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## FOREWORD

This year we already witness results in defence transformation in Hungary, and this is why we decided to focus this issue on defence innovation. One might say that basic research, and academic writing is a solid reflection of overall culture change in the military, this is why it is a privilege to showcase a thought provoking piece from our current commander of the defence forces emphasizing his belief that a structured transformation approach for the armed forces must be based on a solid innovation strategy, and mindset change is crucial for the future force development of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

Lt Gen Ferenc Korom's message, that in order to establish a capable, agile, and ready HDF which can respond to new threats and challenges effectively, we must not only focus on acquisition of the best available platforms and technology, but also on changing the culture of the force through innovation, organizational learning processes as well.

These ideas resonate with our other ones in the issue, which range from disruptive technology thought pieces on mobile systems helping human resource management, to supercapacitors and their applicability in defence.

But, as we always emphasize, technology in and of itself is just a tool, and does not bring about real lasting change and adaptability. This is why we thought that it is important to showcase articles on the role of leadership in the modern VUCA environment, critical infrastructures in counterinsurgency operations, behavioural change in lifestyle change programmes, ISIS recruiting and cognitive operations, migration trends, and lessons learned from Kosovo as well as from EU missions.

We strongly believe that defence innovation is much more than fancy ideas. Innovation is a strategic endeavour, where the civilian innovation ecosystem must be focused on solving critical defence challenges, enabled to carry out joint efforts of developers and operators, and supported by a solid learning process, where warfighters can experiment safely in order to apply the best equipment to face the multitude of challenges. This is a truly national effort, where governmental support through resources of the Z2026 program, and the HDF's willingness to adapt and change must go hand in hand. In an unpredictable world, we can only build a strong, ready and capable force together, and it takes a whole nation to enhance our defence industrial complex.

We will be paying close attention to these trends here in the Defence Review, and welcome everyone, who are willing to share their ideas on contemporary security challenges, force modernization, technology trends, and other thought provoking ideas about the nature of war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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Lt Gen Ferenc Korom:

## HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES CAPABILITY TRANSFORMATION: BALANCING ACQUISITION AND INNOVATION

ABSTRACT: *This article is based on the speech held on the conference “Disruptive Technology for Defence Transformation” in London, 24 September 2019 by Lt Gen Ferenc Korom.*

KEYWORDS: *defence capability transformation, military transformation, national defence planning, Z2026*

I took over as the commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces (CHOD) at an auspicious moment – in the very early stage of a top-to-bottom modernization programme of the Hungarian Defence Forces. It is an exciting, but at the same time a very challenging time to transform the HDF.

My job is exciting and rewarding, because I have the opportunity to oversee the creation of a new, more effective and thoroughly modern defence force, one that is capable of guaranteeing Hungary’s sovereignty and contributing in a meaningful way to the common defence of the Alliance as well. But it is challenging at the same time because we do not know, what challenges lie ahead and what is the nature of armed conflicts in 10 or 15 years. Yet we must plan ahead, organize, equip and train our forces today considering these black swan events.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the most difficult part of my job is making every day decisions about allocating finite resources and managing the myriad of challenges in finding the best available servicemen and women, as well as communicating our transformation efforts to society.

My article is built around three W-s: what defence capability transformation really means for Hungary; why the country decided to launch it; and what is our strategy to reach our desired end state. Our concept of military transformation is a continuous, proactive process with a rolling horizon. It is not necessarily fast, it does not have to cover the full scope of the HDF, and it does not exclude equipment which is already working well. It is not just development, but a fundamental change. Acquiring new equipment to do the same thing better, at longer range and with greater precision is not a transformation. Replacing our AK-47 with the BREN 2 assault rifle is not a transformation, only incremental improvement. But the integration of artificial intelligence into the structure of the armed forces is, and it requires a mind-set change.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The black swan event is referring to a phrase used in a book by the essayist, scholar, philosopher, and statistician Nassim Nicholas Taleb released on April 17, 2007. The book focuses on the extreme impact of certain kinds of rare and unpredictable events (outliers) and humans’ tendency to find simplistic explanations for these events retrospectively. This theory has since become known as the black swan theory. Taleb, N. N. *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. New York: Random House, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Porkoláb, I. “Szervezeti adaptáció a Magyar Honvédségben: Küldetés alapú vezetés 2.0 a digitális transzformáció korában”. *Honvédségi Szemle* 147/1. 2019. 3-12.  
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Our purpose is to develop and maintain military advantage, by making the HDF adaptive, capable of dealing with the changing security environment, and react faster and more effectively than our adversaries. Adaptability is key,<sup>3</sup> and it enables us to respond adequately to new and emerging challenges. To this end we make transformation the driver of future short-, medium- and long-term force development plans.

Hungary is implementing defence capability transformation through the so called “Zrínyi 2026 programme”.<sup>4</sup> The programme is named after a 17<sup>th</sup> century Hungarian general, politician and poet, who advocated the replacement of the inadequate mix of local forces and feudal levies with a professional standing army. In all but name this was a fundamental transformation of Hungary’s defence system.

Implementation through the Z2026 in a VUCA environment<sup>5</sup> is very complex, it means the simultaneous development of the DOTMLPF-I (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) components together, in order to make the HDF more capable of facing new threats and challenges. Our goal is to achieve and keep military advantage through quality advantage, and eliminate shortcomings that are likely to arise in the future, or are likely to be brought about by the changing security environment. We intend to achieve this by turning the armed forces into a learning organization.<sup>6</sup> The success of the Z2026 is based on a goal-oriented development strategy, which is scheduled for the period between 2018 and 2026, and is supported by the twin pillars of National Defence Programmes and Force Development Programmes.

These programmes cover not only the HDF itself, but also include plans to redevelop the national industrial base. Thus, our transformation programme will not only support capability building, but will also contribute to the retention of a high-quality work force, and the end result I expect is a more capable HDF.

<sup>3</sup> NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that “one of our greatest strengths is our ability to adapt.” Stoltenberg, J. “Keynote speech at the 2015 Chiefs of Transformation Conference”. 11 December 2015. Norfolk, VA.; Stoltenberg, J. “Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the opening of the NATO Transformation Seminar”. NATO. 25 March 2015. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_118435.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm)

<sup>4</sup> The Hungarian government launched the most significant development programme since the end of the cold war. It affects all segments of the Hungarian Defence Forces – even the defence industry sector. It entails a plan for robust acquisition projects in order to modernize the Hungarian Defence Forces and revive the defence industry through the transfer of knowledge, technology and establishment of defence industrial capacities.

<sup>5</sup> VUCA is short for *volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity*. It is meant to describe the highly dynamic chaotic environment. VUCA also conflates four distinct types of challenges that demand four distinct types of responses. The notion of VUCA was introduced by the U.S. Army War College in the 1990s. The deeper meaning of each element of VUCA: (1) Volatility. The nature and dynamics of change, and the nature and speed of change forces and change catalysts. (2) Uncertainty. The lack of predictability, the prospects for surprise, and the sense of awareness and understanding of issues and events. (3) Complexity (or variety) is measured by the number of distinguishable states it is capable of having and is beyond the control of any individual. The multiplex of forces, the confounding of issues, no cause-and-effect chain and confusion that surround an organization creates an entangled web of complexity. (4) Ambiguity occurs when there is no clear interpretation of a phenomenon or set of events. It can never be eliminated altogether and the haziness of reality, the potential for misreads, and the mixed meanings of conditions always cause-and-effect confusion. For a better understanding see: Berinato, S. “A Framework for Understanding VUCA”. *Harvard Business Review* 59/9. 2014. <https://hbr.org/2014/09/a-framework-for-understanding-vuca>; Bennett, N. and Lemoine, G. J. “What VUCA Really means for You”. *Harvard Business Review* 59/1. 2014. <https://hbr.org/2014/01/what-vuca-really-means-for-you>

<sup>6</sup> Porkoláb, I. “Szervezeti innováció a Magyar Honvédségben: Az ember-gép szimbiózisa a stratégiaelméletek tükrében”. *Haditechnika* 53/1. 2019. 2-8. DOI: 10.23713/HT.53.1.01

As part of the adaptation to the new situation, Hungary is planning to establish two multinational commands (MND-C, SOCC-R) and we have initiated the reform of the C2 structure of the HDF as well. The bottom-line is that we are all aware of the current, deteriorating security environment, increasing complexity of threats and challenges which act as a trigger for the transformation of the defence sector. This proves the need for adapting to the new environment.

The lessons learned from current operations and the transformational pressure from NATO does not allow us to base our defence on our current capabilities, as a reliable ally we need to increase our defence capabilities through the acquisition of the most modern equipment in order to improve our responsiveness and status, but at the same time we need to build innovation to create an adaptive and resilient organizational culture.

The objectives are clear: we need to create an agile, responsive and modern defence force which can contribute to operations and ensure the safety and prosperity of Hungary; but at the same time we also need to support the improvement of our national economy.

The four main drivers behind our capability transformation are:

- Changing security environment – as we must continuously adapt to keep up with the rapidly changing security environment.
- NATO summit decisions – as we also have our commitments and obligations stemming from our NATO membership.
- National defence ambitions – as our aim is to develop the HDF to become a leading, state-of-the-art military force in the region.
- New trends and opportunities – because it is essential to keep ahead of the threats and challenges we face and to make use of all new opportunities.




Figure 1: Drivers of HDF transformation

One of the drivers for transformation has been the changing security environment. I am quite certain that by looking at the trajectory of events of the past three decades, we can conclude that we are moving away from a relatively simple Cold War period (when the enemy was clearly defined) towards an era of complex conflicts – which has many names: hybrid war, cyber war, unrestricted war. I am sure we can realise the enormous differences between the capabilities that needed during the Cold War, and those that are required today to prevail in expeditionary operations, and those of the future uncertain battlefield. In the 1980s artificial intelligence was still mostly considered to be science fiction – today it is becoming reality, and changes the very essence we fight modern wars.

The sequence of the NATO summit decisions responding to the challenges, especially those in the last decade or so, has reflected on this complexity, and provided a clear guidance on how to proceed. Hungary, as a member of the Alliance is determined to keep up with its Allies. We do our share of responding to the deterioration in the security environment; from upgrading our capabilities, through adapting our mind-set, to building cutting edge capabilities, like the ones able to deter adversaries in the evolving cyber domain.<sup>7</sup> Hungary cannot become a security freeloader and rely on others to provide its defence. We want to remain a relevant actor in the common defence of the Alliance, so we must make a relevant and valuable contribution. That is possible only if our capabilities are equal or superior to those of the potential adversaries of the Alliance.

Obviously, there are other motivating factors as well. Hungary is a sovereign nation. Its interests and ambitions may be closely parallel to those of our Allies, but they do not coincide in every case. A capable military force is an essential element of a nation's existence. A nation that cannot defend its sovereignty by force of arms will remain sovereign only as long as it is convenient for other nations. Meanwhile, it will have to be careful not to offend its potential adversaries, and defer to allies that defend it. But the armed forces are also a symbol of national unity and an instrument of realizing our national ambitions.

A very real problem the HDF has been facing for some time is the legacy equipment from our membership in the Warsaw Pact. We still use a significant number of Russian made equipment that is quite obsolete by today's standards and must be replaced. However, resource constraints in the past forced us to postpone the acquisition of modern western equipment. It has all changed, as now we have not only the urgent need, but also the opportunity to make it happen, as significant funds for the foreseeable next couple of years were made available by the government to the Ministry of Defence. But buying modern equipment in and of itself is not enough, we have to enable the warfighter, and just about every component of DOTMLPF-I has to be re-assessed, modified, and brought up to date. Our domestic industrial capacity needs serious improvement, and initially may impose some constraints, but I am confident that we can overcome these challenges as well in time. We expect that a collateral benefit of the transformation process will be the revival of the Hungarian defence industry and the birth of a defence innovation ecosystem.

The fourth driving factor of transformation is the realisation that the changing security environment brought not only challenges, but opportunities as well. I believe that in our current situation the challenges and the opportunities are two sides of the same coin. If we meet a challenge head on, analyse it, seek to resolve it, and identify the appropriate solution,

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<sup>7</sup> Cyber has been declared as a domain at NATO's Warsaw Summit in July 2016. "Warsaw Summit Communiqué". NATO. 9 July 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)

we can now identify the appropriate direction for future improvement, because we have significant foresight regarding our resources. We must also realize that our potential opponents face very similar challenges.

Taking into account the characteristics of a future war, although there are plenty of buzzwords out there, from agnostic fires platform to semiautonomous wingman teaming, we really do not have a clear idea what a conflict will look like in ten or fifteen years from now. Is it going to be a hybrid war full of ambiguity? A nuclear Armageddon? Fast moving manoeuvre covering entire continents and all domains? Protracted, low intensity war of attrition? Or bits and pieces of all four? We really have no idea, and we do not have any clue who our adversaries will be. Will they be nation states and their alliances? How resilient and strong will they be? How will they fight? These are all relevant questions for strategic decision makers and force planners alike, yet they are mostly unanswered these days.

Still the fact remains, we must make long-reaching decision today, acquire and field complete warfighting systems that best fulfil our requirements, and we also need to train our forces, while we fully realize two things. First, when we deploy our forces in combat, their training and equipment may prove less than perfect in an operational environment that is substantially different from what we had planned for. Second, due to the very rapid pace of development in the technology sector, better systems will be available in the near future, since the technology disruption cycles, especially in autonomy, and digital technology are becoming shorter and shorter.




Figure 2: *New challenges and new opportunities*

Much the same applies to the other challenges and opportunities. Resource constraints like the supply of and access to water, natural resources and rare-earth minerals, the population explosion in the Global South and population decline in the Global North, the rapid pace of technology development, raise questions like: how to translate into capabilities within the armed forces, and how to deal with ethical questions like hunter-killer autonomous systems. One thing seems to be certain: with superior situational awareness (which requires robust



intelligence, solid analysis, and an agile organizational learning system using AI and modern technology) we can allocate adequate resources to defence, and face present and future challenges.

Our national defence planning is in harmony with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Although the Z2026 programme is – first and foremost – based on national interest, we have ensured that it is also in line with the NDPP. We incorporated our obligations from the Capability Target Package 2017 in the national force development plans in order to fulfil our commitments in the Alliance. We also continuously enhance our forces offered to NATO, and review our short-term plans in order to keep up with the rapidly changing security environment.

At the Wales NATO Summit the presidents and prime ministers of NATO member states approved that they will raise their defence expenditures to 2% of GDP, and 20% of this will be used for research & development and the acquisition of new military equipment.<sup>8</sup> In line with the above commitment the Government's decision to allocate the necessary funds for a 7 year time period is unprecedented, and provides us with an opportunity to plan ahead and make the necessary strategic decisions.

As a part of this transformation process, we made structural changes as well, separated the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces Command, in order to clarify the lines of authority and responsibility. We also created some new organisational elements. The HDF Transformation Command and the HDFC Inspectorates are recently established within the HDF. The Modernisation Institute is also a new HDF entity focusing on bringing in new technology and building defence innovation. As it scouts out new ways to innovate, it manages R&D projects and acts as a bridge between the HDF's defence capability building effort, links up the MoD with an innovation ecosystem, and makes suggestions for technology development focus areas. The Cyber Academy is responsible for the training and education of personnel working in the field of cyber defence. We established a new officer and non-commissioned officer training system as well to support capability transformation with well-trained NCO personnel.

There can be no question that technology was a very important enabler in Russia's seizure of Crimea. Cleverly designed algorithms and bot farms are certainly essential for spreading fake news in order to influence international public opinion. We (the Alliance as a whole and each member state) must find the human and financial resources to match our potential adversaries – and not only match, but surpass them in the military application of cutting-edge technology. But we must not be dazzled by the possibilities inherent in technology. Acquisition of new whizz-bang equipment in and of itself does not lead to enhanced capability. New equipment must become an integral part of the armed forces through doctrines, training, and capable operators, before it can contribute to success.

I believe that in our current quest for transformation technology is just one of the drivers. And perhaps not even the most important one. If you look at Hungary's reasons for launching its force modernization project, you will note that they are really the outcomes of political, societal and economic developments in the country's immediate vicinity, and in some cases further away.

<sup>8</sup> "Wales Summit Declaration". NATO. 5 September 2014. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014\\_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914walessummit\\_/sede240914walessummit\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914walessummit_/sede240914walessummit_en.pdf)

For us it is imperative that we think in complete capability packages which cover all the aspects of the DOTMLPF-I spectrum. The thorough reform of the HDF will cover all areas: organization, doctrine and training must all be changed to enable the warfighter to use the brand new up-to-date equipment and materiel acquired through the Z2026 Programme. Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the transformation effort will be the recruitment and retention of educated personnel who are capable to operate the new equipment.

Still, we must not forget that an armed conflict, whether low intensity expeditionary operations or high intensity conventional war, is still a very dangerous business that requires us to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and manoeuvre, or repel his assault by fire and close combat. Thus the very basic nature of war has not changed: it still demands young, skilled, well-trained, physically fit, strong and brave men and women and commanding officers with exceptional leadership skills. Also, in order to support the new equipment we need new facilities and a robust defence industrial complex. Developing the national industrial base supports not only defence capacity building, but also retains the quality workforce we are so proud of, generates opportunities for the younger generation, and supports local companies to scale up defence related businesses in the region or globally.

We also have to realize, that the defence sector needs allies in capability development. While in the past, defence related research and development has been the main driver to create new technology, today a lot of military innovations come from the civil sector, and the armed forces become aware of them only when they are manifested in commercial-purpose drones, cyber-attacks against their information networks, or in jammed communications. These technologies are becoming more and more accessible to non-state actors, their development cycles are shortening, and the attacks using this equipment are extremely low-cost.

On the other hand, the majority of new military equipment takes several years to develop, is extremely complex and expensive, and contains critical electrical components sourced through long and fragile supply chains.




Figure 3: *Thinking outside the box*

The answer to this challenge is clear: quick and effective adaption and integration of the most promising civil technologies in military equipment, development of modular and scalable systems, use of open architecture design, avoidance of over-engineering in new

systems, shortening of development cycles, and development of the national industrial base in order to decrease supply risks. However, the military cannot do all this alone, therefore we need to build an innovation interface organization to be able to connect to the already existing ecosystem.

Innovative, new defence solutions are only guaranteed by partnering with specific talent and knowledge base, agile research facilities. Since the armed forces do not have the necessary scientific and technical knowledge at the moment, and our research and development capabilities are cumbersome, we need to articulate our capability needs and operational and technical requirements in order to foster academic thinking and focus the industry (especially SMEs and start-ups) on specific problem areas we need to solve. At the same time, the validation and certification of the solutions and their integration into larger capability building projects must remain a function of the armed forces.

Innovation is about new ideas merging, creating options, and finally as prototypes being tested by operators. Dedicated military centres with typical military mind-set and procedures alone and in isolation cannot guarantee the cross-pollination of innovative ideas. Therefore, we also need the involvement of a large number of civil researchers in defence innovation. Moreover, the civil sector is the leader in a number of key technology areas, and the civil and defence research sectors are integral parts of national economic and science systems in all developed countries. Decision makers in the defence sector, who disregard the fact that there is no real innovation without building a strategic innovation ecosystem approach with civil research institutes, universities, think tanks and industry, put the competitiveness of their national defence industrial and technological base, and take a strategic risk.

Hungary has a robust academic system, including a network of academic research institutes and polytechnic institutes. The innovation potential of the academic system is a solid basis for the development of cutting-edge defence technologies. Moreover, our start-up ecosystem is blooming and it is a talent base that must be tapped into in order to generate solutions for defence problems. On the basis of this particular innovation ecosystem the Hungarian defence R&D projects are starting to take shape. We are particularly interested in developing autonomous off-road vehicles, energy systems supported by hybrid sources like hydrogen fuel cells, artificial intelligence based dynamic route planning, quantum cryptography algorithms, Artificial Reality/Virtual Reality-based simulation systems, and aeronautic capabilities as well.

To sum up and answer my original question, I believe that a structured transformation approach that is based on a solid innovation strategy is crucial for the future force development of the HDF, and in order to establish capable, agile, and ready HDF which can respond to new threats and challenges effectively we should not only focus on the acquisition of the best available platforms and technology, but also on changing the culture of the force through innovation, and on the organizational learning processes like design thinking,<sup>9</sup> which will enable our warfighters to use the technology and guarantee the sovereignty of the country as well as to contribute to operations carried out by our Allies.

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<sup>9</sup> Porkoláb, I. and Zweibelson, B. "Designing a NATO that thinks differently for 21<sup>st</sup> century complex challenges". *Defence Review* 146/1. 2018. 196-212.  
[https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/112426/dr\\_2018\\_1\\_beliv\\_angol\\_szemle\\_196\\_212.pdf](https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/112426/dr_2018_1_beliv_angol_szemle_196_212.pdf)

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Col Imre Porkoláb, Col Ferenc Hajdú:

## TUATARA

DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.1

*ABSTRACT: Since the era dominated by industrial production to the knowledge-based society, the traditional way of choosing leaders has been to change the development of non-traditional leadership skills. In addition to the traditional leadership virtues, taking into account the previously unconventional skills have become extremely important in selecting leaders in a modern army.*

*Future challenges can only be tackled by adaptive organizations in which individuals have to make much more autonomous decisions, to adapt to the ever-changing environment that management needs to take into account and support.*

*The generals of the future have to form a strategy in a complex environment, they have to learn how to apply a comprehensive approach, when they have to cooperate with different types of professionals and participants in the possession of visionary, operative and bridge building skills – and this is not easy because different roles require different ways of thinking.*

*In history, we find examples of such leaders, which in our time are becoming alive, because if organizations are not ready to find rapid answers to the challenges, if their decision-making processes are overwhelmed, no hopeful success is expected. Deeply embedded, centralized command and control in the armed forces is not an appropriate response to extremely complex asymmetric situations, especially when facing critical challenges that require immediate decisions.*

*Leadership is not the same as power. Non-traditional leaders need to have followers, associates who support their idea and achieve a degree of freedom.*

*A good example of acquiring the necessary learning and adaptation skills in this world is the convincing example of the success of tuatara, a real living fossil, of evolutionary survival.*

*KEYWORDS: leadership, tuatara, unconventional leadership*

Thomas E. Ricks argued in his recent book<sup>1</sup>, that in American history the leadership quality started to deteriorate when the highest-ranking generals became reluctant to fire underperforming generals under their command. He pointed out that the fear made the generals perform better. We tend to disagree with this argument, as we believe that any quality degradation, if it exists, is more likely a result of a leadership gap.

There are several reasons, why this leadership gap is present. First of all, we would like to point out that since the end of WWII (World War II) the political masters have been increasingly influencing who gets removed, which has made the leader selection process and the mind-set of military leaders more conventional. Secondly, during this time the context

<sup>1</sup> Ricks, Th. E. *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

have changed as well and as we are progressing from an industrial era towards a knowledge-based society, leadership is quite different and more complex. Today the use of fear and an arsenal of other tools of an autocratic leader to motivate seems to be inadequate and has quite the opposite effect from the one that we got used to twenty years ago. The modern toolkit of leaders must be much wider and they need to *develop unconventional leadership skills* as part of their arsenal *to compliment the conventional skills*.

At Exercise Allied Reach<sup>2</sup>, the main theme was Future Security Challenges for the Alliance and the transformation efforts required from NATO countries to be able to counter such challenges. In our opinion the real goal is not to counter future challenges, but rather embrace the uncertainty of the complex environment and build adaptive organizations which proactively influence the future. With the amount of uncertainty all around, it is an almost impossible task to figure out what the future brings, and the key for success is the capability of organizations to quickly adapt to the ever-changing environment. One of the key aspects of adaptation is the unconventional leadership capability within the organization.

## THE LEADERSHIP GAP

Thomas Ricks, in his book, formulates an answer<sup>3</sup> and it is somewhat similar to the one described by General Krulak in his *Three Block War* concept. Ricks suggests that future generals need not only to understand strategy in a complex environment but they need to learn to fight the war amongst the people, show respect for the population with a cultural sensitivity, use a comprehensive approach (including all services, interagency, indigenous and multinational partners), as well as being able to speak a political language, not just a military one. We have heard about the *Strategic Corporal* before, but what we really need is more generals who are unconventional thinkers and leaders. Hence, this article attempts to answer what unconventional leadership is about.

Maccoby<sup>4</sup> in his research also points out that in the fast pacing and complex world we need leaders who can mobilize people for the common good. He calls the new era knowledge workers *interactives*, and argues that these people need a flatter, networked working environment and a leader who possesses three leadership qualities: transformational vision, operational obsessiveness and trust-creating bridge building. He also emphasizes that Personality and Strategic Intelligence are the new leadership qualities for the age of knowledge work. *Personality Intelligence* builds more on emotional intelligence<sup>5</sup>, *Strategic Intelligence* more on systems thinking and practical intelligence<sup>6</sup>.

Transformational visionaries are leaders, who communicate vision with a compelling sense of purpose. Operational obsessives are operational leaders, who have the systems thinking to build the organization and infuse the energy that transforms the visions into results. Finally, bridge builders are leaders, who can facilitate the understanding and trust

<sup>2</sup> Allied Reach is a yearly Strategic exercise for NATO. In 2013 it was organized in Norfolk, Virginia.

<sup>3</sup> Ricks, Th. E. *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Maccoby, M. *The Leaders We Need*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> To read more on emotional intelligence read Goleman, D. *Emotional intelligence: Why it can Matter More Than IQ*. New York: Bantam Press, 2006. and Bradberry, T. *Emotional Intelligence 2.0*. New York: Talent Smart, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> For a description of the difference between analytic, practical and creative intelligence, see Sternberg, R. J. *The Hierarchic Mind: A New theory of Human Intelligence*. New York: Viking, 1988. and Sternberg, R. J. *Successful Intelligence: How Practical and Creative Intelligence Determine Success in Life*. New York: Plume, 1997.

that turns different types of specialists into collaborators. This is a very important piece of leadership, since, we are facing more and more complex problems, and while solving these problems, adaptation and organizational change always create a lot of stress. People's skills are also important during the adaptation process, since people resist a change if they perceive this change as a loss. It is my belief, that the different leadership roles required from modern leaders require different mind-sets, therefore it is quite difficult to obtain all the necessary skills by one individual.

It is clear that the officers who were promoted during the Cold War era were rewarded for showing talent in commanding large manoeuvre units on the conventional battlefield. This conventional mind-set was action oriented, concentrated on producing results with very little thought spent on considering the consequences or people's feelings during the process. In asymmetric conflicts though, which were a dominant form of combat in the last fifty years, a broader range of knowledge was needed, and the military leaders had to rely on unconventional leadership skills as well as conventional ones to be able to successfully engage the enemy in these very complex conflicts. It is not a new phenomenon though, so in this article we use an ancient example of Attila the Hun as well as a modern case study of Special Forces to support our argument and shed some light on the unconventional side of leadership.

There are many ancient examples of unconventional leaders throughout the history, and John Arquilla's book<sup>7</sup> is an excellent read to study many of them, but we have chosen the Attila, who is often called the Scourge of God for a specific reason. There are relatively few researches on his leadership style and he is mostly misunderstood and portrayed as a bloodthirsty barbarian, instead of a brilliant, unconventional leader. Special Forces also have long been on the forefront of fighting asymmetric conflicts and their importance seems to be steadily rising ever since 11 September. Many of their heroic accomplishments might never see the light<sup>8</sup>, and the full scale of the shadow war might never be revealed, but it is interesting to see the expansion of the role of Special Forces in contemporary conflicts. The establishment of a JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Task Force) in Iraq was an organizational example of unconventional leadership in itself, and Stanley McChrystal's role as an unconventional leader is a perfect example how one person is able to influence an organizational adaptation process and change ages old theories on asymmetric warfare<sup>9</sup>.

We argue that conventional and unconventional leadership styles are quite different and it takes a lot of efforts to master both of them. It is not our purpose to argue which one is better, we just simply want to point out that unconventional leadership is an often neglected and relatively rarely used leadership option, which must be on the repertoire of every leader today.

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<sup>7</sup> Arquilla, J. *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World*. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2011.

<sup>8</sup> Kelley, M. "US Special Ops Have Become Much, Much Scarier Since 9/11". Business Insider, 10 May 2013. <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-rise-of-jsoc-in-dirty-wars-2013-4#ixzz2jtF8yaxV>

<sup>9</sup> My understanding here is that the ages old theory that "you are not supposed to kill your way into victory" in an asymmetric conflict has changed and through the increasing effectiveness of JSOTF activities in Iraq, the Task Force was able to eliminate so many key insurgent leaders that the insurgent conversion mechanism was unable to create enough replacements.

## THE SCOURGE OF GOD

When we think of a King archetype, hardly anyone would mention Attila, the Hun, who is mostly remembered as the Scourge of God. He is widely portrayed as a savage and a bloodthirsty barbarian, and being Hungarian ourselves, we thought that we should do some research, before we buy into this story. What we found out, was quite different from the misconception and was surprisingly revealing at the same time.

In his book *Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun*<sup>10</sup>, Roberts describes timeless lessons in win-directed, take-charge management that best describes Attila's real character. From Roberts we learn that barbaric, husband of four hundred women, cruel, and carnivorous are qualities that typically do not describe the ideal leader: Attila the Hun. Taking over the world is the ultimate challenge for just about any leader, and Attila seems to have accomplished it with poise and grace. Nearly 1,500 years after his reign, some researchers are still studying his strategies, which are applicable to any organization, group, company, or country. This single man initiated and led the transformation of nomadic tribal barbarians into undisputed rulers of the ancient world.

Very few people know that if he was living today, he would be described as an entrepreneur, diplomat, social reformer, statesman, civilizer, brilliant field marshal and host of some outstanding parties. Researchers have found that he dared to accomplish seemingly impossible tasks in his age. He began his rise to power by renewing and developing relationships with tribal chieftains. He lived a very simple life (even when he was 'guest' of the Roman court in his youth) and reformed the strategies of the 700,000-strong Hun army (a loose conglomeration of barbarians) so well that it is still an example of swarming tactics<sup>11</sup> this day.

It is important to point out that Roberts defines leadership as the privilege of having responsibility over others' actions and the organization's purpose, all of which can affect the organization's success or failure. The organizational application of unconventional leadership represents a model or system, that also embraces the fact that no one can predict circumstances or situations, and consequently the influence they will have on others.

<sup>10</sup> There are several books on Attila, but by far the most insightful one seems to be Wess Roberts's book: *Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun*. This is the book that reveals the leadership secrets of Attila the Hun - the man who shaped an aimless band of mercenary tribal nomads into the undisputed rulers of the ancient world centuries ago, and who offers us timeless lessons in win-directed, take-charge management today.

<sup>11</sup> Swarming is a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions. It employs a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire that is directed from both close-in and stand-off positions. It will work best – perhaps it will only work – if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units. This calls for an organizational redesign – involving the creation of platoon-like pods joined in company-like clusters – that would keep but retool the most basic military unit structures. It is similar to the corporate redesign principle of flattening, which often removes or redesigns middle layers of management. This has proven successful in the ongoing revolution in business affairs and may prove equally useful in the military realm. From command and control offline units to logistics, profound shifts will have to occur to nurture this new way of war. This study examines the benefits – and also the costs and risks – of engaging in such serious doctrinal change. The emergence of a military doctrine based on swarming pods and clusters requires that defence policymakers develop new approaches to connectivity and control and achieve a new balance between the two. Far more than traditional approaches to battle, swarming clearly depends upon robust information flows. Securing these flows, therefore, can be seen as a necessary condition for successful swarming. This concept is best described in Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented\\_briefings/2005/RAND\\_DB311.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf)



Thus, relating it to Attila initially appears difficult. His leadership qualities (many relate to emotional stability and stamina) show that a leader must be loyal, courageous, self-confident, empathetic, and credible. In Robert's book we can also read extensively how he takes care of his Huns and encourages their active participation and through this enables their success.

Attila's leadership style includes a pattern of constant strategies involving the importance of commitment, accountability, standards, and quality. The undoubtedly successful approach of Attila the Hun focuses on continuous improvement and full commitment of the organization, the Huns, but not at the expense of the people's morale. Focusing on quality, Attila created consistently disciplined Huns, who ideally, and realistically, began to discipline one another individually and subordinately. Morale within an army of 700,000 wild creatures is not easy to attain, but through consistent behaviours of his own such as accountability, loyalty, and confidence, Attila maintained this unified purpose.

Holding every member of any sized organization accountable for their actions and ensuring reliability and consistency in their behaviour is a must for a king who wants to rule his realm for extensive periods of time. Again, and again he stresses the importance of individual quality performance and commitment. He understood that if at the basic, single level, you cannot rely on one person, then your army will not be successful, therefore he gave a lot of freedom to his chieftains, but held each of them accountable for their actions and the actions of their subordinates as well.

If he was able to talk about leader development today, Attila would surely say that leaders must encourage creativity, freedom of action and innovation among their subordinates, as long as these efforts are consistent with the goals of the tribe or nation.

## THE MASTER OF DESTRUCTION

The recent book of General Stanley McChrystal<sup>12</sup>, who has been the JSOTF Commander in Iraq, and several recent articles published in open sources and magazines, shed some light on the organization and leadership used to track down and eliminate a highly elusive and networked enemy in Iraq.

In order to make the JSOTF more effective, McChrystal partnered with agencies to fuse intelligence, and synchronize operations. Together they redesigned the bureaucratic ways information travelled up in a pipeline, and developed a real-time information sharing environment. It was not enough though, so in the next phase of organizational transformation they combined all elements of intelligence (finding the enemy); drone operators and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) specialists (who fixed the target); various teams of Special Forces operators (for finishing); as well as analysts and experts in exploitation and crime scene investigation (who pulled immediate information and exploited it in order to feed it back to the cycle for further analysis) in order to carry out the full cycle of the operations that was called F3EA (find, fix, finish, exploit and analyse). From a leadership point of view, the linear and cumbersome bureaucratic conventional methods were replaced by a shared informational and operational environment. As a result of this process, there was a shift in mind-set and organizational culture as well through the shared consciousness among the various organizations.

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<sup>12</sup> McChrystal, S. A. *My Share of the Task: A Memoir*. Boston: Portfolio, 2013.

These changes meant a whole lot more than just an experiment. This was a game changer in modern warfare and had a real strategic effect as well. As it was published in *Foreign Policy*<sup>13</sup> and in *Foreign Affairs*<sup>14</sup> as well, the old COIN (counter – insurgence) adage, stating that it is not effective to attack the insurgent fighters as they will be replaced soon enough was proved wrong. With the help of some technological adjustments but mainly by reorganizing and changing the leadership mentality the newly organized teams were able to turn the F3EA cycle around three times a night! This meant that while in 2004 in all of Iraq the task force did 18 raids; two years later, by August 2006 they carried out up to 300 raids a month. This meant that the network was operating at speeds that had never been seen before and all that was enabled through a new leadership approach which encouraged decentralizing decision making.

Although the teams included more organizations, many of them being unconventional actors, they valued competency above all else. The overall result was not just a lot of captured and killed enemy fighters, but since the enemy network was hit in many places simultaneously, it had a very difficult time to regenerate. This had a decisive strategic effect<sup>15</sup> and the disruption of the enemy network reached a previously unseen proportion.

This organizational adaptation process of becoming a network for the JSOTF has not only technological and organizational components, but leadership ones as well, and the leadership aspects seem to be the hardest to achieve. McChrystal points out in his interview<sup>16</sup> that “if organizations aren’t ready to move faster, their decision-making processes become overwhelmed by the information flow around them”. For JSOTF to be successful it was not enough to survive, but they needed to thrive.

The concept of adaptation arises from scientific efforts to understand biological evolution<sup>17</sup>, the necessary changes in the way military leaders think of asymmetric challenges require a completely different mind-set, which is the organizational equivalent of biological thriving<sup>18</sup>.

Operating with a decentralized decision making within the military is hard enough. The hierarchical decision-making process implies that the leader at every level of the pyramid is the person in charge of deciding and directing everything below him. By proxy the highest-ranking individual is the one, who always has the best answers, the deepest understanding and the best solutions. This process is very deeply entrenched in the military, but it is un-

<sup>13</sup> McChrystal, S. A. “It takes a Network”. *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2011. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it\\_takes\\_a\\_network](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network)

<sup>14</sup> McChrystal, S. A. and Rose, G. “Generation Kill: A conversation with General Stanley McChrystal”. *Foreign Affairs* 92/2. 2013. 2-8. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill?page=show>

<sup>15</sup> Robert H. Scales wrote that “as head of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, McChrystal oversaw the development of a precision killing machine unprecedented in the history of modern warfare,” one whose “scope and genius” will be fully appreciated only “in later decades, once the veil of secrecy has been removed”. Scales, R. H. “The quality of Command: The wrong way and the right way to make better generals”. *Foreign Affairs* 91/6. 2012. 137-143. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/quality-command>

<sup>16</sup> McChrystal and Rose. “Generation Kill...”

<sup>17</sup> See Mayr, E. *Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1988.

<sup>18</sup> Biological evolution conforms to laws of survival, organizations, however, generate purposes beyond survival. Thriving in biological terms means that the species is fruitful and by multiplying and protecting its own kind it succeeds in passing on its gene pool. Thriving is much more than simple survival, it eventually leads to a vastly expanded range of living.

suitable for highly complex asymmetric situations, especially when we are facing adaptive and critical challenges which are changing minute by minute.

Decentralizing C2 (Command and Control) is just the first step on a long road towards adaptation. Synchronizing and fusing different service cultures to finally become a learning organization (one that is able to constantly adapt) and providing a unifying vision for all this effort is quite an endeavour. Using unconventional leadership during this adaptation process is a must.

## UNCONVENTIONAL LEADERSHIP

As we could see in the two case studies, unconventional leadership takes place in the context of problems and complex challenges. In fact, it makes little sense of even thinking about leadership, when everyone is on the same sheet of music and all we need to do is to coordinate routine activities. Leaders step up, when a tough or complex problem arises and they need to be tackled; therefore, mostly while we are in the zone of learning.

The root cause of not being able to lead in an unconventional manner is our conventional military training, which is based on following orders, and on a clearly defined chain of command. But as we could see in our case studies, people without formal authority can practice leadership on any given issue at any given time. We have all seen cases in our lives when people had formal authority, thus a following per se, but they did not lead. Unconventional leaders operate without anyone experiencing anything remotely similar to the conventional experience of following<sup>19</sup>.

Before we define unconventional leadership, we must answer the questions: who is a leader, and where does leadership take place? There is very much debate in academic circles regarding the definition of a leader, but I believe that a leader is someone people follow. This somewhat simplistic definition captures the essence of leadership, emphasizing the main component: followers. Leadership always implies a relationship between a leader and those who are led, and that relationship exists within a context. This context can be very different in many cases. Corporate bureaucracies thrive in a stable, predictable environment, where people are mostly in their comfort zone and these organizations are best led by conventional leadership. But when complex problems arise, these organizations seem to be less effective to cope with the situation.

So according to our definition: Unconventional leadership moves beyond conventional leadership territory and is presented beyond managing technical problems crossing the line into boldly facing complex adaptive or critical problems, and in most cases, it means going beyond your authority in order to tackle the problems at hand in order to orchestrate solutions to unresolved problems. Unconventional leadership results in organizational or procedural changes, and most importantly, changes people's mind-sets within the organization.

Adaptive and critical challenges also demand constant learning from unconventional leaders. This learning process however, is reaching a lot farther than just collecting information. Those lessons that we gathered in the past are to be applied so that it could be stated that we have learned from them. This makes a critical difference in organizations between lessons identified and lessons learned. In the comfort zone model, we can only close the gap

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<sup>19</sup> Heifetz, R. A. "Anchoring leadership in the work of adaptive progress". In Hesselbein, F. and Goldsmith, M. (eds.), *Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 74.

between our aspirations and the reality if we learn in new ways and are able to constantly adapt. This in turn requires a new approach in leadership education as well.

Another interesting factor is the people-centric approach of unconventional leaders. Leadership is not the same as authority. Exceeding authority is not, by itself, leadership. A compelling vision is not enough either. Unconventional leaders need to get followers, collaborators who support their vision and buy into it. What is interesting, unconventional leaders can also mobilize those, who are opposed to their ideas or just fence sitting. This is an essential skill in facing complex challenges.

Adaptive and critical challenges often require a shift in responsibility from the shoulders of the authority figures and the authority structure to the stakeholders themselves<sup>20</sup>. In contrast with the technical challenges, where experts can solve our problems, in the zone of challenge, facing critical challenges, a different kind of responsibility-taking and leadership mentality are required. This is where unconventional leadership can thrive. If we are looking for authority figures in these kinds of situations, it means that we are treating critical challenges just as if they were technical ones, and approaching them with a conventional leadership mind-set and in most cases this can be really damaging.

Finally, we have to mention the time factor, as it is most likely one of the most critical parts of the military decision-making process. Adaptive challenges require significantly more time for people to develop innovative solutions and learn, than technical challenges. Moreover, critical challenges are even worse from the perspective of time, as they do not have a cookie-cutter ready to apply solutions, but generally we do not have time to take, as it would be the case in the case of an adaptive challenge. Overall, organizations need time to make cultural changes in order to adapt, but in the contemporary, 21<sup>st</sup> century VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) context we do not have that luxury any more.

## FINAL THOUGHTS

As Heifetz suggests in his article<sup>21</sup>, “*our language fails us in many aspects of our lives*”. This is why we have chosen the Maori word *tuatara* for the title of our article. Tuatara are reptiles that are endemic to New Zealand. They are often referred to as living dinosaurs, as have largely not changed physically over very long periods of evolution going back millions of years. Tuatara is the only survivor of an ancient group of reptiles that lived at the same time as dinosaurs. The last relatives of tuatara died out about 60 million years ago which is why tuatara is called a ‘living fossil’.

But tuatara at the same time have broken records for DNA evolution as well. A discovery that has astonished New Zealand scientists proves that “the tuatara has the highest molecular evolutionary rate that anyone has measured”<sup>22</sup>. The new research also support-

<sup>20</sup> Heifetz, R. A. “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress”. In Hesselbein, F. and Goldsmith, M. (eds.), *Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 76.

<sup>21</sup> Heifetz, R. A. “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress”. In Hesselbein, F. and Goldsmith, M. (eds.), *Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. 73.

<sup>22</sup> Hay, J. M. et al. “Rapid Molecular Evolution in a Living Fossil”. *Trends in Genetics* 24/3. 2008. 106-109.; DOI: 10.0.3.248/j.tig.2007.12.002

ed a hypothesis by the evolutionary biologist Allan Wilson, that the rate of molecular evolution was uncoupled from the rate of morphological evolution. This basically means that the tuatara is capable of remarkable rates of adaptation, yet it has hardly changed for ages.

Tuatara in the local Maori language also indicates *tapu* (the borders of what is sacred and restricted) beyond which there is *mana* (meaning there could be serious consequences if that boundary is crossed). In our example when a leader decides to walk the line and venture out from the comfort zone (of traditional autocratic command and control leadership) to tackle complex challenges, he is surely setting himself up for a lot of pushing back from others as he disturbs the organizational equilibrium. Anyone, who has done it before, is aware of the personal and professional vulnerabilities of this endeavour. But with the great danger, there are great opportunities presented as well.

Leadership in the contemporary security context is very different to what we have been trained to as military personnel in the last century. Most of the time our training included known scenarios, and as we trained for certainty, we learned the *science* of war. But in the context of new complex challenges we also need to educate our leaders for *uncertainty* and teach them the *art* of war. The brave option is to embrace uncertainty, as it has a reason; it pushes us to reach out and by learning and adapting, develops our leaders personally, as well as creates remarkable organizations, not just good ones.

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Attila Végh, Zoltán Rajnai:

# DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS OF MOBILE SYSTEMS TO HELP HUMAN RESOURCES

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*ABSTRACT: Electronic information systems used by interior and national emergency organizations are based on the same functional components, but even within an organization, specific entities can be equipped with different types of devices from different manufacturers. Apart from the fact that today the management of increasingly complex systems requires serious expertise, it is also complicated with the diversity of system components – so in their operation it is hard to become proficient and well-skilled. The attention of the operator becomes divided, so it is not entirely focused on their task. The topicality of the matter is the growing number of security developments. The purpose of my publication is to explore the tools and user aspects – with emphasis on user overload – related to these systems.*

*KEYWORDS: digital communication, mobile systems, NVR, TETRA*

## INTRODUCTION

Seminars and exhibitions dealing with interior and national security issues present interesting novelties and systems with useful new features year after year. This process is deliberate, Europe's security situation has prompted European Union leaders and defense industry players to change and continuously improve. One of the results is that EU leaders approved the Rome Declaration on 25 March 2017. In this statement, EU leaders have committed themselves, to strengthen the common security and defense policy in cooperation with NATO on the one hand, and to support a more competitive and integrated defense industry on the other.<sup>1</sup>

The result of this process is that the emergency organizations can continuously modernize and replace their equipment that has been used up due to the lack of financial resources. However, this puts a lot of pressure on system operators: they have to learn the management of new technologies parallel with their standard workload, and they may have to manage multiple technical solutions simultaneously with the same activity. There are several reasons for this: from the technical side, the continuous development of the manufacturers, and from the financial side, the purchases of the replacement equipment are not based on the manu-

<sup>1</sup> "A Bizottság vitaforumot rendez az európai védelem jövőjéről". European Commission. 24 May 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1427\\_hu.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1427_hu.htm), Accessed on 23 May 2018.

facturer or the type of the equipment, but on the better offer price in a competitive tendering procedure.

Operating the system components distracts the attention of an already overloaded staff from the management of their tasks. This is especially true for drivers of vehicles equipped with complex systems.<sup>2</sup> From Border Police's mobile thermal imaging car to modern police cars, vehicles are all equipped with sophisticated IT systems that require drivers to handle these components at a high skill level.



Figure 1: Mobile thermal imaging car<sup>3</sup>



Figure 2: Integrated solution from Federal Signal<sup>4</sup>

Several manufacturers have recognized the above-mentioned problem, and for ease of use, integrated the separated systems into a common interface. These integration packs include the manufacturers' own product line and other products from a narrow range of suppliers, so full implementation for older purchases cannot be achieved with these systems.

For a complete implementation, a general-purpose integration platform should be developed that is capable of handling devices with the same functionality in one system, providing the same interface.

## DETERMINATION OF DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND DIRECTIONS

In order to determine the purpose and exact directions of the niche development, the type of equipment used by user organizations, the use case should be assessed and we need to know user opinions, needs, and helpful comments on how to use the tools.

<sup>2</sup> James, S. M. "Distracted driving impairs patrol officer driving performance". *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 38/3. 2015. 505-516.  
DOI: 10.0.3.248/j.tig.2007.12.002

<sup>3</sup> "Újabb hőkamerás fejlesztések". 9 July 2014. <http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/hatarrendeszet/ujabb-hokameras-fejlesztések>, Accessed on 23 May 2018.

<sup>4</sup> "ATENA System". <https://www.fedsigvama.com/en/product/atenea-system/>, Accessed on 23 May 2018.



In the rest of the study, I present a survey of the technical equipment used by emergency organizations, as well as a survey of users' direct opinions. For the survey I chose empirical research from the special methods, we used a questionnaire method, and we made interviews.<sup>5</sup>

## VOICE COMMUNICATION DEVICES

The purpose of speech communication devices is to achieve immediate, reliable group communication between the driver and the dispatcher – who controls their activity.

For the purposes of the study, two modes of communication are distinguished:

- point to point communication
- point to multipoint communication

A typical example of point-to-point communication is when the two parties can talk to each other in full duplex (they can listen and talk at the same time).

In a point to multipoint communication on the other hand, we always distinguish a transmitting party who initiates the call by pressing the PTT (Push to Talk) button and opens the channel to all the other devices in that particular group that can receive the transmitted content. Once the transmission is ended any of the group's participants can initiate a response call.

The benefit of group communication – PTT communication – is that the information for a group member is shared immediately. For a particular event, all members of the geographically dispersed intervention staff (belonging to the same speech group) are fully provided with the event information, are also aware of the instructions the other staff has received, therefore the individual is able to carry out its own task in full transparency of the entire activity.

Of course, PTT-based voice transmission is the main function of the equipment, but modern devices can also be used in additional communication modes:

- private call initiation;
- sending short text messages (all user, status);
- sending telemetry informations (control inputs, outputs, status polling);
- data communications (sending GPS positions, low rate data communication).

The above is true for modern digital systems. Analog devices are only suitable for their main function, using minimal signaling system, or some type is suitable for data transmission at a limited speed.

TETRA<sup>6</sup> digital trunked radio standard was defined in the 1990s. The purpose of the standard is to create a spectrum efficient system by defining 4 logical speech channels on a 25 kHz wide radio channel, and to create a scalable trunk infrastructure for a large number of users. TETRA can provide single, multi-site and even nationwide coverage. The system got in focus when the Schengen Border Cooperation was defined, which required a cross-border communication system between the cooperating organizations. In that time the cooperation between standardization organizations, manufacturers, users of international organizations was exemplary.

<sup>5</sup> Berek L., Rajnai Z. and Berek L. *A tudományos kutatás folyamata és módszerei*. Budapest: Óbudai Egyetem Bánki Donát Gépész és Biztonságtechnikai Mérnöki Kar, 2018. 36-39.

<sup>6</sup> TETRA – Terrestrial Trunked Radio – European standard for trunked radio system

The TETRA system in Europe is typically used by emergency organizations. In addition, there are civil organizations that are very similar to professional establishments with regard to their fleets, their equipment and should use the same system to facilitate cooperation.

Nowadays for civil organizations (such as public police and outgoing cars of civil security services, in Hungary), DMR<sup>7</sup> system is most commonly used for voice communication. Of course, it is reliable, even tens of years have not completely worn out such analogue systems, but fading of compatible DMR systems into the background, which ensures a continuous transition, is expected as the equipment breaks.

On other continents, systems with a similar set of services, and the way they are used, could be interpreted as the same as the TETRA standard. In the United States, a system called P25<sup>8</sup> was constructed while in China the PDT<sup>9</sup> system was introduced. These systems do not differ in their integration from the systems used in Europe.

The use of a new technology started in critical communications, LTE<sup>10</sup>, which had already proven its capabilities in mobile data communication, when allowing high data rates to be used. The solution used in this system is called PTT over the LTE. Its widespread availability is expected in the near future.



Figure 3: Mobile versions of TETRA, P25, DMR, and LTE radios<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> DMR – Digital Mobile Radio – standard defined by ETSI for frequency efficient evolution of analogue radio system

<sup>8</sup> P25 – Project 25, standards for public safety organizations in North America, replacement for analog radios

<sup>9</sup> PDT – Professional or Police Digital Trunking – open standard for trunked police radio system in China

<sup>10</sup> LTE – Long-Term Evolution, a standard for wireless broadband communication for mobile or data terminals

<sup>11</sup> “TETRA Radio Solutions”. MOTOROLA Solutions. [https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en\\_xu/products/tetra.html](https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_xu/products/tetra.html), Accessed on 23 January 2018.; “EV 750 Vehicle Radio”. Huawei. <http://e.huawei.com/en/products/wireless/elte-trunking/trunking-terminal/ev750>, Accessed on 23 January 2018.

After defining the devices, we need to identify the integration interface where these devices become suitable not for their own system environment or for access or control functions via their own interfaces. With an overview of the leading manufacturers of equipment, we can see that the USB<sup>12</sup> or RS232 serial port is defined as the device integration interface.

We can state that the TETRA equipment may possibly be integrated with the RS232<sup>13</sup> port, while the DMR equipment can be integrated on the USB interface with a NDIS<sup>14</sup> driver.

The driver supplied by the manufacturer supports the environment of the windows operating system, so it is advisable to consider this aspect for development.<sup>15</sup>

## LIGHT BARS AND SIRENS

The purpose of the distinctive sound and light signals is to signal the approach of a special vehicle to other participants in traffic on the road, and their obligation to give priority. This ensures that the travel time is significantly reduced in a specific traffic situation.

In accordance with Decree 12/2007. (III. 13.) of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, distinctive light signals are blue or blue-red, the device blinks at different speeds, or a sound signal when the siren is changing pitch.

Light signals are mostly used in roof-mounted design, which ensures that it is detectable from a long distance. If needed, additional flashing lights are used beside the light bars for better visibility. Regardless of their manufacturers, it can be stated that modern light signals use efficient, low power LED technology of high brightness. However, it is not possible to ignore the old flashing devices or the rotating mirror visual warning signals.

The light signals have two modes of control. One is that each function of these devices can be activated separately on a dedicated interface, and the other is to receive information from the device interface via a communication bus to activate the functions.

The use of the communication bus is not yet widespread, it is expected to be more widely adopted in the future. During the development, it is advisable to prepare for it, but the main direction of the system should be used by the parallel communication.




Figure 4: *Modern light bars*<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> USB – Universal Serial Bus is an industry standard for a communication platform between computers, peripheral devices and other computers

<sup>13</sup> RS232 – Recommended Standard 232, an industry standard for serial communication platform between computers, peripheral devices and other computers

<sup>14</sup> NDIS – Network Driver Interface Specification abstracts lower-level drivers that manage hardware from upper-level drivers, such as network transports

<sup>15</sup> Farkas T. and Prisznyák Sz. “Kormányzati célú infokommunikációs hálózatok: A rendészeti szervek infokommunikációs rendszere”. *Hadtudományi Szemle* 10/4. 2017. 583-596.

[http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00037/pdf/EPA02463\\_hadtudomanyi\\_szemle\\_2017\\_04\\_583-596.pdf](http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00037/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2017_04_583-596.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> “Phoenix Series”. <https://www.fedsigvama.com/en/product/serie-phoenix/>, Accessed on 23 January 2018.

In the case of audible signals, the siren control unit determines the siren sounds. This unit is usually integrated with the amplifier. Controlling the sounds can also be handled from a control wire, or in the new units, the CAN control bus<sup>17</sup> can be used similarly to the light signals.<sup>18</sup>

## ON-BOARD VIDEO RECORDERS

The purpose of on-board video recording equipment is on the one hand, to capture the traffic conditions of the vehicle or video record police actions, and on the other hand, visual or in-vehicle speech record the behavior of passengers and forced passengers in the vehicle.

Simple on-board cameras fulfil only commercial demands, for instance, a clear recording of traffic situations, and they are able save information on their own internal memory or an SD card. Such devices are equipped with accelerometer, GPS, motion detector, and can manage the recordings via their own applications – if Wi-Fi or bluetooth connection is available.

It is easy to see that these tools are not suitable for integration into the planned system. The functional features of professional devices specifically designed for installation in the vehicle are the same as those of modern professional imaging equipment, however, their whole design and cable interface surfaces are designed for a more demanding environment (continuous shaking, temperature changes).

Closed circuit, so the cameras are connected directly to the recording equipment, the information is only available to the authorized person.

Some manufacturers (for example, of the Dahua devices in our study) also provide software components for the development of the devices to integrate their equipment to a special vehicle.<sup>19</sup>



Figure 5: On-board NVR<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> CAN bus – Controller Area Network is a communication standard designed for the microcontrollers, computer mainly in vehicle application.

<sup>18</sup> Rusz D. “A megkülönböztető jelzések jogszabályi háttére és aktualitása”. *Hadmérnök* 10/4. 2015. 43-55. [http://hadmernok.hu/153\\_04\\_ruszd.pdf](http://hadmernok.hu/153_04_ruszd.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Berek L., Berek T. and Berek L. *Személy- és vagyonbiztonság*. Budapest, Óbudai Egyetem Bánki Donát Gépész és Biztonságtechnikai Mérnöki Kar, 2016. 51-66.

<sup>20</sup> NVR – a computer with a special program that records and processes IP camera streams. “Mobile NVR: NVR0404MF”. Dahua Technology. <http://au.dahuasecurity.com/au/products/nvr0404mf-11951.html>, Accessed on 23 January 2018.

## AUTOMATIC VEHICLE LOCATION

The Global Positioning System – the GPS – is a widespread, reliable system that can determine the current position of the vehicle, or, by forwarding this position, you can immediately inform the dispatch center.<sup>21</sup>

Positioning should be the basis for integration. Due to the widespread use of the system, several devices have been listed in which this module is integrated:

- devices for modern digital PTT communication (TETRA, DMR, LTE)
- mobile NVR with optional card
- mobile PC with optional card.

## ON-BOARD COMPUTERS

The purpose of the on-board computer is to assemble the components to incorporate it into the development, control through its hardware unit, and running the software components to be developed, visual display of system states.

The computer must handle the components that are installed in the vehicle listed above, therefore, they must have matching interfaces, communication ports.

The computer has to be designed for special needs, so it must be protected against extreme temperature and environmental influences.

It is best to design a touch screen interface for the computer, due to the problem of keyboard and mouse placement.<sup>22</sup>

## DEVICES TO BE INTEGRATED IN THE FUTURE ACCORDING TO THE TREND

According to this trend, the basic equipment of future patrol cars will not change in the next 10 years, however, the interfaces of the devices are expected to be converted to digital communication.

A couple of professional materials forecast the direction that car manufacturers make “ready” patrol cars – with factory-fitted equipment. However, in this case, the manufacturers of professional tools determine the main supplier direction, since the development of the target devices and the professionals are found in these companies.

<sup>21</sup> RUDOLF Á. “GPS rendszer működése és alkalmazása a biztonságtechnikában”. *Hadmérnök* 7/1. 2012. 40-47. [http://hadmernok.hu/2012\\_1\\_rudolf.pdf](http://hadmernok.hu/2012_1_rudolf.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> “Mobile Computing Solutions”. Nexcom. <http://www.nexcom.com/Products/mobile-computing-solutions>, Accessed on 27 May 2018.



Figure 6: *Motorola Integrated Control Panel*<sup>23</sup>



Figure 7: *Motorola Mission Critical LTE device*<sup>24</sup>

Convergence is expected in the field of voice and video communications, its signs can also be found in the new government-oriented LTE equipment. The devices come onto the market with a touchscreen display, a camera, and a dedicated PTT button, suitable for communicating specifically on LTE systems for government purposes. There will also be a future for the deployment of vehicle-mounted devices through Voice over LTE applications like Mission Critical PTT.<sup>25</sup>

## SURVEY RESEARCH

In order to achieve the research goals, I have divided the available human resources into four research groups. The four research teams surveyed the leaders of the Hungarian emergency organizations with a survey questionnaire, visited experts in these systems in Budapest and in all county headquarters in the country. We interviewed the Police, the Counter Terrorism Centre, the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, the National Ambulance Service and the National Tax and Customs Administration staff, about their experience and opinion of the digital systems in use.

Before completing the questionnaire compiled by us, we were informed during a personal interview about the mobile data systems installed in the organizations' service vehicles and their experience in using it, and local forms of protection against security threats to IT systems. After the interview, we had the questionnaire completed on a voluntary basis and it was done without exception.

<sup>23</sup> "APX™ 7500 Multi-Band P25 Mobile Radio". Motorola Solutions. [https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en\\_us/products/two-way-radios/project-25-radios/discontinued/apx-7500.html#tabproductinfo](https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/two-way-radios/project-25-radios/discontinued/apx-7500.html#tabproductinfo), Accessed on 27 May 2018.

<sup>24</sup> "LEX L11 Mission Critical LTE Device". MOTOROLA Solutions. [https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en\\_us/products/lte-broadband-systems/volte.html#tabproductinfo](https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/lte-broadband-systems/volte.html#tabproductinfo), Accessed on 27 May 2015.

<sup>25</sup> "VoLTE (Voice over LTE)". MOTOROLA Solutions. [https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en\\_us/products/lte-user-devices/lexl11.html#tabproductinfo](https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/lte-user-devices/lexl11.html#tabproductinfo), Accessed on 27 May 2015.

The questionnaires were processed one by one, organizations were visited by research teams, and the answers to questions 1-8, and the number of responses from interviewees to the given question were analysed. The survey was answered by 60 people.

## QUESTIONS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. *What kind of tools are available in the vehicles of the emergency organizations?*

*on-board computer*

- voice communication device (TETRA, DMR, etc.)*
  - light bars and sirens*
  - on-board video recorders*
  - other devices (please list them)*
- .....

The respondents were marked without exception, so they are in the patrol vehicles, and they have to use it on every deployment – the voice communication devices (in this case the TETRA radio), 91.7% the lightbars and sirens, while 83.3% the on-board computers, 61.7% the on-board cameras and 10% other, in-vehicle systems. They listed to the other devices on-board terminals (called “IPT” in the vehicles of the National Ambulance Service), smartphones, if necessary, public address loudspeakers, and mobile reflectors. In addition, some police authorities listed bulletproof vests in the vehicle that became necessary during deployments, or the use of roadblocks, or occasional use of images from public surveillance cameras.




Figure 8: *Number of answers to question 1 (edited by the publisher)*

2. *How does it impact the distraction of driving the parallel use of the devices above during deployment? (Please indicate one possible answer)*

- highly*
- a little*
- not at all*

66.7% of respondents stated that operating in-vehicle technical devices is only a little distracting, 23.3% finds this workflow very straining, and 10% do not feel the burden of handling the tools at all.




Figure 9: Number of answers to question 2 (edited by the publisher)

3. Your organization will need in the future (Please indicate all the possible answers)

- easy implementation of local communication
- easy communication with central organizations
- easy access to the database of local and central organizations
- high speed data access at variable locations
- communication options between different communication networks and devices (eg: laptop, applications used by mobile devices, etc.)

76.7% of the experienced staff of the emergency organizations completing the questionnaire think that their organization would need high-speed data access. 60% lack communication tools and capabilities between different communication networks and devices, 46.7% consider it important to have easy access to the database of local and central organizations, while 28.3% vote to preparing easy to communicate with central organizations and only 20% think that the simple implementation of local communication could help their work the most.




Figure 10: Number of answers to question 3 (edited by the publisher)



4. Does your organization use mobile video solution? (Please indicate all the possible answers)

- we use a mobile camera system
- we use a camera system worn by the end user (body worn camera, camera mounted on a helmet, etc.)
- we use video analytics software
- we do not use a mobile camera system

65% of the surveyed said, that there is a camera system in the service vehicles of their organization and is used in their work. During the interview, we came to the conclusion that this was basically true for police vehicles.

35% of the respondents indicated in the questionnaire that they do not use video capture solution, 25% is the end user who uses a body camera or a helmet mounted camera. They also belong to the police. Only 10% of the interviewees use video analysis software during their work.




Figure 11: Number of answers to question 4 (edited by the publisher)

5. How important is real-time data access to your emergency organization? (Please indicate one possible answer)

- critical – data access has higher priority than voice communication
- very important – data access has the same priority as voice communication
- important – data access is important when there is no voice communication
- less important – data access can wait until colleagues return to the station

From 31 emergency organization staffs 60 respondents interviewed during the survey said that the real-time data access is very important, it has same priority as voice communication. 22 said that real-time access is only important when there is no voice communication; 5 people believe that real-time data access has higher priority than voice communication.

Just two participants thought that data access could wait until colleagues return to their place of service, so no data is required to be queried at the site during the deployment.




Figure 12: *The proportion of the answers to question 5 (edited by the publisher)*

6. Does your emergency organisation need data access during deployment? (Please indicate one possible answer)

- always*
- sometimes*
- never*

55% of respondents think that data access is required every time during deployment, the remaining 45% believe that this is necessary only sometimes.

(The question is related to the previous one, therefore there is some doubt to the answer given by those two persons to question 5, stating that data access can wait until colleagues return to the station.)




Figure 13: *Proportion of responses to question 6 (edited by the publisher)*

7. *What tools are used to access the data? (Please indicate all the possible answers)*

- an on-board pc*
  - portable devices (please list them)*
- .....

Based on 80% of the answers, data are accessed by a computer installed in the vehicle, 51.6% use portable device (TETRA, tablet, notebook, laptop or smartphone) to access data. Both replies could be marked, so there is an overlap in the number of responses.




Figure 14: *Number of answers to question 7 (edited by the publisher)*

8. *How is their organization protected against the security threat to their IT system? (Please indicate all the possible answers)*

- with the staff training*
- with daily safety audit*
- with antivirus software*
- using spam and phishing filters*
- with data encryption*
- with data access control*
- with firewall*
- I have no information*

According to the information provided by the respondents the segment examined is basically and primarily (85-85%) protected with firewall and antivirus software. This is followed by – with an almost equal percentage – the limitation and regulation of user data access (68%), education on IT security (63%), and use of spam and phishing filters (57%).

Data encryption, as a protection method was indicated on the fifth place, 48%.

The last form of defense of the imaginary ranking, daily security audits are rarely used by law enforcement and emergency services, only 12% of the respondents' answers mentions it.




Figure 15: Number of answers to question 8 (edited by the publisher)

## PERIPHERALS TO BE INTEGRATED IN THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, ACCORDING TO THE TREND

Vehicles used by the enforcement or emergency organizations are basically not equipped, and we can declare that assets, according to their basic features, minimally differ from each other.

The conclusion of the above is that it is enough to find this common set, for which the system to be developed has to be prepared. According to the previous results it can be stated that the focus of development has to be on the following devices:

- voice communication devices (TETRA, DMR or analogue PTT based devices)
- light bars and sirens
- on-board video recording devices
- automatic vehicle location
- on-board computers

## CONCLUSION

Complex systems used by domestic law enforcement and emergency organizations include digital or analog components of nearly the same purpose and operation. These increasingly sophisticated systems need to be handled by the operators in addition to their basic task. Beyond the listed tools, using additional tools during deployments is needed (body worn camera, bulletproof vest, mobile reflector, stinger, paper-based documentation, other law enforcement tools, etc.), which requires extra attention and focus from the employee.

During my research, I made sure that the use of mobile systems installed in a vehicle is particularly dangerous while driving. The solutions provided by the main manufacturers only manage the problem at the level of integration and do not provide a solution to the distracting components.

The results described in my publications can form the basis for the design and development of systems, which do not present additional workload on the user but effectively help their work.

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Lt Col Zsolt Végyvári:

## SUPERCAPACITORS AND THEIR MILITARY APPLICABILITY

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*ABSTRACT: There are several types of the electrical power devices that are hardly known outside professional circles. One of them is the supercapacitor, which is very interesting attributable to its capabilities. Given its parameters, it can be considered unique, thus, its use in some special equipment is indispensable. With the spread of electricity, there will be more and more military equipment in which currently there is no alternative to its use. It is therefore well worth learning a bit more about it.*

*KEYWORDS: capacitor, supercapacitor, electrical energy storage*

### SUMMARY OF CONVENTIONAL CAPACITORS AND THEIR FEATURES

Before starting to elaborate on supercapacitors, it is also worth reviewing the major features of traditional capacitors as these are more or less the same. Capacitors are electro-technical components that have been known for a long time. The first such device was the well-known Leyden jar. This was built by the German physicist, Ewald Georg von Kleist and the Dutch physicist working at the University of Leiden, Pieter van Musschenbroek independently from each other in 1745<sup>1</sup>. This was the first device with the help of which static electricity could be stored. Thus, this device can be considered to be the antecedent of all power storage devices. The ancestor of the modern capacitors, the paper capacitor had already appeared by the late 1800s. By the 20<sup>th</sup> century, capacitors had become an integral part of everyday life attributed to the revolutionary developments taking place in the fields of electro-technology, electronics and microelectronics. Although it is not widely known, hundreds of such devices can be found in an average household either in the form of discrete circuit elements or integrated into a circuit board. Before moving on, I enclose a brief overview of physical quantities and their units used in the present paper:

| Physical quantity | Symbol | SI unit     |
|-------------------|--------|-------------|
| voltage           | U      | Volt (V)    |
| electric current  | I      | Ampere (A)  |
| electric charge   | Q      | Coulomb (C) |

<sup>1</sup> Young, G. "Leyden jar". *Encyclopedia Britannica (online)*. 16 May 2013. <https://www.britannica.com/technology/Leyden-jar>, Accessed on 19 January 2018.

| Physical quantity | Symbol | SI unit                 |
|-------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| resistance        | R      | Ohm ( $\Omega$ )        |
| capacitance       | C      | Farad (F)               |
| energy            | W      | Joule (J)               |
| power             | P      | Watt (W)                |
| speed             | V      | meters per second (m/s) |
| mass              | M      | kilogram (kg)           |

The structure of the capacitor is rather simple as it consists of two electrical conductors, called plates and an insulating layer between them, called dielectric medium [2, p. 141]. If these plates are connected to direct voltage, they become charged, and the magnitude of the electric charges accumulated on the plates is proportional to the magnitude of voltage. The (DC) equation describing this goes as (1):  $Q=CU^2$  [2, p. 140], which clearly shows that capacitance<sup>3</sup> is the major feature of such devices, namely a sort of proportionality factor between voltage and the quantity of charge. The more charge it can take at lower and lower voltage, the higher the capacitance is. If this is examined in terms of geometrical design, the bigger the surface of the plates is and the closer these plates are located to one another without leakage (i.e. the better the dielectric constant (insulating capacity) of the insulating layer is), the higher the value of capacitance is. The magnitude of capacitance can be deduced from equation (1) (2):  $C=Q/U$  (2).

The capacity of conventional, the so-called 'dry' capacitors used in practical electronics is merely pF and nF ( $10^{-12}$  and  $10^{-9}$  Farad). Although it was patented in 1928<sup>4</sup>, it was not until the 1970s that electrolyte capacitors, in which one of the plates was a conductive liquid called electrolyte, began to spread. Owing to the electrolyte, these devices are polarized, so these can only be used in DC circuits, but in terms of magnitude their capacitance exceeds that of dry capacitors and falls in the  $\mu\text{F}$  range ( $10^{-6}$  or one millionth Farad). The current energy of the capacitors is (3):  $W = \frac{1}{2}CU^2$ , that is to say, high energy goes with high voltage and capacitance. This already hints at the fact that the magnitude of energy stored by the largest devices with the highest capacitance manufactured for electronic purposes is only a few Joule making them unsuitable for providing the energy needed for the amount of work done.

Although the complete model of real capacitors is more complex, it is sufficed to include the below simple model as we are analysing only DC energy conditions. This model will prove to be useful later on:




Figure 1: *The simplified DC energy model of a capacitor (by the author)*

<sup>2</sup> Gergely I. *Elektrotechnika*. Budapest: General Press, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> The applicable term is 'capacity', and the term 'capacitor' is derived from this.

<sup>4</sup> Dubilier, W. "Electric Condenser", US Patent no. 468787.

In the model, the symbol  $R_L$  represents the imperfection of the dielectric medium. If a charged capacitor is left alone leakage of charge occurs through the dielectric medium. The resulting leakage current  $I_L$  slowly discharges the capacitor. ESR symbolizes the loss of energy experienced in the case of the intended discharge of the battery or in the form of increased temperature upon charging.

## A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUPERCAPACITORS<sup>5</sup> AND THE PHYSICS BEHIND

First in the 1950s, General Electric was experimenting with porous carbon electrodes to develop traditional capacitors, batteries and fuel cells as the coiled surface of the carbon electrodes formed an extremely large surface, which proved to be highly beneficial in these devices. In a certain double-layer constellation, extraordinarily increased capacitance was detected. In 1957, a patent was also issued, but its true significance was not recognized at that time and the experiments were discontinued<sup>6</sup>. In 1966, Standard Oil of Ohio staff continued the work, and even though they wanted to develop fuel cells, they already realized the potential for energy storage lying in this technology<sup>6</sup>. Eventually, the first laboratory instruments appeared in the 1970s, but it was not until the turn of the millennium that the production technology reached the level which made the technology available for the general public.



Figure 2: A typical commercially available supercapacitor (Source: lerablog.org)

About 80-90% of the commercially available supercapacitors belong to the category of electrical double layer capacitors, i.e. EDLC<sup>7</sup>. The active carbon layer deposited on the electrodes and the electrolyte – given compact sizes – provide higher performance than the conventional capacitors do<sup>8</sup>. Later on, I will compare the supercapacitors and their direct rival technology, the batteries. It is important to note that in EDLCs charges are stored with the help of chemicals, but only in a physical way, and in contrast to the batteries, there are no chemical transformations involved. The reason why this has been pointed out is that in the case of other forms of supercapacitors, the so-called pseudo-capacitors, this distinction is no

<sup>5</sup> Besides the term ‘supercapacitor’, the terms ‘ultracapacitor’, ‘supercap’ and ‘goldcap’ are also used in the English language literature.

<sup>6</sup> Katsuhiko, N. and Simon, P. “New Materials and New Configurations for Advanced Electrochemical Capacitors”. *Electrochemical Society Interface* 17/1. 2008. 34-37.

<sup>7</sup> Electric Double Layer Capacitor

<sup>8</sup> Zhong, C. *Electrolytes for electrochemical supercapacitors*. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2016.



longer obvious. In this case, the redox<sup>9</sup> processes taking place on the surface of the carbon layer help bind charges<sup>8</sup>.

Some experts think that with the developments in the near future besides keeping the beneficial features of the supercapacitors, low self-discharge and high-power density properties of batteries can also be reached<sup>10</sup>. In this article, it would not be fortunate to make predictions in this respect, so I will only examine the currently available supercapacitor technology.




Figure 3: The structure of EDLC (Source: RS Components Hungary)

## A COMPARISON OF SUPERCAPACITORS AND BATTERIES

In order to be able to find the place of supercapacitors among the various modes of power storage, they need to be compared with the most common available technology, namely with batteries. As it has been mentioned above, chemical processes take place in batteries when charging or discharging<sup>11</sup>. These processes, however, are never 100% as electrodes wear out, the battery ages, and loses capacity during each and every charge-discharge cycle<sup>12</sup>. A battery can be regarded as depleted, if its capacity falls below 80% of the nominal value. This varies from one battery technology to another, but this generally occurs after 103 cycles. In contrast, the aging of capacitors based on physical processes is minimal, generally with a lifetime of at least 106 cycles. As opposed to physical processes, chemical processes are highly dependent on the temperature of the environment. It is a well-known fact that while the parameters of batteries deteriorate in line with the decrease of temperature, capacitors are

<sup>9</sup> Reduction – oxidation

<sup>10</sup> Guerra, M. "Can Supercapacitors Surpass Batteries for Energy Storage?" *Electronic Design*, 16 August 2016. <http://www.electronicdesign.com/power/can-supercapacitors-surpass-batteries-energy-storage>, Accessed on 22 January 2018.

<sup>11</sup> The dry battery is an electrochemical storage device, but as there is only one cycle, this technology cannot be regarded as a direct rival to supercapacitors.

<sup>12</sup> Végvári Zs. "Akkumulátorok a gyalogos lövészkatónák felszerelésében, a fejlesztés lehetséges irányai". *Műszaki Katonai Közlemény* 26/2. 2016. 85-101. [https://mkk.uni-nke.hu/document/mkk-uni-nke-hu/2016\\_2\\_007\\_Vegvari%20Zsolt.pdf](https://mkk.uni-nke.hu/document/mkk-uni-nke-hu/2016_2_007_Vegvari%20Zsolt.pdf)

significantly less susceptible to this, in the case of certain types the temperature/ capacitance graph is basically a straight line.

Despite the above-mentioned non-beneficial properties, the market of electric storage devices is still dominated by batteries. There are two reasons for this: one being that the energy density (i.e. the energy that can be stored in unit mass or volume) of batteries largely exceeds that of the supercapacitors, and the other being the self-discharge. To explain this, the model shown in Figure 1 should be invoked and applied to electrochemical storage devices. The magnitude of the leakage current in the case of batteries and supercapacitors follows a voltage-dependent and temperature-dependent curve, but while in the case of batteries it usually takes months for the charge to drop below 80%, in the case of supercapacitors it is usually a matter of hours<sup>13</sup>.

It is the dimension of power density (i.e. how much power it can deliver at a given moment) in which supercapacitors perform very well. To understand this, we need to look at the model in Figure 1 again. When charging and discharging, the device has a so-called internal resistance, in other words, equivalent serial resistance (ESR). This resistance needs to be overcome by the charging and discharging current. For batteries, this value is typically around 100mΩ, whereas for supercapacitors this value falls between 100μΩ and 1mΩ (for the time being let us calculate with the least beneficial value of 1mΩ). Let us suppose, that our devices (one battery and one supercapacitor) are charged to the same voltage value level (now let this be 2V) and discharged with 0.1, then 1, 10, and 100A.

Applying Ohm's law, the voltage on the internal resistance can be calculated as follows (4):  $U=IR$ , and the thermal dissipation on the resistance is (5):  $P=IU$ . If relation (4) is inserted into the latter, one ends up having the relation (6):  $P=I^2R$ . If the generated heat output is entered into a table, the below can be seen:

Table 1: *Thermal dissipation at various discharging currents in a battery and in an EDLC (by the author)*

|         | ESR   | Current                | 0,1A | 1A    | 10A   | 100A |
|---------|-------|------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|
| Battery | 100mΩ | Thermal<br>Dissipation | 1mW  | 100mW | 1W    | 1kW  |
| EDLC    | 1mΩ   |                        | 10μW | 1mW   | 100mW | 10W  |

It is even more interesting, if one takes a look at how much voltage out of the nominal voltage of 2V falls on the internal resistance and the load:

Table 2: *Voltage on internal resistance at various discharging currents in a battery and in an EDLC (by the author)*

|         | ESR   | Current           | 0,1A  | 1A    | 10A  | 100A  |
|---------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| Battery | 100mΩ | Voltage at<br>ESR | 10mV  | 100mV | 1V   | –     |
| EDLC    | 1mΩ   |                   | 100μV | 1mV   | 10mV | 100mV |

It can be clearly seen that if higher performance is required from the device, the battery starts to warm up drastically, and less and less voltage is delivered to the load. In this case, 100A cannot be obtained from the 2V cell, whereas the supercapacitor – besides tolerable

<sup>13</sup> Yu, A., Chabot, V. and Zhang, J. *Electrochemical supercapacitors for energy storage and delivery: fundamentals and applications*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013.

loss of heat – can still supply the load with 1.9V. It is also true that the battery under 1A constantly maintains 1.9V until total discharge while the voltage of the supercapacitor continuously decreases.

What if we want to charge our devices? The faster we want to charge a device, the bigger charging current we use. While in the case of the battery voltage higher than the nominal value has to be switched on due to the big internal resistance, the supercapacitor can practically be charged with the nominal voltage. The increase of charging current and that of the voltage are hindered by the fact that the high temperature generated by dissipation damages the device. As a result, charging batteries is a quite time-consuming process.

The chargeability of the supercapacitor is hardly limited by dissipation, due to meagre internal resistance one can expect a linear charging curve, and the following formula can be applied: (7):  $I=C*dU/dt$  [8, p. 284]. Assuming that our supercapacitor is 100 Farad and is charged with 10A, its voltage increases by 100 mV per second, thus it can be charged within 20 seconds. If 100A charging current is applied, the duration of charging is altogether 2 seconds.

Table 3: *A comparative overview of basic battery and EDLC technologies (by the author)*

| Equipment |                              | Cubage-related Energy Density | Mass-related Energy Density | Power Density | Temperature Dependency | Life-time   | Self-discharge   |
|-----------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|------------------------|---|------------------|
| Battery   | Pb acid                      | 100-150 kJ/l                  | 90-100 kJ/kg                | 150-200 W/kg  | significant            | 500 cycles  | 4-6% per month   |
|           | NiCd, NiMH                   | 500-1000 kJ/l                 | 30-500 kJ/kg                | 200-1000 W/kg | very strong            | 1-2000 cycles   | 20-30% per month |
|           | Li-ion                       | 2000-2500 kJ/l                | 800-1000 kJ/kg              | 300-350 W/kg  | very strong            | 500-1500 cycles                                       | 2-3% per month   |
|           | LiFePO <sub>4</sub>          | 6-700 kJ/l                    | 3-400 kJ/kg                 | 150-200 W/kg  | significant            | 2-4000 cycles   | 3-4% per month   |
| EDLC      | porous graphene              | 5-700 kJ/l                    | 30-40 kJ/kg                 | 10-15 kW/kg   | minimal                | 10 <sup>5</sup> -10 <sup>6</sup> cycles <sup>14</sup> | 5-25% per hour   |
|           | graphite-oxide <sup>15</sup> | 800-1000 kJ/l                 | 40-50 kJ/kg                 | 15-20 kW/kg   |                        |   |                  |

## MILITARY APPLICABILITY OF SUPERCAPACITORS

It can be stated that batteries are preferably to be used under circumstances where there is no possibility for charging, and besides this, in fields where it is important to store energy given the smaller mass and volume. Military applications of batteries include radio appliances, lamps or most electricity powered devices and equipment.

<sup>14</sup> Since one million cycles are difficult to interpret, and due to the short duration of cycles their use is basically constant, the duration of supercapacitors is usually given in hours, which is minimum 10,000 hours.

<sup>15</sup> The term is used in an abbreviated form, the complete name of the technology is activated microwave exfoliated graphite oxide (a-MEGO)/1-ethyl-3-methylimidazolium bis(trifluoromethylsulfonyl)imide.

Where to use supercapacitors then? In applications where the charge can more or less be maintained continuously, but at times we want to obtain enormous amounts of energy impulsively in a very short period of time. Today, in cutting edge (sometimes pilot) systems these areas of application already exist. Although it is not widely known, supercapacitors have already set their feet in military technology. Let us take a look at these systems.

## 1. Laser weapons

Laser weapons no longer exist only in science fiction. The United States, Russia and presumably China have systems with which enemy aircraft, ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles are destroyed with a laser beam<sup>16</sup>. It is apparent that the energy needed is generated by a generator rotated by the engine of the aircraft or that of the ship, but how the energy is transmitted to the weapon. In the case of a fast-moving distant target (i.e. an aircraft, not to mention a missile), it is not possible to hold the laser beam on the target, therefore, the energy that can destroy the target must be delivered in the form of single radiation that occurs in some milliseconds. Such type of ‘firing’ laser, which does not only disrupt the navigation of the target but it also destroys it, presupposes approximately 10-100kW impulse performance. Currently, only supercapacitors are capable of accumulating electric power for a few seconds and delivering it in a matter of milliseconds.



Figure 4: *USS Portland belonging to San Antonio-class will certainly be equipped with the laser (shown in the picture) developed against sea skimming anti-ship missiles<sup>17</sup>*

<sup>16</sup> Ványa L. *Irányított energiájú fegyverek*. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2013.

<sup>17</sup> Insinna, V. “US Navy’s next amphibious warship to get laser weapon”, *Defense News*, 10 January 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2018/01/10/navys-next-amphibious-warship-to-get-laser-weapon/>, Accessed on 20 January 2018.

## 2. Electromagnetically accelerated projectiles, i.e. railgun

The situation with the railgun is similar. What makes this weapon interesting is that while the laser proves to be efficient against flying objects (most of the aircrafts and the missiles are not armoured, in addition, minor damage can entirely cripple a fast-moving object), railgun is efficient against bunkers and tanks. The kinetic energy of the 12.7 kg projectile hitting the target at multiple sound speed corresponds to the impact of several kilograms of TNT<sup>18</sup>.

“The introduction of the railgun was postponed in the last minute supposedly due to financial reasons, but based on the current state of the weapon, it is already deployable and commensurate to similar-purpose conventional ship cannons in efficiency. On the basis of the published results, the ready-made railgun is capable of launching 10 HVP type projectiles per minute at an approximate 7.5 times the sound speed (7.5 Mach). This means nearly 40 MJ of muzzle energy for which – ignoring the losses – a capacitor capable of delivering minimum of 200MW electrical power is needed. Taking the planned firing speed into consideration, one charging cycle takes 5-6 seconds, and the required 40-50MW power demand puts an immense burden on the electrical system of the carrying platform. By comparison, if all electrical appliances of an average household are simultaneously switched on, only 4-6 kW is required meaning that the power demand of the railgun commensurate with that of a small town”<sup>19</sup>.




Figure 5: *One of the first test shootings of the Railgun (Bae Systems)*

<sup>18</sup> Végvári Zs. “Elektromágnesesen gyorsított lövedékek a tüzérség eszköztárában, A Bae Systems EM railgun-ja. 1. rész”. *Haditechnika* 51/1. 2017. 28-31. DOI: 10.23713/ht.51.1.06

<sup>19</sup> Végvári Zs. “Elektromágnesesen gyorsított lövedékek a tüzérség eszköztárában, A Bae Systems EM railgun-ja. 2. rész”. *Haditechnika* 51/2. 2017. 18-22. DOI: 10.23713/ht.51.2.04

### 3. Catapults of aircraft carriers

Experts from the few countries deploying aircraft carriers have been long waiting for the introduction of the electromagnetic catapult because the currently used steam catapult has many weaknesses. The steam powered catapult is very big in size, rather heavy, and a very complicated system. For seawater is an extremely aggressive corrosion agent, the necessary steam is developed from desalinated water, and desalination is a very energy-intensive process. The system is supplied with the steam from the turbines, thus there is no need for heating a separate boiler, but constant level of pressure must be maintained in the system to ensure preparedness, moreover, between two launches it takes quite a lot of time for the system to reach the proper level of steam pressure again. Power needed for the aircraft of various weights can only be roughly controlled, and the enormous pulling force puts a big strain on the structure of the aircrafts. In addition to this, the high-pressure hot steam runs the high risk of causing accidents, plus the system also has high maintenance needs<sup>20</sup>.

The latest super aircraft carrier of the United States, the USS Gerald Ford (CVN-78), currently undertaking its sea trials, is equipped with electromagnetic launch units or systems (EMALU or EMALS<sup>21</sup>) replacing the steam catapult. Despite the many initial problems, in principle, these are free of the shortcomings of the steam catapult. Here, the energy needed for the launch is stored kinetically in huge rotating rotors. It is obvious that research and development will be focused on the possible substitution of mechanical parts with high space and maintenance needs<sup>22</sup>.



Figure 6: USS Gerard Ford with EMALS (General Atomics)

<sup>20</sup> Allamadani, R. and Chen, F. “Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching Unit (EMALU)”. Presentation. ASEE 2014 Zone, Bridgeport, 2014.

<sup>21</sup> Electromagnetic Launch Unit/System

<sup>22</sup> Yu, Chabot and Zhang. *Electrochemical supercapacitors for energy storage and delivery...*

## 4. Vehicle drive train

More and more experts are dealing with hybrid and purely electricity driven vehicles. At the current level of technology, only batteries can store the energy needed in such vehicles, but supercapacitors can improve a few parameters of the system. As it has been pointed out earlier, at a higher load the loss of batteries significantly grows, thus, in theory a supercapacitor functioning as a buffer can have beneficial effects on the efficiency of the system<sup>23</sup>.

As the energy density and power density of the batteries deteriorate at low temperatures, a buffer supercapacitor would provide the starting current needed for the cold-start of a conventional diesel engine. The so-called hybrid batteries produced for such purposes are currently available<sup>24</sup>.



Figure 7: *The well-proven Oshkosh HEMTT is also available with electric drive (TruckTrend)*

The American Oshkosh Corporation known for its military vehicles went even further. The newest, electricity powered version of the HEMTT<sup>25</sup> military vehicle – first produced 35 years ago – has been available in its product range since 2011. HEMTT A3 is equipped with a 470LE Cummins diesel engine, which does not only drive the wheels but it also drives a 340kW generator which constantly charges a series of supercapacitors of 1.9 MJ nominal capacitance, and drives four AC engines of 480V (one per each axle) through an inverter<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Mihalczuk, M., Grzesiak, L. M. and Ufnalski, B. "A lithium battery and ultracapacitor hybrid energy source for an urban electric vehicle". *Przegląd Elektrotechniczny* 88/4. 2012. 158-162.

<sup>24</sup> "Maxwell Technologies Engine Starting Module". Maxwell Technologies. <http://www.maxwell.com/esm/default.aspx>, Accessed on 22 January 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

<sup>26</sup> Thompson, J. "The Diesel-Electric Hybrid HEMTT A3 Lean by OSHKOSH – Diesel Power Magazine". *Truck Trend*. 1 July 2011. <http://www.trucktrend.com/cool-trucks/1107dp-diesel-electric-hybrid-hemtt-oskosh-a3/>, Accessed on 28 November 2017.

Oshkosh claims that the ProPulse version consumes 20% less fuel than the diesel driven version with the same capacity, but this is not the most remarkable novelty of the system. With the help of the supercapacitor, the ProPulse is suitable for supplying military facilities, communication stations, military medical units, etc. with medium-level consumption needs, but it is also capable of launching a 120kW electric power-impulse making it an ideal platform for radars, land-based laser or railgun weapon systems.




Figure 8: The structure of HEMTT ProPulse (A – generator, B – diesel engine, C – supercapacitors, D – AC engines, TruckTrend)

## CONCLUSION

Today it is not always the military research and development that represents the leading edge of innovation. It is sufficed to take the smart devices, IoT, or electromobility as an example. Society's ever-growing demand for electric power and desire for mobility are a lot stronger than the demand of the armies. As a consequence, one of the most intensely researched fields of science has been the storage of electric power. Everyone wants to have a storage device, which has properties such as huge capacity, high power output and increased resistance to the cold. At this moment, it cannot be foreseen if there will be batteries capable of power output similar to that of supercapacitors, or there will be supercapacitors with higher capacity and with the ability of staying charged for months. Hybrid batteries may spread. It is certain that supercapacitors are already here, and other technologies are not suitable for meeting special military needs at the moment. In all likelihood, supercapacitors will be more frequently used in the armed forces in the future.



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Lt Col Sándor Farkas:

## THE ROLE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.4

*ABSTRACT: The establishment of a safe, secure and predictable environment combined with a capable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way for COIN forces to permanently isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support. This can only be achieved through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled and proficient security forces and by administrative, economic, social development.*

*KEYWORDS: asymmetric, insurgency, COIN, innovation, critical infrastructure, normative system*

### INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of written history there have been numerous conflicts and small wars that were not waged between two states, but between a state and a non-state actor. Since in many cases there were huge inequalities between the belligerents' relative military and combat power, the warring parties were forced to use significantly different tactics and strategies to defeat their opponents thus as an outcome these conflicts were asymmetric in nature. If we take a good look at the proportion of symmetric and asymmetric wars of all armed struggles in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and in the first seventeen years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we can clearly identify that most of the conflicts were asymmetric (Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria).<sup>1</sup> By analysing the asymmetric conflicts throughout the last 200 years, the following tendency can be seen. For the entire 200 years, it can be stated that 70.8 percent of the asymmetric conflicts were won by the stronger (the state) warring party. But by dividing the era into 50-year intervals the result is a lot more diversified. Between 1800 and 1849 88.2 percent, between 1850 and 1899 79.5 percent during the 1900-1949 period 65.1 percent and between 1950 and 1998 only 45 percent of the asymmetric conflicts were won by the stronger party.<sup>2</sup>

Based on the above analysis it can be unambiguously stated that the closer we are to our present day, the less successful the stronger party has become in achieving its' strategic goals and the more successful the weaker party has been in asymmetric conflicts. The decreasing

<sup>1</sup> Read, D. "Airpower in COIN: Can Airpower Make a Significant Contribution to Counter-Insurgency?". *Defence Studies* 10/1-2. 2010. 126. DOI: 10.1080/14702430903392828, Accessed on 20 December 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Arreguin-Toft, I. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict". *International Security* 26/1. 2001. 96-97. <https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001.pdf>, Accessed on 04 January 2018.

success of the nation states is what makes it extremely substantial to draw the attention of politicians, military leaders, and scholars to this type of armed struggles. Therefore, military leaders and scholars must constantly analyse these asymmetric conflicts, to draw new conclusions, and to come up with new ideas and theories how regular armies combined with special operation forces and civilian advisors can efficiently combat this irregular enemy.

There are many theories, books and even military doctrines written about how our military power should be used to defeat an enemy that uses insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla methods as their primary tactics. The leading doctrine for the US Military Forces on how to operate against an insurgent force – the *2007 United States Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency* – whose making was coordinated and overlooked by General David Petraeus and David Kilcullen mentions two different types of approach to defeating insurgencies. With the enemy-focused approach, which mainly concentrates on hunting down the insurgents, COIN<sup>3</sup> forces are not able to accomplish their assigned tasks most of the time. Instead of killing the enemy the focus should rather be on isolating the insurgents from the population and on improving their living standards. In opposition to Maslow's hierarchy of needs – which states that the most important necessities for mankind are the physiological needs – in COIN operations the emphasis should rather be focused primarily on the security of society.




Figure 1: *Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs*<sup>4</sup>

Foremost the security of the populace must be guaranteed and only after that – or parallel with it – can the emphasis be put on the development of critical infrastructures such as healthcare, road-system, public utility, communication systems and good governance which is free from corruption.

<sup>3</sup> Counter Insurgency

<sup>4</sup> "Needs for Lifestages". <http://needsforlifestagesmhs.weebly.com/maslows-pyramid4.html>, Accessed on 24 January 2018.

## SOME VERY SHORT CASE-STUDIES

On September 10, 2009, a patrol was sent out from the American-led Jalalabad<sup>5</sup> PRT<sup>6</sup> in Dara-i-Nur District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan to handover a hydro plant to the locals in a remote area of the district. On the way, back from the ceremony the US convoy was ambushed by RPGs<sup>7</sup> and small arms fire. It did not require a great effort from the attackers to choose the location of the ambush since the Afghan hills and the sparse road network made the movements of the Americans predictable and forced them to use the exact same road whenever they wanted to get to and from their base to this part of the district. Still, the site of the attack did not help the accomplishment of a successful ambush, because it was too far from the road for the RPGs and for the machine guns to lay down an effective fire on the MRAPs<sup>8</sup> or on the dismounting soldiers. The execution of the attack was also half-hearted and lacked professionalism because the attackers did not make serious effort to block the road or to blow up the bridge to halt the American convoy. They chose firing positions on the forward slope of the mountain making their own withdrawal nearly impossible and giving away their own positions by the dirt that the RPGs kicked off by firing them. Most of the soldiers travelling in the convoy and their military leaders believed that the Taliban was responsible for conducting the attack, but deeper analysis revealed that this was not the case.

Dara-i-Nur district, where the ambush took place has never been supportive towards the Taliban not even during the era when they were in power throughout the country. Furthermore, no Taliban activity had ever been reported or observed by any coalition, allied or local forces and indigenous inhabitants in the region before this attack happened. This district is inhabited mainly by Pashai people who are not supporters of the central government<sup>9</sup> but they do not provide support for the Taliban either, which is mainly Pashtun. Locals did not tolerate outsiders in their area and it was almost impossible to for the Taliban to operate in this region without the knowledge of the locals. It would have not made any sense either for the Taliban to insert some forces to the region since there were only a couple of weeks left until winter season arrived which would have locked them in this zone isolated from their base areas or safe havens in Pakistan. In conclusion, all the evidence collected and analysed by the investigators suggested that the ambush was not conducted by the Taliban so they turned their attention towards the mission that the PRT personnel were conducting that day.

The main objective of the mission was to hold a handover ceremony where the engineers and US military personnel from the Jalalabad PRT would officially put in operation a hydro plant which could provide electricity for half of the village. The intent of this construction was not only to improve the living standard of the locals but also to give them work opportunity on the construction site with which the goal was to provide alternative revenue streams to farmers other than growing and selling poppy. Next to the hydro plant another

<sup>5</sup> Capital of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan

<sup>6</sup> Provincial Reconstruction Team – the first PRT emerged in an ad hoc way but a couple years later PRTs were common throughout Afghanistan and they were all part of a multinational reconstruction effort. PRTs included civilian and military specialists responsible for providing guidance for the provincial leaders in order to facilitate nation building and economic growth and good governance.

<sup>7</sup> Rocket Propelled Grenade

<sup>8</sup> Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles

<sup>9</sup> Almost no tribes or inhabitants of any districts were supportive to the central government this deep in the country. Most of the time these tribes lived separated from all other tribes and they only wanted and still just want to be left alone.

project – the building of a slaughterhouse – was also ongoing further increasing the living standard and job opportunities of the local inhabitants. Neither of these projects were done in the central area of the province but in a peripheral zone and the attack did not happen near the construction sites. Since the ambush site was close to the district centre and tactically it was not performed in a professional manner made the analysts think that the attack was not conducted by a well-organized insurgent force like the Taliban but rather by local inhabitants unsatisfied with the fact that a certain part of their province gets infrastructures that improve the living standards of the nearby populace while leaving the central area of the province completely out of the development process.<sup>10</sup>

A similar incident happened in Helmand province where the security guards of a road construction were attacked and killed by locals just because the constructors did not consult them whether they needed the road or not and because they did not hire local workers and security personnel from the surrounding villages but they got the job done by foreign workers. Besides there was a Taliban opposition to the construction of the road too since developed road systems and well-maintained high-speed avenues of approaches make it easier for bigger armies to manoeuvre and by this, roads make defeating insurgency and governing a lot easier. So, insurgents and locals had a common interest in this case which made them cooperate to stop the construction.<sup>11</sup>

A third incident to underline my point happened in Wanat where a US PRT intended to build a road into a valley. This valley was a traditional buffer zone between two hostile population groups the Nuristanis and Safi Pashtuns. In this case the locals and the Taliban also had a shared interest since the locals did not want the road to be built because it kept them isolated from their historical enemies and helped them keep their autonomy from the central government while the Taliban opposed this avenue because it would have brought ANA<sup>12</sup> and US troops in striking distance to their major infiltration routes to and from their bases.<sup>13</sup>

From the above-mentioned examples, it can be stated that critical infrastructures or the lack of critical infrastructures may have a significant role in COIN operations. On the one hand, for a weakened or not yet properly operating central government – with the primary mission of nation building – or for an occupying force the creation and maintenance of systems like a well-maintained road network, healthcare, public utility, communication systems and corruption free governance are vital to win the support of the population. On the other hand, for an insurgent group opposing the power of the central government the destruction or the prevention of improving these systems may go hand in hand with success. As in Helmand province and in the city of Wanat the Taliban did not want the roads to be built because they would have made high speed avenues of approaches for highly mobile mechanized government units with enormous firepower which would or could have resulted in catastrophic consequences for the insurgents. By the government being able to send and successfully use extremely mobile forces in great number, the freedom of movement and the capability to execute attacks would have been seriously limited for the insurgents. It is also not favourable for rebellious forces to let COIN forces build any other kind of infrastructures – such as hydro plants – because as the government improves the living standard of the population the inhabitants would slowly but

<sup>10</sup> Kilcullen, D. *Out of the Mountains, The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 3-10.

<sup>11</sup> Kilcullen. *Out of the Mountains*. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup> Afghan National Army

<sup>13</sup> Kilcullen. *Out of the Mountains*. 11-12.

surely turn away from the guerrilla forces. The long-term objective for the government or the COIN forces is to assume full responsibility and accountability for the vital services.

From the inductions derived from the Jalalabad, Helmand and Wanat examples it can be stated that the defeat of an insurgency does not always primarily depend on the number of insurgents killed in kinetic direct actions but also on how the government or COIN forces can improve the living conditions of the population.

## “A REVOLUTIONARY WAR IS 20 PERCENT MILITARY ACTION AND 80 PERCENT POLITICAL!”<sup>14</sup>

There are two main kinds of approaches to counterinsurgency operations. One – which by most of the field manuals, essays, and books is referred to as the enemy-centric counterinsurgency approach – puts the focus on the elimination or killing of hostile guerrilla forces. The other – and in most of the cases the more effective way of fighting insurgency – is a more indirect method which is usually referred to as the population-centric approach.

The primary goal of every COIN force is to make an area – which may be part of a country, or even an entire county – free of insurgents. If a COIN force has a sufficient number of troops, then it is a relatively easy task to drive away, kill or capture the key leaders, the hardliners, and the fighting elements or cells of an insurgent movement. The challenge has always been in keeping the cleared area free of insurgents and in preventing the guerrillas from re-infiltrating, so that COIN forces may move to other areas – or in case of a third party to withdraw to their own countries – and to hand over security tasks to local police forces.

With the enemy-centric approach where COIN forces focus almost exclusively on killing guerrillas, the goal of keeping an area free of insurgents permanently is almost unachievable.<sup>15</sup> It is not feasible because while it is relatively easy to disperse and to expel insurgent forces from a certain zone, it is almost impossible to destroy their political organizations and their ideology and to rally the bulk of the population by purely military actions.<sup>16</sup> Political organizations may be temporarily destroyed by intensive police actions, but it is still impossible to prevent the return of the guerrillas and to prevent them from re-establishing their political parties unless the population cooperates with and provides support to the COIN forces. If most of the population sponsors and assists the insurgents it is preposterous for COIN forces to believe in success. Therefore, guerrilla forces focus on obtaining and keeping the support of the populace by either coercive or non-coercive means. As Mao Zedong said guerrillas cannot operate without the help of the population:

It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, the focus should be on draining the sea,<sup>18</sup> which means that the main objective for COIN forces – just as well as for insurgents – should be the population. This

<sup>15</sup> Resperger, I., Kiss, Á. and Somkuti, B. *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2013. 225-226.

<sup>16</sup> Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. 52

<sup>17</sup> Zedong, M. “The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare”. In Zedong, M.: *On guerrilla warfare*. Maoist Documentation Project, Mao Tse-tung Reference Archive, 2000. <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm>, Accessed on 23 March 2018.

<sup>18</sup> Zagorski, P. W. and Harmon, S. A. “The War on Terror: Separating the (Star) Fish from the Sea”. *Freedom From Fear Magazine*, issue 5. <http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=419>, Accessed on 22 March 2018.

objective can only be accomplished through the population-centric counterinsurgency approach which puts the emphasis mainly on the protection of the population and on the fulfilment of their necessities. The easiest way to describe the basic needs of the commonwealth is through critical infrastructures – the existence of an operable healthcare, road-network, public utility, and communication system and a corruption free governance is vital to win the support of the populace. But even if the most advanced infrastructure system is run in a certain area, even if the inhabitants live in an outstandingly developed milieu, the most important aspect of meeting the needs of the population is a safe, secure and predictable environment. Progress in building support for the host nation government requires protecting the populace. Thus, an effective political and economic action on the population must be preceded by military, secret service and police operations against the guerrilla units. If the population is not convinced that COIN forces have the will and the capabilities to defeat the insurgency, counterinsurgent forces will not be able to win the support of the populace. People who do not believe that they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts.<sup>19</sup> A permanent victory can only be achieved through the physical (military, police actions) and the psychological (counter propaganda, development of key infrastructures) isolation of the insurgents from the population and by addressing and eliminating the root causes of the insurgency. Military and police forces can compel obedience and secure areas, however, they cannot by themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Thus, COIN operations should combine offensive, defensive and stability operations to achieve a stable and secure environment needed for essential governance, essential services, and economic development.<sup>20</sup>




Figure 2: *Essential services and their objectives*<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> “Counterinsurgency”. Headquarters Department of the Army. December 2006. 5-20. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>, Accessed on 16 December 2017.

<sup>20</sup> “Counterinsurgency”. 5-2.

<sup>21</sup> “Counterinsurgency”. 5-15.

## “POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN”<sup>22</sup> ... BUT!

Most of the time there are several groups who contest for the control of a community. Even when we talk about the different parties in democratic states trying to win the elections, or about warlords, guerrillas or insurgents fighting against each other or against the central government, there is always one thing that is common. It is almost never just one party, one group, band, gang or any kind of non-state actor struggling to gain the upper hand over a certain part of the population, but several or at least two. That armed actor that the populace sees as the most competent to establish a resilient normative system<sup>23</sup> by which this actor can provide security, project full-spectrum control over violence, control, conduct or even improve economic activities is most likely to prevail in gaining control.<sup>24</sup> In other words, this means that whoever sets up rules that is correlated with a set of consequences with which the group can maintain a resilient system of control that gives people the sense of security, and a predictable and safe environment, is going to gain the support of the population. The emphasis here is on the “*resilient, full-spectrum control*”.<sup>25</sup> Though for the groups fighting to gain the control over a certain populace being armed is critical, indispensable, and a priority it is not a sufficient characteristic. A very good example of it is Iraq in 2006-2007. Al Qa’eda in Iraq could enforce their will on a large number of inhabitants only by coercive means, but it did not prove to be long-standing. As soon as the Coalition Forces increased their presence in the insurgent-ruled area and the inhabitants realized that the foreign forces could protect them from the atrocities committed by the insurgents, moreover, they even provided social justice, work opportunities, a running healthcare, school and a workable public utility system they turned their back on Al Qa’eda in Iraq and started supporting the Coalition Forces. During this period the number of Al Qa’eda fighters and followers dropped significantly and the organization almost ceased to exist. This was the case up until the President of the United States publicly announced that he was going to withdraw forces from Iraq. From that point on the locals knew, that the most competent group that would stay permanently in their region is Al Qa’eda in Iraq, which resulted in the loss of support for the Coalition Forces and slowly but surely helped the evolution of the Islamic State. In conclusion, it can be stated that every time when different groups struggle for the control over the population the actor that creates a better normative system of competitive control is likely to dominate the target audience.<sup>26</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Military doctrines, books and articles written about counterinsurgency mention two different types of method to fight against insurgents. The one which puts the emphasis primarily on killing the enemy and does not deal with the securement and the improvement of living standards of the population is usually not as effective as the population-centric counterinsurgency approach. The later tactic stresses the importance of meeting the basic and essential

<sup>23</sup> Alchourron, C. and Bulygin, E. *Normative Systems*. New York: Springer Verlag, 1971. 53-59.

<sup>24</sup> Kilcullen, D. *Counterinsurgency*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 152-154.

<sup>25</sup> Kilcullen. *Counterinsurgency*. 152.

<sup>26</sup> Kilcullen. *Out of the Mountains*. 133.



necessities that individuals and communities need and which has long been identified in Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

The establishment of a safe, secure, and predictable environment combined with a capable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way to permanently isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support. This can only be achieved through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled and proficient security forces and by administrative, economic, social development.

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2<sup>nd</sup> Lt Zsófia Rázsó, Cpt Attila Novák, Maj Beatrix Hornyák:

## EXAMINATION OF THE PHASES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE AMONG PARTICIPANTS OF THE LIFESTYLE CHANGE PROGRAMME

DOI: 10.35926/HDR.2019.1-2.5

*ABSTRACT: Developing and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is an important and up-to-date topic for the Hungarian Defence Forces, too. A health-conscious lifestyle, which helps achieve the mental and physical well-being of the soldiers of the Hungarian Defence Forces and increases their deployability, may be adopted with the help of intervention programmes focusing on lifestyle change. The Hungarian Defence Forces Body Composition Programme (hereinafter referred to as HDF BCP) was introduced in 2015 in accordance with the above. According to Article 12 of Decree No. 10/2015 (VII.30.) of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence on medical, mental and physical fitness for military service and on the review procedure,<sup>1</sup> a soldier who has different parameters than the physical recommendation must be offered a participation in the HDF BCP. Based on the starting body weight and body fat percentage of the soldier, a weight loss schedule is determined which is to be met every three months during a 12-month period. Within the framework of the Programme, this study examined the distribution of participants of the Programme according to the stages of the behavioural change process, on which the transtheoretical model (TTM) was based. According to the results of the literature, the effectiveness of the lifestyle change programs and the possible number of dropouts are greatly influenced by the stage of change in which participants are.*

*KEYWORDS: behaviour, health, Hungarian Defence Forces Body Composition Programme, lifestyle*

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

By examining the process of behaviour change, we sought an answer to the question of how, through what processes, health-damaging behaviour is quit and new behaviour is developed.<sup>2</sup>

Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross developed their transtheoretical model of behaviour change, which describes intentional behaviour change and was first used in the treatment of addicts, by integrating several cognitive and behaviour models, and pointed to the possible ways of acquiring positive behaviour.<sup>3</sup> The model can demonstrate the processes that take place in the behaviour of an individual and can assign individuals to one of its stages. Practically, it can

<sup>2</sup> Urbán, R. *Az egészségpszichológia alapjai*. Budapest: ELTE, Eötvös Kiadó, 2017. 325.

<sup>3</sup> Czeglédi E. "A viselkedésváltozás tranzsteoretikus modelljének alkalmazási lehetőségei az elhízás kezelésében". *Mentálhigiéne és Pszichoszomatika* 13/4. 2012. 411-434. DOI: 10.1556/Mental.13.2012.4.4

be adapted to any disease or lifestyle change, making step-by-step communication easier and revealing information about emerging problems, e.g. on what level a person got stuck.<sup>4</sup>

There is no “royal path” in the field of efficient weight loss intervention, either. Certain methods are very efficient for some obese individuals, whereas they are less efficient, or are even inefficient, for others. The reason for this, as Teixeira, Going, Sardinha and Lohman argue, is that the success of weight loss treatment depends on the characteristics of the treatment and of the given individual, as well as on the interaction of these two. Patients starting lifestyle-changing therapies and weight loss treatments, and changing their physical activities, without being ready for the multiple changes that are required for an efficient lifestyle change affecting several areas of their life may play a role in their dropout.<sup>5</sup>

## PRESENTATION OF THE TRANSTHEORETICAL MODEL OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (TTM)

The transtheoretical model of behaviour change (one that spans several theories) was originally introduced as an integration of the theories and concepts of clinical psychology to understand the process of change.<sup>6, 7, 8</sup>

TTM is an integrative model of behaviour change which encompasses process-oriented variables to explain and predict when and how persons change their behaviour.<sup>9</sup> They thought a model was needed which could be applied to the entire population, not only to those who are motivated to lose weight.

## STAGES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE

The stages of behaviour change have already been described in detail.<sup>10</sup>

### 1. Precontemplation

People in this stage do not intend to change their physical activity, to lose weight, or to control their weight, in the foreseeable future (in the next six months). The absence or inadequacy of information about the unfavourable consequences of overweight may play a role in the fact that people who lead an unhealthy lifestyle, and overweight people, do not see their excess weight as a problem. Previous, failed weight-loss attempts may also

<sup>4</sup> Prochaska, J. O., DiClemente, C.C. and Norcross, J.C. “In search of how people change: Applications to addictive behaviors”. *American Psychologist* 47/9. 1992. 1102-1114.

<sup>5</sup> Teixeira P.J., Going S.B., Sardinha L. B. and Lohman T.G. “A review of psychosocial pre-treatment predictors of weight control”. *Obesity Reviews* 6/1. 2005. 43–65. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-789X.2005.00166.x

<sup>6</sup> Prochaska, J. O. and DiClemente, C.C. “Transtheoretical therapy: Toward a more integrative model of change”. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice* 19/3. 1982. 283.

<sup>7</sup> Prochaska, J. O., DiClemente, C.C. and Norcross, J.C. “In search of how people change: Applications to addictive behaviors”. *American Psychologist* 47/9 1992. 1105.

<sup>8</sup> Prochaska, J. O., Norcross, J.C. and DiClemente, C.C. *Valódi újrakezdés. Hatlépcsős program ártalmas szokásaink leküzdésére és életünk jobbá tételére*. Budapest: Ursus Libris, 2009. 98.

<sup>9</sup> Johnson, S.S. et al. “Transtheoretical model-based multiple behavior intervention for weight management: Effectiveness on a population basis”. *Preventive Medicine* 46/3. 2008. 238-246. DOI: 10.1016/j.ypmed.2007.09.010

<sup>10</sup> Prochaska, J. O. and Prochaska, J.M. “Behavior change”. In D. B. Nash, J. Reifsnnyder, R. J. Fabius and V. P. Pracilio (eds.), *Population health: Creating a culture of wellness*. Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett, 2011, 25.

discourage individuals and undermine their faith in their ability to change. People in this stage are not ready for traditional health promotion programmes; these just do not work for them.

## 2. Contemplation

Although people in the contemplation stage do not make any effort to lead an active lifestyle change or lose weight, they seriously contemplate starting it in the next six months. They are more aware of arguments for health promotion but arguments against change are also present to the same extent. The balance of advantages and disadvantages, which results in ambivalence, leads to the fact that overweight people who avoid physical activities stay in this stage for a long time, contemplating over their problems and delaying action. People in this stage are not ready for traditional, action-oriented programmes which require immediate action, either.

## 3. Preparation

In this stage, people intend to start a health-conscious lifestyle, or to lose weight, in the near future, i.e. in the next month. Typically, they have already made some steps to achieve this goal (e.g. they use sweeteners instead of sugar, go for a walk after dinner from time to time, etc.). People in this stage make action plans, e.g. they are planning to consult a specialist (general practitioner, life coach, dietitian, naturopathic practitioner), or read about diet. They are ready for change, and traditional, action-oriented health promotion programmes are likely to work for them.

## 4. Action

People in the action stage are those who actively strive for changing their lifestyle or controlling their body weight, and have achieved results in this field by clear, specific lifestyle changes; however, this has been taking place for less than six months. For example, they limit their daily energy intake to 1,700 calories, avoid fast food restaurants, eliminate sugared soft drinks from their diet, do regular exercise, always walk instead of taking the lift, and chose an alternative activity (e.g. walking, jogging) instead of eating when they are tired, sad or distressed. All this requires enormous dedication and effort from an individual. Lifestyle changes and weight loss are usually evident for the individual's environment as well, and that is when it gives the most appreciation, encouragement and support to the person. We have to emphasize that action does not equal change. Several developments which are necessary to induce behaviour change (e.g. changes in self-image or thinking) take place in the pre-action stages.

## 5. Maintenance

Those people belong here who have maintained their achieved lifestyle change for at least six months. There is no consensus with respect to what changes are considered to be successful; this largely depends on how the given person perceives them in his own life. General characteristics of this stage include that the person actively works on preventing relapse; he is less threatened by temptations; at the same time, he becomes more and more confident in his ability

to maintain the changes he has achieved so far<sup>11</sup>. Although the above may be well explained and seem valid for several kinds of health-damaging behaviour (especially for smoking), it is less true for weight management. Weight control in obesogenic environments practically constantly requires resistance to temptation and demands permanent efforts in the field of diet limitations and physical activities. Consequently, the argument of Kristal et al.<sup>12</sup> that the action and the maintenance stage with respect to diet change should be interpreted within the framework of the development and persistence of cognitive and behavioural alertness connected to healthy food choices is justified and acceptable. In the stage of action, the person tries to acquire a number of new behaviours. With respect to specific behaviours, he may be in various stages of change at the same point in time. A person in the maintenance stage, however, has already acquired a sufficient number of behaviours to achieve the goal, but needs to check the changes and efforts in his new lifestyle to achieve long-term maintenance. In this context, fluctuations between action and maintenance are to be perceived positively and not as a relapse. All these take us closer to the understanding of the characteristics of the maintenance stage in the context of behaviour change connected to lifestyle management.

## 6. Termination

In general descriptions of TTM, people in the stage of termination are no longer tempted, and their self-efficacy is 100%. No matter what their mood is, they will definitely not return to their previous health-damaging habits as a coping method. In accordance with the above, the termination stage seems less applicable to weight management because overweight people rarely achieve the healthy weight range. No matter how much weight they lose, maintaining their weight and physical activities represent practically a lifelong challenge for them: they need long-term restrictions in eating and permanent energy input in physical activities, so maintaining the behaviour change requires constant efforts from the person,<sup>13</sup> if due to nothing else but to inevitable weight gain that comes with ageing.<sup>14</sup> Prochaska admit that in areas such as physical activity or weight control, *the realistic goal is a lifelong persistence in the maintenance stage*. They highlight that the termination stage gets much less emphasis in TTM research, partly because of the limitedness of its practical reality, and partly because it appears well after the end of the intervention.<sup>15</sup>

Generally, only a relatively small proportion (mostly less than 20%) of the threatened populations are ready to act.<sup>16</sup> However, readiness to change usually evolves in a more favourable way in the field of weight control. Time spent in the various stages shows high individual variability. It can take years, although the tasks required to step further are the same.

In each stage, certain principles and change developments work most efficiently for reducing resistance, promoting progress, and preventing relapse. Progress between the stages is not necessarily linear, since *relapse is inevitable in the process of behaviour change*.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Prochaska and Prochaska. "Behavior change". 29.

<sup>12</sup> Kristal, A. R. et al. "How can stages of change be best used in dietary interventions?" *Journal of the American Dietetic Association* 99/6. 1999. 681. DOI: 10.1016/S0002-8223(99)00165-0

<sup>13</sup> Baranowski T. et al. "Are current health behavioral change models helpful in guiding prevention of weight gain efforts?". *Obesity Research* 11. 2003. 34.

<sup>14</sup> Hu, F. B. *Obesity epidemiology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 42.

<sup>15</sup> Prochaska and Prochaska. "Behavior change".

<sup>16</sup> Prochaska and Prochaska. "Behavior change". 32.

<sup>17</sup> Prochaska, Norcross and DiClemente. *Valódi újrakezdés...* 103.

## INTRODUCTION OF THE HDF BCP

The HDF BCP is a complex lifestyle change support programme, which provides professional assistance to soldiers committed to lifestyle change. The programme is adjusted to the participants' needs, personal goals as well as physical condition and health. During the first consultation, the applicant's goals, schedule and available resources are determined. Every participant – mainly cadre personnel and contract soldiers – receives a programme which sets realistic goals for the next 12 months and for which constant support is provided by experts working in the programme. The body composition recommendation introduced as a regulation by the Ministry of Defence 10/2015. (VII. 30.) is based on the US Army Body Composition Program<sup>18</sup> and is in accordance with the military health disciplines set in NATO doctrines as well as with the prevention policy and health promotion goals of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

Application is currently optional and free of charge. Soldiers whose body composition parameters differ from the recommended standards (see charts), need to be offered the possibility to enter the programme.

Chart N. *Own editing*: Maximum allowable weight

Chart O. *Own editing*: Minimum and maximum recommended body fat percentage by age groups

Chart P. *Own editing*: Ideal BMI values by age groups

## PROCEDURE

During the first session, the participant's lifestyle is assessed in detail both by objective, instrumental (body composition, cardiac stress, fitness) and subjective methods (questionnaire-type). For a successful programme, the participant's level of motivation, reasons for their previous lifestyle change, successes and difficulties need to be understood and taken into consideration when forming new habits. Furthermore, more information is needed regarding possible changes in the participant's health so that the programme can have an optimal effect even in the presence of health deficits. The participant's lifestyle is assessed by using SAQ (self-assessment questionnaire), which includes internationally accepted questions suitable for independent assessment as well. The assessment is carried out before the first session. Within the 12-month programme, participants are re-evaluated every 3 months so as to introduce individual changes concerning both the diet and the exercise programme if necessary.

## ASSESSMENTS

The OMRON BF 511 type body composition monitor is used to assess changes in the body composition (body weight, BMI, body fat%, skeletal muscle%, visceral fat and rest metabolism). Initial screenings are carried out monthly, later every three months. The professional analysis of body composition, nutrition and fitness is based on the BIA 500 bio-electronic impedance analyser, where body fat, lean body mass, water content (intra- and extracellular fluid), cell ratio and phase angle are assessed and compared to the ideal, optimal and special targets. The documentation contains a written evaluation with figures

<sup>18</sup> "AR 600-9: The Army Body Composition Program". 28. June 2013. [http://www.wood.army.mil/sapper/document\\_frames/ar600\\_9.pdf](http://www.wood.army.mil/sapper/document_frames/ar600_9.pdf)

as well as detailed recommendations for the participants. The regular comparison of body composition assessment results enables us the evaluation and optimization of the diet and exercise programme. Medical treatment and diagnostic tests are not carried out in the programme.

The results provide a complex picture on the physical condition and nutrition of the participant, making the diet and exercise programme controllable. The aim is to reduce calorie intake; therefore, the daily calorie intake will be prescribed during the sessions and participants will be given a one-week sample menu. The recommended daily calorie intake is based on the participant's rest metabolism and amount of physical exercise. During the first 4 weeks of the programme, the daily calorie intake equals the resting metabolic rate and is later increased by +10%; this, of course, might change depending on the rate and speed of weight loss. The number of calories burnt during exercise is generally 250-350 kcal; participants' individual target pulse rate for exercising is also identified depending on their fitness level and body composition.

## SAMPLE, METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS

### Sample

In total, 68 persons participated in the examination (n=68). Their average age was 35 + 7,9 years and, as for their gender distribution, the proportion of women was 56%. The respondents were typically university graduates. Some participants have already had experience with one or more unsuccessful lifestyle change programmes.

### Methods

We used a self-completion questionnaire in the research. We sought an answer to the following question: *In your opinion, where do you stand in the transition to a physical activity you consider more regular or to a diet you consider healthier?*

The participants in the Programme had to select one of the five possible statements which were as follows.

1. I do not intend to shift to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet I consider healthier in the next six months (precontemplation phase).
2. I feel a strong urge to shift to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet I consider healthier (contemplation phase).
3. In the next one month, I am going to take steps to shift to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet I consider healthier (preparation phase).
4. During the last six months, I shifted to a physical activity I consider more regular or to a diet I consider healthier (action phase).
5. I have been doing physical activities/eating more healthily for more than six months, and the chances of relapsing to my old habits are minimal (maintenance phase).

### Assumptions

Concerning the study, the following assumptions have been formulated:

- We have assumed that most of the participants in the HDF BCP are in the stage of preparation and /or action.

- We have assumed that concerning physical activity, participants reached more advanced stages of behavioural change than in nutrition.

## RESULTS

Based on the results, we may establish that all the participants in the HDF BCP have already passed the precontemplation phase with respect to physical activity as well as a healthier diet. This is understandable, since their application for the Programme must have been preceded by the precontemplation phase, for this is already a “second step” with respect to change. In the field of physical activity, the majority of the participants (34%) were in the contemplation phase, although many of them (30%) were already in the preparation phase. 21% of the current participants were in the action phase, whereas the fewest of them (15%) were in the maintenance phase (*Figure 1*).




Figure 1: Distribution of the HDF BCP participants according to TTM stages with respect to physical activity (N=66)

In the field of diet, the majority (32%) of the respondents were in the precontemplation phase, 28% were in the contemplation phase, and 27% ranked themselves into the action phase. 13% of the respondents were in the maintenance phase (*Figure 2*).




Figure 2: Distribution of the HDF BCP participants according to TTM stages with respect to diet (N=68)



## SUMMARY

Initially, it was assumed that the majority of the applicants would be in the stage of preparation and action concerning physical activity and healthy eating habits. Considering that the application in the HDF BCP is currently optional which assumes awareness of the problem and searching for solutions. This assumption was only partly justified, as regarding exercise, the majority of the applicants were still in the stage of contemplation; whereas regarding a healthy diet the majority of them were in the stage of preparation, some still in the stage of contemplation. It was also assumed that considering the profession itself – the personnel of the Hungarian Defence Forces have to undergo annual physical screening tests – the participants had reached more advanced stages of behaviour change concerning exercise than diet. This hypothesis failed, as a higher percentage of the participants were found in the stage of preparation concerning diet than concerning regular physical activity. A similar distribution of the participants can be found regarding both the increase of physical activity as well as developing/maintaining a healthy diet. It was found that while concerning physical activity, the majority of the participants were in the stage of contemplation, regarding diet change, they were in the stage of preparation. This is understandable if we consider that fact that while introducing or increasing the amount of regular physical activity in a person's lifestyle requires extra time and energy, the time for eating is given. Regular dieting – in most cases – is part of everyday life, the change needed might be qualitative or quantitative, which might require less extra time and energy than the introduction of daily physical activity.

Appearance showing physical strength and stamina, which is part of military identity, cannot manifest itself in case the soldier's body weight and body fat percentage are above the prescribed standards. This might decrease physical and medical aptitude as well as individual readiness. The HDF BCP – currently optional – provides complex professional support for the army personnel so that they can meet the body composition requirements, and last but not least, supports the development of health education policy in the Hungarian Defence Forces.<sup>19</sup> Besides monitoring the participants, our aim is to identify the factors which need to be emphasized more in the programme (in our case the introduction of regular physical activity) as well as to support soldiers committed to a lifestyle change as effectively as possible.

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<sup>19</sup> Novák, A., Sótér, A., Rázsó, Zs. and Juhász, Zs. “Harc az elhízás ellen: a Honvéd Testalkati Program. Morfológia és metodika”. *Honvédségi Szemle* 145/3. 2017. 74-86. [https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/63128/hsz\\_2017\\_3\\_beli\\_074-086.pdf](https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/63128/hsz_2017_3_beli_074-086.pdf)

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Luna Shamieh:

# ISIS MARKETING STRATEGY TO RECRUIT MEMBERS: ISIS COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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*ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the marketing strategy of ISIS to recruit its members including locals and expats. It illustrates the military information support operations and technical tools used by insurgents while focusing on the recruitment strategy.*

*The marketing analysis illustrates the recruitment strategy in marketing including opening new markets and expanding existing markets as compared to guerrilla recruitment locally and globally. It provides an overview of the use of information operations by ISIS and it concludes with a description of the recruitment strategy.*

*KEYWORDS: ISIS, insurgents, marketing strategies, Information Operations, military information support operations, cognitive dimensions*

## REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Information plays a vital role in military operations, and the new trends in warfare have resulted in an increased use in the information operations in the command, control, and execution of military operations.

Information Operations are vital in modern warfare as it includes a wide variety of military operations that aims at influencing beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies. According to the Joint Publication 3-13, “Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), Computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”<sup>1</sup> It integrates the application of force and the employment of information with the goal of affecting the perception, emotion, and attitude of adversaries. With this definition in hand; the IO includes a wide variety of military tools related to the information operations and aims at ensuring a competitive advantage in the information environment. “The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of

<sup>1</sup> “Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations”. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 2006. 10. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=461648>, Accessed on 12 August 2019.

three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical, informational and cognitive”.<sup>2</sup>

The term IO has been evolving and the definition has been changing due to ambiguities in the definitions provided. More clarity can be found by separating the functional domains of the IO: the technical domain and the functional domains associated with the PSYOP/MISO.<sup>3</sup>

One of the main producers of actions within the IO is the PSYOP. “Psychological Operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator’s objectives.”<sup>4</sup>

“Information operations are marketing communications”<sup>5</sup> since marketing as in information operations aims to influence a target audience. This paper illustrates this metaphor through an in-depth analysis of recruitment strategies of insurgents and more specifically of ISIS.

Marketing management is the art and science of choosing target markets and acquiring, maintaining, and growing customers through creating, delivering, and communicating superior customer value.<sup>6</sup> While there is a clear match between the objectives of marketing and information operations, the question lies in how the processes of each are correlated. This will help analyse how insurgents utilize the marketing communication strategies in their recruitment of new members.

The aim of this study is to point out the recruitment strategies of insurgents and more specifically of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while comparing this strategy with the marketing strategies used in the business world. It utilizes the concepts of commercial marketing strategies to understand insurgency operations. This paper analyses the Ansoff growth matrix<sup>7</sup> with the insurgents’ recruitment strategies. Furthermore, it analyses the relationship between insurgency operations and marketing strategies to identify linkages that can help uncover the behaviour of insurgents.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS VS. MARKETING STRATEGIES

To be able to utilize civilian advertising and marketing in the IO, an analysis of the parallelism between both should be examined. This section compares the IO with the marketing to be able to utilize the concepts. The analysis includes the comparison of the objectives, environment, target group, and strategies of both fields.

<sup>2</sup> “Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations”. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Porche I. R. et al. *Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1100/MG1113/RAND\\_MG1113.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1100/MG1113/RAND_MG1113.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> “Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment”. Department of Defense, USA. June 2016. <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf>; “Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations”. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Trent, S. and Doty, J. L. “Marketing: An overlooked aspect of information operations”. *Military Review* 85/4. 2005. 71.

<sup>6</sup> Kotler, P. and Keller, K. *Marketing Management*. 14<sup>th</sup> ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2012. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Ansoff, I. H. “Strategies for diversification”. *Harvard Business Review* 35/2. 1957. 113-124.

## Objectives

In order to understand the objective of IO, the concept itself should be elaborated and analysed. IO is currently considered the key to successful operations; it uses different activities and capabilities to produce the intended effect. “The target of Information Operations is to influence the adversary decision maker and therefore the primacy of effort will be to coerce that person into doing or not doing a certain action.”<sup>8</sup> In accordance with AJP-3.10, Information Operations comprise “a staff function to analyse the IE, plan, synchronize and assess IA to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries, enemies and NAC approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives.”<sup>9</sup> By definition, IO includes both offensive and defensive activities.<sup>10</sup>

In general, all definitions of IO state that it aims at affecting adversaries’ (target group) decision-making through different capabilities to shape and influence the information environment. It uses all means of influence so that the targeted group behaves in accordance to their plan.

According to Kotler, marketing is “the science and art of exploring, creating, and delivering value to satisfy the needs of a target market at a profit. Marketing identifies unfulfilled needs and desires. It defines, measures, and quantifies the size of the identified market and the profit potential.”<sup>11</sup> Similarly, the American Marketing Association (AMA) defines marketing as “the set of activities, institutions and processes for creating, communicating delivering and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients.”<sup>12</sup> These two definitions of marketing along with the many different definitions available present four main activities of marketing: Creating the process, Communicating, Delivering and Exchanging or Influencing.

The objectives of both fields include physical, emotional and cognitive influence of the targeted audience to achieve the desired mission. It includes the ABC model of attitude including: Affective component that involves feelings and emotions, Behavioural or conative component, and Cognitive that involves a person’s belief about an attitude object. They are both directing the targeted audience to act in accordance to their views. They are both working in the same structure: Create, Communicate, Deliver, and Exchange.

## Environment

Whether it is an IO or a marketing field, analysis of the environment is much needed to start the initiative. In order to start an operation, an analysis of the self and the other party is needed. An analysis of the environment is critical, execution needs to be based on the physical aspects within the environment, the information available, and most importantly a

<sup>8</sup> Armistead, L. *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*. Washington D. C.: Brassy’s, 2004. 8.

<sup>9</sup> NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). “AJP-3.10: Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations”. 2015.; “Draft MC 0422/6: NATO Military Policy for Information Operations”. Working version as of 11 Sept 2018. NATO. 4. [https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2018/upcoming%20events/MC%20Draft\\_Info%20Ops.pdf](https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/images/2018/upcoming%20events/MC%20Draft_Info%20Ops.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Armistead. *Information Operations*...

<sup>11</sup> Neeraja, B., Chandani, A. and Mehta, M. “Marketing: Past, Present and Future Theoretical Framework”. *International Journal of Advance Research in Computer Science and Management Studies* 1/6. 2013. 198-201.

<sup>12</sup> “Definitions of marketing”. American Marketing Association. <https://www.ama.org/the-definition-of-marketing/>

psychological analysis of the adversary. The question is: how is the environment defined in both fields?

The Information Environment (IE) is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.<sup>13</sup> According to NATO, the information environment consists of three domains: cognitive, virtual, and physical. The cognitive domain is where decisions are made, virtual domain is where intangible activity occurs and technical tools facilitate communication, and physical domain is the space where physical activities occur. The environment goes beyond the physical dimension to reach the cognition and emotion of decision makers.<sup>14</sup>

Different elements are incorporated in each of these environmental domains. The physical environment includes human beings, command and control facilities, paper-based media, info-communication assets, computers etc. The information/virtual dimension is based and composed of information collected, processed, stored, disseminated and protected. The cognitive dimension includes the minds of individuals who receive and respond to the information.<sup>15</sup> Information Operations use various means of physical environment to shape a targeted information environment to be able to change the target's cognitive dimensions.

The marketing environment is categorized in two main domains: internal and external; the external domain includes both micro-environment and macro-environment. The internal environment includes personnel, money, and resources within the organization. The micro-environment includes the stakeholders and customers, it includes the elements that have direct effect on the particular organization's operations. The macro-environment includes the political, economic, technological, social, cultural, and legal competition; it affects the microenvironment of the organizations within the same market.<sup>16</sup>

Although the categorization and analysis of the environment in both fields seem to be different, they both consider the same factors. The internal environment discussed in the marketing environment includes the physical and mental environment of the IO; the micro environment encompasses the physical and information environment of the IO; and the macro environment includes the political, economic, technological, social, cultural, legal and competition factors. The two fields work beyond the physical environment to affect the cognition of the customers and adversaries.

## Strategies

IO planning is a process that examines external and internal planning requirements; it includes steps to carry out the mission from the conception through execution and follow-up assessment. Steps include assessment, planning and execution.<sup>17</sup> PSYOP uses the SCAME

<sup>13</sup> "Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment". Department of Defense, USA. June 2016. 3. <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf>, Accessed on 14 August 2019

<sup>14</sup> "Draft MC 0422/6: NATO Military Policy for Information Operations".

<sup>15</sup> Haig, Z. and Hajdu, V. "New Ways in the Cognitive Dimension of Information Operations". *Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre* 22/2. 2017. 94-102. DOI: 10.1515/raft-2017-0013

<sup>16</sup> Kotler and Keller. *Marketing Management*.

<sup>17</sup> Nissen, T. E. *Tactical Information Operations in Contemporary COIN Campaigns: research paper*. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defense College, 2011. <http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Tactical%20information%20operations%20in%20contemporary%20COIN%20campaigns.pdf>

technique to analyse the propaganda of the opponents. This includes analysing the *Source* that is the individual, organization, or government that sponsors and disseminates the propaganda; the *Content* that includes what the propaganda message says along with the objective of the message; *Audience* or target group of the message could be apparent, intermediate or unintended groups; *Media* that is the medium used and the capacity to use the medium; and *Effects* that is the most important but most difficult aspect of the propaganda that studies the impact of the propaganda.

Marketing strategies are identified and plans are developed to be able to execute marketing operations. These plans help identify models and ways to bring the product or service to the market. One of the well-known models is the 4P model that has been developed by E. Jerome McCarthy<sup>18</sup>. *The 4Ps are the product or service, place, price and promotion*. This helps ensure putting the right service in the right place. The strategy as such helps understand what the product or service can offer and how to plan for a successful product offering. According to this model, the customer is the focal point; the value of the product is measured in accordance with the customers' perceptions and the goal is to accomplish customer satisfaction and loyalty.<sup>19</sup>

"They decide, detect, deliver, and assess [IO] targeting cycle is, in fact, similar to the process many advertising agencies use: discover, define, design, and deliver."<sup>20</sup> This indicates similar technique in strategizing for both fields.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS BY INSURGENTS

Although IO is a term that originated for the United States Military, this paper applies the term for the insurgents' operations. Insurgents use technical and psychological mechanisms in their operations; they have developed their own strategies that have been promoted and adopted by other insurgents. "Insurgents are rational, strategic actors who attempt to optimize the distribution of their attacks overtime in such a manner that the insurgents preserve their resources while maximizing the anti-war..."<sup>21</sup>

Insurgency is the most prevalent type of armed conflicts. "Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources, organizational expertise, propaganda and demonstration, and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."<sup>22</sup>

Although insurgency is a political and not a military struggle, it utilizes tools of struggle that are relevant to the tools used by the conventional forces. The tools used by insurgents

<sup>18</sup> In the 1960s, the American marketer, E. Jerome McCarthy, provided a framework by means of the marketing mix: the 4P's. The 4P's include price, promotion, product and place, which is known as the basic marketing mix. The publication of McCarthy's 'Basic Marketing' (1960) is widely cited as a fundamental approach.

<sup>19</sup> Perreault, W. D. and McCarthy, E. J. *Basic Marketing: A Global-Managerial Approach*. 14<sup>th</sup> ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Trent, S. and Doty, J. L. "Marketing: An overlooked aspect of information operations". *Military Review* 85/4. 2005. 70-74.

<sup>21</sup> Kott, A. and Skarin, B. "Insurgency and Security". In Kott, A. and Citrenbaum, G. (eds.), *Estimating Impact: A Handbook of Computational Methods and Models for Anticipating Economic, Social, Political and Security Effects in International Interventions*. Boston: Springer, 2010. 239-262.

<sup>22</sup> O'Neill, B. E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Washington D. C.: Potomac Book Inc., 2005. 13.

expand beyond political and organizational to reach propaganda and deception. They compete with those used by the national forces and sometimes they even win against them. “Insurgency since 2001 has proven that even a non-state actor can pursue the modest goal of area denial against vastly superior conventional armed forces, via asymmetric warfare.”<sup>23</sup>

The nature of insurgency has evolved due to the ever-changing environment. Currently, insurgencies are not the single-party organization, like that of Mao or Ho Chi Minh. Insurgent organizations are composed of “loose coalitions” of local and global networks.<sup>24</sup> These organizations reflect the social organizations they come from. They operate locally and globally, they also operate through local and transnational organizations like the Afghans who fought in Bosnia.<sup>25</sup> Taliban is another example that changed from being a purely local movement into a global jihadist community.<sup>26</sup> Although many insurgent coalitions share a common battle, they need not have the same goals, each party can fight for its own cause. In Syria insurgency coalitions have different objectives ranging from forming a secular government to those which aim at forming a strict Islamic one; however, they form coalitions of insurgents.

Insurgencies are now adapting to the changing environment; many are “transdimensional and transnational.”<sup>27</sup> They are using electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception. They have moved from simple communications and propaganda to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, training, and e-marketing. They are using the social media widely and intensively.

Insurgencies have been able to create and sustain funds for their activities. Colin Clarke categorizes the insurgents’ financial activities into “grey activities”<sup>28</sup> which include diaspora support, charities, fraudulent businesses, front companies, and money laundering; the other type is the “dark activities” which include kidnapping for ransom, robbery, smuggling or trafficking.

Psychological operations are critical, powerful tools used by the insurgents and counter-insurgents. They are usually seeking to expand their control of the grass-roots levels. In fact, in many cases psychological operations become factors that determine the results. Propaganda and marketing of insurgents’ cause were able to influence public opinion towards their cause or at least reach to a point of neutrality towards this cause. The psychological activities used by insurgents focus on the marketing objective discussed earlier: “exploring, creating, and delivering value to satisfy the needs of a target market.”<sup>29</sup>

A battlefield is a multidimensional one, it encompasses the physical space, but it also includes cyberspace. The expansion of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) development made it possible for insurgents to start cyber-insurgency. Leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Zawahri stated “we are in a battle and more than half of this battle is in the media. In this media battle, we are in the race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”<sup>30</sup> The internet

<sup>23</sup> Mahadevan, P. “The ‘Talibanization’ of Insurgency”. Center for Security Studies. 2 April 2014. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/178192/pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Hammes, T. X. “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks”. *Military Review* 86/4. 2006. 18-26.

<sup>25</sup> Hammes. “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks”.

<sup>26</sup> Mahadevan. “The ‘Talibanization’ of Insurgency”.

<sup>27</sup> Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks”.

<sup>28</sup> Clarke, C. P. *Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Kotler and Keller. *Marketing Management*.

<sup>30</sup> Zelin, A. Y. “The State of al-Qaeda”. The Washington Institute. 13 April 2015. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-state-of-al-qaeda>



has been used to maximize their effect and to have a greater influence. It is used for recruitment, training, advertisement, marketing and propaganda, for posting videos, photos, training materials, online magazines, building networks, among other tasks. The Islamic State publishes an online magazine named “Dabiq”<sup>31</sup>. Until July 31, 2017 15 issues were published. The magazine followed the development of IS and markets its propaganda globally.

The expansion of social media made it also possible to reach to the status of “global village”, where information spreads fast. It helps with the marketing process especially the case of Facebook, where you can use tools such as “recommended for” or “people you may know”. These tools reach not only local audience, but also global one; they help drive interests and link people with similar interests.

## MARKET EXPANSION VS. GUERRILLA RECRUITMENT

The recruitment strategy of insurgents is indeed a market growth strategy. This section will illustrate some marketing strategies while comparing them to the insurgency strategies and operations and more specifically to the insurgents’ recruitment. As mentioned earlier, IO and marketing share similar objectives, similar elements of the environment, and similar operational themes. An analysis of the market growth will help point out the recruitment strategies of insurgents.

Linking the marketing strategy to the general strategic direction is core when doing business or starting an IO. The Ansoff Matrix is, in fact, a strategic planning tool that links an organization’s marketing strategy with its general direction. It provides a framework enabling growth opportunities. The Ansoff Matrix was created by Igor Ansoff<sup>32</sup>. The model presents four alternative growth strategies. The matrix is a 2x2 table; the first dimension in this matrix is the ‘products’ that could be existing or new; while the second dimension is the ‘markets’ that could be existing or new. According to this model, four strategies are presented. Market penetration uses existing products and existing markets; with this strategy a company seeks to increase market share, increase product usage, increase frequency of use, or increase quantity used. Product development strategy uses new products and existing markets; this strategy includes product improvement, product line extensions, or new products for the same market. Market development uses existing products and new markets through expanding markets for existing products, geographic expansion or target segments. Diversification strategy uses new products and new markets.

The Ansoff Matrix simply suggests growth strategies that helps set the direction of an organization, while providing marketing strategies that helps achieve them. Each strategy is achieved differently, and each one faces different levels of risk. The market penetration strategy involves selling existing products to existing markets to gain higher market share. Though, in some cases the market is already mature and there are no new demographic sectors to target; in this case the strategy is to obtain market share from the competitors. This strategy carries the lowest risk compared to the other strategies. This can be achieved by competitive pricing strategies, advertising, and/or sales promotion.

<sup>31</sup> “Dabiq Magazine”. Jihadology.net. <https://jihadology.net/category/dabiq-magazine/>, Accessed on 20 January 2019.

<sup>32</sup> Igor Ansoff was a Russian American applied mathematician and business manager, he is known as the father of strategic manager and famous for his development of the Ansoff matrix, which he developed as a tool to plot generic strategies for the establishment of a company via existing or new products in existing or new markets.

The market development strategy is about selling existing products in new markets. This can be achieved by opening new geographic markets or new segments of population (e.g. approaching women or children who haven't been targeted before), which is associated with a high level of risk depending on the financial capacity and the new markets. This strategy is also possible through new distribution channels, such as changing street retailers to internet retailers to attract new customers throughout the globe or through providing services and products in new types of markets, which would require training of staff and developing of methods of distribution.

Table 1: *Ansoff Matrix for Market Growth Strategies*<sup>33</sup>

|         |          | Products           |                     |
|---------|----------|--------------------|---------------------|
|         |          | Existing           | New                 |
| Markets | Existing | Penetration        | Product Development |
|         | New      | Market Development | Diversification     |

Product development strategy is about introducing new products to existing markets. This growth strategy needs clear knowledge of the needs of the customers to be able to satisfy those needs. This might require new materials or new technologies. As this requires new product offerings (products, services, or ideas), research and development are much needed; however, the risk of losing existing customers with the new product is possible. This could be approached by presenting a new product that is closely associated with the existing one.

Diversification is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new products for completely new markets. Hence, it is associated with a very high risk because of the lack of experience in the new market and the new product. There are three types of diversification: full diversification, backward diversification and forward diversification. Full diversification is a totally new product to a new, unknown market, which is a strategy with the highest risk. Backward diversification is when the organization decides to complement its existing product with one that is used in the preceding step of the production cycle. Forward diversification is about developing a product that is used in the following steps of the production cycle.

The recruitment strategy of insurgents is in fact an Ansoff matrix; it is a growth strategy model of operations to maintain existing members and recruit new members. It provides a framework enabling growth opportunities. As is the case in the market growth strategy, the model presents *four alternative growth strategies*. The first dimension in this matrix is the 'services' that could be either existing or new; while the second dimension is the 'region' that

<sup>33</sup> Ansoff, I. *Corporate Strategy*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1965.

could be existing or new. According to the model, four strategies are presented: insurgency penetration (existing services and existing regions), insurgency development (new services and existing regions), insurgency expansion (using existing services and new regions), and insurgency diversification (using new services and new regions). Figure (2) below illustrates the recruitment strategy of insurgents.

The Ansoff Matrix for insurgency, named here *the insurgents' recruitment matrix*, is a growth strategy of insurgency. Each strategy is achieved differently, and each one faces different levels of risk. The *insurgency penetration* involves promoting existing services and propaganda to existing regions to gain higher acceptance and loyalty amongst local community. This targets the adversary, but most importantly targets the neutral communities in the region they operate. This strategy carries the lowest risk compared to the other strategies, as insurgents are aware of the community and the needs and interests of this community. This can be achieved by promoting their ideology through local media and local recruiters. Direct contact (face to face word of mouth or personal selling) of potential members is the most common method in this strategy as those members are possible to be identified by some surveys and intelligence.

Table 2: *Insurgents Matrix for Insurgency Growth Strategies*

|        |          | Services               |                            |
|--------|----------|------------------------|----------------------------|
|        |          | Existing               | New                        |
| Region | Existing | Insurgency Penetration | Insurgency Development     |
|        | New      | Insurgency Expansion   | Insurgency Diversification |

The *insurgency expansion strategy* is about promoting existing services and propaganda in new regions. This can be achieved by expanding the ideology to new regions or new population segments, which is associated with a high level of risk depending on the financial capacity, the new regions, and the knowledge about those regions. This strategy is also possible through new distribution channels such as the cyber-insurgency; where insurgents are able to recruit new members through the internet. This would require high levels of trainings and developed skills in the use of ICT. ISIS is a good example of this since they use the internet to expand their operation and recruit new members from the globe.

*Insurgency development strategy* is about introducing new services to existing markets. This growth strategy needs clear knowledge of the needs and interests of the local community, to be able to satisfy those needs, and provide the desired and possible new services. ISIS provided different services to develop their organization and expand their operations through recruiting new members. The organisation was able to provide medical and educational services in a manner that fits their strategy and their ideology.

*Insurgency diversification* is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new services for completely new regions. Hence, it is associated with a very high risk because of the lack of experience in the new region and the new service. Main examples of insurgency diversifications are the mergers of two different insurgencies in two different countries, for example Al-Shabab insurgent group in Somalia united with ISIS to expand and diversify their operations.<sup>34</sup> Diversification is also present in insurgency through backward diversification<sup>35</sup>, this is apparent through ISIS associated places of worship that supported their operations in those regions.

Insurgents usually develop highly sophisticated strategic communications campaigns, “this has been the pattern since Ho Chi Minh.”<sup>36</sup> Insurgency have developed recruitment strategies that helped them recruit new members locally and globally through services related directly or indirectly to their operations.

## ISIS MARKET EXPANSION STRATEGY

The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was announced in October 2006 with the leadership of Hamid al Zawi (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi)<sup>37</sup>. Al-Zawi was killed in April 2010 and replaced by the current leader Ibrahim al-Badri (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was announced as the *Amir Al-Mu'mineen* (commander of faith)).<sup>38</sup>

The first media product was issued by the ISI in 2012, it was a video titled “The Expedition of the Prisoners”. The video targeted Iraqi Sunni audience, and the main message was identifying the enemies of the ummah, including the Shiites and Americans.<sup>39</sup> This was followed by a series of publications titled *Salil al-Sawarem* (The Clanging of the Swords).<sup>40</sup> The videos ranged from violent scenes to peaceful and religious messages.<sup>41</sup>

PSYOP includes the SCAME technique to help analyse the opponent propaganda. SCAME is about Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects. The following is an analysis of the *Salil al-Sawarem* using the SCAME technique:

*Source*: Actors in the videos were mainly ISIS people showing their activities, their training, their achievements, their messages and everything they do. Many of them are real

<sup>34</sup> Azman, N. A. and Alkaff, S. H. B. O. “ISIS in Horn of Africa: An Imminent Alliance with Al-Shabaab?” *RSIS Commentary* 282. 30 December 2015. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CO15282.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> Backward Diversification is when a company decides to diversify its products or services by offering a product or service that relates to the preceding stage of the current product or service. For example, a dairy products company’s backward diversification is to buy cows so that they control the raw material (that is milk).

<sup>36</sup> Jones, C. W. “Exploiting Structural Weaknesses in Terrorist Networks: Information Blitzkrieg and Related Strategies”. In David, G. J. and McKeldin, T. R. (eds.), *Ideas as weapons: influence and perception in modern warfare*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009. 7-12.

<sup>37</sup> Tonnessen, T. “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State”. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9/4. 2015. 48-60.

<sup>38</sup> Barret, R. “The Islamic State”. The Soufan Group. November 2014. <http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> Hartmann, C. “Who does (not) belong to the jihadist umma? A comparison of IS’s and al Qaida’s use of takfir to exclude people from the Muslim community”. *Journal for Deradicalization* 13. 2017. 213-242.

<sup>40</sup> Zelin, A. Y. “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq: ‘Clanging of the Swords, part 1’”. *jihadology.net*. 3 June 2012. <http://jihadology.net/2012/06/30/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-clanging-of-the-swords-part-1/>

<sup>41</sup> Shamieh, L. and Szenes, Z. “The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH Through the Virtual Space”. *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 7/1. 2015. 7-31.

footage, however, some are cheap visual effects. These videos are funded and produced mainly by individuals associated to the group.

*Content:* All the videos produced included a background song and music called “Salil al-Sawarem”. Strikingly, if you listen to the music without watching the shocking visuals, you will be amazed with the melody and beautiful Arabic hymn. Studying these videos makes the listener even start humming along. A technique that helps recruit new people especially the youth. The impact of those videos is enormous given the thousands of viewers of those videos. Those videos were organized in such a fashion that they follow similar structure that is able to present the objective of the video, intentions. Videos also show witnesses of men who have bled and died for their beliefs, they show why “true Sunni Muslims” (as they call it) should follow the same path. Recruitment is based on two aspects; the right religion, and the strive to attack theological enemies.

*Audience:* The propaganda was aware of the different targets, hence they addressed each differently using different means, different types of videos, and even different languages, which enabled the global dissemination of the means.

*Media:* ISIS had several media strategies<sup>42</sup>; Salil al-Sawarem, was mainly videos used to widely disseminate the message.

*Effects:* The effect of the videos and the music was a cutthroat; the melody was interesting even for those who tried to mock the videos and used the same music to mock the content. The number of viewers ranged from hundreds of thousands to millions. Although measuring the effectiveness of the video is difficult, however, the number of followers, likers and commenters gives an indication about the impact.

When Abu Baker al-Baghdadi announced Nusra Front a branch of the Islamic State 2013, ISIS propaganda transformed to the new brand and expanded to non-Arabic speaking audience. During this period, they were seeking market development by attracting new segments of the population. The quality of the publications advanced in this phase. 2014 witnessed the transformation of the ISIS propaganda. They started the publication of the “Islamic State News” in English. Within two years the messages changed from Arabic speaking media production to English and German speaking with main messages of “conquering the world” with its main message “*baqeya wa tatamadad*” (here to stay and expand).

ISIS gained support locally and internationally, they were able to persuade audiences in the region along with overseas audiences, this is evident through a variety of members engaged from different nationalities, different regions and even different religions. They were able to attract audiences with little at stake in their mission to sacrifice for their cause.

ISIS markets itself as strong group supported by religious scripture. The slogan of “enduring and expanding” enforces the group’s message of strength. It aims at establishing a nation-state ruled by Sharia law with an intention to return to the earliest fundamental sources of Prophet Mohammed, to expand it to a wide geographical are in the Middle East and Europe.

ISIS used the market penetration/insurgency penetration strategy by providing financial and sexual incentives for its existing members. They used product development/insurgency development through providing educational programs, health and legal services under *Sharia* cover. They used market development/insurgency expansion through expanding presence in different countries. They also used backward diversification through controlling oil sources.

<sup>42</sup> Shamieh and Szenes. “The Propaganda of ISIS/DAESH Through the Virtual Space”.

## ISIS RECRUITMENT STRATEGY

ISIS recruitment strategy will be identified through the Ansoff strategy defined earlier as the *insurgents' recruitment matrix*. ISIS recruitment strategy was based on two factors; the services they provide and the regions they are operating in or targeting potential members in.

The *insurgency penetration* involves promoting existing services and propaganda to existing regions to gain higher acceptance amongst the local communities. In Syria and Iraq ISIS targeted the adversaries and most importantly the neutral communities. ISIS is aware of the region and the needs of the people. Knowing the culture and the economic status, ISIS provided rewards through religious beliefs. They provided rewards and salaries for those in need along with sexual rewards. This was possible through promoting their ideology using local media and local recruiters and direct contact with potential members.

The *insurgency expansion* strategy is about promoting existing services and propaganda in new regions. ISIS achieved this by expanding their ideology to new regions. They were able to achieve this by new distribution channels including cyber-insurgency. ISIS was able to recruit new members through their chatrooms, Facebook and other social media.<sup>43</sup> They promoted their utopian and religious state to the internationals using multilingual messages, and they were able to recruit Arabic and non-Arabic speaking members.

*Insurgency development* strategy is about introducing new services to existing markets. ISIS provided medical and educational services to the people living in the areas they control. They provided military training along with religious education. They provided medical services through their medical members. They also provided dispute and conflict resolution through sharia law and courts they established.

*Insurgency diversification* is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new services for completely new regions. Although this strategy is hard to accomplish as it entails high risk, ISIS was able to diversify its services. This was accomplished by the association of other insurgency groups to ISIS. ISIS also succeeded in accomplishing a backwards diversification, where ISIS controlled places of worship that was then able to feed the organization with new members. It was able to control financial sources as was accomplished with the oil in Iraq.

## ISIS COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

ISIS works at *three environmental levels*: physical, emotional and cognitive influence of the targeted audience to achieve the desired mission. It utilizes the ABC model of attitude including: Affective component that involves feelings and emotions, Behavioural or conative component, and Cognitive that involves a person's belief about an attitude object. However, the main factor motivating the different individuals and groups to participate and engage in ISIS is its cognitive dimension. ISIS is marketing its brand by being the '*right Sunni*'. Hence the war is between Sunni and the rest of the religions and sects. It is between Sunni and all non-Sunni, between Sunni and Shiite, between Sunni and non-Wahhabis Sunni, between Sunni and other Wahhabis Sunni.

Although ISIS might be driven or even started or fed by external forces and by motives that are not necessarily part of the whole cognitive dimension of ISIS, the Caliphate and the

<sup>43</sup> Liang, C. S. "Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda". *GCSP Policy Paper 2*. 2015. <https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/cyber-jihad>

Jihadism as a tool are the core of this cognitive dimension. The Caliphate is not a new term or concept for them; it was the basis for Islamic rule in the early phases of Islam, but it was also revived by the Ottoman Empire during their rule. Currently, Caliphate is a contested status amongst different Sunni Islamic parties. The caliphate and jihadism as a tool are the core of the cognitive dimension of ISIS.

## BRANDING OF ISIS

The American Marketing Association states that “a brand is a name, term, sign, symbol or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or a group of sellers and to differentiate them from their competitors. In fact, ISIS is a name that is very well known globally. Their flag is extremely recognizable *Muhammad Rasoul Allah* (Muhammad is the prophet of God) with a black background. Their symbol is religion and military capability, which is used to identify their existence and to differentiate them from other insurgents. The name ISIS identifies itself as a state, and all their operations are executed as such; starting from the structure of the state to the currency they started and the military education and they are providing. “Brands distill the value of other intangible assets into one meaningful identity of the firm.”<sup>44</sup>

Aaker describes brand personality as metaphor which “can help brand strategist by enriching their understanding of people’s perceptions of and attitude toward the brand, contributing to a differentiating brand identity, getting the communication effort and creating brand equity.”<sup>45</sup> ISIS has in fact understood people’s perceptions and communicated with different segments according to the perceptions they hold. Aaker mentioned that a brand should not only define its functional purpose, but also to express the brand’s higher purpose. ISIS has defined its functional purpose which is Islamic Sharia, it also defined its higher purpose which denominating the rule in the region through the Islamic caliphate. This means that by defining the brand purpose, the brand positioning will be achieved, the brand differentiation and the brand identity.

ISIS has been able to develop a nation brand. A nation brand is “the unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences.”<sup>46</sup> This definition proposes that ISIS as a brand exists in the minds of the people; it is a perception of ISIS. ISIS was able to appeal diverse stakeholders through its nature of nation brand. It was successful to a certain point of time when it was able to deliver its promised values. Their laws, the religion, the social norms, the organizational structure all reflect and appreciate were able to attract certain groups to engage. The individuals recruited and the groups affiliated, all appreciated the values and the social and economic interactions. They are all aware of the values and all are interested in joining. ISIS member are all guided by the strict religious values leading to utopianism as they claim. Their main themes to identify their brand is brutality and belonging; ‘either you are with us or against us’. Their main objective to hone their nation brand is to gain more power and expand the regions of control, to recruit more members, and to generate more fear amongst the others to be able to achieve the first two objectives.

<sup>44</sup> Moore, L. “The Law and the Ultimate Intellectual Asset”. *Intellectual Asset Management* 10/6. 2012. 78-84.

<sup>45</sup> Aaker, D. A. *Building strong brands*. New York: Free Press, 1996. 126.

<sup>46</sup> Dinnie, K. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. Elsevier, UK. Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier, 2008.

ISIS was trying to hone the nation brand to be able to form a competitive identity. Having different nationalities, ISIS members have one thing in common; they have common affiliations. This affiliation forms their identity. Individuals who are recruited feel they don't belong to their original states or societies, they have a sense of lack of belonging. They reach to a point of dilemma about their identities and belonging. ISIS then works on leading them to a new direction; members feel ISIS the saviour. With this ISIS plays a role in making individuals feel they have new belonging and identities.

ISIS was able to work on the institutional and political image, image of the ISIS services and image of the contacts and partners. The identity-image gap was diminishing by time when people faced the immense violence enacted by ISIS. With this diminishing trend ISIS started its diminishing phase.

## ISIS: A MODERN MARKETING STRATEGY

ISIS operations were based on non-traditional marketing methods. They adopted guerrilla marketing using innovative and creative tools and methods to achieve their goals, by using multilingual messages to reach as many people as possible. Guerrilla marketing techniques seek to maximize the surprise effect, the diffusion effect and the low-cost effect. The surprise effect is aimed at surprising the consumers with unexpected activities, the diffusion effect is to increase the number of individuals exposed to the message, and the low-cost effect is to achieve the surprise and diffusion at little or no cost.<sup>47</sup> Mainly, ISIS was able to achieve the three effects and more, they focused on the following guerrilla marketing methods:

*Viral Marketing* is a marketing technique that utilizes websites or users to pass on messages to other sites or users, which enables the message to be delivered to a mass number of people.<sup>48</sup> ISIS is active in this field as it focuses on publishing many videos on YouTube. It is very active on twitter, to the extent that many twitter accounts were closed but users were able to start new accounts whenever their accounts were closed. With this marketing strategy, ISIS was able to use the 1/9/90 rule of social media network, which posits that on a social media network only 1 percent of users create content, 9 percent react by sharing and commenting, and 90 percent watch and read without commenting.<sup>49</sup> ISIS was able to expose its messages to the public; it took advantage of rapid multiplication to spread the messages to thousands then to millions.

*Grassroots Marketing* aims at winning customers on an individual basis, it focuses on building a lasting connection and relationship between the consumer and the brand.<sup>50</sup> ISIS was able to connect to individuals, to brain wash, to build a lasting relationship with those members who became part of the community. They were able to maintain this relationship by providing services of different kinds, both financial and non-financial.

<sup>47</sup> Hutter, K. and Hoffman, S. "Guerrilla Marketing: The Nature of the Concept and Propositions for Further Research". *Asian Journal of Marketing* 5/2. 2011. 39-54. DOI:10.3923/ajm.2011.39.54

<sup>48</sup> Wilson R. "The six Simple Principles of Viral Marketing". *Web Marketing Today* 70/1. 2000. 232.

<sup>49</sup> Rainie L., Lenhart, A. and Smith, A. "The tone of life on social networking sites". Pew research Center. 9 February 2012. [http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/Pew\\_Social%20networking%20climate%202.9.12.pdf](http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/Pew_Social%20networking%20climate%202.9.12.pdf)

<sup>50</sup> Baker, M. J. and Hart, S. J. (eds.) *The Marketing Book*. 6<sup>th</sup> ed. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.



*Astroturfing* is the marketing strategy with the highest risk. It includes fake endorsements, testimonials and recommendations by individuals who are paid to convey a positive message.<sup>51</sup> ISIS published several videos of people giving testimonials about the utopian state and idealistic life they are living. Several videos of locals presented that; along with videos of internationals, like the testimonials of the British hostage John Cantlie who provided a series of videos that started from describing his case until the last video that showed how easy it was for him to live and travel within the Islamic State territory.

*Ambush Marketing* is a form of associative marketing; this is done by associating the organization with an event or property without necessarily having a direct connection.<sup>52</sup> In many cases ISIS claimed their responsibility for different events, explosions, or brutal activities throughout the globe, though there are no proofs that they are really responsible for these activities.

## CONCLUSION

The war of perceptions and deceptions is more effective than the war of weapons. Therefore, understanding the cognitive dimensions of the insurgents is important before applying new methods and techniques. In the changing security environment, it is even more important to understand the operational environment and the operations capacities of the adversaries.

In this study, the recruitment strategy of insurgents was compared to the Ansoff growth matrix. Four recruitment strategies were identified on the basis of the services the insurgents provide and the regions they operate in. The model shows that it is possible with the diversification of services that insurgents are able to recruit new members locally or globally, whether affiliated to the ideology or even not related to the ideology.

ISIS marketing strategy was analysed through understanding its brand. Its market expansion strategy was also analysed. It showed ISIS focus on the target group to achieve attitude change. It also showed that with the proper use of marketing campaigns, insurgents are able to recruit neutral members easily.

Insurgency can blend in easily with the surrounding environment through their marketing strategy; thus, an analysis of this strategy helps counter the actions and results. Understanding this strategy helps exploit communication and information rather than the utilization of traditional war and mass killing. Since insurgent strategies focus on political and psychological operations, the counterinsurgents should act similarly. Countering the insurgency should be through the Ansoff matrix; it should counter their penetration, expansion, development and diversification strategies by controlling the geographic expansion and limiting the insurgents' capability to provide services. It should counter the local and global messages using information and communication technology. It should be focused on the brand by diminishing the gap between its image and the real identity. Most importantly, it should focus on the message delivered to the neutral population.

<sup>51</sup> Jacobs, J. "Faking it: how to kill a business through astroturfing on social media". *Keeping Good Companies* 64/9. 2012. 567-570.

<sup>52</sup> Chadwick, S. and Burton, N. "Ambushed! Sponsors pay a lot to link their brands to sporting events. Then there are those who get those links for nothing". *Wall Street Journal*, 25 January 2010. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204731804574391102699362862>

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## THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY SECTOR IN KOSOVO: ADVANTAGES AND CONSTRAINS

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*ABSTRACT: Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, following the war and the NATO bombing campaign, Kosovo was placed under an international administration, by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). After the end of the war, the course of the security policies in Kosovo was directed mainly by international actors. Basically, the security sector was non-existent, whereas the international military and civilian presence was responsible for the security of Kosovo's borders and the protection of public order. The responsibility for security thus belonged to the international community and was progressively transferred to the Kosovo security institutions. While in the beginning, the takeover of security by the international community was a necessity in order to provide peace and stability, the prolongation of the delegation of ownership to local institutions created disadvantages in terms of timely and professional development. During international administration, the undefined political status of Kosovo influenced the security sector as an area reserved for the international community.*

*KEYWORDS: International Organisations, security, policy, peace, stability*

### INTRODUCTION

Given that in 2001 the final status of Kosovo was not resolved yet, based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 (1999) of June 10, 1999, Regulation 2001/9 on establishing a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was promulgated for the purposes of developing an essential but provisional self-government. Through this constitutional framework, UNMIK delegated significant responsibilities to the local institutions in “the legislative, executive and judicial field through the participation of the people of Kosovo in free and fair elections.”<sup>1</sup> However, some very important areas, including the security sector, continued to be the direct authority of the international presence in Kosovo, namely UNMIK.

The inclusion of Kosovo institutions in the security sector started after the commencement of the security sector review process.

<sup>1</sup> “UNMIK/REG/2001/9. On a Constitution Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo”. 15 May 2001. <http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm>, Accessed on 16 July 2019.

The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies defines three key periods of Security Sector Reform (SSR) along with overall political developments.<sup>2</sup> The first period entails the years 1999-2005 and it signifies the Security Sector Building (SSB) phase which includes the efforts made towards building security institutions such as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and other relevant bodies.<sup>3</sup> This is the period where security related responsibilities were reserved for the Special Representative of the Secretary General whilst only limited responsibilities were vested to locals. The second period, covering the end of 2005 till the beginning of 2008, notes the beginning of the handover of responsibility from the international community to the locals.<sup>4</sup> In this period, the major significance lies with the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) as it notes not only the creation of the new security architecture, like the establishment of two rather relevant ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in Kosovo, but it also assesses the state of play of the security sector of that time. The third period is related to the declaration of Independence as well as the entry into force of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo indicating that the new security architecture in Kosovo permits the creation of new security institutions such as the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), Kosovo Security Council (KSC), Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), including police reform, and establishment of emergency services. Furthermore, the SSR referred to the gradual transformation of the KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) whose mission will be the protection of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Kosovo, whereas the MKSF will be turned into the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that will exercise civilian and democratic control of the KAF.<sup>5</sup>

The role of international organizations in the creation and structuring of the security mechanisms has been indispensable while the local ownership was evidently deficient. The shaping and direction of the security policies in Kosovo after the end of the war was conducted mainly by the international actors as responsibility for security belonged to the international community and was progressively transferred to the Kosovo security institutions. While the takeover of security from the international community was a necessity in order to provide peace and stability, the prolongation of the transfer of ownership to the local institutions created disadvantages in terms of timely professional development.

According to the US State Department, *Diplomacy in Action – International Support for Kosovo*, the US is committed to work with the Government of Kosovo and the European and international partners for the continued progress and development of Kosovo for the benefit of its citizens while amongst others, identifying the following organizations: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), International Civilian Office (ICO), OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR).<sup>6</sup> Each of these organizations has a particular role and will be analysed mainly from security perspective and the impact they had in building the security architecture, legislation and policy.

<sup>2</sup> "Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo". Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS). Pristina, 2009. [http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Chronology\\_of\\_Security\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_in\\_Kosovo\\_609982.pdf](http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Chronology_of_Security_Sector_Reform_in_Kosovo_609982.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> "Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo".

<sup>4</sup> "Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo".

<sup>5</sup> "Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo".

<sup>6</sup> "International Support for Kosovo". U.S. State Department of State. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c27789.htm>, Accessed on 12 July 2019.

## UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO

Following NATO's military campaign in 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1244, authorizing UNMIK to start an extensive process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-government in Kosovo.<sup>7</sup>

It is important to emphasize that Resolution 1244 presents one of the most disputable and paradoxical resolutions of the UN for many scholars. I consider that one of the strongest arguments to put forward is that since the FRY ceased to exist, this makes Resolution 1244 extraneous and consequently it makes Kosovo independent by default.

In accordance with Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework and the original standards statement, approved by the Security Council, a policy document under the name "Standards for Kosovo" was developed. This document set out a number of standards that Kosovo had to accomplish. As Bernard Knoll indicates, "These standards reinforce Kosovo's parallel progress towards European standards in the framework of the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process, based inter alia on the Copenhagen criteria. The standards describe a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background".<sup>8</sup>

Since summer 2002, UNMIK has submitted regular baseline reports on standards implementation to the UNSC. Knoll describes that "since early 2003, the benchmarking process has been reinforced by the Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo, through which the European Commission tracks the development of standards and provides sector-specific recommendations for different policy areas. Under the Tracking Mechanism, Kosovo is obliged to gradually bring its legislation and institutions into line with the EU *acquis*, and receives access to the EU market in return."<sup>9</sup> Despite the fact that these mechanisms were set long time ago, still, to this day, Kosovo lags way behind the countries of the region in terms of EU integration process.

The unrest of March 2004 certainly presented a drawback in the process. Furthermore, it damaged the reputation and the credibility of UNMIK and KFOR. The inter-ethnic violence of March 2004 was a clear indicator that proved that the international community's efforts to create a harmonious multi-ethnic society in Kosovo had failed, or as the report on the international commission in the Balkans puts it: "A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic assessments of the international community. The events of March 2004 amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could explode."<sup>10</sup> Certainly, this situation made the UN rethink its approach and take steps towards the change of the *status quo*.

Consequently, on 23 May 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Mr. Kai Eide of Norway as a Special Envoy to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo in order to assess if the conditions are ready to start the political process that would determine the future status of Kosovo. He concluded that although the standards implemen-

<sup>7</sup> You may access the resolution in the official UN language in the following link: "Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating Kosovo". United Nations Peacemaker. <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-resolution1244>, Accessed on 16 February 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Knoll, B. "From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate". *European Journal of International Law* 16/4. September 2005. 4-12. DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chi140

<sup>9</sup> Knoll. "From Benchmarking to Final Status?..."

<sup>10</sup> International Commission on the Balkans. *The Balkans in Europe's Future*. Sofia: Secretariat Centre for Liberal Strategies, 2005. 19.

tation in Kosovo had been uneven, the *status quo* was unsustainable and the time had come to move to the next phase of the political process and launch negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.<sup>11</sup>

On 1 November 2005, Kofi Annan appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as a Special Envoy to lead the political process that would resolve the future status of Kosovo. Martti Ahtisaari's appointment signalled the commencement of the last part of the international administration of Kosovo in its present form, furthermore it signalled that the time for the European Union's intense involvement in this issue had come.<sup>12</sup>

On February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007 UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented the plan for the future status process of Kosovo. According to this proposal, the minority communities will be granted special protection while the municipalities will undergo a process of decentralisation in order to ensure that the rights and interests of non-Albanian communities are protected. In this light, Kosovo would govern itself under international supervision but would have the right to enter into international agreements, including membership of international bodies. The Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon considered the proposal as fair and balanced. Additionally, the proposal entailed the deployment of an international civil and military presence that would supervise the new arrangements and ensure peace and stability. A European Union (EU) Special Representative would act as an International Civilian Representative, with ultimate supervisory authority over the civil aspects of the settlement, including the power to annul laws and remove officials whose actions are determined to be inconsistent with it.<sup>13</sup>

On April 3, 2007 Ahtisaari presented to the UNSC his final package of proposal recommending that Kosovo should become an independent state with a period of international supervision. Kosovo accepted the proposal while Serbia rejected it. Throughout April-July, 2007, a number of draft resolutions based on Ahtisaari's plan were rejected by Russia in the UNSC. Consequently, Ban Ki-Moon authorized a time-limited round of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade led by an EU/US/Russian Troika. The unsuccessful diplomatic efforts of the Troika to bridge the gap between the parties on Kosovo's status eventually led to the unilateral declaration of independence but in coordination with the major powers.

In addition to having a paradoxical and disputed mandate, UNMIK also had policies which have been widely and deeply criticized as having had detrimental effects on Kosovo and its society. It is arguable that the *status quo* that was maintained by this organization did not allow the proper maturation of Kosovo institutions and was not working to achieve its goals within the society, but rather had built a hostile tension that culminated with the 2004 unrest, proving the administration was far from what it proclaimed and was not succeeding at all in its mandate. Another policy is that of the decentralization, which was supposed to increase the security of the non-majority communities in Kosovo but arguably yielded a very different result. Decentralisation turned many cities in Kosovo into ethnically homogenous

<sup>11</sup> Annan, K. A. "Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council". 7 October 2005. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf>, Accessed on 12 July 2019.

<sup>12</sup> "Secretary-General Appoints Former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as Special Envoy for Future Process for Kosovo". United Nations. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sga955.doc.htm>, Accessed on 16 February 2019.

<sup>13</sup> "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement". United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK). 2 February 2007. <http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf>

spaces, where previously there had been multi-ethnicity, in turn creating enclaves where the Serbs constituted a majority. Such a constitution brought about a total ethnic separation between the Albanians and the Serbs, who now could very easily avoid frequenting the areas where the other ethnic group was a majority. While how such a process contributed to the physical security of the Serb population in the decentralized enclaves is vague and inconclusive to say the least, it did a great deal to contribute to an array of other insecurities, with economic insecurity being at the very top. For a country where employment opportunities are weak for many groups even in the largest cities, to find such opportunities in enclaves or villages is imaginably even more unlikely. In addition to economic insecurity, decentralization made cultural exchange between the Albanian majority and Serbian minorities extremely difficult. Instead of natural encounters between the two populations who previously lived in the same cities, this exchange now had to be “facilitated” by international actors through workshops and other artificially stimulated conditions. Moreover, this very process helped create an atmosphere of insecurity in the country, by sending the message that the minorities had to be protected from some sort of threat, which was also unfair to the majority. With a lack of such encounters and exchange extreme narratives about the other risk to grow, increasing hostilities between the communities, and ultimately contributing to overall insecurity.

## INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN OFFICE

The International Civilian Office (ICO) had a significant impact on building important segments of the security architecture in Kosovo. ICO was in charge of the supervision of the implementation of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal, widely known as the Ahtisaari Plan, by the Government of Kosovo. The ICO was led by the International Civilian Representative (ICR), Pieter Feith, appointed by the ISG. The ICO finished its work in Kosovo in September 2012 and presented a rather unique international body because unlike other international organizations, it was not status neutral and did not have UNSC limitations, but was independence-supportive and as such, created solid ground and political basis for the state-building in Kosovo.<sup>14</sup> This rather contextual and precise approach of ICO however, presented some sort of paradox and inconsistency on the ground, especially after the decision for the deployment of the EULEX mission based on the UN’s six-point plan. The main fundamentals of the plan presented on the Secretary-General’s report covered: Police, Customs, Justice, Transport and Infrastructure, Boundaries and Serbian Patrimony.<sup>15</sup>

This plan was not supported by the local authorities namely the president and the prime minister, but they were in favour of the EULEX deployment. The six-point plan also triggered protests with the motto “Against the six points, for sovereignty,”<sup>16</sup> which were organized by several non-governmental organizations, including the movement Vetevendosje!. The protestors blamed the government for not firmly refusing the six-point plan but silently

<sup>14</sup> I worked for ICO during 2008–2009 as a Religious and Cultural Policy Officer.

<sup>15</sup> “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: S/2008/692”. UN Security Council. 24 November 2008. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/492e79152.html>, Accessed on 16 July 2019.

<sup>16</sup> “Kosovo Protests UN Six-Point Plan for EULEX”. Balkan Insight, 2 December 2008. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-protests-un-six-point-plan-for-eulex>, Accessed 21 February 2019.



implementing it thus allowing the return of Serbia.<sup>17</sup> The deployment of EULEX followed the presidential statement at the UN Security Council based on Resolution 1244.<sup>18</sup> While there were protests against the mandate of EULEX as an outcome of the above mentioned six-point plan, this affected the mandate of ICO as well. The latter was expected to cooperate and monitor EULEX's work in accordance with the laws of the Kosovo Constitution based on Ahtisaari's plan, therefore locals expressed concerns about potential problems regarding the oversight of the EULEX in terms of legal framework. ICO on the other hand was firm about its mandate, claiming that regardless of the six-point plan EULEX operation is based on UNSC 1244 while ICO will continue to supervise the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and cooperate with the Government of Kosovo. According to them, the six-point agreement of New York-Belgrade-Brussels for the reconfiguration of the international civilian presence in Kosovo was an interim agreement that will serve to pave the way for the deployment of the EULEX mission.<sup>19</sup>

From security point of view, the protection of Serb religious and cultural heritage, as set in Annex V of the Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal, had a special attention.<sup>20</sup> The protection of the Serbian religious and cultural sites shall constitute a special operational task of the KPS. The ESDP Rule of Law mission, in consultation with the International Military Presence (IMP), shall monitor, mentor and advise the KPS in the implementation of this task.<sup>21</sup> In fact, Serbs even before the independence had set out their conditions for the Serbian Patrimony which were then embodied in the status proposal of Ahtisaari, for which Kosovo not only agreed but also made commitments to comply fully. The protection of the religious sites was a core responsibility of KFOR, EULEX and Kosovo Police, which was gradually handed over to the local institutions as the security situation improved. The decision taken by North Atlantic Council in March 2010, for the protection of one of the most important monuments for the Serb heritage – Gazimestan – to be handed over from KFOR to the Kosovo Police presented an advancement of the responsibility as well as reflected the confidence that NATO and KFOR contributing partner nations have in the capability of the Kosovo Police to perform this task.

In regards to the legislative agenda that contributed to the security development, the ICO Planning team provided a vast technical assistance. Based on this assistance the Assembly of Kosovo adopted 19 laws that entered into force on 15 June 2008 in the Constitution of Kosovo.<sup>22</sup> This preliminary package contained important security laws such as: Kosovo Police, Kosovo Police Inspectorate, Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo Security Force – that laid the foundation for the security architecture of the state. However, from security point of view, the situation on the ground was very complex both internationally and domestically. UNMIK was regarded as a mission that had fulfilled its mandate once the

<sup>17</sup> Vetevendosje! is currently one of the biggest opposition parties in Kosovo that has been constantly vocal against international and local deals that would in one way or another affect territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kosovo.

<sup>18</sup> "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the deployment of EULEX". Council of the European Union. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PESC-08-147\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-08-147_en.htm), Accessed on 21 February 2019.

<sup>19</sup> Peci, E. "EULEX-i neutral (s')kërcënon mandatin e ICO-së". Radio Free Europe. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/1354530.html>, Accessed on 21 February 2019.

<sup>20</sup> "Comprehensive Proposal for Status". 37-38.

<sup>21</sup> "Comprehensive Proposal for Status". 37-38.

<sup>22</sup> State Building and Exit: *The International Civilian Office and Kosovo's Supervised Independence 2008–2012*. Pristina: ICO, 2012. 8.

country was declared independent while “the EU was on the verge of launching its most ambitious security and defence mission, EULEX, an arrangement that would not see Belgrade’s cooperation anytime soon”.<sup>23</sup>

The security situation in North Mitrovica deteriorated with violence when on 17 March, 2008 members of the Serb community protested against the declaration of independence of Kosovo. Subsequently, they took over an empty UN courthouse building. Even though this violent confrontation lasted for several hours, UN Police and KFOR soldiers overmastered the courthouse building. Following this event, UN and Kosovo Police as well as KFOR withdrew from the north. Their withdrawal created a security vacuum in an area where criminal activity was widespread. This period was a test for the dynamics amid UNMIK, ICO, KFOR, Kosovo Police and other international actors who were monitoring a tense and uncertain situation. The international community was not in unison nor spoke in one voice as to finding the right approach to the north to impede any further deterioration of the situation.<sup>24</sup> From my personal experience working with ICO, I could notice that even within ICO there were divergences particularly over North Mitrovica, which led to the eventual withdrawal of ICO from there.

Another remarkable contribution of ICO in terms of security development, was the successful conclusion of the border demarcation between Kosovo and Macedonia. ICO played an essential role that had an impact amongst others on border security and stability. After a couple of years of difficulty to demarcate the border of Kosovo with Montenegro due to the refusal by the opposition, the demarcation ICO undertook, is recalled as a very successful exercise.

Lastly, ICO is appraised for two distinct stages, first for its focus on stabilization through establishment and consolidation of the main state institutions and the second the enhancement of local ownership through transferring of responsibilities to the Kosovo authorities and the EU.

As Peter Feith puts it: “Our relationship to the political elite was based on equal partnership, rather than on intrusive international scrutiny that Kosovo had experienced during the preceding decade,”<sup>25</sup> and having worked in this organization and for almost a decade in other international organizations in Kosovo, I could not agree more. However, while the role of ICO must be appraised for the partnership approach and assistance in state building process and for what was elaborated above, its mandate inopportunately remained unfulfilled from the security point of view given that the Ahtisaari Plan endured unenforced in the north of the country, a challenge that ICO foresaw and the consequences of which are distressing the sovereignty and security situation of the country to this day.

## ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION IN KOSOVO

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) was established in 1999 and it is the second largest field operation. It is the only international civilian organisation that is present in the entire territory of Kosovo and that monitors political and institutional developments as well as the

<sup>23</sup> *State Building and Exit...* 13.

<sup>24</sup> *State Building and Exit...* 14.

<sup>25</sup> Feith, P. “Overseeing Kosovo’s Conditional Independence” European Council on Foreign Relations, Commentary”. [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_overseeing\\_kosovos\\_conditional\\_independence](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_overseeing_kosovos_conditional_independence), Accessed on 21 February 2019.

developments in the field of security. In terms of institution building, the Mission has been engaged in establishing many key institutions, like the Assembly of Kosovo, the Ombuds-person Institution, the Central Election Commission, the Office of the Language Commissioner, municipal community protection bodies, etc.<sup>26</sup> The mandate of the mission is determined by UNSC Resolution 1244 based on Decision 305 of July, 1999 of the Permanent Council of the OSCE.

In terms of security, OMiK supports ministries and law enforcement agencies to review strategies and action plans regarding the fight against different security threats such as organized crime, violent extremism, terrorism, etc., as well as the strategies on intelligence-led policing, community policing and safety. It works on expanding police-public partnerships through fostering dialogue between the communities and police. It has established a number of community safety forums through which the security issues are addressed while working to establish new ones in the northern part of Kosovo. OMiK works towards increasing the representation of communities and gender in police and other managerial positions. Police is also monitored for the compliance with human rights.<sup>27</sup> Hence, OMiK still has an important role in the security sector development and advancement.

The functional mandate of OMiK's thematic departments derives from the OSCE's General Council Decision no. 305,<sup>28</sup> approved on 01 July 1999, which explicitly refers to UNSCR 1244, thus the mandate of the OSCE is defined directly through this Resolution and it constitutes one of UNMIK's main pillars. This decision mandates OMiK with a leading role in institution building, democratisation and human rights. Through this reference, OMiK extends its mandate from one year to the other while the relations with Kosovo are quite paradoxical due to the obsolete authorisation of its mandate. This presents one of the main obstacles for the coordination, planning and identification of the needs of the Republic of Kosovo vis-a-vis OMiK's programs.

This does not in any way mean that many of these programs and institutions, which have been established by OMiK, are not suitable; on the contrary, many of them have laid grounds for respect for human rights such as the Ombudsperson, the rule of law efficiency, police academy then affirmation of institutions from modern media standards to accommodating minority rights in the Republic of Kosovo and as such have contributed to the security sector development. However, OMiK's referral to 1999's decisions and the completely new situation created in the Republic of Kosovo (especially after the declaration of independence, and the great advancement of the fundamental definition of the subjectivity and sovereignty of the state of Kosovo in the international sphere) are not in line with the priorities of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo. Consequently, this approach clearly shows there is a lack of coordination with OMiK's programmatic work in Kosovo that in an ideal scenario should take into consideration the needs of the Kosovo institutions and involve them in the planning process and not only in the implementation phases.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> "Mission in Kosovo". Factsheet. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Pristina, 2017. <https://www.osce.org/mission-in-kosovo/143996?download=true>

<sup>27</sup> "Mission in Kosovo".

<sup>28</sup> "Decision No. 305. PC.DEC/305." Permanent Council of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). PC Journal 237. Agenda item 2., 1 July 1999. Parag. 6. <https://www.osce.org/pc/28795?download=true>

<sup>29</sup> *Coordination of Priorities and a Coordinated Technical-Content Modality with OMiK and Proactive Approach to OSCE Member States*. Internal Draft Concept Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Department for NATO and Security Policies: Pristina, 2018.

In the political sphere, in the framework of relations with the Permanent Council and the OSCE Secretariat,<sup>30</sup> Kosovo is regrettably formally addressed in full reference to Resolution 1244 and the Decision 305 of 1999 of the OSCE. As indicated above, not only with regards to the relations with OMiK but also when ministerial meetings of the member states are concerned, starting from the OSCE Permanent Council to the lowest level fora, the entire correspondence related to Kosovo including official documents does not mention Kosovo institutions while uses the asterisk that refers to UNSCR 1244. There are cases when discussions in meetings exceed OMiK's respective content, especially through non-recognizing states, primarily by Serbia and Russia, which also serve to create an opinion about the image and situation in Kosovo by voicing issues of daily politics and processes outside the contextual mandate of OMiK. Thus, Kosovo is not allowed to participate during the OMiK Chief of Staff semester reporting to the OSCE's Permanent Council which is not the case for example with the UNSC when reporting about Kosovo, where the Kosovo Government is present and reports.

Therefore, Kosovo does not participate in any formal OSCE activities even though OMiK is the second largest mission – out of the 16 existing OSCE field missions. Even though the scope of the mandate encompasses the security sector and particular security institutions from various perspectives, OMiK has the tendency to run its own programs without consulting Kosovo institutions for their needs. This is best illustrated by the OSCE Programme Outline 2019 SEC.GSL/65/18 for the OSCE missions,<sup>31</sup> where in the part for Kosovo in the first paragraph it is stated that the new strategic framework will take into consideration the specific role and expertise of the mission that has been realized over years and will aim to further clarify the mission's focus in the fields where the OSCE possesses added values. The role and the expertise of the mission should go hand in hand with the development needs of the Kosovo institutions which in fact should present the core reasons of OMiK presence in Kosovo. Furthermore, the respective document indicates that the OSCE will continue to implement its activities in coordination with the international community without mentioning or referring to the institutions of Kosovo. Hence to prove this point or rather the concerns raised by the Kosovo side, even this very important document about the work of the OSCE does not refer directly to the consultations with the Kosovo institutions or to a formal orientation along priorities of the Government of Kosovo which are covered by OMiK.<sup>32</sup> While acclaims for some segments of security sector development are undeniable, still they tend not to go in a two way direction.

To this end, membership in the OSCE is one of the long-term aims of Kosovo. Yet, Kosovo should persuade member states for new forms of cooperation that goes beyond the obsolete documents of 1999 and at the same time lobby and “convince” them about the benefits of its membership, from the security point of view in particular. Kosovo's membership would have resolved the problems of interaction and as well definition of programs deriving from the necessities of the institutions would have been more adequate. This certainly will depend on the dynamics of the geopolitics circumstances but one thing is for sure, it would have contributed to the overall security in the region and advancement of the security institutions of Kosovo.

<sup>30</sup> The Secretariat consists of 57 member states, where over half of them have recognised the independence of the Republic of Kosovo.

<sup>31</sup> “OSCE–2019 Programme Outline”. SEC.GAL/65/18. Restricted Document. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2018. 10.

<sup>32</sup> “OSCE–2019 Programme Outline”. 10.

## THE ROLE OF NATO IN KOSOVO – SECURITY AND BEYOND

Since June 1999, NATO, namely Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo as the main supporter of wider international efforts for peace and stability. KFOR was established after the air campaign against Milosevic's regime. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to stop the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding. The mandate of KFOR derives from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of June 1999 and the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, conducts a peace enforcement operation.<sup>33</sup>

KFOR's mandate is to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate with, and support, the international civil presence. KFOR continues to help "maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities in Kosovo."<sup>34</sup>

Martin A. Smith and Paul Latawski claim that the NATO air operations against the government of Milosevic have been among the most controversial aspects of the Alliance's involvement in South East Europe since the end of the Cold War. Many critics and scholars qualified the military intervention in different ways, such as 'humanitarian war', 'virtual war', intervention and 'humanitarian intervention'. Nonetheless, the debate over the use of force was mainly concerned with the legality and legitimacy as well as the ethic basis and its impact on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They further argue that these conceptual debates are important not only within the context of European security but for the international system as a whole.<sup>35</sup>

Certainly, the rationale of NATO and its member states was clear, first, all diplomatic efforts and actions were exhausted and second, there were imperative humanitarian considerations. Military power was employed to support the political aim, as the Serbian actions were in breach of the core values and norms embraced by the "Atlantic Community" namely NATO.<sup>36</sup>

With the passage of time, as the security situation has improved, NATO has been gradually adjusting KFOR's posture towards a smaller and more flexible force with fewer static tasks. The North Atlantic Council decides about all adjustments to the KFOR posture conditional to the evolvement of the security situation on the ground. KFOR cooperates and coordinates with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other international actors to support the development of a stable, peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> "NATO's role in Kosovo". North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 29 November 2018. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48818.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm), Accessed on 21 February 2019.

<sup>34</sup> NATO's role in Kosovo".

<sup>35</sup> Latawski, P. and Smith, M. A. *The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European Security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. 165.

<sup>36</sup> Latawski and Smith. *The Kosovo crisis...* 165.

<sup>37</sup> Latawski and Smith. *The Kosovo crisis...* 165.




Figure 1: NATO Kosovo Force United in Commitment

The role of NATO in Kosovo was multifaceted while its operations evolved from the air war to humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and peace building.<sup>38</sup> As such, some of the units, such as civil affairs, significantly extended the mission in support of peace operations. Thus, civil affairs soldiers were out every day working with UNMIK to help set up local governments and restore electricity, water and telephone service. KFOR operates under the auspices of the UNSCR 1244 and through its military ensures peace and also supports UNMIK, the EULEX Civilian Crisis Management Operation as well as other international organisations. KFOR enjoyed and enjoys respect not only from Kosovo's institutions but also from its citizens because of its role in maintaining peace, security and stability in Kosovo. Another importance of the role of NATO in Kosovo other than its contribution to the peace and security through the mission of KFOR is its impact in the establishment, consolidation and functionalization of the KSF.

Currently, in Kosovo there are around 3,600 NATO troops run by KFOR, from 28 states (20 NATO members and 8 NATO partners), which continue to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment for all citizens.

## CONCLUSION

The role of international organisations was indispensable in Kosovo both for providing security and creating its security architecture. The progression of the security policies in Kosovo since the end of the war has been handled and guided mainly by the international actors. Essentially, the security sector did not exist whereas the international military and civil presence was responsible for securing the borders of Kosovo as well as providing public order. This brings us to a rather oxymoronic situation if we consider the fact that most of the reports released by the organizations examined in this chapter are very critical to the public institutions of Kosovo while these same organisations were involved in the institution and capacity building of these very institutions. This situation ultimately suggests that part of the responsibility lies on the respective international organisations as well.

Rebecca J. Cruise and Suzette R. Grillot argue that the role of the international community is not over, claiming that the EU, NATO and the OSCE must continue to enhance the communication and collaboration at the elite-levels. According to them, these organizations must also continue and build up their pledge to funding and supporting local community through the project development with a special focus on those projects that intend to bridge ethnic divergences through an increased interaction.<sup>39</sup> I agree that there is still a need for the international organisations' support given the fragility of the institutions, inner politicization and also external influences primarily of Serbia. Ethnic divergence is not as big as it is portrayed by the international organisations, most of the time it is an outcome of the political interference that comes from Serbia. In this light, Kosovo should be proactive and more inclusive and work very closely with the local Serbs. The constitution of Kosovo generously grants them all rights and other affirmative actions in line with international standards and as such they should take their fates in their own hands and make decisions without interference from Belgrade. Once an extensive local ownership of all communities living in Kosovo is

<sup>38</sup> Wentz, L. K. "Introduction". In Wentz, L. K. (ed.), *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*. Washington, D.C.: CCRP, 2002. 3-7.

<sup>39</sup> Cruise, R. J. and Grillot, S. R. "Regional Security Community in the Western Balkans: A Cross-Comparative Analysis". *Journal of Regional Security* 8/1. 2013. 21.

reached, the level of accountability will be increased along with the reduction of eventual divergences. Sonja Stojanovic Gajic rightly finds that in the initial two phases of SSR the coordination of the international community was much better and this is attributed to the executive role of the UN mission as a main pillar that managed to integrate major intergovernmental actors such as the OSCE, the EU and KFOR and more openly defined the distributions of tasks between them. However, in regard to capacity building that would lead to an increased local ownership, there was no coherence in terms of transferring articulate models to local authorities. Much of the work was undertaken by the contingents of the member states or senior representatives of the international organizations, which resulted in the application of their respective national models.<sup>40</sup> She further claims that the partial engagement of local actors in security governance during the stabilization and demobilization phase precluded the development of local ownership.<sup>41</sup> However, after the inclusion of Kosovo institutions in the security sector, the commencement of the security sector review process developed accordingly along with the overall political developments. Throughout this process the most significant development was the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) that gave way to the creation of the new security architecture in Kosovo and most importantly the establishment of two important ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice. Finally, in the new security architecture in Kosovo the new institutions were created: KSF, KSC, KIA including reforms in police and emergency services. What is most important, the SSSR referred to the gradual transformation of the KSF to the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF), whose mission will be the protection of the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Kosovo whereas the MKSF will be turned into the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which will exercise civil and democratic control of the KAF. All these developments happened with support and mentoring and international supervision which leads to the conclusion that the role of international organizations in the creation and structuring of the security mechanisms has been indispensable. However, the question to ask is: what is the exit strategy for the international organisations in Kosovo? What benchmarks determine their continuation of operation in Kosovo or redefinition of their mandates, which as examined in this chapter, should be in line with the needs of the Kosovo institutions. The response though politically very complex, is very simple: peace, stability, sustainable development can only be ensured once Kosovo becomes member of the Euro-Atlantic structures and this is what actually sets the basis for the withdrawal of the international organizations from Kosovo.

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<sup>40</sup> Gajić, S. S. "Capacity Building for Security Sector Reform in Kosovo". EU-CIVCAP Working Paper 2. 2017. 2. [https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/eucivcap-workingpaper-02-17-stojanovic\\_gajic.pdf](https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/eucivcap-workingpaper-02-17-stojanovic_gajic.pdf)

<sup>41</sup> Gajić. "Capacity Building for Security Sector Reform in Kosovo". 2.



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Mariann Vecsey:

# CHANGES IN THE MIGRATION TRENDS FROM WEST AFRICA TO EUROPE

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*ABSTRACT: For a long time, the Central Mediterranean migration route was the most popular among those which went to the European Union from Africa. However, data from 2018 show that the trend is about to turn, and the Western Mediterranean route to Spain is about to become the most popular. Changes in Italy, the entering point to Europe presumably means changes in the African internal routes as well. This article intends to track the reasons which could affect the migratory pattern to the EU. The research focuses on the condition changes along the Central Mediterranean route, from Italy, to Mali. The article aims to sum up both the political and security domains, including the CSDP missions and operation from the southern border of the EU to the heart of West Africa.*

*KEYWORDS: international migration, Central Mediterranean route, Italy, Libya, Mali, Niger, West African route*

## INTRODUCTION

In 2018 the whole European Union turned its eyes towards Italy. The reason: the parliamentary elections. As in one of the biggest migration transit and receiving countries, internal political changes in Italy are expected to influence the migration flows of the Central Mediterranean route. The rising popularity of the League and the Five Star Movement (M5S) foreshadowed radical changes in Italy's migration policies. New approaches on the European side are likely to influence changes in the migration patterns in Africa as well. The biggest North-African transit country, Libya is experiencing years-long fight for national power, which took another violent turn in April 2019. The events in Libya possibly affect the migration flows, discouraging people to choose the Central Mediterranean route. As a result of growing insecurity and jeopardy during the travel, migratory routes can change to directions which are assessed to be cheaper or safer. Additionally, in 2017 the former Italian government also managed to secure a deal with Libyan tribal leaders to seal the borders, which also affected migration routes.<sup>1</sup> The possible consequence is a change in the migratory pattern between Africa and Europe.

<sup>1</sup> "Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant influx". <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-influx/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.



Map 1: *Geographical overview*

In addition to the changes in Italy and Libya, Mali is experiencing a further deterioration in the country's internal security. The ongoing conflict in the Northern part of the country and the escalation of ethnic tension in the Center, can also affect migration patterns. The political and security changes could affect the migrants' choice, on which route they prefer to use, let it be intra- or inter-African. However, these changes do not necessarily result in changing patterns. To assess what is behind the figures on the Central- and Western Mediterranean route, I will examine both the developments in the political situation in Italy, and the evolution of the security situation in Libya and Mali. I also used data analysis to examine if the change of the figures in the Central and Western Mediterranean routes means a change in the migration flow as well.

## MEDITERRANEAN MAYHEM

In 2018, we could see significant changes in the migration policies of the EU's southern flank. The result of the Italian elections predestined the changes. The far-right League and the anti-establishment M5S parties formed the new government.<sup>2</sup> The parties gained popularity because of the existing economic problems, the failed growth, and the long-lasting pressure of irregular migration flows from Libya, and their dissatisfactory management. In parallel, trust decreased towards the EU and its institutions. With this background, it was not a surprise, that one of the main policy changes occurred in the field of migration. The new, more radical approach discontinued the practice of the former government in supporting the presence of the NGO boats in the Mediterranean. Instead, it insisted on the closure of the Italian ports to migrants.<sup>3</sup> This step did not come unexpectedly, since earlier Italy heavily criticised the NGO activity in the Mediterranean. NGO vessels could use Libyan coastal

<sup>2</sup> Kirchgaessner, S. "Italy's president invites populist coalition to form government". *The Guardian*, 23 May 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/23/italys-president-invites-populist-coalition-to-form-government>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Molnár, A. "Olaszország biztonsági kihívásai és stratégiai irányai" [Italian Security Challenges and Strategic Directions]. *Felderítő Szemle* 17/3. 2018. 91-111. <http://knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2018-3.pdf>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

waters, while the EUNAVFOR MED ships could not, and were able to transport the stranded directly to Italian or Maltese ports.<sup>4</sup>

Because of the growing migratory pressure, and the lack of burden sharing, the South-European border countries, namely Malta and Italy closed their ports to NGO rescue ships. The most well-known case is the *Aquarius*, which was forced to detour to Spain with rescued asylum seekers on board. Therefore, since 26<sup>th</sup> August 2018 the rescue ships, which are operating in the Mediterranean have not had a clear guideline where to disembark with the rescued migrants.<sup>5</sup> The decision of Italy and Malta to keep their ports closed to vessels which are carrying saved migrants on board also changed the attitude of cargo ships. These vessels started to neglect their duty to save people in distress because of the fear of economic loss.<sup>6</sup>

Italy's first attempt to gain more control over NGOs was made in 2017, when the government passed a code of conduct for NGOs, who run migrant rescue ships in the Mediterranean. The 12-point code includes limitations, such as banning NGO ships to enter Libyan territorial waters and calls for closer cooperation with the police.<sup>7</sup> The code was presented to around nine NGOs which were threatened with being barred from Italian ports in case of refusal.<sup>8</sup> It was, however, not the final step by Italy in restricting migration policies. On 24<sup>th</sup> September 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a decree which restricts access to asylum, protection, and increases detention.<sup>9</sup> The notorious law, advocated by Interior Minister Matteo Salvini (League), was approved on 29<sup>th</sup> November 2018.<sup>10</sup> The new legislation does now allow to give protection on humanitarian grounds. This means that those who are not eligible to asylum, but had serious reasons of humanitarian nature to flee their home countries are no longer entitled to get asylum status.<sup>11</sup> It also extended the time limitation for keeping migrants in detention centres. Besides this, the withdrawal of the already granted protection became easier. A list of various crimes, from thefts to violence to public officials, was identified, for which asylum seekers can be expelled from Italy. The new law also weakens the integration program, the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). This step will possibly lead to an

<sup>4</sup> Molnár, A. "Az EUNAVFOR MED Sophia műveleti" [The EUNAVFO MED Operation Sophia]. In Molnár, A. and Komlósi, O. (eds.) *Az Európai Unió mediterrán térséggel összefüggő kapcsolata*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2019. 95-121. [https://akfi-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf\\_kiadvanyok/Web\\_PDF\\_Az%20EU\\_mediterran\\_terseggel\\_osszefuggo\\_kapcsolata.pdf](https://akfi-dl.uni-nke.hu/pdf_kiadvanyok/Web_PDF_Az%20EU_mediterran_terseggel_osszefuggo_kapcsolata.pdf), Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Tondo, L. and McVeigh, K. "No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn". *The Guardian*, 12 September 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediterranean>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>6</sup> Schmeer, L. "Migration in the Mediterranean: between Myth and Reality". <https://eyes-on-europe.eu/migration-mediterranean/>, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Zalan, E. "NGOs divided by Italy's new rescue code". <https://euobserver.com/migration/138656>, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Balmer, C. "Italy drafts contested code of conduct for NGO migrant boats". <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ngos/italy-drafts-contested-code-of-conduct-for-ngo-migrant-boats-idUSKBN19X2U1>, Accessed on 19. September 2019.

<sup>9</sup> Sunderland, J. "New Low for Italian Migration Policies". <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/new-low-italian-migration-policies>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>10</sup> Scherer, S. "Italy's Salvini gets win with new asylum and security rules". Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-immigration-security/italys-salvini-gets-win-with-new-asylum-and-security-rules-idUSKCN1NY1JN>, Accessed on 11 May 2019.

<sup>11</sup> Torrisi, C. "The Italian government has approved a new bill targeting migrants". <https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/the-italian-government-has-approved-a-new-bill-targeting-migrants/>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

increase in the number of those who are in an irregular situation. In parallel with this, the legislation strengthens the police through increasing funds.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile Malta, with no EU agreement on search and rescue cooperation, follows the migration policy, which has the widest support throughout the EU, namely the fortification and externalisation of Europe's border control. Besides this, Malta is an active participant in training the Libyan Coast Guard, and views the North African country as a partner in the EU's external border management.<sup>13</sup>

However important, these Member State responses cannot influence migration flows in the Mediterranean in themselves. The EU has a mission and an operation under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Mediterranean. The mission is the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), which is a civilian mission. Its task is to “support the Libyan authorities in contributing to efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved notably in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism.” It started in 2013, and “supports the Libyan authorities in the areas of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice.”<sup>14</sup> The EUBAM Libya has always had a difficulty to conduct its tasks. The deterioration of the security situation drove the mission out of the country in July 2014, and for the second time in 2019. Mainly because of these negative circumstances the mission reduced its activities in Libya.<sup>15</sup>

The operation, the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, is more interesting. The first phase of the operation was launched on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2015, with a focus on “surveillance and assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The second stage of the operation provided search and, if necessary, seizure of suspicious vessels.”<sup>16</sup> In 2017 the Council extended the mandate of the operation with two additional tasks, “with the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and with the contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.”<sup>17</sup>

As the operation is part of the EU's comprehensive approach to migration, and its headquarters is located in Rome, the expiration of its mandate on 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018, provided Italy with an opportunity. Italy had enough of receiving migrants in the shape of letting NGO vessels into its ports and having the EUNAVFOR MED ships rescuing the stranded as well. Therefore, the newly elected government, pushed for changing the rules to be able to redistribute rescued migrants in November 2018. Interior Minister Matteo Salvini even threatened with closing up the operation, if there is no consensus on the proposed relocation system, which would ease the pressure on Rome. Other options emerged, one of them to shut

<sup>12</sup> Matamoros, C. A. “Italy's new security decree clamps down on immigration”. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/11/29/italy-s-new-security-decree-clamps-down-on-immigration>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>13</sup> “Cherry-picking Europe: Migration and economic management in Malta”. European Council on Foreign Relations. [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_cherry\\_picking\\_europe\\_migration\\_and\\_economic\\_management\\_in\\_malta](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_cherry_picking_europe_migration_and_economic_management_in_malta), Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>14</sup> “EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)”. [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319\\_eubam\\_libya\\_factsheet\\_march\\_2019\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190319_eubam_libya_factsheet_march_2019_en.pdf), Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>15</sup> EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Official. Personal interview. 17 June 2019.

<sup>16</sup> “Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean”. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22/fac-naval-operation/>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>17</sup> “Story”. <https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/#story>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

down Operation Sophia, and another is to launch a new mission in Tunisia, with the focus on training the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile it does not serve entirely the Italian interests to close Operation Sophia. It is an operation led by Italy, with an HQ located in Rome, and it gives prestige to the country.<sup>19</sup> It would also put more responsibility and financial burden on Italy if Operation Sophia ends. Rome would have to handle migration in the Central Mediterranean alone, if the migration flows from Libya increase.<sup>20</sup> Not to mention Italian ties with Libya, which would further erode with finishing up the operation. Keeping these in mind, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte proposed a three months technical elongation to the operation. During this timeframe Italy aimed to achieve its originally proposed conditions.<sup>21</sup>

The new timeframe was not enough for successful negotiations and reaching consensus in the EU. Moreover, Italy's decision to close its ports, and refuse to allow EUNAVFOR MED ships to disembark rescued migrants can easily lead to further conflicts within the EU. The first sign of it was when Germany decided to withdraw its naval units from Operation Sophia.<sup>22</sup>

Because of the lack of consensus, in March 2019, the Political Security Committee of the EU agreed on a six-month-long elongation of the operation, with a rather interesting solution. France proposed to temporarily suspend the deployment of naval assets of the EU-NAVFOR MED, allowing only the air component to conduct surveillance tasks. In parallel with this, the EU reinforced the support to the Libyan Coast Guard.<sup>23</sup>

The current Italian struggles to reduce the number of migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean are, however, not the first attempts to reduce migration flows. After the EU-Turkey deal in 2016, the EU was keen to reach agreement with Libya as well, securing the community's southern borders. Thus, negotiations started in early 2017 between EU and North-African representatives.<sup>24</sup> Italy took the leading role in the negotiations soon. Then Interior Minister Marco Minniti announced on 02<sup>nd</sup> April 2017, that after three days of negotiations behind closed doors, 60 tribal leaders from Libya agreed to secure the country's vast southern borders. The deal included the deployment of a Libyan border patrol unit to the 5,000 kms long southern border area. Besides this, various tribes agreed to monitor different sections of the border. The deal not just aims to reduce migration flows, but also to reduce criminal activity in the region: people, drugs, weapons smuggling. It also calls for job training programmes, in order to provide young people with other options than joining criminal groups.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Barigazzi, J. "EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia". <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>19</sup> Taylor, P. "Salvini's Sophia soapbox". *Politico*, 12 March 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-matteo-salvini-sophia-soapbox/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>20</sup> Barigazzi, J. "EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia". <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>21</sup> "Italy extends Operation Sophia for three months". <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/13824/italy-extends-operation-sophia-for-three-months>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.


<sup>22</sup> "German Navy drops out of Mediterranean Sea operation Sophia". <https://navaltoday.com/2019/01/23/german-navy-drops-out-of-mediterranean-sea-operation-sophia/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>23</sup> Barigazzi, J. "EU diplomats tentatively agree to extend Operation Sophia". <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-migration-refugees-diplomats-agree-to-extend-operation-sophia/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>24</sup> "European, North Africa ministers seek to curb Libya migrant flows". <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/european-north-africa-ministers-seek-to-curb-libya-migrant-flows/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>25</sup> "Italy brokers deal with Libyan tribes to curb migrant influx". <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italy-brokers-deal-with-libyan-tribes-to-curb-migrant-influx/>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

The deal, agreed with the help of Italian Interior Minister Minniti, proved to be successful in reducing the migration flows. By September 2017, the figures decreased dramatically on the Central Mediterranean route. However, rumours started, that Italy induced Libyan tribes and militias to end their illicit activities, especially people smuggling and human trafficking. Paired with the Libyan Coast Guard playing more active role in rescuing migrants.<sup>26</sup>



Map 2: *Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe*

Source: <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.


According to Map 2, the decline in the migratory figures started in mid-June 2017, continued throughout 2018, and the decrease sustained steadily in 2019 as well, as it is clear from Map 3. Translating it to numbers, around 24,000 migrants arrived in Italy in June 2017, which dropped back to less than 5,000 monthly arrivals in 2018,<sup>27</sup> and less than 300 in the first two months of 2019.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Wintour, P. "Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya". *The Guardian*, 7 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>27</sup> "Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe". <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2707>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>28</sup> "Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019". <https://ercportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2839>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.





Map 3: *Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019: map*

Source: <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2955>, Accessed on 18 July 2019.

However, the conflict in Libya did not continue as peacefully as it was expected in 2019. To follow up the rather peaceful period of 2017-2018, when different armed groups secured their territorial gains, in the end of 2018 General Khalifa Haftar started his southern campaign with the Libyan National Army (LNA).<sup>29</sup> His aim was to secure oil fields and fight terrorist groups. The operation, which lasted for almost seven weeks, ended on 02<sup>nd</sup> March 2019.<sup>30</sup> With this step, General Haftar gained control over the key oilfields in Libya. Besides the oilfields, General Haftar went into a territory, which was involved in the EU's external border control, therefore the Italian deal, made in 2017, possibly fell victim of General Haftar's southern campaign. The Tobruk based LNA gained control just over the oil, but not the revenues. The Libyan oil should be sold by the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and the payments are received by the Central Bank of Libya. These institutions, besides they both are headquartered in Tripoli, are declared as neutral. However, NOC condemned the LNA's militarisation of two facilities. The move resulted in the open support of LNA from the eastern NOC subsidiaries. Thus, General Haftar still needs to control Tripoli to influence the revenue allocation.<sup>31</sup> Economic considerations, years-long intent to take Tripoli, and possibly

<sup>29</sup> Marsai, V. "Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához". <http://kozterhetotudas.hu/2019/04/11/marsai-viktor-elemzo-tanulmany-a-2019-marcius-14-es-23-kozotti-libiai-migracios-kutatasahoz/>, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

<sup>30</sup> Binnie, J. "LNA advances across southwest Libya". *Jane's Defence Weekly* 56/11. 2019. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Smith, R. and Pack, J. "Oil revenue access drives conflict". <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2019/oil-revenue-access-drives-conflict>, Accessed on 19 September 2019.

some international suggestions led to General Haftar's next step, the offensive against Tripoli. On 03<sup>rd</sup> April the LNA started its advancement towards the country's capital.<sup>32</sup> It became obvious soon, that capturing Tripoli will not be an easy task for the LNA, and by the end of April a house-to-house fight was unfolding.<sup>33</sup> The protracted battle for Tripoli will soon affect migration as well. When the fights started there were approximately 140,000 migrants in Tripoli, who were in need for protection.<sup>34</sup> According to IOM, Libya has a migrant stock of about 820,000 people, mainly from Syria and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>35</sup> The Libyan Ministry of Interior, however, estimates the number of irregular migrants in the country around 1.5 million, but we have to take in consideration, that there is no reliable data from Cyrenaica or Fezzan.<sup>36</sup> The population in Tripoli, local and migrant, are both in a volatile situation, and will likely seek the opportunity to flee Libya to safer countries if the situation does not change in the short-term. With Libya becoming an unsafe country to reach, the protracted situation can affect migration patterns in the mid-term from the sub-Saharan region, to adapt to the new situation. The second part of the article investigates the possibility of Mali becoming a migration hub due to the changes in the situation in Libya and the Mediterranean.

## MALI MISFORTUNE

To be able to place Mali and assess its status on the West African migration route, the security situation in the country must be analysed. In 2012, a Tuareg insurgency started in the northern region of the country, aiming to liberate Azawad, a Tuareg state. Bamako could not handle the situation in the north, and a coup d'état, led by military officers, made the situation more complex in the country. The *coup de grâce* came in April 2012, with the Islamist groups taking the lead in the Tuareg insurgency. In 2013, an international intervention started in the country, and in 2015 the insurgency was supposed to end when a peace agreement was signed between the warring parties, namely the Mali government, the Platform, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).<sup>37</sup> However, the conflict de-escalated, it has not ceased but remained at low-middle intensity.<sup>38</sup> After the Peace Agreement was signed, despite the heavy international presence in the country, the government was not able to consolidate the situation. Jihadist attacks remained a problem throughout the years, not just in the northern region of Mali, but in the whole country. The presence of multiple groups even threatens with the possibility of the regionalisation of the conflict, with a spill-over to Niger and Burkina Faso. Now, in 2019, besides the radical Islamism, Bamako has to face escalating ethnic tensions in the central region of the

<sup>32</sup> "Eastern Libyan commander orders forces to move on Tripoli". Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/eastern-libyan-commander-orders-forces-to-move-on-tripoli-idUSKCN1RG0RT>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>33</sup> "Libyan forces push back against Haftar in house-to-house battles". Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/libyan-forces-push-back-against-haftar-in-house-to-house-battles-idUSKCN1S40Q8>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>34</sup> Peyton, N. "Migrant women, children denied shelter in Libya's battleground". Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-migrants/migrant-women-children-denied-shelter-in-libyas-battleground-idUSKCN1SG1PV>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>35</sup> "Migration Data Portal". IOM. [https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock\\_abs\\_&t=2019&cm49=434](https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2019&cm49=434), Accessed on 19 September 2019.


<sup>36</sup> Marsai. "Elemző tanulmány a 2019. március 14. és 23. közötti Líbia migrációs kutatásához".

<sup>37</sup> Vecsey, M. "Maliból jelentik" [Reported from Mali]. In Kaló, J. (ed.) *Napjaink biztonsági kihívásai, veszélyei és fenyegetései*. Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Kft., 2016. 129-143.

<sup>38</sup> "Conflict Barometer 2016". Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 76. <https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/bisherige-ausgaben/?lang=en>, Accessed on 1 October 2017.

country. With such a background it is a rightful question to ask how Mali could possibly apply for the position of a migration hub. The answer can lie in the local patterns. Mali is already the part of a rather busy regional migration system, specifically the West African one. Migration within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region is mainly labour migration of various kinds: seasonal, temporary or permanent. Mali and Niger, the well-known migration hub, are both countries of origin and destination in this complex. Mobility within the ECOWAS is easy, since it is a visa-free movement area. Therefore, changes in the migration routes would not demand further documentation, other than a passport. However, the use of smugglers is common, especially when the aim is to exit the free movement area.<sup>39</sup>

In 2017, Mali hosted about 384,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees.<sup>40</sup> The number changed during 2018. By the middle of the year only 238,000 IDPs and refugees were officially reported from Mali.<sup>41</sup> In March 2019 this figure reached 372,000 again.<sup>42</sup> As these data show, the migration stock can change drastically in Mali during a couple of months' time. But in a country marred with insurgencies, violent extremism, and ethnic tensions, migration stock and flows are rather fluid, and changing rapidly, depending on the situation.



Map 4: Mali Regional Crisis

Source: <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2771>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

<sup>39</sup> “World Migration Report 2018”. IOM. [http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2018\\_en.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf), Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>40</sup> “International Migration Report 2017: Highlights”. 26. [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017\\_Highlights.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf), Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>41</sup> “Mid-Year Trends 2018”. UNHCR. 38. <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5c52ea084/mid-year-trends-2018.html>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>42</sup> “Mali Humanitarian Crisis”. <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2918>, Accessed on 13 May 2019.

The European Union deployed two missions to Mali, to help Bamako to consolidate the situation in the country. The EUTM Mali started in 2013, with the aim to provide training to the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), and to advice on “command and control, logistical chain, and human resources” together with educating MAF on human rights, and protection of civilians as well. The mission also got a task to conduct its tasks in close coordination with other actors in the country, UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA, and ECOWAS.<sup>43</sup> The original mandate only changed in 2016, when it had to add another coordinating partner, the G5 Sahel.<sup>44</sup> Supporting G5 Sahel Joint Task Force means that the EU is supporting a home-grown African solution to the regional crisis in the Sahel.

The EUCAP Sahel Mali started in 2014. The main tasks of this civilian mission were to help Malian authorities to “restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace, state authority and legitimacy in the territory of Mali.” Most importantly, the mandate of the mission includes the obligation to establish contacts among the EU missions from Mali to Libya.<sup>45</sup> The following mandate extensions reinforced these tasks and obligations. In this way, Mali served as an incubator of the use of the EU’s comprehensive and integrated approach in practice.

The EU missions in Mali are supporting the interests of the European community. With the help of the EU to consolidate the situation in Mali, strengthen state legitimacy and training the security forces, a stable democratic country can emerge. Stable countries are generally not countries of origin of the migration process, so the stabilisation of the country is in line with the EU’s Global Strategy to build resilient states in the south down to Central Africa.<sup>46</sup>

However, the situation is not favourable to achieve these optimistic goals. As the situation in the northern region has remained practically the same since the summer of 2013, and inter-ethnic tensions have escalated in central Mali, stability has remained a dream. Because of this, migration flows can be expected to change. Instead of becoming a major transit country, Mali can be again a country of origin.

Data, collected in the first half of 2019 testify, that outgoing flows were more significant than the incoming migration flows. Nearly half of the outgoing migration flows are Malians, but Guineans, Ivoreans, Senegalese, Nigeriens, and Gambians were also observed to cross Mali. The collected information also shows, that Spain is the most popular European target country, followed by Italy and France. Since the second half of 2018, Spain has replaced Italy as the most popular destination.<sup>47, 48, 49</sup> This new popularity resulted in a steep increase

<sup>43</sup> “Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP”. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D0034>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>44</sup> “Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/446”. <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f521b2e0-f18c-11e5-8529-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>45</sup> “Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP”. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0219&from=PT>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>46</sup> “Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe, a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. 9. [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf), Accessed on 25 September 2017.

<sup>47</sup> “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 36: January 2019”. IOM. <https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-36-january-2019>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>48</sup> “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 37: 1-28 February 2019”. IOM. <https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-37-1-%E2%80%94-28-february-2019>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

<sup>49</sup> “Mali: Flow Monitoring Report 38: 1-31 March 2019”. IOM. <https://migration.iom.int/reports/mali-%E2%80%94-flow-monitoring-report-38-1-%E2%80%94-31-march-2019>, Accessed on 12 May 2019.

in the migration flows towards Spain from Africa. However, this number did not exceed or even reach the figures which have been observed in the Central Mediterranean route just two years ago, in 2017.<sup>50</sup> In the first two months of 2017 roughly 14,000 migrants arrived in Italy from Libya, and 5,000 in Spain.<sup>51</sup> In the following year, the same reporting period Italy received 5,200 migrants, while Spain 3,200. 2019 was the first year which started with visible differences in the favour of Spain. 11,138 people used the West-Mediterranean route to get to Europe, while only 2,160 choose the Central Mediterranean.<sup>52</sup> To assess if this change in the figures means a shift in the migration pattern, I followed the method which had been used in an earlier research on the shift of the migration patterns. According to this research, the arrivals of those nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route most commonly must be analysed.<sup>53</sup>

I used data collected by FRONTEX on ‘illegal border-crossings statistics’ to show data on the number of arrivals by nationality, using data from 2015 to May 2019<sup>54</sup> To reveal the possible differences between the figures of detected arrivals and asylum applicants I used EUROSTAT data from 2017 to June 2019.

Data on detected border-crossing show that the main countries of origin changed over time regarding the Central Mediterranean route (*Table 1*) on a larger scale than on the Western Mediterranean route (*Table 3*). In 2015, Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan were the top 5 source countries of the Central Mediterranean route, while by 2019, seven more countries had been added to the list at least temporarily. In the first months of 2019, the main nationalities who used the Central Mediterranean route, were mainly from the Middle East and North-Africa (MENA) region, however, Eritrea and Nigeria remained among the top sending countries over the examined period. Besides the changes in the main nationalities, data show a sharp decrease in the use of this route, from 90,570 people in 2015 from the top 5 sending nations to 1,209 in the first 5 months of 2019. In parallel with the detected arrivals, EUROSTAT collects data which show how many people want to legalise their situation in the host countries. *Table 2* shows the main nationalities who applied for asylum in Italy from 2017 to June 2019.<sup>55</sup> The data comparison of the two tables shows gaps both in the number of applicants and their nationalities. Most of the countries present here as main senders appear in the FRONTEX dataset as well. Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mali and Nigeria are present in both tables. Senegal and Morocco, however, are not considered as main countries of origin, according to FRONTEX data. It is also visible that some nationals are not keen to legalise their situations in Italy. Among them we can find Eritreans and Guineans. I assume, that the difference between the figures can be interpreted as a delay between the time of the detected arrival and the actual time of the application, which possibly means months-long delays.

<sup>50</sup> “Europe Monthly Report”. UNHCR. March 2019. 1-2. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68983>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>51</sup> “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe”.

<sup>52</sup> “Influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2019”.

<sup>53</sup> Brenner, Y., Forin, R. and Frouws, B. “The ‘Shift’ to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality?”. <http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route/>, Accessed on 04 May 2019.

<sup>54</sup> “Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download: updated monthly”. [https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory\\_routes/Detections\\_of\\_IBC\\_2019\\_07\\_05.xlsx](https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/Detections_of_IBC_2019_07_05.xlsx), Accessed on 30 July 2019.

<sup>55</sup> “Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, monthly data (rounded)”. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, Accessed on 14 May 2019.

Table 1: *Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality*  
(Data collected from FRONTEX)

| <b>Detected arrivals on the Central Mediterranean route by nationality</b> |             |             |             |             |              |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| <b>Year</b>  | <b>2015</b> | <b>2016</b> | <b>2017</b> | <b>2018</b> | <b>2019*</b> |
| Eritrea  | 38,791      | 20,721      |             | 3,529       |              |
| Nigeria  | 21,914      | 37,554      | 18,163      | 1,262       |              |
| Somalia  | 12,430      |             |             |             |              |
| Sudan  | 8,916       |             |             | 2,037       | 229          |
| Gambia   | 8,519       | 11,929      |             |             |              |
| Guinea   |             | 13,550      | 9,714       |             |              |
| Côte d'Ivoire  |             | 12,399      | 9,509       |             |              |
| Bangladesh   |             |             | 9,009       |             | 193          |
| Mali   |             |             | 7,119       |             |              |
| Tunisia  |             |             |             | 5,182       | 347          |
| Pakistan   |             |             |             | 1,513       | 232          |
| Algeria  |             |             |             |             | 208          |
| * Data collected until M05   |             |             |             |             |              |

Table 2: *Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)*  
(Data collected from EUROSTAT)

| <b>Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship in Italy (rounded)</b> |             |             |             |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Year</b>  | <b>2017</b> | <b>2018</b> | <b>2019</b> |
| Nigeria  | 25,500      | 6,970       | 1,180       |
| Bangladesh   | 12,445      | 5,410       | 1,060       |
| Gambia   | 8,875       | 2,270       | 320         |
| Senegal  | 8,455       | 3,060       | 595         |
| Côte d'Ivoire  | 8,440       |             |             |
| Mali   |             | 2,465       |             |
| Morocco  |             |             | 510         |
| * Data collected until M06   |             |             |             |

Table 3: *Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality* (Data collected from FRONTEX)

| <b>Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality</b> |             |             |             |             |              |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| <b>Year</b>  | <b>2015</b> | <b>2016</b> | <b>2017</b> | <b>2018</b> | <b>2019*</b> |
| Guinea   | 1,946       | 2,184       | 3,283       | 12,233      | 191          |
| Algeria  | 1,193       | 1,698       | 4,293       | 4,349       | 324          |
| Cameroon   | 843         |             |             |             |              |
| Morocco  | 684         | 722         | 4,704       | 11,881      | 1,970        |
| Côte d'Ivoire  | 609         | 1,646       | 3,517       | 4,045       |              |

| Detected arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route by nationality |      |      |       |        |       |
|---|------|------|-------|--------|-------|
| Year  | 2015 | 2016 | 2017  | 2018   | 2019* |
| Gambia  |      | 899  | 2,660 |        |       |
| Mali  |      |      |       | 10,747 | 191   |
| Senegal   |      |      |       |        | 117   |
| * Data collected until M05  |      |      |       |        |       |

The main senders regarding the Western Mediterranean route changed less over time. Here North-African and West African countries dominate among the top 5 countries of origin from 2015 to May 2019. On this route it is visible, that in 2018 the figures rose to 39,210 detected arrivals from 5,275 in 2015 regarding the top 5 senders. Therefore, we can state that this route became the more popular, but the examination of these data is not enough to verify if the migration pattern changes or not because it just shows how the top 5 senders varied over the examined timeframe. Thus, I created a list of West African countries, collecting them from the main countries of origin over time on the Central Mediterranean route, to examine the detected arrivals of their nationals from 2015 to 2018. The selected countries are Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. To get a wider picture, I added 4 more West African countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger and Senegal to the examination. Senegal was added because it appeared as a main country of origin on the West African route, and I assumed that this country's nationals use traditionally the West African route. The other 3 countries were chosen, because, however they are not main sending countries, they can provide further context on the intra-African patterns.

The first result, which is visible is, of course, the significant decrease in the figures since 2018. The further examination showed, that Senegalese, whom I expected to prefer the Western route, used mainly the Central Mediterranean between 2015 and 2017, and changes occurred only in 2018. *Table 4* shows, that the selected country nationals preferred the Central Mediterranean route from 2015 to 2017. In 2018, the pattern changed significantly regarding the examined nationals. The Western Mediterranean route was preferred during 2018 in a large extent for almost all nationalities, save Nigerians. Even such nations as Niger, for whom the Central Mediterranean route is geographically closer, started to use the Western route on a greater scale.

Figures also show, that the number of detected arrivals by nationality on the Western Mediterranean route exceeds the figures in the Central Mediterranean route on such a scale, which means the change of the preferred routes. For example, in 2017, 68 Ghanaians and 624 Malians used the Western route, while 3,909 of Ghanaians and 7,119 Malians the Central. However, these numbers changed to 461 Ghanaians and 10,747 Malians using the Western route in 2018, while only 218 Ghanaians and 915 Malians reached Europe via the Central Mediterranean route.

According to the scale of the difference on the figures, it is visible, that the Western Mediterranean route replaced the Central route in 2018. There are nationalities, which still prefer to use the Central Mediterranean route despite the emerged difficulties along it. To assess its causes, another research is needed on the available migrant stock of those nationalities in the main African transit countries.

**Detected arrivals by nationality**




Table 4: Detected arrivals by nationality (data collected from FRONTEX)



## SUMMARY

The reported numbers and visible patterns of migration flows in the Mediterranean can suggest that now we are experiencing a change in the migration routes to the European Union. Based on the results of the research it can be stated that the changes in the migration pattern are not necessarily visible if the research focuses only on the biggest sending country nationals. With including multiple countries from West Africa in the data analysis, the changes in the pattern can be detected. Although some countries, like Nigeria and Eritrea still prefer the Central Mediterranean route, most of the West African nationals have preferred to use the Western Mediterranean route since 2018. The general figures show a significant decrease of the migration flow to Italy, which is expected to continue during 2019.

The decreasing numbers of crossings on the Central Mediterranean route are originating from the agreement between Italy and the Southern-Libyan tribes, to control sub-Saharan African migration flows. Additionally, Italian political changes made the Southern European country less appealing to migrants from Africa. In 2018 Italy also restricted its asylum policy, which possibly had a further discouraging effect on migrants. Besides this, suspending the activities of naval assets of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia made the journey particularly dangerous. General Haftar's offensive against Tripoli, which proved to be a protracted situation, displaced Libya from its previous position of the biggest transit country of the North-African region. Mali also experienced the escalation of ethnic tensions in its central region, while radical groups are still present and active in the whole country.

It is also important to note, that in spite of the relatively large number of migrants, who reaches the EU, it is now visible, that most of the African migrants remain on the African continent. Additionally, there is a growing tendency among young Africans to choose Asia over Europe when deciding about the destination. An increasing number of people choose China, whose Africa policy is far more welcoming than that of the EU.<sup>56</sup>

The use of information technology, which helped to organise the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, now supports those sub-Saharan Africans, who are planning to leave their countries of nationality. Therefore, the news on unfavourable policy changes, developing anti-immigrant attitude are getting to those, who want to reach the EU. It might be also discouraging, that the EU has still not finished the reform of the Dublin system. Potential migrants can also gather information on the rapidly changing security situation in transit countries. Thanks to the internet, all this earlier mentioned information can reach the people on the move relatively fast to discourage them to start a perilous journey to the European Union, which is ever more difficult to reach through countries which have a rather hostile environment.

The change of the migration patterns is the result of complex, interconnected events. Policy changes in one country cannot realistically influence the directions of entire migration routes, but a series of events along a formerly popular migration route can be an effect multiplier. On the Central Mediterranean route multiple changes took place, including both policy, and security changes, which was apparently enough to encourage migrants from sub-Saharan African countries to choose routes different from that of their predecessors.

<sup>56</sup> Tarrósy, I. "“Kik és hányan kopogtatnak ajtóinkon onnan Délről?": az afrikai migráció valóságának sokszínűségéről". *Magyar Tudomány* 180/1. 2019. 79-89. DOI: 10.1556/2065.180.2019.1.7

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## FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN EUNAVFOR SOMALIA

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*ABSTRACT: Piracy, once a novel phenomenon in the already altered security environment along Somali coasts following the millennium, has become a factor threatening the stability of the region. This is despite the fact that along African coastlines steady international military presence has always been ensured, since 70 percent of the European Union's sea trade is conducted through this region. France – putting into action both its political and military powers – has actively participated in the fight against piracy in the region by providing continual as well as situational aid, which in my opinion proves both France's interest in the region as well as their aspiration to be an all-time leading power in Europe. Moreover, demonstrating and analysing France's participation might also contribute to pre-planning future naval operations as regards asymmetric conflicts.*

*KEYWORDS: France, Somalia, piracy, European Union Naval Force–Somalia (EUNAVFOR), French navy, Gulf of Aden*

### REASONS FOR AND BACKGROUND OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

First of all, historical reasons behind piracy in this region must be explained. In 1960, Somalia was established by uniting territories formerly belonging to British as well as Italian colonies. Alluding to its geographical location, the country is generally referred to as the Horn of Africa, where a civil war broke out in the mid-80s overthrowing former dictator Mahammad Siyaad Barre and his regime, who had seized power in 1969 by staging a coup<sup>1</sup> following a short-lived democratic government. After a series of coups d'état in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was by no means possible to establish a stable political system, and the different political powers have so far been incapable of creating a separation of powers. Following the commencing of armed fights among the clans, the country began to decline not only politically, but also economically. As a result, due to a lack of centralized power the area today has become a state suffering from the battles of its warlords. Previously termed a 'failed state'<sup>2</sup>, today it is most commonly called a 'fragile state'. In 2018 it came in second

<sup>1</sup> Kiss, Á. P., Besenyő, J. and Resperger, I. *Szomália: Országismertető*. Budapest: Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely, MH GEOSZ, 2014. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Failed states; according to the definition, born at the end of the Cold War, a failed state is a state which is internationally acknowledged as a sovereign state, yet has no functioning central governing power, thus cannot attend to the most basic tasks in international context. Hegedűs, K. "Tizenhárom év anarchia: Szomália a hidegháború után". *Külügyi Szemle* 4/1–2. 2005. 37–62.  
[https://kki.hu/assets/upload/KULUGY\\_KulugyiSzemle\\_2005\\_\\_1-2hegedus.pdf](https://kki.hu/assets/upload/KULUGY_KulugyiSzemle_2005__1-2hegedus.pdf)

on the Fragile States Index by 113.2 points, indicating a state that is still weak and presents security risks.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 1: Fragile States Index 2018

Source: “Fragile States Index”. The Fund for Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/>; “Fragile States Index: Global Data”. The Fund for Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>, Accessed on 14 May 2018. (Edited by Eva Fabian)

<sup>3</sup> “Fragile States Index: Global Data”. The Fund for Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>, Accessed on 14 May 2018. “The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as “CAST” – that was developed by FFP nearly a quarter-century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results. Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure the condition of a state at any given moment.” “Fragile States Index: Indicators”. The Fund for Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/>, Accessed on 14 May 2018. The indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index are as follows: Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance, Economic Decline and Poverty, Uneven Development, Human Flight and Brain Drain, State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic Pressure, Refugees and IDPs, External Intervention. “Fragile States Index and Cast Framework Methodology”. The Fund for Peace. 13 May 2017. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/13/fragile-states-index-and-cast-framework-methodology/>, Accessed on 14 May 2018.

In the instability after the civil war and in the absence of central political control, pirate fishing got underway, which particularly posed a problem for those living along the coast-line, for whom fishing was almost the only way of making a living. The first of the pirates were fishermen who meant to drive away directly competing foreign ships from their waters. This affair increased in intensity when warlords of the Somali coastline saw it as an opportunity to make money, and therefore set up their own militias. Although it was not until April 2005 that the first large foreign ship was attacked, this incident was soon followed by a great number of such attacks. In conclusion, the sea-bandits' gangs consisted of former fishermen, seamen as well as recruited members of military groups<sup>4</sup>. The first raids were conducted in and around the Gulf of Aden – where the annual traffic of about 20,000 commercial ships is managed, and which is also considered the most important transport route between Asia and Europe – though by now the piracy hotspots have relocated to the waters further out.<sup>5</sup> Piracy in the area undoubtedly became socially accepted. It is no great surprise that pirates grew in strength and organization and called themselves coast guardsmen rather than pirates.<sup>6</sup> In general, each pirate group has their own set of rules regarding recruitment, treatment of hostages as well as division of the spoils. Although we consider them to be several rival groups of pirates, their methods as well as structural hierarchy are practically identical. Most of them – being former fishermen – have a significant amount of local knowledge, yet the small fishing boats they used at first are constantly modernized.<sup>7</sup> Their weaponry is obtained in Mogadishu black markets as well as in Yemen, applying the informal, trust-based, traditional hawala mediator system.<sup>8</sup>

## STEPS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The humanitarian disaster urged the United Nations to launch humanitarian operations. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I and then II (UNISOM) took place alongside the US-led international United Task Force (UNITAF). Blue Helmets first arrived there in September 1992, and their numbers grew rapidly owing to the increasingly disastrous conditions. The International Committee of the Red Cross as well as other aid organizations conducted humanitarian actions in the area, which – at least at the time – were regarded as the largest of their kind since World War II. The course of events significantly changed in July 1993. Upon overthrowing Barre's regime, the country's two most powerful figures were Ali Mahdi, an influential businessman, and General Aideed, who nevertheless never managed to reach an

<sup>4</sup> Pirates are divided into three categories. There are one-time fishermen, who also know the sea inside and out. There are former militiamen, who used to fight for the clan of a warlord, and there are technology experts, who are computer-literate, and have knowledge of various high-tech devices and can handle GPS, satellite phones and the like. "Lutter contre la piraterie". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

<sup>5</sup> "Lutter contre la piraterie". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

<sup>6</sup> Hunter, R. "Somali pirates living the high life". BBC. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm>, Accessed on 20 December 2010.

<sup>7</sup> "Lutter contre la piraterie". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

<sup>8</sup> Mayyasi, A. "Hawala: The working Man's Bitcoin". Priceonomics. <https://priceonomics.com/hawala-the-working-mans-bitcoin/>, Accessed on 22 April 2017.

agreement and actually divided the capital city of Mogadishu into two parts. Both made efforts to extend their control over other areas in Somalia. The fight previously between the latter warlord and United Nations (UN) as well as the United States (US) troops resulted in turning the clans controlling Mogadishu against the foreign troops, so the operation went amiss. Somalia's self-appointed president Mohamed Farrah Aideed's militiamen began combating American soldiers. Because of this failure and pressure from the general public, then US President Bill Clinton had withdrawn the American troops – sent by George H. W. Bush – from the area by spring 1994, whilst the UN mission was obliged to cease its operation in March 1995.<sup>9</sup>

Adverse changes in the 1990s led to the establishment of several separatist state forms in the Horn of Africa, which all took advantage of the weakness of the central administration. One of these areas was Puntland, established in 1998, where the majority of Somali pirates originated. Due to the present state of the country the various territories are functioning autonomously, making their own political decisions. Following the 2012 elections it was generally thought that the 'federal system had found a way in Somalia, creating hope for the formation of would-be federal member states in which law and order can be restored at the grass root level.'<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, as Viktor Marsai expressed in a 2017 article, since the 'federal member states have fallen into the hands of wrangling clans and sub-clans, some people describe Somali federalism as the Balkanization of the country'<sup>11</sup>. In his opinion, during the last (i.e. 2016) elections the clans, which – according to several experts, international public figures, as well as the Somali themselves – serve as the foundation of the Somali political establishment, as well as the Somali elite, some foreigners, and al-Shabaab all played major parts in the political dynamism.<sup>12</sup>

After the discontinuation of the central governmental power, the influence of Islamic law (also known as Sharia) increased. In 2000, 11 Mogadishu courts were united, establishing the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)<sup>13</sup>, which was to join with different Islamic movements in the whole of Somalia. One of their strongest military groups is Al-Shabaab. ICU's sphere of action covered the whole of Mogadishu by 2006, as well as most of South and Central Somalia, yet it was overthrown by the Ethiopian army in January 2007.<sup>14</sup> Al-Shabaab launched guerrilla activities. With UN authorization, in February 2007 the peacekeepers of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) commenced their activities in Somali territories and managed to push Al-Shabaab forces out of the larger cities.<sup>15</sup> Al-Shabaab has since then been continually attacking both army and civilian targets throughout Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. Their main goal is to overthrow the internationally supported federal government of Somalia. The mission of AMISOM has not achieved all that was expected: the counterinsurgency operations of the African Union troops and Somali government forces

<sup>9</sup> Kiss, Besenyő and Resperger. *Szomália...* 52–53.

<sup>10</sup> Tawane, A. A. "Federalism in Africa: The case of Somalia". Pambazuka News. 6 April 2017. <https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/federalism-africa-case-somalia>, Accessed on 23 October 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Marsai, V. "Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?". *Center for Strategic and Defense Studies Analyses* 14. 2017. 1–12. [http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media\\_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v.original.pdf](http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v.original.pdf), Accessed on 4 November 2018.

<sup>12</sup> More of this analysis in Marsai, V. "Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?". *Center for Strategic and Defense Studies Analyses* 14. 2017. 1–12. [http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media\\_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v.original.pdf](http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v.original.pdf), Accessed on 4 November 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga

<sup>14</sup> The US was in favour of this operation, since they assumed close connection between the ICU and al-Qaeda.

<sup>15</sup> "Brief History". AMISOM. <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/brief-history/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.






Figure 2: *Somalia Federal States map*

Source: “*Somali update, latest Somalia news and analysis*”. *Africa news online*. <http://www.africanews.online/somalie/somali-update-latest-somalia-news-and-analysis-2/>, Accessed on 23 October 2018.

have failed to blunt Al-Shabaab’s capacity to inflict heavy civilian and military casualties.<sup>16</sup> This fact along with the weakness and low public acceptance of the federal government explain why the armed group has been gaining territories in the area in the past few years. Still, the group neither entertains global terrorist ambitions nor has such capacities. Al-Shabaab was also able to step up its deadly actions despite a greater frequency of United States drone attacks since President Trump’s inauguration.<sup>17</sup> Altogether 10,535 Africans lost their lives because of militant Islamists’ actions between May 2017 and May 2018, which is – while greater than the number of fatalities in the previous 12 months – definitely lower than it was in 2015.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Adan, A. M. “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa”. Hiraan. [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al\\_shabab\\_ranked\\_as\\_deadliest\\_terror\\_group\\_in\\_africa.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_in_africa.aspx), Accessed on 23 October 2018.

<sup>17</sup> Since the beginning of 2017.

<sup>18</sup> There were 18,728 deaths in total in 2015. Adan, A. M. “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa”. Hiraan. [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al\\_shabab\\_ranked\\_as\\_deadliest\\_terror\\_group\\_in\\_africa.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_in_africa.aspx), Accessed on 23 October 2018. Nevertheless, the 2015 mortality rates – even compared to those

## DIRECT ANTECEDENTS, FORMATION, AND RUNNING OF OPERATION ATALANTA

Modern-day piracy has become a problem of globalization which the international community has had to tackle to an ever-greater extent. France realized this long before NATO, and before the launch of the all-European cooperation. On 10 July 2007, indicating their despair, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)<sup>19</sup> appealed to the general public in a call for international cooperation against piracy along the coastline of the Horn of Africa as well as for protecting humanitarian aid to Somalia. As a response, on 25 September, during the 62<sup>nd</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France would send a warship to protect WFP ships. On 16 November 2007 Operation Alcyon commenced. The task was taken over on 2 February 2008 by the Danish Navy, and numerous nations joined the initiative. On 15 September 2008, following France and Spain's suggestion, the Council of Europe in Brussels decided to establish the European Union Naval Coordination Cell (EUNAVCO), in the framework of which a European commercial ship was first escorted through the Gulf of Aden by a French warship on 12 October 2008. EUNAVCO served as the European coordination network of the fight against piracy at sea. Among its tasks, it partly coordinated measures taken by member states within their national missions with regard to the battle against piracy, and also informed European ship-owners about military assets. Within its framework France made it possible for 20 commercial ships altogether to safely pass the Gulf of Aden. The Coordination Unit ceased to exist once Operation Atalanta was launched, with no legal successor.<sup>20</sup> On 24 October of the same year, Operation Allied Provider was launched, being the first NATO operation in the fight against Somali pirate activities.<sup>21</sup>

The UN-mandated EUNAVFOR, commonly known as Operation Atalanta, was launched on 8 December 2008 by the EU as the first European operation at sea with the hope of successfully countering, preventing, and tackling piracy and armed robbery along the Somali coastline. Their mandate was for a one-year period, which has been prolonged several times. The event itself was preceded by an Action Plan approved on 10 November 2008 in the Council of the European Union regarding the launch of the first naval operation of the

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of 2011 – were much better, for which Viktor Marsai in a 2015 article of his provides a less scientific but even more interesting and telling example: ‘...in January 2013 an al-Jazeera journalist interviewed gravediggers from Mogadishu. One of them, Ali Hassan took up this profession in 1991. (...) In 2011 there were still 14 gravediggers in the cemetery called Abdirrahid Ahmed Sharmake in the capital, working seven days a week, whilst today only two of them are still doing the job, Hassan and another undertaker. The decreasing number of the deceased – also meaning less income for the undertakers – is reported by other providers in the funeral and related services, such as textile sellers, who sell white caftans to wrap the deceased with.’ Marsai, V. “A szomáli szövetségi kormány első két éve és az al-Sabáb elleni katonai műveletek 2012-2014. (I.)”. *Nemzet és Biztonság* 8/1. 2015. 72. [http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb\\_2015\\_1\\_08\\_marsai.pdf](http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2015_1_08_marsai.pdf), Accessed on 4 November 2018.

<sup>19</sup> You can read more about the IMB on their official website. “International Maritime Bureau”. ICC CSS. <https://www.icc-css.org/icc/imb>, Accessed on 2 June 2018.

<sup>20</sup> “L’action de la France dans la lutte contre le piraterie”. France, Ministry of Defence. 12 July 2010. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/l-action-de-la-france-dans-la-lutte-contre-la-piraterie>, Accessed on 2 June 2018.

<sup>21</sup> “Operation Allied Provider”. NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. <https://shape.nato.int/page13984631>, Accessed on 2 June 2018.

integration. The latter was backed by the UN Security Council as closely related to their resolutions (numbers 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851) regarding the fight against Somali piracy. Among the aims of Operation Atalanta are listed the protection of WFP and other ships<sup>22</sup> in danger which navigate in the Gulf of Aden as well as off the Somali coasts and near the Seychelles Islands, the prevention of and measures taken against pirate activities and armed robberies along the coastline, as well as controlling fishing along Somali coastal areas. EUNAVFOR became the integral part of the European integration's security and defence policy. Another goal is to support other EU missions and international organizations that aim to promote maritime security and strengthen capacity in the region. Regarding the operation's mandate, apart from protecting the WFP, AMISOM and commercial ships, the participants were authorized to employ any means – including armed force – to attain the above-mentioned goals only and exclusively in the zone where these activities are carried out. Numerous countries – based on their military potential – participated in the operation, namely: the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Estonia – indicating that Atalanta is indeed a European military action. Moreover, on 3 January 2014, a Ukrainian frigate joined the operation. The French have been present from the very beginning in the EUNAVFOR units, continuously represented by one frigate<sup>23</sup> and occasionally dispatching their Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, based in Djibouti, where the Joint Force Command Headquarters is located. The French assist in the operation's success with the logistics base in Djibouti, too.<sup>24</sup> The Area of Operations covers the southern territories of the Red Sea, the area of the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles Islands. EUNAVFOR units deter attacks and show military presence in the Area of Operations and Somali coastal waters, as well as constantly escort ships, in accordance with the UN Security Council's relevant regulations. Naturally, in the area in question several nations' navies are operating, with which EUNAVFOR has developed a broad network of connections by now.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> For example, consignments launched by AMISOM as well as commercial and passenger ships.

<sup>23</sup> On 1 July 2009, the French (at the request of a group of ship-owners) established the so-called onboard protection teams (EPE – équipes de protection embarquées) Seychelles mission, with the help of which French fishing boats are directly protected on board, when they operate along the Seychelles. The number of states involved in the EPE as well as their operational area has increased year by year. In June 2011 Estonia joined the EPE which has contributed to the success of Operation Atalanta since November 2010. "Atalante: les équipes de protection embarquées, image de la coopération européenne". France, Ministry of Defence. 3 August 2011. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-les-equipes-de-protection-embarquees-image-de-la-cooperation-europeenne>, Accessed on 19 February 2018.

<sup>24</sup> "Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante>, Accessed on 15 March 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Since the end of 2008 more and more countries have been sending battleships to the Gulf of Aden as well as to the Somali coasts, which do not belong to any multinational forces, yet closely cooperate with the EU-NAVFOR. It means about 10-15 battleships. "Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante>, Accessed on 15 March 2017.



Figure 3: Fight against Somali piracy – Area of Operations

Source: Maritime security chart: Q6099: Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. UK Hydrographic Office. [https://www.admiralty.co.uk/AdmiraltyDownloadMedia/Security%20Related%20Information%20to%20Mariners/Q6099\\_A4.pdf](https://www.admiralty.co.uk/AdmiraltyDownloadMedia/Security%20Related%20Information%20to%20Mariners/Q6099_A4.pdf), Accessed on 23 October 2018.

In June 2010 the EU Foreign Affairs Council somewhat altered the concept of the operation, requiring states in the region to actively participate in restoring order and peace in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa. Another significant development was the extension of the Area of operations both eastward and southward, and to address the roots of the problems the European Union Somalia Training Mission (EUTM)<sup>26</sup> had also been launched, which

<sup>26</sup> In the battle against modern-day piracy, relying only on high-tech navy forces is not sufficient; efficient maritime and air force cooperation with the local armed forces is more and more necessary. The mission's mandate was prolonged until 31 August 2018.

was expected to reinforce security forces in Somalia.<sup>27</sup> Besides particularly representing the member states' economic interests in the area, the operation also served humanitarian purposes in the form of humanitarian aid transferred by sea.<sup>28</sup>

The two following tables' data on the EU Naval Force – Somalia clearly show that the political, legal, diplomatic, and military efforts have been fruitful. The number of pirate attacks has significantly decreased, the route of commercial ships in the region has become more secure, and owing to the extended alarm system and offers of the European Union and the IMB, they are more prepared against attacks.

Table 1: *EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta*

| CURRENTLY HELD BY PIRATES   |      |      |      |      |      |                 |      |               |      |                  |      |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----------------|------|---------------|------|------------------|------|
| Vessels Held*   |      |      |      |      |      | Hostages Held** |      |               |      |                  |      |
| 0   |      |      |      |      |      | 0               |      |               |      |                  |      |
| SINCE 2009  |      |      |      |      |      |                 |      |               |      |                  |      |
| WFP Vessels Protected   |      |      |      |      |      | 438             |      |               |      |                  |      |
| AMISOM Vessels Protected  |      |      |      |      |      | 139             |      |               |      |                  |      |
| Tonnes of Food/Aid Delivered by WFP   |      |      |      |      |      | 1,726,497***    |      |               |      |                  |      |
| Pirates Transferred to Competent Authorities with a View to their Prosecution |      |      |      |      |      | Total<br>166    |      | Remanded<br>6 |      | Convicted<br>145 |      |
|   | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 166             | 2014 | 2015          | 2016 | 2017             | 2018 |
| Suspicious Events   | 8    | 59   | 99   | 166  | 74   | 20              | 5    | 1             | 2    | 6                | 1    |
| Total Attacks   | 24   | 163  | 174  | 176  | 34   | 7               | 2    | 0             | 1    | 7                | 1    |
| Of Which Pirated****  | 14   | 46   | 47   | 25   | 4    | 0               | 0    | 0             | 0    | 2                | 0    |
| Disruptions*****  | 0    | 14   | 65   | 28   | 16   | 10              | 1    | 0             | 0    | 2                | 0    |

\* Plus, an unknown number of unreported/unconfirmed dhows and smaller vessels

\*\* Estimated

\*\*\* Reported metric tonnes of food/aid delivered to Somali ports by World Food Programme shipping protected by EU NAVFOR

\*\*\*\* TOTAL ATTACK is the combined number of all attacks mounted by suspect pirates; those repelled/aborted and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews taken hostage

\*\*\*\*\* An action that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operation

Source: "Key facts and figures". *EU Naval Force Somalia*. <http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018

<sup>27</sup> "European Union Training Mission Somalia". <https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/>, Accessed on 2 June 2018.

<sup>28</sup> "EU NAVFOR: Proud to have protected by sea over 1.5 million tonnes of WFP humanitarian aid for people of Somalia". *EU NAVFOR Somalia*. 4 July 2017. <http://eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-proud-to-have-protected-by-sea-over-1-5-million-tonnes-of-wfp-humanitarian-aid-for-people-of-somalia/>, Accessed on 2 June 2018.

Table 2: *Latest piracy incidents*

| Latest Piracy Incidents  |                 |                                  |                            |     |      |         |               |
|--|-----------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----|------|---------|---------------|
| Date   | Type of Vessel  | Approximate Position of Incident | Attack or Suspicious Event | BMP | PASC | Unknown | Pirated/ Safe |
| 2018/03/08   | Cargo Vessel    |                                  | Suspicious Event           | X   | X    |         | Safe          |
| 2018/02/22   | Chemical Tanker | Somali Basin                     | Attack                     | X   | X    |         | Safe          |
| 2017/11/22   | Bulk Carrier    |                                  | Suspicious Event           | X   |      |         | Safe          |
| 2017/11/18   | Fishing Vessel  |                                  | Suspicious Event           |     |      |         | Safe          |
| 2017/11/18   | Container       |                                  | Attack                     | X   |      |         | Safe          |
| BMP: Best Management Practises<br>PASC: Private (armed) Security Company |                 |                                  |                            |     |      |         |               |

Source: “Key facts and figures”. EU Naval Force Somalia. <http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

## THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION AND SUCCESSES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRATES

According to French opinions, the success story of EUNAVFOR really began in March 2010.<sup>29</sup> In February 2010 the frigate *Nivôse* joined the operation, replacing another vessel of the same class *Surcouf*, serving till then along the East-African coastline and in the Gulf of Aden. First and foremost, it was ordered to provide protection – correspondingly – for commercial, WFP and AMISOM ships as well as participate actively in the fight against pirates. Soon after it began its mission, the *Nivôse* and its crew achieved success as on 5 March 2010 they successfully fended off two separate attacks. On 6 and 7 March, just off the Somali coast, some participating EUNAVFOR units with French leadership foiled an attack on either day. The results at that time, however, amounted to something much greater than ever before. Within the course of three days, altogether 35 pirates, five mother ships and eight boats were taken hold of. The action executed on 7 March proved just how essential the naval power provided by the participating European states was in the fight against piracy, when applied in a combined, concerted way. The united action executed by the *Nivôse*, together with the *Etna*, the flagship of the operation since December 2009, their helicopters as well

<sup>29</sup> French authorities can only come to help against pirate attacks if the given vessel is flying a French flag and operates in a French economic sector, or if it belongs to the especially endangered ships that are protected in the framework of Operation Atalanta. In such cases the ships under protection must agree to change course, and also have to share costs regarding their safety. When a French ship is attacked, or there are French sailors and passengers among the pirates’ hostages, France may consider dispatching warships. “Lutter contre la piraterie”. France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

as Spanish Navy reconnaissance aircraft guaranteed the eventual success. The helicopters played a significant role in spotting the pirates' boats and the mother ship. Warning shots encouraged the African pirates to lay down their weapons, and then following their capture they were – together with their boats – taken on board the ships participating in the action. The pirates' mother ship was, as always, sunk on the spot.<sup>30</sup>

The story, however, did not and could not end here. A great number of successful actions had justified the participation of French forces, too. On 14 August 2010 France took command of Operation Atalanta for four months under the leadership of Rear Adm. Philippe Coindreau.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, beside their frigate and naval reconnaissance aircraft, France deployed a warship to the operation. During the French leadership, the French frigate *de Grasse*, joined by the frigate *Floréal* on 6 September 2010, and accomplished several successful actions against the pirates in the Somali Basin. Within the four months of French command, over 120 suspected pirates were captured in over 20 actions. Coindreau handed over the command of the operation to the Spanish Rear Adm. Juan Rodriguez Garat in Djibouti on 10 December 2010.<sup>32</sup> In the end of March 2012, France made another warship available for Operation Atalanta. Between 7 April and 6 August 2012, France again commanded the operation under the leadership of Rear Adm. Dupuis, who handed over the command of the operation to his Italian colleague Enrico Credendino. For some months after 12 April 2012, four French vessels were involved in Operation Atalanta. On 6 December 2013, in Djibouti, France – for the third time – took over the command of the operation's Task Force (TF) 465 under the leadership of Rear Adm. Hervé Bléjean for another four months.<sup>33</sup> Under French leadership, the Amphibious Landing Dock (ALD) *Siroco*'s multinational staff proved to be able to successfully cope not only with combating the pirates, but also the training of personnel from African states that cooperated with EUNAVFOR, showing that both the European operation as well as the French naval forces in the region are capable of development and renewal. This has been proven to date by countless examples. The French frigate *La Fayette*, currently serving under the ALINDIEN<sup>34</sup>, contributed to the success of Atalanta – through the suppression, deterrence, and prevention of piracy – in the Indian Ocean.<sup>35</sup>

For the forces taking part in the national and international cooperative effort, special watercraft is needed to bring firepower to bear, and prevent the pirates from succeeding or to attempt to free hostages. Arresting pirates, bringing them to justice and sentencing them appear to be complicated even today, despite the fact that there is now an international

<sup>30</sup> "Atalante: 35 pirates interceptés en trois jours par la frégate Nivôse". France, Ministry of Defence. 3 July 2010. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/07-03-10-atalante-35-pirates-interceptes-en-trois-jours-par-la-fregate-nivose>, Accessed on 19 February 2018.

<sup>31</sup> "Atalante: la France prend le commandement de la force maritime européenne: vidéo". France, Ministry of Defence. 17 August 2010. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france-prend-le-commandement-de-la-force-maritime-europeenne-video>, Accessed on 19 February 2018.

<sup>32</sup> "Atalante: la France rend le commandement de la force de l'opération". France, Ministry of Defence. 18 December 2010. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france-rend-le-commandement-de-la-force-de-l-operation>, Accessed on 19 February 2018.

<sup>33</sup> "Piraterie: la France prend le commandement de la force Atalante". France, Ministry of Defence. 6 December 2013. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/piraterie-la-france-prend-le-commandement-de-la-force-atalante2>, Accessed on 19 February 2018.

<sup>34</sup> Amiral commandant de la zone maritime de l'océan Indien et les forces maritimes de l'océan Indien.

<sup>35</sup> "Opération Atalante: la frigate La Fayette reçoit le commandant adjoint de l'opération". France, Ministry of Defence. 18 April 2018. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/operation-atalante-la-fregate-la-fayette-recoit-le-commandant-adjoint-de-l-operation>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.

agreement that makes it possible. On 6 March 2009, the EU and Kenya signed an agreement ordering persons accused of piracy in the framework of Operation Atalanta to be taken to Kenya and be tried in court there. The Seychelles Islands can also be counted on in this regard, although pirates are often set free there<sup>36</sup>. In the battle against piracy the most common strategy is eliminating the mother ship. There seem to be some options for commercial ships, too. They can, for instance, increase speed, or can attempt to cross the danger zone when strong wind is producing high waves that set the pirates back. Some shipping offices have begun to employ armed security guards, and there is also an interesting method that could be called maritime electric fences. This device surrounds the body of the ship and causes an electric shock, which may offer efficient protection. If, despite all precautions, the pirates' attack is successful, ransom negotiations begin and may take weeks, even months. The ransom may be dropped with a parachute but if food and fuel also feature among the negotiated claims, it can be delivered by ship. The most important factor during a negotiation is to guarantee safety for the crew and the passengers, i.e. human life, which the pirates also take advantage of.<sup>37</sup>

For decades France has been maintaining constant military presence in the Indian Ocean, whilst in the Gulf of Aden the country is active in the frameworks of both national and multinational operations. ALINDIEN is in charge of the command of naval forces in the Indian Ocean maritime zone which extends from the Red Sea and West Africa to the Philippines as well as East Vietnam. Apart from military control these forces actively provide intense defence diplomacy. The active participation of the French Navy in the Indian Ocean increased in the Gulf War of the 1990s and has not ceased since. The fight against Afghan terrorism also took place in this context, as well as aiding the victims of the tsunami that occurred on 26 December 2004. After December 2001, on the basis of the report by Control Naval Volontaire,<sup>38</sup> France set in motion an information channel for ships, battleships and their crews in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. By promoting interactions between the civilian sphere and the military, this helps avoid potential threats or efficiently tackle them. The idea was also adopted by EU Operation Atalanta, which launched the Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) with Northwood, UK, as its headquarters; they can offer help to all vessels in the zone and a kind of passive protection, thanks to its website. The MSCHOA has proven to be useful: due to their advice a huge percentage of ships have avoided pirate attacks when crossing the high-risk territory.<sup>39</sup>

## CONCLUSION

After the turn of the millennium the EU appeared as a new player in international crisis management. The EUNAVFOR operation, launched in December 2008, can be considered as one of the largest-scale military operations of the EU as I view it. The success of the integration's foreign and defence policy was particularly palpable in this operation, in which

<sup>36</sup> Moreover, besides these two countries EUNAVFOR, during their operations, is already cooperating with Tanzania, Uganda, Djibouti, Oman, Madagascar and Mauritius.

<sup>37</sup> "Lutter contre la piraterie". France, Ministry of Defence. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/>. Accessed on 3 June 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Voluntary Navy Control (VNC)

<sup>39</sup> "Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa". MSCHOA. <http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us>, Accessed on 3 June 2018.



France had an important role from the very outset, and according to relevant literature: the French state viewed itself as one of the most decisive participants in it. Apart from the EU integration's operation France flourished in the region on its own, too – for instance, within the framework of the above-mentioned ALINDIEN. In addition, in the course of the EU-NAVFOR, France took initiative on several occasions and proved to be successful, showing that France prefer(red) to go its own separate ways from their European partners (too). As an example of the latter, they launched an information channel for ships, naval vessels and their crews in the Pacific and Indian Ocean after December 2001, on the basis of which the still active and successfully operating MSCHOA was introduced; or another example is the EPE Seychelles mission.

In light of the above we can state that in the course of the multinational naval operation of the European integration not only military but also diplomatic and legislative means were used to fight the Somali pirates. With its naval forces France successfully participated in the operation – due to its nature, often in an unorthodox manner – in order to fight the asymmetric challenge of the day in a greatly altered security environment.

When talking of today's Somalia, it is no longer pirate attacks that come to our mind, since piracy as such has shifted to the region of the Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asian waters. Nonetheless, in my opinion it is indisputable that as long as there is a chance for piracy to occur in the African continent, as it occurred in the case of Somalia, there will be pirates as well.

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Zsolt Csutak:

## STRATEGIC REPOSITIONING OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY: IS THERE A 'TRUMP DOCTRINE' ON THE HORIZON?

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*ABSTRACT: The core interests, strategic guidelines of the United States and the priorities of the American president are also elaborated and expressed in the key documents of National Security and Defence Strategy, which are accurately scrutinized and analysed both by the allied and rival, challenging powers of the United States. Following the rather passive and restrained interest assertion of the Obama administration's foreign and security policies, the incumbent Trump presidency tends to show more power, resoluteness as well as quite unpredictable measures and controversial strategic framework in the ever-changing arena of international affairs. Many analysts claim that the new American administration tends to focus primarily on preserving the relative American economic and absolute military primacy, and the global status quo without any clear future vision or strategic set of objectives that would be desirable from a super-power. A question quite frequently emerges whether a Trump-doctrine is due to get into shape or it is rather totally out of scope for the time being?*

*KEYWORDS: American National Security and Defence Strategy, Trump, strategy, global affairs*

*“As long as I am President, the servicemen and women who defend our Nation will have the equipment, the resources, and the funding they need to secure our homeland, to respond to our enemies quickly and decisively, and, when necessary, to fight, to overpower, and to always, always, always win.”*

President Donald J. Trump<sup>1</sup>

### SETTING THE STRATEGIC AGENDA

Without doubt the Americans are considered to be masters of strategy making as well as of efficient implementation of theory in practice, as their militant historical records have significantly manifested it along the past centuries. The primary set of political thoughts and the important repository of special guidelines which would determine the national security concerns, the foreign political span as well as the various sector-driven professional military objectives are supposed to be elaborated and projected through the National Security Strategy

<sup>1</sup> President Trump's declaration from December, 2017, as also cited in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C.: The White House Press Office, 2017. 24. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, Accessed on 12 September 2018.

(hereinafter, NSS) and the National Defence Strategy (NDS) of the American government. Furthermore, as far as military affairs are concerned, the National Military Strategy as the document of key military doctrines is of outstanding importance as well, though for the time being, the Trump administration has not presented a document of this kind, yet. The delivery of the forthcoming and similarly important legislatively mandated Quadrennial Defence Review<sup>2</sup> has also seemed to be delayed for the time being ever since 2018 by the incumbent Trump administration, which might as well reflect a certain level of vague reluctance from the part of the Defence community of the American administration.

The primary intention of this paper is to provide a brief analytic overview of the above-mentioned two key strategic documents and the intellectual setting behind them as well as to put their contents into the context of international affairs and security studies, concerning the position of the United States in the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium. Moreover, we would like to inquire whether the decisions made in the foreign and security political dimensions of the new American administration may outline the formation of some sort of intellectual strategic framework that may be labelled as a new doctrine or it is just an exaggerated assumption, a perception without any sensible fundament.

A nationwide grand strategy, as Sir Basil Liddell Hart<sup>3</sup> put it aptly, serves the long-term interest of any nation accumulating and aligning all the necessary resources for achieving the primary set of objectives of the strategy, elaborated by the civilian government and, nonetheless if necessary assisted and carried out by the military. Strategy, though its ancient Greek term “stratēgos”<sup>4</sup> derives from the context and sphere of military science, cannot be separated or analysed solely in itself without the broader dimensions of political science, international affairs, and security studies. As the two ancient Greek fathers of military historiography, Thucydides and Xenophon had already stated in their much-revered works from the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C., without a solid strategy and political, military plans no state can exist or even survive. Based on their intellectual setting, according to many political realist theoreticians and strategists the rights of the states and their citizens derive basically from their power projection abilities, which implies the effective combination of political will and military might.<sup>5</sup>

This stance and condition have not changed significantly ever since the early times of humanity, when the first state formations got into shape about 5 thousand years ago in ancient Egypt, China or Mesopotamia up to the emergence of real global powers, like the British Empire, the Soviet Union, or predominantly the United States. Based upon the commonly shared neo-realistic political attitude as well as the classical idea of anarchistic global theatre determined by sovereign powers on the stage of international relations, the current position and strategic dimension of the United States deliberately fits into this old-new state-centric paradigm. Namely, the United States of America managed by the Trump administration tends to emphasize her inherent, primordial right and duty to protect and assert her genuine own economic and political interests through all means available and feasible.

<sup>2</sup> *Quadriennial Defence Review*. U.S. Department of Defense. <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/QDR/>

<sup>3</sup> Hart, B.L. *Strategy*, London: Tannenberg, 2016. 490.

<sup>4</sup> Greek term of military scientist often used by Thucydides in his master work. Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. London: Penguin, 1973.

<sup>5</sup> Moran D. “A stratégiaelmélet és a hadviselés története”. In Bayliss, J. et al. (eds.). *A stratégia a modern korban: bevezetés a stratégiai tanulmányokba*. Budapest: Zrínyi, 2005. 30-35.

The new American national security and defence strategies were revealed during the first and second year of the incumbent Trump presidency, mostly reflecting the visions and strategic guidelines of the top American executives, think tanks in the new Republican government of Donald Trump, whose rather strident and scandalous presidential style has rung quite many bells among the military and national security leaders – also called as the community of intelligence services. As it is well known, the big news of the 2018 Christmas season from Washington proved to be that the outstanding “Triade of Generals”, as they were labelled by the media<sup>6</sup>, came to an end in the Trump administration with the rather forced resignation of General James Mattis, the former powerful Secretary of Defence of the US, also following the departure of general H.R. McMaster from the National Security Council, and of general John Kelly from the Chief of Staff position of the White House. Without any further investigation of the details and causes of their resignations, it can obviously be stated that the above-mentioned outstanding military leaders and scholars manifested enormous intellectual impact as well as practical importance in elaborating the above mentioned key national security and military documents of the United States.

Strategy analysis classically proves to be of outstanding importance in order to obtain a deeper insight into the thoughts, visions and presumably of the future measures of any country or organization, not to mention a super-power, such as the United States. Perhaps, when President Trump, before saying farewell to his top general advisors and secretaries, may have read about the famous witty remark attributed to former French president Clemenceau that strategy is much more important than to be allowed only for generals to deal with it.<sup>7</sup> Among many others, even the great Prussian war strategist von Clausewitz confirmed that politics permeates the military, warfare and strategy making as well, essentially it is part of the political sphere, so, evidently it is not supposed to be the task of military leaders, either primarily or exclusively.<sup>8</sup>

The US proves to be a strategy-driven nation and this prevailing national trait presumably stems from the missionary Puritan tradition of many Americans, as well as their pragmatism of living up to certain objectives along clear-cut values and core interests. The extensive American state administration abounds in various national and sector-specific strategies. For instance, since 2005 even the large and highly influential Intelligence Community of the US, consisting of 17 different agencies and institutes, has had its own strategic document, the globally unique National Intelligence Strategy<sup>9</sup> of the US, compiled by the Director of National Intelligence. The primary role of the Office of the DNI is to coordinate and adjust the operation of the various agencies in accordance with the previously elaborated strategic framework, similarly to the task of the Chairman of the Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Joseph F. Dunford) to elaborate and implement the rather restricted operational guidelines of the National Military Strategy<sup>10</sup> also outlined broadly and more overtly in the National Defence Strategy of the US.

<sup>6</sup> Johnson-Freese, J. “Too Many Generals in the Trump administration?”. *Breaking Defense*. 7 August 2017. <https://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/too-many-generals-in-trump-administration/>, Accessed on 10 December 2018.

<sup>7</sup> Brodie, B. *War and Politics*. London: Pearson, 1973. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, C. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1989. 28-30.

<sup>9</sup> *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States*. Washington D. C., 2005. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/CHCO/nis.pdf>, Accessed on 12 September 2018.

<sup>10</sup> Mehta, A. “The Pentagon’s National Military Strategy is done, and it’s unclear if the public will ever see it”. *Defence News*. 13 February 2019. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/13/the-pentagons-national-military-strategy-is-done-and-its-unclear-if-the-public-will-ever-see-it/>, Accessed on 1 April 2019.

Notwithstanding, reading both recent American strategies, they quite share an abundance of much-quoted Trump remarks in first person singular and more than rhetoric guidelines, similarly to the famous 2002 America strategy, a collection of thoughts deeply influenced by president George W. Bush and his hawkish, belligerent neoconservative consultants. Compared to the blatantly militant administration of President George W. Bush, and the much more reserved, softer and even disoriented strategy of president Obama, the foreign political thinking of Donald J. Trump seems to be more realistic, pragmatically transactionist, as his critiques would put it aptly from an American, business-oriented point of view. The missionary and rather messianic Wilsonian idea of “making the world safe for democracy” and of spreading the American values and lifestyle seems to be neglected if not totally abandoned by the new American president, who is considered to be an outsider from the centuries old bi-partisan Establishment of Washington D.C. as well as quite an alien from the neoconservative, over-ideologized, even religious zeal of President Reagan and of George H. W. Bush.<sup>11</sup> Obviously, Donald Trump proves to be utterly different from his predecessors, not only in style and rhetoric but also in handling the state affairs of the United States, nevertheless, the set of priorities and strategic objectives for the state he presides seem to be remaining unvaried. Consequently, we can assert that the new, 21<sup>st</sup> century American strategic repositioning of the United States can be derived personally from the thoughts, political visions, and agenda of President Donald Trump as well as from the military expertise and academic education of his top general aides just recently abandoned. Taken into account the rhetoric manners of several presidents from the last century, the much cited catchy yet rather controversial and protectionist slogan of Trump, namely to “Make America Great Again” and “America First” actually proved to be the primary concern and political grand strategy of all American presidents in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, only not so much conspicuously or sometimes even frantically emphasized as done by President Trump. Moreover, his blunt remarks since October 2018 on the probability of a reinvigorated arms race as well as of nuclear missile build-up among the USA, China and Russia also reflect his resolute willingness to involve the US into a controversial and costly challenging game for global supremacy against his rivals.<sup>12</sup>

It is also noteworthy that despite the prevailing decline theory, particularly popular among neoliberal economists and challenging rival powers of the US – that would evidently include China, Russia or even the EU – in terms of global military power projection, political and even economic output and importance America is still the undisputed leading super power, also keeping the 20<sup>th</sup> century wisdom still valid that in global affairs no one can do politics without or against the will of the United States.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Schmitz, D. F. *Brent Scowcroft: Amerika a nemzetközi arénában Vietnám után*. Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2017. 270.

<sup>12</sup> Watkins, E. and Vazquez, M. “Trump threatens nuclear buildup until other nations ‘come to their senses’”. CNN. 24 October 2018. <https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2018/10/22/politics/donald-trump-russia-china-inf/index.html>, Accessed on 10 March 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Nye, J. S. *Véget ér-e az amerikai évszázad?* Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2017.

## THE 'OLD-NEW' STRATEGIC GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED STATES

In the next pages we are going to scrutinize briefly the present and foreseeable future theory and practice of the American national strategies, considered to be the intellectual guidelines as well as the national security and military frameworks of the 21<sup>st</sup> century American global positioning, determined by the visions of the Trump administration.

Naturally, many international and domestic analyses have already dealt with presenting the detailed content-driven and semantic structure of the American strategies,<sup>14</sup> thus in the forthcoming pages as projected above, we would like to focus on the strategic, national interest-centric analysis of these key documents in the matter, obviously with their global outlook and possible implications.

As also stated before and emphasized by many analysts and critics so far dealing with examining the foreign and security political agenda of the Trump administration, at first sight it seems to be a rather isolationist and protectionist policy reflected primarily in the renegotiated and reshaped American trade agreements with the European Union, Canada, Mexico and, most importantly with the great rival power, China.

However, taking a deeper and closer glimpse into the American stance and attitude in this respect, it might reveal that most of the reset deals and treaties were justified and necessary steps for asserting and protecting the core American interests. Naturally, the controversy arises as soon as we start to discuss about the nature of core interests of a super-power the size and influence of the United States, involving the abundance of versatile interests, political agenda and objectives.

According to several professional academic analysts out of the White House perimeter, like the outstanding liberal political scientist and security strategy analyst Barry Posen at MIT, the Trump administration is outlining the framework of a basically new kind of foreign and security policy paradigm, with new style and category without the ideological load and content and even visionary objectives of the previous American administrations. It may be too early to refer to this paradigm as Trump doctrine, though academics like Posen tend to label it, rather sarcastically as Trumpean “illiberal American hegemony”.<sup>15</sup> Naturally, this political paradigm tends to rely on and stem from the odd, narcissistic personal features and the rather unique business-like attitude of the president, furthermore it is also based on the fundamentals of the previous administrations strategic foreign policy objectives with slightly restructured and repositioned priority ranks. Nevertheless, following the observation and thoughts of Posen on the new, post-modern American illiberal hegemony, it also suggests the idea that the United States reshaped by President Trump still wants to preserve the status of singular though pragmatic hegemon of the world without the ideological burden of the conservative Republicans, the missionary zeal of the neocons, or even much less of the liberal internationalist cosmopolitanism embodied by the leftist American Democrats.

<sup>14</sup> See also among others the author's recent comparative analysis of the American strategies, Csutak, Z. “Az Egyesült Államok helye a világban az új amerikai biztonsági és védelmi stratégiák tükrében”. *Hadtudomány* 2018. [http://mhdt.eu/hadtudomany/2018/2018\\_elektronikus/2018ecsutak.pdf](http://mhdt.eu/hadtudomany/2018/2018_elektronikus/2018ecsutak.pdf), Accessed on 10 December 2018. DOI 10.17047/HADTUD.2018.28.E.257

<sup>15</sup> See Posen, B. R. “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony. Trump's surprising Grand Strategy”. *Foreign Affairs* 97/2. 2018. 20-27. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-13/rise-illiberal-hegemony?fa\\_anthology=1123571](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-13/rise-illiberal-hegemony?fa_anthology=1123571), Accessed on 10 December 2018.



Furthermore, many strategic analysts like professor Posen and even the neocon ideologist William Kristol also assert that the military development projects of the incumbent administration as well as the newly shaped trade deals only tend to solidify and stabilize the present status quo and nothing else, without any clear-cut set of future strategic goals and, what is even more important, without visions for a 21<sup>st</sup> century United States. This argument, oddly enough, also nestles to the intellectual framework of the popular decline-theorists, who claim that the “Make America Great Again”-project basically deals with preserving and stabilizing the slow but sure decline of the United States, primarily in the global economic and political arena against the rising global powers of the East and the South.

The global direction of the American military and economic power projection seems to be consequently and increasingly significant as far as geopolitics is still concerned in the new era of global affairs. The old-new challenges and security threats posed by the rising powers of the East, namely by the global player China and the rogue state of North Korea with nuclear capabilities must be evidently addressed, strengthening the existing American ties with China’s rivals – India, Japan and naturally, Australia. Therefore, no doubt the importance of the Indo-Pacific region is emphasized and ranked as a key priority region also in the NSS,<sup>16</sup> since the decades-old power shift from the West to the East is also manifested in the hot zone of the South China Sea, which proves to be a potential future conflict-driven area between the US and China. Taken into account the rather tensed conditions prevailing in that busy and strategically important geographic region, almost all factors are set for a direct or indirect kinetic conflict to burst out between the facing big powers any time in the near future. In other words, the actual assertiveness and power status of America will be most presumably directly tested and challenged, so the emphasized presence of the US as a game-changer power shield cannot be decreased or pulled back without extremely negative and irreversible consequences for her Far Eastern allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and even The Philippines) as well as for the global American power status and position.<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, the NSS also emphasizes the rehashed importance of the European arena – *nota bene* it was quite considerably neglected by the Obama administration – where the American power positions seem to have been critically challenged recently by the muscled-up, rather expansionist Russia of president Putin, particularly in the East European region, stretching down from Estonia, the Baltic Sea, to Romania and to the Balkan peninsula with Turkey and the land-locked Black Sea around. Decision makers in Washington tend to realize that for the safety and security of the United States, it is quite important that the countries along the globally expanded American *frontier* regions in the Far East or Eastern Europe must have confidence in the shield and might of the United States. This feeling of security and feasible perception of power, especially of hard, deterring – military – power must be built up, maintained and demonstrated both for the allies and particularly for the opponent forces. All it takes is a considerable amount of money and time. From this respect, the Trump administration reversed the gradual withdrawal strategy from Europe of president Obama and initiated a quite significant military build-up project in Central and Eastern Europe covered by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) project, with an estimated annual

<sup>16</sup> National Security Strategy... 45.

<sup>17</sup> See Nye, J. S. *Véget ér-e az amerikai évszázad? 70-75.* and Mitchell, A. W. and Grygiel, J. J. *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies and the Crisis of American Power.* New York: Princeton University Press, 2017. 260-264.

budget of USD 7-9 billion for 2019,<sup>18</sup> which is a bigger amount than the combined Defence budget of the three Baltic and three Central European NATO member states in a year (with the only exception of Poland). From this vast closing-up military allocation the Ukrainian forces alone are expected to receive a 200-million-dollar grant for military gear development in 2019. Initially, the European Reassurance Initiative program from 2016 aimed at only softly containing Russia's expansion in her near-neighbourhood, former Soviet republics like Ukraine. Yet, the new American NDS also highlights the increased importance of improving and developing the deterring and rather lethal striking combined force capabilities of the American military in all key regions, such as Eastern Europe. All the same, many strategists and critics of the growing EDI claim that the American military build-up in Europe basically weakens and even jeopardizes the development of the European allies' own military capabilities. Following this claim, the rich and developed small and medium-size countries, apart from Germany and Poland, continuously and predominantly fail to comply even with their decades-old NATO obligation of 2% GDP Defence budget allocation.<sup>19</sup> This is, naturally a quite disillusioning fact that provides justified ground for the rather harsh, outspoken Trump arguments and critical remarks on the unwillingness and meek attitude of the European NATO allies to invest into their own defence projects.

As we referred to it, the personality and political philosophy of the president deeply affects the primary strategic guidelines and global positioning roadmap of the United States in many respects, thus it is advised to take into account the basic traits of President Trump, as well. From a military point of view, President Trump fits into the row of rather militant Republican presidents sharing their high respect and esteem towards the uniform and glorification of the American military achievements, nevertheless his presidential tenure seems to be overwhelmed by his defining trade-driven businessman-like attitude. Though the president used to be a very popular and even group-leader cadet in the prestigious New York Military Academy boarding school during his adolescence in the 1960's<sup>20</sup>, he definitely lacks the highly appreciated military field practice experience – unlike the revered war hero Bush family, with both father and son military pilots and American presidents. That fact provided enough room for several defamatory media speculations<sup>21</sup> and various gossiping in the Washington Establishment on his strategic decision making skills as commander-in-chief of the mightiest military force in the world.

As for his latest, the quite drastic and controversial order of partial withdrawal of the American ground forces from Syria and Afghanistan may not have been the best decision concerning the long-term American strategic interests in those war-stricken countries. Former Secretary of Defence Mattis also gently expressed his covert disapproval with??? the rather hurried executive order from December 2018 on the American troops' withdrawal lacking strategic reasoning and even forsaking key strategic partners of the US, like the

<sup>18</sup> Judson, J. "Funding to Deter Russia reaches \$6.5B in FY19 defense budget request". Defense News. 12 February 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-budget-request/>. Accessed on 20 December 2018.

<sup>19</sup> Posen. "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony..."

<sup>20</sup> See Robinson, M. "Trump says this private boarding school gave him more military training than the Army could — take a look". *Business Insider*, 15 December 2016. <https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-attended-new-york-military-academy-2016-12>, Accessed on 2 December 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Hart-Hunter, M. "What does 'Cadet Bone Spurs' mean? Trump's nickname was coined by Sen. Tammy Duckworth". 7 February 2018. <https://www.bustle.com/p/what-does-cadet-bone-spurs-mean-trumps-nickname-was-coined-by-sen-tammy-duckworth-8150101>, Accessed on 27 December 2018.

Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces group in Northern Syria.<sup>22</sup> Acts like this do not really serve the amical trust building perception among the allied partners of America, small but really important they might be, especially in key war-torn regions. As General Mattis proclaimed, reasserting President Trump's well-known view that America should not and cannot be the world's policeman, yet the US "must be resolute and unambiguous" towards opponent and allied powers, as well.<sup>23</sup> However, typically to the rather contradictory presidential tweets the pompous proclamation on social media that "I will make our Military so big, powerful & strong that no one will mess with us" following his inauguration in January 2016 conveys the assumption of President Trump that the US would remain the "sheriff in town" the unchallenged strongman of the world, who cannot and, basically does not intend to get rid of this role.<sup>24</sup>

When discussing grand strategies at national level and the ramification of the defined set of goals down to tactical and implementation levels, it is important for the decision makers to be consistent and reliable, otherwise it might result in strategic or operational malfunction and disorder. You cannot befriend with someone, even at state-level, whom you try to contain, deter and oppose at the same time, as it seems to be the case regarding the controversial relations of President Trump with Russia and even with some of her allies, not to mention the case of Syria and Afghanistan, without a clear strategic roadmap outlined for the United States.

As for the 21<sup>st</sup> century technological revolution and the expansion of the much-cited American frontier reaching up into the space, the festive proclamation of vice president Mike Pence as of August 27, 2018 about the inauguration of the American Space Force and the revitalization of the National Space Council was meant to be a noteworthy moment.<sup>25</sup> Although many experts regard the event as merely a symbolic act facing the future challenges from space posed by China and Russia rather than an effective and lethal 6<sup>th</sup> service branch of the American military as White House officials initially tended to label it. Nevertheless, it is a really significant step forward in transforming the military strategic thinking and focal points for the new, 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges, in accordance with the paradigm of Revolution in Military Affairs stating that non-kinetic power projection can be as important and efficient as the kinetic forces of conventional military units. The NDS as well as the NSS<sup>26</sup> emphasize the importance of new warfighting domains and types of warfare, such as cyberspace with electronic and cyber warfare, and the real space domain (which starts from an altitude of 100 km) around the globe, aiming to improve the competitive edge and deterrence, counter-strike operability of the American armed forces. Although the militarization of space *de jure* has still been illegal under the international Outer Space Treaty since 1967, practically

<sup>22</sup> Mattis, J. N. "Jim Mattis's letter to Trump". *New York Times*, 20 December 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/letter-jim-mattis-trump.html>, Accessed on 27 December 2018.

<sup>23</sup> Breuninger, K. "Mattis' Letter to Trump". CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/read-james-mattis-letter-to-trump-resigning-as-defense-secretary.html>, Accessed on 27 December 2018.

<sup>24</sup> Trump, D. J. "@realDonaldTrump: I will make our Military so big, powerful and strong that no one will mess us". Twitter, 24 January 2016. <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/691276412666261504>, Accessed on 10 November 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Lewin, S. "Plans for Space Force Laid Out at National Space Council Meeting". <https://www.space.com/42237-national-space-council-space-force-meeting.html>, Accessed on 2 December 2018.

<sup>26</sup> *National Defense Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018. <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, Accessed on 12 September 2018. 4-5. and *National Security Strategy* ... 31-32.

no state authority can really control or supervise outer space, *de facto* both the real as well as the cyber space domains are allegedly militarized and dominated by the three most significant global powers, namely the USA, China and Russia. Moreover, the elaboration and development details of the brand new space command or would-be 6<sup>th</sup> service branch are still unfolding with various pro and con arguments coming from the military command centres as well as from the Pentagon in this matter.

Another outstanding strategic defence issue concerns the modernization and development project initiative of the American nuclear triad, particularly of the quite sizable stockpile of obsolete, half-century-old Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as the reinvigoration of the operational deployment of short and medium-range tactical ballistic missiles, also galvanized by the Chinese and Russian build-up in this regard.<sup>27</sup> The Trumpean trend of the relentless renegotiation of trade deals as well as of defence-related treaties also affects the 1987 Soviet – American Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Since the American capabilities in this branch show considerable handicaps against the rising rival powers, this problem should be properly addressed from the perspective of revisited American security concerns. The treaty as considered *de facto* obsolete and ineffective was actually phased out in July, 2019 both by the US and Russia.

## FINAL THOUGHTS

Despite the rhetoric arguments and shifts in the political trend, the Trump administration's national security and Defence strategies show basic consistency with the guidelines of the previous executive documents of the Obama administration, although reflecting some significant alterations and shifts in priority ranking as well as in the emphasized military capability build-up and technological development projects. According to the initial campaign slogans and preliminary political vision of Donald J. Trump, his presidency tends to preserve the core values and interests of the United States as a super-power, by putting it on the top of the priority list by “making America great again”, a message which unintentionally reasserts and suggests the declining power theory-concept of the liberal opponents of President Trump. In many respects the United States needs serious refurbishment, rejuvenating development projects, particularly in domestic infrastructural and economic areas, which are all considered to be national security priorities and concerns according to the trade-centric attitude of the president reflected in the NSS, too.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, strengthening the vast American frontier-line stretching from the East European peripheries through the Far Eastern South-China Sea and even up to space is considered to be of outstanding importance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, since protecting the American interests should start at the peripheries, as President Trump's former under-secretary for Central and East European affairs Wess Mitchell pointed out remarkably.<sup>29</sup> The classic, 19<sup>th</sup>- and 20<sup>th</sup>-century defence strategic idea of the two-ocean shield is not sufficient and, as also proclaimed in the NSS, the “home country is not a sanctuary, either” anymore, especially after 9/11, and particularly with the

<sup>27</sup> Johnson, J. “China's missile build-up: a threat to U.S. bases in Japan: likely a key factor in Trump plan to exit INF”. *The Japan Times* 22 October 2018. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/22/asia-pacific/russia-blamed-china-real-reason-u-s-inf-exit/#.XCyHoVzQjDc>, Accessed on 29 November 2018.

<sup>28</sup> National Security Strategy ... 16.

<sup>29</sup> Mitchell and Grygiel. *The Unquiet Frontier...* 220-223.

rise of cyber-age threats.<sup>30</sup> According to this paradigm, enhancing the military capabilities and boosting the home country economy go hand in hand, these measures strengthen and promote each other. On the other hand, this seems to be enough just for preserving the transient power balance and the status quo and not for setting a new agenda and future vision for the United States. That is the reason why the above mentioned critiques of the Trump presidency and analysts of his core security documents tend to emphasize and pinpoint the lack of coherence and long-term strategic vision presented to the nation. As the much-quoted MIT professor Posen put it bluntly “President Trump’s grand strategy is about preserving American hegemony without a purpose”.<sup>31</sup> Obviously, being only at the mid-term of the Trump presidency, perhaps time is not ripening for making a statement on the existence of a possible Trump doctrine. Furthermore, other policy analysts like professor Brands from the Johns Hopkins University claim that the grand strategy of President Trump is basically the one also applied by his predecessor President George W. Bush and even partly by President Obama only in a much different political manner and coverage.<sup>32</sup> Altogether, the new American strategies tend to reiterate and share the classic idea of peace and American prosperity through power as well as power-balancing by preserving American supremacy against the rising challengers from the Asia-pacific mega region.

From all aspects taken into account, we can firmly concur that the utmost priority of the Trump administration both in its security and foreign political strategy relies on the quest for preserving the political, economic as well as military primacy of the United States on the world stage, where the only real challenger in all terms proves to be China. As the Beijing bureau chief of *The Economist*, David Rennie tweeted aptly from the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Chinese Navy: “After millennia as an agrarian civilization that saw the sea as a source of threats, China is becoming a maritime power. That could help shape this century.”<sup>33</sup> This kind of strategic presumption also defines the re-orientation of the American defence and foreign political focus into the fermenting Indo-Pacific region.

All the same, considering the presidential decisions made, the strategic guidelines presented through the core national documents, the renegotiated deals and a plethora of rather contradictory presidential tweets, we can assert that, typically to Donald Trump’s personality features as a leader, his doctrine is basically not to have one and to reject any constraints in any matter and policy, making his allies and, especially his adversaries constantly feel unease and adapt to the pace and rhythm set by his presidency. This rather flexible, dynamic and transactionist business-type leadership attitude also genuinely reflects the postmodern, ever-changing and flexible fashion of international relations in the new cyber-era. Nevertheless, the classic wisdom of the great leader Napoleon Bonaparte should not be neglected by President Trump, either, namely that “You can lead a nation if you provide them a vision of the future; the Leader must provide hope and clear goals.” As we could realize, the popular yet rather superfluous slogan of “America First” and “Make America Great Again” may be sufficient on presidential election campaign trail, yet might not be enough to fulfil the role of this kind of strategic set of vision and objectives for a super power nation like the United States of America...

(The analysis manuscript was closed in July, 2019)

<sup>30</sup> National Security Strategy... 12-14.

<sup>31</sup> Posen. “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony...”

<sup>32</sup> Brands, H. *American Grand Strategy in the age of Trump*. Washington D. C.: Brookings Inst., 2018. 65-70.

<sup>33</sup> Rennie, D. “@DSORennie: After millennia as an agrarian civilisation...” Twitter, 26 April 2019. <https://twitter.com/DSORennie/status/1121686136244408320>, Accessed on 27 April 2019.

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## REPOSITORY OF CAPABILITIES: REPORT ON THE NON-KINETIC CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES

It has become almost a cliché to remark that our international environment and, in line with it, the tools of modern warfare have been undergoing changes. The need for modernization and development of the forces is constant, the technological transformation of defence capabilities is continuous, but in the interconnected world the scientific and analytical-assessing capacities essential for understanding the strategic environment are under pressure. The development and interconnection of non-kinetic capabilities and their influence on the security of certain countries, regions and federal systems are sometimes in line with the effects of traditional military interventions, thus the development of effective responses, technologies and strategies has become a top priority. The scientific conference entitled “*Operational Success without Arms: Expanding Non-Kinetic Capabilities of the Force*”, held on November 07-08 2018 organized jointly by the Honvéd General Staff’s Scientific Research Centre of Preparatory and Training Command and Szent István University of Gödöllő, provided an opportunity to gain an insight into a vital segment of changes and the modern trends of their practical implementation.

The primary goal of the conference was to highlight the fact: our strategic vision should be based on data as reliable as possible and information gained from primary sources with the use of modern technologies in line with the knowledge of non-kinetic warfare tools. The intentional online presence, following the tendencies of non-kinetic abilities and the continuous development of our existing capabilities both in cyberspace and in reality, comprises important cornerstones of the success of the defence sector, they will contribute to our ability to effectively accomplish our tasks, to raise the level of understanding between the civil and military sectors and the ongoing and future co-operation to the highest possible level.

In his welcome speech Mr Pál Kádár, PhD, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, stressed that the changes taking place in the international security situation make it necessary for us not only to respond to the challenges, but also to proactively prevent them. A forum like this will offer a good opportunity to do so. In his view, the “system of the national defence is not capable of standing on its own feet, it is not sufficient to develop the military capabilities in order to defend the country. It is a complex system, some of its elements do not fall within the competence of the Ministry of Defence but the innovative solutions and the ideas this sector is supposed to provide will help the entire national defence to build its capabilities”.

In his opening address Lieutenant General Gábor Böröndi, PhD, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces, stressed that the resilience of a state and society is best illustrated by the success of its diplomacy, the strength of its economy, and the effectiveness of its intelligence and army. Therefore, in hybrid warfare, the attackers target the population to discourage them from following their leaders. He recalled the operational achieve-



ments of the Hungarian Defence Forces, which had been accomplished without fighting, such as the performance of border guard duties that started in 2015, in which the Defence Forces CIMIC and PSYOPS and military intelligence capabilities were largely involved as, due to their activities, the Hungarian society supported the work of the Hungarian Police and the Defence Forces. Although this work was not of a showy kind, it greatly contributed to the success of the operation.

In the opening remarks, Ferenc Magyar, the Chancellor of Szent István University, emphasized the close ties between the University and the Hungarian Defence Forces stretching back decades, which is further strengthened by the ongoing research programmes. He emphasized that the concept of security is now more broadly understood and goes far beyond the political, military and social approaches and is complemented, for example, by the security of the sustainable environment, economy, food and water. At the same time, he defined the task to establish the security as a common social interest, in which all actors must be involved; the Hungarian Defence Forces will rely on the knowledge accumulated by civilian research centres and universities.

The first plenary lecturer, Major General Prof. József Padányi, DSc, analysed the impact of climate change on the military forces (*"The impact of climate change on military force"*). He explained how some armies contributed to global warming, and he also reviewed that the challenges and tasks the environmental changes pose to the troops are not purely military in nature. As a second plenary lecturer, Colonel Imre Porkoláb, PhD, addressed the relationship between the innovation and non-kinetic capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces (*"Innovation and the development of non-kinetic abilities in the Hungarian Defence Forces"*). The last plenary lecturer was Colonel Tibor Rózsa, PhD, who discussed one of the most complex forms of the non-kinetic warfare of our time (*"Theory and Evolution of Information Operations"*). He presented the theory and evolution of information operations in detail, as well as the influence operations in this context, then he covered the topic of the future challenges the information operations will face.

The first of a series of lectures in the special area of competence was held jointly by Lieutenant Colonel Gábor Hangya, PhD, and Major Ferenc Soucz (*"Non-kinetic Abilities from the Perspective of Hungarian Defence Forces – Correlation of Theory and Practice"*). They studied the concept of non-kinetic abilities from the perspective of the Hungarian Defence Forces and the international (primarily allied) conceptual approaches, and demonstrated the possible utilization of the abilities at national level through the work of the HDF Civil-Military Collaboration and Psychological Operations Center by showing practical examples. Then Ferenc Mező, PhD, Head of the Institute of Psychology of Eszterházy Károly University, spoke on the realization of a possible civil-military cooperation and its benefits gained from the database of psychological operations he had developed (*"An example of psychological warfare – roaming through the war, psychology paths, mazes of history"*). Major Márta Pákozdi, researching the career choice motivations of the health care professionals and staff serving in military health system, has shown that, in addition to a secure livelihood, professional and moral appreciation can play a role in the development of the labour force maintaining capability of the Defence Forces. In her lecture (*"The motivation of career choice of the professionals and staff serving in the military health system"*), she highlighted that the career development support in high-quality work continues to play a key role.

Subsequent lectures explored the various aspects of security and the factors influencing them. First, a complex rural security approach based on the security concept of the Copen-

hagen School was given particular attention to in the lecture held by Colonel Prof. Tibor Szilágyi, PhD, and Colonel Gábor Boldizsár, PhD, (*“Operational Success without a Weapon or Rural Security Alert”*). In connection with this, Csaba Bognár analysed the latest trends in bioterrorism (*“Bioterrorism, The Latest Trend in Bioterrorism”*) and finally Péter Miletics presented the population movements triggered by climate change in the Carpathian Basin (*“Chapters of the Climate Change-driven Migration History of the Carpathian Basin”*). Examining and understanding these ongoing processes that are currently taking place and affecting the communities will allow them to timely prepare for the challenges they will face.

The most crucial lectures delivered on the first day of the conference addressed the topics of non-kinetic threats, such as social media and data analysis that are popular even with the laic audience. György Körmendi depicted the latest techniques and trends in the analysis of unstructured data sets generated by law enforcement by using some case studies (*“Artificial intelligence and data analysis are going to be deployed”*). In this context, Gergely Takács presented how different data mining methods can be utilized in the sphere of national security (*“Big Data Analysis Methods in the National Security Sector”*). At the end of the section, Second Lieutenant Balázs Lóderer, PhD, presented (*“SOCMINT”*) how to exploit the methods of analysing and defending social media in modern warfare such as creating a noisy dataset, application of different structures, and separation of data systems.

The first lecture on the second day of the conference was delivered by Péter Balogh, PhD, (*“Armed Forces (Development) and Trust (Building): Capability Building as a Social Embedding Operation”*). He discussed how the Defence Force was being (re)embedded into society and how this process was taking place as a specific non-kinetic operation affecting the inclusive society. András Jung, PhD, presented the latest tools of mobile spectral imaging, their international and domestic applications, and their possible uses, with the title *“Spectral Imaging Systems in Remote Sensing and in the Field Data Collection”*, underlining that the gap between data collection and decision making will be decreased by making the remote sensing data chain more closed, therefore more accurate results are expected.

Colonel Zoltán Jobbágy, PhD, in his lecture entitled *“Non-War Operations, Non-Kinetic Skills: The British Mission Command”* presented the British characteristics of NATO’s mission-oriented leadership philosophy. Subsequently, László Szelke, PhD, presented Operation Bodyguard, a disinformation operation which sought to divert the attention of the German General Staff from operation Overlord and as part of it, he presented the actors and the plans of operation Zeppelin and the plans of the Balkan invasion, (*“Information and Disinformation Operations in World War II”*). The closing lecture was held by Lieutenant Colonel Norbert Hegedűs, aiming to optimize the operation of the territorial reserve system (*“Geographical aspects and projections of the voluntary territorial reserve system”*).

Subsequently, Lieutenant Colonel Csanádi outlined to what extent intelligence affects the success of military activity and the seriousness of cybernetic blasts on which they are based (*“How Painful Weapon is Information?”*). Colonel László Keszely, PhD, presented the co-ordinated and joint use of civil, military and law enforcement capabilities as a non-kinetic ability of national defence, emphasizing the importance of the role of national defence management (*“Cooperating with Civil and Law Enforcement Agencies as Non-Kinetic Defence Ability”*). In the closing contribution of the conference (*“The link between cryptocurrencies and terrorism”*), Major Klára Fekete-Karydis (Res.) outlined the features of cyberspace and the stages relevant to cyber defence in the international security architectures, including the regulations that are in force in Hungary and the requirements imposed

on them. In addition to presenting the background, she sought to find out whether, besides the financial sector and terrorism, there could be other points of attachment between the new technology and Armed Forces Development Program.

## SUMMARY

The presentations at the conference reflect the importance of witnessing a slow change in attitude in which military and civilian capabilities that used to be strictly separated are now not only complementary but also in most cases an indispensable combination of crisis management tools, creating a complex operational environment. The symposium provided an excellent opportunity to share the knowledge accumulated during the application of non-kinetic capabilities of the defence forces, it allowed to renew, develop and update the strategic background, as well as presented new areas that came to the fore last year and the Hungarian Defence Forces can have a practical benefit from. The research, focusing on these issues, professional plenary sessions and discussions were and are useful because within the framework of National Defence and Armed Forces Development Program Zrínyi 2026, the portfolio's core aim is to summarize, process and implement the theoretical and, in particular, practical lessons learned during the modernization process. In addition to the representatives of military sciences, the researchers of diverse interdisciplinary areas and the participants of the private sector were involved in the conference. This event was a great example of civil-military cooperation since it is essential for the Hungarian Defence Forces – as an integral part of the society – to look for new alternatives of the cooperation in order to carry out its missions and activities and to achieve its objectives in the most efficient way possible.

Maj Zoltán Somodi:

## NIHILISM OR ISLAMIC JIHAD?


Oliver Roy's theory on the roots of European jihadism

Olivier Roy's most recent book on the nature of contemporary jihad is a summary and further development of his idea, the "Islamization of radicalism". It claims that Islamic religion is not the main motivating force behind jihadi violence; in fact, jihadists possess only a low level of religious knowledge. Instead, it is their pre-existing radicalism and nihilism that find Islam as a framework to channel their frustration and fulfil their revolutionary and nihilistic desire for death and destruction. Disagreeing with scholars who explain this form of violence via a line of thought descending from authentic, sacred religious texts through Ibn Taymiyya and Sayeed Qutb to Osama bin Laden, he uses a cross-cutting approach, and compares jihadism to other forms of violent radicalism, like self-destruction and doomsday cults, claiming that these are somehow similar to Islamic radicalism.

On the nature of religious fundamentalism, his position is that this alone will not result in violence. Fundamentalists may promote a radical break from society, but do not necessarily turn to violence. As an example, Hasidic Jews or Benedictine Catholics are comparable to "most Salafists", by which he means the non-violent ones. Arguably, it would be useful to differentiate between types of fundamentalism based on the difference between the actual fundaments, where the respective movements want to return, but Roy's contextual approach leads us away from discussing core doctrinal foundations. Touching on the problem of "religious radicalization" and "moderate religion", he writes that it hardly makes sense to write about a moderate theology, since there is no moderate religion only moderate followers.

One of his central thoughts that raises questions in the reader is the distinction between terrorists and jihadis. His hypothesis is that terrorists are a subset of jihadis, and the main distinguishing factor appears to be the geographical location of their death. "Terrorists" commit their attacks in the West, whereas "jihadis" go to wage war in the Middle East, and fight for the foundation and expansion of the Caliphate. Another difference would be the level of their connectedness, since jihadis are recruited over the internet, but nearly all terrorists are connected to jihadist organizations, like al-Qaeda or ISIS.

This imaginary differentiation between the subgroups of jihadis is harmless as long as no government policy is founded upon it. However, it is somewhat disturbing to think about certain Western European gov-



ernments' completely flawed and mistaken approach of letting jihadis back to their countries and trying to "integrate" them, instead of doing their best to keep them as far away from Europe as possible. It appears as if the word "jihadi" had less negative connotations than the popular euphemism "terrorist", they almost appear as timeless revolutionaries, embedded in a so-called nihilistic "youth culture", using and abusing the framework of an otherwise harmless ideology to channel their fervour.

Perhaps the hardest statement to agree with is "What fascinates is pure revolt, not the construction of a utopia. Violence is not a means. It is an end in itself." The appropriate jihadi label reminds us of their goal, which is global Islamic world order based on the sovereignty of Allah and sharia law. It is their goal which is important and not their means (violence) or theatre of operations. Roy also maintains that "everyone and everything" is an enemy for the Islamic radicals, but this is questionable. For instance, we can look at jihadists (some of them would be called "terrorists" by Roy) who let those hostages go who are clearly Muslim, and can recite the Quran, and kill only the *kuffar*. Their violence is not indiscriminate at all, it is carefully selective, and their targets are only the kafir civilization, heretics and apostates. Collateral damage is possible, but they should never be looked at as intended targets.

Another debate where Roy clearly positions himself is whether the content of Islamic religious texts is important in the radicalization of individual Muslims. His claim is that while "an Islamophobic segment" thinks that there is no such thing as moderate Islam, traditional Muslim authorities, liberal Muslims, and secular state authorities "try to draw a dividing line between a good Islam, that rejects terrorism and gives jihad a spiritual definition, and a radical Salafi, Wahhabi Islam that is the seedbed of terrorism and jihadism." Indeed, this is the core of the problem, and a main dividing line between agreeing and disagreeing with Roy. On several occasions throughout the book, Roy mentions the lack of proper religious knowledge of Western jihadis, and their poor command of Arabic as one of its main reasons.

This is a somewhat surprising critique from a scholar who himself does not speak Arabic. So, the question boils down to the core problem whether it is possible to comprehend the message of Islam without speaking Arabic and going through the traditional learning process with some religious authority whose knowledge we accept as more authentic than ours, or not. However, if we accept Roy's idea that "the question is not: 'What does the Quran really say?' but rather: 'What do Muslims say about what the Quran says?'," then we end up needing to choose from one Muslim theologian's opinion or the other's.

The lack of a professional command of Quranic Arabic makes this choice all the more difficult, and the unfortunate reality is that neither the traditional Muslim authorities, nor liberal Muslims, nor secular state authorities are in the position to tell what is true Islam and what is not. None of their opinions is more authentic than those of others, although some can be more appealing to our ears, especially if they reject so-called "terrorism" and define jihad as a spiritual struggle. The usual problem these traditional authorities and liberal or secular Muslims encounter is that their definition of terrorism is quite ambiguous, and they have limited success in supporting their claims with authentic and truly authoritative religious sources. Therefore, these are simply opinions, and even if they were shared by the majority of Muslims, Islam is not a creation of a majority decision, but of divine revelation and Muhammad's example.

The book certainly brings the debate on contemporary jihadis forward and has several points that can be welcomed by critics and enthusiasts alike. The fact that volunteers travelling to the Middle Eastern jihad fronts are called what they are, jihadis, and not terrorists, insurgents, foreign fighters, or militants is already positive, even if their terminological sepa-

ration from so-called “terrorists” on Western home fronts can be disputed. In the conclusions part the author stresses another important point, that deradicalization programs are unlikely to be a successful strategy. He also acknowledges that jihadism is not rooted in former colonial history or economic problems, but then positions Islam only as a framework for the channelling of a pre-existing nihilism, and definitely not as the cause of political violence.

Roy’s book leaves one wonder why exactly Islam is the preferred framework for today’s nihilists, and certainly leaves the question unanswered, what we can do to protect ourselves from this “Islamized radicalism”. Even if we agree with Roy’s assessment that Western, second generation “jihadists and terrorists” alike are in fact nihilist rebels in search of a cause, we must not forget that Western-born nihil-jihadists are but a fragment of the world’s community of global jihad, and we are left guessing why young Muslims grown up in entirely different social and cultural circumstances also end up fighting side by side with them for the same political goals.

*Olivier Roy: Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. New York, NY. Oxford University Press, 2017, 130 pages, ISBN 9781849046985*

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Use double quotation marks for quotations. Long quotations (40 words or more) are usually indented and blocked, without quotation marks. Do not use italics in these indented paragraphs. Use square brackets to indicate authors’ insertions and changes to the original. Additional emphases are noted as [my italics/emphasis]. Omitted text is indicated by an ellipsis in square brackets [...]

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*Footnote and reference list:* Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Chief of the General Staff (hereafter CGS) 607, CGS/3/2/1Vol. 1, CGS Adjutant General (hereafter AG), 6 June 1952.

*Subsequent reference to this archival group can be made as follows:* DOD Archives, CGS/3/2/1Vol. 1, CGS-AG, 6 June 1952.

### Journal article

Last name, Initials. “Title of Article”. *Journal Title* Vol./Nr. Year. pages. DOI.

*Examples:*

*Footnote:* Scholtz, L. “The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola, 1987–1988”. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 38/1. 2010. 79.

*Subsequent reference:* Scholtz. “The South African Strategic...”. 80.

*Reference list:* Scholtz, L. “The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola, 1987–1988”. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 38/1. 2010. 77–113. DOI: 10.5787/38-1-80.

### Book

Last name, Initials. *Title of Book*. Place of publication: Publisher, Year.

*Examples:*

*Footnote:* Gray, C. S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 56.

*Subsequent reference:* Gray. *Modern Strategy*. 62.

*Reference list:* Gray, C.S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

*Two or more authors:*

*Examples:*

Footnote: Ward, G. C. and Burns, K. *The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945* New York: Knopf, 2007. 52.

Subsequent reference: Ward and Burns. *The War...* 85.

Reference list: Ward, G. C. and Burns, K. *The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945*. New York: Knopf, 2007

*For four or more authors*, list all of the authors in the bibliography; in the note, list only the first author, followed by *et al.*

## Chapter

Last name, Initials. “Title of Chapter”. In Last name, Initials and Last name, Initials (eds), *Title of Book*. Place of publication: Publisher, Year, pages.

*Examples:*

Footnote: Kiras, J. “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency”. In Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J. and Gray, C.S. (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 189.

Subsequent reference: Kiras. “Irregular Warfare...”. 200.

Reference list: Kiras, J. “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency”. In Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J. and Gray, C. S. (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 185–207.

## Internet document

Last name, Initials. “Title of Document”. Site Owner. Date. URL, Accessed on Date.

*Examples:*

Footnote: Engelbrecht, L. “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost”. defence-Web. 28 October 2009. [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379), Accessed on 3 June 2010.

Subsequent reference: Engelbrecht. “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost”.

Reference list: Engelbrecht, L. “Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost”. defence-Web. 28 October 2009. [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379), Accessed on 3 June 2010.

## Newspaper article

Last name, Initials. “Title of Article”. *Name of Newspaper*, Date. Section. Page.

*Examples:*

Footnote: Sefara, M. “Beast that instills only fear and loathing”. *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

Subsequent reference: Sefara. “Beast that instills...”. 14.

Reference list: Sefara, M. “Beast that instills only fear and loathing”. *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

## Thesis

Last name, Initials. “Title of Thesis”. Thesis presented for degree (stipulate in full). Name of university, year.

*Examples:*

Footnote: Jordaan, E. “South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making”. Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005. 25.

Subsequent reference: Jordaan. “South African Defence since 1994...” 28.

Reference list: Jordaan, E. “South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making”. Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005.

## Conference paper

Last name, Initials. “Title of Paper”. Paper presented at Name of Conference, Place, Date

*Examples:*

Footnote: Heuser, B. “Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice”. Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

Subsequent reference: Heuser. “Strategy Making...”

Reference list: Heuser, B. “Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice”. Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

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
# NATO 4.0 and Hungary

20 years of membership – 30 years of cooperation

*Written by Zoltán Szenes, Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy*

In 2019, NATO and Hungary commemorate interrelated anniversaries: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established 70 years ago, and Hungary has been its member for 20 years. This volume, dedicated to the jubilee of the membership, pays close attention to presenting NATO's development and functioning, which would like to emphasize the impact of the Alliance on Hungary. It discusses Hungary's NATO membership as part of the Alliance policy and functioning, which expresses the principle of "all for one, one for all". The "NATO part" of the book presents the development history of the Alliance based on current assessment; its structure is determined by the three essential core tasks of the strategic concept and the metamorphosis of NATO's security theory functions. The "Hungarian part" of the book discusses national issues in the same triad, thus demonstrating the part-whole relations and emphasizing nation-specific issues. Thus, the authors hope that the readers will not only understand a unified NATO, but will also be able to imagine the contributions of other member states through the Hungarian example – thus receiving a whole picture of the Alliance's policy and functioning.

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