. Several countries use double standards in their own interests in point of different ACP countries.

As an example we can mention the rather discreet and slow reaction to the constitutional putsch of 04 August 2009 in Niger, when President Mamadou Tandja had the constitution – made by his own demands - elected in the general elections. Prior to this, on 26 May he had the parliament dissolved, and also the Constitutional Court on 29 June. The new constitution made it possible for him to stay in office for three more years after his second mandate, and then to remain in power without control. In the course of the handling of the generated crisis, the African Union together with the CEDEAO⁶ responded fairly quickly, warning the Niamey-ruled government of the danger of „getting into constitutional illegality”, however, it proved to be unsuccessful. The Niger authorities rejected the modification of the election date for 20 October boycotted by the opposition, thus the CEDEAO automatically suspended the membership of Niger in the organization for the violation of democracy. In contrast, the EU and its member states were waiting with their reactions as far as 06 November. It was then when they declared the suspension of the possibility of cooperation and consultational petition according to paragraph 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. The consultancy in Brussels between the EU and Niger restarted only on 08 December 2009. Certain observers underlined that the EU responded too slowly in both cases. It should have suspended the cooperation much earlier and a consultancy should have been initiated much earlier, even though one of its member states, namely France, had significant interests in Niger, prominently in mining uranium.

In the above example the contradiction between the values of democracy and the economic interests of the particular countries is clearly illustrated. This contradiction is typical not only of Niger but in all the African countries rich in oil and minerals at present.

National Security Policy and Migration

The foreign policy of the EU is deeply influenced by the national security policies of its member countries. The issue of development has become more relevant due to the migration crisis, since the flow of African immigrants towards Europe can be prevented only by developing their own countries. Countries deeply influenced by these immigrants (Italy,

⁶ CEDEAO: Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CÉDÉAO) (FR) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), West African governments, which was founded on 28 May 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration among the organization's member countries, especially through economic co-ordination actions. <http://www.operationspaix.net/2-organisation-cedeao.html>, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/09/06/qu-est-ce-que-la-cedeao_1756007_3212.html

Greece and also Hungary) are pressing forward a solution which focuses on the economic development of the African countries and the making and sustaining of peace and security.

The EU has not found a satisfactory solution, agreed on by all its member countries, to the problem of migration or to the handling of the underlying causes yet.

Multinational Organizations

Development policy and economic growth are often influenced by multinational organizations, like World Trade Organization (WTO)⁷, World Bank, or International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁸ in which European countries are represented significantly. The economic Partnership Agreement (APE), negotiated between the EU and ACP region countries in 2010 is an illustrative example of this. These agreements are to correspond with the free trade regulations having been urged by OMC since 1995. However, several African countries interpreted it as a possible negative impact on their own economy.

Influential economic public figures of some African countries have started to put pressure on their governments to refuse to sign APE unless it would guarantee them equal opportunities. They have recognized that their local enterprises, not having the same financial and technical background as the European ones, could be jeopardized by allowing international entrepreneurs to enter their national markets freely. If Europe forced its individual interests on the partner countries in the current tense situation, it would take the risk of making local governments disrespectful to their citizens. By diminishing the legitimacy of the governments, the further cooperation could be jeopardized.

In the course of efforts made to establish the reconciliation between democratization and economic growth, the complexity of the legitimization of state institutions and their representatives should be taken into consideration. This is a great challenge which, for the sake of fruitful and efficient cooperation, cannot be neglected.

SUMMARY

In my opinion, Africa's increasing importance on the international political and economic stage can already be felt. Africa will have a determining role in the next decades. The EU has already established the measures and the related mechanism which are appropriate for handling Africa's problems. However, it is obvious that the mere support of democratic administrations cannot solve the problems. The previous priorities have to be reconsidered and, if necessary, new ones should be set so that the political, economic and social problems of African, in our case Sub-Saharan, countries can be handled.

⁷ WTO: World Trade Organization, (GB) Organisation mondiale du commerce (FR), a multilateral trade organization whose purpose is the liberalization of international trade through phasing out and elimination of the so-called tariff barriers to trade (tariffs, export subsidies and non-tariff barriers, and import permits). The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 as a successor to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its goals are similar to those of the GATT, but it is a permanent organization. The establishment of an international treaty signed on 16 April 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco. <https://www.wto.org/>

⁸ International Monetary Fund (IMF): is an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty around the world. Created in 1945, the IMF is governed by and accountable to the 188 countries that make up its near-global membership. <https://www.imf.org/external/about.htm>

The checks and balances developed during the years may help establish the necessary conditions to achieve this goal. However, it is absolutely necessary to find common grounds, which may bring along some surprises among the member countries though. There are still too many different interests stemming from Africa's historical and colonial legacy relating to the policy of many EU countries.

It is essential to find the possibilities of handling the „African” problems in Africa, but the increasingly serious problems developing due to political, social, economic and environmental reasons should be taken into consideration.

Beyond the issues of democratic changes and human rights the establishment of security and the conditions for livability must be the fundamental values, as in their absence any efforts for the stabilization of the regional hotspots are pointless. Certainly, this does not necessitate a multitude of common EU military interventions on the continent.

It is also true, that against the increasing terror threat the above mentioned interventions are necessary but they can be realized within the framework of cooperation with the more and more deployable African Union.

Furthermore, the strengthening of African economies is essential in order to establish the conditions for the stabilization of African societies.

The Africans often say: *“Don't give us fish, just teach us how to fish.”*

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Lt. Ákos Treszkai:

SECURITY RISKS IN AFRICA: WATER CONFLICTS

ABSTRACT: This paper introduces the concept of water scarcity and in general it gives a short summary of water conflicts linked to water or water scarcity all around Africa. In the North-East African region the hotspot is the Nile conflict between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the West African region the Volta River and the Senegal River cause conflicts. The Volta River is also the hotspot between Ghana and Burkina Faso, and a war broke out for the Senegal River between Senegal and Mauritania. In the Central African region, tension increased between Niger, Mali and Nigeria. Nigeria is involved in the conflict of Lake Chad as well. In the South African Region, Lesotho and the South African Republic as well as Botswana, Namibia and Angola are affected in the Okavango River dispute.

KEYWORDS: water scarcity, water conflicts, Africa, Nile, Senegal River, Volta River, Lake Chad, Okavango River

INTRODUCTION

Globally, some 1.2 billion people have no regular access to fresh water. According to forecasts, this number will rise in the following decades. It means that one fifth of the population of Earth live in areas where water scarcity is not only a theoretical but also a real issue. Water scarcity is both a natural and a man-made phenomenon. According to some forecasts, water scarcity in the 21st century will be one of the leading causes of future conflicts in Africa. The issue is rather complex. Until now, fresh water as a cause of war or conflicts was only a secondary issue, the main reasons were religious, ethnic, economic and political ones.¹

After World War II and the period of decolonization, several unstable countries emerged with innumerable ethnic and religious groups and tribes. The borders were created artificially. Ecological and water aspects prevailed. This inconsiderate and unfair distribution of water and other mineral resources added fuel to fire. Widespread poverty, urbanization, environmental pollution, and the climate change all stimulate conflicts. If people have no access to fresh water, they might not be able to live in that area anymore, in the worst case. In another scenario, if they have no water to irrigate the lands or give water to the animals, again, they cannot stay in that area so they have to migrate to another land. This migration could generate conflict between the original local tribes and the newcomers.²

According to Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, in the next decades water scarcity and decreasing agricultural production will cause occasional water and food shortages, and in addition, other environmental problems; there would be five types of conflicts:

¹ Human Development Report, 2006. United Nations Department of Economic And Social Affairs. <http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml> (Accessed on: 13. 12. 2015.)

² V. Glied: Water conflicts in Africa (in Hungarian). In: Afrika Tanulmányok Fókuszban: Vízproblémák Afrikában. Publicon Kiadó, 2008, 45–46.

1. Local conflicts caused directly by the degradation of the local environment.
2. Ethnic clashes with links to migration and a deep social divide due to the scarcity of environmental goods.
3. Civil strife – for example insurgency and other internal conflicts – caused by environmental scarcity affecting economic performance related to people's livelihood.
4. Interstate wars could be generated by scarcity in general and especially that of water.
5. Conflicts between north and south, or nowadays the western world and eastern world over global environmental problems such as global warming or decrease in the fish stock.³

The above statements are especially true for Africa, which is the second driest continent of the World after Australia. According to the UN Africa Water Atlas, 69% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa has no proper sanitation facilities; furthermore, 40% of the people have no reliable access to safe fresh water. 15% of the global population lives on the African continent, and despite this fact it has only 9% of the global freshwater resources.⁴

According to the Human Development Report 2006 from the United Nations Development Program, the water stress is experienced in an area where the annual water supply dropped below 1,700 m³ per person.

The population will face water scarcity when the annual water supply drops below 1,000 m³ and absolute water scarcity goes under 500 m³ per year.⁵




Figure 1.: *Global physical and economic water scarcity*⁶

Source: *drylube.co.uk*

The largest numbers of water-stressed countries of all regions in Africa are situated in the Sub-Saharan areas. Today, almost 25% of the Sub-Saharan African population lives in a water-stressed country.⁷

³ Th. F. Homer-Dixon: *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton University Press, 2010, 5.

⁴ *Africa Water Atlas*. United Nations Environment Programme, 2010, 13–14.

⁵ Human Development Report 2006. United Nations Development Programme, 135.

⁶ http://www.drylube.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/scarcity_bgc.png (Accessed on: 13. 12. 2015.)

⁷ Human Development Report 2006. United Nations Development Programme, 136.

THE NORTH-EAST AFRICAN REGION

According to the United Nations, Algeria, Libya and Egypt are threatened by water stress. Seawater desalination plants were built along the coasts in Algeria and others are planned in the future.⁸

Libya is one of the poorest countries in water resources. There is no permanent water flow in the country. During the Muammar Gaddafi regime, there was a plan to build “The Great Man-Made River”. Essentially, it was the world’s largest irrigation project. In the 1980s, this project caused a conflict between Egypt and Libya concerning the non-renewable groundwater (fossil water) resources. Due to Gaddafi’s death and the Libyan crisis the grandiose plan has not been completed yet.⁹

Nowadays the primary hotspot in the North-East African area is the Nile conflict.

The Nile has been an essential asset for civilization in Egypt since ancient times. There are two blocs involved in the conflict. The downstream countries (Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan) and the upstream countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Democratic Republic Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania) compete for the utilization of the Nile water. At present, agriculture uses 90% of the Nile in Egypt. In colonial times, Egypt and Sudan were the winners of all treaties. According to the Egyptians and Sudanese, they have the exclusive right for the water of the Nile because of the 1902 and 1959 treaties.¹⁰ Those two pacts gave Egypt and Sudan veto power over the upstream projects.

The Nile Basin Initiative regional inter-governmental partnership was established in 1999.¹¹

The actual conflict began in April 2011 when Ethiopia announced that it intended to build one of the largest dams of the world, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and another four dams on the Nile.¹² This is not the first tension between the two nations. In 1979, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat said: “*The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.*” More recently, former Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi said in an interview that “*Egypt had been trying to destabilize Ethiopia for decades by supporting its rebels and enemies.*” Meles also said: “*I am not worried that the Egyptians will suddenly invade Ethiopia,*” “*Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell the story.*”¹³

In May 2013, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi claimed that “*all options are open*” in dealing with protecting Egypt’s water supply. “*We are not calling for war, but we will*

⁸ T. Freyberg: Algeria’s supersized 500,000 m³/day desalination plant open for business. 2014. <http://www.waterworld.com/articles/2014/11/algeria-s-supersized-500-000-m3-day-desalination-plant-open-for-business.html> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

⁹ Besenyő J. – Marsai V.: Országismertető: Líbia. MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság Tudományos Tanács, 2012, 9–10.

¹⁰ A. Carlson: Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia’s History-Changing Dam. 2013. <http://origins.osu.edu/article/who-owns-nile-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia-s-history-changing-dam> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

¹¹ The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is a regional inter-governmental partnership led by 10 Nile riparian countries, namely Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea participates as an observer. NBI provides riparian countries with the only all-inclusive regional platform for multi stakeholder dialogue, information sharing as well as joint planning and management of water and related resources in the Nile Basin. <http://www.nilebasin.org/> (Accessed on: 12. 12. 2015.)

¹² R. Sanyanga: Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 2015. <https://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

¹³ B. Malone: Next on Egypt’s to-do: Ethiopia and the Nile. 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/next-egypt-do-ethiopia-nile-201312872410501805.html> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

never permit our water security ... to be threatened", and he added: *"If it loses one drop, our blood is the alternative"*¹⁴

As a reply to the Egyptian's statements, Ethiopian diplomats reacted with a famous revised Herodotus quote: *"If Egypt is a gift of the Nile, then the Nile is a gift of Ethiopia."* Responding to Mohamed Morsi's statements, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said that the dam's existence was non-negotiable. The Egyptians will not consider war *"unless they go mad."*¹⁵

In parallel with the diplomatic dispute, Egyptians also have military plans for the Nile conflict. According to the assessment of US-based intelligence analysis company Stratfor, a military operation against the Dam is too complex and too difficult. First of all, technically it is very difficult to destroy the Dam. In such a case, an attack could cause floods in Sudan or directly in Egypt. Secondly, Ethiopia is simply too far from Egypt. It is beyond the combat radius of the Egyptian air power. Egyptian aircraft need to use Sudanese airfields, but this is politically complicated. Thirdly, special operations forces could move across the Sudanese-Ethiopian border to sabotage the construction or to destroy the Dam, but technically it is also too hard to do. This Dam is, similarly to others, is critical infrastructure, and it is well protected by special units. A military operation would be too risky and it could have international consequences.¹⁶

Despite the above intelligence analysis, according to WikiLeaks Press, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir had a secret agreement about a small airbase in the Kursi region in Sudan as a relay point for the possible military operation against the Ethiopian dams, as a final option should diplomatic efforts fail. WikiLeaks got hold of what a source said regarding how Egypt would respond to the Ethiopian dam building if diplomacy were to be defeated: *"If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that. Or we can send our special forces in to block/sabotage the dam. But we aren't going for the military option now. This is just contingency planning. Look back to an operation Egypt did in the mid-late 1970s, I think 1976, when Ethiopia was trying to build a large dam. We blew up the equipment while it was traveling by sea to Ethiopia. A useful case study."*¹⁷

The above would be one of the worst possible scenarios. After Mohammed Morsi resigned, new negotiations started between the partners. Currently, on 23th March 2015, the incumbent President of Egypt Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi, Sudan's President Omar Al-Bashir and Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn signed an agreement in the Republican Palace in Khartoum, Sudan. This vital deal means the end of a long-running dispute and for the time being it is a peaceful solution for the equitable sharing of the Nile water.¹⁸

¹⁴ Egypt warns Ethiopia over Nile dam. Aljazeera, 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/06/201361144413214749.html> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

¹⁵ B. Malone: op. cit.

¹⁶ Egypt's Limited Military Options to Stop an Ethiopian Dam Project. Stratfor, 2013. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypts-limited-military-options-stop-ethiopian-dam-project> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

¹⁷ Noel: Stratfor sources reveal Egypt, Sudan contingency plans to secure Nile water resources. 2012. <http://wikileaks-press.org/stratfor-sources-reveal-egypt-sudan-contingency-plans-to-secure-nile-water-resources/> (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

¹⁸ Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan sign deal to end Nile dispute. BBC, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32016763>, (Accessed on: 14. 12. 2015.)

THE WEST-AFRICAN REGION

From 1968 to 1973, rainfall decreased in West Africa. There was drought in Mauritania, Senegal, some regions of Mali and Niger since 1968. In 1970, the amount of precipitation was extremely low and the drought spilt over to Burkina Faso and Chad as well. This phenomenon was one of the first signs of the climate change. The runoff of the Senegal River and other rivers reduced due to the decreased amounts of precipitation.¹⁹

There are two hotspots in West Africa: one is Ghana and Burkina Faso concerning the Volta River and the other one is Senegal, Mauritania and Mali because of to the Senegal River.

In the Ghana and Burkina Faso conflict the subject of the primary dispute is the River Volta. This conflict began in the 70's regarding the sharing the Volta River. Ghana built the Akosombo hydroelectric power plant and the artificial Lake Volta in 1965.²⁰ This is one of the largest man-made lakes of the world. The dam and the lake are really important issues for Ghana. People use the lake for fishing and shipping.²¹ This is one of cheapest ways for travel and transport. Since the independence of Ghana, the country has been looking towards economic development through industry and the mining sector. The country needs cheap hydroelectric power for sustainable development.²²

In contrast to Ghana, Burkina Faso is a land-locked country and one of the least urbanized states in the world. 90% of the population lives on agriculture. Industry and mining are insignificant. It has no need for cheap energy like Ghana, but irrigation is a key issue.²³

In the 1980's Burkina Faso announced that it was planning to build three dams on the Volta. The population of the country is increasing. Finally, Burkina Faso announced more than 1,500 minor water projects during the 90s. As a result of the Burkina Faso water projects, the Volta's runoff decreased and endangered Ghana's hydroelectric power supply. The water of the Volta River is seriously contaminated and this is an environmental issue. As in other water conflicts, in this dispute too, water was only a secondary reason.²⁴ The deepest point in the relationship between the two countries was the Liberian civilian war, when Ghana and Burkina Faso were involved in the conflict on opposite sides. It was a political conflict and water tension was just another reason.²⁵ Nowadays the relations between Ghana and Burkina Faso are warm and close again, despite the fact that there are no compromises on the water issue.²⁶

The climate change and the drought caused more and more problems in the Sahel countries. In this area, water and irrigation are essential. Two great dams, the Manatali and

¹⁹ M. Shahin: *Hydrology and Water Resources of Africa*. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006, 67–79.

²⁰ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Akosombo Dam. <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Akosombo-Dam> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Lake Volta. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Lake-Volta> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²² N. Van De Giesen – M. Andreini – A. Van Edig – P. Vlek: *Competition for Water resources of the Volta basin*, 2001, 201. http://www.zef.de/fileadmin/template/Glowa/Downloads/giesen_andreini_edig_vlek_2001.pdf (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²³ *Ibid.* 202.

²⁴ V. Glied: *op. cit.* 50.

²⁵ Liberia – first civilian war – 1989–1996. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²⁶ Burkina Faso Country Study Guide Volume 1, Strategic Information and Developments. Int'l Business Publications, 2013, 70.

Maka-Diama dams influence the runoff of the Senegal River as well. In general, the nomad tribes do not respect the artificial borders of countries. They have to give water to the animals thus they usually just follow the rivers and lakes.

In 1989 tension increased between Senegal and Mauritania when Senegalese Fulani herdsmen and Mauritanian Soninke farmers clashed over the grazing rights. Mauritanian border guards intervened and killed two Senegalese farmers. This tension rapidly escalated into violence and conflict between the two countries. This was the first step to the trans-border and ethnic war. This conflict generated one of the largest population exchanges in the history of the region. Senegal sent approximately 200,000 Mauritians to Mauritania and approximately 70,000 Senegalese had to repatriate from Mauritania to Senegal. With the help of the Organization of the African Unity, the borders re-opened on 2 May 1992.²⁷

According to UNHCR, more than 13,500 Mauritanian refugees still lived in Senegal in 2015.²⁸ At present, the relations in the area are peaceful but the tension could increase again due to water scarcity.

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REGION

Nigeria is a really powerful country in Africa and plays a leading role in the Central African region. Nigeria built two great hydroelectric dams on the Niger River, the Kainji Dam in 1968 and the Jebba Dam in 1985.²⁹

The Nigerian economy and industry need energy, even though two thirds of the Nigerian population lives on agriculture. The fast population growth presents a serious problem and it accelerates urbanization and environmental deterioration.³⁰

In agriculture people need water for irrigation. Mali and Niger are planning to build new dams on the Niger River as well, and according to Nigerian experts, this could cause 10% water loss in the Niger River which could endanger both the Nigerian hydroelectric dams and Nigerian agriculture.³¹ In 2010 Nigeria interfered with the building of the new dam at Taoussa. About 100 million people live in the Niger basin, and this fact causes new conflicts related to water sharing.³²

Nigeria is involved in another water conflict, too. This is the Lake Chad conflict which is also very complex issue. During the past 53 years the Lake lost 90% of its water.³³ In 1964, four countries – Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon – shared the water of Lake Chad. Nowadays it dried out so much that actually only two countries – Chad and Cameroon – share it.³⁴

²⁷ A. G. Pazzanita: *Historical Dictionary of Mauritania*. Scarecrow Press, 2008, 454–464.

²⁸ 2015 UNHCR sub regional operations profile – West Africa. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4850e6.html> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

²⁹ Project description: Kainji and Jebba Dams, Niger River, Nigeria. Sarafinčin Consulting Engineers. 2015. <http://www.sarafinchin.com/index.php/projects/africa/kainji-and-jebba-dams-niger-river-nigeria/> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁰ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Economy> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³¹ V. Glied: *op. cit.* 49.

³² Besenyő J. – Miletics P.: *Országismertető: Mali*. Magyar Honvédség Geoinformációs Szolgálat, 2013, 20.

³³ Lake Chad: almost gone. United Nations Environment Programme, 2008. <http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article16.html> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁴ <https://www.google.hu/maps/place/Cs%C3%A1dt%C3%B3/@13.0748444,14.2230142,88798m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x1110f0d2794b9cd9:0xf287fa499e9b3dd4> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

In 1964, the above mentioned four countries and later the Central African Republic initiated the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The task of this regional body is to regulate the Lake Chad water and other natural resources, but virtually this organization was not able to save the basin.³⁵



Figure 2.: Lake Chad³⁶

Source: www.unep.org

Nigeria built two monumental dams on the Yobe River. The Tiga dam was constructed in 1974 and the Challawa Gorge dam in 1992. As a result of inconsiderate water management the Yobe's runoff reduced by 60%, consequently only 1% of the Yobe water reaches Lake Chad. The two dams disrupted the natural balance resulting in low water level,³⁷ therefore this generates a continuous tension between local farmers and the Nigerian State.

As a result of the disappearance of Lake Chad in the 1980s, Nigerian fishermen began to follow the disappearing water and started to migrate to Cameroon. Ten years later, Nigerian fishermen established approximately 30 villages in Cameroon. As it is typical in the African conflicts, the border between Nigeria and Cameroon has existed since colonial times. The tension grew when the Nigerian government insisted that the new villages belonged to Nigerian territory. Nigeria installed military and police forces, health centers and schools in the Nigerian populated villages. This situation caused several military encounters and clashes between the two countries. Finally, the case was taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002. In accordance with the international judgment Nigeria had to withdraw its public services and military from the area.³⁸

³⁵ A. Salkida: Africa's vanishing Lake Chad. 2012. <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2012/africa%E2%80%99s-vanishing-lake-chad> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Appraisal of the Safety of the Tiga and Challawa Gorge dams, Nigera. World Bank/Lake Chad Basin Commission, 2002. <http://projects.inweh.unu.edu/inweh/display.php?ID=1269> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

³⁸ Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. International Court of Justice, 2002. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=294&code=cn&p1=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=94&k> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

Today the former enemies are in one military alliance. Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad have created an alliance. The region of Lake Chad is the operational area of the Islamic terrorist organization Boko Haram. All of the affected countries are making efforts to break down the organization which pledged allegiance to Islamic State.³⁹ In December 2015, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari announced that the country “*technically won the war*” and Boko Haram is not able to carry out conventional attacks against the Nigerian and Cameroonian security forces and civilians.⁴⁰

This will, hopefully, contribute to the stabilization of the region in the future.

THE SOUTH-AFRICAN REGION

At present, co-operation between Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa is really peaceful and successful. The Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP) is a good example of water management between the two countries.⁴¹ It was a long way that led to this exemplary co-operation.

The relations between Lesotho and South Africa were strained throughout in the 1980s. There were two reasons for the tension. For one thing, former Prime Minister Leabua Johnatan gave shelter for the African National Congress (ANC) guerillas that fought against the South African Apartheid regime. He also prevented the agreement of Lesotho Highland Water Project. In the 1980s the South African economy increased, industries and urban centers needed more water supplies. In the middle of the 1980s there was a really prolonged drought in South Africa which began to threaten the economy.⁴²

ANC terrorists executed operations against South Africans from Lesotho's territory. In 1982, South Africa sent a commando to raid Lesotho where they killed 30 ANC leaders and 12 others. This operation angered the international community. The next three years, South Africans did not repeat such operations. In December 1985, thirteen South Africans were killed by landmines and bombs of Lesotho-based ANC terrorists. The same month, South Africa sent a commando to Lesotho which killed dozens of ANC terrorists again. Furthermore, South Africa introduced a tight control of all cross-border activities, officially to stop the weapons transfer to Lesotho, but frankly speaking, it was a blockade. After three weeks of blockade, Lesotho suffered shortages of consumer goods and basic supplies, such as food; in addition, workers from Lesotho were not able to go to South Africa to work. As a result of the general discontent, General Justin Lekhanya took power from Leabua Johnatan via a bloodless coup on 20 January 1986. South Africa immediately lifted the blockade and recognized the new regime. After 30 years of unsuccessful negotiations about the LHWP, the new leadership and the South Africans came to an agreement.⁴³

³⁹ Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State. BBC, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁰ Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically defeated' – Buhari. BBC, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴¹ P. Morenth: The Lesotho Water Project (in Hungarian). In: Afrika Tanulmányok Fókuszban: Vízproblémák Afrikában. Publicon Kiadó, 2008, 56.

⁴² Water Coup in Lesotho. 2015. <https://library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/water-coup-lesotho> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴³ The Lesotho “Water Coup”. 2014. <http://www1.american.edu/tesd/ice/leswater.htm> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

The Okavango River is the fourth longest river system in Southern Africa. The river is shared by one upstream country, Angola, and two downstream countries, Namibia and Botswana.⁴⁴

The root of the conflict was that the three countries had three opposing interests and needs related to the river. The Namibian economy is growing but water scarcity hinders prosperity. There is a similar situation in Botswana, which is facing water scarcity, but agriculture needs water and the developing economy needs water as well. Namibia and Botswana, as downstream countries, are dependent on Angola, where after the 27 year long civil war the country is rebuilding and developing thus it also needs water for progress. Tension increased between Namibia and Botswana after Namibia announced that it was planning to build a pipeline system to extract water from the Okavango.⁴⁵ Namibia desperately needs the water of Okavango, again due to water scarcity. As a result of the pipeline system, it would have endangered the unique wetland system of the Okavango Delta which has special, pristine flora and fauna in Botswana. The Okavango Delta is protected by the UNESCO World Heritage.⁴⁶ The other reason for the conflicts as a consequence of the pipeline system was that the runoff of the river would have been reduced. This is also a key issue for the water supply for Botswana's economy. After the pressure of international environmental groups and the strong political opposition of Botswana, finally the conflict stopped when after 10 years of drought, heavy rainfall helped Namibia and water resources got balanced. In 1994, Angola, Namibia and Botswana agreed to establish the Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) for water sharing.⁴⁷

The above situation shows that drought and opposing interests of countries could cause serious conflicts in the next decades.⁴⁸ At the present, Angola is one of the poorest countries in the world, but in the future it will be one of the top oil producers in Africa.⁴⁹ If the development of the country continues at this rate, Angola's water needs will increase in the future. This includes the possibility of new conflicts arising.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper tackles the water conflicts in Africa. As it is known, oil is "black gold" in the Middle East and water is "blue gold" in Africa. Oil is really important and it is unquestionably profitable, but water is vital for life. The African continent, due to the climate change and global warming has to face water scarcity. Additionally, the black history of colonization and the artificial borders which divided and mixed tribes and people all included the chance of

⁴⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Okavango River. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Okavango-River> (Accessed on: 15. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁵ A. Alao: *Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*. University of Rochester Press, 2007, 223.

⁴⁶ Okavango Delta. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2015. <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1432> (Accessed on: 16. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁷ The Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission advises the three riparian states about the best possible use of the river's natural resources. The Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission, 2015. <http://www.okacom.org/okacom-commission> (Accessed on: 16. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁸ D. Schwart: *Namibia/Botswana water wars*. 1997. <http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s384473.htm> (Accessed on: 16. 12. 2015.)

⁴⁹ S. Hanson: *Angola's Political and Economic Development*. 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/world/angolas-political-economic-development/p16820> (Accessed on: 16. 12. 2015.)

conflicts. Africa is a divided continent regarding ethnic, religious, economic, social aspects as well. Everyone - country, tribes or human beings - has different interests, but water is a common interest and as in so many cases, everyone wants to appropriate it.

As it is evident from this paper, conflicts are similar in all hotspots. Countries need water for their development. In Africa agriculture is essential, people have to irrigate the fields and they have to give water to animals. In the Senegal River conflict or in the Chad Lake conflict it seems that people follow the water; this is a kind of migration as well. This migration in some cases leads to conflicts between the locals and newcomers. Widespread poverty, urbanization, water pollution and pollution of the environment are all factors that could cause migration. If people have no access to fresh water, they have to leave their homes and look for new possibilities. In some cases reckless water management creates conflicts such as the Nile conflict. Every country has its own interests and sometimes countries are ready for military action to protect their waters. Those operations are risky because they could easily lead to inter-state wars or to proxy wars. Interstate wars generated by water conflicts result in millions of refugees who look for safe and better life. They try to start a new life in one of the safe neighboring countries or otherwise they start to migrate to Europe in hope of a new life.

The water issue, access to fresh water, water for irrigation and water for hydroelectric power will be more and more of a critical factor. Water is a key to life. Its role is increasing. In the next decades, access to water will be the principal cause for conflicts and wars because there is no life without water.

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Lt. Col. Endre Szénási:

AN UNNECESSARY CONFLICT: TURKISH DOWNING OF RUSSIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT

“Mr. Erdogan has fallen far from the days when he could be regarded as a respected leader of a Muslim-majority democracy and a trusted partner in the region.”¹

ABSTRACT: *There are three core parts of the present analysis. The first part is about whether the Turkish peacetime downing of the Russian military aircraft is justifiable or not on the basis of an alleged airspace violation. The second part is the analysis of Russian accusations against Turkey, focusing on whether Turkey is an ally of ISIS by being involved in smuggling weapons, ammunition, explosives, cheap oil and gas, narcotics etc.² to or from the terrorist organisation. Based on such an analysis the real reasons of downing of the Russian military aircraft will emerge. The third main part of the analysis will examine possible escalation scenarios when Turkish calls for Article V. military operations against Russia will likely fail.*

KEYWORDS: *intervention, downing, smuggling, ISIS, Russia, Syria, US, West*

TURKISH DOWNING OF THE RUSSIAN SU-24M

We will first examine the conditions under which a Turkish F-16 downed a Su-24M Russian bomber aircraft that allegedly violated Turkish airspace on 24 October 2015. As a result of an attack with an air-to air missile by the Turkish F-16 the Russian bomber was hit by a short-range heat-seeking missile in the back. When the Russian plane became uncontrollable and caught fire the Russian pilots (in fact pilot plus navigator), Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Peshkov and Captain Konstantin Murakhtin ejected and landed on the territory of Syria. The Russian pilot, Lt.Col. Peshkov was shot dead by a local Islamist rebel group when parachuting at low altitude or short after landing.

The navigator landed and hid successfully until the Russian and Syrian Special Forces Rescue Team arrived by helicopters. A Russian helicopter was hit by local rebels and a Russian marine got killed during the rescue operation. The rescue operation was successful: the navigator was found and rescued to safety. According to Russian official information, he was not hurt.³ The navigator claimed that the Russian plane was not warned even once.⁴

¹ Mr. Erdogan Crosses Yet Another Line. The New York Times. 6 January 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/opinion/mr-erdogan-crosses-yet-another-line.html?ref=opinion&_r=2 (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

² Турецкий наркотрафик. Voenkor, 22. December 2015. <http://voenkor.info/content/10740> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

³ Шойгу: второй летчик сбитого Су-24М спасен и доставлен на базу, он жив и здоров. TASS. 25. November 2015. <http://tass.ru/politika/2469793> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

⁴ I. Fraser – R. Akkoc: Turkey shooting down plane was 'planned provocation' says Russia, as rescued pilot claims he had no warning – latest. Russian and Syrian special forces free second pilot of a Russian warplane shot down by Turkey, says defence minister. The Telegraph, 26. November 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12015465/Turkey-shoots-down-Russia-jet-live.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

This completely contradicts the Turkish official version of the downing according to which the Russian military aircraft was warned several times to leave Turkish airspace before being shot down.

Russian and Syrian government forces later literally “erased” the location where the Islamist rebels shot the Russian pilot dead, killing many Islamist militants. The Russians later claimed that the gunman who shot the Russian pilot had been liquidated.⁵

Both the Turkish and the Russian Ministries of Defence established their own official versions^{6,7} about the flight paths and the explanations of the downing. We have two official versions of the flight path of the Russian bomber. They differ largely. Turkey insists that the Russian bomber violated Turkish airspace for approximately 17 seconds,⁸ and the Russians deny that any airspace violation occurred at all. The Russian version also claims that the Turkish F-16 violated Syrian airspace⁹ and the attack on the Russian bomber was planned and deliberately executed.¹⁰

“According to the objective monitoring data received from the air defence means, the Turkish jet remained in the Syrian air space for 40 seconds¹¹ and dived 2 km into Syrian territory, while the Russian bomber did not cross the Turkish border... The estimated time of arrival of an F-16 aircraft from the military airfield Dyabakyr from the stand-by position on the ground to the possible place of missile launch constitutes 46 minutes (15 minutes for preparation and take-off, 31 minutes – flight time needed to arrive at the firing point). Thus, interception of a Su-24M aircraft from the stand-by position on the ground from the military airfield Dyabakyr is impossible as the necessary time for approaching the target exceeds the minimum time needed for attack by 12 minutes.”¹²

Interestingly the Turkish and the Russian versions of the flight paths do not even match at the crash site of the plane. Such contradictions prove that at least one party is acting dishonestly and there is a lack of good will. It is also surprising that there must be Western and

⁵ Боевик, который расстрелял русского пилота, уничтожен ударами ВКС. Voenkor, 27. November 2015. <http://voenkor.info/content/10350> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

⁶ Statement by Lieutenant General Sergey Rudskoi, Head of the Main operational directorate, General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (24 November 2015). Russian Defence Ministry, 24 November 2015. <http://eng.syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?id=12066682@egNews> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

⁷ Briefing by Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Viktor Bondarev on the attack on the Russian Su-24M aircraft carried out by the Turkish F-16 fighter in the Syrian airspace on November 24 (Moscow, 27 November 2015.). Russian Defence Ministry, 27. November 2015. <http://eng.syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?id=12066900@egNews> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

⁸ N. MacFarquhar – S. Erlanger: NATO-Russia Tensions Rise After Turkey Downs Jet. The New York Times, 24. November 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

⁹ Турецкий F-16 был в воздушном пространстве Сирии 40 секунд. Lifenews, 27. November 2015. <http://lifenews.ru/news/172198> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹⁰ Briefing by Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Viktor Bondarev on the attack on the Russian Su-24M aircraft carried out by the Turkish F-16 fighter in the Syrian airspace on November 24 (Moscow, 27 November 2015). Russian Defence Ministry, 27 November 2015. <http://eng.syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?id=12066900@egNews> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹¹ P. C. Roberts: An Experienced Pilot Explains ‘Stall Speed’. 1. December 2015. <http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2015/12/01/an-experienced-pilot-explains-stall-speed/> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹² D. Cenciotti: Turkish Air Force F-16s ambushed the Su-24 Fencer’: here’s Russia’s version of the controversial shootdown. Here’s the Russian version of the Su-24 shootdown. The Aviationist, 27. November 2015. <http://theaviationist.com/2015/11/27/turkish-air-force-f-16s-ambushed-the-su-24-fencer-heres-russias-version-of-the-controversial-shootdown/> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

Middle Eastern radars that provide data about both civilian and military aircraft. Thus we would expect third parties to confirm or deny flight paths of the military aircraft involved in the incident. Syrian radars that the Russians refer to are not really credible this time since the Syrian Government is fully aligned with Moscow. The credibility of Western radar sources information would also raise doubts since Turkey is a member of NATO and thus aligned with the West. If Western Air Control information contradicts the Turkish version that would seriously undermine the credibility of a NATO ally in an unusually serious conflict with Russia.

Right after the incident Turkey requested summoning an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council where the Turkish actions and their version of the events were supported. Not even condolences for the death of Russian military servicemen were mentioned during the statement of the NATO Secretary General after the extraordinary meeting, even though it would have cost the Alliance *nothing* in political terms.¹³ Such condolences would be a minimum effort in diplomatic terms if NATO, strictly defending Western security interests, ever wanted to improve relations with Russia.

Let us assume that *all information* officially provided by the Turkish side is entirely correct. It is *not normal in peacetime* to shoot down military aircraft because of an airspace violation when no action by the intruder aircraft, such as firing a single shot, dropping a bomb or launching a missile etc, is noted against the country whose airspace had been violated. The Turkish president defended the Turkish downing of the Russian aircraft and promised that same course of action would be taken if a Russian airspace violation would occur again. The Turkish president's sensitivity for airspace violations is entirely hypocrite since Turkey violated Greek airspace countless times. "*In 2014 alone, Greek military authorities have recorded 2,244 violations of Greek airspace by the Turkish Air Force. This is three and a half times more incursions than in 2013. This staggering figure amounts to an average of 6 violations a day.*"¹⁴ Greece is not the only country subject for Turkish airspace violations. Iraq, for example, suffers from both airspace violations and even ground incursions when the Turkish Armed Forces fight the Kurds on Iraqi soil, with no consent of the Iraqi government. Even more interestingly, the Greek General Staff claims that the Turkish Air Force significantly cut down the number of airspace violations and the day when the Turkish F-16 shot down the Russian bomber, not even one Turkish airspace violation occurred in Greece.¹⁵ Such Turkish behaviour is a clear evidence of applying *double standards* when judging airspace violations by military aircraft.

From the Greek point of view, once the Turkish F-16 shot down the Russian bomber and the Turkish leadership was vehemently defending their actions, it could be a perfect timing to shoot down a Turkish military aircraft violating Greek airspace. Then it would be extremely difficult for the Turkish leadership to justify their actions against the Russian bomber meanwhile blaming Greece for doing *exactly the same thing*. Such situation would have been aggravated by the fact that both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO, therefore Article 5 operations could not be applied against members of the Alliance. In other words Turkey could not rely on NATO like they do in case of the conflict with Russia. *This*

¹³ Statement by the NATO Secretary General after the extraordinary NAC meeting. NATO, 24. November 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125052.htm (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹⁴ P. Antonopoulos: Turkish Territorial Violations Is Nothing New. Almasdar News, 25. November 2015. <http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/turkish-territorial-violations-is-nothing-new/> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹⁵ Генштаб Греции: Турция сократила нарушения воздушных границ страны. Ria Novosti, 25. November 2015. <http://ria.ru/world/20151129/1331280618.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

is a typical case when Article 5 is bound to fail unless one or the other participant of the conflict is expelled from the Alliance that is unprecedented. Luckily, the wisdom of the Greek leadership prevented such a course of action. Similar wisdom and restraint were exercised by the Iraqi government that did not start a war with Turkey as a retaliation against Turkish army and air force violations of Iraqi sovereignty.

There is no need to be an aviation or an air force expert to come to the conclusion that if the Russian bomber spends only 17 seconds in Turkish airspace and Turkish fighters have to be alerted at the airfield (where they are stationed) to fly to the location of the airspace incident they would have no chance at all to fire upon the Russian bomber. The Russian Ministry of Defence estimates that it would take the Turkish F-16 12 minutes to reach the location of the alleged airspace violation from the airfield.¹⁶ “*Rapid appearance of militants' groups in the landing area and publication of the video on the Internet just 1.5 hours after the accident show that the terrorists had been informed in advance about the prepared provocation for its videoing and publication of the materials in social media on the Internet.*”¹⁷

Such facts suggest that the Turkish downing of the Russian military aircraft in peacetime is a *deliberate, overwhelmingly political decision* rather than a “justified” military necessity to protect borders.

Russian and Syrian actions are also based on top level political decisions and policies. The Russian and Syrian air defences did not make an attempt to destroy the Turkish F-16 even though they most probably had a chance to do so. The Russian bombers flew in a pair: the remaining Russian aircraft did not make an attempt to destroy the Turkish F-16 either. There was not a word in official Russian assessments about some kind of lost opportunity to down Turkish fighters. The Russian omission of a military retaliation was a wise decision, preventing further escalation. It could hardly be misinterpreted as a Russian weakness since the Russians introduced a chain of new measures to deter further similar Turkish actions.

The Russian bombers flew without fighter escort on a regular basis in Syria because it seemed to be absolutely unnecessary against ISIS and other Islamist terrorist groups. This proves that the Turkish downing of the Russian bomber was *truly unexpected* for the Russian leadership. Russian president Vladimir Putin called the Turkish action “*a hit in the back that was carried out by the supporters of terrorists.*”¹⁸ The head of the press service of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov called the incident “*an unprecedented challenge for the Russian Federation.*”¹⁹ Providing fighter escort to bombers, strengthening the Russian air defence capabilities by the Moskva missile cruiser, and the deployment of the newest version of the S-400 were amongst the new Russian military measures introduced. I consulted an unnamed air defence expert who confirmed that the S-400 and even less powerful Russian air defence systems are indeed capable of downing any Turkish military aircraft if such a decision is made by the Russian side. The S-400 is capable of covering the entire airspace of

¹⁶ Briefing by Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Viktor Bondarev on the attack on the Russian Su-24M aircraft carried out by the Turkish F-16 fighter in the Syrian airspace on November 24 (Moscow, 27 November 2015). Russian Defence Ministry, 27. November 2015. <http://eng.syria.mil.ru/en/index/syria/news/more.htm?id=12066900@egNews> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Путин: атака Турции на Су-24 – удар в спину РФ, который нанесли пособники террористов. TASS, 28. November 2015. <http://tass.ru/politika/2467007> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

¹⁹ Песков: сбив Су-24, Турция бросила России беспрецедентный вызов. RIA Novosti. 28. November 2015. <http://ria.ru/world/20151128/1330710588.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

Syria that is a major concern for Turkey and her allies.²⁰ Such Russian capabilities combined with powerful electronic warfare assets made it very risky for the Turkish side to attempt any repetition of similar scenarios when Russian planes might be downed. The Russian military countermeasures – especially the deployment of the S-400 – immediately brought Syrian airspace under tight Russian control.²¹

TURKISH MOTIVATIONS: GREAT POWER AMBITIONS, GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND FLOURISHING BUSINESS WITH ISIS AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS

It is clear that the Russian intervention in Syria supporting the Assad regime and the Kurds fighting against ISIS goes against *perceived* Turkish geopolitical interests. Turkey wishes to topple Assad and weaken the Kurds as a minimum. Turkey also makes an emotional issue of Russian bombardment of Turkmen rebel groups. Turkey perceives Russian intervention in Syria as an interference with her sphere of influence, although *it is not officially admitted*.

From the beginning of the incident Russia accused Turkey of deep Turkish involvement in smuggling business with ISIS. It is common in NATO not to trust Russia when the Russians accuse a NATO ally. No matter how much evidence Russia produced, Turkey vehemently denied the flourishing smuggling business with ISIS and other terrorist groups²² and there was no scandal in the Alliance because of such *unacceptable* Turkish policies.

However, the extent of oil production and smuggling on ISIS controlled territories makes it impossible to hide.²³ *“Estimates by local traders and engineers put crude production in Isis-held territory at about 34,000-40,000 bpd. The oil is sold at the wellhead for between \$20 and \$45 a barrel, earning the militants an average of \$1.5m a day.”*²⁴

*“Black market oil quickly became the main driver of Isis revenues – and Turkish buyers were its main clients.”*²⁵

Russian claims against Turkey go as far as accusing president *“Recep Tayyip Erdogan of running a “family business” after his son-in-law has allegedly been linked to smuggling Isis oil... Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s deputy defence minister... said: “In the West, no one has asked questions about the fact that the Turkish president’s son heads one of the biggest energy companies, or that his son-in-law has been appointed energy minister. What a mar-*

²⁰ США и их союзники обеспокоены тем, что российские С-400 могут покрыть всю территорию Сирии. Russia Today. 26. November 2015. <https://russian.rt.com/article/132770> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²¹ Главком ВКС РФ: С поставкой С-400 Россия сразу навела порядок в воздушном пространстве Сирии. Russia Today. December 27, 2015. <https://russian.rt.com/article/139106> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²² Turkey's Erdogan challenges accusers to prove it buys energy from Islamic State. Reuters with CNBC, 26. November 2015. <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/26/turkeys-erdogan-challenges-accusers-to-prove-it-buys-energy-from-islamic-state.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²³ Erika Solomon – Robin Kwong – Steven Bernard: Inside Isis Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil. The Financial Times, 14 October 2015. <http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²⁴ E. Solomon – G. Chazan – S. Jones: Download Isis Inc: how oil fuels the jihadi terrorist. The Financial Times, 14. October 2015. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b8234932-719b-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a.html#axzz3sh2k8y00> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²⁵ M. Chulov: Turkey sends in jets as Syria’s agony spills over every border. The Guardian, 26. July 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/26/isis-syria-turkey-us?CMP=share_btn_tw (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

vellous family business!"²⁶ Appointing family members to head of big business and a top government position (such as energy minister) is a sign of an autocratic and most probably corrupt system in itself, since important decisions are most likely made the "right way" to support the business of the same family. Even though there might not be publicly available "hard evidence" against the Erdogan family, proving that they personally benefit from smuggling ISIS oil, the facts make it clear that there is no possibility of hiding oil smuggling at such levels without the knowledge and *at least the tacit approval of the Turkish government* including police, energy ministry, military, secret services etc.

Furthermore, the Turkish support to ISIS is not limited to oil smuggling but also weapons and explosives trafficking etc. We also need to note that Turkey is not the only country that directly or indirectly supports ISIS.²⁷

*"The White House says it did not start targeting ISIS oil infrastructure until recently due to environmental and collateral damage concerns. The real reason American forces were finally ordered to start destroying fuel trucks was the fact that Russia embarrassed them into doing so. Frankly, the whole White House narrative is incomprehensible. Therefore the American government is complicit in whatever consequences accrue from ISIS being able to grow, expand, and extend its reach across the world, threatening our way of life. The lack of American air pressure on the ISIS oil transportation and production network was the equivalent of a no-fly zone for the ISIS money machine."*²⁸

Even though official Turkish and US policies against ISIS largely coincide *on paper*, Turkey gets accusations not only from Russia but from the most powerful NATO ally, the US as well (!). *"The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known as Isis, is earning as much as \$1m a day through the sale of oil to some of its biggest enemies: middlemen from Turkey, Iraq's Kurdish community and the regime of Bashar al-Assad, according to the US Treasury. The remarks ... (were – the auth.) made in a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Thursday by David Cohen, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence..."*²⁹ Such statement of the US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence should be taken seriously by anyone in NATO, even by those who might not give credit to Russian accusations against Turkey.

The US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, Russia, politicians and newspapers from many countries around the world are not the only ones who criticize the Erdogan leadership for its oil smuggling business with ISIS. Ali Ediboluan, a Turkish member of Parliament, confirmed such accusations and evaluated the situation as "extremely dangerous": *"In June 2014, a member of Turkey's parliamentary opposition, Ali Edibogluan, claimed that IS had smuggled \$800 million worth of oil into Turkey from Syria and Iraq... He cited oil fields at Rumaila in northern Syria and others near Mosul in Iraq, saying that*

²⁶ E. Henderson: Russia accuses Turkish President Erdogan's son-in-law of being 'linked to Isis oil trade'. The Independent, 5. December 2015. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-accuses-president-erdogans-son-in-law-of-being-linked-to-isis-oil-trade-a6761436.html>

²⁷ Ph. Stephens: The fatal flaw in the west's fight against Isis. The Financial Times, 2. October 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1cef76e2-48c1-11e4-9f63-00144feab7de.html#axzz3t9j7TuQn> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

²⁸ L. T. Wood: Russia is right: White House helped ISIS smuggle, sell oil. The Washington Times, 7. December 2015. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/7/1-todd-wood-russia-right-white-house-helped-isis-s/> (Accessed on 08. 12. 2015.)

²⁹ S. Jones – P. Zalewski – E. Solomon: Isis sells smuggled oil to Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, says US Treasury. The Financial Times, 23. October 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6c269c4e-5ace-11e4-b449-00144feab7de.html#axzz3sh2k8y00> (Accessed on 08. 12. 2015.)

*IS had laid pipes allowing it to "transfer the oil to Turkey and parlay it into cash". "Turkey's cooperation with thousands of men of such a mentality is extremely dangerous," he said*³⁰

RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN AND ADOLF HITLER – PARALLEL OF "GREATLY ENHANCED EXECUTIVE POWERS"

There are several signs according to which Turkish president, Mr Erdogan is enhancing presidential powers dragging Turkey towards a sort of authoritarian rule, possibly a dictatorship. The crackdown on moderate Kurdish opposition or on journalists is amongst many examples of the violation of basic values of democracy. The president's views about presidential power discredited him when he referred to Adolf Hitler, as a historical example of an "effective form of government"^{31, 32}: „*President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey marched across another line last week. Asked about his push for greatly enhanced executive powers, he told reporters that there was a precedent in "Hitler's Germany." Those were shocking words from a world leader, especially one who heads an ostensible democracy and a member of NATO. Once the international condemnations poured in, Mr. Erdogan's office tried to backtrack, claiming that his remarks were "distorted by media outlets." Mr Erdogan, however, had already built a disturbing record as an authoritarian leader willing to trample on human rights, the rule of law and political and press freedoms. Since coming to office more than a decade ago, he has used his powers as prime minister and then president to crack down on the media, labor unions and other critics.*"³³

When it had become obvious that such statements severely damage the already degraded reputation of Mr Erdogan, his office routinely denied allegations suggesting that the press has distorted his words and his phrase "*has been used in the opposite sense from that intended.*"³⁴ Furthermore, it was not the first time when Erdogan referred to Adolf Hitler.³⁵ Needless to say that Vladimir Putin would never refer to Adolf Hitler positively, as an example of "an effective form of government", because of the *incomparable leadership qualities of Erdogan and Putin.*

If Mr. Erdogan falsely interprets what Adolf Hitler has done, he could also falsely interpret the probable consequences of a serious military confrontation with Russia. That would be very dangerous indeed.

³⁰ A. Barker: Is Turkey buying oil smuggled by Islamic State? ABC, 7. December 2015. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-01/is-turkey-is-buying-oil-smuggled-by-islamic-state/6991526> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

³¹ A. Withnall: Turkey's President Erdogan cites 'Hitler's Germany' as example of an effective form of government. Mr Erdogan defends push for his own position as president to be strengthened. The Independent, 1. January 2016. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-cites-hitler-germany-as-example-of-effective-government-a6792756.html> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

³² Реджеп Тайип Эрдоган назвал гитлеровскую Германию примером эффективной системы. Russia Today, 1. January 2016. <https://russian.rt.com/article/139946> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

³³ Mr. Erdogan Crosses Yet Another Line. The New York Times, 6. January 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/opinion/mr-erdogan-crosses-yet-another-line.html?ref=opinion&_r=2 (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

³⁴ C. D. May.: Erdogan and the meaning of Hitler, The Turkish president's revealing slip of the tongue. The Washington Times, 5. January 2016. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/5/clifford-may-recep-tayyip-erdogan-and-the-meaning/> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

³⁵ Эксперт: Эрдоган не в первый раз ссылается на Адольфа Гитлера. Russia Today, 2. January 2016. <https://russian.rt.com/article/139982> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF TURKISH MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH RUSSIA – WHEN ARTICLE 5 WILL LIKELY TO FAIL

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the incumbent Turkish minister of foreign affairs made a shocking statement concerning Russia on a Turkish TV channel. *"If it becomes necessary, I can assure you that we can occupy Russia in less than seven days with NATO and our regional allies"*³⁶ This is statement that a minister of foreign affairs should never ever make, since it is overwhelmingly bellicose and totally unrealistic. It must be handled as a warning for NATO, that there are top government officials in Turkey who cannot be taken seriously at best. If Mr. Çavuşoğlu spoke seriously, that is even worse, since that would prove that Turkey could indeed drag NATO into an all-out war with Russia that would most likely become nuclear at a later stage. This is something that nobody wants, including NATO, Russia, or the regional allies of Turkey (whoever they might be). This is a case when Turkish adventurism could take NATO self defence mechanisms hostage.

I hope that Turkey got some firm critiques behind closed doors when they downed the Russian military aircraft and rushed immediately to NATO for consultation. It would have been good, if the US were amongst those, who made it clear that they would not be partners of Turkish adventurism when they militarily confront Russia.

In case Turkey does something truly irresponsible, such as a major violation of Syrian airspace and the downing of another Russian aircraft, but on a bigger scale, Turkish requests for Article 5 operations will *hopefully* fail, because *a major war between NATO and Russia will most likely destroy the entire humankind*. If Article 5 military operations take place against Russia, God save the world.

In a major military conflict with Turkey all Russia needs to do in order to avoid Article 5 is to keep the defensive nature of Russian military operations against Turkey. If the Turkish Air Force, Army or Navy advance against Russian military targets *outside the territory of Turkey*, Article V. military operations would have the greatest chance not to be implemented at all against Russia. Russia could be wise enough to refrain from hitting targets *in Turkish territory*. Putin should even more importantly *refrain from the occupation of Turkish lands* that would raise the most difficult dilemmas in NATO throughout the history of the Alliance on the brink of a nuclear war with Russia.

CONCLUSIONS

- The downing of a military aircraft in peacetime purely because it spends 17 seconds in foreign airspace is not normal: it is a controversial act as a minimum.
- The Turkish downing of the Russian bomber led to unprecedented tension between the two countries, also bringing NATO – Russia relations to a new low.
- Even though the Alliance publicly supported the Turkish action and explanation of the story, it most probably raised concerns amongst several NATO allies because further escalation that could lead to an all-out military confrontation between the Alliance and Russia is in nobody's interest.

³⁶ Чавушоглу: Турция и НАТО совместно за неделю оккупировали бы РФ. Voenkor, 18. December 2015. <http://voenkor.info/content/10681> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

- The Russian and Syrian leaderships exercised restraint making a wise decision when their air defences did not attempt to shoot down the Turkish F-16.
- Turkish and Russian official versions of the incident differ gravely, to an extent when the foundations of credibility, honesty and good will of at least one party can be questioned.
- The Turkish downing of the Russian Su-24M is a deliberately planned execution of an overwhelmingly political decision, rather than a military necessity when protecting Turkish borders.
- The Turkish decision to shoot down the Russian military aircraft when insisting to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the application of double standards and ruthless hypocrisy, since Turkey regularly violates airspace of several countries by military planes, including Greece, a NATO ally.
- Turkey and some NATO allies use ISIS to promote their own geopolitical interests, that makes the Western efforts against ISIS fundamentally flawed.
- Turkey has extensive business with ISIS and other terrorist groups, which includes smuggling oil, weapons, explosives etc. Such official accusations come not only from Russia, but from the greatest NATO ally, the US itself. It is quite widely covered by mainstream Western media.
- Russian military measures to increase safety of Russian bombers have remained unchallenged since the incident took place.
- NATO did not even offer condolences regarding the death of Russian military servicemen that would be a minimum from the diplomacy point of view. It would politically cost the Alliance nothing if there is a genuine need to ever improve NATO-Russia relations.
- Russia – unlike Turkey and some other members of the US lead coalition against ISIS – take the war against ISIS and Islamist terrorist groups in Syria seriously.³⁷ This leads to extensive destruction of ISIS oil infrastructure,³⁸ alienating Turkey.
- The Turkish downing of the Russian bomber can be viewed as a desperate Turkish retaliation attempt because of the Russian military intervention supporting the Assad regime and the Kurds, that is aimed at all terrorist groups including the so called “moderate opposition”, the Turkmen's armed groups and ultimately the ISIS. Such Russian intervention goes against the perceived Turkish geopolitical interests in Syria.
- If the Turkish goals through downing the Russian bomber were to minimise or delay the Russian air campaign in Syria, these policies failed entirely.
- The Turkish downing of the Russian bomber is a truly unnecessary conflict further eroding the already strained relations between NATO and Russia.
- If Turkey did something truly irresponsible when confronting Russia militarily, the world could get to the brink of a nuclear war that would most likely destroy the entire humankind. If Russia acts wisely, as she did, she will have a great chance to avoid Article 5 operations.

³⁷ На новую авиабазу Шайрат продолжают прибывать российские военные. Warfiles, 11. December 2015. <http://warfiles.ru/show-102692-na-novuyu-aviabazu-shayrat-prodolzhayut-pribyvat-rossiyskie-voennye.html> (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)


³⁸ Генштаб показал доказательство покупки Турцией нефти у ИГ. Фото, видео. Ria Novosti, 2. December 2015. http://ria.ru/syria_mission/20151202/1334390432.html (Accessed on 01. 01. 2016.)

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ANNEX



Flight Paths of the Russian Aircrafts: Russian and Turkish versions


Source: *The New York Times*,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html>




Inside ISIS Inc: The Journey of a Barrel of Oil

Source: *The Financial Times* <http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)



ISIS: The munitions trail

Source: *The Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/baad34e4-973c-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc.html#axzz3t9j7TuQn> (Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)



Approximately 550 gasoline transporter vehicles massed in Syria on 18 October 2015
Source: Russian General Staff, Ria Novosti http://ria.ru/syria_mission/20151202/1334390432.html
(Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)



More than 3000 fuel tankers amassed in Turkey according to a Russian satellite image of Sylopy (Turkey). They serve as an evidence of Turkish Oil smuggling in cooperation with ISIS

Source: satellite imagery of the Russian General Staff, http://ria.ru/syria_mission/20151202/1334390432.html
(Accessed on 07. 01. 2016.)

Lt. Col. József Horváth:

„THE BATTLE OF WIZARDS“: THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ABSTRACT: Electronic warfare has an important role in recent conflicts. In order to have an effective electronic capability, we need not only money, energy and manpower, but also a clear picture of the structure of the planned capability. However, it should not be forgotten that a single activity can influence several other fields, as well, and that is why we have to clarify the limits and build cooperation with the involved services.

In this article, the author introduces the electronic warfare capability of the biggest countries, and presents the future possibilities of electronic warfare.

KEYWORDS: electronic warfare, EW

INTRODUCTION

During various conflicts, we can collect information about new military equipment, including new electronic devices, e.g. radios, radars and electronic warfare (EW) assets. It is an open secret that there is an arms race among the most powerful countries. In connection with the development of EW capability of these countries, the US Deputy Defence Secretary Robert Work said during a conference that the „United States still had greater capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum than potential adversaries, but other countries were investing heavily.”¹

EW CAPABILITY OF THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRIES

In my earlier article² I introduced some recent conflicts, in which EW and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)³ assets or capabilities were used. Now, I would like to introduce the EW capability of the biggest countries. This list cannot be complete because we could fill an article with the analysis of one single big country’s EW capability alone. Instead, the goal is to analyze and introduce some processes that signal the future.

¹ A. Shalal: Pentagon sets up panel to study electronic warfare requirements. Reuters, Mar 17 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-electronicwarfare-idUSKBN0MD1PX20150318>, (Accessed on: 06. 01. 2016.)

² Horváth J.: Elektronikai hadviselés korunk konfliktusaiban. Honvédségi Szemle, 144. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2016, 18–26.

³ SIGINT: The generic term used to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two. AAP-6

USA

First of all, I have to mention Iraq and Afghanistan, where one of the most important fields of EW, the Counter-RCIED,⁴ capability was/is used to save the lives of both soldiers and civilians. In Figure 1. you can see the current number of recorded IED (all types of IED, not only radio- controlled ones) attacks in Iraq. There is a 70% increase in the number of recorded attacks between January 2014 and August 2015. Despite the marked increase in total IED attacks, we have to emphasise, that the successful use of IED has decreased during these 20 months.⁵




Figure 1. *Success rate of recorded IED attacks in Iraq, 2014-20156*

Against radio controlled IEDs the defence forces and civilian organizations (e.g. aid organizations, civil security firms, etc.) use so-called jammers, which can be mounted on ground vehicles, fixed sites, soldiers' backpacks or air vehicles (helicopters, airplanes, drones, etc.).

The US Army has over 32,000 short-range defensive jammers, and now they are trying to utilize possibilities with a new system called the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare system (MFEW). Based on current plans, it will be a network of sensors and jammers feeding data to and getting orders from another EW system or an EW officer. This EW system can become the Electronic Warfare Planning & Management Tool (EWPMT), to which the Pentagon submitted a \$2.5 million budget in the current fiscal year. The EWPMT will be a software that the MFEW will collect and provide electronic warfare data for. However, at the moment MFEW is merely a "concept", it will only be considered a program after being approved by an MFEW Development Document. MFEW will not enter service before 2023 and will have reached full operational capability (FOC) by 2027.⁷

⁴ Radio controlled improvised explosive device

⁵ J. Grossmann – M. Al Rowas: Automation tracks Islamic State's IED use in Iraq. IHS, 30 October 2015. <http://blog.ihs.com/q24-automation-tracks-islamic-state%E2%80%99s-ied-use-in-iraq> (Accessed on: 10. 01. 2016.)

⁶ See Reference 6.

⁷ S. .J. jr. Freedberg: Army's Electronic Warfare Cupboard Is Bare: No Jammer Until 2023. Breaking Defense. July 20, 2015. <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/armys-electronic-warfare-cupboard-is-bare-no-jammer-until-2023/> (Accessed on: 10. 01. 2016.)

In connection with the US Navy and Air Force, the most important improvement is the replacement of the obsolete EA-6B Prowler. The needed financial source was requested in 2013, and this story has been added a new chapter this year, because it is possible that the US forces need more jets. The new type is the Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jet. This type is able to suppress enemy air defence, jam radars and destroy radar stations with the Raytheon AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).⁸

In connection with the electronic warfare of the USA we could continue the list and mention other programs, as well. There are some minor and major agencies that are responsible for a full program or a part of a program. Among them we have to highlight the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency, also known as the DARPA.

Russia

We can find examples for Russia's deployed EW capability in the recent years. First of all, there are some sources that provide news and photos of Russian EW assets deployed to Ukraine. We can collect information about the Russian jamming capability because there are unwelcome experiences with GPS (Global Positioning System) and communication jamming in that area. Not only the Ukrainian Defence Forces but also the representatives of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have had jamming-related problems. The reports of these two organizations are also confirmed by US forces. Ukrainian military forces are unable to use their radios and mobile phones. It has been officially confirmed that Ukraine has requested NATO and US help against the Russian jamming capability. The OSCE elements have experienced communication problems with their drones while they were monitoring different areas during the conflicts. Based on open sources there are some signs that Russian EW capability is in use in Syria, as well. Due to these events and new discoveries we can collect information about systems with different roles, e.g. Krasukha 2 and 4, Rychag and Infauna, Murmansk-BN or Leyer-3. It is important to emphasise that there is no specific information available about the capabilities of these systems.⁹

Another interesting example is the incident between the USS Donald Cook and a Russian SU-24 in 2014. During this incident the unarmed Russian military airplane has simulated attacks on the vessel. As a result of these manoeuvres, the vessel's electronic systems (radars, control circuits, information transmission, etc.) were disabled, so the vessel stayed there deaf and blind. In connection with this incident, the sources mention the Khibiny jamming wing tip pod, which is capable of jamming state-of-the-art radar-based weapon systems.¹⁰

⁸ Ch. Harris: Electronic Warfare Spending Rises in 2013 Budget Request. Clearance Jobs, Mar 15, 2012. <http://news.clearancejobs.com/2012/03/15/electronic-warfare-spending-rises-in-2013-budget-request/> (Accessed on: 10. 01. 2016.)

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⁹ J. Harding: Russia Wins The US Electronic Warfare. To Inform Is To Influence, November 9, 2015. <http://toinformistoinfluence.com/2015/11/09/russia-wins-the-us-electronic-warfare/> (Accessed on: 12. 01. 2016.)

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¹⁰ Russian aircraft head off US warship in Black Sea, news agency says. The Guardian, 30 May 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/30/russian-aircraft-us-warship-black-sea> (Accessed on: 06. 02. 2016.)

Figure 2. *Krasukha 4 (or Belladonna) system*¹¹

Russia, beside the real use of EW assets, has bigger plans as well. They announced the development and production of a directed energy weapon, which will be used against electronic guidance and navigation systems of aircraft, missiles and satellites.¹²



China

If we would like to speak about the electronic warfare capability in China, we have to start by mentioning the newest part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), called Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF will "integrate and consolidate intelligence, communications, and technical reconnaissance with cyber warfare and electronic warfare to create an information dominance force. The cyber force would consist of hackers focusing on attack and defence, the space forces would focus on reconnaissance and navigation satellites, and the electronic warfare force would focus on jamming and disrupting enemy radar and communications."¹³

Continuing this thought I would like to mention China's Cyber Warfare Doctrine because based on it, the plan of China is to have achieved global electronic dominance by 2050.¹⁴

Naturally, China currently has different EW assets, and in order to possess sophisticated equipment they are improving them. Some examples regarding the PLA Air Force is the different versions of Shaanxi Y-8 for electronic intelligence, electronic jamming, information operations or psychological operations. They are currently building the Chinese version of Wild Weasel.^{15, 16}

We could continue the list with other countries as well, e.g. France, Germany, UK or Italy, but I think the USA, China and Russia are the most important ones in the EW field. France and Italy deployed vessels to the Black Sea in 2014, to carry out SIGINT missions to collect information about mobile phone and radio communication, radar systems,

¹¹ M-A. Russon: Russia using electronic warfare to cloak its actions in Syria from Isis and NATO. International Business Times, October 10, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russia-using-electronic-warfare-cloak-its-actions-syria-isis-nato-1523328> (Accessed on: 06. 02. 2016.)

¹² J. Keller: New Russian directed-energy weapon could complicate U.S. military strategic planning. Military&Aerospace Electronics. July 7, 2015. <http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2015/07/directed-energy-weapon.html> (Accessed on: 05. 02. 2016.)

¹³ J. Costello: China Finally Centralizes Its Space, Cyber, Information Forces. The Diplomat, January 20, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/china-finally-its-centralizes-space-cyber-information-forces/> (Accessed on: 05. 02. 2016.)

¹⁴ W. Carroll: China's Cyber Forces. DefenseTech, May 8 2008. <http://defensetech.org/2008/05/08/chinas-cyber-forces/> (Accessed on: 05. 02. 2016.)

¹⁵ J. Lin – P. W. Singer: China Builds Its Own 'Wild Weasel' To Suppress Air Defenses. Popular Science. December 29, 2015. <http://www.popsci.com/china-builds-its-own-wild-weasel-to-suppress-air-defenses> (Accessed on: 07. 02. 2016.)

¹⁶ Wild Weasel is a concept at the USAF, for an aircraft, equipped with radar-seeking missiles against radars (air traffic, SAM sites, etc.). Earlier the F-4 variants, currently the F-16 is used for this purpose.

and important infrastructure elements of the Crimean peninsula. The UK supports the USA with SIGINT aircrafts in Syria.¹⁷

Another interesting point is that, for example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group has had an EW garrison and a separate jamming system in Raqqa, which was hit by a US air strike in 2014.¹⁸

BASICS OF THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE'S FUTURE

Based on different incidents mentioned in both the previous and current article we can claim that there is no doubt that the military services that work in the electromagnetic spectrum have become more important over the last decades.

Different countries spend energy and money on services working in the electromagnetic spectrum, but they have various organizations and principles in connection with EW.

The basics of the effective use of EW are: principles and doctrines; well-organized and structured units and commands; well-trained and experienced personnel; state-of-the-art equipment (not only EW, but vehicles, communication assets, etc., as well).

I would like to emphasise that if we fail to fulfil as few as one of these requirements, the whole system can result in wasted energy, time and money, and we may find ourselves believing in the illusion that we are prepared for fighting in the electromagnetic environment (EME).

I would like to quote the STANAG 6010 regarding the principles (Electronic warfare in the land battle), because we can find a very helpful figure in this Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) showing the quantity of the services of the electromagnetic operations carried out in EME. On the basis on Figure 3 everybody can imagine the difficulty of effective activities in a complex electromagnetic domain.




Figure 3. *Examples of electromagnetic operations (EMO) and capabilities in the EME*

¹⁷ NATO's merry-go-round electronic surveillance in the Black Sea. RT, 4 June 2014. <https://www.rt.com/news/163484-nato-black-sea-eavesdropping/> (Accessed on: 08. 02. 2016.)

D. Stupples: How Syria is becoming a test zone for electronic warfare. CNN, October 9, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/09/opinions/syria-electronic-warfare-russia-nato/> (Accessed on: 06. 02. 2016.)

¹⁸ U.S. says strikes hit ISIS garrison, 'electronic warfare'. English Alarabiya, 1 December 2014. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/12/01/U-S-says-strikes-hit-ISIS-garrison-electronic-warfare-.html> (Accessed on: 06. 02. 2016.)

On the basis of principles and doctrines we need to create clear and consistent rules and documents for the troops on the ground, including orders, plans, electronic orders of battle (EOB), etc.

To be able to work without interference and disturbing or destroying our elements we need a centre or a command above the subunits with highly qualified and experienced manpower. It needs to have a very strong cooperation with allied forces and civil agencies in peace- and wartime, because this activity can influence several other services, e.g. air traffic and flight safety, broadcasting, meteorology, etc. When discussing manpower and units, China can be a good example for the centralization of the command of these units and activities. There are several training courses and exercises available both for training and gaining experience in connection with the qualification of the personnel.

Naturally, we have to analyze the current conflicts and learn from them. It is interesting to know that the US soldiers were learning from the Ukrainians about their experience regarding Russian electronic warfare, jamming and information collecting capabilities, because they could learn lessons from them.¹⁹

To have state-of-the-art equipment (not only EW but vehicles, communication assets, etc., as well) is not only important, but is also one of the most important elements of the basics. We cannot forget that it is not enough to have assets standing alone, we need to create a complex network cooperating with other services, e.g. communication, air defence, intelligence (in terms of both technology and manpower, as well), special operations, etc.

SUMMARY

During the last decades, more and more electronic devices entered service at different defence forces. Some of them are the target of the electronic warfare. Based on open sources, the countries are investing many resources to be able to create electronic dominance on future battlefields. One of the possible services in this fight is electronic warfare. That is the reason why we have to be prepared to work in an electronic warfare environment and to have a well-operating EW system.

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Éva Jakusné Harnos:

CHANGES IN METHODS OF PERSUASION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDIA

ABSTRACT: The study analyses the impact of technological change in the communicative channel on political communication between the elite groups and the masses. Techniques of persuasion and the potential for manipulation are outlined from the beginning of the mass production of printed newspapers through the spread of radios and televisions to the interactive online news websites and the social media. The issue is examined from the aspect of communication theories, political discourse analysis and the history of propaganda. Methods developed for analysing and evaluating the content of media communication are referred to. The author concludes that online news texts allow a greater degree of manipulation than the previous ones. The new media, especially user generated content, or pretended user generated content, have changed strategic communication and have led to a convergence of Information Operations and Media Operations.

KEYWORDS: psychological operations, persuasion, strategic communication, news text, history of propaganda, convergence

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL IN THE MASS MEDIA

Theories of communication usually devote some attention to the impact of the channel of communication on other factors of the communicative situation. It is remarkable that the mediatory channels of the systems of social communication are various technological devices in our time. They influence the social process of communication: for instance, new habits of newspaper reading, television watching or social media using form, while the content and way of communication also change, as new types of texts evolve, which require new modes of processing by the recipients. Simultaneously, alterations in these processes have a backlash effect on the communities and shape them. Recently, a lot of studies have been published on the transformation of the systems, content, and social role of the mass media, researching the issue from the aspect of linguistics, political science, sociology and other academic areas.¹

The aim of this study is to examine from the aspect of political discourse analysis how the relationship between the elite and the masses was represented in the press in the era of the print media, the radio and the television. I will give an overview of the guidelines of the theory of propaganda, then investigate whether these fundamental rules of propaganda activity are still valid in the age of the online media and of user generated content. Who exercises greater influence on whom: the elite on the masses or the masses on the elite? Have techniques of propaganda changed? If so, in what respect?

¹ For instance: N. Fairclough: *Language and Power*. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001; D. McQuail: *A tömegkommunikáció elmélete*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003; J. Chovanec: *Pragmatics of Tense and Time in News. From Canonical Headlines to Online News Texts*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2014.

THE EFFICIENCY OF PERSUASION

Propaganda is rooted in ancient rhetoric, whose function was convincing the masses in ancient Greece and Rome. In the 17th century it was used for the efforts which served the dissemination of the tenets of the Catholic Church and the reinforcement of Catholic faith. Nevertheless, due to the manipulative techniques applied by political ideologies, especially dictatorial ones, such as Nazi and communist propaganda, the word *propaganda* gained negative connotation and was replaced by *persuasion*. In Hungarian, for example, negative connotation was assigned to this loan word as soon as it was borrowed from French during the era of the French Revolution.²

At present, propaganda activities of various purpose as well as messages created as a result of such activity have a number of names: political communication, public relations, public diplomacy, public affairs, strategic communication, publicity, promotion, advertising, commercials, — just to mention a few. The broadest definition of political propaganda was given by Lasswell and his team, who laid the foundations for propaganda analysis: 'the calculated selection and circulation of symbols, with a view to influencing mass behaviour.'³

Psychologists and sociologists have classified and defined types of influencing target audiences with respect to their awareness of the situation and their expectations about the possible benefits or rewards as *convincing*, *persuasion* and *manipulation*.⁴ Generally, convincing relies on logical reasoning, while persuasion is founded on symbolic strategies provoking emotions. In the case of both, the target audience are aware of the attempted act of influencing. Manipulation also arouses emotions without letting the target audience recognise the attempted act of influencing. The common feature of all of these is that they result in the required behaviour of, or actions by the target audience, who assume that these are beneficial to them. Nevertheless, these categories are difficult to delineate in natural interpersonal or social communication, owing to the game-like nature of communicative events. In addition, they share a significant feature: the asymmetry of information, that is, in order to be successful, the persuader must have more information than the target audience. As the aim of this study is not the discussion of the differences of the various techniques of influencing, the broad terms *propaganda* and *persuasion* will be used.

Csepeli defines persuasion from the aspect of social psychology as a message which is released by the sender with the purpose of triggering an intended effect in the receiver.⁵ A pre-planned message and aiming at achieving an intended effect are peculiarities of propaganda targeting masses. The source of propaganda may be decisive in achieving the desired effect. By 'source', the source of the message as perceived by the receiver is meant, thus, the target audience usually identify the means of mass communication as the source of political communication which affects the society. Csepeli discusses three components of the receivers' evaluation of a source: 1. credibility, 2. intention or aim attributed to the source

² For more detail see: Jakusné Harnos É.: A hatékony propaganda nyelvi eszközei (The linguistic means of efficient propaganda). PhD dissertation. Eötvös Loránd University, 2003, 4–7.

³ B.L. Smith — H.D. Lasswell — R.D. Casey: Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion. A Comprehensive Reference Guide. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 1.

⁴ See, for example, in Hungarian: Siklaki I.: A meggyőzés pszichológiája. Scientia Humana, Budapest, 1994; and Csepeli Gy.: Szociálpszichológia. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1997; or, in English: E. Aronson: The Social Animal. New York and Oxford: W. H. Freeman and Co.; A. Pratkanis — E. Aronson: Age of Propaganda. New York and Oxford: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1992. (Also available in Hungarian translation.)

⁵ Csepeli Gy.: Szociálpszichológia. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1997, 289.

and 3. the degree of similarity of the source to the recipient.⁶ The credibility of the source is important if alternative sources of information are available; if they are not, the value of the single source of information increases. (For instance, in a dictatorship everybody must rely on the only official medium.) It is essential that the intention of the source be concealed so that the recipient of the message is not aware of the persuasive situation and does not resist psychologically. Persuasion is efficient if the target audience do not realise what interest the persuader has in its success. The (apparent) similarity of the source to the recipient also decreases resistance to the message.

It follows from the foregoing that certain guidelines must apply to all kinds of propaganda activity, which can be detected in the various channels of communication to our time. They are as follows: concealing the source of the propaganda message, hiding the (real) interest and/or aim of the persuader, making it difficult for the target audience to recognise the persuasive situation. The effect of propaganda is more profound and lasting if linguistic and visual tricks make the receivers infer the messages from the implicit content of communication on their own, so they will believe the idea and its linguistic form are the product of their own mind. As a result, they will adhere to them more strongly. However, soon after the evolution of the institutions of modern mass communication propagandists realised the limits of their techniques as it is not always possible to tell people *what* they should think, rather, *what* they should think *about*. Consequently, the major function of propaganda and of the media is focusing attention, that is, agenda-setting.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA: PRINT NEWSPAPERS, RADIO AND TELEVISION

The mass production and distribution of newspapers in the late 19th century, the appearance of the radio in the early 20th century and of the television in the mid-20th century led to the development of institutionalised systems of news and media content production and consumption. Simultaneously, scientific methods were worked out to describe the content of media messages, partly for marketing purposes, partly for measuring the social or political effects on consumers.⁷ This indicates that the elite groups were aware of the opportunity for influencing public opinion from the beginning.

The impact of the printed newspapers was tested globally before and during the First World War. For instance, books and studies reveal the preparatory propaganda and the war propaganda of the United Kingdom, which exploited the opportunities offered by the press, beside posters and newsreels and the telegraph. It is known that writers whose identity was kept in secret were employed to invent and place stories in newspapers.⁸

Belligerent propaganda carries and makes visible all the characteristic features of political communication represented in the conventional media: the pre-designed messages from the elite reach great masses. As a great amount of time passes between the production and the consumption of news, the news must be edited under time pressure so that it gets in the press in time. If there is any feedback from the readers, it arrives with much delay, for example,

⁶ Ibid. 290.

⁷ The history and methods of content analysis are summarised, for example, in: K. Krippendorff: *Content Analysis/ Introduction to Its Methodology*. Sage Publications Inc., 1980. (Hungarian translation: *A tartalomelemzés alapjai*. Balassi Kiadó, Budapest, 1995.)

⁸ R. Marlin: *Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion*. Broadview Press, 2003, 62–76.

in the form of a reader's letter. It is the elite that decide what is published in the paper and what is left out. The role of the *gate-keeper* is taken by the propagandists and the journalists.

Although the editorial board and the names of correspondents may be known to the public, the elite groups who are in control are more difficult to detect. As a result, the strategic objectives of persuasion may remain hidden from the readers, who, as said above, will identify even the source of a message mistakenly.

Similarly to information operations of our era, the objectives of war propaganda were to gain and sustain the support of home public, to discredit the enemy and to discourage its allies, and, in addition, to win the potential support of neutral third parties, or, at least, to keep them away from fight.

Radio, just like film, played an important role in Second World War propaganda. It offered more opportunity for persuasion due to the fact that it allowed live broadcast. Contrary to printed papers, which required transportation and distribution networks, it was less restricted by geographical distance and political boundaries. The opposing sides worked out various methods for the content analysis of each other's radio broadcast and newspaper articles as represented by summaries and case studies of Lasswell's research team⁹. Many of the team's findings concerning the situationality and pragmatic aspects of communication are underpinned by today's cognitive linguistics.

Television added techniques of visual manipulation to means of linguistic manipulation and took it to the average households. Psychologically, it gives the viewers the illusion that they are watching and experiencing reality as it seemingly images reality directly. This impression conceals aspects of edition, viewpoint, media frame and media attention, which all work as filters and means of manipulation.

In the 1980s the appearance of satellite television launched globalisation in television broadcast. It generated new processes in the race for producing and disseminating news. The elites of countries developed means which allowed influence across borders. The system of messages about a country and the broadcast of news in their own (linguistic and visual) design became a priority.

As far as the impact of propaganda is concerned, it should be noted that, according to research data, the television news programmes, which are seemingly impartial and factual, and, consequently, an efficient means of persuasion, are still considered a primary and reliable source of information by media consumers.¹⁰

On the whole, the most significant characteristic of the systems of mass communication comprising the printed newspapers, radio and television is that they convey content which is generated by few people to masses. In various phases of the generation of the content, information is carefully selected according to the intentions and ideology of the elite. It is true in the case of feedback from the recipients (e.g. readers' letters) or interviews, phone-in programmes or Skype interviews.

⁹ A. L. George: *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1959.

¹⁰ V. Bakir: *Sousveillance, Media, and Strategic Communication: Iraq, USA, UK*. Continuum International Publishing, 2010, 65.

THE CONTENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL MASS MEDIA

Discourse analysts have explored the institutionalised production and consumption of news and have drawn conclusions about news values, which serve as a basis for news selection. Apart from geographical proximity, ideological proximity is a decisive news value, the availability of which facilitates broadcast of information in the media, but the difference from dominant ideology or socially accepted norms reduces the likelihood of broadcast in the media.¹¹

The institutionalised media disseminate messages in which real news and fictitious stories are intermingled and reinforce one another, thus representing a specific world view which permeates the given society.¹² The less educated the audience is, the more easily it accepts this world view, believing that it is founded on its own experience. This claim is supported by the theory of media equation, which explains why people tend to treat radio, television and computers as if these were humans. It can be traced back to neurological reasons: in the brain there is no function or anatomic area which could distinguish between immediate and mediated experience and shape mental processes accordingly.¹³

Obviously, these qualities of the conventional mass media have been exploited by propaganda. But has modern, web-based, interactive media changed propaganda techniques and effects? In our time, is it still the elite that focuses the attention of the media, especially, of the online media, or is it the masses communicating with each other?

THE INTERACTIVE MEDIA AND THE TARGET AUDIENCE

The appearance of digital devices has created the opportunity for almost anyone to upload content to the internet. The new media environment led to the evolution of new theories that emphasise the difference between the one-way flow of messages from the elite to the masses before the 21st century and the multi-directional flow of information generated by the internet users. Seemingly, the propaganda activity, which is so important for maintaining the influence of the elite, is obstructed because communication has become diffusive and the layers of the Net may distract attention from the messages of the elite.

In her book on changes in strategic communication, Vian Bakir borrows the term 'sousveillance' from a Canadian philosopher. 'Sousveillance' means 'watching from below', which could describe the new relationship and communication between the elite and the citizens through digital devices and the internet. A novelty of new technology is that citizens can monitor and document the activities of the elite or of the state machinery. At the same time, the new technology provides new methods for data mining for the elite groups which can target their propaganda at individuals even better than in previous ages.¹⁴

Bakir analyses two case studies from the time of the war on Iraq. She examines the 2004 internet leak of the torture in Abu Ghraib and the role of new technology in agenda setting. Technological development was one step ahead of legal regulations and of communication controllers.¹⁵ The other case study is on an image repair campaign in the UK,

¹¹ T. A. Van Dijk: *News As Discourse*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 1988, 49.

¹² Gerbner G.: *A média rejtegett üzenete*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2000, 34–60.

¹³ E. Griffin: *Bevezetés a kommunikációelméletbe*. Harmat Kiadó, 2001, 382–385.

¹⁴ V. Bakir: *op. cit.* 16–23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 69–97.

which exploited a video clip about British soldiers serving in Iraq using an old hit song *Is This the Way to Amarillo*. The video clip was spreading on the internet with the permission of the Ministry of Defence.¹⁶ The researcher does not state it explicitly, but the video clip might have been made for propaganda purposes and disguised as user generated content uploaded to the internet.

THE IMPACT OF ONLINE NEWSPAPERS ON NEWS TEXTS

Political communication follows the trend of social media and user generated content. Politicians address their supporters and opponents directly on Facebook or Twitter, what is more, through their blogs. It seems that print newspapers are no longer needed. Nevertheless, a look at the online editions of newspapers proves that interactive online news service renders itself to visual and linguistic manipulation to a greater extent than earlier conventional media. The new channel of communication has established a new structure for news texts: at the end of articles, readers are asked to write comments and send photos or videos about their own experience related to the topic.

Current events are reported online almost real-time, and a news article can be updated as often as every ten or twenty minutes as long as it counts recent. However, the BBC homepage, for instance, displays only the latest version and it is impossible for the average user to click on an earlier version. A typical headline and lead from the CNN homepage can be read below, which seems to lay special emphasis on detailed reporting and accuracy.

Migrant crisis: With Hungarian border blocked, many head for Croatia

By Tim Hume, Ben Wedeman and Jethro Mullen, CNN

Updated 0740 GMT (1440 HKT) September 17, 2015 | Video Source: CNN

Story highlights

- *Hungarian forces **use** tear gas and water cannons on migrants at border with Serbia*
- *“People **will continue** to try to reach Europe,” says International Organization for Migration*
- *Hundreds of migrants **head** toward Croatia, facing landmine threat*

The parts of the lead that are printed in bold may lead to the reader’s confusion. Keeping to the conventions of English journalism, fresh news is presented in Present Tense, as if the use of tear gas and the movement of migrants towards the Croatian border took place at the same time. Between the two, the comment by the Organization for Migration is included with a future verb form. What is the point of reference? What is the sequence of events?

Continuous updating visibly breaks up the structure of the news texts. Paragraphs are loosely related and often do not follow the chronology of events, which should be the key for the reader to processing the text and establishing cause and effect relationships. As a result, it is very difficult to create a logical order for the events in order to help interpretation. The news texts are dismembered even more by video links, and titles of other articles which are said to be related. When these websites open, they offer similar structures and yet other links, which all have their time references inside and outside the news texts.¹⁷ The news text is not written to the schema of a narrative as it was found by discourse analysts in the case of the conventional media. It proliferates endlessly, often without giving the impression of being

¹⁶ Ibid. 98–103.

¹⁷ For a comprehensive analysis see: J. Chovanec: *Pragmatics of Tense and Time in News*. From Canonical Headlines to Online News Texts. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2014.

finished at all. The chaotic structure of news texts is perhaps an expression of disturbance and the loss of values or of changing values in our modern society. Focusing the attention of the readers and guiding them in establishing the links required by propagandists has a greater chance than ever.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERSUASION IN THE ONLINE MEDIA

Modern online media is often associated with the word convergence. On one hand, it describes interpersonal and institutionalised mass communication drawing closer, on the other hand, news service and entertainment shifting together (infotainment). Convergence also has a technological dimension: as the most sophisticated technological devices are available commercially to ordinary citizens, anyone can prepare and upload to the internet a verbal, visual or multimodal text. Consequently, producing media content is no longer a privilege of the elite.

Convergence can also be detected in the style of online news texts. According to new findings, news texts have become more personal and emotional in their tone, contrary to the (appearance of) neutral tone in conventional journalism, which was a basic requirement a decade or two ago.¹⁸ Personalisation itself is evidence for the convergence of interpersonal and mass communication, which offers more opportunity for persuasion and deception, since similarity between the source of information and the recipient can easily be pretended. In addition, the competition for attention is increasing, that is why, for example, correspondents 'drag' the television or video link viewer into the space where they are reporting from, thus compelling them to create a shared mental space.

The impact of viewpoint and of personalisation has been known to propagandists and researchers. In his book on the ethics of persuasion, Randal Marlin discusses how, at the time of the First World War, the United Kingdom received foreign journalists and public figures as guests in luxury circumstances so that, after their return home, they conducted personal propaganda campaigns which were more effective than official propaganda. He also remarks that the same technique was used in the 20th century by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, South Africa and the Pentagon.¹⁹ The assignment of embedded journalists to military units in the war on Iraq relied on the emotional involvement of the opinion leaders likewise.²⁰ What is more, the American troops could select correspondents of their regional newspapers, which resulted in taking war events closer to American citizens by publishing reports in their local papers. Referring back to news values, the news value of war reports was increased by (pretended) 'geographical' proximity and, presumably, actual ideological proximity.

It was mentioned above that online news texts may confuse time relationships and may make it difficult for the reader to set up a chronological order. Below is the beginning of the CNN news text which was quoted earlier.

At the Hungarian-Serbian border (CNN) A day after Hungarian riot police used tear gas and water cannons to turn back people at the country's border with Serbia, migrants attempting to reach Western Europe were left with a difficult choice.

¹⁸ For a summary of the phenomenon, see, for example: D. Landert: Personalisation in Mass Media Communication. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2014.

¹⁹ R. Marlin: Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion. Broadview Press, 2003, 66–67.

²⁰ V. Bakir: op. cit. 47–55.

Go up against Hungary's tough new border defenses yet again or set out once more on a different path toward the European Union's wealthier nations.

*Frustrations boiled over **Wednesday afternoon after Hungary had sealed the final hole in its border with Serbia a day earlier**, shutting off a popular route used by tens of thousands of people in Europe's vast migrant crisis.*

The move left desperate men, women and children – most of them fleeing violence in the Middle East – blocked from entering Hungary by a razor-wire fence.

The news text starts with the middle of the events, as if Hungarian riot police had used tear gas without reason. The time phrases marked in bold type do not provide clues for the reader to reconstruct a situation model based on the chronological order of events and the cause and effect relationships. It is unclear which day of the week we are on, and which day 'a day after' refers to. Is it Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday? If the news text can be accessed the day after or some days after its publication, the situation is even less possible to reconstruct. In addition, the correspondents suggest that the fact and the circumstances of the use of tear gas are part of shared knowledge with the recipients. Unlike in interpersonal communication, the online reader has no chance to negotiate what is shared knowledge and what is not. Thus, 'background information' works as a constraint to establish shared knowledge. As a result, the readers will heavily rely on the offered links, that is, the journalists will not only focus the recipients' attention, but also force them to establish certain links between the events which may or may not be justifiable. Indeed, they have control not just over what the readers should think about, but also, what they think.

Over the online text of the mentioned CNN article, a Twitter entry was floating, just like a page from a notebook or a Post-it. It depicted a pretty, approximately three-year-old little girl with sad eyes and the following caption:

This little refugee kid crying after Hungary police use tear gas and water canons 2 disperse migrants on Serbia border.

The caption contains some strange features: the auxiliary verb 'is' is missing from the verb phrase; *cannon* should have double *n*; 2 instead of *to* is typical in texting and user generated content. Consequently, the reader assumes it must have been uploaded by a participant of the events whose English is non-native as an act of 'sousveillance'. After careful check of the photo one discovers that legs of adults who are probably queuing are seen behind the little girl, so the scene does not look like a clash. On Twitter it turns out that the name *gultuysuz* refers to the Istanbul correspondent of CNN, who had joined Twitter in 2008:

CNN producer based in Istanbul, views my own, retweets not endorsement.

Conclusively, the twenty or so upsetting photos and captions which were uploaded to Twitter and linked to the homepage of CNN, are not user generated content from an average internet user, but the product of a professional journalist, who partly meets the ethical standards by indicating the views are her personal ones, and partly does not, because she links the emotional, evaluative 'supplement' into the news text.

The disappearance of the boundary between journalism and interpersonal communication is not easily recognisable to the average news consumer, as technology distracts attention from the source. So, persuasion has a subconscious effect, that is, it has the most powerful effect because the recipient does not realise what is happening and does not mount psychological resistance.

Online news texts do not survive in their physical reality; rather, virtually, in the archive of a home page. The content of the archive is said to be under constant transformation. Allegedly, the search engines of the online media survey reading and searching habits and

offer different links to different individuals dependent on what they accessed or read before. As a consequence, propaganda may have an unlimited effect on our knowledge about the past and the present, what is more, the way it shapes messages is nearly impossible to track and to record.

CONVERGENCE IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Convergence in strategic communication concludes from the phenomena discussed above. Strategic communication is defined in the dictionary of terms of the US Department of Defense as follows:

strategic communication – Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. Also called SC. (Joint Publication 1-02).

For a better understanding of the term, the general meaning of *strategic* should be examined:

Strategic: 1. done as part of a plan, especially in a military, business or political situation; 2. useful or right for a particular purpose, 3. used in fighting wars (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English)

These are the semantic components that help with the interpretation of the phrase: pre-planned, targeted, persuasive communication, used, perhaps, for the purpose of war.

The NATO standardised definition of strategic communication (STRATCOM) is included in the Staff Manual of the Hungarian Defence Forces:

Strategic Communication (StratCom): The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.

It is known that 'Information Operations' is the American, and 'I Ops' is the British term for the same type of operation. Similarly, 'Public Affairs' is the American, and 'Media Ops' is the British phrase for the same activity.²¹ The aim of Information Operations is to influence enemy or neutral public opinion, whereas the objective of Public Affairs or Media Ops is to inform home public and international public true to facts. Nevertheless, as early as in 2003 a classified report was made in the US on the public consuming messages intended for foreign audience in increasing number, and vice versa.²²

In the era of the global digital media it is impossible to separate informing the home public from informing the foreign public. On the internet, the satellite channels and on the social media, messages produced for home citizens, for citizens of an opponent country, and for citizens of neutral third parties may blend. It is clear from a US Army Field Manual: inform and influence activities

²¹ V. Bakir: op. cit. 42.

²² V. Bakir: op. cit. 78.

The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision making. (FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities. Glossary-2).

This definition combines the notion of informing and persuading. On the whole, beside the above mentioned types of convergence, a new outcome is the convergence of the various types of strategic communication. This can be explained by the global development of communication technology, but also by the crisis of modern democracies whose leaders resort to persuasion or deception as a means of influencing their own society.

CONCLUSION

The classic techniques of propaganda are still used. The most important are the occupation of the information space, focusing the attention of the target audience, the concealment of the source, and of the real aim of propaganda as well as of real interests related to it. The effect of linguistic and psychological techniques of persuasion is multiplied by online news service, which creates more opportunity for hiding the source of a message, for example, in anonymous comments or by appearing as user generated content in the social media. The target audience seems to be more and more the victim of data mining and the target of well designed propaganda. Propagandists can exploit the chance of placing and disseminating (deceptive) messages by multiplying them on the internet within a short time.

The online and the digital media have transformed news texts in such a way that denies the recipients the possibility of inferring chronological order and establishing cause and effect relationships, that is, of constructing their own model of reality. As a consequence, they must rely on guidelines provided by the elite more than formerly. Additionally, the target audience habitually publicise their thoughts on the internet or on smart phones, thus providing data on themselves to nearly any user. At the same time, the citizens are able to communicate and organise themselves via the internet or the digital media as a form of resistance to the elite.

In the new media environment strategic communication connected to psychological operations must develop new, complex methods. Due to the impact of the social media, which involves personalisation, and, due to the confusion of values, strategic communication must use deception and exploit emotional effects even in the case of home public. The intrusion of the internet and of various digital devices into interpersonal communication and social communication make it more difficult for an average citizen to recognise, reveal and document propaganda ploys. It seems the elite groups still determine the agenda and modern communication technology helps them conceal it. Meanwhile, new elite groups form merely on the basis of new knowledge about exploiting technological opportunities.

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György Nógrádi:

REVIEW OF “AZ ISZLÁM ÁLLAM – TERRORIZMUS 2.0” (THE ISLAMIC STATE: TERRORISM 2.0)

This book definitely fills a serious gap in the literature. Such a detailed work has not yet been published by Hungarians for Hungarian readers. It analyzes and elaborates on the worldwide rise of present-day terrorism, specifies its birth, history, ideological ground, and financial resources.


The book analyses the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the historical failures of the United States, following its interventions in both countries. Additionally, it explains the reasons for and the results of these interventions, as well as the appearance and spread of terrorism in these countries. The reader can gain a deep understanding of the reasons behind the Shiite–Sunni conflict and its effects on the terrorist organizations’ operation. Introducing Saddam Hussein’s era presents us Iraq’s current situation and helps understand why its army has not proven useful on the field despite its training by western instructors and the modern – mostly American-made – weaponry.

The book elaborates on the current situation in Syria as well. It introduces the grounds for radicalism of the mujahedeen, which led to a significant rise in the immigration of European volunteer fighters to join the Islamic State. We gain an understanding of the complete failure of the Arab Spring and its effects on the Middle-East, including the Palestinians.

It offers an in-depth analysis on the Islamic State, the most important – and most dangerous – terrorist organization of our days. It details the IS financial background and operations, as well as its income, which exceeds 3 million US Dollars a day, through which the terrorist organisation finances its political and military successes.

The book has a very diverse bibliography and a well-structured footnote system. This makes it more scientific than an average book, and might be further used as a new source for other researchers in the subject.

During the last 18 months I had the pleasure to watch the first steps of the Research Institute of the General Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces closely. Following the publication of the now well-known Country Guides and the previously issued book on the African terrorist organizations, this opus about the Islamic State is the most recent work. We can only hope that more will follow. I am honored to recommend it to all of its future readers, both for professionals and non-professionals.



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Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviations and acronyms should be given in full when they occur for the first time and the abbreviation/acronym should be given in parentheses. Acronyms such as ECOWAS and HIV/AIDS should be written in caps. Do not use full stops in acronyms, for example USA., RSA., UN. Avoid the use of abbreviations/acronyms in headings. Please note, that acronyms and abbreviations that are well known and in daily use in one professional discipline or in one particular region of the world may be completely unknown in another.

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Start all bulleted lists with capital letters. Semicolons are required between bullets and a full stop after the last item in the list.

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Use italics for the titles of books, periodicals and newspapers.

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Last name, First name. "Title of Article". *Journal Title* Vol./Nr. Year. pages.
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Last name, First name. *Title of Book*. Place of publication: Publisher, Year.
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Last name, First name. "Title of Article". *Name of Newspaper*, Date. Section. Page.
Example: Sefara, M. "Beast that instills only fear and loathing". *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

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Last name, First name. "Title of Thesis". Thesis presented for degree (stipulate in full). Name of university, year.

Example: Jordaan, E. "South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making". Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005.

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