

Defence Review

VOLUME 145
SPECIAL ISSUE 2017/I

THE CENTRAL JOURNAL OF THE
HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES

FOR THE HOMELAND



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SPECIAL ISSUE 2017/1

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Gen. Petr Pavel:

THE CHALLENGES FACING NATO TODAY

During the March 2017 NATO Transformation Seminar (NTS) in Budapest, the officers of Allied Command Transformation, in concert with the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, discussed the key challenges facing NATO in the 21st century. Simultaneously, these Alliance scholars, politicians, military leaders and practitioners also agreed on some potential solutions to these complex challenges, both in the short and long-term. Just as the U.S. President Harry Truman voiced during the founding of the Alliance in 1949, NATO today remains the underpinning of our common security as well as our common devotion to human dignity and freedom. Furthermore, as the U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shared in April during their meeting in Washington, “every generation has strived to adapt the NATO Alliance to meet the challenges of their times”. At the NTS in Budapest, today’s Alliance members did just that.

In order to frame their debate, NATO’s senior leaders first were required to define their strategic environment. Recently, the catch-phrase “arc of instability” has become a popular descriptor for the security situation currently confronting Europe. This metaphor captures the transition from the period of relative stability following the Balkan Conflicts of the 1990s until those days just prior to the Arab Spring. Used in this context, instability is a very broad term, which encompasses the span of security challenges from the East, where our Alliance is facing Russia as a single opponent or competitor, to the South, where a plethora of challenges exists.

MODERN INSTABILITY

At the NTS, our leaders confirmed the “arc of instability” as a descriptor, providing some additional clarity. Today we find that strategically the situation in the East has not significantly changed since the annexation of Crimea in 2014; however, the circumstances on the ground remain far from stable. We could characterize this as *static instability*. In contrast, our South (the region stretching from Mauritania to Afghanistan) suffers from various degrees of *dynamic instability*.

This dynamically unstable region includes a multitude of “wicked” problems/challenges. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIL/Daesh) continues to occupy vast swaths of territories and find ideological support throughout the region. Iran’s sphere of influence continues to grow in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The Assad regime, on the verge of collapse in 2015, has been resurrected. Our ally, Turkey, seated well within this zone, attempts to collaborate and coordinate with her southern neighbours and the entirety of the Arabic world. Russia has again become an important player in the region. The Israel-Palestine issue remains a hot spot, yet somewhat diminished in relation to the mounting Sunni-Shia conflict. In fact, the Sunni-Shia divide underlies nearly all of the conflagrations in the region.

This potent mix of state and non-state actors, interwoven with migration, organized crime, autonomy issues, traditional rivalries and the combination of explosive demography, and insufficient economic growth, have created a series of dynamic security challenges.

This vast array of complex issues and dynamic instability on Europe's southern borders appears to be an enduring plight.

NATO'S CORE TASKS IN THE MODERN ERA

NATO's Core Tasks remain valid and relevant in the face of the two aforementioned challenges - static and dynamic instabilities. Since its publication in 2010, NATO's Strategic Concept has been underpinned by the communiqués from each biannual NATO Summit. The March 2017 NTS also pointed to the enduring fact that NATO must fulfil its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis response, and cooperative security no matter the challenge.

In the East, NATO is focusing its collective defence posture on deterrence. The various Allies are leveraging the instruments of national power, with NATO's security blanket serving as merely one, albeit critical, component. This deterrent military component is based predominantly on responsive and mobile high-readiness forces in addition to a semi-permanent rotational forward presence on the very soil of those NATO Allies which border the Russian Federation. This deterrence posture serves to reassure those nations in geographical proximity to Russia. However, this conventional military land forces' posture does not thwart any effects below the threshold of open aggression. These hybrid actions, strategic communication, cyber warfare, and other means within the borders of our open societies promote the interests of Russia as a competitor.

The relationship between states is no longer binary. Russia, for example, can simultaneously be a competitor, adversary, and partner, often with partially compatible foreign policy interests with the EU or NATO, depending on the theatre or conflict in question. Deterrence, competition, and engagement, therefore, are not mutually exclusive factors. This demands a flexible, adaptable political approach and military posture. Avoiding miscalculation in spite of the ongoing competition remains crucial. Understanding the effects desired and achieved by modern state actors to shape the political and informational space for expanding their influence through non-conventional means is vital for any modern state actor. The thin line between competition and confrontation requires dialogue and understanding by all parties involved.

The challenges in the South are fundamentally different to those faced in the East. These problems emanate from the weak and failed states throughout the region, which can neither preempt nor prevent transnational terrorism in the region or beyond it. Nor can these states provide the basic conditions to allow their populations to remain and thrive; spurring the migration crisis we now face in Europe. Additionally, the symptom of terrorism is fed by the dramatic mismatch between demography and economic growth – a generational and strategic challenge that has, thus far, only seen tangential and tactical responses from national governments or intervening forces, international bodies or charity organizations.

WHAT ANSWERS?

In Budapest, the Alliance's strategic thinkers reinforced the findings of the NATO Heads of State and Government from the Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016. In Budapest, our leaders determined that in a complex world, there is an ever-increasing requirement for innovation and agility, as well as improved readiness and effectiveness. Addressing the root causes of both of the complex challenges along this modern "arc" requires the utilization of the entirety of the instruments of power and influence in a coordinated manner

over an extended period. This far-reaching application of means will help create long-term political stability rooted in societies in which the individual is empowered to contribute to the nation's wellbeing and continued advancement. The NTS provided some answers to the challenges that NATO faces, but more importantly, our work in Budapest identified areas for continued effort and improvement.

Two World Wars and a Cold War have taught Europe and North America that long term stability requires cooperation. In Budapest, NATO leaders pledged to explore enhanced cooperation with a variety of partners. NATO must continue to embrace the European Union, the United Nations, and other key actors, such as non-governmental organizations, to leverage the expansive political, diplomatic, economic, judiciary, law enforcement, and military tools. Only when these forces are harnessed together, while respecting the principles of inclusiveness, local ownership, host-nation solutions, and tailored cooperation the maximization of local capacities will NATO again achieve long term stability in the pan-European space and beyond.

Col. (Ret.) Friedrich W. Korkisch:

THE NEVER ENDING DEBATE: BRIDGING THE GAPS BETWEEN STRATEGIC POLICY AND TACTICAL EXECUTION

A Contemporary Look at Strategic Thinking and What the Past Could Teach Us

ABSTRACT: Warfare is always in a move. It always changes, adapts new technologies. This is why doctrines only in themselves are far not enough. Tactics are needed, which can always be changed if the circumstances require. Tactics (and techniques) must stay adaptive to remain the whole strategic policy efficient and combat worthy. There is a video footage from back in October 1990 (USAF Air University, Montgomery AFB, Maxwell, Alabama), where a member of the audience, participant of the Staff Course asked the presenter – a Hungarian representative of the Army, a fresh General – a question, concerning that after the 1989-1990 political change in Hungary, by the due-to-adapt new military doctrine, who actually the new enemy was? The presenter's – the Hungarian General's – answer was short but clear: "who attacks us" – he just said this simply. So, we have already made it clear at that time at a certain level that doctrines must change. In summer 2016, the French government admitted that since the end of the Cold War France – for the first time in centuries – has not had an "enemy", just "threats" and "risks". There are no fixed or concrete "enemies" as earlier, simply formed on ideological basis. The new enemies are threats and risks. And, with the doctrines, the strategic plans, policies and the way of tactical implementation, as the link between the two, must change too.

KEYWORDS: geopolitics, strategy, warfare

INTRODUCTION

In ancient times, the leadership distance between the *Strategos* and his foot-soldier was maybe half a mile, to his cavalry maybe two or three miles, and there was no tactical gap, the *Strategos* was usually all in one: Political leader, strategist, planner, and tactician. Assembling the force, marching distances, the enemy's options and timing were well known. Prussian King Frederick "The Great" had well-trained soldiers, and he was eager to occupy parts or all of Silesia, and had generals who knew how to move forces into battle; he occasionally gathered his generals and told them what they should accomplish. Napoleon had plans for large campaigns, but supplying the armies was usually done on the depleting stocks of the conquered lands and that was risky. His idea to go to Moscow was a strategic stepping-stone for a possible invasion of India – every European nation wanted to go to India – but the British were already there. Invading Russia was based on information about troops, terrain, rivers and roads, but it failed because of changing weather conditions and the supply problems, which he and his generals had underestimated – Russia was poor and rather empty.

In 1860 Winfield Scott drafted a strategic plan of how to defeat the new Confederacy, but the still small and untrained Union Army could not follow a Cannae-type strategy. In 1863 the same army was still not organized enough, even Lincoln's generals had trouble to transform ideas into combined operational moves. Even, when Lincoln had explained his "Grand Plan", the military needed two more years of manoeuvring to achieve tactical attrition of the Confederate Army. Contrary to this, in 1870 Helmuth von Moltke followed a detailed plan how to win by fast moves, using railroads, select terrain and his excellent artillery, whereas Napoleon III, his generals and the government, were unable to work out an efficient joint war plan, but even if there had have been one, the army was badly trained and supplied and like the French people politically split. There were too many broken bridges between politics and military leadership at all levels.

Air war in 1914 did not exist, but in 1918 all basic ideas of aerial warfare were already perfectly understood and developed – only the airplanes could not follow these new doctrinal ideas.

When Giulio Douhet published his book *Il Dominio dell' Aria (The Command of the Air)* in 1921, it was a blueprint for airpower and victory by bombing cities, but his ideas were attacked by Italian's top army and naval officers as insane, and it needed many more years before he influenced British and American theorists and engineers to built bombers with adequate range and payloads.

After 1924, the Reichswehr began to look into coming wars and in 1930 had plans ready for all possible scenarios Germany might face. A dozen of young officers made blueprints for an army with 108 divisions. Modern plans usually come from young officers with new ideas, rarely from generals and admirals as it could be seen in Great Britain after 1918, when army leadership opposed any modernizations. When Germany built its Wehrmacht after 1933, it followed the most promising ideas of leadership ("Auftragstaktik", tanks, aircraft, artillery, submarines, superb general-staff training etc.) and was far ahead of all other nations. Germany had well understood that any defence strategy was inferior to offensive operations; but also that retreat requires flexibility and firepower, but exactly that was in decline at the end of 1944.

After 1945, all strategy papers and all war planning were nuclear-weapons-heavy, and so was the "Active Defence" of the 1970s, when Army analysts considered that tactical nuclear weapons could stop Soviet advances effectively, and attacking Soviet "Second Echelon Forces" supply routes from the Western Military Districts to central Europe would be cut off by airpower. That, for EUCOM and NATO, could be a superb defence of Europe if one would disregard the affected German civilian population. And the Army had to be "dual capable", according to Army's training command TRADOC, led by the intellectual General William dePuy.

With conventional weapons improved, and the new *AirLand Battle*-concept as proposed by (many times revised) FM 100-5 *Operations* executed, the US returned to conventional warfare at campaign-level, later on with the focus on the "Centers of Gravity". The *AirLand Battle* was using speed, flexibility, new tanks, guns with target-seeking ammunition with high range, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), quick targeting, and stealth, attack helicopters and high speed movements into the enemy's rear. Computers; 3rd generation fighters began to emerge as expensive, but effective assets for all levels of warfare. However, such warfare required additional training at operational and tactical levels. And if the *Active Defence* was the end, the *AirLand Battle* was the re-emergence of Clausewitz, who was now frequently quoted in military publications like *Military Review* (published by the US Army Command

and General Staff College) or *Parameters* (Army War College), and in many field manuals. However, 1989 put an end to all strategic thinking and the purpose of western armies, navies and air forces.

In summer 2016, the French government admitted that since the end of the Cold War that France – for the first time in centuries – has not had an “enemy”, just “threats” and “risks”: In 2008, France reduced its forces by 54,000, and in 2012 by another 14,000 persons (instead of 33,000 as envisioned, because of the situation in Mali, Ukraine, and internal terrorism).

The very informative German *Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und die Zukunft der Bundeswehr 2016*, described national values, new insecurities, the importance of NATO and EU, and explained the need for more military tasks and know-how at all levels of the forces.

Technology and weapons sometimes made deep impression on interested politicians like on Donald Rumsfeld and his “Shock and Awe”-orientation in 2003.¹ Actually, electronics and computers, laser and stealth, influenced warfare in the same way, as did rifled guns, steam, electricity, and the railroad in the 19th century, the airplane and tank did after 1918, or nuclear weapons did after 1945. The theater- or unified-commands (now “combatant commands”) wrote numerous strategic contingency plans, which had to be updated permanently, or at least once every five years. The Army was also confronted with a number of organizational changes, which even hurt readiness and force-stability. In the years after 2000, the term “transformation” was a permanent process, until Robert Gates finally stopped it.

The Al Qaida, growing terrorism, and especially “9-11” changed that all, at least for more than a decade. It initiated a shift from conventional strategy into all modes of counterterrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created tons of literature about “special operations” and counterinsurgency, but strategies were often missing – regime change alone is a weak strategy. That was the moment, when the European powers (including NATO) also deleted classical strategy, but drifted from force reductions into large-scale force eliminations, which were nearly devastating NATO and European defence capabilities. However, terrorism remains a severe problem and is – according to the CIA, FBI and other intelligence sources – largely financed by the government of Saudi Arabia and by private “investors” in Qatar, Kuwait, Sudan, and the Emirates. A new phenomenon is Islamic State insurgency, infiltrating dozens of states in Africa, Iran and the Central Asian republics;² operating in cities in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

After 2000, the western world transformed astonishingly fast from prosperity into crisis, and became politically more and more fragmented, with high unemployment, horrendous national debts, contracting per-capita income, nearly zero-economic growth, plus a growing number of poor people and growing crime, numerous bank-failures, insecurity about the future, and a weird “political correctness”-mania that increasingly muzzled the freedom of speech, academic education and mass media.

THE POWER OF HISTORY

Even today, despite the “post-modern state”-ideas of One-World-liberals, nothing is stronger than history, and all the events in the former Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, the

¹ Rumsfeld was impressed by the book published years before: Ullman, H. K. and Wade, J. P. *Shock and Awe. Achieving Rapid Deployment*. Washington DC: NDU Press Book, 1996. Today this book is already “historical”.

² Lynch, Th. L. III et al. *The Return of the Foreign Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy*. Washington DC: National Defence University, 2016.

conflicts in the Balkans after 1989/90 due to the collapse of Yugoslavia, had historical roots.³ The borders of 1914 are back. The ideas of an independent Scotland, of a Catalan state, Basque state, independent Corsica, or a split-off Northern Myanmar are creating more and more states who might fail after a few years like South-Sudan. But currently history and nationalisms are stronger than economic logic.

Logically, international institutions are getting weaker, especially the UN, World Bank and the IMF, the OECD and even NATO and especially the OSCE.

A question that historians will have to answer is how Western Europe could, during the Cold War, maintain large and effective military forces, have full employment, permanently growing GNPs and per-capita income, high national cohesion with low national debt figures, all based on solid democratic pillars, and why all that is gone today.

NOW EVERYTHING IS STRATEGY

If all is strategy, nothing is strategy: Contemporary strategy papers are less counterinsurgency-loaded and less counterterrorism-centered, they are looking for a new approach to combine technology and classical/conventional war-theories, are repeatedly quoting Clausewitz, Jomini, Corbett, Mahan or Billy Mitchell, are underlining the effective fighting of Le May, Nimitz, Guderian, Manstein or Patton. Since Mahan US policies have always been guided by geopolitics and national interests, but any new president might like to shift past priorities, and Donald Trump might avoid confrontations in Europe, but will take a tougher stance with aggressive China.

America's national interests are either "vital", or "major" ones, are "key Interests", or just "important" or "peripheral" ones. A joint commission in Washington is looking periodically into geopolitical shifts, new threats and challenges. Another commission looks into the geographical borders of the combatant commands every few years.⁴

Now we see the return of nuclear strategy and the modification/modernization of weapons like the B-61 bombs, also the ones on top of ICBMs and SLBMs, but even tactical nuclear weapons with a low yield might have strategic impacts on the receiving end.

New weapons that cover large distances and territories change policy, strategy, operations and tactics, make all less distinguishable, hierarchies are evidently merging.

New publication about strategy adapt to these changes by using terms like "national strategy", followed by "military strategy", "operational strategy", "tactical/battlefield strategy", "employment strategy", and the US Air Force conducts now "Strategic Operations" and "Tactical operations".⁵ It seems that everything is now strategy; all levels are directly influenced by the top decision-makers, have different labels for the same, had created a

³ Porter, P. "Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn of Studying War". *Parameters* Summer 2007. 45–58.; Ikenberry, J. G. *Strategic Reactions on American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity*. Washington DC: National Intelligence Council, 2003.

⁴ The last time in 2011, under supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with some minor alignments.

⁵ Numerous sources like Drew, D. M. and Snow, D. M. *Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006; Shaud, J. A. *Air Force Strategy Study 2020–2030*. Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2011.; Gompert, D. *Analysis of Strategies and Strategies of Analysis*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008.; Moore, D. A. *The Art of Aerial Warfare*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2005.; *Joint Operation Planning*. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011.; *Campaign Planning Handbook*. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2008.

“seamless” command-structure of equal force-levels as described in many publications. Evidently, strategy has merged with campaigns and operations and on the other end, operations is also tactics. One reason for that is the elimination of field armies, army corps and divisions with three or four brigades or regiments. The geographical operational area of a modern battle group resembles the area of a tactical Second World War-type division. The cost to create, equip, train and maintain a modern 4,000-strong sub-tactical force is many times higher than that of a former type triangular 20,000-man division.

Maybe, there are too many strategy papers in circulation, because the number published in the US is currently about 50, and with additional strategic papers coming from think tanks or service schools that number might reach 100. The conclusion is that there exists a top-heavy relation between commands and force-strengths. The US Army had for years experimented with the size and organization of Brigade Combat Teams or Combat Maneuver Groups, all lacking boots on the ground – all inadequate for combat in Europe or Asia, all need additional firepower and air support; the thinning out of ground forces reminds many of the failed *Pentomic* Division of the 1960s. It seems that a 1990-type 15,000-strong division will again be the ideal structure.

The US Army had never fully abandoned the army corps-structure, but they are now rather administrative commands. Within NATO, some organizations are already missing, like artillery, combat engineers and ground based air defence. The EU Battle Groups were seen as the key to an “EU Army”, but that remained a virtual idea, they will never be used without massive reinforcements.

Today, employed battalions and companies are overloaded with data and messages, unit commanders must permanently report something, it is command and control (C2) everywhere. What, if the radios are silent or the notebook-screens go suddenly black? General James Mattis warned that the military depends too much on technology and should learn to act with their radios turned off;

Mattis: Mission-Type Order leadership style (“Auftragstaktik”) is more important than to know about radio bandwidth, and a lance corporal in Iraq can better explain the situation there than a general far away.⁶

THE OTHER DIMENSION: GEOPOLITICS DOMINATE BIG-POWER-THINKING

Because geopolitics is a geographical issue, it is the battle ground of concepts of large states. Small states have no such global concepts, have no geostrategy to enforce or protect their interests, and a small economy has no geoeconomy either. Geostrategy is (national) “grand-strategy” is to implement, maintain, or improve a geopolitical stance, is combining the assets on hand to fight geopolitical or geostrategic ambitions of other nations, and will, by using political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and especially military means, defend what is “ours”.⁷ Geopolitics became the superior and guiding term for

- Geostrategy (defending the geopolitical empire, protection of the lines of communications),
- Geoeconomy (trade, trade war, sanctions, access to resources, water, energy,).

⁶ Cavas, Ch. P. “Mattis: military should rely less on technology”. *Marine Corps Times*. May 14, 2010. http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/05/military_mattis_technology_051310w/, Accessed on 06 April 2017.

⁷ Lombardi, B. “Assumptions and Grand Strategy”. *Parameters* Spring 2011. 29–40.

- Geoculture (another word for “public diplomacy” or “propaganda”, exporting culture, ideology and ideas to promote democracy to win people over when wars had ended.)⁸
- Finally, there is Geoecology (dealing with climate issues, water, air and soil).

Currently, all elements of geopolitics have re-emerged, and geopolitical ambitions are guiding not only the US, China or Russia, but the politics of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and of Saudi Arabia as well with ups and downs. In fact, for the poor masses religion replaces real culture; Huntington pointed to culture clashes of Islam with other religions, but there is a clash within Islam as well. Religious clashes are actually the worst kind of common irrationality.

European alliances in the 19th century reflect the fear of the unexpected, but the “enemy” was always in the east: For England it was France, for France it was Germany, for Germany Poland, for Poland (and again) Russia. Nations would seek options for expanding their boundaries to enhance economic chances or to overcome limitations of national security. Tools for such a policy are political agreements, alliances, bilateral-, multilateral and “multitrack”-diplomacy, the weakening of antagonists and building up national power. Security policy can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, but there is always the interest of other states who also seek territory and economic strength.

Bulgaria could never have become a large power, because it had no industry, Austria-Hungary collapsed as an entity mainly for demographic reasons, and Hungary had no alpine barriers to support a successful defence in the north and east.

When in England the issue of controlling India and occupying the Transvaal turned into a public debate, the Labour Party and the “Little England” protagonists recommended no further colonial expansions, but more social programs for Great Britain. But the group around Alfred Milner, Herbert Kitchener, Cecil Rhodes and the newspaper *Times* (plus others) decided to occupy the Transvaal with its gold and diamond mines. The Boer War, planned as a small campaign that should have been over in six months, then lasted for three years, was witnessing genocide-type British atrocities, required a total of 450,000 men, and nearly caused the crash of the Bank of England. Little wars can turn into expensive near-disasters.

The Russian idea of expansionism into a “Great Russia” began around 1850, and was a combined ideology of czarism, imagined cultural and racial superiority. Orthodoxy was considered the real Christianity, and Russia was to expand all the way to the English Channel and the Nile, to Canada and California. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Russism and Pan-Orthodoxy were enhanced by Ivan Sergejevich Axakow, Konstantin Sergejevich Axakow, Alexei Stepanovich Chomjakow, Nikolai Yakowlewich Danilewski, Iwan Vasiljevich Kirejewski, Fjodor Dostojewski,⁹ finally by Soviet politicians like Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and Stalin, all “expansionists” and devoted „Anti-Westerners”, creating an ideological barrier that is present even today. Sociologists and historians explain this attitude with cultural inferiority, backwardness, oppressive rule, communism, fear of encirclement, and so on.

⁸ Korkisch, F. “Die Geopolitik der USA; Szenarien und kommende Konflikte: aus der Sicht Washingtons: Neue Mächte, Amerikas Grand Strategy und die Marginalisierung Europas”. In Eberhard, B. (ed), *Technik – Innovation – Strategie*. Fürstenfeldbruck: Gneisenau Gesellschaft, Offiziersschule der Luftwaffe, 2010. 42–53.; Korkisch, F. “Globale Strategie: Die Geopolitik der USA - Von der Western Reserve über den Panama-Kanal zur Gegenküste: Teil 1”. *ÖMZ* 2/2010. 151–167.; Korkisch, F. “Globale Strategie: Die Geopolitik der USA - Von der Western Reserve über den Panama-Kanal zur Gegenküste: Teil 2”. *ÖMZ* 3/2010. 342–353.; Korkisch, F. “Globale Strategie: Die Geopolitik der USA - Von der Western Reserve über den Panama-Kanal zur Gegenküste: Teil 3”. *ÖMZ* 6/2010. 730–739.

⁹ Pan-Slavism had a high acceptance in the Czech part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, also in Serbia and Bulgaria.

Between 1880 and 1930, many states dreamed about expansion, so the Poles of a Greater Poland (with its western border in the outskirts of Berlin), the English of a Great(er) Britain and the French fearing a Great Germany, there were ideas circulating of a “Great Albania”, “Great Greece”, “Great Hungary”, “Great Rumania”, “Great Bolivia”, a Czechoslovakia with the Danube as its southern border. An extremely racist Japanese state wanted its empire reaching to India and even to Australia. The “Erez-Israel”-idea, considered by Ben Gurion and others, included parts of the Lebanon, the Sinai and parts of Jordan, showing that even small states had ideas of expansions at the expense of their neighbours.

In America, expansionist ideas flourished especially after the Civil War. Geographic interests and nationalist and political-missionary-thinking (the term “geopolitics” didn’t exist at that time) included the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, central and northern South America (the Amazon was even seen as “extension of the Mississippi”), wanted Canada and parts of eastern Siberia. The Social-Darwinist idea of an “Exceptionalism of America” and the superiority of the “American Race” lived until the late 20th century and were until the late 1950s textbook language.

In the same way, as Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover saw the Rhine River as “America’s line of defence”, the US was ready, if necessary, to help to defend this line along with the British, who wanted to contain Germany after 1871 and Russia after 1917: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson were willing to support and defend Great Britain, also with nuclear weapons.¹⁰ The USA was always willing to defend NATO-Europe, even with using nuclear weapons, but today, a third of the US population lives west of the Mississippi, and the traditional links to Europe and then historical solidarity to ancestors is getting weaker. Strategic planners should be aware of this.

As Henry Kissinger wrote, nations have no friends, they have interests, and these can change. Therefore, geopolitics has always become an issue whenever a large power collapses, and when an aggressive member of the international community tries to take advantage of a disengaging moment of a competitor, as Russia did in Georgia 2008 (in fact politically abandoned by the EU), tried in Ukraine 2014-2016, or for two decades in Moldova, and Putin might even risk a war about the Baltic States.

Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the Middle East and Central Asia as the center of coming conflicts, now that is probably shifting to East Asia and the Western Pacific when China is expanding at the expense of its neighbours, but that is challenging America’s interests and concepts of controlling essential lines of communication. But what about a China that could, due to migration, win control over certain parts of Siberia’s territory? Or might demand access to the Arctic Region as it has already indicated? A clash with China is expected by experts within two or three decades – including the probability that both states would even use nuclear weapons – shifting the geopolitical landscape for a century,

RUSSIA IS AGAIN IN DECLINE, BUT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

After 1990, with a much smaller Russia on the map, experts warned about a re-emerging Russia that might, within one or two decades, try to regain control of the split-away outer belt

¹⁰ Nuclear weapons should remain under US control; when the *Skybolt* air-to-ground missile (developed for the B-58 and B-52) should be delivered to the UK as agreed for the RAF *Victor* and *Vulcan* bombers, Kennedy explained that these weapons would not work as anticipated what was totally incorrect and led to the quick development of British nuclear weapons.

of republics in Europe and Asia, backed up by 15,000 nuclear weapons. Such resurrections could be based on 200 years of observed decline and recovery, but in Western Europe such comments were undesired, were even suppressed by liberal pro-Kantian peace-enthusiasts and by trendy European governments, and millions of people who looked to Putin as an example of an efficient statesman. Some “Eurasian” enthusiasts demanded the disbandment of NATO or wanted Russia to join it.¹¹ And the EU’s passiveness and “soft-power”-policy was the main reason why Russia, after the defeat in the Cold War, could, with the support of certain European politicians, get the upper hand again in essential issues, simply by reminding a number of states about economic realities.

Russia has turned into a modernized copy of the former Soviet Union, and is, besides its nuclear weapons, weak, it resembles a “failing state”. It has neglected non-military manufacturing and since 2010 has been spending again nearly all of its economic gains on defence like the former Soviet Union did. But even Russian conventional military power is very limited and if it provoked a war it would probably quickly be defeated. But then China would immediately grab large parts of Siberia, and Japan would occupy its Kuril Islands.

Cyber attacks shifted lately into occasional cyber wars, e.g. when aggressive Russian and Chinese government-hackers not only tried to disrupt networks, but were interfering with whole government-operations (like during US elections, and attacking Germany in November 2016) that cannot be tolerated, the US will retaliate.

Cyber-issues became very much political; attacks are aimed at foreign, security, internal policies, military planning and intelligence, industrial espionage, theft of intellectual property, government operations, energy systems, and non-government institutions. Russia is fully exploiting its propaganda warfare, especially via Russian Television (RT) and its cultural exports, with the purpose to manipulate the public opinion in Europe.

As long as NATO exists, Russian will have to face American involvement in European affairs and defence. But Russia knows that in the case of growing tensions with Peking it will need at least some support from Washington and Brussels, and such a support means that Russia must open its market for US investors and foreign products. In this case, the relations to China will become even more confrontational. Over the last three years Russia violated the airspace of Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom, of the three Baltic States, of Turkey and of Japan; nearly all were pre-planned violations or provocations.¹²

Officially, Russia and China are allies, but experts admit that Moscow feels growing Chinese pressure regarding Central Asia. Especially China’s “Silk Road”-ideas are a clear attempt to weaken Russia, India, the EU, and the transatlantic relations, and serve to undermine possible EU-Russian alliances. Chinese investments are strategic footholds, like the one in Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, Montenegro, in Central and Southern Asia. Chinese foreign policy includes open threats to European governments who dare to dispute Chinese rights in Tibet, Nepal, and the South China Sea, or when denying strategically sensitive commercial take-overs.¹³

¹¹ Mueller, J. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

¹² During the Austrian election campaign for the presidency in 2016, Russia openly sided with the right-wing liberal party FPÖ, which had over the years established close links to a number of Russian politicians.

¹³ When the US government blocked ownership attempts of dubious Chinese companies, Peking immediately tried to threaten European governments for “violating trade policies”. But China is in fact denying free trade and investments by foreign companies herself. It couldn’t have been any surprise for Peking that the west is finally stopping unwanted take-overs by disguised military interests.

The reason why Putin supports Assad is geostrategy, it is the danger of losing its only naval base outside Russia. Russia does everything to keep Assad in power and fights a war with massive war crimes to maintain her presence, besides hoping for exploring Syrian oil and gas.

THE MISSING STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Strategic direction helps to coordinate ways and means; in US manuals it is defined as:

*... the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands... It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and manner by which the President and the Secretary of Defence provide strategic guidance to the joint force.*¹⁴

During the Cold War, the enemy was the Soviet Union and her satellite states, plus China, and the West was reacting to permanent threats like the “revolution by the working class, the use of nuclear weapons, wiping out capitalism, western elites, and private ownership”, but after 1988 such threats became quite hollow, the Soviet Union, “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons” was in deep crisis.

But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the west had lost its strategic direction, and when China emerged forceful on the political stage, it became less a military but an economic threat. Donald Trump tries to develop a new strategic direction by attacking Chinese interests to protect American national interests, and is using Russia’s fear of Chinese long-term interests.

WHAT ABOUT STRATEGY?

Strategy is “National Interest”, “National Security Objectives”, it is about achieving national political aims peacefully or with military and economic means. It is divided into Policy, Defence Strategy and Military Strategy, and is usually a top-down approach. A definition can be as short as “*The most intelligent way to use available means to win a war or to prevent defeat*”, or:

*"The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."*¹⁵

All definitions of strategy – about 30 can be found in relevant literature – are usually defining national aims from the highest levels of decision-making.¹⁶ Naturally, such definitions cover all ideas and interpretations of what political and military interest typically are, they look convincing, but definitions are usually too hollow, are inadequate to provide more than a wise tautological accumulation of ideas, and rarely provide much guidance. Politicians prefer answers as how a conflict can be avoided or won.

¹⁴ *Joint Operation Planning*. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. IX.

¹⁵ United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Dictionary of the United States Military Terms of Joint Usage*. Washington DC, 1964. 135.

¹⁶ Storr, J. “Warfare and Strategy”. *Infinity Journal* 4/2. 2014. 20–23.

Strategy can be “continental” or “maritime”; in the case of the US maritime strategy comes first, because it is the fundament for the continental-strategy and for deploying forces on a global scale. Strategy is (a) also theory, “strategic thought”, (b) it is often about geopolitics, (c) contemporary political and military fact-finding and rational assumption about the future, and (d) it is processing and practice. Many universities teach strategy, like Georgetown, Yale, Columbia or Tufts, so do Army, Navy and Air Force service academies and war colleges, and the National Defence University in Washington, DC., but in Europe such institutions are rare to find, in Germany strategy is analyzed by the “Clausewitz Gesellschaft” or “Gneisenau Gesellschaft” which are private initiatives with many military members, in Budapest it is taught at the National University for Public Service, the former Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University, and in Austria by the Landesverteidigungsakademie in Vienna.

For years, many experts like Colin Gray, have complained that today it is not clear what strategy the United States is really following. During the Obama-era the *National Defence Strategy* became a text loaded with catchwords like “effects based”, “resilience”, “comprehensive approach” and so on, which later on disappeared. Strategy papers are now covering all aspects of internal and external security, like economy, energy, bank-problems, globalization, climate and environmental issues, but the original idea of a strategy – clarification of policy like providing clear direction – got lost. Speeches of the president, and strategy papers often became contradicting.

Strategy should be a clarification and an alignment of political will embedded in policy and civil-military relations.¹⁷ Military strategy, however, is different, it follows an established policy for maximizing chances and planning. Interestingly, most planners in the Second World War were below the rank of colonel. War planning requires a different approach, it follows a set of basics, like “Rules of War” – the classic experience and wisdom how to fight and win, supplanted by military theory which is a classroom topic. Detailed planning must be specific, requiring resources, intelligence data and an assessment of options. The military also needs some good men who will ask the right questions.¹⁸ The Red Army planned simple but efficient operations, using superiority in men and arms, but often lost the initiative when the execution was too slow or lacked tactical surprise, but was insensitive to high losses.

In fact, a good war plan can be composed “out of the blue”, like the Reichswehr planners had to do in 1924/25, like the RAF’s “Western Air Plans” for bombing German industry in the Ruhr area, written in the late 1930s, or when Haywood Hansell and his staff wrote the AWPD-1 in 1941, without any preliminary experience. Evidently, common sense, weighting means, intelligence data, possibilities, technical data, doctrine, and a “how can we do it” approach might be sufficient.

¹⁷ Ricks, Th. E. *The Generals: American Military Command From World War II To Today*. New York: Penguin Books, 2012.; Johnson, D. E. *Modern U. S. Civil-Military Relations: Wielding the Terrible Swift Sword*. Washington DC: National Defence University, 1997.; McFetridge, Ch. D. “Foreign Policy and Military Strategy: the Civil-Military Equation”. *Military Review* 66/4. 1986. 22–30.

¹⁸ Johnsen, W. T. et al. *The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995.

But a good commander can win even with a bad plan as good plans are no guarantee for success. There are different strategic planning requirements:

- Strategic planning is long-term budget planning, organizing the forces, industrial planning for manufacturing, building of camps, airports and harbors, communication and training facilities, writing manuals and doctrines, prepare civil defence and think about large-scale evacuation.
- The antagonist? Options? What about a possible Worst-case scenario?
- Prepare energy and food stocks? Logistics?
- Reinforcing the terrain for defence, bridges and essential roads.
- Define deficiencies and risks, and compare capabilities to war aims.
- Select commanders and organize staffs for strategic and campaign-levels.
- Prepare the mobilization, for Alert Orders and Warning Orders,
- War planning in peacetime is “Future Campaign Planning”, is contingency and operational planning; will follow experience, common wisdom and predictions, uses doctrine, but compose policy or strategy papers critically with reality.
- Check if tactical capacities match operational requirements and if planning oversteps aims with means.

In the United States, the air planning process was traditionally divided into (a) winning air superiority, followed (b) by interdiction at selecting target-priorities and strategic attacks by bombers, cruise missiles or land attack weapons, and (c) close air support, which is a tactical process, quite complex, was always at the planning end. Today, all three phases are run rather parallel under labels like “Operation Strategy” (the planning), “Strategic Operations” or “Strategic Attack” (aimed at specific strategic targets) and “Tactical Operations”. “Thinking About War” is the task of higher service schools which also develop doctrines.

*Strategy used to fight campaigns and links military strategy and operations. Because this level of warfare is conducted by combatant-/unified commands, it is also called Theater of War-Warfare (also called Theater Campaigns).*¹⁹

Naval Operations were always clear, they were always the moving of fleets, task forces, aircraft carriers and submarines to protect the oceans, to guarantee the lines of communication, and defeat the enemy on the high seas. Here, the distinction between strategy and operations is quite clear: The strategy tells the fleet what to do, and operations means doing it. Flying air-to-ground or anti-ship missions from a carrier to bomb land or ship targets was never “strategic”, but a battle won always was. Similar explanations can be formulated for special operations, counterinsurgency, amphibious warfare and ballistic missile defence; they all are types of strategies and are operations at the same time.

Land-warfare has never had such clear separations. The US Army doesn’t even have a specific “land strategy”:

- If it is “war planning”, it is on the top of the planning process, including transportation and logistics, because combat units have always had to cross half of the globe. Strategy was a concept, was “national defence policy”, “military objectives”, because the term “security policy” did not emerge before the late 1960s,
- or it was “campaign strategy” with “campaign objectives”. Campaign planning was guided by “grand tactics” seeking advantages, like surprise and risk-taking.

¹⁹ *Strategic Attack: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2*, United States Air Force, 2003.

- At the lower end it was pure tactics, the combined arms planning, amphibious landings etc.

The force commanders, “the doers” – only a few were “born leaders” – learned via “on the job training”: If one could command a regiment or a brigade, he could do so with divisions and corps as well, but in Vietnam the Army realized that many of their brigade commanders had to be quickly replaced.

Clausewitz was well known, but was rarely read, was not always understood, was for planning actually irrelevant. Even the term “strategy” emerged rather late in the war, was an air power term for the “Big Week”, especially, when planning the combined bombing offensive, which in 1944 was seen as a “strategic air war”. The 8th and 15th Air Forces became the *U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Europe*, and the B-29 under the leadership of the 20th Air Force carried out devastating attacks on the cities of Japan, also dropped the two atomic bombs. Not surprisingly did the bomber generals claim in 1945 that airpower had won the war, and bombers and nuclear weapons were “strategic”, the Army and Navy were logically not. National security was a task for the Air Force, and seen from a pure economic side, nuclear bombing was cost-effective and that was the reason, why President Eisenhower wanted a deterrence – or “massive retaliation” – strategy to prevent huge outlays for conventional weapons. In 1946, the bomber forces came under control of the newly created Strategic Air Command (SAC), which separated itself from the rest of the Air Force and became the core of the United States Air Force in 1947, dominated by strategic and nuclear thinking until the end of the Cold War, and “strategic air war” was now a combination of 300 and more single bomber missions without any classical “operations” or “tactics”.

Logically, a definition of tactics might read like “*The best use of troops and materiel to win a battle*”. For the Army, successful tactics is gaining ground, for the Marines it is killing the enemy in the next foxhole. A more official interpretation was falling back to the earlier “Battlefield”-term, and linked battle or tactics to strategy:

*Battlefield strategy is the art of employing forces on the battlefield to achieve national security objectives.*²⁰

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

The term *Strategic Culture* was coined by Jack L. Snyder in his book *The Soviet Strategic Culture* (1977) when he analyzed the Soviet strategic thinking in regard to nuclear war. Later on the term was used by many authors, was mainly linked to civil-military relations and strategic war planning.

Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow see strategic culture as a national, historical, and mainly elitarian approach, especially about the acceptance of military thought, combining tradition, the role of the military services and service schools, and the ability to maintain capable and ready military forces. It can be measured by the prestige of the military and its acceptance by mass media, especially when it is necessary to use force.

America’s strategic culture is based on history, patriotism, force capabilities, military leadership, and the proposals about “how to fight”, duty, honor, country and patriotism. Debating about a possible war never stopped after 1945, or after 1990, and included NATO,

²⁰ Drew, D. M. and Snow, D. M. *Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems*. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006.

the protection of allies, bi- and multinational security, the role of the UN, annihilation, attrition, mobility, bombing campaigns, Massive Retaliation, Flexible Response, the *AirLand Battle*, Force XXI, Military Technological Revolution (MTR), Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), strategic planning principles, force transformation, Net-centric Warfare, Effects Based Operations etc. It was and is based on overseas deployments, moving large forces over long distances, seeking superior technology, more than sufficient logistics, but it is also based on optimism, a “gung ho”- and a “can do”-attitude, plus occasionally on political fear of a high number of casualties.

A fear to engage was typical for the eight years of the Obama era, who misread the never existing “Arabic Spring” early in 2011 as an “upheaval for democracy” and not as the Muslim Brotherhood’s desire for power and for enforcing radical Islam on Egypt, Tunisia and other states in the region. Later on, Obama even considered the restricted and short Libyan operation in 2011 as “my biggest political error”, but it was foremost a failure of France, Great Britain, of NATO and the torn EU. Moving a few squadrons into disputed areas do not require much strategic thought, but insisting during an ongoing NATO operation to destroy an existing and well-functioning NATO structure, as some European governments did in 2011, raised a number of questions, e.g. why it was done, and why it was accepted by the military leadership – or was there none?

Strategy can have many faces and the corresponding culture is often radical, what Michael Sherry wrote, when he questioned the air power mania of Roosevelt and air power-generals.²¹ Currently, critics point to the implementation and dependence on leadership-conformism, the problems to keep the public “positively engaged” in long wars. Because the fact that only 0.5% of the American population (and EU population as well) is currently in uniform, and that only a few members of Congress have actually done their military service, raises questions about budgets and programs.

However, important defence issues are supported by the fact that an estimated 15 million people live directly and indirectly from defence and have influence on national and local politics, additionally there are more than 30 million veterans, usually supporting defence, generally critical of Obama and in favor of Trump.

In Europe, the popularity of the military was always contained by the devastating wars in the 20th century, and neither the British nor the French or any other military had prevented the loss of colonies. Even the best theory could not prevent the decline of defence after 1990. If risks are low, military warnings will be neither understood nor appreciated. If risk-taking is low, even the most convincing strategy paper will be ignored.²² A “soft power”-strategy written by political cabinets is usually useless, but if political culture is dominating military culture, politicized military will not speak out.

After 1990 long-term strategic thinking was missed in most EU-member-states, replaced by Kantian peace-euphoric, low-budget defence policies, and an inability of the military leadership to tell the public what the ongoing budget cuts would mean for security, moreover, it was even proposing further cuts by favoring small inexpensive “professional” forces. Political indifference to defence matters had hit the whole EU. What about Sweden’s security policy, when it nearly eliminated its army and navy? Finland maintained strong defence capabili-

²¹ Sherry, M. S. *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1987.

²² The author had witnessed best intentions by authors of strategy papers that were ignored by all levels of government.

ties, because it had learned from history, Sweden did not. Budget problems had hit Great Britain, France and Italy, and Germany's Bundeswehr was transformed into a "voluntary force", in the 1980s it had 550,000 men, in 2016 fewer than 170,000. Of 3,000 *Leopard* and 800 M-48 tanks in 1991, the armour force numbers now 240, the rest (300 *Leopard* II's are in depots) is gone. The Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium nearly abandoned their armies, cut 50% of their air forces, all done under the title „transformation“ and changed "challenges" like terrorism, and hoping for a "ten-year pre-warning"-time". However, 50% of the equipment currently on hand is not combat ready, the Luftwaffe in 2016 had only 40% of their Eurofighters in operational conditions, and all NATO air forces have only small stocks of PGMs and anti-air systems. The advertised rebuilding of the European forces is hit by low budgets, high social expenditures, image problems, and a shortage of officers and NCOs.

Austria's EU-membership was actually a contradiction of permanent neutrality but also of a "homogenized EU", was opposed but then accepted for geopolitical reasons by France, whereas Austria fully accepted the Maastricht Treaty, the agreements of Amsterdam and Nice, declared officially that it would join a "European Army" (which is still not existing) and even had in mind to join NATO (1999, again 2001, fully supported by the military), and for many years has been sending numerous experts to Afghanistan. Today, it again insists on neutrality, but cannot explain under what circumstances it will abandon neutrality. It tries to be a "security provider" but is rather a "security consumer", however with a highly professional and well trained military. Politics tried to reduce the military to an engagement in international peace missions and humanitarian tasks and nothing else.

The *Sicherheitsstrategie* (2013) was therefore strongly linking national security to a new kind of "security-internationalism" and hoped to be protected by the EU, UN and OSCE. The question of many observers was what politicians would expect from these institutions.

Internal security is plagued by growing crime figures and "soft" crime fighting by an overburdened police and by a government that is deducting from every income 50% taxes, but doesn't protect the people. Logically, it cannot expect loyalty either. The problem is the unwillingness of the EU to act on "imported" crime, and mass migration, whereas a *laissez-faire* legal system regards crime as a product of society and inequality, which means, the situation is politically accepted.

INNOVATIVE STRATEGISTS PUSH STRATEGIC ENGINEERING

Alfred Thayer Mahan and other authors identified a number of specifics that are important for great powers, like the geographical situation, the physical topography, the chances for expansion, the unity of population, the national character and political will. He also created a number of terms, some borrowed from Theodore Mommsen, Antoine-Henri Jomini or Alexander Hamilton, which are frequently used today, such as "Middle East", "control of the opposing coasts", "national interest", "national strategy", "national security", "national character", "national policy", "political strategy", "sea frontier", "operations of war", "grand tactics", "doctrine" and "lines of communication". As Carl H. Builder explains in his book *The Masks of War*, the individual services developed an individual strategic culture over 200 years, but in fact mainly since the 1920s.²³ The Air Corps promised in 1938 to prevent any

²³ Builder, C. H. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989.; Watts, B. D. *The foundations of US Air Doctrine: the problem of fiction in war*. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984.

invasion emerging from the Atlantic by bombing the approaching ships, but it turned out that sometimes bombers had problems to find ships or hit a ship, no matter if anchored or sailing.

The Navy has always been able to master operations and tactics, and thanks to a dozen of excellent thinkers and tacticians, it has never lost an important battle, but in 1948 it wanted large aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons. In 1941 the Army was transformed by General Marshall when he replaced most regiment and division commanders because they were either too old or were still debating horse cavalry.

But the events in the Philippines were a real tragedy, because the American troops were simply abandoned there. It was always clear that there were no further reinforcements and no further supplies coming, and evacuation was not possible either. And what about Europe? Strategically seen, at least Great Britain was an unsinkable airbase, if that was lost, as assumed in Washington in 1941, long range bombers like the B-29, B-32 and B-36 would reach Europe from Greenland, Iceland, Morocco, Libya, Egypt or Iraq.²⁴ None of these bombers had become operational before 1944 and Germany could not cross the English Channel.

Nuclear war-planning was beginning as early as 1945, and included some 50 large war plans before a conventionalization of forces was back in the service schools in the 1980s. David Petraeus was able to transform large parts of the Army's strategy into one with a small-tactics counterinsurgency-dominance.²⁵ The much applauded FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* was replacing fire and maneuver with "cultural competence", but today, counterinsurgency is now replaced by classical "large-force" tactics, shifting back to "conventional thought" which is an indicator that coming confrontations will become "continental" again.²⁶

Strategic innovation comes again from service schools and think tanks. RAND saw the need for a new "Grand Strategy"²⁷ as early as 2008.

A NEW EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

Without any EU-forces there is no need for an EU-strategy, but now the EU has published a second text under this title. The EU's chronic lack of clear guidelines in regard of a valid strategic assessment, has led to diverse policies in regard to challenges like Russian threats, China's aggressive behavior, immigration waves, and cyber-attacks. The EU is fighting unemployment but also faces high national debt figures and inflation. Other issues are a closer cooperation with NATO. In late summer of 2015, EU member states were invited to write proposals for a new strategy and many states sent texts.

²⁴ Hansell, H. S. *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*. Atlanta, Georgia: Arno Press, 1972.; Hansell, H. S. *The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: a memoir*. Washington DC: Office of the Air Force History, 1986.; Freeman, R. *The U.S. Strategic Bomber*. London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1975.; Pape, R. A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996.; See also: Korkisch, F. "Der strategische Luftkrieg in Europa und Asien: Teil 1". *ÖMZ* 2/1985. 121–126. and Korkisch, F. "Der strategische Luftkrieg in Europa und Asien: Teil 2". *ÖMZ* 3/1985. 203–211. (These articles include detailed data, production figures and the results of the attacks between 1941–1945).

²⁵ Corbin, M. "Reshaping the Military For Asymmetric Warfare". CDI Terrorism Project Report, 5 Oct 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20120410201159/http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/asymmetric.cfm>, Accessed on 17 May 2017.

²⁶ McDonough, W. "Time for a New Strategy". *Parameters* Autumn 2008. 109–119.

²⁷ Such a typical short proposal was: Dobbins, J. "Does America Need a New Grand Strategy?" CT-311 Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 July 2008. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2008/RAND_CT311.pdf, Accessed on 05 June 2017.

In June 2016 the EU published a paper with the promising title *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, replacing the former *European Security Strategy* (ESS) from December 2003. Viewed from the outside, the new “strategy” looked good and promising. But it turned out that, besides a good narrative of the current problems, the “Global Strategy” did not make any recommendations, had no “action plan” on foreign policy and defence matters, and bypassed the issue of “European forces”. If a strategy doesn't give any advice, then it is not a strategy. But then, why this “Global Strategy” paper at all?

In Alpbach 2016, Nathalie Tocci, Cathryn Clüver and Heather Crabbe pointed out the necessary improvements, and especially Cathryn Clüver from Harvard University reminded the group of experts that the EU has neither foreign policy, nor any defence policy and has no military forces either. With the UK gone, all military potentials are reduced, including nuclear deterrence. Most EU member states do not want a common security strategy anyway and oppose the EU forces outside any national command.

This problem, however, is not new, and became a severe problem in the Balkans, in Iraq and in Afghanistan, as delineated by Wesley Clark²⁸ and Rupert Smith.²⁹

Every order given by a NATO commander was counterchecked in the European capitals if it should be followed or not, also Rules of Engagements (ROE) were interpreted differently by governments. Low defence budgets have been subject of critical comments from US authorities since NATO was created in 1949, expressed just recently by Donald Trump, but were aired over decades by Caspar Weinberger, John Carlucci, Madeleine Albright, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Gates, David Panetta, Chuck Hagel, Ashton Carter, and by a dozen of SACEURs.

In 1999 (Kosovo, attacks on Serbia) NATO was short of pilots, PGMs, night-flying, air-to-air refueling and operational readiness. In 2011 (Libya) the situation was even worse, even standardization agreements (STANAG) agreed to 30 years ago, have not been implemented by all NATO members yet.³⁰

It is a fact that “no strategy” is also a strategy. Many European states have no strategy, and some have their national strategy based on the NATO strategy of 2010 *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by Heads of State and Government* is too unspecific. The paramount question – not only for Russia – would be, how and when the British and French governments would use nuclear weapons; both states have denied any control of these weapons by the EU, but have coordinated targeting with the US nuclear planning staff at Offutt, Omaha.

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINES – FUNDAMENTAL FOR STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Modern doctrines explain, in political, strategic, operational, tactical and technical terms, the advantage or disadvantage of specific developments and their impact on warfare at all levels, and also their effect on leadership and organizations. An armour doctrine will explain what armour warfare is about, generally and maybe even in details: It could be a perfect one

²⁸ Clark, W. K. *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*. New York: Perseus Books, 2003.

²⁹ Smith, R. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London-New York: Allen Lane-Penguin, 2005. See also the criticism of British generals regarding missing German support during combat operations in Afghanistan, because German commanders did not get permission to engage in the fights.

³⁰ But otherwise, many PfP-states did so, like Austria and Finland.

like the German doctrine of 1937, a wrong one like the British, a quite successful one like the one applied by the Red Army, or it might be partially wrong and partially right, like the American one, implemented in 1939/40 but corrected later on.³¹ When the *AirLand Battle* doctrine emerged, the artillery branch faced the question of either speeding up processes or being eliminated from the combined arms team. Doctrine is therefore about rules and ideas:

Doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how forces conduct operations. It is rooted in time-tested principles but is forward looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions.

*Doctrine is detailed enough to guide operations, yet flexible enough to allow commanders to exercise initiative when dealing with specific tactical and operational situations. To be useful, doctrine must be well known and commonly understood.*³²

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps have identical views about doctrine; Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM-1) states:

*“Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting. ... Doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.”*³³

An air power doctrine will describe the role of air forces, or the difference of offensive and defensive air defence.³⁴ The evolution of a good doctrine can be seen when comparing the Air Force Basic Doctrine of 1953, then a little booklet with some extra texts for tactical warfare and reconnaissance, which grew over time into many volumes. General Curtis E. Le May wrote along the same thoughts:

*“At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war on order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. ... Doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces. ... is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles that describe and guide the proper use of air and space forces in military operations.”*³⁵

Doctrine and manuals are often the same: The first manual using the term “doctrine” was TR No. 440-15 of 1926,³⁶ which changed in 1940 into the FM 1-5, *Employment of the Aviation of the Army*, with some severe misgivings about the use of air assets by the overall ground commander, but the shift to full authority over air assets was clarified in 1943, when

³¹ LtGen Leslie McNair recommended the “tank destroyer” (M10, M-18, M-36) as the ideal anti-tank weapon, whereas the tanks would be supporting infantry. This was World War I thinking, and that viewpoint resulted in the M4 Sherman tank with a totally inadequate 75mm main gun. The unprotected tank destroyers with excellent guns were now used as tanks. The light tanks like the M3 and M5 series were tactically useless. This deficiency was repaired in 1944, with the new and heavy M-26 tank, and finally by an upgunning of the M4 with a 7,62cm gun late in the war.

³² Definition adapted from Army Doctrine (based on joint doctrine); see FM 3.0: Operations. Headquarters Department of the Army, Feb 2008. 11–12., 1–45. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf>, Accessed on 20 May 2017.

³³ Reese, W. G. III. *The Doctrine Gap: The 27 Year Wait for a New Air Force Operational Doctrine Document*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1996. 3.

³⁴ Curry, B. L. *Turn Points in the Air: Using Historical Examples to Illustrate USAF Doctrine*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1997.; Jones, J. R. *Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine 1947–1992*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997.

³⁵ Reese. *The Doctrine Gap...* 3.

³⁶ *Air Service: Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service*. Washington DC: War Department, 1926.

FM 100-20 *Command and Employment of Airpower* was released, but the debate about close air support went on till 1948, until the Key West Agreement, but in fact it has never ended even by today.

The B-17, the new (and overrated) Norden bombsight, and doctrinal evaluation of the effects of strategic bombing resulted in the already mentioned AWPD-1 air war plan for bombing Germany that favoured high altitude precision daylight attacks by masses of bombers. Hansell's planners had selected approximately 95 strategic targets and calculated the required number of bombers to destroy them, respectively to win the war by air power.

The plan even calculated the exact number of bombers to be built and bases needed.

This plan was revising Douhet's primitive mass-bombing on cities, because the American planners wanted an air offensive with precision attacks on industrial and energy targets, a great theory that had been worked out at Maxwell in the 1930s, supported by modern bombers (still under development), whereas the RAF Bomber Command did stay with Douhet and the massive night-time city-bombing. In fact, both strategies nearly failed and ended in a mix of specific target- and carpet bombing.

Hansell's calculations on bombers were wrong by 500%, but it was the very first plan ever written down with such details, following innovative thinking. The problem of bomber development, doctrine and employment was the growing potential of German air defence – and fighter – development that caused nearly 35% of all bombers employed over Europe lost. The bombers B-17, B-24, B-29 and B-36 were developed by specifications based on doctrine-requirements and newly required qualities, promised by industry (with the A-bomb still unknown to planners) but either were bombers technically behind doctrine-demand, or the defence environment was advancing faster than bombing-doctrine had predicted (early warning, radar-directed guns, jet-fighters, air-to-air rockets). After 1945, defence improved with IR- and radar-guided missiles, far-reaching ground bases of air defence with missiles and integrated command systems, whereas bombers (B-45, B-47, B-58 and B-52) had only the option to fly faster at high altitudes or very low to avoid detection and missiles.

In 1953, the AFM 1-2 *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine* was published, followed by later editions in 1954, 1955, 1959. In 1964 the first AFM 1-1 *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine* appeared, which was revised periodically until it was split into a number of individual texts in 2016. The major push for new doctrinal thought came from airpower experts like John Warden, selecting the political *Center of Gravity* as the main target for an offensive aerial warfare, using PGMs, Stealth, Data Link, Computers etc.³⁷

The Army had a number of Field Manuals dealing with the *Army* (FM 100-1), the *Corps* (FM 100-15), the various types of *Divisions* (FM 71-100), plus numerous others, and changed tactics with the FM 100-5 *Operations*, all regularly updating organizations, armour warfare, artillery, engineers, logistics, tactical airlift, attack helicopters etc. The biggest doctrinal change came in 1982, when the Army implemented the *AirLand Battle Doctrine* with the new FM 100-5 *Operations* (now really dealing with that level) plus the idea of the *Follow-On-Forces Attack* (FOFA) against the “*Second Strategic Echelon*” of the Warsaw Pact forces. (The FM 100-5 in 2001 became the FM 3.0.)

³⁷ Warden's ideas were rated highly by USAF Chief of Staff Michael Dugan but never understood by LtGen Chuck Horner, Air Component Commander CENTCOM, who wanted to run the air war in 1991 in the “traditional style” of air doctrines, even explaining that he wouldn't care for doctrine at all.

The Navy was fighting like in World War II, with carrier operations unchanged since Midway, altered Maritime Strategy and *Sea Power*,³⁸ and was publishing its *United States Fleet Publication*. And a navy has always been the most expensive service.

Doctrines implemented the Air Force Expeditionary Wings, new ideas about close air support or how to fight counterinsurgency more effectively. Other titles guided through the use of space, capabilities, roles and missions, technical options, best organizations and better tactical principles. But what looks ideal today, can be wrong a short while later, like the above mentioned *Pentomic* division idea of the US Army in the 1960s, the “surveillance tanks” (M-103) of the 1960s, or the abandoning of armour warfare at all, as envisioned by many European “military experts”, and doctrines about Cyber War written five years ago seem already outdated today.

Presidential Doctrines are describing political principles, usually addressing new ideas in speeches, implementing an answer to a political problem, but usually will follow established national interests. Such principles were in nearly all cases coined later on by historians or are labeled as “doctrine” by mass media: George Washington’s *Farwell Address* is seen as a doctrine to stay out of foreign conflicts; see also Thomas Jefferson (maintaining neutrality), James Monroe (and John Quincy Adams: Hands off from the Western Hemisphere), John Tyler (“Open Door”), Theodore Roosevelt (“Global Power”), Woodrow Wilson (“Make the World Safe for Democracy”; The 14 Points), Franklin D. Roosevelt (Defeat Fascism, “The Four Freedoms”, “The Great Design”, Germany First); the more recent ones were the Truman Doctrine (Containment “Fair Deal”), Eisenhower (Massive Retaliation, Formosa, the “New Look”), Kennedy (Flexible Response, NATO), Johnson (fight communism), Nixon (Guam Speech), Carter (Detente), Reagan (Roll Back) and George W. Bush (Counterterrorism). European states do not have such an unbroken tradition.

BRIDGES FROM POLICY TO TACTICS: PLAN FOR THE UNEXPECTED

Military planning and command and control work by hierarchies, command flexibility and adjustments to changing situations; current strategic and operation planning is Joint Warfare Planning. Such planning is bridging the various command levels and forces either by jointness, or by combining assets under one commander. Jointness is usually an advantage but should never degrade the capabilities of any force or service.

Typically, planning for a campaign is based on two types of planning:

- Deliberate Planning (planning in peacetime, usually contingency planning, always based on best possible assumptions), and
- (b) Crisis Action Planning (in emergencies, time sensitive, often the result of a Warning Order).³⁹

A valid definition of such planning is the following:

"Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) in response to contingencies and crises."

³⁸ Hoffman, F. G. “A New Maritime Strategy: Navigating Uncertain Waters”. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2 Nov 2006. <http://www.fpri.org/article/2006/11/a-new-maritime-strategy-navigating-uncertain-waters/>, Accessed on 05 June 2017.

³⁹ See: *Army Planning and Orders Production*. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2005.

*It transforms national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.*⁴⁰

Strategy should guide, but never limit subordinated commands in their freedom how they should accomplish their task, neither should the operational level forward detailed orders about tactical moves. It is evident that multinational and combined or joint operations require more detailed orders, so does defence; evidently the are “free style” operations like in World War II. When attacking, “Auftragstaktik” is recommended (a term which cannot be translated or explained correctly into English) for the operational level,⁴¹ whereas in retreat situations “Befehlstaktik” (*Detailed Order Tactics*) is used on the tactical level. But even Auftragstaktik can fail, if the involved commanders ignore the situation up front, or disregard weather, topography, logistics, or the strength of the enemy.

The Trident Conference and the following Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in May 1944 had not decided about strategic and operational details for the landing in France or the operations later on. After the liberation of Paris, it was Eisenhower, who decided with his American-British staff to establish a rather straight front-line running from north to south to the Swiss border. All armies were ordered to reach the Rhine River approximately at the same time in November 1944, then cross the river and push to the center of Germany.⁴²

In late August, and bypassing Eisenhower and his staff, Field Marshal Montgomery, commander of the 21st Army Group, had the idea to push to the northeast and go from there to the east and prevent that the Red Army would eventually reach Denmark early in 1945 with access to the North Sea and the Channel. His idea was being backed up by Field Marshall Alan Brooke, but it was a clear violation of an agreed strategy. Eisenhower, who already lacked enough troops, would have to shift 50% of his theater-forces into northeastern direction. He immediately wanted Montgomery’s resignation who finally apologized.⁴³ This controversy involved Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall, Bradley, Bedell Smith, and a dozen of other generals, and overshadowed the American-British relations for the next few years,⁴⁴ despite the fact that a number of Americans thought that Montgomery was actually right, and that Eisenhower, who was ignoring British geopolitical insight, was wrong.

One more interesting detail: At the strategic-operational level, Omar Bradley, then commander of the 12th Army Group, ordered the 1st Army to push forward, take the Siegfried Line in the forests in the east, and get across a number of small rivers and towns to reach the Rhine River. When Patton had to stop at Metz, the considered north-south frontline was already somewhat bended, but Courtney Hodges – a veteran of World War One and a favourite of Eisenhower and Bradley – then commander of the 1st Army with three corps, was facing a

⁴⁰ Joint Operation Planning. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. IX.

⁴¹ Widder, W. “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership”. *Military Review* 81/5. 2002. 3–9.

⁴² Ross, S. T. *American War Plans 1941–1945*. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997.

⁴³ Dozens of sources by the participants who made the decisions in 1944; see e.g.: Eisenhower, D. D. *Crusade in Europe*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948.; from Bradley’s position see: Bradley, O. N. and Blair, C. *A General’s Life: an Autobiography*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.; Bradley, O. N. *A Soldier’s Story*. New York: Holt Rinehard and Winston, 1951.; Bernard Montgomery’s own story was however somewhat different, but he never admitted that his ideas were beyond his means: Montgomery, B. L. *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*. Cleveland: The World Publ., 1958.

⁴⁴ Eisenhower even in the 1960s criticised Montgomery harshly, and during the Sues Crisis in 1956 was unwilling to support British-French ambitions in regard to Egypt.

large number of rather steep hills and dense woods, including the Hurtgen Forrest south of Aachen. He wanted to do what he was told, acting along standard procedures, and ordered Collin's VII. Corps to proceed to the east as planned.

Despite the problems already faced by a number of divisions in late October, Hodges was unwilling to change the Course of Action, and so was Collins. The 1st Army suffered heavy casualties, with Collins blaming the badly trained officers and soldiers at battalion- and company-levels, the terrain and weather, and Hodges was blaming the division commanders.

This is an example of multiple failure of all command levels, especially when blaming division commanders (of the 4th, 8th, 9th, 28th. 83rd Inf and 5th Armour Div.) who were simply following orders. Collins suffered in the Hurtgen area for 12 weeks, 35,000 Americans were killed or wounded, and such losses would have had some questioning about planning, execution and judgment of Hodges and Collins, but both rose to 4-star rank later on. A dozen of books are now dealing with the Hurtgen-issue, but none could tarnish the decision makers of 1944. Additionally, all was overshadowed by more severe misjudgments, when the German overwhelmed US forces in the Ardennes a few weeks later.⁴⁵

Eisenhower's strategy (guided by the limitations of forces and logistics) is a good example for a perfect bridging from a Grand Strategy all the way down to the tactical level, but somewhere the involved commanders failed, beginning with Bradley, intelligence, staffs, all blinded by earlier successes, with no one proposing a different "course of action" when the first attacks had already failed, finally Hodges and Collins.

Another well known example of misjudgment top-down was the handling of the X. Corps by Edward Almond 1950 in Korea. Walton Walker, commander of the 8th Army, did not keep Almond under tight control, because he was MacArthur's former Chief of Staff, and Almond wanted to show his superb aggressiveness but was also a man of occasional bad judgment. His permanent attack-orders came even when the 8th Army in the west was already under heavy attack and retreating south.

The X. Corps, with no contact to its right, was partially encircled, and when retreating, Almond was leaving the 1st Marine Division behind in the mountains and the Chosin Reservoir to protect the retreat of forces to Hungnam and Wonsan. But the 1st Marine Division fought its way down south and was then evacuated by the Navy. The acid-loaded commentaries of Marines about "Army leadership" went all the way to Tokyo and Washington.

In the same way as Hodges and Collins were protected by Bradley, Almond was protected by MacArthur, and in 1951 Almond was even promoted to three-star rank.

⁴⁵ Historians and eyewitnesses later on blamed all involved: (1) Eisenhower for downplaying the problems in the 12th Army Group, even in his Book "Crusade" he only wrote of some severe fighting but avoided any questioning of Omar Bradley's command style, he was Bradley's mentor. (2) Bradley, who wasn't evidently not concerned about what happened in "his" 1st Army's area, because he had recommended Hodges for command, who also was his friend. (3) Hodges, with his conservative and unimaginable command style, periodically not up to the task, depended too much on his experiences corps commanders. (4) Collins did not dare to recommend a bypassing of the forests in the north, and shared responsibility for not fully supporting and then defending his division commanders. All of these generals had certainly their merits; also German resistance was excellent, organized by Feldmarschall Walter Model. The Hurtgen disaster was quickly overshadowed by the German offensive in the Ardennes, one large disaster was followed by an even larger one. Bradley became a 5-star general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hodges, now 4-stars, became CG Army Continental Command, and Collins became Chief of Staff, US Army. Who wanted to rock the boat with Eisenhower in the White House?

Today, bridging the gap between political strategy and military strategy is often disturbed by interference from outside, because today war is not only a decision of a few politicians and the military,⁴⁶ rather it became one of societal attitudes, opinion polls, social media, resistance from radical opponents, mass media, human rights activists, parliamentarians and hostile NGOs, budget cuts, dubious allies, etc. Ongoing compromises might undermine clear aims, and language and resolutions might be vague. Today, even the word “war” is often banned from texts and is replaced by “crisis”, “disturbances”, “destabilization”, “intervention” etc. Strategy is rarely Clausewitz, and war plans depend on political parties, elections and ideologies. In democracies political leaders often disregard advice of experts, but so do military planners; such can result in “strategic malpractice”.⁴⁷ Getting it right must be an objective by planners.⁴⁸

Yes, there are manuals on hand, like FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, FM 2-0 *Intelligence* or the FM 3-0 *Operations*, just to name a few, but their disadvantage is their sheer volume. Current manuals describe all eventualities and try to list a solution for each problem, but too many details will not be of much help when the shooting starts two blocks away.

The European Union has currently given up the idea of a common defence or of any “European Forces” as proposed for the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999. If the EU and NATO are now joining ranks, it means that the EU will depend on NATO which means that the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 must be revised. As already proposed by Jean-Claude Juncker in December 2016, a new treaty should be less complex, giving member states the chance to select their own courses. Therefore, the individual European nations will be well advised to keep NATO alive, properly equipped and trained, and ready for any eventuality that might come.

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⁴⁶ Betts, R. K. “The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations”. *JFQ* 47/2. 2001. 23–30.

⁴⁷ Mihara, R. “Strategy Malpractice and the False Hope of Experts”. *Infinity Journal* 4/1. 2014. 10–12.

⁴⁸ Ripper, P. van. “From Grand Strategy to Operational Design: Getting it Right”. *Infinity Journal* 4/2. 2014. 13–18.

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1st. Lt. (Res.) Roland Kiss:

THE FUTURE OF WAR, THE WARS OF THE FUTURE

ABSTRACT: War is an organic part of human history, and we can say it is part of life, or in some regions of our World it is life itself. It would be very naive to think that we can ever get rid of war; it is part of human nature. For this reason we face another problem, if we cannot get rid of war, we have to prepare for it, but how can we predict what kind of it will come to us. This problem has caused much headache for politicians and soldiers, strategists and theoreticians, who have had the task: prepare troops for the next war. Many times they have failed and their countries have fallen or suffered more than they had needed to. A common mistake was that they have prepared to win the last fought war, not the next one. The goal of this paper is not to give exact predictions of future wars, but to discover current tendencies. Upon this we can draw possibilities, which may bring us closer to possible future realities. The real goal is to think out of the box and shed light on this very rich topic from other perspectives and trigger others for further thinking, because this paper in itself cannot be perfect or complete therefore it should be only a starting point or a station of a long journey. We are on the edge of something, but it may be too early to determine whether we are on the end of an age or this is already the beginning of a new one.

KEYWORDS: counterinsurgency, MOOTW, hybrid warfare, economic or financial warfare, networking, non-linear wars, insurgencies, modern tribal wars, migration

INTRODUCTION

Nobody could predict the nature of First World War which cost millions of lives on the battlefield. After the Great War, generals and politicians in the West created a strategy to win the „next First World War” which led to the building of Maginot Line and the Belgian fortress system along the German border. On the other side of the border, the losers learned more from their defeat and created a new kind of warfare, which was later called „Blitzkrieg”. The new mechanised warfare made the remnants of the previous war useless. After the Second World War both NATO and Warsaw Pact prepared for the Third World War, which would have been similar to WW II but with the massive use of weapons of mass destruction; fortunately WW III has been postponed. But Cold War was only cold in Europe and the North Atlantic, meanwhile a lot of proxy wars were fought around the World. American forces, which were built up to stop a Soviet invasion across Germany, had to fight against mass infantry assaults in the snowy hills of Korea and guerrillas in the Vietnamese jungle, while Soviet forces, which were built up to invade Western Europe, had to fight on the Chinese border and in the mountains of Afghanistan. As the Berlin Wall fell down, many felt that World peace broke out, but Saddam Hussein had other plans. With Cold War tactics the US-led coalition defeated the Iraqi army and many thought that similar wars would come, where the advanced Western forces would defeat the aggressors, but history failed them again, because the 90’s brought the age of endless peace operations from Haiti to Timor Leste, where many times the peacekeepers did not know who were the hostile forces. After 9/11 militaries had

slowly reinvented counterinsurgency, however, almost every country had had some kind of experience about the fight against guerrillas.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) have become a regular term, because war is an ugly word. Politicians do not like saying „boys go to war”, this is a strong rhetoric reason why ‘conflicts and operations’ replaced ‘war’. On the other hand military science needed a term for the situation which is not a real war like WW II was, but is definitely not peace.

So, what is war? Carl von Clausewitz took previous wars and his experience from the Napoleonic wars as a basis to create a definition for war. In his work ‘*On War*’, he called it as: ‘*War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will*’¹. In this definition there is much truth but we have to ask ourselves, is it true nowadays too? It must be, but not in that clear form as in the past, since many things have changed and there are a lot of factors in our World, which Clausewitz did not know or could not imagine. For example in the previous wars since the ancient times, the armies lined up against each other and by superior force, tactics and operations or simply by fortune, defeated the other party physically. Now and in the future some financial transactions or a group of hackers can cause so much damage to a country in terms of money like a minor war, without any shot fired. Factories may stand still (in a normal war they would be bombed), but if it is sent to bankruptcy, the effect is the same: production stalls. Hackers can shut down computer networks, which could paralyse a government, a company or a whole country in a *Die Hard 4.0* style. Media can be also a good tool to disrupt the enemy’s credibility with a well built up campaign, diminishing its reputation, creating hostile public and international opinion, which could result in international isolation and, maybe, a change of government. And these methods can be combined with more conventional military operations to achieve the desired end state, as the Gerasimov doctrine uses them.²

Therefore we have to ask what war itself is. Do we really need fallen soldiers and smoking ruins to say that we are at war? Maybe armoured columns do not advance across our country, paratroopers do not fall from the sky and bombers do not fly sorties against us, in spite of this we can be under attack. Sometimes it is hard to identify the attacker, so it is hard to counterattack. As opposed to conventional war, it is hard to determine the attack, we just feel the results. Or do we know that we are at war? Maybe we live in a constant war and only a small circle knows about it, only the belligerents change: terrorists, hackers, hostile states, financial groups. We have to examine the cause of the attack; maybe it is not political, despite its political side effects, only acquisition. So can we say that if another country attacked us with armed forces to seize our natural resources or other values is war, but if a financial group was shorting us to seize tremendous money or achieve a government change, is not war? Maybe history has overwritten the above scientific definition. According to current standards, it would be better to say that war is an act of pure force and/or coercive and disrupting tools to achieve our goals against enemy’s will. Therefore in this paper I use a broad sense use of war, defining those situations where some kind of hostilities is in progress as we will see the various possibilities. On the other hand, from a military point of view, when boots are on the ground it really does not matter that we call it MOOTW or war or something else, because troops are going to war. The Battle of Mogadishu was part of a

¹ Clausewitz, C. von. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 75.

² Gerasimov, V. "The value of science in prediction". In The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War. Moscow’s Shadows. <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>, Accessed on 11 September 2015.

peace operation, which is not war, however it had been the most intense fire fight of the US Army since Vietnam (including Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War).³ While in Iraq, during the war period (March-April 2003) 122 US troops were killed (hostile and non-hostile),⁴ by December 2011, the end of active US military presence, this number had grown to 4490,⁵ most of them killed in MOOTW operations. We can say that war in its clear form does not exist now, for this a clear scientific distinction is not possible or simply does not make sense.

BELLIGERENTS

To predict the wars of the future, we should first examine the possible belligerent parties. The circle of potential belligerents has significantly increased, we can list countries, various groups and also individuals, meaning everyone who takes part in offensives or defence, regardless of being armed or not. From them numerous opposition scenarios are possible, like state vs state, state vs group, group vs group, state vs individual, group vs individual, and of course the combination of these. The state vs state scenario is the most obvious what we have seen many times in history; naturally these wars can be different depending on size and capabilities of the adversaries. However the number of interstate conflicts has been decreased, it would be a huge mistake to rule out the possibility, even in Europe as many „experts” did in the past years.

Groups are more interesting belligerents since we can list almost endless types of them, based on classification. The first and most obvious is guerrillas, or partisans, or insurgents, or whatever they are actually called. Some kind of armed group which fights against a foreign or domestic government along its own political or social agenda, for example liberation from foreign occupation, autonomy, or independence, etc. We have seen endless examples of guerrilla wars, which have become more and more popular, since their asymmetric tactics were found effective against even the most advanced and strongest militaries. Although defeating them is not impossible, it is much harder than win in a conventional war, hence the weaker side has more chance than in a face-to-face fight. There are domestic and foreign insurgencies, the latter comes up during operations abroad.⁶

Terrorists are more problematic because the question “Who is a terrorist?” is always part of the game. There are numerous definitions for terrorism, maybe the Netanyahu’s is the simplest, he says that terrorism is a use of violence and/or threatening on civilians to terrorize them and trough it achieves political goals.⁷ On the other hand, sometimes it is very difficult to draw a clear line between guerrillas and terrorists, because sometimes it is the same, one day fighting against occupiers (guerrilla), next day committing attacks on civil society (terrorist). In Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East it is a usual thing, but in other parts of the World the clear classification is easier. Terrorist types can be categorised in many ways, but (in this case) we have to distinguish (just) old and new

³ Bowden, M. "A defining battle". *The Inquirer*, 16 November 1997. <http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp>, Accessed on 11 September 2015.

⁴ Keegan, J. *Az iraki háború*. Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 2004.

⁵ Fischer, H. *A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom*. Congressional Research Service, 2015. 1.

⁶ It is a hard question that do the private armies of warlords belong to here or maybe to criminal groups?

⁷ Netanyahu, B. *Fighting Terrorism*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1995. 9.

type terrorism. The old type has usually achievable goals (autonomy, independence), they commit selective attacks and are willing to negotiate. New type terrorists do not negotiate, they have unreal goals (e.g. global caliphate) and commit indiscriminate attacks, these are the characteristics of modern jihadist movements. One of the most important things about terrorism is to forget a bunch of bad guys with AKs and Semtex. Modern terrorism is more diversified, these organisations not only have militant groups, but own security services, far reaching economic and financial branches, political wings, media and propaganda groups, humanitarian organisations, health and education institutes.

Mercenaries⁸ have always been part of warfare, but now it is done at a very very sophisticated level, in specialized firms. Today, individual soldiers of fortune were replaced by companies which provide services from logistics and personal protection to combat operations. Many PMCs served out even the strongest armed forces, for example Halliburton provided global logistics to Pentagon and later to British armed forces, while other companies helped with the operating of highly sophisticated systems like Navy's AEGIS system. However the employees of PMCs are neither soldiers nor civilians, as they are not current members of any armed forces, but they very often carry or operate weapons, so legally they are not civilians. Furthermore, they are out of the military chain of command, so they have responsibility toward their CEO, not a military commander of operations. Among their criticism are that they work for those who pay them, from democratic governments to multinational companies dictators and warlords.⁹ Another strange act was in 2004, when Paul Bremer, the US governor of Iraq, immunized PMC personnels from any prosecution in Iraq before he left the country,¹⁰ further complicating the questionable responsibility issue of them. According to US DoD, in 2010 224 thousand contractors worked for CENTCOM mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, most of them had support and logistics role.¹¹ Until 2015 April, 7,000 contractors were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the real number must be higher as many times contractor death (mainly foreign and local) are not reported or counted anywhere.¹² According to estimates, by 2004 the private military industry reached the annual 100 billion USD value.¹³ This business is so prosperous that it is possible in the future that more advanced capabilities may be rented. For example, naval or air forces and special capabilities like ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite capabilities, those which are too expensive for smaller countries to maintain, but when they need them, they can hire them.

Fortunately, in the West we do not have to face political parties whose private armies fight on the streets, but in many parts of the World it is reality. But instead of simply speak-

⁸ Upon most of the tasks what current contractors do, they cannot be tagged as mercenaries as it is a legal term, which determines who are mercenaries. "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977". International Committee of the Red Cross. 08 June 1977. <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750057>, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

⁹ Singer, P. W. "Outsourcing War". Foreign Affairs. 2005. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-03-01/outsourcing-war>, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁰ Scahill, J. *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. Nation Books, 2007. 14.

¹¹ "Contractor support of U.S. operations in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, Iraq and Afghanistan". www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html/5A_Dec2010.doc, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹² "US & Allied Killed and Wounded". Watson Institute, Brown University. April 2015. <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military>, Accessed on 28 October 2015.

¹³ Lane, E. "The rise of the UK's private security companies". BBC. 2 November 2010. <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-11521579>, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

ing about private armies, we should focus on other possibilities. Political parties have an extremely crucial role, because those who are in the national assembly have an effect on legislation and running of the country. But they can also fight against the standing government as a legal branch of an insurgency (like Sinn Fein and the IRA) or support alien interests, heighten tensions against the government, delay or prevent bills, which can be crucial in a conflict or imminent conflict situation. They can create a shadow government and finally, if enemy attack commenced they can step forward as a „legitimate” government which ask for foreign help. This is not a game of mind. During WW I Lenin could go back to Russia only because Germany helped him to overthrow the provisional government and quit Russia from the war. During WW II both Hitler and Stalin had puppets who were glad to „call in” their troops, like Quisling did in Norway, or local communist parties in the Baltic states or Finland. If we examine the Russian non-linear war in Ukraine, the role of the pro-Russia political parties is essential for success.

NGOs and civil organisations are very widespread today, it is hard to sum their numbers, but there are millions of them worldwide. Many of them do very useful work for society and their actions can be tagged only as positive. On the other hand, many others’ activity is more problematic, many of them support cases which are harmful to society, and we have to note that in democracies they have a lot of tools to fight against their own government or support fight in other countries. As an asymmetric warfare book writes, they only follow their own agenda, do not deal with any other interests, do not respect rules, demand the cooperation of government while they refuse to do so. They are ready to sabotage the measures of national governments, manipulate international public opinion with the belief that they can do anything because their status saves them.¹⁴ Anybody can found an NGO and it will follow his or her and the main funders’ goals, but in democratic sense no one elected them and they also lack political or any other responsibility. NGOs are ideal to organise demonstrations, collect and redistribute funds, provide shelter, develop and organise insurgency, provide supplies, run an intelligence circle or spread propaganda. Hand in hand with media and extremist political parties, these organisations have a leading role to cover up important problems in the name of political correctness and human rights. If their activity is compromised, they can hide behind civil rights, claiming that they are investigated only for political reasons, and they can count on international media support and international organisations. Wikileaks can be an interesting and very good example, it leaked out confidential and secret US papers, which caused tremendous diplomatic troubles to Washington, while it had also some military effects, giving an example how an NGO can fight a superpower with generally simple techniques, which can be considered as a soft disrupting tool. If we consider non-linear war and events in Ukraine, it is not difficult to verify that NGOs can be very useful means in preparing the „battlefield” for an imminent coup and take over or a covert or overt armed attack against the country. However not only Russia, but Western powers also extensively used the NGOs in Ukraine before the revolution to oust the pro-Russia Yanukovich government.

Regarding media, the first thing to do is forgetting independent media or journalist ethic.¹⁵ The greatest newspapers, news channels and sites are part of the greatest firms in

¹⁴ Resperger I., Kiss Á. P. and Somkuti B. *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2013. 74. and 236.

¹⁵ This paragraph is not about those journalists who are loyal to their profession, work hard to create the clearest picture possible and try to inform their audience according to their best knowledge without bias or preconceptions.

the World, which have many economic and political interests and the means to support their goals. We can say that media does not only report about events, but it also develops them. Media cannot be a real belligerent like combat forces, if we want to use military term, it has a combat service support role. What soldiers call PSYOPS,¹⁶ media does every day. Therefore, media can work for governments, political parties, lobby groups, national or multinational companies, NGOs or along any ideology the given journalists believe in or paid for. Media has been always a very useful tool to propagate own opinion, nowadays it is as important to oppress as any other. In our World where there are so much ways we can get information, it is hard to present only one deliberate picture and a decisive coverage cannot be reached, in spite of this superiority can be developed. This is possible through „news chain reaction”, but what is it? It is enough to place some „good” articles at high-value press players, because most of the news companies do not have the resources to be present everywhere, therefore they take over news from the bigger ones, so only some well-placed article can trigger a news flood and this will reach most of the people. Biased reports, misinterpretation, half-truth, fake news and recorded put-up situations are good means to disrupt a reputation and credibility of countries or groups. In dictatorships it is easy to gain that opinion terror, but it would be a mistake to think that only they use it. Past years proved that there is no such lie, which even the greatest and most respected Western newspapers or channels cannot present as an only undisputable truth. They have a leading role in suppressing those who have different opinion, keeping up opinion terror. The force of the media is that they develop opinions. Armies can win battles, if people see defeat on the TV, on the sum it will be a defeat. Therefore, underestimating the role of the media in war is one of the greatest mistakes the commanders and politicians can make.

Companies are among the belligerents, but not only PMCs, though they are crucial for these business wars nowadays. But this is not a new phenomenon, here come two examples. The British East India Company was the top multinational firm of its age. To protect its trade compounds it needed security personnels with a modern word, which included some companies of local riflemen with artillery led by European officers, but by the early 19th century it had nearly 150 thousand soldiers (both European and native units) which was more than most European states had, and also a small navy in India. In 1746 EIC fought a war with the help of regular British Army units against the French firm, *Compagnie des Indes* and its private army in India.¹⁷ Companies have always been some kind of belligerents, we should think about that wars often break out because of economic interests, so business and war always walk hand-in-hand. Modern multinational companies have also interests, maybe more than ever, and use any tool to protect them, however, such a colonization that EIC did is not possible today. Nevertheless, modern firms can also wage a war with more indirect means, and mainly in territories where media attention is less focused, like Africa, with more direct ones. A more modern example happened in Sierra Leone, where the RUF rebels (more like drug addicted mass murderers than freedom fighters) threatened diamond and other mineral mines, where the South African DeBeers, the British Branch Energy and other companies had mining concessions. The national government proved to be impotent and RUF was close to seize the capital city. In 1995 the South African Executive Outcomes PMC was hired to secure the mines. 150-200 mercenaries (mainly ex-recon and special

¹⁶ PSYchological OPerations

¹⁷ Reid, S. *Armies of the East India Company 1750–1780*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009. 3–13.

forces) trained and led the local Kamajor militia and went on an offensive, driving out RUF which got on the edge of defeat.¹⁸ It is also a good example that these actions are not only negative, because EO's operation meant the life for the local civilians, however, they fought for business interests. Companies use PMCs in many parts of the World, mainly as security force for their installations or personal protection for their employees, but the above example showed that PMCs can be used by firms in a more traditional military role. However, it questions the state's monopoly of force, or what happens if a country fights a war with a company, or a company fights with a group in its territory. Many multinational companies' revenue is higher than that of most of the countries' GDP,¹⁹ so raising or renting an army is a possibility in the future, and it can be more elite with more advanced weapons, and may be bigger than most of the countries will have in the future.

Illegal occupiers are those who migrate to another place (country) to settle down there, however they refuse any compliance with native population, they want the goods and all the benefits without giving anything in return. If they are prevented somehow, they act aggressively. Although they disguise themselves many times as refugees and use real refugees to infiltrate or mask themselves, there are many differences in their behaviour. Refugees ask, occupiers demand; refugees are grateful for any aid, occupiers take what they need; refugees cooperate with host nation, occupiers try to drive out host nation by bare violence or creating parallel society; refugees appreciate their new home, occupiers want to exploit it; refugees run for life, occupiers go for higher benefit. Occupiers also refuse to accept the rule of law referring to harsh conditions and they think acting out of law is legal for them, because media, extremist and radical parties and NGOs are on their side.

Although fight against criminal organisations is the task of law enforcement forces, sometimes military is also needed. Organised crime usually keeps a low profile, because the greater the publicity the greater the burden from the police. On the other hand, in some parts of the World local authorities lost control over some of its territory, where criminal organisations take over. This is a reality in Latin America where drug cartels are so powerful that police itself is not enough to defeat them, many times even military is insufficient for victory. The favelas of Rio, jungles of Columbia, or the streets of Mexico became battlefields in the past decades, when government forces and criminal organisations clashed. The Mexican drug war started as an inter-gang fight over the rule of drug routes from Columbia to the USA, but the scale of violence overwhelmed Mexican police, which was also on the cartels' paylists, therefore Mexican armed forces had to intervene to restore order. Also local militias have been formed to save civilians, although many times they fight against each other. According to estimates, at least 60 thousand people died in the drug war between 2006 and 2012.²⁰ Sometimes these groups are hybrids with drug traffickers who become guerrillas to protect their territories, sometimes guerrillas turn to be drug traffickers to raise easy money for their cause and to continue fight.

¹⁸ "War for Diamonds: Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone". Soldiers of Misfortune. <http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/eo-sierra-leone.htm>, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

¹⁹ "The World's Biggest Public Companies". Forbes. <http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall> and "Country comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity)". CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#hu>, Accessed on 22 October 2015.

²⁰ Bender, J. "Mexico's drug war is getting even worse". *Business Insider*, 14 May 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-drug-war-is-taking-worse-turn-2015-5>, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

Individuals can be also belligerents. If we take hackers, we can see that one single person can also cause tremendous trouble as we depend more and more on information networks. Individual hacker attacks happen every day with the intent of gaining money, make trouble for fun, or for political reasons as, for example, Anonymous hacker group have done it many times, shutting down websites. Governments and violent groups have recognised the value of hackers and today hacker groups or units are developed, some for offensive, others for defensive roles. Offensive groups can be used to acquire information or disrupt enemy networks. For example China uses them extensively for military and economic espionage, North Korea used them to revenge and cracked the sites of Sony, stole and uploaded movies to file sharing sites, which caused more than 100 million-USD-losses for the company.²¹ Russia expedited successful cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, although its direct involvement could not be confirmed. In both cases government sites were shut down using automated methods, but Moscow took no responsibility for these attacks because of the lack of any direct evidence.²²

Financial speculants and businessmen can be considered as belligerents. However they mostly want to acquire money, sometimes they have political goals too, for example changing government (for a more compliant one). The modern international financial system makes it possible to devastate a country without a shot fired. Shorting is not far from robbery, it is just more sophisticated. I am not an economist, so I do not go deep in technical details. But only from a military point of view, it can be considered as an attack against the country to seize values of it not by force, but a trick. Can we see economic coercion as an act of war? Is it an attack when country does it, and if so, what is it if a financial group does the same? From this aspect, can leaders of financial groups be legitimate targets? How should we estimate a situation when a businessman attacks a politically and militarily allied country? Historically these people can do their tricks without any political responsibility or ever be taken to criminal court for their actions; however, the attacked party suffers all the consequences for years or decades.

We have to take the question what if we do not know the enemy, if the fog of war is so thick that we only feel their strikes, but we have no information about the attackers' identity? What should we do if we are under attack, but we cannot track down who is behind the scenes? Modern technology and our modern World have empowered too many players, including individuals, to be able to wage war. If someone has enough money, he/she can hire a professional army (PMC), can establish supportive political parties and NGOs to represent interests, pay journalists to degrade the reputation of adversary, purchase cyber intelligence and attacks and launch economic actions. I think this will be one of the greatest questions of future wars: to identify the real attacker. Also this is a real counter-democratic move, that more and more people can launch devastating attacks only on their own or a small group's decision. The conclusion should be that anyone who is willing to wage war must be seen as a belligerent regardless of wearing military uniform or an expensive suit.

²¹ Grevatt, J. "The As-Pac cyber challenge". *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 February 2015. 24. and 26.

²² Gamero-Garrido, A. "Cyber Conflicts in International Relations: Framework and Case Studies". Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 19–20., 36., 43. http://ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/Gamero_Case%20studies%20in%20Cyber%20Conflict_Final.pdf, Accessed on 23 September 2015.

CHARACTERISTICS OF WARS

Conventional wars are on the decline, but that does not mean that we can forget it as it probably remains the main form of armed clash between states. It can be very similar to what we have known since the Second World War, with mechanised warfare and the massive use of artillery, air and naval forces. Therefore conventional forces play the leading role. In case of highly advanced countries, warring sides can use cyber, anti-satellite, electronic warfare to deplete adversaries' command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication capabilities before the conventional operations are launched. Anti-access and area denial weapons can play a leading role in defending own territories or setting up a perimeter in the theatre of operations where enemy forces are not able to intervene without suffering heavy casualties. The main difference between former and future battlefields can be the more effective kill chain which makes the most advanced main battle tanks, fighter bombers (maybe except stealth ones) or warships less survivable. Situational awareness is also in jeopardy as against lower tech adversaries high-tech countries can reach the highest level ever, but against other high-techs with the above mentioned capabilities it will be able to fall on a WWII level. Only one thing is sure, future conventional wars will be faster and more destructive.

Hybrid warfare or war has become a very fashionable term, however it is generally used in a wrong sense and the war in Ukraine is tagged with „hybrid“. In reality William Nemeth used this term for the Chechen way of war. He argued that Chechen society was between modern and pre-state level, and in warfare they used also the combination of modern regular and irregular methods, and they could easily, flexibly switch to guerrilla or conventional warfare.²³ Frank G. Hoffman supplemented this theory with terrorist and criminal activity and he used another term, compound warfare for when both regular and irregular guerrilla forces are used to attrite opposing force. Because of the lot of and many times misused terms, I use only the hybrid for mixed conventional and irregular warfare. He lists many examples in the history, including Hezbollah's successful defensive fight against Israel in the 2006 war.²⁴ It is interesting that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps worked out the „mosaic defence“, which Hezbollah used in Lebanon. Iran's mosaic defence was based on the 2003 Iraq war, as they concluded that they could not resist an attack from a modern armed force like American, therefore they turned to a hybrid conventional and guerrilla defence.²⁵ In this strategy they avoid clash with heavy enemy forces and exploit the geography of their country (strategic depth and mountainous terrain) to attack the supply routes of their enemies, which resulted in high level of self-control and self-reliance of the Iranian forces.²⁶ Iran also developed an asymmetric naval warfare, which roots in the Tanker War in the 80's, and for that Tehran have developed a massive sea denial capability by today. As Taiwan recognised its declining force comparing to ever stronger China, Taipei is also working on asymmetric

²³ Rácz A. "Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist". The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 16. June 2015. 28. http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/514/russia_s_hybrid_war_in_ukraine/, Accessed on 07 October 2015.

²⁴ Hoffman, F. G. "Hybrid vs. compound war". *Armed Forces Journal* 1 October 2009. <http://www.armedforces-journal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/>, Accessed on 06 October 2015.

²⁵ Ward 322–324.

²⁶ *The Military Balance 2011*. IISS. 297.

capabilities²⁷ to execute a sea and air denial campaign in case of war, or as they call: guerrilla air and naval warfare.²⁸ Also the countries' terrain (mountains and dense cities) can be ideal for hybrid warfare and it is possible to inflict heavy losses to invading forces. Another use of this warfare can be found in a Cold War era '*Total Resistance - Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations*' handbook which describes guerrilla and underground methods both for cutting off regular soldiers and civilians, what can be used in case of enemy (Soviet) invasion. Also North Vietnam and the Viet Cong fought a hybrid war against the US. If someone faces enemy invasion what they are unable to resist, the mixed use of conventional and irregular forces is a possible way, since the use of guerrilla methods can turn even a successful enemy invasion into a bloody war of attrition, as Soviet Red Army and partisans did it after the 1941 German invasion. Or delaying enemy advance can give time to allied forces to deploy, or preparing the battlefield and supporting the retake of their country. Because this warfare needs highly independent and self-reliant forces, this kind of warfare can be executed only as an all-out war and with 'do or die' mentality, so only very patriotic armed forces can fight a classic hybrid war, which also civil society accepts with all its burden and losses. Also enemy should mean a grave danger to the defender like Nazi Germany was to the Soviet Union or Imperial Japan to China.

What is labelled hybrid war in Ukraine is the *non-linear war*, as I presented which is real hybrid. Non-linear war is especially connected to Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov and named after him: Gerasimov doctrine. The General wrote his observations about the conflicts of near past, according to him we can no more draw a clear line between war and peace in every case, and a country can be disrupted within months or even days. He says: „*The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, ... The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces.*”²⁹ This doctrine was used in Ukraine by Russia, and we can say that the seizure of Crimea was a military masterpiece, because without firefights or any serious losses, Russia seized the peninsula and captured the local Ukrainian forces. On the other hand in Eastern Ukraine, things have not gone on in a so smooth way. András Rác gave us an exceptional description of the Gerasimov doctrine which states that the doctrine has 3 phases with 3 sub-phases each. First is the preparatory phase (strategic, political, and operational preparations), when the aggressor reconnoitres the target country and identifies its weaknesses, then establishes organisations (political parties, NGOs) which are loyal to Moscow, gains economic influence, builds media positions and heightens tensions, develops a network of pro-Russia agents and corrupt officials, while applies soft diplomatic pressure. In the next, attack phase (exploding the tensions, ousting the central power from the targeted region, establishing alternative political power), they commence the real attack, when the attacker organizes mass demonstrations and covert forces (special forces)

²⁷ "2013 Quadrennial Defence Review". 40-41. <http://qdr.mnd.gov.tw/file/2013QDR-en.pdf>, Accessed on 06 October 2015.

²⁸ Thomas, J., Stillion, J. and Rehman, I. "HARD ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deterrence Through Protraction". Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 21 December 2014. 33-35. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/186741/2014-10-01_CSBA-TaiwanReport-1.pdf, Accessed on 08 October 2015.

²⁹ Gerasimov. "The value of science in prediction".

disguised as local civilians capture key buildings (government, media), supplemented by an intensive information operations and the disruption of the defender's command and control capabilities. Meanwhile the regular forces of the aggressor are ready to intervene on the other side of the border. The third phase is stabilisation (political stabilization, separation of the captured territory from the attacked country, lasting limitation of the strategic freedom of movement of the attacked country), when a referendum about independence is held, the new „state” requests help from the aggressor, which later annexes it and establishes constant military presence. Due to the loss of territory, the attacked country suffers serious political, economic and prestige losses. But Rácz describes that this kind of doctrine cannot be used in every case, it needs some conditions to work, which are military superiority over the victim, weak central power and security structure, lasting dissatisfaction with the government, and the presence of aggressor nation's minority as a source of legitimacy.³⁰

MOOTW is a term which describes and involves a very wide range of activity and according to present tendencies this probably remains the main form of military operations in the future. While interstate conflicts are on the decline, intrastates are on the rise, when many problems need domestic or foreign military assistance. These are ranging from peace operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to counterinsurgency. If we take a look at current and near past conflicts, we can develop a picture of the *MOOTW* of the future. *MOOTW* operations will be able to be a part of homeland military operations in the future, even in Europe.

According to RAND Corporation: '*Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.*'³¹ The extensive use of information networks and the dependence on them have made it possible to expedite devastating strikes from great geographic distances with a single laptop. Attackers can range from bored teenagers to nation states' cyber units, as the goal can be simple theft of data or shutting down of whole systems and networks. Cyber warfare must have a central role in almost every type of conflicts in the future; therefore it is not really an independent category, but a part of every other. We must note too that the practicing of cyber warfare does not need visible acts of hostilities; instead, it can be done as a silent war also in peace time.

Economic or financial warfare has become a very often used and widespread form of warfare, an alternative warfare against deploying troops. However this warfare has its limits, as only rich and powerful countries can use it against poorer and weaker states, between 2000 and 2012 sanctions³² were used against 20 countries. The leading states of this kind of war are the United States and the EU countries, however, Russia and the international organisations also take part, while on the other side we can find countries which are not famous for their wealth, like North Korea, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic. These techniques were used to sabotage nuclear or other weapon programs or to achieve a government change, but Cuba and North Korea are good examples where these sanctions have had no real effect. One of the latest examples was the US-EU sanctions against Russia in retaliation for its ac-

³⁰ Rácz. "Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist". 58–80.

³¹ "Cyber Warfare". RAND. <http://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html>, Accessed on 1 November 2015.

³² Restrictions on trade, investments and financial transactions, and freezing assets.

tions in Ukraine.³³ Because it is not only soft, but silent warfare it can be also used against allied countries to press them, as the US did against the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis, depressing the value of the British Pound.³⁴ Financial groups can also fight this war in coordination with nation states or on their own. In the latter case the main goal is usually business, but it can have political goals as well, for example change of government for a more business friendly one, lacking any democratic consideration.

CULTURES OF WARFARE

We have to differentiate types of warfare, one is depending on the symmetry of forces. First is symmetric, when the parties are in similar strength, have a similar organisations and technology level, for example US and China, NATO and Warsaw Pact. Second, asymmetric warfare is when one party has tremendous superiority over the other in terms of strength, technology, training, like NATO and Taliban. But maybe it is an oversimplified approach because, for example, one of the tasks of the special forces is irregular (asymmetric) warfare, however they are among the best trained soldiers. So, it is better to say that asymmetric warfare is a use of minor forces against major in a way other than conventional. Asymmetric warfare became a very often used term, but many times in a wrong sense. Two totally equal enemies will never meet, there will be always some difference, so every fight is asymmetric in this sense, but here asymmetry means a very huge difference like regular army against guerrillas. Therefore we make a third term between the two, non-symmetric, when parties have similar organisations and technology level, however there is a huge difference in strength, like Russia and Ukraine, China and Taiwan. Wars happen along these types of warfare, but it almost never happens in a clear form, these can exist in a following order or in a same time. On the other hand these terms refer more like to a kind of use of force.

We can also differentiate the way that warring parties use to achieve their goals, it can be direct or indirect. Direct warfare is more straightforward, with the destruction of enemy forces, cracking the defence capability physically and achieving victory on the battlefield while indirect warfare is fighting the enemy with wearing it down, for example depleting enemy defence capabilities with the denial of access to important materials (eg. blockade) or with the destruction of war infrastructure (factories, railway). It can be psychological wear down as in the case of guerrillas, who may not defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but achieve that their enemy loses the will to fight further on.

Waging a war does not have a uniform way, different countries or groups have their own traditions, personal opportunities, resources, geographic considerations and also culture, which form their own way of war. This can be called culture of warfare, and we can differentiate them upon being direct or indirect. It is not really an operational plan or strategy, but a vision, an approach how to achieve goals, secure interests, defend the country and fight conflicts. Jenő Kovács determined the culture of warfare as "*the sum of military, intellectual and material values regarding to warfare, which marks out the baseline of disintegration of enemy forces and protection of own troops. Culture of warfare can be named as an orienta-*

³³ Lakshmanan, I. A. R. "Financial War". Bloomberg. April 2014. <http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/financial-war>, Accessed on 01 November 2015. E link idén februárban frissült, és már más szerző cikkét tartalmazza.

³⁴ Bracken, P. "Financial Warfare". FPRI. 13 September 2007. <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2007/09/financial-warfare>, Accessed on 08 November 2015.

tion of military science, a character of the armed forces, or other.”³⁵ He distinguished three types of them; maneuver centric, material centric and guerrilla warfares.

Maneuver centric culture is connected to the German and Soviet/Russian culture of warfare. German maneuver centric culture is based on offensives and strikes at enemy centres of gravity. It depends on superior maneuver skills of forces and following punches, when defence is only a temporary status. On the other hand the Soviet/Russian culture shows different characteristics, as they had more forces and resources, it is more like a steamroller than a precision strike force, which counts with a lasting war and great casualties.³⁶

Material centric is the way of war of Anglo-Saxon powers, and according to Kovács it uses defence as its central core, while keeping paramount territories and using great firepower to prevent enemy offensives and attrite hostile forces. This culture of war needs tremendous resources, good planning, pre-war preparations and long time to work. He also argued that it lacks creativity and it is too rigid system.³⁷

At the *guerrilla* culture, he pointed out the central role of a political leader of the movement, who can be also the military one, but anyway he/she has the charisma and ability to mobilize and control the movement. The main goals of guerrilla war are to get people’s sympathy, to gain international acknowledgement of their fight, to get moral-material support of great powers. Guerillas also need safe bases where they can prepare their forces and they achieve their goals through constant harassment and attrition of enemy forces, at first mentally, not really physically.³⁸

In my opinion this theory is a little bit simplified and at least partly not true. For example between the German and Soviet 20th century way of war, there is too much difference to group them in one category. Also I argue that Anglo-Saxon powers followed a strictly defensive strategy, although they used indirect methods during WWII like strategic bombing, they had been on the offensive since late 1942, just switching right and left punches to outbalance their enemies, while their maneuver warfare was performed by air and naval forces, which made it possible to move troops around the periphery and strike at the least resistance. On the other hand, this theory is a very interesting thought experiment, that different kinds of states or groups fight their wars according to some kind of culture.

These cultures of warfare may have worked for the WWII and maybe later decades, but nowadays we cannot distinguish them as clearly, and also World has changed and maybe it is time to create a new classification. For example the elements of maneuver centric culture of warfare were adopted by almost all regular armies after WWII. However it is a type of warfare against states, for this in future low intensity conflicts, maybe there will be no one to outmaneuver (eg. urban guerrillas). Material centric is more like in jeopardy than maneuver centric as lacking state belligerents, there is no one to attrite because current enemies might not be attrited by matter, but they are also playing the same game, only they play for mental exhaustion. Wars like Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq proved that it is easier to exhaust a superpower mentally and psychologically than attrite a guerrilla force physically. This foreshadows that future wars may be decided by greater will and stronger determination, not material or technical superiority. Spoiling the new classification, it is not a perfect formula in its current form, I know that separation is not clear and there are many overlappings among

³⁵ Kovács J. *Magyarország katonai stratégiája: 2. kötet*. Budapest, 1995. 17–18. (translation by the author)

³⁶ Kovács. *Magyarország katonai stratégiája*. 22–27.

³⁷ Kovács. *Magyarország katonai stratégiája*. 27–31.

³⁸ Kovács. *Magyarország katonai stratégiája*. 39–41.

these categories. However, it may be worth to examine what kinds of cultures develop and influence the warfares of our age.

Let's start with the *guerrilla* which, according to current tendencies, will continue its hundreds years' long victory march as the most obvious way of war for those who face a much superior enemy. Therefore it does not need any further explanation to the above written.

The next category is the *conventional*, which is the mix of maneuver and material centric warfares, shifted toward the former. This is and will be the primary culture for regular armies, which can be classified as mid-tech forces, thus owning (more or less) modern weaponry but maybe not cutting edge technology or if they had them, they cannot exploit the full range of opportunities of these systems. They may also lack the resources or the will to step on a next level, however, they can fight a conventional mechanised conflict with the hope of success anytime. They operate mainly with the classic fire and maneuver to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, while they are able to fight both low and high intensity conflicts. Most of the countries can be categorized in this culture of warfare; examples are Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Chile.

The next category is *networking*, this is the club of tier one players who have the resources, technology and other non-military means to fight wars against anyone from low intensity to World War III. They show many similarities to conventional culture, they have the modern weaponry, good training and cutting edge technology, like stealth planes, nuclear submarines, ASAT and BMD, long range strikes, some have nuclear weapons, while they gain superiority in information and situational awareness³⁹ with their information systems, satellite and UAV-based ISR, and own the non-military coercive tools to secure their interests. They can use a broader spectrum of national resources and toolbox to achieve their goals from indirect sanctions to very direct military operations. These countries' aim is to defeat the enemy in a fast, intensive war like it happened in the Gulf War or the invasion of Iraq, however, they are able to win via indirect methods. If they face an enemy with close equal capabilities, they would try to avoid direct confrontation or force the other to negotiate instead of an all-out war, in which national infrastructure would suffer considerable damage. These countries are the United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom, France, maybe Japan or future India.

Denying is maybe not a totally separate form, but a subcategory. It means strategic defence and deterrence, where goal is to prevent enemy forces to access and to operate in a territory. This is closely connected to anti-access/area-denial weapons,⁴⁰ where advanced weaponry is used with asymmetric tactics against an advanced and mighty foe. For example, the use of anti-ship missiles and mines against enemy naval task forces. These weapons are acquired and used en masse to overwhelm enemy defence, while dispersal and great number of them assures their survival. Denying does not mean no offensive, in this case setting up a perimeter within own forces can operate with little chance of foreign intervention. Iran and China are the two primary players in denying, having the yet most sophisticated and potent anti-access/area-denial systems. On the other hand some parts of these capabilities can be found in many countries, mainly in the As-Pac region.

Hybrid warfare can be considered as a fusion of conventional and guerrilla warfare, when regular forces also have some asymmetric capabilities, or better to say they got irregular warfare training. These armed forces prepare to strategic self defence against a much stronger

³⁹ Meaning they have the best available real time picture about the situation, meanwhile adversaries lack or lost these capabilities, for this they are fighting almost blind.

⁴⁰ Long range surface-to-surface/surface-to-air missile systems, naval mines, submarines, advanced fighter jets.

adversary, with little hope for a successful conventional war. This means that enemy forces are too powerful to arrest them and/or the defender country lacks strategic depth to believe in a success of delaying and retrograde operations to a newly built up or better defensive line. However, it cannot be the war of gentlemen, as it would be a do or die situation, which requires very well determined officers and soldiers. Also these countries need a vast reservist force, which can provide large numbers of fighters in case of war, who may act as local militiamen who wage war (maybe without command) after the frontline passes through. Hybrid can mean that regular forces provide delaying mobile defence, while cut off forces with the local reservist militia fight an all-out guerrilla war. Iran and Hezbollah are good examples with their mosaic defence, and maybe Taiwan is turning that way. Nevertheless, hybrid warfare can be a weapon of choice for those small countries that face an invasion of a more powerful enemy.

Modern tribal warfare is not necessarily just the mix of cultures of warfare, but mix of ages. This culture closely resembles guerrilla warfare in terms of used weaponry, like small arms, RPG-s, technicals⁴¹ and maybe obsolete armours, it is typical in the most undeveloped regions of the World. In this warfare smaller, lightly armed and untrained forces fight mobile warfare, while using a strange mix of modern and pre-historic weapons and tactics. Decentralized leadership and lack of any rules of war are also the characteristics of modern tribal warfare. African civil wars give us good examples what these conflicts look like, for example Somali civil war, Afghan civil war can be also considered as a modern tribal war, as Taliban and other factions (later Northern Alliance) used similar tactics, or Islamic State does something similar in Iraq and Syria nowadays. In case of a foreign intervention this can quickly turn into insurgency as these forces cannot stand the strikes of a modern armed force, as it happened in Mali after the French intervention, therefore they reverted to guerrilla warfare. It should also be mentioned that this type of warfare has a very strong cultural and psychological element, this is one of the causes of exceptional cruelty and ritual acts like raping and mutilation in order to defeat the enemy also in psychological manner.

WARS OF THE FUTURE

Conventional wars

We cannot rule out large conventional wars in the future, but their probability declines because they are too overt, costly and destructive, and also there are many other ways to achieve goals. So, large wars are not impossible, but less probable, mainly among superpowers, like the US, China or Russia. The high end of these wars is an all-out nuclear war, which has the least probability because it means effectively the end of human race, so we do not have too much to do with it. Conventional wars are more possible, therefore more of interest. A war between hi-tech and mid-tech (or low-tech) adversaries will be mainly one sided, as it happened in the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 invasion. In a conventional war, better training, equipment and technology will be the decisive factor, even an outnumbered force can achieve victory with superior weaponry, training and situational awareness against a much larger force with weaker training, obsolete weapons and lack of modern C4ISR⁴² systems.

⁴¹ Technical: A pick up or jeep equipped with a mounted machine gun, recoilless gun or auto cannon.

⁴² Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

In case of smaller countries there are many variables, so we can be fed from the past and these wars have shown a great diversity, for example beyond naval warfare Iran-Iraq and Falkland Wars have not too much common points, Arab-Israeli wars were other cases. This kind of war might be less probable than the big vs. smaller countries, because today trends show that most of the countries fight internal threats, and a war without the intervention of great powers is not probable. But if it happens, better training and discipline, and also more modern technology and superior doctrines will be the decisive factors.

However, a war between great powers and their allies is currently not so probable, but how we can say that there won't be any such situation in the future which will lead to a major war or a new World War. Anyway, a war between superpowers will start with massive cyber-attacks against enemy military and civilian information systems and the destruction of satellites to cripple enemy C4ISR and navigation capabilities. So it is possible that the early days of a new great war would be spent in a virtual blackout. But wars will differ based on theater of operations, if it is fought in the As-Pac region, it would be mainly air and naval war in the vast oceans or archipelagos, anti-access/area-denial doctrines and joint naval-air operations would be tested against each other. In this, warring parties would rarely see the enemy visually, while warfare would be dominated by long range precision strikes, missile salvos against enemy fleets and bases, large scale air and naval battles, submarine and anti-submarine actions, amphibious and convoy operations, with the mass use of unmanned platforms (air, sea, underwater) in strike and ISR roles. On the other hand, in continental territories (like Northeast and North Central Asia, or even Europe) land and air warfare would dominate, where mechanized formations would maneuver against each other, while air forces would fly sorties against the other or enemy ground forces (close air support, air interdiction) and infrastructure (strategic strikes) to weaken enemy war machine. This war can be similar to what was expected in the 80's in a NATO and Warsaw Pact clash, so similar doctrines like AirLand Battle or Soviet type deep operations can emerge again in an updated version. One thing is certain, this type of war would see the use of almost the whole arsenal of great powers (maybe except for weapons of mass destruction), including the use of non-military means like diplomacy, economy and media.

Hybrid wars

In a 2014 National Geographic documentary Maj. Gen. McMaster said that: "*There are two ways to fight the US military: asymmetrically or stupidly.*"⁴³ Hybrid war can be a weapon of choice for those smaller countries that face a much more powerful, mighty enemy, which cannot be defeated in conventional war. While historic examples have shown that when opposing forces use the same strategic approach, almost always the stronger wins, on the other part in asymmetric conflicts between 1950 and 1998, the weaker side won 55 percent of conflicts. Therefore creating a professional (full time soldiers) irregular force can be the most viable defence strategy for small countries, with the creation of proper education, training, preparation and political will with citizens' support. Of course rough terrain or urban environment is needed to expedite a successful irregular defence as Hezbollah did in Lebanon in 2006.⁴⁴ Pentagon does not expect conventional wars in the near future, because

⁴³ *American War Generals: film*. National Geographic. 2014.

⁴⁴ Fábán S. "Professional Irregular Defence Forces: the Other Side of COIN". Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 28–29. and 161–163.

of the US power. Therefore those who want to defeat US forces will have to neutralize American superiority by dispersal, concealment and disruption of high end capabilities like GPS. This is why the US Army does not want to rely on only technology in the future, but also superb training, leadership and infoops.⁴⁵ This is the cause why conventional wars of the future will probably turn into hybrid wars rapidly as weaker countries can hardly stand great powers' strikes, however, even great powers have hard times when they face irregular warfare. Therefore it is a logical step that even nation states turn to irregular warfare at least partly to assure their survival. Iran, the Hezbollah, and North Korea has developed their own hybrid systems, while for countries like Taiwan, and in the case of deteriorating East European security situation, a hybrid warfare system can be a viable alternative for Eastern NATO members, like the Baltic states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, or the non-NATO Finland, or for Vietnam in the As-Pac.

Non-linear wars

Conventional wars are very costly ways to achieve goals, therefore new methods have emerged which use military forces and other non-military coercion in very close coordination to achieve the desired result. This is what we have seen in Ukraine in two cases, the first was Crimea with inevitable success, while the second one in East Ukraine was not sustainable without a half-covert Russian military intervention even with regular forces. But non-linear warfare is considered too successful and cost-effective comparing to conventional wars that it must have a future, however its use is restricted by the conditions which have been listed above. A probable target can be the Baltic countries (mainly Estonia and Latvia), Taiwan, Southeast Asia or even Russia's Far Eastern and Siberian territories. This kind of warfare has the advantage of less responsibility, because if things went well like in Crimea, everything would be fine. But if things went wrong, like in Eastern Ukraine, the attacker can simply deny everything and continue its restricted secret war until things turn good or other end state comes. A non-linear war can work on its own, but in the future it can be an initial phase of a large conventional invasion, with the aim of depletion of enemy defence capabilities, or by creating the *casus belli* for the aggressor, claiming its responsibility to protect. On the other hand it can be a primary form of (low intensity) conflicts between great powers or alliances, as they can get rid of the destruction, heavy casualties and political consequences of a large conventional war; meanwhile they can penetrate the borders of the others.

Peace operations

Peace operations will change in nature as the number of interstate conflicts decline, so the classic peacekeeping is more and more seldom. Modern peace operations show a very mixed picture like it was in Iraq and Afghanistan, where peacekeeping, nation building and counterinsurgency happened in the same time. For this, while the main characteristics of current peace operations will remain, they may shift toward more like a combat centric activity, because losing sides can start a guerilla war against peacekeepers in the hope of achieving victory. Therefore future peacekeeping forces should prepare for combat operations also, where they will have to perform classic infantry tactics with the support of armour, engineer,

⁴⁵ Wasserbly, D. "ConOps conundrum". *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 September 2015. 25.

artillery and air forces, meanwhile they will act as a police force, humanitarian organisation (e.g. healthcare, construction) or local administration.

Insurgencies

On operations in remote foreign countries, intervening forces must face insurgencies in the future, as wars of the near past proved that the most advanced armies can be fought effectively this way. This does not mean that insurgencies cannot be defeated, but regular armed forces may have a hard time to do that, because it usually gains much more time and a more complicated approach than conventional operations. Even the most advanced armed forces, like those of the US, NATO, or Israel, have had difficulties to fight insurgencies, and while they could reach military success at a local level, countering the whole movements has been failed. Because of this, insurgencies will be the main form of defiance, since guerillas can fight a war of attrition. They have almost endless number of replacements as war produces their recruits while most of Western societies cannot stand killed and wounded soldiers, or civil casualties for a long time. Therefore intervening armed forces and their political leadership need a very strong determination and a lot of time to execute a successful counterinsurgency. Hence insurgency and counterinsurgency will appear in most of the foreign operations of the future, probably becoming the dominant form of warfare.

Domestic insurgencies are the other form, which is an everyday thing in many parts of the World from Columbia to the Philippines, but in Europe it is a long forgotten phenomenon. In spite of this Europe will have to face it and not only in foreign missions. The main cause of this should be searched in the mistaken immigration policy of the Western European countries, shortsighted political considerations, and their over-tolerant behaviour toward the incomers. This made it possible to live in Europe without learning the host nations' language, creating parallel societies within their own districts or slums where their own rules and laws are working and not the host nation's ones.⁴⁶ „No go zones“⁴⁷ are developed as enclaves, where government presence (administration, police, health, education) is failing or effectively ceased to exist, therefore host nations simply gave up part of their territories. The host nations failed to integrate immigrants, while mainly Muslim communities have shown total refusal toward their host nation societies, laws, values and way of life.⁴⁸ Poverty, no perspectives, searching for identity, closed different societies with a well-developed way of life and hatred towards host society are ideal soil to radicalize people, as we have seen that thousands of second and third generation immigrants (mainly youngsters) joined the Islamic State⁴⁹ to fight for radical Islam. Apart from those who have gone to Syria and Iraq,

⁴⁶ Resperger, Kiss and Somkuti. *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban*. 263.

⁴⁷ Kern, S. "European 'No-Go' Zones: Fact or Fiction? Part 1: France". Gatestone Institute. 20 January 2015. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5128/france-no-go-zones>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.; "Muslim Mob chases cops from 'No Go' Zones in UK: video". 28 January 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dao89Redlco>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

⁴⁸ Some example: http://jtf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/islam_netherlands_sweden.jpg; Hurd, D. "Native French under Attack in Muslim Areas". CBN. <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2014/April/Native-French-under-Attack-in-Muslim-Areas/>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

⁴⁹ According to estimates at least 3500-3900 muslim from Europe have gone to the Middle East to join the Islamic State. Rebala, P. and Wilson, Ch. "Growth of Muslim Populations in Europe Map". <http://time.com/3670892/muslims-europe-map/>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

it is hard to tell how many stayed here,⁵⁰ and how many of them come these days, who are to be recruited as well.⁵¹ The newcomers will probably want to live within their people, they also export their home problems, while they will face with broken promises, unemployment and lower living standards than host society has. Europe is importing masses which tend to be radicalized (or at least their offsprings) and some parts of them will be willing to join jihadist organisations like the Islamic State, or wage a war at home. Urban slums are ideal battlegrounds to fight a guerilla war. With good planning and leadership these social problems can turn into a homeland security nightmare. Western Europe will have to face large scale urban uprisings in the future, but more serious than those we have seen in Paris, London or Stockholm, which can be supported by other non-Muslim, but marginalized extremist groups. According to IS statements they infiltrated thousands of covert jihadist fighters into Europe. They can cause serious casualties and damage if these terrorists execute their attacks, similar to Mumbai or Paris. But if they are not used as fighters, instead recruit, organise, train and lead cells, they can multiply their destructive force and this is their more probable will in this case. Breaking out an uprising is the real price that would multiply the force of these well organised groups, it just needs an event what triggers the outbreak, like it happened in Paris. If it does not happen, terrorists can trigger it by false flag operations, their task is to take events further and lead the insurgency. Secret services face serious problems, because their resources remain the same, while their target group increases and effective work can be prevented by political considerations or in the name of civil rights. Radicals are using democracy to cripple host governments to a level, where they can no longer defend the democracy. These factors make Europe a probable battleground for domestic insurgencies; Paris, Marseille, Hamburg, Birmingham and Malmö can be on the list with Fallujah, Najaf, Baghdad, Gaza or Grozny in the coming decades.

Another type of domestic insurgencies can come from non-linear wars, where security forces (military and police) have to face both trained guerillas (own and foreign citizens) and foreign special operations forces, which may be supported by a great power's regular troops, beyond the whole political, economic and diplomatic toolkit of a nation state. Another similar situation is when armed gangs and other organised crime groups fight for territories against each other and law enforcement. This is the case in the jungles of Columbia, the slums of Brazil or in northern Mexico. Where government control is on the decline, the power vacuum is filled by criminal or other militant groups, which won't give up their seized territories easily.

Modern tribal wars

Civil wars and inter-group conflicts of regions like Africa, Middle East and Central Asia will see modern tribal wars as a main form of warfighting. This is the war of warlords, terrorist

⁵⁰ This must not been the whole number, there must be a considerable number of people who are willing to fight, just stay here, also a much wider circle has to be here, who are not fighters, but they are ready to support them directly. While a huge base does not fight or support the fighters directly, but agree with the case and they are willing to provide financial or other support, however they stay away from operations, they are the symphatizers. This is the classic build up of the terrorist organisations and symphatizers.

⁵¹ Martin, M. "German spy says Salafists trying to recruit refugees". Reuters. 17 September 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/us-europe-migrants-germany-salfists-idUSKCN0RH2VM20150917>, Accessed on 17 October 2015.; "Radical Islamists recruit male youths in refugee camps in Germany". RT. 11 September 2015. <https://www.rt.com/news/315058-islamists-recruit-refugee-camps/>, Accessed on 17 October 2015.

and insurgent groups, or any local militia. However, it shows many elements of pre-historic conflicts, which caused fewer casualties than modern conventional wars; these can be the most savage wars with genocides, mass rapes and mutilations. These horroristic events have happened in the past in Ruanda, Sierra Leone, Darfur and Afghanistan. Therefore we have to consider them in the future and these conflicts can be the cause of international peace enforcement operations and further peace building. However, it can be halted by deploying superior force, like it happened in Somalia in 1992, when the US deployed a massive force to restore peace, it can turn into insurgency quickly, so from our point of view these conflicts should be seen as a starting point of peace operations and counterinsurgencies.

Migration wars

Because this is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe (in scale and nature), it earns more discussion. Nowadays Europe faces an annual hundreds of thousands of immigrants, which soon can grow to millions. The roots of this problem are very far-reaching from the Middle Eastern destabilization by irresponsible wars and by the Arab Spring to Europe's behaviour, since it is acting as a migrant magnet with its generous social systems, welcoming and over tolerant behaviour toward anyone, and historical and cultural maladjustment. These factors make Europe a top tier migrant target. Letting unlimited immigration will only cause the disruption of the continent, therefore major EU nations' leaders should think about it, because soon millions are going to knock on the door or simply kick it in, which will lead to conflicts, if it had not started yet.

Now we can distinguish three main types of possible migration wars, but they cannot be divided clearly, instead they come one from the other. The first one is what IS does, committing genocides and other mass violence against civilians to force them to flee and by generating a migration crisis, they harm their enemies. Lots of migrants cause heavy burden to host nations which have to receive, accommodate, settle, and integrate them. This can cause serious financial problem with overwhelming of host social systems, but far not as serious as social troubles. As the ethnic mixture of a country changes fast, it can cause a losing balance because large numbers of people arrive with totally different culture, religion, customs and languages. This in itself can heighten social tensions, mainly if a host nation fails to integrate them or immigrants refuse the integration. Therefore it brings a long term problems for the target countries and now we can see this type of warfare against Europe. Furthermore it gives a never returning opportunity to infiltrate terrorists and other Islamist agents into Europe as usual identity check has been suspended. These Islamist agents will be able to train, recruit, organise and lead terrorist networks across the continent to cause confusion, to carry out devastating strikes, or launch the aforementioned large scale uprisings in the future. In September 2015, the IS claimed that they have already smuggled 4,000 covert jihadists into Europe amongst migrants.⁵² This spoils the third category and the above domestic insurgency.

The second type is a counter move by target countries, which means military interventions in the departure points to counter the causes which led to migration, or intervention in the transit countries which fail to contain migrants. If we see the current situation, most

⁵² Brown, A. "Just wait...! Islamic State reveals it has smuggled THOUSANDS of extremists into Europe". Express. 18 November 2015. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/555434/Islamic-State-ISIS-Smuggler-THOUSANDS-Extremists-into-Europe-Refugees>, Accessed on 26 November 2015.

of the countries in the Balkans let the migrants flow through their territories, so they effectively gave up part of their sovereignty, because they are incompetent or by nasty reason to pass the problem to their neighbours (or both cases like in Croatia). The problem is that these countries were encouraged to do so, while Hungary which tried to keep the situation under control was under heavy pressure, from international media, through UN secretary, to major and some very minor EU leaders gave further lessons about hypocrisy and took every occasion to stab Hungary in the back. If current trends continue, we will face such heavy immigration that would be able to crack Europe from every point of view, but hopefully EU leaders wake up and start acting like nations' leaders and not teenage human rights activists. Holding up the masses at Schengen borders is not an efficient way; therefore the problem must be solved on the route to Europe. This could lead to military interventions in transit countries to help restore order or to do themselves and then maintain it. This is not a war against migrants, because refugees have to be treated under human conditions, and of course they must respect laws too, but Europe must avoid letting such masses in. Uncontrolled immigration causes so much dilemma from social welfare to security that Europe must not let its free flow. Within the EU this problem cannot be solved as it failed to integrate those who were already born in the EU, the current trends will only worsen the situation which will lead to the above mentioned homeland security problems.

The third form is when migrants decide to use any means, including armed violence, to reach their destination. Western media created a false picture about migrants who were depicted only in positive manners, recording mainly families with little children.⁵³ On the other hand, they do not like or simply fail to report atrocities⁵⁴ that migrants commit (also against their own women,⁵⁵ or media and politics tried to cover up the mass sexual assaults throughout Europe in new year's eve 2016) or anything which does not support the positive image. Only a very little portion of the current migrants are real refugees who came from Syria,⁵⁶ also relatively very few families, women and children come. Most of the migrants are young adult males in their military age,⁵⁷ many times in very good condition, with smart phones and a lot of money. Because most of them destroy any identity papers and refuse to register anywhere,⁵⁸ we do not know anything about them (except that they lie about their

⁵³ Kassam, R. "ANALYSIS: BBC Pictures Show 53% Migrant Kids, Just 36% Men – Hugely Out Of Step With Official Stats". Breitbart. 21 September 2015. <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/09/21/analysis-bbc-pictures-show-53-migrant-kids-just-36-men-out-of-step-with-reality/>, Accessed on 09 October 2015.

⁵⁴ Kern, S. "Germany: Migrants' Rape Epidemic". Gatestone Institute. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6527/migrants-rape-germany>, Accessed on 9 October 2015.

⁵⁵ Watson, P. J. "Report: Muslim Migrants Raping Women & Children at German Refugee Camp". InfoWars. <http://www.infowars.com/report-muslim-migrants-raping-women-children-at-german-refugee-camp/>, Accessed on 8 October 2015.

⁵⁶ According to recent EU estimates only 20% of the migrants are from Syria. "1 in 3 'Syrian' refugees have fake IDs, German authorities admit". RT. 26 September 2015. <https://www.rt.com/news/316570-eu-false-syrian-refugees/>, Accessed on 4 October 2015.

⁵⁷ According to UN estimates 71 percent of the migrants are military-aged men 20-30 years old, 15 percent are children and 13 percent are women. Hohman, L. "35 million Muslim migrants may set sights on Europe". World Net Daily. 18 September 2015. <http://www.wnd.com/2015/09/35-million-muslim-migrants-may-set-sights-on-europe/>, Accessed on 9 October 2015.

⁵⁸ Burman, J. "Migrants REFUSE to claim asylum in Denmark - because they do not get enough BENEFITS". Express. 17 September 2015. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/605252/Migrants-Denmark-Finland-Sweden-Marwen-el-Mohammed-TV2-News-Immigration-Refugee>, Accessed on 4 October 2015.

names, nationalities, dates of birth, etc.⁵⁹). Those who now demand our welcome maybe fought for years against NATO and US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan or some other part of the World. These people showed to be very well organised, they come with migrant handbooks/guides,⁶⁰ we could see that some kind of leaders give them orders through loudspeaker, threatening people, giving ultimatums to host nations, and then attack with improvised weapons against the police. If Europe closes its gates and other transit states do so, what will they do? We have seen that many countries' law enforcements cannot keep back large (yet) unarmed crowd, instead they allowed them to go through their country without any control. For this reason if migrants act aggressively under generally normal conditions, what will they do under stricter ones? So it is not far from reality that we will have to face armed groups who want to simply break through every obstacle to reach their destination. Although it is not a difficult task for most of the armies to defeat a relatively large, but lightly armed force,⁶¹ these attackers have many advantages. First, most of the media and radical political parties turn a blind eye toward their atrocities. They have also a human shield from women and children,⁶² which prevent the police and military to fight effectively. And third, they do not need supply routes, because they could acquire most of the supplies on route. Large swarming groups can overwhelm smaller police or military units or seize smaller settlements, but their success can be based on media attention and positive coverage, which can cripple government forces from effective countermeasures. But we must see that Europe is already under a soft invasion, which will only worsen, and we cannot believe in some miracle which will solve every problem instead of us.

We have to take another possibility, when migration war can break out. A major or a global pandemic could trigger a mass immigration to any previously not infested territory, which could result in further problems over the above mentioned ones. Namely, the faster spread of a virus, which could bring out the worst of human nature both from refugees and defenders, this could lead to the most savage and desperate situations, which would be worsened by domestic panic.

CONCLUSION

With all these factors in view, what will future wars be like? The simple answer is they will be very-very diversified. As we have seen in the 20th and in the one and half decades of the 21st century, wars have come in many forms and it is very hard to find two very similar wars,

⁵⁹ Fake Syrian ID papers can be bought from less than 1000 EUR, because Syrian refugees get asylum easier, therefore everybody (over 90%) claim to be Syrian. "1 in 3 'Syrian' refugees have fake IDs, German authorities admit".

⁶⁰ Samuels, J. "Sky Finds 'Handbook' For EU-Bound Migrants". Sky News. 13 September 2015. <http://news.sky.com/story/1551853/sky-finds-handbook-for-eu-bound-migrants>, Accessed on 4 October 2015.

⁶¹ Weaponry can extend from hooligan weapons like bats, knives, broken bottles or spears and swords to infantry small arms like pistols, assault rifles or simply hunting rifles.

⁶² In the Middle East and Africa civilians are often used as a human shield with or without their agreement, because users know that the western strict rules of engagement and media attention will help them, meanwhile they do not respect any rule. Sabrina, A. "Somali Children as Human Shields in Combat, Abused and Forced into Marriage: Rights Group". International Business Times. 22 February 2012. <http://www.ibtimes.com/somali-children-human-shields-combat-abused-forced-marriage-rights-group-414346>, Accessed on 23 October 2015.; "Children used as human shields in Syria war – UN". Inquirer. 13 June 2013. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/425643/children-used-as-human-shields-in-syria-war-un>, Accessed on 23 October 2015.

the two World Wars were very different, even the guerilla/counterinsurgency conflicts have had few common points. So we must avoid thinking that we can prepare for one, uniform way of war. Furthermore, the coming threats heavily depend on the country in question. For example, while future great powers like the US or China have a difficult task because of internal unrests or high-end all out wars, they have to prepare for anything, at the same time for example, according to current tendencies Latin American countries have very little possibility for interstate conflicts, on the other hand internal security threat is considerably higher.

After all, some game changing phenomenon should be mentioned or outlined again, which will have a considerable effect on future warfare. Looking at the new phenomenon of current conflicts we must highlight the increasing role of non-state actors and traditionally non-military tools. These actors cause much problem, because so far it was evident that those who carry weapons are legitimate targets, though now many elements of them are legally civilians and may never hold weapons, while actively and directly support military type operations. And not only PMCs, mercenaries or guerillas belong here, but many NGOs, newspapers and TV channels, hackers, financial groups and multinational companies, which can actively support foreign powers' or individual political and business interests. These latter organisations can work under the concealment of humanitarian and human rights activity, which complicates the defence of the target country, while provide intensive international support and sympathy for the covert attack force. This does not always mean a direct military activity, maybe just soft coercion, which means not kinetic, however today it is a sufficient way to achieve such goals, which could be achieved by mainly military tools in the past.

The other phenomenon is the unprecedented technology level and the power it means. Military technology has had always a decisive effect on conflicts, but until the latest times it wasn't possible to spy or disrupt from thousands of kilometers distance without a single intelligence officer or soldier in the target area. Cyber warfare brought along an age when there is no need for very complicated and expensive equipment to cause a lot of troubles. What the most frightening in this is that single individuals can do that as well as on their own.

Technology has also allowed the development of long range, highly sophisticated precision weapon systems. Hence anti-access/area-denial weapons make it possible to keep out enemy forces, while long range strike capability prevents the defender to access to enemy's carrier platforms. In past wars the difference between capabilities was much tighter, so weaker and less developed side could fight effectively in a conventional war even against stronger enemies. Therefore in the future, there will be a great need for stealth platforms, which might be the only carriers having a survival capability to operate in denied environment. Because of their high price, there is little chance that every military can equip themselves with such a technology. Also there will be a greater need for stand-off weapons which can be launched from relatively safe distance, also by conventional platforms. Lacking any effective electronic countermeasures, the targeted side can be endangered by hostile electronic warfare, which could result in the collapse of operational capabilities, like keeping up communications, targeting or operating combat network systems.

The fast evolution and spread of unmanned platforms must be also announced, the unmanned air systems (UAS) have seen the most spectacular development, however, sea and undersea systems are also coming into operational status. Ground systems have achieved less success and their widespread use is an issue of the future, but if it happens, soldiers' burden can drastically decrease, because "pack-animal" systems will be able to carry soldiers' load, another use of them can be reconnaissance and fighting platforms, but partly they can

also take over tasks like convoy escort. These systems can revolutionize future warfare and decrease the number of friendly casualties. The big question is what will happen, if current unmanned⁶³ systems become really unmanned and make decisions on their own?

We must make another mention. In the latter decades technologies which used to be the privilege of militaries became commercially available. Today it is an everyday thing, that anyone has a cell- or smart phone, anyone can buy a satellite phone, also anyone who has internet access, has some kind of, but not up to date satellite reconnaissance. Also, smaller drones can be bought in most of the supermarkets, which carry a small digital camera, but they could also deliver a small amount of explosives. Social networks became a very rich information source, in the past secret services would have been happy for such a database which contains relations, habits, hobbies and details of private life or political opinion and sympathies, and the best is that people voluntarily provide information about themselves. These sites became also the organizing place of demonstrations and flash mobs, which intensively contributed to the, for example, North Africa revolutions and uprisings of 2011.

So, what can we say in Central Europe, what kind of force would be sufficient for the conflicts of the coming decades? What are the coming threats for us? In my opinion the most probable upcoming military challenges are expeditionary operations derived from NATO membership or other EU or UN missions (probably mainly peacekeeping, low intensity conflicts or humanitarian aid in the third World), and the internal security problems (terrorism, uprisings, insurgencies, uncontrolled mass illegal immigration) especially in Western Europe, so low intensity conflicts will dominate the future warfare, while non-linear wars (in the territory of NATO and EU states) and conventional wars have very little possibility now, but they cannot be ruled out at a 100-percent certainty.

Because we cannot rule out conventional wars, we must be prepared for them. Before the Ukraine crisis, I had heard many times that "*in Europe, there will be no wars, and current borders are everlasting*", and this too optimistic and shortsighted view always bothered me, because what if there would be? And that is what happened, when Europe suddenly faced a massive Russian intervention and revealed that most of the NATO countries' expeditionary oriented light forces either lacked or had only limited territorial defence capabilities.

I think that every country's ground forces need infantry, armour and artillery. Infantry should be the core; it is the most flexible, which can execute many types of combat tasks. Because of the limited nature of resources and funds in most of the countries, not every type of infantry units can be sustained; therefore cross training is essential as it is practiced in the French Army. For example, mechanized infantry can be trained for also light infantry and air assault roles (and vice versa), as light infantry is more effective in the usual tasks of low intensity conflicts, while mechanized infantry is better suited for conventional operations. Tanks and AIFVs provide the maneuver capability, firepower, and protection at the same time, for this, effective offensive, defence, or counterstrikes cannot be executed without them. Also, while the twilight of heavy armour has been announced many times since its appearance, Iraq and Afghanistan proved again their indispensable support to infantry, and until today there is no such innovation which can totally replace heavy armoured tracked vehicles. While artillery is still the most effective in the delivery of large amounts of explosive munitions to long distances and cheaply, in other words it is the tool of the remote destruction of

⁶³ It means that there is no crew aboard actually, but there is at least one human being, who controls them from a remote location.

enemy. Therefore these three branches are the core for any powerful ground forces, however, they also need massive support from other branches to be able to do and sustain fighting.

Special forces are indispensable for future conflicts as their value has drastically increased in the past decades, because they can be employed in any type of conflict with very various tasks. If we consider current counterinsurgencies, non-linear wars, foreign military assistance missions, or more conventional wars, special forces have always had crucial roles. Because of their exceptional skills and capabilities, these soldiers can be deployed and operate covertly also in official peacetime. No considerable armed force can let itself lack special operation forces, and due to the operational requirements of Afghanistan, many smaller NATO countries established their own units of special operations forces. However, it should be highlighted that not even the best trained special operations forces can operate successfully without an intensive and efficient intelligence and reconnaissance background (this is true for every other military operation too). Therefore these branches should be strengthened, including all types of their activity (for example the many times underestimated human intelligence or the use of recon soldiers on the ground). Beside them acquiring UAS for proper reconnaissance and surveillance is a must, however, most of the current UAS cannot operate in an environment with adequate air defence.

Air force and navy are much harder questions, because their structure depends on financial opportunities, while the latter also on geographic characteristics and long-term foreign policy considerations. At least future air forces will need stand-off and other precision weapons, particularly if they do not have stealth fighters, because considerable adversaries will have integrated air defence systems. Helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft of army aviation or air force will be also very valued assets, because of their flexibility and maneuver capability. Also, if NATO considers future counterinsurgencies, a less expensive common counterinsurgency air wing would be desired, because turboprop attack planes can be more effective and cost efficient in this role than high-tech fighter jets.

Proper reserve forces are also important, because they can multiply the actual force of the military without serious defence budget increase, what would be needed for full-time soldiers. On the other hand, requirements toward the reservists, their training and equipment must not be inferior to those of professional soldiers²; it must be close to identical. Training and education of any soldier should be as effective and realistic as possible and if there is only one thing for which we cannot spare money is the training. It can mean the difference between life and death, or victory and defeat.

Because of the increasing terror threat in Europe, the internal security role of the armed forces will definitely increase. However, this role is usually heavily restricted legally, in case of emergency, law enforcement forces cannot provide enough human force to fulfill their usual public security roles and send policemen to the streets as a preventive force in anti-terrorist operations. In this case the military is a potential source of trained armed personnel, who can supplement police, though it hasn't been a usual mission for them so far. For this reason, there is a need for a gendarmerie type paramilitary force, which is better armed and tactically more military than regular police, but less heavy and destructive than military, it should be basically a light infantry force. It would be able to execute high end police and low level military operations as the clear borderline between police and military activities is often blurred, so it would be better tailored for higher intensity internal security. Such a force could fight against urban and rural guerillas, terrorists or foreign special operation forces. Anyway, the military and police will need more cooperation in the future.

So finally, how can we predict future conflicts and how can we prepare the troops for them? First, always remember the hard lessons of past conflicts and integrate them into training. Second, follow current tendencies which may show a way of future conflicts or may not, anyway it can be useful. Third, be openminded, examine every opportunity and never reject any possibility which has some chance, only because it is not liked or seems less probable now. Fourth, if the above written is done, find out what force structure can be the most adequate against the expected threats and spend the funds smart to build up the most effective and powerful armed force available. Fifth, never miss re-examine your past work and belief and if it is needed, make corrections. There will never be a perfect preparation, but we should try it, and finally we can never forget that it is always only the last but one war ended.

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Bg. Gen. Imre Porkoláb:

LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE FUTURE OF INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP APPROACHES¹

ABSTRACT: In his article, the author argues that in the contemporary complex our organizational and leadership methods are quickly becoming obsolete. He takes us through the leadership theory development of the last century and focuses on the newest leadership trends, where every organization has to make sure to treat all personnel as potential leaders and provide them opportunities to grow and learn. Such circumstances preclude direct hierarchical-bureaucratic supervision, and leadership must rely on the expertise of employees with selective skill-sets and experiences. The author presents an integrated approach to leadership, and suggests that understanding, developing and practicing integrated leadership will better prepare all leaders to handle difficult situations under pressure.

KEYWORDS: Leadership, integrated leadership, holacracy, ambidexterity, organizational transformation, cynefin, lean, agile

On an overcast mid-afternoon the commander of the United States premier counterterrorism force was terminating an exercise in Budapest. The highly classified joint readiness exercise² (JRX) was aimed at observing and capturing a hybrid force of players who have been trafficking weapons of mass destruction.

But the exercise had barely begun, and operators were just starting to chase terrorists, when the news hit them. It was 11 September 2001, and the JSOC commander stared in disbelief at a TV screen showing Fox breaking news as the World Trade Center in New York was collapsing. The war on terror has begun and JSOC³ was at the forefront of this war. On that day, they did not realize that the highly efficient organization was not set up for the challenges they would encounter in the next couple of years.

Two years later, in order to make JSOC more operationally effective, Stanley McChrystal (who was commanding the unit at that time) partnered with agencies to fuse intelligence, and

¹ The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the Ludovika Research Group.

Das Werk wurde im Rahmen des Prioritätsprogramms mit Identitätsnummer KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 mit dem Titel „Entwicklung des Öffentlichen Dienstes gerichtet auf Gute Regierungsführung“ in der Ludovika Forschungsgruppe fertiggestellt.

A mű a KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 azonosítószámú, „A jó kormányzást megalapozó közszolgálat-fejlesztés” elnevezésű kiemelt projekt keretében működtetett Ludovika Kutatócsoport keretében, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem felkérésére készült.

² The exercise was called *Jackal Cave*, and the goal was to practice advance force operations (AFO) in a highly complex situation. JSOC operators during this exercise were conducting deep reconnaissance operations, often undercover in preparation of a possible „direct action” mission.

³ The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a subordinate command of US SOCOM (Special Operations Command) most of the time only identified by codenames (TF11, TF 6-26, TF 121). It carries out highly classified operations throughout the world.

synchronize operations.⁴ They collectively redesigned the bureaucratic ways that information travelled up the pipeline, and developed a real-time information sharing environment⁵.

In the next phase of organizational transformation they have combined all elements: intelligence (finding the enemy); drone operators and SIGINT specialists (fixing the target); various teams of Special Forces operators (for finishing); as well as analysts and experts in exploitation and crime scene investigation (pulling immediate information and exploiting it in order to feed it back to the cycle for further analysis).

From a leadership point of view, the linear and cumbersome bureaucratic conventional methods were replaced by a shared informational and operational environment. As a result of this process, there has been a mindset and an organizational cultural shift as well, which enabled a common purpose in the various organizations.

These changes meant a whole lot more than just an experiment. This was a game changer in modern warfare⁶ and had a strategic effect. As it has been reported in Foreign Policy⁷ and in Foreign Affairs,⁸ by reorganizing and changing the organizational culture, the newly organized teams were able to turn around the F3EAD cycle⁹ three times a night! This meant that by August 2006 they were conducting up to 300 raids a month. This meant that the operational effectiveness has improved 17-fold, compared to the numbers two years previously. That is an unbelievable 1,700% improvement in productivity without spending additional resources.

It seems to be very clear that a success rate like the Special Forces have achieved in the face of adaptive and critical challenges is remarkable. The JSOC organizational transformation is an excellent example of the capability of special operations teams but the question still remains: what are the leadership approaches that enable these teams to become the best in the world?

This military example, however, is part of a global phenomenon. Leadership has been going through a remarkable transformation in the past couple of years and in this article my goal is to look at the most recent leadership trends to figure out how they can be applied to warfare in particular?

Though leadership science has ancient origins and prominent representatives as Plato, Sun Tzu and Machiavelli have studied it; it has only become part of the contemporary aca-

⁴ The recent book of General Stanley McChrystal, who has been the JSOC Commander from 2003, and recent articles published in open sources magazines, shed some light on the organization and leadership used to track down and eliminate a highly elusive and networked enemy in Iraq. McChrystal, S. *My Share of the Task: A Memoir*. New York: Portfolio Hardcover, 2013.

⁵ According to Pulitzer Prize-winning *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward, beginning in late spring 2007 JSOC and CIA Special Activities Division teams launched a new series of highly effective covert operations that coincided with the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. They did this by killing or capturing many of the key al-Qa'ida leaders in Iraq. Woodward, B. *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006–2008*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.

⁶ Peter Bergen also credits McChrystal with transforming and modernizing JSOC into a "force of unprecedented agility and lethality," playing a key factor in the success of JSOC efforts in subsequent years and in the success of the war in Iraq. Bergen, P. *Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden From 9/11 to Abbottabad*. New York: Broadway Books, 2012. 152–158.

⁷ McChrystal, S. „It takes a Network”. *Foreign Policy*. 22 February 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

⁸ Rose, G. "Generation Kill: A conversation with General Stanley McChrystal". *Foreign Affairs*. 2013. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill?page=show>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

⁹ F3EAD = Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze-Disseminate

demographic research in the past sixty years, particularly in the most recent decades. Therefore, in this article, I will first introduce briefly a few leadership development theories of the past century, which had a great influence on how people thought about leadership. This will be followed by an explanation of the modern security landscape and the unpredictable VUCA context focusing on how it has changed leadership thinking.¹⁰ Finally, I will describe in detail the phenomenon of integrated leadership and its influence on warfare in the 21st century.

THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

During the last century the very definition and understanding of who a leader really is changed quite a lot and today more and more people define leadership as an influence process, where the main function of the leader is to gain followers.¹¹ It is fascinating to see that although the main function has changed throughout the ages, the concept of leadership remains a relatively new phenomenon.

Throughout history a duality in mindset toward leadership seemed to exist. In a paper submitted to the Asymmetric Warfare Conference¹² I describe this *asymmetry as a fundamental difference in mindset*. I argue that the distinction between warfighting cultures¹³ (and as a result leadership styles) creates asymmetry on the battlefield.

There are two main warfighting cultures. The first one is *traditional*, based on the *bié* mindset and it has two main forms (annihilation and manoeuvre warfare). The second one, is *irregular* and it is based on the *métis* mindset and it also has two distinct forms (guerrilla warfare and terrorism). We can talk about *asymmetric warfare, when two different warfighting cultures collide*.

This duality has existed through the ages and we can witness this through reading Homer's Iliad, Sun Tzu's The Art of War, or Machiavelli's The Prince (just to name a few of the major writings). However, the focus of this article is to look at the last century, more importantly the last two decades, and concentrate on analyzing the major leadership trends during this time.

In the generations of warfare model the *first generation* begins after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and established the state's need to organize and conduct war.¹⁴ This war of line and column tactics, where the battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly was very structured and organized compared to today's battlefields. The battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" – uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank – were products of the first generation and intended to reinforce this culture of order. The dominating form

¹⁰ VUCA - Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity And Ambiguity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatility,_uncertainty,_complexity_and_ambiguity, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

¹¹ Bakos, Cs. "Hagyományostól eltérő hadviselés, hagyományostól eltérő vezetés". *Társadalom és Honvédelem* 19/3. 2015. 50–51.

¹² Keynote address delivered by the author at the Asymmetric Warfare conference. Porkolab, I. "The context of asymmetry: an integrated strategy for shaping the future and leading on the edge of chaos". In *Asymmetric Warfare: Conflict of the Past, the Present and the Future*. 2016. (to be published)

¹³ Warfighting cultures research goes back a long way. In this paper I would like to acknowledge the work done by LTGen Jenő Kovács and note the importance of the work he had done on this field. I am building on his findings and slightly modify his structure in this paper.

¹⁴ Lind, W. S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare." *Antiwar.com*. 15 Jan 2004. <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

of leadership style in the military was the *bié* mindset: the strong autocratic leader, who heroically leads his troops in battle, had prevailed since the Greek and Roman times.

During that time, the trait approach to leadership was widely accepted. The trait approach arose from the above mentioned military style “great man” theory and suggested that critical leadership traits can be isolated and people with such traits should be identified for leadership positions. The problem with this approach was that researchers could not agree on the traits that were most sought after.¹⁵ Moreover, it was based on the belief that their skills were fixed (thus cannot be developed, a person either has them or not).

Ever since Winslow Taylor produced the “theory of scientific management”, bureaucratic institutions have been considered to be finely tuned machines. The focus in this age was on increasing productivity and workers were following precise instructions. Workers were motivated to keep their jobs, in return they got paid, and were expected to advance through the ranks of bureaucracy in a relatively predictable manner.

This leadership trait approach had a great influence on business as well, and large bureaucratic companies were applying the military style of organization and leadership. But in the mid 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies equipped with rifled muskets, then machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

Similarly, in business in 1924 some studies started to question the trait leadership approach. At the Western Electric Hawthorne factory in Chicago, a series of studies,¹⁶ led by Elton Mayo and Fritz Roethlisberger, were conducted with the goal of gaining worker loyalty and increasing productivity at the same time. The idea that the supervisor should also be a psychotherapist was later called the Hawthorne Effect.

The main findings of the research suggested that workers are motivated not only by money, but also by a caring boss. Mayo believed that first-line supervisors should get human relations training. It was a departure from *Taylorism* (which considered people in the workforce as cogs in the machine). The newly developing human relationships approach was very much in need, because at that time managers in an organization failed to develop human relationship skills.

Thus, attention shifted to behavioural theories emphasizing the focus on human relationships. Leadership theories during the second and third generation of warfare had undergone significant changes, and great deal of what was taught about leadership concentrated on motivating workers within an industrial bureaucracy.

This idea took a long time to penetrate the conventional leadership thinking in business and to support this line of thought, in the 1960s more psychology based experiments were carried out. One of these experiments by Douglas McGregor was especially interesting. McGregor’s Theory Y¹⁷ was based on Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, and it was a revolutionary approach at that context and time. Theory Y recognized that employees can

¹⁵ A comprehensive list of traits and skills was compiled by Ralph M. Stogdill. Trait Theory. <http://www.leadership-central.com/trait-theory.html>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

¹⁶ The Hawthorne Works had commissioned a study to see if their workers would become more productive in higher or lower levels of light. The workers’ productivity seemed to improve when changes were made, and slumped when the study ended. It was suggested that the productivity gain occurred as a result of the motivational effect on the workers of the interest being shown in them.

¹⁷ McGregor’s Theory highlights the motivating role of job satisfaction and encourages workers to approach tasks without direct supervision.

be ambitious, self-motivated and exercise self-control. It was believed that employees enjoy their mental and physical work duties. They were believed to possess the ability for creative problem solving, but in the bureaucratic industrial context workers were powerless to make changes in their work even when their ideas would have improved their work effectiveness.

McGregor looked at Taylorism as Theory X (where people need to be forced to work) and realized that those workers whose lower level needs for security are satisfied cannot reach their peak performance, because their work doesn't let them satisfy their higher needs (self-esteem, recognition and, beyond that, self-fulfilment).

Other concepts, like Blake and Mouton's Managerial Grid also tried to capture the behavioural side of leadership and proposed that "team management" is the most effective type of leadership. Whilst behavioural theories helped executive leaders and managers to develop particular leadership behaviours, they gave little guidance as to what effective leadership really is and they were optimized to simple or complicated contexts.

As we can see throughout these examples, the context of leadership has been definitely changing towards the end of the last century. The 20th century phenomena of the industrial paradigm dominated by the traditional bureaucratic mindset and influenced by the second and third generation warfare military leadership styles are becoming outdated.

In the global security context, at the beginning of the 21st century, there is a resurgence of fourth generation open-sourced irregular warfare groups¹⁸ and western cultures (whose organizational constructs are still based on last century models) seem to be very uncomfortable to deal with the chaos, the myriad of actors, and the non-traditional methods coupled with indirect approaches.¹⁹ Trends suggested these challenges were about to get even more pressing in the near future. Researchers started to suspect that as the context changes, different leadership styles are necessary, and theories contributing towards this school of thought are described in the next part of this paper.²⁰

THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF LEADERSHIP

In the contemporary complex environment²¹ people need extreme attitude and stress tolerance to be able to make decisions. The shifting context²² and constantly reforming alliances are pushing organizations towards a more adaptive stance. The strategic approaches that worked in the past seem to be irrelevant today and a different organizational mindset

¹⁸ Porkolab. "The context of asymmetry."

¹⁹ Bakos, Cs. „Korunk változó hadviselésének hadelméleti alapja”. *Hadtudomány online*. 24/1. 2014. 210–218. http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2015/1_2/2015_1_2_9_ONLINE.pdf, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

²⁰ Jobbágy, Z. "A háború antropológiája: primitív hadviselés, gerilla hadviselés és a szövetséges összhaderőnemi műveletek sikere". *Hadtudomány*, 25/3-4. 2015. 67–78.

²¹ Things that are complex (living organisms, ecosystems, national economies) have a diverse array of connected elements that interact frequently. Being complex is different from being complicated. Things that are complicated may have many parts, but those parts are joined, one to the next, in relatively simple ways, the workings of a complicated device might be confusing, but they ultimately can be broken down and reassembled to be the same. Complexity on the other hand occurs when the number of *interactions* between components increases dramatically. This is where things quickly become unpredictable. McChrystal, S. et al. *Team of teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*. New York: Penguin Random House, 2015. 57.

²² Matus J. "A globalizáció gazdasági, politikai és társadalmi hatásai". In Matus, J., Kertész-Bakos, F. and Fülep D. (eds.), *Globalizáció és társadalom*. Budapest: John Henry Newman Oktatási Központ Kft., 2015. 7–27.

is necessary to build a strategy, which has a high success rate. But building or formulating a strategy is only the first step.

During the implementation phase of the strategy, success depends largely upon using the right balance of leadership skills. Leaders can use a variety of skills, like trust building, communication, and even misdirection, or showmanship but these are merely tools. True influence results from seeing and understanding future trends, formulating a vision and communicating an ideology, or a cause. Through this process, we can build trust and influence with other people who share the vision.

Most recently, we seem to be living in increasing turmoil, where there are no predictable outcomes, the traditional rules do not apply, the number of stakeholders in an operational theatre has increased significantly, and the interactions between these stakeholders (both ally and foe) have increased exponentially, leading to overall uncertainty and ambiguity.

The environment has shifted from complicated to a VUCA state²³ and threats are shape-shifting much faster than it was traditionally the norm. To explain this paradigm shift, I use the *cynefin*²⁴ model, which differentiates among four distinct contexts.

In a nutshell, it states that simple and complicated contexts are relatively predictable, while complex and chaotic contexts are unpredictable, thus require a different leadership approach. In more detail the *cynefin* model distinguishes among four different contexts:

- *Simple* – is a context which is part of the history of the military at an age, where the connection between input and output was right in front of you. This is the classical era, where someone could gather forces (resources), and was able to predictably calculate the effect or the outcome of the battle.
- *Complicated* – After the Napoleonic Era, when massive armies with increasingly sophisticated equipment were fielded, the complicated context emerged and this model has been perfected for generations. With the transition into the industrial age, this was the backbone of scaling large military forces and creating stable nations. This is how the military was educated for generations: understand enough information about potential threats, analyse them, and told that we can predictably budget our spending, and get a relatively good assumption to what the outcome might be. This was the mindset/mentality that we brought with ourselves into the information age.
- *Complex (VUCA)* - This is the place we found ourselves in the majority of the last decade. It seems that in this context our planning based decision-making systems and approach does not work as promised. But many of the (irregular) threats adapted and developed complex systems. They don't play by the traditional rules, yet have the ability (with technology) to scale and fight. This environment looks like an agile network. Traditional systems lack the speed and agility that enables the organization to move/adapt like the adversaries.

²³ „Korszerű hadviselés, korszerű vezetői felfogás”. Speech delivered by Imre Porkoláb at the Joint Forces Command's Conference on 10 february 2016. Németh J. L. „Korszerű hadviselés, korszerű vezetői felfogás I. – összefoglaló Dr. Porkoláb Imre dandártábornok előadásáról az MH ÖHP-n”. <http://biztonsagpolitika.hu/cikkek/korszeru-hadviseles-korszeru-vezetoi-felfogas-i-osszefoglalo-dr-porkolab-imre-dandartabornok-eloadasarol-az-mh-ohp-n>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

²⁴ I am using the *Cynefin* model by David Snowden to illustrate this. <http://cognitive-edge.com/>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016. *Cynefin* is a Welsh (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welsh_language) word meaning *haunt, habitat, acquainted, accustomed, familiar*.

- *Chaos* – In chaos the rulebook is out the window. Disruptions are constant, and they are hitting us with increasing speed and volume. Our traditional approach and instinct says that we should face these situations head on, and come up with solutions, but the frequency of challenges in this state will not allow us to do this. If we try to stick to traditional methods, they result in burnout.

From a leadership perspective this means that in the contemporary context leaders have to deal with different attitudes (the workforce is changing,²⁵ thus different behavioural aspects present a challenge). In a rapidly changing context, where unpredictability seems to be the norm, and where the old ways of doing things seem not to work any longer, we have to use different leadership approaches.

In the field of leadership development, the contingency and situational theories were gaining ground. Fiedler's Contingency Model for example suggested that there is no single best way to lead, instead different leadership styles have to be used in different situations. Fiedler looked at three situations that had a major influence on the leadership style: the leader-follower relations; the task structure; and position of power, concluding that relationship oriented leaders did better in all kinds of situations.

The Hersey-Blanchard model of leadership also took a situational perspective and suggested that the developmental levels of followers (or subordinates) play the greatest role in determining which leadership style should be applied. It distinguished between four different leadership styles (directing, coaching, supporting, delegating) based on the maturity of the subordinates.

Nevertheless, there have been many criticisms levelled at leadership styles as well, on the grounds that the various styles mostly looked at leadership issues in black and white terms, while in reality things were not so simple. Autocratic and democratic styles have been juxtaposed, and their relative effectiveness debated. It seems that a choice must be made by leaders (just as they had to make a choice between *bié* and *métis* in ancient times).

This dilemma was addressed by contingency theorists, like Tannenbaum and Schmidt, who looked at leadership behaviours as a continuum. As one moves away from one extreme (autocratic style) to the other (democratic style), where subordinate participation and involvement in decision making and strategy formulation is more important, one can realize that several other styles (like persuasive and consultative) exist in between. The research also concluded that in some situations (e.g. in an emergency) an autocratic (telling) style is more effective, while in other situations (e.g. when international coalitions must be aligned) a more persuasive or consultative approach must be used. Finally, in a complex and unpredictable context (where there are multiple players and alliances are shifting constantly) the democratic (joining) style seemed to be most effective.

Looking at leadership from a contextual point of view suggests two important things.

- First of all, leaders should change their behaviour and adjust leadership style on the basis of context. However, there are limits to behavioural plasticity and when a leader is stressed, personality prevails. What is necessary though, is to build up the leadership

²⁵ The workforce in the not so distant future will prefer a flexible work environment. They are no longer bound to the office where they are forced to commute an hour each way, sit in a cubicle, and work 9-5. Many employees are becoming location independent and will be able to work when and where they want using modern technology. The workplace itself is a moving environment and being hired in one role for a long-term career is quickly disappearing. Employees have more say than ever to shape their career and choose the projects they work on.

skill-set arsenal (both the autocratic as well as soft power) and have it ready when needed, but leaders must pay attention to recognize the need (the context they are in).

- Second, when the time comes, and our newly developed leadership superpowers are required (e.g. in a chaotic situation), it is very rare that a leader can think straight, and ponder about the best personal style. In these situations there is simply too much stress and uncertainty so it is not enough to recall skills but we also need to be able to navigate through chaos and cope with stress in order to lead in times of turmoil and rapid changes (which requires an extreme character).

THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

The contemporary context has an effect on every aspect of our lives. Beyond the extraordinary challenges of the increasing trend of terrorist attacks, we witness challenges posed by crises (like natural disasters) and witness more uncertainty than ever before. Most complex challenges do not have existing solutions, new approaches are necessary and they demand new learning ability as well as agile decisive actions. Clearly, we are in need of a new way of thinking about leadership.

In the age of knowledge workers, leaders who are still using (solely) an autocratic approach are obsolete. Today predictability and security is all but the past, and a leader is being defined more broadly, as “anyone whose role allows him to influence a group, regardless of direct reporting relationships.”²⁶

It is not a coincidence that several contemporary leadership approaches concentrate on the team aspect of leadership. John Adair, in his model, emphasized the action-centred leader, who gets the job done through building an effective team. In this model an action-centred leader must direct the job to be done (task orientation); support individuals (people orientation); as well as co-ordinate and foster teamwork (team orientation) at the same time. The famous three-circle diagram might be a simplification, but it is a useful model to look at from a leadership perspective. The challenge in this case is the ability to manage all aspects of the diagram.

Another school of thought led by Robert Greenleaf took this approach to the extreme and introduced the notion of Servant Leadership. This leadership style is a practical philosophy, which advocates that leaders should serve first, and then lead as a way of expanding service to individuals and institutions.²⁷ An emphasis of serving a higher purpose made this leadership style widely accepted by institutions where meaning is important, like the church but even the military as well.

Although we assume a logical connection between leader and follower, as if it was an unchangeable logical structure, people realize that the most interesting leadership operates without anyone experiencing anything remotely similar to the experience of “following.”²⁸

²⁶ More than half of global companies increasingly define leaders not by their position on the organization chart but by their influence and performance, according to a survey of nearly 1,200 senior business and human resource executives from more than 40 countries by American Management Association. "Global Survey: 'Leader' Now Defined More Broadly". Training Industry. 15 Jul 2013. <http://www.trainingindustry.com/leadership/press-releases/global-survey-%E2%80%98leader%E2%80%99-now-defined-more-broadly.aspx>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

²⁷ Center for servant Leadership. <https://www.greenleaf.org/>, Accessed on 12 Jan 2016.

²⁸ I came across this school of thought first in Ronald A. Heifetz's *Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress (Leader of the Future)*.

Indeed most leadership mobilizes those who are sitting on the fence, in addition to supporters and friends. This change in perception is a relatively new phenomenon and will be explained in detail in the next part of this paper.

Modern leadership trends started to emerge, where workers were more empowered (a term not used until the 1980s) and allowed to think creatively. When people were able to make suggestions and participate in making decisions on how to do their job, managers have started to transform into teachers and coaches. Towards the end of the last century many large companies started to apply, what business schools have been teaching, and were retraining the managerial force.

As people were rediscovering Sun Tzu, this influence was discussed in several articles²⁹ as well as portrayed in films.³⁰ Those who read *The Art of War*,³¹ understood that warfare was an art to gain advantage through unconventional ways in dynamic and fluid situations. They also recognized that the ability to better understand our own capabilities as well as constantly monitor the context and not just the opponent was a useful alternative in a time when a total business war concentrated on eliminating the opposition.

People felt that a revolution would take place over the coming decades, and the economist-focused approach was changing slowly. In 1978 James McGregor Burns³² has laid another milestone in leadership development theory. His definition of transforming leadership was based on an understanding that leadership is a social process (involving both leaders and followers).

This revolutionary new approach advocated that the purposes of both leaders and followers are intertwined. The traditional transactional leadership view (where only an exchange of values was acknowledged) was slowly replaced by an alternative transformational approach (where people needed to be motivated by other means, not just simple value exchange) and encouraged leaders to focus on the beliefs, needs and values of their followers.

This new approach was grounded in change, and many others built upon Burns' initial concept spreading the idea of transformational leadership. Bass in particular³³ was explaining the psychological mechanisms that underlie transforming and transactional leadership. Bass suggested that the leader transforms and motivates followers through his idealized influence, intellectual stimulation and individual consideration. In addition, he emphasized that a leader encourages the followers to come up with new and unique ways to

²⁹ In addition to the original *The Art of War* it is worthwhile to read other pieces like Foo, C. T. and Grinyer, P. H. *Organizing Strategy: Sun Tzu Business Warcraft*. Butterworth: Heinemann Asia, 1994.; Michaelson, G. A. *Sun Tzu: The Art of War for Managers: 50 Strategic Rules*. Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 2001.

³⁰ One of the famous instances was in the cult business film *Wall Street*, where Bud Fox used unconventional philosophy to prevail over Gordon Gekko, the ruthless moneymaker, quoting Sun Tzu: if your enemy is superior, evade him. If angry, irritate him. If equally matched, fight and if not, split and re-evaluate. The appeal of Sun Tzu can be understood. Leaders need intelligence, imagination and cunning.

³¹ Griffith, S. B. *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

³² Burns has shifted the focus of leadership studies from the traits and actions of great men to the interaction of leaders and their constituencies as collaborators working toward mutual benefit. He is best known for his contributions to the transactional, transformational, aspirational, and visionary schools of leadership theory. Burns, J. M. *Leadership*. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.

³³ Bernard M. Bass extended the work of Burns in 1978 by explaining the psychological mechanisms that underlie transforming and transactional leadership. Bass introduced the term "transformational" in place of "transforming". Bass added to the initial concepts of Burns to help explain how transformational leadership could be measured, as well as how it impacts follower motivation and performance.

challenge the status quo and to alter the environment. Bass's research introduces four elements of transformational leadership:

- *Individualized Consideration* – the degree to which the leader attends to each follower's needs, acts as a mentor or coach to the follower and listens to the follower's concerns and needs. The leader gives empathy and support, keeps communication open and places challenges before the followers. This also encompasses the need for respect and celebrates the individual contribution that each follower can make to the team. The followers have a will and aspirations for self-development and have intrinsic motivation for their tasks.
- *Intellectual Stimulation* – Such leaders encourage their followers to be innovative and creative. They encourage new ideas from their followers and never criticize them publicly for the mistakes committed by them. The leaders focus on the “what” in problems and do not focus on the blaming part of it. They have no hesitation in discarding an old practice set by them if it is found ineffective.
- *Inspirational Motivation* – the degree to which the leader articulates a vision that is appealing and inspiring to followers. Leaders with inspirational motivation challenge followers to leave their comfort zones, communicate optimism about future goals, and provide meaning for the task at hand. Followers need to have a strong sense of purpose if they are to be motivated to act. Purpose and meaning provide the energy that drives a group forward. The visionary aspects of leadership are supported by communication skills that make the vision understandable, precise, powerful and engaging. The followers are willing to invest more effort in their tasks; they are encouraged and optimistic about the future and believe in their abilities.
- *Idealized Influence*– the degree to which the leader acts as a role model for their followers. Transformational leaders must embody the values that the followers should be learning and mimicking back to others. If the leader gives respect and encourages others to be better, those influenced will then go to others and repeat the positive behaviour, passing on the leadership qualities for other followers to learn. This will earn the leader more respect and admiration from the followers, putting them at a higher level of influence and importance. The foundation of transformational leadership is the promotion of consistent vision, mission, and a set of values to the members. Their vision is so compelling that they know what they want from every interaction. Transformational leaders guide followers by providing them with a sense of meaning and challenge. They work enthusiastically and optimistically to foster the spirit of teamwork and commitment.

Based on these new developments, in the context of contemporary conflicts and in light of the recent technological changes of our time we can witness a rise of knowledge work ever since the 1990s. Knowledge workers' productivity does not depend on processes and getting them to abide by the rules. They need a leader who instils meaning and common sense at the workplace, thus gives them a purpose and a common goal to work towards.

It's safe to say, that in a constantly changing context, the employee of tomorrow is not the same person as the employee of yesterday³⁴. It is important to point out that people realize: everyone can become a leader in certain situations. In the context of the fourth generation

³⁴ Seven aspects are detailed in Jacob Morgan's book, *The Future of Work*. Morgan, J. *The Future of Work: Attract New Talent, Build Better Leaders, and Create a Competitive Organization*. New York: Wiley, 2014.

warfare, small teams, and even super-empowered individuals can wage warfare against much stronger opponents.³⁵

For the first time in the history of warfare, people have the unique opportunity to become leaders by sharing their ideas and feedback in a transparent way. This last point needs further explanation and in the last section of this paper I describe a few modern experiments with leadership methods, and analyze their implications on warfare and war-fighters.

MODERN EXPERIMENTS WITH INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP

Centuries have passed since the publication of *The Art of War* or *The Prince*, but leaders throughout the ages have never stopped looking for advice. A recent research carried out by CLL³⁶ has suggested that the very definition of leadership has changed in the past five years. The study suggested, that the nature of understanding leadership shift even further towards the "soft-skills" of building relationships, collaboration and change management. These skills are becoming crucial.

Another recent Global Survey carried out in 2013 suggests³⁷ that the majority of people throughout the world define leaders not by their position (based on the organizational chart), but by their influence and performance³⁸.

This signifies a major change in how people think about leaders worldwide. Therefore, I propose an overarching and simplistic definition of a leader in the contemporary context. This definition defines a leader as a person, who is *someone people follow*. This definition aims to emphasize that leadership is a relationship and in an unpredictable context, it is a very important aspect, as we will see throughout the experiments described below.

In the past ten years, several experiments have been carried out both by the military, as well as other organizations. During this time, the rapidly changing nature of warfare resulted in integrated forms of warfighting. Several leadership lessons can be drawn from studying modern manifestations of irregular warfare.

- The most important one is that the two distinct warfighting cultures (traditional and irregular) are not just coexisting any more, but are *completely integrated* by some actors. This integration is a conscious strategic choice, which enables them to communicate their ideology to a huge number of people, and transforms the fight into a network centric one. It also results in new leadership constructs.
- The *second* observation is based on winning in asymmetric conflicts, which requires a capability to influence masses of people. An understanding of the human psyche and social trends is a requirement to efficiently utilize the moral and cognitive domains. At the small-team level people can best be influenced through trust and by understanding the various needs of individuals. Between teams leaders need to

³⁵ Jobbágy, Z. "On the Shifting Balance of Command and Control: A Tale of the Genes and Xenophon". *Science and Military* 6/1. 2011. 28–34.

³⁶ A team headed by André Martin at the Center of Creative leadership have prepared a report based on the study titled „*The Changing Nature of Leadership*”.

³⁷ The survey, which was based on 1200 senior business and human resource executives from more than 40 countries by the annual Global Leadership Development (GLD) study conducted by Training magazine, the American Management Association (AMA), and the Institute for Corporate Productivity (i4cp).

³⁸ According to the survey, another 14% of people, a leader is anyone, whether they manage others or not, who is a top-performer in his or her specific role. Moreover 39% of people have believed that a leader is anyone, whose role allows them to influence a group, regardless of direct reporting relationships.

provide and constantly communicate a compelling ideology, which is easy to connect to. The tendency toward a network centric nature of warfare³⁹ is inevitable, and the end result will be more complex organizational structures.

- Masters of irregular warfare have always understood that small units can reduce the conventional opponent's capability to mass forces.⁴⁰ If the conventional forces are scattered, and chasing the elusive irregular forces throughout the battlefield, they will be more prone to surprise attacks. This is the *force divisor effect*⁴¹ and it is very effective against traditional forces in a prolonged battle. So the *third* significant change we can observe, is the way dispersed small teams are employed: the operational term is *swarming*⁴² as it enables irregular warfare proponents to strike unexpectedly, at vulnerable points of the opposing force.
- Developing this ability is a question of whether a force is willing to change its ways to adapt constantly to the demands of the context.⁴³
- The modern application of swarming is best described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt⁴⁴ who suggest abandoning the term command and control in favour of agility, focus, and convergence. *Agility* is the critical capability that organizations need to meet the challenges of complexity and uncertainty, and is a characteristic of an organization or unit capable of swarming. *Focus*, which provides the context and defines the purposes of the endeavour, can be the designation of a goal by a higher-level person in the organization, or by a peer unit detecting a target. *Convergence*, the goal-seeking process that guides actions and effects, is the key feature which, while it can be distributed, causes swarming units to coordinate their actions, apply force, and know when to stop applying force.
- Moreover, recent technological advances in information technology (fuelled by the 4th industrial revolution) have increased the ability to synchronize a large number of dispersed forces. As a result, strikes in a contemporary conflict appear not only in one, but *in multiple domains at the same time and simultaneously*.
- The *final* observation is a result of the irregular warfare evolution. Organizational constructs (combined with an integrated strategy and the right leadership approach)

³⁹ This danger was identified by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in 1993, when they published their article: *Cyberwar is Coming!* in *Comparative Strategy*. Later on Arquilla has authored several books on netwar and emphasized the networked aspect of the enemy, popularizing the Swarming concept.

⁴⁰ Besenyő, J. "Gerillaháború Nyugat-Szaharában: Polisario vs. Marokkó és Mauritánia". *Hadtudomány* 25. 2015. 48–58.

⁴¹ Arquilla, J. *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: how masters of irregular warfare have shaped our world*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011. 11.

⁴² Swarm behaviour, or swarming, is a collective behaviour exhibited by animals of similar size, which aggregate together, perhaps milling about the same spot or perhaps migrating in some direction. As a term, *swarming* is applied particularly to insects, but can also be applied to any other animal that exhibits swarm behaviour. The term *flocking* is usually used to refer specifically to swarm behaviour in birds, *herding* to refer to swarm behaviour in quadrupeds, or *schooling* to refer to swarm behaviour in fish. By extension, the term swarming can be applied also to warfare where opposing forces are not of the same size, or capacity. In such situations, swarming involves the use of a decentralized force against an opponent, in a manner that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy and coordination or synchronization. Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. "Swarming and the Future of Conflict". RAND Corporation, 2000. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/DOCUMENTED_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf, Accessed on 21 Nov 2016.

⁴³ Arquilla, J. *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits...* 273.

⁴⁴ Arquilla and Ronfeldt. "Swarming and the Future of Conflict".

can evolve to be super-resilient, resembling something that Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls *antifragile*. As Taleb suggests in his book⁴⁵ *antifragile* gets better when shocked, and can thrive in complex situations or even in chaos.

These observations change organizations and the way they are led significantly. In the past couple of years there have been several attempts to experiment with new organizational and leadership methods, and the results so far are promising.

It seems that a somewhat enhanced version of transformational leadership is being tested and promoted by many organizations. Most modern contemporary frameworks integrate several leadership approaches advocating emergent and collective leadership development. The Learning and Skills Research Centre developed a useful model,⁴⁶ which uses two dimensions. The model suggests that leadership development initiatives differ in a degree to which they focus on processes (individual vs. collective) and approaches (prescriptive vs. emergent).

The study concludes that only 5% of leadership initiatives are collective. It proves that (although there are several attempts to explore the edges of leadership) the majority (95%) of focus is still on individual leadership development and little attention is being paid to the leadership process itself.

However, we can witness several academic and real life experiments, which can help to get a glimpse at the possibilities of future leadership. In a review of the Experienced Chief executives program⁴⁷ Activity Theory was tested⁴⁸ through a program designed for participants to step back from daily pressures (chopping wood) and instead focusing on exploring new options (forestry).

In the information age, when technology is developing exponentially the study of complex adaptive systems is more important than ever. In these systems, multiple players and exponentially increasing connections between these players are being analyzed. These „emergent” behaviours⁴⁹ can also help to understand future leadership options as well.

Biological systems are also being analyzed and the concept of evolution and adaptation⁵⁰ can also help scientist understand how future organizations might behave and what the most effective ways to lead people, teams⁵¹ in complex⁵² and chaotic situations are.⁵³

⁴⁵ Taleb, N. N. *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder*. New York: Random House, 2012.

⁴⁶ Rodgers, H. et al. “The Rush to Leadership”. Presented at Management Theory at Work conference, Lancaster University, 2003.

⁴⁷ Blacker, F. and Kennedy, A. “The Design of a Development Programme for Experienced Top Managers from the Public Sector”. Lancaster University, 2003.

⁴⁸ Engestrom, Y. *Learning By Expanding: An activity the oretical approach to developmental research*. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit, 1987.

⁴⁹ Bertalanffy L. *Modern Theories of Development*. New York: George Braziller, 1968. Maturana, H. R. and Valera, F. J. "Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living". In Maturana H. R. and Varela, F. J. *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living*. New York: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980.

⁵⁰ Mueller-Hanson R. A. et al. *Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice*. Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005.

⁵¹ Hackman, J. R. *Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002.

⁵² Burke, C. S., Pierce, L. G. and Salas, E. *Understanding Adaptability: A Prerequisite for Effective Performance Within Complex Environments*. London: Emerald Group Publishing, 2006.; Contrada, R. J. “Type A Behavior, Personality Dardiness, and Cardiovascular Responses to Stress,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57. 1989. 895–903.

⁵³ Zaccaro, S. J. and Banks, D. “Leader Visioning and Adaptability: Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice on Developing the Ability to Manage Change.” *Human Resource Management* 43. 2004. 367–380.

The US DSB's document also proposes a definition regarding adaptation. The Study identified a strategy to promote the elements of adaptability for the US DoD with the ultimate goal of improving mission effectiveness. Key elements of the strategy are: aligning organization functions to support mission outcomes; reducing uncertainty through building better global situational awareness; preparing for degraded operations; enhancing adaptability of the workforce; and changing the culture of the organization.⁵⁴

Leadership research most recently supports the idea that in today's complex and unpredictable context no one person is able to carry out all leadership functions and styles effectively. This has led to the research of complex adaptive leadership.⁵⁵ In this school of thought, leadership is complex, because the leader is not necessarily the person in an authority role or position. This means that only a detailed social (or network) analysis can reveal where real leadership lies in any given organization. This theory builds upon Heifetz's work, in which he had distinguished between leadership and command.⁵⁶

Raelin took this idea further and spoke of leaderful organizations,⁵⁷ where leadership roles are fulfilled by different personnel (with the right mix of skillset) at different phases of the project. This theory has focused more on the leadership process and not on the individual leader itself. This leadership theory also has its challenges. The major one is that the leader needs to focus on monitoring ongoing processes, and develop the future through disruptive innovation at the same time.⁵⁸

This duality is very similar to the one (*bié* and *métis*) described throughout this article. Traditional (efficiency focused) organizations find it very difficult to cope with flexibility and adaptability. Disruptive innovation can only thrive in a different organizational culture and requires a different mindset as well as different leadership approaches as well. The solution is a dispersed approach to leadership, where the two systems (traditional and irregular) must be aligned. This approach is best implemented through ambidexterity.⁵⁹

In an environment where changes are slow, there is sufficient time to react to the radical changes by constructing dual structures and strategies. However, in a highly-competitive environment, balanced structures may be better prepared to deal with the constant need for

⁵⁴ Defense Science Board, *Enhancing Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces*. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2011. 3.

⁵⁵ *Complex adaptive leadership* (CAL) is a complementary approach to leadership based on a polyarchic assumption (i.e. leadership of the many by the many), rather than based on an oligarchic assumption (i.e. leadership of the many by the few). Leadership in this theory is seen as a complex dynamic involving all, rather than only a role or attribute within a hierarchy. The theory calls for skills, attributes and roles which are additional to the demands of traditional leadership.

⁵⁶ Heifetz, R. A. *Leadership Without Easy Answers*. Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994.

⁵⁷ Raelin, J. *Creating Leaderful Organizations*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc, 2003.

⁵⁸ Heifetz, R.A., Grashow, A. and Linsky, M. „Vezetés (tartós) válság idején.” *Harvard Business Review: Hungarian edition* November 2009. 16–28.

⁵⁹ Jobbágy, Z., “The Efficiency Aspect of Military Effectiveness”. *Militaire Spectator*, 2009. 504–516.

alignment⁶⁰. Resolving this contradiction requires *ambidexterity*,⁶¹ the ability to both explore new approaches and exploit existing ones.

Organizations in stable, simple environments do not require ambidexterity—they can thrive by emphasizing operating efficiently, but most others⁶² need to pursue ambidexterity. In the most complex cases,⁶³ organizations, like the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF), may need to orchestrate a diverse ecosystem of external parties⁶⁴ in order to source the strategy approaches they require. This is the *external ecosystem* component of the ambidextrous organization. This approach is only appropriate in the most complex cases because the cost of building platforms and incentivizing partners to participate, and the risks associated with dilution of control over the organization's operations are high.

To build ambidexterity, the HDF must understand the diversity and dynamism of the security environment and choose and implement an integrated strategic approach.⁶⁵ This approach requires different set of organizational interventions and implies different leadership styles to be considered for use.

Academic research and concept development is only one side of the coin though. There are real life examples as well, which aim at proving that modern leadership approaches are in fact working. An excellent example of these experiments is holacracy,⁶⁶ which is a practical approach towards irregular organizational constructs using the theory of complex adaptive systems and emergence.

Holacracy fully integrates the modern leadership trends described above and can best be described by a constantly changing organizational structure (small teams organized into a network) led through shared decision making and very high level of autonomy. Started in 2009 by Brian Robertson, this movement replaces the traditional management hierarchy with a “peer-to-peer” operating system that increases transparency, accountability and organizational agility.

⁶⁰ Raisch, S. and Birkinshaw, J. "Organizational ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes, and moderators". *Journal of Management* 34. 2008. 375–409.

⁶¹ The need to develop ambidexterity is widely acknowledged in the business world as well. In a recent BCG survey of 130 senior executives of major public and private companies, fully 90 percent agreed that being able to manage multiple strategy styles and transition between them was an important capability to develop. Reeves, M. et al. " Ambidexterity: The Art of Thriving in Complex Environments". BCG Perspectives. 19 Feb 2013. https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/business_unit_strategy_growth_ambidexterity_art_of_thriving_in_complex_environments/, Accessed on 20 Nov 2016.

⁶² A recent BCG study in the business sector about the financial performance of approximately 2,000 publicly listed U.S. companies found that only about 2 percent consistently outperformed their industry in both turbulent and stable periods.

⁶³ For example, fighting in the grey zone against a highly adaptive enemy requires rapid adaptation to changing needs and fast-moving competition, while deterring a resurgent Russia is scale intensive and requires a more traditional approach. It is an environment which is extremely diverse and dynamic and it is hard to produce the required range of approaches internally.

⁶⁴ Apple has used it with great success in the smart phone arena, where winning requires multiple strategy styles.

⁶⁵ Porkolab. "The context of asymmetry".

⁶⁶ Holacracy is a specific social technology or system of organizational governance developed by HolacracyOne, LLC in which authority and decision-making are distributed throughout a holarchy of self-organizing teams rather than being vested in a management hierarchy. Koestler, A. *The Ghost in the Machine*. New York: Penguin Group, 1967.; Robertson, B. J. *Holacracy: The New Management System for a Rapidly Changing World*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015.; Brian Robertson's TED presentation "Holacracy: A Radical New Approach to Management". <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJxfJGo-vkI>. Holacracy website: <http://www.holacracy.org>, Accessed on 29 Oct 2016.

Several companies have been experimenting with this organizational and leadership method in Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and UK as well as the US. Maybe the best recognized company of all is Zappos,⁶⁷ which was acquired by Amazon, but still retains autonomy in how to organize and lead inside the company.

A detailed study has been published recently⁶⁸ shedding light onto the inner operating mechanisms of Zappos and explaining the most important aspects of Holacracy. The trend definitely seems to be using small independent teams in a dispersed fashion, who can re-organize, self-govern and collaborate in a networked fashion. This is all too familiar to the swarming military concept⁶⁹ and is a real life manifestation of using irregular leadership methods in a creative and effective way.

Other experiments, like GoogleX⁷⁰ led by Astro Teller prove that a team of brilliant and creative engineers and scientists can develop solutions to dozens (perhaps hundreds) of the world's toughest problems. Some of their publicly known projects include: the self-driving cars, the smart contact lenses, high-altitude wind-power generation, and Project Loon.

The other Google experiment, re: Work⁷¹, is a website sharing curated guides, case studies and research about how businesses, like Google and others, rethink business to put people first. Their goal is to provide resources to help other organizations design workplaces to make people happier, healthier and more productive. This leadership approach promotes managers acting as role models for continuous growth and improvement; advocates for treating employees like owners; and removes subconscious bias through replacing them with education, measurement and accountability.

Rather than on delivering mass-scaled products or services, the focus of these organizations is on creating data-based platforms, that enable a number of stakeholders, such as customers, partnering companies, and third party contributors to participate in co-creating highly contextualized solutions.⁷²

To increase speed and agility The LEAN method is being widely used by start-ups and large organizations alike. It focuses on streamlining processes by eliminating overburden or unbalanced workloads. This type of movement is best demonstrated by Toyota, which summed up its ideals in 2001, calling it "*Toyota Way*." They base their management style on 14 principles. The method promotes building a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time. It also advocates for a learning environment through reflection and continuous improvement. This culture removes trust issues by using visual controls so no problems are hidden.

⁶⁷ Groth, A. "Zappos is going holacratic: no job titles, no managers, no hierarchy". Quartz. 2013. <https://qz.com/161210/zappos-is-going-holacratic-no-job-titles-no-managers-no-hierarchy/>, Accessed on 29 Oct 2016.

⁶⁸ Bernstein, E. et al. "Beyond the Holacracy Hype". *Harvard Business Review*. 2016. 38–49.

⁶⁹ SCO Swarming experiment – 103 swarms in unison. Martin, D. "New generations of drones set to revolutionize warfare". CBS News. 8 Jan 2017. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-autonomous-drones-set-to-revolutionize-military-technology/>, Accessed on 29 Oct 2016.

⁷⁰ Diamandis, P. "How X (Google) Experiments". LinkedIn. <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-x-google-experiments-peter-diamandis>, Accessed on 29 Oct 2016.

⁷¹ "re:Work 2016 highlights". <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npBmZKJYrbM>, Accessed on 29 Oct 2016.

⁷² Popular examples are: Apple's App Store, Google Play, GE, Amazon, Alibaba, Kickstarter, AirBnB, 3M or Ebay. Regalado, A. "The Economics of the Internet of Things". MIT technology Review. 20 May 2014. <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/527361/the-economics-of-the-internet-of-things/>, Accessed on 21 Nov 2016.

Started in 2015, Responsive Org⁷³ also aims to redefine how organizations operate in the era of rapid development in digital and social technologies. Their mission is centred on a collective of organizations sharing concrete change toward a more responsive management system that fosters transparency, agility and openness. Introduced in the book *Reinventing Organizations* by Frederic Laloux in 2014⁷⁴, this movement advances the idea of soulful workplaces that focus on their impact on the world versus management targets. By focusing less on the bottom line and shareholder value and by implementing agile practices, Teal organizations are reaching new heights in financial results and are outpacing their competitors.

To sum up the latest leadership approaches, which will have a major influence on how we lead in the 21st century, we can conclude that:

- Social relations in the leadership contact will play an integral part in leadership and the ability of leaders to influence masses of people (even outside of their organizations) will be crucial.
- It also seems that no one individual can possess all necessary leadership skills and “informal” or “dispersed” leadership styles will dominate future organizations.
- In this construct the leader’s role might be disassociated from the organization, and certain individuals can fulfil leadership roles at different phases of the project completion process.
- As a result, leadership (a process of gaining situational awareness, and making necessary decisions to guide others) might become more important than the leader (who can only be identified through careful social analysis of the emerging network).
- This also means that present HR approaches (in talent identification and leadership development) need to be re-imagined. A shift from individual leader development towards the identification of what constitutes effective leadership will be the key to success.

SUMMARY

In times of relative peace a leader should not forget that when crisis hits the organization, extreme skills will be very much in demand, and these skills must be built well before the crisis breaks out. This requires a different approach to leadership, where the *bié* and *métis* mindset is not a choice, but instead people realize that they need to be combined and integrated.

Based on the leadership trends above every organization has to make sure to treat all personnel as potential leaders and provide opportunities to grow and learn as a leader. In the contemporary complex context the appointed (positional) leader cannot give much input for dealing with a problem. Such circumstances preclude direct hierarchical-bureaucratic supervision and leadership must rely on the expertise of employees with selective skill-sets and experiences.

More importantly, it seems that creating loyalty not to a specific leader, but rather to a winning concept, or idea and a shared purpose can unify knowledge workers. This theory is focused more on the leadership process and not on the individual leader him/herself and in the future we will be seeing more dispersed approaches to leadership, where the two

⁷³ "Manifesto". Responsive.org. <http://www.responsive.org/manifesto>, Accessed on 22 Nov 2016.

⁷⁴ Laloux, F. *Reinventing Organizations*. New York: Nelson Parker, 2014.

systems (traditional and irregular) must be aligned. This is best approached through an integrated strategy and this strategy must be implemented through ambidexterity.

When we are fusing the traditional method with other strategic methods (designed for the contemporary context) the end result is an *integrated strategy*. The *main challenge* in this endeavour is that we have to find a way to create adaptability and agility, while preserving many of the traditional strengths of a well established bureaucracy. There is no manual for this transformation and we have to carry this out while facing multiple disruptions at once.

I believe that most organizations (including the HDF) ultimately need to transform themselves to an *integrated warfare system capable of continuous innovation and adaptation*. A similar approach has been advocated by Zoltán Orosz,⁷⁵ Zoltán Szenes and several other Hungarian experts,⁷⁶ who promote the idea of supporting research and innovation activities in order to serve the HDF mission requirements.

A system or a network developed parallel to the bureaucracy is not a threat to the existing traditional bureaucratic system, (which maintains stability and dependability), but instead layers in the right communication and decision-making methodology that allows the organization to be as agile and disruptive as the adversary networks we are facing.

Implementing this strategy through ambidexterity is tough to master, but it is an increasingly critical necessity as we are struggling with the apparent paradox of having to carry out multiple strategies at the same time. The imperative to achieve ambidexterity will only rise as technological change and economic turbulence increase the diversity and dynamism of the security environment. The HDF thus should begin to build organizations that can both explore and exploit.

Finally we need to understand that change is about people. Processes will not change an organization, people will do! In a rapidly changing context the capability of being more agile than the opposing forces is the key to survival. There is no alternative to being agile, decisive and adaptive, being first to comprehend trends and the context and building strategic alliances.

Understanding integrated leadership is a lifelong commitment since what is unconventional and unfamiliar today, becomes familiar and even the norm tomorrow. The search for the Holy Grail, out-thinking and out-performing adversaries, has been in the forefront of all leaders' to-do list for ages, and will continue in the future as well. Integrated leadership methods are skills that can give leaders a cutting edge advantage, and additional skills to choose from their toolkit in complex and uncertain situations, when they most need it. Understanding, developing and practicing integrated leadership will better prepare all leaders to handle difficult situations under pressure.

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⁷⁵ Orosz, Z. "Scientific Life at the Research Centres of the Hungarian Defence Forces in 2015". *Defence Review* 144/Special Issue 1. 2016. 6–14. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/58745/defence_review_2016-1.pdf, Accessed on 20 Nov 2016.

⁷⁶ Boda, J. et al. "A hadtudományi kutatási irányok, prioritások és témakörök". *Államtudományi Műhelytanulmányok* 16. 2016. 1–23.

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Lt. Col. Wolfgang Paul Illner:

WHITE PAPER 2016, ON GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR: AN INTRODUCTION ON THE NEW GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR

ABSTRACT: The new German "White Paper 2016" is a development process within the German security policy and gives a trend for the future development of the Bundeswehr. After a lot of public discussions about this paper, the German Federal Minister of Defence Mrs. Ursula von der Leyen, presented on the 13th of July the new "White Paper 2016" as the key policy document of the German Government on security policy. This policy paper is the essential guide for the security policy decisions and actions of Germany. It creates a conceptual and contentual framework and provides links for further national and community-specific strategies. THE White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr answers questions about the motives, interests and priorities that guide Germany's international activities. It creates baselines for all authorities of the Federal Government so that they can further develop their instruments and strategies based on their specific needs. It also describes the participation of the Bundeswehr in providing the security for Germany and its allies as well as to a stable international community.

KEYWORDS: German security policy, Future of the Bundeswehr, whole-of-government development, Comprehensive Approach, Embedded Security Policy

INTRODUCTION

White Paper 2016 was published by the German Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. This paper describes the security policy situation of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies for the coming years. It takes on the future task of the Bundeswehr, its personnel, equipment and training.

Since its first publication on February 11, 1969¹, it has been published at irregular intervals under different titles. In public, it is called a Defence White Paper or Bundeswehr White Paper.

In the meantime, White Papers have appeared in the following years: 1969, 1970, 1971/72, 1972, 1973/74, 1975/76, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1994, 2006 and 2016. In terms of its content the expenditure reflects the changing domestic and foreign political, constitutional, military and economic situation and their discussion at the respective time.

¹ *Weißbuch 1969 zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bundesregierung* (White Paper 1969 for Defence policy of the Federal Government). Bonn, 1969.

With the new White Paper 2016 it is the first time that a White Paper was prepared in an inclusive development process. White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr is the current key policy document of the German Government on security policy.

It is thus the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of German authorities. Now that the new White Paper has been adopted, it replaces its predecessor from the year 2006. White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr is a document of the entire Federal Government. On account of its whole-of-government character and its contents and scope, which encompass the entire breadth of Germany's security policy, it was adopted by the federal cabinet².

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF THE NEW "WHITE PAPER 2016"

The German Federal Ministry of Defence was responsible for its preparation. White Paper 2016 Project Group was part of the Directorate-General for Security and Defence Policy and prepared this document in close cooperation with all other ministries, especially with the Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Aside from these contributions from other ministries, the participation phase, which lasted from February³ to October 2015, included numerous events of various formats and with different types of participants.

The heart of the participation phase consisted of ten expert workshops⁴ on current security issues. In addition, there was an in-depth exchange with the German allies and partners, who were able to directly contribute their ideas and suggestions. Besides an abundance of expert talks, a great number of third-party events took place as well. These were used for debates with representatives from politics, science, industry and society – and above all from the interested general public.

This highlights the broad range of activities and the great interest they attracted. In total, the various events of the German Federal Ministry of Defence reached more than 6,500 participants.

These Workshops were generally conducted in close cooperation with partner institutions from various fields. These included think tanks such as the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), associations such as the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), Federal Ministries and international partners such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which is based in London.

A broad range of current and emerging topics and issues were debated with all partners, the invited experts, and – during the accompanying debates – the interested general public. These debates yielded many ideas and suggestions that have found their way into the new White Paper 2016.

² At its 111th meeting on 13 July 2016, the Federal Cabinet approved, inter alia, the draft White Paper 2016.

³ Kick-off event for the preparation of the "White Paper 2016 On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" at the Grand Hotel Esplanade on 17 February 2015.

⁴ "Weißbuch 2016: Wege zum Weißbuch" (White Paper 2016: Ways to White Paper). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Berlin, July 2016. 20–28. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UIRvcjZYSWIRcEVHaUd-4cklzQU4yNW FvejhLbjVyYnRIOct3ZIU1N09FVvk5FaGxPNGVrQkd4TWVoamIGOXVJnkZUY3JTM09PLzBkUTQxNDJkUX VoQmJXM24xSngzQlBydE0wRURtc kRLR1E9/RZ_Begleitprodukt_Weissbuch_Ansicht.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The participation phase has stimulated the security debate in Germany, broadened its scope by involving new actors, and enlarged its reach through the many events all over Germany. Germany has to use this momentum to continue the debate on the future of German security policy and the Bundeswehr and need to take White Paper 2016 as a new point of reference.

THE STRUCTURE OF WHITE PAPER 2016

The new White Paper is structured in two parts. The first part contains guidelines for security policy in the coming years. It describes Germany's approach to security, its interests, strategic priorities, and its key national and international areas of engagement.

The second part concerns the future of the Bundeswehr. Based on the papers first part, it shows the properties and abilities the Bundeswehr must have to perform as an instrument of German security policy nowadays and for the future.




Illustration 1 *Structure and Narrative Flow – Part I Security Policy*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

The first part of White Paper 2016 on Security Policy provides all other ministries with starting points for their own ministerial strategies. White Paper 2016 also provides an opportunity to continue the security debate in Germany.

After all, White Paper 2016 helps to promote the public debate on security policy and also to document Germany's ambition and scope of action for its international partners.

Ten White Papers have been published in Germany so far. Back then the title was “White Paper on the Defence Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Later White Papers extended their scope to encompass security policy.

The public understanding in Germany of security changed significantly, especially after the end of the Cold War. Today's way of thinking is in terms of extended security. Security is no longer defined as just the absence of a military threat. Instead, other developments of non-military nature can and are considered relevant to security. The new White Paper 2016 thus adopts a whole-of-government approach and in some cases even a whole-of-society approach, for example when it comes to building up and ensure resilience. In this way, it breaks new ground.

The new White Paper 2016 has been published full ten years after the last one in 2006. The 2006 White Paper was the first key security policy document to call for a comprehensive approach⁵, that is, a closely coordinated action by civilian and military actors to sustainably resolve crises and conflicts.

The structure of White Paper 2016 follows the guiding principle of a willingness to take on responsibility and a leading role. It combines the interests, priorities and key areas of engagement of German security policy into a strategic approach.

It begins with an ambitious clarification of Germany's position and its security interests. This serves as a starting point for an analysis of the security environment. The results of the analysis determine strategic priorities and the resulting key national and international areas of engagement.

The chapter "Key National Areas of Engagement" represents a substantial innovation and provides starting points for other ministries, as does the chapter "Key International Areas of Engagement". Key national and international areas of engagement are taken up again in Part II on the future of the Bundeswehr. The guiding principle of this White Paper 2016 is not only to illustrate and describe but, above all, to draw forward-looking perspectives about Germany's security policy.

Part II is based on Part I. It takes the demands and requirements from Part I and applies them to the Bundeswehr.

This is true especially of the guiding principles developed in White Paper 2016 and the further development of capability domains⁶. Together with the mission and tasks of the




Illustration 2 *Structure and Narrative Flow – Part II Future of the Bundeswehr*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

⁵ "The Comprehensive Approach provides an overall concept for policy and action in international crisis and conflict management. Its purpose is to:

- Coordinate, bundle and optimally employ,
- Resources of diplomacy, development cooperation, the civilian peace corps, military and police,
- Within and between organizations and institutions
- At the local, national, and international levels

– With the goal of effectively resolving international (violent) conflicts, thereby contributing international, European, and German peace and security." "Comprehensive Approach". Center for International Peace Operations. <http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/focus-areas/comprehensive-approach.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁶ The Department of Planning within the German Ministry of Defence is responsible for the development of the Strategic Guidelines and the Capability Management of the Bundeswehr.

Bundeswehr, these are used to answer the question of how the Bundeswehr of the future can meet the demands made on it.

Like Part I, Part II is also designed to finish with a clear-cut guideline for future action. The mission and tasks are formulated against the backdrop of the changed security environment and are incorporated into guiding principles and guidelines for the capability development of the Bundeswehr. Areas where further development of the Bundeswehr is necessary are also indicated. These areas spell out how Germany intends to make the Bundeswehr fit for the future, and help them protect Germany's interests and pursue their strategic priorities.

GERMANY'S VIEW ON SECURITY POLICY


The first chapter of Part I – Security Policy is entitled “Key Elements of German Security Policy” and consists of sections on “Germany's role in the world and approach to security” and “Germany's values and interests”.

The first section is the central prerequisite for the analysis of the security environment and the identification of strategic priorities.

The key questions are: How does Germany see itself? What does Germany depend on and where is Germany vulnerable? What is Germany's current and – above all – future role in international security policy?

Since the 2014 Munich Security Conference and the opening speech of the German Federal President⁷, the security debate in Germany has intensified. The idea proposed there, that Germany should assume greater responsibility, has already become reality and must be taken even further. White Paper 2016 encourages this very much.

All of these factors influenced the way Germany sees itself. At the same time, none of the



- Protecting our citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country
- Protecting the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the citizens of our allies
- Maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law
- Ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy and unimpeded world trade
- Encouraging a responsible approach to limited resources and shortages of goods in the world
- Strengthening European integration
- Consolidating the transatlantic partnership

Illustration 3 *Germany's Security Interests*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

factors can be seen isolated. Instead, it is the combined effect of individual factors which is key, which forms Germany's identity, explains the role it should play in international security policy, and determines the expectations of the international community.

After identifying Germany's place in the international community, White Paper 2016 sets out the country's security interests. These are based on Germany's identity and values: German security policy is tied to values and guided by interests.

⁷ Gauck, J. "Germany's role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances". Der Bundespräsident. Munich, 31 January 2014. <http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2014/140131-Munich-Security-Conference.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The national interests guide the actions Germany takes on matters of security policy. Germany's interests reflect what is required of national security policy in a globalised world.

Germany's focus, then, is not just on traditional interests like protecting and defending (if necessary) the country and its citizens. Instead, Germany asks what conditions should be maintained, protected, and developed in order to guarantee Germany's security and prosperity, and that of its allies, both now and in the future.

Milestones of Germany's national interests are their multilateral approach and a security policy based on international norms (preservation of the rules-based international order).

Germany has to first determine the requirements for security in Germany and for its interests and only then attention can be drawn to the security environment. Because only then it can be realistically assessed what current and probable developments will affect Germany's interests and thus require action on its part.

A look at the security environment shows that the challenges Germany must respond to are increasing both in number and type. In other words, greater demands are challenging Germany's security policy.

First of all Germany has to look at the causes of current developments, the most important ones are the following. The international order is under pressure. The global distribution of power is changing – power is shifting within the international community but also between countries and non-state actors.

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation⁸ and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine both represent a challenge to the rules-based Euro-Atlantic order of peace and stability. But even the European Union (EU) project itself is under pressure.

Most recently, the outcome of the British referendum⁹ has highlighted the pressure which the EU currently faces from within. Prior to that, the EU and its various member states had already had to deal with the consequences of the economic and financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and instability at Europe's external borders. With member states now placing stronger emphasis on national affairs, the EU is now facing both internal and external challenges. This brings Germany to the specific challenges affecting their present and future security.

All in all, Germany's security environment – and the range of security risks – has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic, and thus increasingly unpredictable.

More than ever before, a broader approach to security is required, as recent events have shown. Refugee crises, pandemics, and radicalisation in societies without prospects are just a few examples of situations that have immediate security repercussions.

In this security environment, Germany must show maximum flexibility and respond to challenges in an effective and timely manner. Terrorist attacks are the most immediate challenge to Germany's security. Germany's free, open and tolerant society is both an enemy and a target of such terrorism¹⁰.

The threat from cyberspace¹¹ and information domain has also palpably increased both in number and type; it thus counts among the challenges directly affecting our security at the present time.

⁸ Crimea Crisis from February–March 2014 and Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Crimea on 11th March 2014.

⁹ Referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union from 23 June 2016.

¹⁰ Berlin Terror Attack on 19 December 2016.

¹¹ Cyber Attack on German Parliament in May 2015 and German Telekom Cyber Attack on 29 November 2016.

Hybrid threats have increased over the past few years. Through their targeted application of military and non-military measures, hybrid methods are an attempt to blur the boundary between war and peace. Often carried out in the grey area between the domestic and foreign security domains, hybrid attacks aim to reduce, as far as possible, the options available to target countries and their ability to respond. Hybrid threats call for a hybrid analytical capability¹², as well as defence readiness and other relevant capabilities.

The return of traditional power politics and the associated risk of interstate conflict are also worrying developments. Apart from affecting distant regions, such as Southeast Asia, now they also have their impact on the European neighbourhood and the south-eastern periphery of Europe.

Security challenges can arise both as a direct and an indirect consequence of these developments. Fragile states have a major impact on security because they provide safe havens for international terrorist networks and human trafficking groups and can threaten international trade and the global supply chain of energy and resources. Instability, then, is both a security challenge in and of itself and also a cause of and precondition for further risks to local security structures.

Germany can only define its strategic priorities if it has previously produced a hazard analysis. In setting out these strategic priorities – for the first time in White Paper 2016 – Germany has, in a sense, “operationalising” its interests with due consideration for the security environment.

Germany’s strategic priorities specify what Germany is willing to do to safeguard its interests in the security environment; but they also identify areas in which Germany is prepared to assume responsibility and lead.

And whenever Germany contributes to international security and stability, it contributes to German security as well.

The next chapter, “Key Areas of Engagement in German Security Policy”, is a core part of White Paper 2016.

National and international areas of engagement reflect Germany’s ambition to play a substantial role in security policy. The section on “Key National Areas of Engagement” – another innovation in White Paper 2016 – is specifically designed to encourage the involvement of all other Federal Government ministries. However, their ambition for self-improvement should not stop at national level. On the contrary, in our globalised world, which is more interdependent than ever before, Germany must constantly be prepared to assume responsibility at an international level. Germany’s national and international areas of engagement are therefore complementary and reflect the country’s overall security ambition together. White Paper 2016 is thus a national document with international aspirations.

At national level, the Federal Government is determined to increase its strategic capability. Its ability to analyse, assess, and take decisions is essential if it is to act effectively. A forward-looking and well-equipped inventory of security instruments is required. Permanently safeguarding security interests is a cross-generational responsibility that demands forward-looking and sustainable engagement. The comprehensive approach¹³ will continue to guide

¹² "In Optionen denken: Interview mit Nigel Inkster, IISS London". Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 3 August 2015. <https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/start/weissbuch/fragen/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹³ Explained in "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation". NATO, 2010. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

Germany's actions. But it must be even better coordinated and practiced. The boundaries of ministerial responsibility must be made flexible, because the challenges Germany face are not contained by such boundaries; sometimes the boundaries themselves are the target.

National security is not just a task of the state, but increasingly a joint task of the state, industry, academic community, and society itself. Particularly, when it comes to hybrid threats, Germany needs an approach to security that ensures resilience, which must be seen as a whole-of-society task.

If Germany is to assume its share of responsibility for international stability and security, its instruments must be further developed – especially with a view to provide an effective early prevention. Important elements of this include early crisis recognition and enabling and enhancing their partners.

The overriding goal in setting out Germany's international areas of engagement was to maintain the international order as well as to strengthen and develop it even further if possible. In working towards this goal, Germany remains true to its traditional approach¹⁴ of acting only as part of a multilateral framework. Established organisations like the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE will continue to be Germany's main forums for multilateral engagement.

NATO is a guarantor of Germany's security and the main framework for action in matters of security policy. Its future viability and capacity to act must be ensured across all three of its core tasks. Collective defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security are crucially important aspects of this¹⁵. Germany will resolutely continue to play an active role in NATO's future development.

The European project and the EU itself face considerable challenges. However, these challenges also present opportunities to make the EU fit for the future and to increase its capacity to act. Germany must strengthen the EU, especially when it comes to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹⁶.

Germany will continue to act responsibly in pursuit of this goal. The development of an effective European security and defence industry is important in achieving this, as is the more distant goal of a European security and defence union.

Close, reliable and long-term cooperation as part of a broad network of allies, partners, and regional organisations will remain at the heart of German security policy.

But beyond that Germany must consider the increasing importance of ad hoc cooperation as an instrument of international crisis management. With a look at the implications of the first part of White Paper 2016 for the future of the Bundeswehr, the German Ministry of Defence has to develop their strategies that can be derived from Part I of the new White Paper 2016.

¹⁴ „Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). 23 May 1949. Art. 24.

¹⁵ "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation".

¹⁶ "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence". Council of the European Union, Brussels. 14 November 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR

As an instrument of the comprehensive approach, the Bundeswehr makes a vital contribution to the security, peace and freedom of Germany, its allies and its partners as well as to international stability. The transformation process of the Bundeswehr is still ongoing also with a changed German identity and a permanently changing security environment.

The first focus is on the requirements, mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr in the changing security environment.

As we all know it is not only the number of operations but also the demands made on the Bundeswehr that have changed fundamentally. The demands made on the Bundeswehr are increasing in number and changing in type as a result of the complex, dynamic and volatile security environment, Germany's national interests and priorities, as well as its aspiration to play both a substantial and a leading role. The character and intensity of the challenges have changed. The expectations of Germany's allies and partners have continued to increase¹⁷.

This development is also reflected in the task of national and collective defence, the significance of which has increased again recently. However, the character of this task has changed considerably: shorter warning times, spatially focused threats posed by military forces, and hybrid warfare are important factors in this respect.

At the same time, the demands facing the Bundeswehr in international crisis management missions are continuing to increase. This part of the mission seems to have remained unchanged. However, it has become significantly more multifaceted, ranging from training and humanitarian aid for people in need to the use of military force, as a last resort for peace enforcement.

In addition, this also includes a clear commitment to countering security threats together with Germany's partners and allies.

One new task is contributing to the resilience of state and society against external threats. This is not only due to new threats in areas such as cyberspace.

As a result of the increased requirements and the more multifaceted mission, the task spectrum has become wider. These tasks must be given the same level of priority. The Bundeswehr must focus on the most challenging task, namely national and collective defence, and must also provide the forces and assets required for international crisis management and crisis management for German nationals abroad.

At the same time, the number of theatres of operations around the world is continuously growing. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr faces a wide range of challenges seldom experienced on such scale. It must be able and prepared to perform tasks simultaneously.

The necessary flexibility and agility can only be delivered by a multifunctional and adaptable Bundeswehr with a broad spectrum of capabilities. This is easily said, but how does Germany achieve this goal? What steps must be taken towards this end?

¹⁷ "In the alliance, the fears of the victory Trumps are enormous. A secret report from the staff of General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg describes the scenario of a Trump presidency. According to the NATO strategists, the new president could withdraw the pledge for the rotating US troops in Eastern Europe. Another scenario generally provides for the reduction of the American quota in Europe. In the most favorable scenario, it is assumed that Trump will strictly insist that Europeans spend more money on their security...". Hoffmann, Ch. "Nato verschiebt Gipfeltreffen wegen Trump". Spiegel Online. 12 November 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/donald-trump-und-die-nato-buendnis-verschiebt-gipfeltreffen-a-1120873.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.



- **Broad spectrum of capabilities** in an integrated network of command and control, reconnaissance, effects and support
- **Ability to accomplish tasks depends on**
 - adaptability of personnel, equipment and structures
 - high-value capabilities that contribute to the accomplishment of different tasks
 - high levels of readiness and appropriate sustainability
- **Important factors**
 - ensuring survivability and protection
 - strengthening reconnaissance and command and control capabilities
 - defining effects in all their dimensions
 - being able to lead as a framework nation

Illustration 4 *Guidelines for Capabilities of the Bundeswehr*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

In order to achieve these aspirations, a balance must be maintained between the Bundeswehr's task spectrum and its resources. As a result of the trend reversal in the areas of personnel, equipment and financing, the appropriate framework conditions have already been established¹⁸.

In order to continuously modernise the Bundeswehr, guiding principles were derived from the first part of White Paper 2016, which provide guidance for joint action in various areas of the Bundeswehr. These guiding principles are:

- Multinationality and integration with NATO-wide capability development as well as leadership and responsibility as a framework nation¹⁹;
- A comprehensive approach in a national and international framework and
- Flexibility and agility with a single set of forces.

These guiding principles must be applied to the areas of personnel, material, equipment and training in equal measure. The capabilities required for the Bundeswehr's tasks can only be provided through targeted and guided cooperation in these areas. It is particularly important, however, that the equipment of the Bundeswehr is suitable for different tasks in different operational theatres.

The ability of the Bundeswehr to accomplish its tasks depends above all on

- the adaptability of its personnel, equipment and structures;
- high-quality and modern capabilities including the availability of critical capabilities (such as strategic air transport) in order to assume multinational responsibility as well as to carry out national tasks independently; and

¹⁸ "In the future, personnel planning is to be coordinated with requirements every year. At present, the Bundeswehr assumes that by 2023 another 14,300 military and some 4,400 civilian service posts are to be filled. For example, there will be 7,000 new appointments and extended service time for soldiers from 2017 onwards. The further staffing requirements should be ensured by internal measures and restructuring. A total of 96 individual measures are intended to increase the efficiency of the Bundeswehr. These include, for example, the construction of the new cyberspace and information space, as well as the strengthening of the special forces of the army and navy. In addition, health care provision in Germany and abroad is being expanded. Further steps need to be taken to cushion the impact of the EU working time directive." "Mehr Personal für die Bundeswehr". German Federal Government. 10 May 2016. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/05/2016-05-10-mehr-personal-fuer-die-bundeswehr.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁹ Germany introduced in 2013 a Framework Nation Concept (FNC) to NATO, this was then adapted by NATO in 2014 on the Summit in Wales.

- the rapid availability, high levels of readiness, appropriate sustainability, and strategic deployability of capabilities.²⁰

Other important requirements in terms of capability development include

- ensuring survivability and protection as well as strengthened reconnaissance and command and control capabilities;
- covering the range of direct and indirect effects at the same time (from humanitarian aid and enabling and enhancing partners by providing advice, training and equipment to the use of military force, including kinetic and non-kinetic effects);
- being able to lead as a framework nation and provide critical capabilities that are needed for other nations to participate in operations.

These guidelines for the capabilities of the Bundeswehr are also reflected in the final chapter of White Paper 2016 "*Making the Bundeswehr Fit for the Future*".

In a similar manner to the key areas of engagement for German security policy in the first part of White Paper 2016, the considerations in this chapter are based on an active approach.

Certain areas of the Bundeswehr must undergo continuous modernisation²¹ so that it can remain a viable instrument of German security policy.

The first area that has to be examined is that of personnel. The Bundeswehr requires a modern, sustainable and demographically sound personnel policy. The initiated reversal in personnel trends²² and the Attractiveness Agenda²³ are significant contributions in this respect. Germany needs a high degree of flexibility in the area of personnel, without fixed upper limits, and in compliance with constitutional law. This is the only way Germany can actively shape the Bundeswehr and create new capabilities, for instance in the cyber domain.

With the many and varied challenges it faces, the Bundeswehr needs the best possible equipment in order to fulfil its mission successfully and to protect the lives of its servicemen and women. The Armaments Agenda²⁴ has already been launched for this purpose. It is in keeping with the conclusions drawn in White Paper 2016 and builds on the guiding principles of transparency and efficiency.

²⁰ White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: The Federal Government of Germany, 2016. 102.

²¹ Also already stated in Milestones for the reorientation of the Bundeswehr by Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière on 15th May 2011. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. <https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/start/sicherheitspolitik/bundeswehr/neuausrichtung/chronologie/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²² Leyen, U. von der. "Tagesbefehl" (Day Order). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Berlin, 10 May 2016. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMm UzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzLzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY5NmYzMTYyMzLz NzMwNmEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Tagesbefehl_Personal.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²³ German Minister of Defence, Mrs. von der Leyen presented the attractiveness campaign of her house with the title "Aktiv. Attraktiv. Different. - Bundeswehr in Leadership" at the beginning of June 2014. Essentially, it is an 8-point plan, underlined by 29 "subordinate" measures. The eight core projects are as follows: the introduction of new leadership management (1) and new recruitment and training opportunities (2), the reconciliation of family and work life (3), more flexible working conditions (4) with improved planning and better promotion conditions (5), the development of health management (6), the modern setting up of the barracks (7), and the deepening of the Bundeswehr in the society (8). "Die Agenda Attraktivität". (Attractiveness Agenda). Bundeswehr. 2 June 2014. https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/karriere/bundeswehr_in_fuehrung/ueberblick/, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁴ German Minister of Defence, Mrs. Von der Leyen introduced the Armaments Agenda with a total of 1.500 measures by 2030 in a Press Conference at the German MoD on 27th Januar 2016.

Constitutional guidelines²⁵ are an important factor when it comes to deploying the Bundeswehr inside and outside of Germany. With regard to missions abroad of the Bundeswehr, Germany can see that the number of deployments and missions necessitating immediate and resolute action has grown in recent times. A rapid response is frequently requested when it comes to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tackling human and drug trafficking on the high seas, and supporting partners at short notice in stabilisation operations. This increasingly leads to ad hoc cooperation between states.

In view of this development, Germany must also be in a position to meet these challenges too at short notice, if necessary by deploying armed German forces. Nevertheless, all deployments abroad require the consent of the German Bundestag²⁶. This practice of parliamentary consent has stood the test of time.

With respect to the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Germany, White Paper 2016 states: *"In the context of present-day threat situations, the deployment of the armed forces in effective disaster response plays an important role within the narrow limits of unusual emergency situations and in accordance with current constitutional law. It is important to foster good cooperation between the federal and state authorities that work together in the event of a disaster and to conduct exercises for them. We must be able to rely on them as part of a common and responsible approach to ensuring security in our country."*²⁷

The dynamic changes happening around Germany and Germany's increased responsibility in the world mean that the Bundeswehr must be even more rigorously organised in accordance with the principles of agility and adaptability. This is the only way it can respond to rapid changes. The objective is to continuously modernise the Bundeswehr in a way that takes into account the continuously changing framework conditions.

However, the modernisation of our Bundeswehr can only be successful with an appropriately sized defence budget. Tasks, structures, personnel and equipment must be harmonised so that future requirements and challenges can receive the necessary consideration. The capability of the Bundeswehr is not only determined by the areas of personnel and equipment. White Paper 2016 also indicates a need for further development in the areas Bundeswehr and society, *Innere Führung* and tradition.

²⁵ „Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). 23 May 1949. Art. 87a and "Defence Policy Guidelines". German Federal Ministry of Defence. 27 May 2011. <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UIRvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4cklzQU4yNWFvejhlbjVyyYnR1OC3ZIU1N09FWEwrL0NqN21rVmRmMU01U3B2VFhLVzcxhHF4TU1Sa1NSUkFnQzhzT1h6MThxZmlaMzR2Y1ZHblVmRDRSdnkvREU9/110527%20VPR%20engl.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁶ 1. for defense - in Germany the defense of the country as well as abroad the NATO defense, peace and humanitarian interventions of the UN and the EU as well as the protection and the evacuation of threatened Germans abroad („Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. Art 87a para 1 and Para. 2.); 2. to protect civilian objects (so-called critical infrastructure) and to regulate traffic in cases of tension or defenses („Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. Article 87a para 3). In the two cases referred to above, the Bundestag (with the approval of the Bundesrat) shall, as a rule, fix the defendant's case of a defendant's decision or declare a foreign benefit pursuant to the Parliament's participation law, 18. 05. 2005.

²⁷ White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. 110.

The Bundeswehr is absolutely integrated into the state. It has strong links with society and is broadly appreciated²⁸. It is important to cultivate and encourage the further growth of this relationship between the Bundeswehr and society. In addition, White Paper 2016 again emphasises the significance of *Innere Führung*²⁹, or leadership development and civic education, as a core element of the Bundeswehr's identity. It is and will remain an indispensable foundation for individual and collective action in the armed forces, as it recognises the conscience of each and every individual as a moral authority.

This also includes seeing *Innere Führung* as a Leadership framework for developing a common identity for and with all members of the Bundeswehr. All members of the Bundeswehr, whether in uniform or civilian clothes, comprise a single entity, today more than ever before. *Innere Führung* is a unique feature that must also be successful in an international environment.

With respect to the traditions practiced in the Bundeswehr³⁰, they must have relevance to the present day and to everyday life. In addition to its established traditions, the Bundeswehr will place an increased emphasis on its own successful, over sixty-year's history. It is a history of armed forces in a strong democracy which proved themselves not only in the Cold War but also after 1990, when they embodied the reunification of Germany from the first day onward. It is also the history of a force on operations, in which servicemen and women have shown what they can do in combat and have proven their readiness and skills. A great deal remains to be done to further modernise the Bundeswehr and to make it fit for the future in a way that reflects Germany's identity. Doing nothing should not be an option.

CURRENT COMMON AND SOCIAL DEBATE ABOUT „WHITE PAPER 2016“

Within the framework of the presentation of White Paper 2016, the political parties represented in the German Bundestag, as well as other public institutions such as the churches, expressed their position.

The CDU / CSU³¹ sees in White Paper 2016 the new security policy compass and speak of a successful work for the national security system. Similarly, internal and external security could no longer be separated from each other, and a modern Bundeswehr has to be the basis for a stable security system.

²⁸ The majority of the citizens (85 percent) represent a positive attitude to the Bundeswehr. The positive opinion is predominant in all strata. Bulmahn, Th., Fiebig, R. and Hilpert, C. "Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsbefragung 2010 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr". (Security and Defense Policy Climate in the Federal Republic of Germany 2010). Strausberg, May 2011. <http://www.mgfa.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/forschungsbericht94.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁹ "A-2600/1: Innere Führung: Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur: Zentrale Dienstvorschrift" (A-2600/1: Inner Leadership: Self-understanding and Leadership Culture: Central Service Specification). 28 January 2008. <http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/resource/resource/U1RvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4ckIzQU4yNWFvejhLbjVyYnR1OCt3ZIU1N09FV3UxVU11bi9WbnVZWk1INEVJQ1p2MzFrQlhxTW9wUlpaeTk2M1VvaXZZeGJRZ2pBZzRXSEfKbDd2d1pOWnJQdIU9/Zentrale%20Dienstvorschrift%20Innere%20F%C3%BChrung%20Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis%20u nd%20F%C3%BChrungskultu r.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁰ "Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr" (Guidelines on tradition and tradition in the German Armed Forces). Bonn, 20 September 1982. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/geschichte/tradition/traditionserlass/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³¹ Otte, H. "Sprung in die sicherheitspolitische Zukunft Deutschlands" (Leap into the security policy of Germany). CDU/CSU. Presse Portal. 13 July 2016. <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/7846/3377739>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The SPD³², on the other hand, welcomes the clarification of the limited scope for the use of the Bundeswehr in the interior and sees here the need for a well-equipped police as an improved protection. Even if the SPD-led ministries have signed it, White Paper 2016 is not be evaluated sufficiently within the SPD. The SPD left the CDU / CSU the interpretation of White Paper 2016. For this reason, the SPD Berlin is planning an argument paper with its Working Group on Security Policy.

The Left Party³³, on the other hand, sees in White Paper 2016 a written legitimating for more money, more soldiers, more military operations and more war equipment.

The alleged externally imposed responsibility of Germany to shape the global order is only the approach of the great and middle powers in the fight for the raw materials of the world. Likewise, the The Left Party is missing an evaluation or summary of the foreign operations as well as an assessment of the worldwide nuclear armament contest.

In the publication of White Paper, the Alliance 90 / The Greens³⁴ see the manifestation of the conservative right-wing of German defence policy and the return to the Cold War. From their point of view, White Paper 2016 deals with backward-looking ideologies and does not search for causes and then uses them as a grounding approach for security and peace strategies. Everything is directed only at military symptom control, instead of diplomacy or the support of international institutions and trust building. Overall, White Paper 2016 is only the orientation of the German foreign and security policy with more military commitment.

The Evangelical Church of Germany³⁵, on the other hand, praises the inclusion of the churches in the preparation of White Paper 2016 and sees it as a stimulus for a further, broad discussion of questions of peace and security. However, the support of the non-military instruments of German peace policy should be improved.

The Catholic Military Bishop of Germany³⁶ supports this approach as well and emphasizes that Christian peace ethics is peace and not violence. The causes of conflicts should be sought in ecological hazards or cultural disparities. In addition to "Responsibility to prevent" and "Responsibility to protect", "Responsibility to rebuilt" is also an International Protection Responsibility.

In addition to the displeasing tones of the opposition parties in the Bundestag, one must acknowledge that with White Paper 2016 the inclusion of many groups and organizations was realized for the first time.

³² Socialist Party Germany, Berlin, Working Group Security Policy. "Resümee der Diskussionsveranstaltung 'Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunft der Bundeswehr'" (Conclusions of the discussion 'White Paper 2016 on the security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr'). Berlin, 5 September 2016. www.spd.berlin/w/files/spd-arbeitskreise/resuemee-weissbuch.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³³ Buchholz, K., Kunert, K. and Neu, A. "Ein Weißbuch für Aufrüstung und Krieg" (A White Paper for rearmament and war). Die Linke. 13 July 2016. <https://www.die-linke.de/themen/nachrichten/detail/ein-weissbuch-fuer-aufruestung-und-krieg/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁴ Hofreiter, A. and Brugger, A. "Weißbuch: Ideologie aus der Mottenkiste statt Zukunftsstrategie für Frieden und Sicherheit" (White Paper - Ideology from the "Mottenkiste" instead of the future strategy for peace and security). Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90 / The Greens). 13 July 2016. <https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/2016/juli/weissbuch-ideologie-aus-der-mottenkiste-statt-zukunftsstrategie-fuer-frieden-und-sicherheit-13-07-2016.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁵ Brahm, R. and Rink, S. "Zu viel Sicherheit, zu wenig Frieden" (Too much Safety, too little Peace). Evangelical Church of Germany. 8 September 2016. http://www.kirchengeld.de/download/2016_09_08_Stellungnahme_Weissbuch.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁶ Overbeck, F.-J. "Friedensethischer Rahmen und das Weißbuch 2016" (A Peaceful ethical framework and White Paper 2016). Kompass Special Edition White Paper. 2016. 4–6.

CONCLUSION

With the new White Paper 2016, Germany has made it clear for the first time that it is ready to take on *more responsibility* as Europe's strongest economic power. The core points of the German security policy are the *continued close ties to NATO and the EU*, that the *security of Germany is a national task* and that the *basis for a comprehensive security policy is a modern powerful Bundeswehr*.

The reorientation of the German security and defence policy must now also be appropriately financed, as planned by the increase in the defence budget³⁷.

The Community approach and the Multilateralism leading to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union are also Milestones which are still to be formulated. At any rate, White Paper 2016 made it clear that Germany's existing security policy had to be adapted to the changing threats, and this is a common acceptance in German society. The paperwork has been done and it is now the responsibility of the politicians to implement it.

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³⁷ *The defense budget will be raised by EUR 1.7 billion to around EUR 36.6 billion in 2017 through the face of diverse and changing tasks in the field of defense and international defense, and will be reduced by a total of around 10, 2 billion Euros.* "Draft 2017 budget and financial plan to 2020: the right priorities, no new debt". German Federal Ministry of Finance. 6 July 2016. <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Public-Finances/Articles/2016-07-07-Draft-2017-budget-and-financial-plan-2020.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

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HUNGARIAN AAR CONCEPT – WAY AHEAD

ABSTRACT: Refuelling (AAR) capability is crucial to the Hungarian tactical fighter community, the HUNAF, the HDF and even to the entire Hungarian defence strategy. The article also describes the history of the development of this capability and also the challenges that we face to maintain AAR in the future.

BY entering the JAS-39 Gripen tactical fighter aircraft into the Hungarian inventory we didn't just simply purchase a new aircraft type but introduced a series of new capabilities that are part of the modern western war-fighting principals that NATO is counting and building on. Such capabilities are the Link 16 Tactical Data-link system, the Litening III targeting pod, the precision guided munitions systems, the Night Vision Goggle capability, the sophisticated Electronic Warfare System with the necessary intel and analytical background and the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) capability.

In modern warfare current technology provides several force multipliers to achieve more objectives/goals with fewer capabilities and smaller military force. One of those Force Multipliers is the Air-to-Air Refuelling. That means because of the possibility to refuel our aircraft in flight we can keep them in the air for longer time, send them to farther targets and/or they can carry more ordnance to achieve greater effect on the enemy's plans and capabilities. By understanding that "fuel is a weapon" we realized the importance of AAR.

All those capabilities must be integrated in the HDF with effect on our training, operations and logistics systems and generating the necessity of harmonization of existing doctrines and the development of appropriate operational guidelines, SOPs and other crucial documentation. The integration of the AAR capability in the HDF arsenal must have impact on all levels of military activities and areas of responsibilities (Strategic Concept, Operational Considerations and Planning, Tactical Implication and Technical Compatibility) and the future development plans as well. Maintaining the AAR trained aircrews' currency is a key element of the maintenance of that capability. That requires adequate training environment including the material and technical assets availability as well.

The requirement of AAR capability will have consequences on the modernization of the HUNAF (Hungarian National) Military Airlift capability by incorporating that profile in the requirements (Tanker/Receiver) of the future transport aircraft types. AAR might have implications for the future helicopter fleet development too, depending on national ambitions to establish Special Operations support and/or Combat Search and Rescue capability.

KEYWORDS: Hungarian Air Force, HUNAF, Hungarian Defence Forces, HDF, NATO, JAS-39 Gripen, Air-to-Air Refuelling, Tanker, Receiver, fuel, AJP-3.3, ATP-3.3.4.2, USAF, SwAF, ATARES, training, operations, logistics

In modern warfare current technologies provide several force multipliers to achieve more objectives/goals with fewer assets and resources and with smaller military force. One of those Force Multipliers is the Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) capability.

The NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations AJP-3.3 describes the core air power attributes and the capabilities that distinguish Air Force from the other branches of military forces.

„Air power offers the advantage of finding, fixing and engaging adversary surface forces across the full depth of the battlespace, without many of the physical, spatial, and environmental limitations imposed on surface forces.¹”

Air Forces exploit the nature of the third dimension to project military power by three core air power attributes; speed, reach and height. These elements enable the agility through which Air Forces *“can quickly switch the point of application within and between operational theatres, sometimes during the same mission, and create tactical to strategic effects in a variety of air power operational roles. Air power’s agility stems from its responsiveness, enhanced by the capabilities of genuinely multi-role platforms”*².

“In combination, these provide air power’s characteristic flexibility as the most responsive and easily scaled tool of national force.³”

These guidelines also define the most important areas and missions that allied Air Forces have to focus on. One of these areas is Air Mobility including AAR capability too.

“AAR is an essential capability that increases the range, endurance, payload and flexibility of all capable receiver aircraft, and is especially important when forward basing is limited or unavailable.⁴”

In other words because of the possibility to refuel our aircraft in flight we can keep them longer time in the air, task them to farther targets, they can carry more ordnance to achieve greater effect on the enemy’s plan and capabilities in a more flexible manner. The principle is crystal clear:

“The objective of AAR operations is to enhance effectiveness by extending the range, payload or endurance of receiver aircraft.⁵”

The Doctrine sets also the course of air power development efforts highlighting the importance of AAR as one of the fundamental categories of air mobility. As the document states:

“The speed and responsiveness of air mobility provides political flexibility, thereby offering options to create immediate strategic influence.⁶”

AAR capability is one of the fundamental requirements of the North Atlantic alliance in the modern principles of aviation warfighting. That Force Multiplier provides the necessary flexibility in air operations to achieve the desired goals and effects over the opposing force. That flexibility is displayed in the areas of action range, the number of necessary aircraft, endurance and weapon payload. The desired effects can be achieved and the tasked targets can be reached by less aircraft using advanced capabilities such as AAR.

¹ NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine For Air And Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 Apr 2016) 1.2.1.1, 1-3.

² NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine For Air And Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 Apr 2016) 1.2.2, 1-4.

³ NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine For Air And Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 Apr 2016) 1.2.2, 1-3.

⁴ NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine For Air And Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 Apr 2016) 1.5.3.5, 1-14.

⁵ NATO Standard ATP-3.3.4.2 Air-To-Air Refueling. Edition C Version 1 (18 Nov 2013) 1.8, 1-3.

⁶ NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine For Air And Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 Apr 2016) 1.5.3.1, 1-12.



Picture 1. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kate Thornton/Released (100. ARW)

The importance of aerial refuelling capability is also emphasized by the fact that during Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) events of NATO assigned forces this area is also thoroughly evaluated. The allied requirement clearly defines that an AAR capable force should be able to perform day or night aerial refuelling in accordance with the capabilities of the employed aircraft type. It is also required that the aircrews must maintain AAR qualification by the standards set in respective national and allied regulations/publications⁷. During the actual evaluations the AAR performance is also graded and the insufficient qualification and currency of aircrews could lead to unsatisfactory grading of this area⁸.

Appropriate training is an essential and inarguable necessity of preparation that leads to the desired operational capability. This statement is absolutely valid for the AAR business. The key to the preservation of the operational capability is the currency maintenance. If we don't continue keeping alive the ability to do AAR following the initial training, all the efforts and money that was put in this capability would be lost without having any operational benefit.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The development of the JAS-39 Gripen fourth generation, multirole tactical fighter aircraft goes back to the early 80's having influenced by the requirements of the neutral Swedish national military defence needs to oppose the threat of a possible Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact invasion over the Scandinavian Peninsula. Later on, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the changes in international political and military environment led to resetting the Swedish strategic objectives and also have resulted in updating the role and tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) as well. These changes and the success of export efforts necessitated some fundamental changes in the concept of Gripen capability structure including the AAR requirement too. The changes were introduced in the updated JAS-39C/D (industrial designation: EBS – Export Baseline Standard) version of the aircraft that was modified by the requirements of the SwAF and the possible export costumers including Hungary as well.

⁷ ACO Forces Standards Volume III – Standards For Air Forces (06 May 2013) 2-16. F.

⁸ ACO Forces Standards Volume VI – Shape Tactical Evaluation Manual (03 January 2013) Flying Forces OPS Resources Paragraphs 3. c.

Since the fundamental geopolitical changes in the early 90's Hungary maintains a relatively small, affordable but still capable military force. Within the Hungarian Air Force (HUNAF) such a shift resulted in drastic force reduction and changes in technical equipment as well. Once the Hungarian Peoples' Army had nine tactical fighter squadrons organized in three wings stationed on three different air bases, operating over 150 tactical fighter aircraft representing three different Soviet-built, Warsaw Pact era types; the different versions of MiG-21 Fishbed, the MiG-23MF Flogger and the SU-22M3 Fitter types. Following the long lasting gradual downsizing process of the HDF the decision was made to break up with the operational capabilities provided by the aging technology of the Soviet-made fighters – including the latest models, the MiG-29 Fulcrums. After the evaluation and selection process to find the replacement, the next generation HUNAF fighter aircraft, the Gripen was chosen as the successor to carry out the tasks previously done by the Fulcrums. Initially the Hungarian government decided to purchase Gripen A/B models with technical and operational capabilities suitable for the sole national requirements only to defend Hungarian national sovereignty. Following Hungary's NATO accession in 1999 and the upcoming elections the newly elected administration developed more robust military ambitions willing to enter the arena of allied operations. This new ambition required aircraft that could match allied compatibility requirements. The most obvious choice was the new and updated model of the Gripen aircraft – the C/D version.

HUNAF presently maintains only one tactical fighter squadron comprising 14 JAS-39C/D Gripen aircraft altogether. The Swedish made fighter aircraft along with their enhanced operational performance and the new concept of maintenance were also bringing new potential capabilities discovered step-by-step by the operators and the military and political leadership. Part of that learning curve was the realization of the importance of the AAR capability and its impact on our air operations capabilities. Currently the 12 single-seat and 2 double-seat aircraft provide capabilities that are essential for the Hungarian contribution to the NATO Air Defence System and the combined multinational operations that we participate in. These capabilities are needed not only because of our international obligations we undertake but the national duties as well.

INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

With introducing JAS-39C/D (EBS HU) Gripen fighter aircraft into the Hungarian inventory we didn't simply purchase a new aircraft type but established a series of new capabilities that are part of the modern western war-fighting principles which NATO is counting and building on. Such capabilities are the effective Air to Ground attack and up-to-date Reconnaissance capabilities of the aircraft, the Link 16 Tactical Data-link System, the Litening III Targeting Pod, the precision-guided munitions systems, the Night Vision Goggle capability, the sophisticated Electronic Warfare System with the essential supporting analytical background and Air-to-Air Refuelling capability.

The combination of all those capabilities provided by the Gripen fleet must be integrated gradually but altogether in a single unit and incorporated in the Hungarian training, operations and operational planning systems. That is a vital and still ongoing process within the HUNAF and constitutes a big challenge to the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF). That process has clear effect on our training, operations and logistics systems and generates the necessity of harmonization of existing doctrines and the development of appropriate operational guidelines, SOPs and other crucial documentation.

The establishment of the Hungarian AAR concept has its impact on all levels of military activities and areas of responsibilities.

1. Strategic Concept – Establish concept of maintaining AAR capability (Operational Concept) in international cooperation (bilateral and multilateral) followed by possible national Tanker contribution (on condition of appropriate national Airlift capability modernization plan), harmonize relevant doctrines with the concept.

2. Operational Considerations and Planning – Include AAR training and operations into appropriate directives, orders and financial plans. Participation in international conferences and workshops will help to establish the necessary network of professional subject matter expert connections. Having no tanker aircraft in the Hungarian inventory requires advance planning and existing international arrangements.

3. Tactical Implication – Standardized methods (TTPs) how to execute AAR to provide cross servicing through NATO. Participation in respective international exercises will provide up-to-date professional knowledge. It is also important to maintain a continuously updated register system of achieved training certifications, currencies, theoretical preparations and training plans. The planning and arranging of actual tanker mission bookings are also essential tasks of this level, just like maintenance and logistic aspects of handling possible minor damage to or scratches on the airframe and canopy.

4. Technical Compatibility – Maintain appropriate logistic support plans and Technical Orders (in full cooperation with the Swedish aircraft manufacturer). Maintain national currency in relevant allied publications (ATP-3.3.4.2, national Standard Related Documents (SRD) and Air-to-Air Refuelling Clearance and Compatibility Database (AAR Matrix)⁹). The success of AAR operations depend on three major factors; the three areas of compatibility, the equipment, the performance and the procedural compatibility. It means that the receiver and the tanker aircraft have to meet the same standards and technical specifications of fuel systems, must have identical envelope of flight performance, and follow common standard procedures.

PREPARATORY ACTIONS

Because of the successfully running Gripen program we could initiate cooperation with the NATO tanker community and begin the sequence of technical compatibility arrangements. We followed the Swedish footsteps. The SwAF Gripens have already completed several hundred tests, training and operational aerial refuelling flights with a number of different tanker types (also including the Czech Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force aircrews the list is very impressive; modified SwAF C-130E, modified South African B707, French Air Force KC-135F, USAF KC135 and KC-10, German Air Force A310 MRTT and Italian Air Force KC-767, Republic of Singapore Air Force KC-135). Benefiting from the fact that Hungarian Gripens have identical fuel system to the Swedish ones we have the possibility to get our aircraft certified against all tanker types the Swedish party has proven technical compatibility with. This way we don't have to do the expensive testing and technical verification of the ability but simply provide the necessary paperwork that proves our aircraft meet the standards and required specifications. Nations obviously tend to protect their

⁹ "Air-to-Air Refuelling". Joint Air Power Competence Centre. <https://www.japcc.org/aar/>, Accessed on 12 May 2017.

high value airborne assets like tanker aircrafts. One form of that protection is requesting evidences of technical compatibility and setting minimum training requirements that have to be met before receiving permission to contact tankers. Bilateral cooperation agreements are signed based on documents proving technical compatibility of receiving aircraft. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) documents these in ATP-3.3.4.2 publication.

In November 2012 Hungary signed the Letter of Interest (LoI) of EDA Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) initiative – however did not join the efforts to establish the Pillar capability. The purpose of the program is to facilitate multinational initiatives in relation to either increasing the AAR capability in Europe or optimizing the use of existing one. The goal is to develop an AAR capability in Europe and offer tailored access to AAR to non-tanker capable member states¹⁰. The reason of our delay in developing this capability and later the limited participation was the lack of available pre-planned Hungarian financial resources dedicated to AAR. Since the present year on HUNAF has assigned additional funds committed to the aerial refuelling training.

To support the Hungarian Gripen program a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) project was established with the US counterpart to provide funding for USAF tanker flight hours. That resource was used for the initial training and also for the follow-on currency extension flights. HUNAF has greatly benefitted from the USAF aerial refuelling support provided by the 100th Air Refuelling Wing (ARW) at RAF Mildenhall, England¹¹. For initial AAR training a KC-135 tanker aircraft has been deployed for a two-week mission to the Hungarian Gripen home base to provide training support. Most of our currency maintenance missions were also backed by the 100th ARW.

We have initiated bilateral negotiations with partner air forces having compatible tanker aircraft with the purpose to sign MoU governing AAR cooperation. This is a still ongoing process. Based on the technical compatibility of tankers, or operating an identical aircraft type, the geographical location and historic military cooperation we consider the following nations as possible cooperating partners: Czech Republic, Croatia, France, Italy, Germany, Slovakia, Sweden and United States.

Hungary is member of the ATARES¹² program as well. In May 2016 Hungary hosted the semi-annual Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) AAR/ASM Operations Meeting in Budapest, offering excellent occasion to establish further professional relations. This meeting also highlighted the importance of ATARES – instead of money transfer the AAR and AT services are compensated among the nation in barter – flexibility, minimizing bureaucracy. MCCE regularly publishes the tanker flights available for AAR training. That is certainly a cost-effective and flexible way of organizing refuelling training. The other benefit is that through ATARES we have to reimburse services proportionally – only the share of flight time we used up from a particular tanker mission. In the current conditions this program can be one of the long-term solutions for HUNAF AAR currency maintenance.

¹⁰ “Air-to-Air Refuelling”. European Defence Agency. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/air-to-air-refuelling>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

¹¹ Thornton, K. “Hungarian air force performs first historic air refueling with help from NATO ally, partner”. U.S. Air Forces In Europe & Air Forces Africa. 13 July 2015. <http://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/748212/hungarian-air-force-performs-first-historic-air-refueling-with-help-from-nato-a/>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

¹² Air Transport & Air-to-air Refueling and other Exchange of Services.

OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING CONCERNS

AAR provides obvious and undeniable advantages to HDF in the area of Air Operations. In the past, with the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter aircraft – the predecessor of the Gripen type – HUNAF could not participate in full operational extent in allied exercises and operations. One of the main reasons was the “short legs” of the Fulcrum, in other words the insufficient range and endurance to provide air power projection. We were forced to play either opposing Red Force role or being employed in short route and endurance scenarios. That shortcoming made us unwelcomed in real allied air operations. We had to face the fact that fuel is a weapon and we had serious disadvantage in that field.

“Additional fuel provides attack aircraft the ability to fight longer and out-last the adversary by extending range and endurance, and thus putting adversary aircraft at a distinct disadvantage.¹³”

With the successor fighter type we are equal partner to the allied air forces and capable to meet the operational needs and requirements of the alliance. Although without external fuel tanks Gripen has only about 50% more range compared to the predecessor fighter aircraft, and by using drop-tanks that range could be nearly tripled, the possibility of in-flight refuelling virtually puts us in the prime league. Generally speaking, a typical fighter aircraft using external fuel tanks can stay airborne about 1-2 hours. With in-flight refuelling that endurance can be extended more than 5 times.

The initial AAR training of the Hungarian pilots was covered by the Gripen Lease Agreement. To support our efforts SwAF provided experienced instructor pilots and a double-seat aircraft in order to complete the task as scheduled. That provided us the capacity to hook-up on tanker aircraft daytime in good weather conditions. Based on the conversations and continuous communication with the Swedish and Czech instructor pilots, the follow-on training has critical importance. Practical experience shows that only a relatively intensive practicing of AAR skills can get us to the next level, being capable of in-flight refuelling under more complex weather conditions and fulfil the mission in more stressful environment.

Night contacts are currently not permitted due to the existing technical limitations of the aircraft. However, the technical and software modifications are nearly completed, and subsequently the night aerial refuelling capability will be available to all Gripen user nations that have ordered such updates.

The original configuration of the JAS-39A/B Gripen aircraft had no AAR capability at all. The original Swedish homeland defence concept using the network of dispersed forward operating bases and expecting relatively short missions did not need it. That requirement was added and introduced later in C/D variant. According to the original plan there was no AAR probe designed in the aircraft and it had to be added to the existing structure of the airframe therefore the manufacturer had only very limited options where to put and how to position it. Although Saab engineers did an excellent work on adding the retractable telescopic refuelling probe the best available location was far from the optimum place. Finally they have stuck it in the intake nacelle assembly, close to the root of the port canard. (Picture 2) This way the tip of the probe got way behind the pilot’s position, this way fading out of the peripheral vision and makes the actual contact “invisible” right in the most critical phase of

¹³ NATO Standard AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. Edition B Version 1 (8 APR 2016) 1.5.3.5.b, 1-14.



Picture 2. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kate Thornton/Released (100. ARW)

the manoeuvre. Having only limited direct visual references the pilot can rely on the closure rate and attitude prediction making judgments based on his experience.

Missed connections coupled with attitude or closure misjudgement and aggressive manoeuvring could easily lead to aircraft damage or ripping off the basket. Most common ones are the bruises and scratches on canopy, canard and fuselage. In case of serious mistakes the tanker's drogue could cause serious damage on the receiver aircraft – subsurface damage in the canard structure, deep scrapes on canopy or even breaking off sensors and antennas or damaging the refuelling probe itself. (Picture 3) Such problems could lead to the need of changing these expensive parts causing the affected aircraft falling out of training or operations for a significant period.

The imperfect location of the refuelling probe makes the in-flight refuelling operation a difficult process that requires extensive flight experience from the pilots. That fact emphasizes that the systematic preparation including frequent periodical training flights are even more important for them. The Swedish and the Czech experience proves the logical presumption that more frequent training flights will result in less canopy and airframe damage and will reduce the Flight Safety risk level. The minimum currency requirement by the relevant NATO document (ATP-3.3.4.2) is set as a minimum of 3 contacts every 6 months. Initially, HUNAF planned to maintain aircrew currencies in accordance with the above



Picture 3. Photo courtesy of SwAF

mentioned STANAG. However, after evaluating national and other Gripen user nations' in-flight refuelling missions the real life experience proved that due to the probe location it is recommended to do training flights more often, at least one training sortie – with multiple contacts – every 3-4 months.

Another flight safety problem is the extended flight capability itself, provided by AAR. In the past, HUNAF had no experience in long endurance flights with fighter jet aircraft. The previous types had some limited possibility to extend range and/or endurance using external tanks but that did not provide a “quantum leap” in that area. We consider this issue a significant matter that requires special attention. During the discussions with foreign subject matter experts we mapped up the critical aspects that has to be considered for the future planning and research.

In preparation for the AAR training and in support of fighter deployments we introduced training missions connected with hot refuelling – refuelling on ground with running engine and pilot in cockpit. Those flights provided similar workload and time period spent in cockpit on one sortie as the AAR sorties and this way we can gain initial experience for a deeper analysis of the problem of long-term workload in a very compact cockpit.

In the future we might also face the necessity of extreme long endurance flights. Those conditions require special arrangements and care for the pilots involved regarding the area of metabolism. Providing fluid and nutrition/food supplies (energy replenishment) and handling organic waste substances are also critical issues. Maintaining the awareness and alertness of the aircrew during the whole flight is another area of concern. Certain nations have detailed guidelines to regulate this area. We still have an ongoing debate regarding the acceptable methods and risks in different possible solutions.

FUTURE PLANS AND WAY AHEAD

Current trends in the geopolitical situation suggest that national and coalition forces will have a continuous requirement for in-flight refuelling capability. The renewing tensions with the Russian Federation and its possible allies intensify the need for force multipliers within NATO countries. This re-emerging need affects the national military potentials too. If we want to meet the challenges of our security environment we have to keep up with the needs to defend our national sovereignty and also support the military operations of the alliance we are part of. That goal designates a clear path to us in the question whether to maintain the hardly achieved Hungarian AAR capability. We have to maintain aircrew currencies and keep updating of relevant documents. If we lose the capability it would take quite higher magnitude of money and much lengthy period of time to re-establish it again. That would also make the efforts we took go in vain.

The integration of the AAR capability in the HDF arsenal must have its impact on the future development plans as well. Maintaining the AAR trained aircrews' currency is a key element of maintaining the capability. That requires adequate training environment including the availability of material, technical and financial resources as well. If we don't have our own tanker aircraft available, we will lose operational and training independence on missions. We either have bilateral/multilateral agreements established on financial basis or rely on other nations/organizations goodwill influenced by their own national interests and needs.



Picture 4. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kate Thornton/Released (100. ARW)

Like in the case of Gripen the JAS¹⁴ designation refers to the multirole capability of the aircraft, the MRTT concept can be the solution for our tanker needs. There is an urgent and looming need to replace our aging “Millennium Falcon” – the An-26 fleet. The long-awaited modernization of the Hungarian Military Airlift capability is a good opportunity to incorporate AAR capability in the requirements (Tanker/Receiver) of the future transport aircraft types. (Note: AAR capability might have implications on the future helicopter fleet development too, depending on national ambitions to establish Special Operations support and/or a Combat Search and Rescue capability.)

Until we can establish own tanker capacity operational and training missions we have to create financially sustainable international cooperation. We need to benefit from sharing experience and sharing resources – that is the point of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing concept. For that kind of collaboration the ATARES program is an excellent example. We have to create new bilateral agreements and maintain the cooperation with USAF by extending the existing FMS project.

Another possible way of keeping the currency alive is the regular participation in international exercises and joining AAR scenarios, fly realistic missions. That practice is also needed to get our aircrews used to performing in-flight refuelling in assigned, strictly controlled time-window, under operational pressure. One of the lessons learned from Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was the importance of aerial refuelling capability. Since OUP was an AAR-heavy operation, tanker planning and availability was a crucial factor that required experienced planners and aircrews. All these experts had to show great flexibility to keep the campaign running amidst aircraft fall-outs and breakdowns. Therefore it would be highly desirable to have regular, NATO organized, and AAR-dedicated exercises where planners, tanker and receiver aircrews could gain more experience and maintain their knowledge and skills.

¹⁴ JAS designation refers to the multirole performance of Gripen aircraft; „Jakt” for air-to-air, „Attack” for air-to-surface, and „Spaning” for reconnaissance capabilities.

Finally, the conclusion and the bottom line is that by maintaining HUNAF AAR capability our dedicated goal is to be a more effective contributor in the collective defence system through providing up-to-date and high-quality capabilities to support coalition operations and national duties as well.

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Lt. Col. Zsolt Végvári:

INTERNATIONAL SCENES OF MILITARY ENERGY RESEARCH

ABSTRACT: After recognizing the civil aspects of energy, nowadays it is inevitable to examine these questions from the side of military, too. Energy research is very important in the defence sector now, and several international organizations make serious efforts in order to make the importance of these issues recognized, and support researches in the field of energy security and energy efficiency, trying to find new methods and technologies to supply military units with energy.

KEYWORDS: energy research, energy security, energy efficiency

GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF ENERGY

Energy is one of the most important elements of our modern civilization. In the prehistoric times, people were parts of nature, and they used their environment like any other organism. About 5,000 years ago, during the time of agricultural revolution, people cut the forests and started to cultivate lands, mine hills, build roads and found cities. Mankind was no longer only part of nature, but began to change the environment in order to survive. Creation and maintenance of the artificial environment needs a lot of energy, but the available energy – manpower and animal power – was limited for centuries.

Finally, mankind discovered how to use the power of water and wind but the real breakthrough was the spread of fossil energies. Now the world's total energy consumption is more than 100,000 TWh and 90% of this amount comes from fossil sources.¹ Nowadays sustainable development is a keyword in modern science and the yield, the transportation and storage of the necessary energy pose really big challenges for us. Unfortunately, by using this extremely huge amount of energy, human activities changed the climate of the whole planet, so only generating energy is no longer enough, we have to find better and cleaner ways than ever before.

ENERGY ISSUES IN THE SECURITY DOMAIN

Energy is also very important for the defence sector. In the ancient times, warfare was totally based on manpower and horsepower, but, after the industrial revolution, it totally changed. In WWII, a daily operation of a single soldier took 4 litres of oil equivalent to energy.² In the Vietnam War, it was more than 33 litres of oil equivalent and during the Iraqi mission a single allied soldier needed 81 litres of oil equivalent a day.³ Based on these data, we can

¹ *Key Words Energy Statistics*. International Energy Agency, 2016.

² Bryce, R. *Gas pains*. The Atlantic, 2005.

³ Howard, W. et al. "Report of the Defence Science Board Task Force on Trends and Implications of Climate Changes for National and International Security". Defence Science Board, 2011. <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA552760>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

conclude that defence is an extremely energy-intensive domain of human activities, and the energy necessity of military actions will expectedly grow in the near future.

In the defence sector, there are two main aspects of questions of energy: energy security and energy efficiency. Energy security is part of sustainable defence. The concept of energy security refers to that case when essential energy for military operations is available and the resupply is safe and secure. If the energy for operations is insecure, there is a real risk that coordinated applications of armed forces will collapse, and the state will no longer be able to secure its territorial integrity or public safety. When we examine energy security in the defence domain, actually, we are looking for methods how we can change risky or insecure energy sources to better ones as well as how our military forces can be independent from foreign sources of energy. It is very important for the Eastern European countries, especially for the NATO-member Baltic countries. Their economy and also their defence, of course, are absolutely dependent on Russian hydrocarbons, despite the fact that Russia is still one of the biggest threats for NATO.

Energy efficiency in the defence sector is usually analysed from two points of view: normally, in their peace time accommodation, armies function as most of the governmental organizations. In this situation, more efficient use of energy can reduce the energy costs and the ecological footprint. This is very impressive for the public assessment of the armed forces, but we should know that during a military operation, these aspects have no priorities at all.

The priorities are to accomplish missions successfully and to minimize the casualties during missions. Practically, energy efficiency is still appetizing, but the goal is to reduce the 'logistic footprint'. This relatively new term means using as few logistic resources as possible to supply our forces. In modern guerrilla warfare it is not the strike forces that suffer the highest casualties but the logistic units because those are much more vulnerable.⁴ The fewer supply convoys there are, the less possible 'easy' target they are for the enemy. On the other hand, if our forces need less energy than before, they have to pack fewer batteries, less oil, etc., which increases their mobility, or they can pack more ammunition or devices in exchange for energy sources, which increases their abilities in the field.

These issues of energy have been a concern to humanity since about the fifties, but the military theoretician recognized the importance of this question only for the past twenty years. Fortunately, nowadays some international organizations from the defence sector take bigger part in developments. This short article tries to present these organizations in Europe and their main scopes of activities.

NATO ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE

NATO is a very complex organization. Now it has 28 member states (and 3 more states are in the negotiation phase) and more than 6,000 employees worldwide. This number does not include the officers delegated and the staffs of background institutions. In a complicated organization like NATO, sometimes a lot of different parts are involved in the same issue, but there is no dedicated department for energy. Overall, the leadership of NATO is strongly committed to this question that is well reflected by the NATO Summit Declarations:

⁴ "Casualty Costs of Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq". Army-technology.com. 26 Feb 2010. <http://www.army-technology.com/features/feature77200/>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

- Chicago 2012, 52. §.: “We will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; [...]”⁵
- Wales 2014, 109. §.: “[...] continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and [...] note the Green Defence Framework.”⁶
- Warsaw 2016, 135. §.: “We will further improve the energy efficiency of our military forces through establishing common standards, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and demonstrating energy-efficient solutions for the military.”⁷

NATO HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS

There are a lot of permanent structural departments at the monumental administrative centre of the military alliance in Brussels, but some working groups have no own offices or staff. A very good example to this working method is the *Environmental Protection Working Group*. There are dozens of experts delegated into this group, but except for the secretary, they are not NATO employees, but MoD or scientific institute representatives from the member states. They hold meetings a couple of times a year, and they do not focus on technical solutions, instead they try to put more general directives into shape. This professional community played a serious role in the creation of the most important NATO document on environment protection – the Environmental Protection Policy (MC 469).⁸ This document approaches energy from a very special point of view, but improving energy efficiency is mentioned as a highly desirable way as well.

In 2010, the NATO Council approved the Secretary General's proposal to establish an *Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD)*⁹ at the NATO HQ in order to manage the growing range of novel risks and challenges. Of course, these challenges were well-known before, but integrating these kinds of questions into one entity results in a more efficient work. Now ESCD has six sections and one directorate:

- Counter Terrorism Section (CT),
- Cyber Defence Section (CD),
- Energy Security Section (ES),
- WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (WMDC),
- Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC),
- Economics and Security Assessments (ESA),
- Nuclear Policy Directorate (NPD).¹⁰

Using holistic approaches, ESCD is a very innovative part of the traditionally conventional and hierarchic NATO centre, and the impact factor of the division sensibly improved in 2013, when Ambassador Sorin Ducaru took over the position of the Assistant Secretary General for ESCD. The former Romanian UN representative and Romanian ambassador to

⁵ “Chicago Summit Declaration”. NATO. 20 May 2012. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

⁶ “Wales Summit Declaration”. NATO. 5 Sep 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

⁷ “Warsaw Summit Declaration”. NATO. 9 Jul 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

⁸ “Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection: MC 469/1”. NATO Military Committee. 13 October 2011. The classification of EP Policy of NATO (MC 469) has been changed from ‘unclassified’ to ‘public’ recently.

⁹ <https://esc.hq.nato.int/default.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

¹⁰ Emerging Security Challenges Division. <https://esc.hq.nato.int/default.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

the United States is a prestigious diplomat, and he is strongly committed to the energy issues in the defence sector. During his administration, his staff built a strong society of energy issues spread-out across NATO, and 'Smart Energy' became a real brand of new methods and technologies of military energy efficiency.

Beyond doubt, their biggest success is their participation in international military logistic interoperability and standardization exercises 'Capable Logistician' (CL15). The exercise series are conducted by a nominally NATO-independent organization¹¹ but 90% of their members are also NATO members, so the co-operation with NATO is more than beneficial. In the CL13 in Bratislava, Slovakia, Smart Energy was only a static part of the exhibition days of the exercise, but in the CL15 in Várpalota, Hungary, there was a real historical breakthrough.¹² For this event, NATO ESCD was requested by the organizer to raise Smart Energy to a new level in Europe.

The CL15 international field training exercise was held in Hungary's Bakony Military Training Area in the summer of 2015. For two weeks, around 2,000 soldiers from more than 20 countries co-operated in order to achieve the main goals of the exercise, which was the biggest military event of recent times in Central Europe.¹³ It was the very first time when very up-to-date energy devices like hybrid microgrids¹⁴ were not only exhibition objects, but real participants of the exercise. As armies did not have really modern equipment, it was also the very first time when civil companies and their technicians took part in the live exercise, and cooperated with military forces in the field. For two weeks, German, Italian, British, Dutch and Greek civilian companies, led by a small Hungarian group of officers, integrated an independent logistic unit, supported solar energy, insulated tents, LED lights, etc. for the troops. Exercise CL15 marked the successful introduction of the mutually beneficial co-operation between military and civilian sectors, and there is no more doubt that modern technologies like LEDs, solar panels, hybrid generators are ready for field-deployed military use.

A brand new initiate of NATO ESCD is the Smart Energy Training and Assessment Camp¹⁵ that is not a simple camp with tents, of course, but it attempts to search for the innovative technologies of military energy and collect them. The CL15 demonstrated the readiness of some technologies now, so SETAC will try to connect the individual technologies into a bigger system, and try to solve their interoperability problems. The first meeting of SETAC was held in December 2016, and in 2017 the main concepts and procedures will be defined. The co-operation between individual national and company technologies will be ready for demonstration in 2018 or 2019. 'Smart Camp' or 'Zero Footprint Military Camp' are already well known terms in NATO, but SETAC might be the best way to make them real.

NATO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION (STO)

The first NATO science organization was called *Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development* (AGARD). It was founded in 1952 only for aerospace issues, and its history

¹¹ See later at 'MLCC'.

¹² The author was the consultant engineer and technical liaison of host nation.

¹³ *CL15 Final Evaluation Report*. MLCC, Praha, 2016.

¹⁴ Field electrical power generator that combines the conventional diesel generator and a renewable source of energy, commonly photovoltaic panel.

¹⁵ The author represented Hungary on first SETAC meeting at NATO headquarters.

has a special Hungarian relation as Tódor Kármán struggled most to found a NATO science institute. Later on, NATO built a general research organization called *Defence Research Group* (DRG). In 1998, these organizations were merged, and NATO's primary science and technology organization was engendered as it is commonly known now *Science and Technology Organization* (STO) in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France.¹⁶ STO is supervised by the Science & Technology Board of NATO. Under the name STO, we can find the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation in La Spezia, Italy. The office of the chief scientist is in Brussels, but the main corps called Collaboration Support Office (CSO) is in Paris.¹⁷ Now the activities of STO are divided into seven panels controlled by CSO:

- Applied Vehicle Technology (AVT),
- Human Factors and Medicine (HMF),
- Information Systems Technology (IST),
- System Analysis and Studies (SAS),
- Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI),
- Sensors and Electronic Technology (SET),
- NATO Modelling and Simulation Group (NMSG).¹⁸

As we can see, there is no nominated panel for energy because these are more general topics, but most of them have connections with energy, and a lot of panels launched do research related to energy. It is important to know that STO is a basic research institute, and never develops products ready for standardized production. Usually, STO finishes its development at the stage *Technology Readiness Level* (TRL) 5-7 which is a technology demonstrator.¹⁹ When a technology is ready for use, the collaborating countries get the possibility to develop their own products based on the technology.

Today some conventional ways of armament development are slowed down, so it is a worldwide trend that we try to support new capabilities for our soldiers by giving them electronic devices, for example GPS, laser targeting devices, jammers, more radios, tactical drones, real time reconnaissance systems, etc. One of the biggest problems with energy in the defence domain is how we can give more electrical energy to unmounted soldiers without increasing the weight of their equipment. This question is one of the main limits of NATO Future Soldier project and one of the main activities of STO.

NATO CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE

NATO *Centres of Excellence* (COEs) are very special 'irregular' organizations as those are not part of the official NATO structure; rather they are in charge of a very special field as they have really considerable effect on NATO's developments. Their domains are not presented within the NATO's command structure that gives them relatively high level of independence. These are nationally or multinationally funded institutions founded in order to train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member countries. Normally, their aims are assisting doctrines development, identifying lessons learnt, improving interoperability, and

¹⁶ Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/agard-history.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

¹⁷ "About the STO". <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/organization.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

¹⁸ "The Collaboration Support Office". <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/collaboration-support-office.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

¹⁹ *Defence Acquisition Guidebook*. Washington: US Department of Defence, 2010.

capabilities and testing and validating concepts through experimentation, too. Now NATO has 18 accredited COEs, and another 3 are under development.

The *Military Engineering COE* (MILENG COE) is one of the oldest and maybe the biggest COEs.²⁰ Its ancestor, called *Euro NATO Training Engineer Centre* (ENTEC), was founded in 1977 in Ingolstadt, Germany. The ENTEC mission was promoting the interoperability of military engineers of NATO countries operating in Europe's central region during the Cold War. After this era, in 2006, the ENTEC transformed into MILENG COE, but the main aim is still interoperability as the ENTEC's motto says: 'Interoperability is a question of attitude'. Now the MILENG COE is supported by 17 member states, among which Hungary was the last to express the wish to join in 2014.²¹ At present, Ingolstadt is the centre of the MILENG COE, and there are the main facilities of ground activities but there are the MILENG COE stations also in Izmir, Turkey and Northwood, UK. The MILENG COE has an Environmental Protection & Energy Efficiency Working Group, which launches one-week intensive courses for NATO logistic officers two times a year.

The *Energy Security Centre of Excellence* (ENSEC COE) is a much younger organization, but impressively active already during its developing phase. It was founded in 2012 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The location is not coincidental – as it was mentioned before, the energy supply of Baltic States is very vulnerable, extremely dependent on Russia, which is always ready to use natural gases as a weapon. Although currently it has only 9 supporter member states (Germany joined in 2017, Hungary does not participate), this organization strongly represents the business of energy inside NATO.²²

As it is expected, the ENSEC COE has several training courses like Advanced Net Zero Energy, Water and Waste Training Course, or Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course, and it operates an advanced e-learning centre. It has an own periodical called 'Operational Highlights', and some other publications, and it has good links to the academic and industrial sector, for example there is a special internship programme for young academics funded by ENSEC COE.²³ During exercise CL15, the ENSEC COE operated an international Smart Energy evaluation team in order to recognize and analyse the lessons learned from the Smart Energy Logistic Unit.

Moreover, their greatest events are the series of international conferences and exhibitions called Innovative Energy Solutions for Military Application (IESMA). It is staged in November every two years. The first one in 2012 was only a huddle for some, complemented with a small exhibition. The last one in 2016 was already a great, highly publicized show. The presenters were invited from all European countries, the USA, Canada, and the special guest was Georgia. For example, there was the Director of the NATO ENSEC COE, the NATO Assistant Secretary General, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, several high-ranking military leaders, and the best energy scientists from universities and institutes as well. The exhibition part was similarly large-scale. More than 30 companies from about a dozen countries were represented, and the exhibited technologies and products were really the most up-to-date in the world.²⁴

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "History of the MILENG COE". <http://milengcoe.org/milengcoe/Pages/History-of-the-MILENG-COE.aspx>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

²² NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence. <https://www.enseccoe.org/en/>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The author represented Hungary on IESMA.

At the end of 2015, the ENSEC COE, as the first European NATO organization, purchased a very sophisticated hybrid power system from the German Pfisterer. This equipment combines solar and wind power with conventional diesel generators, and integrates a powerful energy store and control system, which makes this system a very suitable platform for studying new technologies²⁵. As an education centre, ENSEC COE is ready to share its operational experience, and the equipment is available for individual learning, too. As we can see by its name, the main scope of the ENSEC COE is energy security, but it does not neglect the field of energy efficiency because improving energy efficiency is a proper way to reduce energy dependency.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC COORDINATION CENTRE

The Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC) was established in 2008 in Prague, Czech Republic, by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, and the USA as an independent multinational coordination centre of military logistics. The main task of the MLCC is to provide assistance to coalition partners with planning and executing logistic support. The MLCC also wants to be a training and education centre in logistics, a developer of standardisation and interoperability in logistics, and an exchange platform of experience in operations conducted in the area of logistics, coordination of transport, and troop movements.²⁶

During the past few years, the MLCC took a big step forward, and now it has 13 member states (10 NATO members, 2 partners and the independent – Austria). Theoretically, most of the MLCC events are open for everyone, for example a delegation of observers from Jordan could be noticed on an exercise preparatory conference, but because the members are EU and NATO countries, the MLCC never wanted to expand its operation outside Europe. Despite the fact that the leadership of the MLCC has always emphasized its independence, several documents refer to them as an informal NATO Centre of Excellence, the logistic one.

Similarly to the Centres of Excellence, the MLCC also conducts some scientific activities, but its main scope is based on practice. In this spirit, the MLCC organises some of the biggest European military exercises, for example the aforementioned Capable Logisticians, and as a part of logistics, the MLCC regularly gives place for Smart Energy in those. The CL15 in Hungary was a really great achievement of the MLCC, but analysing the experiences takes a long time. By the evaluation process of ENSEC COE, 2 STANAGS will be changed and 2 more are under revision in the field of power generation. The next CL exercise will be held in 2019 in Poland, and the first preparatory actions will take place in 2017. At the same time, NATO ESCD and ENSEC COE are working on the preparation of the successful participation of Smart Energy Logistic Unit.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

After WWII, Western European countries based their security absolutely on NATO. After the end of the Cold War, most of the Eastern European countries joined this alliance. In this situation, Europe can rely on the American military presence in Europe, and the US,

²⁵ Cazaubon, N. "A German engineering system brings NATO closer to smart energy targets". The European Security and Defence Union 23/1. 2016. 56–57.

²⁶ Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre. <http://www.mlcc-eng.army.cz>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

Canadian and the really huge Turkish armies are also a very solid background. This solution allows the European countries spend less on their armed forces, but, in exchange, the US has relatively big influence on the continental politics. After the bipolar world collapsed and new challenges appeared, Europe has to face the fact more and more frequently that American interests are not correspondent with the European ones. By this time, there is serious political support to create a European military force separated from NATO forces, which would help Europe assert without or against the USA. Of course, there are several opponents of that, but this idea firmly stands by in European public life, and there are many examples for regional military cooperation as well as joint military units.

This was not the only reason why the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established, and its existence is one of the possible pillars of a future European army. Of course, the EDA did not come from nothing, its ancestor, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) was established in 1976, and worked for years, but after the former socialist countries from the east joined, it was closed in 2005. Officially, the EDA was founded in 2004 in Brussels.²⁷ Despite its name and headquarters, the EDA is not a part of the structure of the European Union, but, of course, the co-operation between them exists and is very positive. Indicating this co-operation, the EU Military Staff has a permanent representative in EDA, and some EDA projects are supported and even funded by the European Commission. The theoretical basis of the European military co-operation is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, so all EU member states take part in the work of the agency, except for Denmark, which opted out of the CFSP. The EDA is open for non-EU members, too. At this moment, there are signed administrative arrangements with Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, and Ukraine.

EDA's main mission is to be a collaborate platform for the member states. By supporting the cooperative work, EDA wants to increase the European defence capabilities, promote the European armament cooperation, strengthen the industrial and academic base of European defence sector, widen the European defence market, and enhance the effectiveness of the defence R&T. EDA has a 30 million EUR annual budget proportionally paid by the members. Normally, there are two main types of EDA projects. Category "A" projects can be launched by a member's proposal, but the steering board of EDA can also start projects. These types of projects are funded entirely from the common budget of EDA. The contracts of the projects are signed by EDA, and EDA shares the experiences with all the members via reports.

Category "B" projects are always started as a proposal of one or more members. Other countries can join anytime during the project period, but they are also authorized to leave the project if it does not meet their expectations anymore. Project contracts are signed by the participating member states, and they pay the project costs as agreed. In this case, EDA does not lead the projects, but supports them by giving advice and administrative assistance, and hosting project events. Of course, the results of these types of projects are owned by the participants, and they are not obligated to share or publish them. The budget of 30 million euros is very modest for a military R&T of a whole continent, and a notable part of this amount is paid for EDA's infrastructure and employees. That is the reason why EDA is trying to increase the number of Category "B" projects, and, most recently, EDA assists the project participants to get European application funds.

²⁷ European Defence Agency. <http://www.eda.europa.eu/>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

Until the end of 2013, EDA was divided into five directorates, one of which was the R&T. From 2014 onwards, EDA has a new structure with three directorates. The conventional R&T activities were moved to the Capability, Armaments and Technology Directorate and energy issues are covered by the European Synergies & Innovation Directorate. As energy is a very important part of military developments, the former energy projects were moved into a new structural part. At the end of 2014, the Energy Working Group of EDA held its first meeting. From the second meeting onwards, the working group is amended with environmental issues and keeps on working as the Energy and Environment Working Group (E&E WG)²⁸.

The preparation of the biggest project of E&E WG called Smart Energy Camp was started before the formation of the WG, but the contracts were signed and achieved during the E&E period. This is the only Category “A” project of E&E WG, which means the deployment and operation of a hybrid power system in harsh conditions at Camp Kouliroko of the European Union Training Mission in Mali. Although the Smart Energy Camp project was finished and EDA has published the Final Report on it²⁹, the equipment manufactured by BAE Systems is still working there. In the Final Report, EDA rated this project as a great success, and a Spanish proposal has already been made for Smart Energy Camp II, which means a military camp equipped with a hybrid power generator as well as management of water and waste.

The other projects of E&E WG are Category “B” projects. Project Blue Camp led by Greece and Cyprus is a very good example. The main task of this initiative is to solve water management – collecting and storing water – in a military camp. During the performance phase some countries joined and some left depending on the gained lessons. According to the summarized report the project was successful, but a lot of questions could not be answered. After the closing session, Greek MoD presented his new ‘Smart Blue Water Camp’ project based on the previous one and agreed with EDA. Now they are seeking partners.

As mentioned above, EDA and the European Union are working closely together, and the European Commission has formulated serious environmental and energetic demands of European armies and tries to set them off via EDA E&E WG. As the first step, EDA organized a meeting series funded by the EC in order to deepen the energy-conscious behaviour in the military. The EDA Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (CF SEDSS) is a five parts series of events where the participants can listen to very qualified presenters from the academic and industrial sector in three sections: ‘Energy Management’, ‘Energy Efficiency’ and ‘Renewable Energy’³⁰. All the costs of the participation are covered by EDA for a delegate of three persons per country, but the budget comes from the EC. Now CF CEDSS is over three meetings (Brussels, Dublin and Rome), and the next one will be held in Lisbon in April 2017. The organizers pay close attention to the financial questions of energy projects, and there are also organized courses on how to apply for and get EU funds. CF CEDSS has very positive press coverage, and a second series of negotiations between EDA and the EC has been started.

²⁸ The author is the Hungarian representative in E&E WG.

²⁹ Annual Report: 2016. 34. European Defence Agency. 17 March 2017. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/annual-report-2016>, Accessed on 31 May 2017.

³⁰ The author is the Hungarian representative in CF CEDSS third WG (renewable energy) and the National Contact Point of Hungary.

SUMMARY

It is clear that military energy developments are taken up by several organizations, and it is obvious that there are very similar projects to NATO Smart Camp and EDA Smart Energy Camp, where not only the names are almost the same, but the tasks and devices used are also similar. Fortunately, these duplications have already been identified and now the organizations mutually invite others in order to share relevant information and avoid starting similar projects. As the professionals of different organizations can observe and recognize other works and projects, the military energy community is forming and rising more rapidly.

In the near – or reasonably far – future, supplying energy will be a critical point of all military operations. Supplying fuel for a military convoy in conflict hotspots in the world or supplying electrical energy for a refugee camp are not only logistic, but also partly security issues. That is why all European States make intense efforts to improve energy security and efficiency in defence. When the military focuses on up-to-date energy technologies, it means that it focuses on existing civil technologies and tries to adopt them into military environment.

In the past, armies were usually the leaders of scientific progress when brand new technologies appeared such as new weapons or pieces of armament that later passed into the civil world. Now basic developments are extremely complex and costly, and most of MoDs, like the European ones, would not be able to achieve and finance them without technology institutes and multinational companies. In the energy sector, the situation is much worse. As in the past, the defence domain was not interested in energy developments, the civil industry had a big advantage, so it is advisable to learn the lessons from civil energy firms and universities.

On the other hand, modern technologies are commercial goods that the industry would like to sell to military forces, but before purchasing them the military has to rely on in-depth studies. It is undisputable that the best forums for knowledge and experience exchange in the field of energy are the above listed organizations but to exploit these sources of knowledge decision makers need proper representation, that is military experts who can translate the demands of armies to companies and the ideas of scientists to military decision makers. As Tódor Kármán said: „Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, and scientists cannot produce results useful for warfare without understanding the operations.”³¹

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³¹ Hajdú, F. "90 éve alapították a Magyar Királyi Honvéd Haditechnikai Intézetet". *Haditechnika* XLV/1. 2011. 2–9.

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Jeffrey Kaplan:

LIFE DURING WARTIME: ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE MICROCHIP ERA

ABSTRACT: *"Life During Wartime: Active Measures in the Microchip Era"* traces the evolution of the Soviet Active Measures campaign from the dawn of the Cold War in the late 1940s through their near abandonment in the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. It focuses in particular on the campaign focusing on peace and disarmament, especially in their application to ecumenical religion, because of the particular relevance of these aspects of the campaign to the United States. The article suggests that the Active Measures campaign, a marginal aspect of the Cold War, has been revived in modern form under Vladimir Putin and used to great effect around the world, in particular in the US presidential campaign of 2016. It concludes with the controversial conclusion that tidings of the death of the Cold War have been greatly exaggerated and the US response, both domestically and internationally, should be robust.

KEYWORDS: Active Measures, Cold War, Vladimir Putin, Russia, United States, election, Donald Trump

*Heard of a van that is loaded with weapons,
Packed up and ready to go
Heard of some grave sites, out by the highway,
A place where nobody knows [Talking Heads, "Life During Wartime"]*

INTRODUCTION

Life was a simple thing in 1984. The Reagan Administration had determined that the Soviet Union had outlived its usefulness and National Security Directives 75 and 77 decreed that what President Reagan referred to as the 'Evil Empire' would be brought to heel and disposed of as publically as possible.¹ A movie written by Kevin Reynolds and starring Patrick Swayze thrilled American teenaged boys with its depiction of young guerilla fighters rolling back the Soviet occupation of the United States. Where Czechoslovakia would brood over the failures of Prague Spring in 1968 and Karta 77 in 1977,² and Hungary recalled the failed

¹ Schoen, F. and Lamb, C. J. *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference*. Washington, DC: National defence University Press, 2012. 55. The Presidential Order that made it possible can be found at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/03_NSDD-77.pdf; NSDD 75 is available at <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

² Karta 77 was already failing in 1977 and much discussion among young people in the taverns and wine cellars harked back to the hopes of Prague Spring—an event that occurred when many were small children. Hagen, T. "From Inhibition to Commitment: Politics in the Czech Underground". *EastBound Journal of Media Studies* 2012. 2–34. https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/7271/Hagen_From%20inhibition%20to%20Commitment.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

American promises of support in 1956,³ American confidence was at its zenith in Reagan's Morning in America.⁴

By 2017 that optimism has gone, the presidential campaign shocked and awed a nation for its hateful and willfully ignorant tone, a Russophile populist President sits in the White House surrounded by an inner circle who appear as much Vladimir Putin's men as Donald Trump's.⁵ The world is as revolted by the earliest actions of the American Administration as the European far right is cheered by them.⁶ It is an irony of history that one of the earliest and strongest foreign supporters of the Trump campaign, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, has already constructed a wall to keep migrants out – a project that the Trump Administration has decreed by Executive Order will begin on a vastly greater scale in the US.⁷

The chaos emanating from the US in 2017 harks back to the naiveté of “Red Dawn” and to a time in Eastern Europe when troops and socialist satraps formed the bones and sinews of foreign occupation. Is it a moment for the passive resistance of the *Good Soldier Schweich*, or is time for the “Street Fighting Man?”⁸

Heard about Houston? Heard about Detroit?

Heard about Pittsburgh, P. A.?

You oughta know not to stand by the window

Somebody see you up there [Talking Heads, “Life During Wartime”]

Perhaps, but it is a question for another forum. The siren song of the historian is how did this happen? As any practitioner of the field will answer, there is no single reason and a cottage industry has already arisen of those seeking to more fully answer the query. This article will look at one aspect alone of the larger issue, contending that the Cold War never ended, it simply entered a new phase under the same rebranded management. In that battle, Moscow is now in the ascendant. To achieve its current dominance, the Kremlin employed many weapons, but none more effectively than the venerable Active Measures (*Активные мероприятия*) campaign whose origins go back to 1948. And herein lies a tale...

³ Granville, J. ““Caught with Jam on Our Fingers”: Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956”. *Diplomatic History* 29/5. 2005. 811–839.

⁴ Compare the uplifting tone of a ‘Morning in America’ ad from the 1984 campaign to the vitriol of the 2016 Trump campaign, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EU-IBF8nWSY>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁵ Sanger, D. E. and Haberman, M. “50 G.O.P. Officials Warn Donald Trump Would Put Nation’s Security ‘at Risk’”. *New York Times*. 8 August 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/national-security-gop-donald-trump.html>; Schmidt, M. S. et al. “Intercepted Russian Communications Part of Inquiry Into Trump Associates.” *New York Times*. 19 January 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/trump-russia-associates-investigation.html>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁶ Tharoor, I. “Trump is ruling America with the agenda of Europe’s far right”. *Washington Post*. 31 January 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/30/trump-is-ruling-america-with-the-agenda-of-europes-far-right/?utm_term=.0b921c364863, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷ Whether Orbán, whose own battles with billionaire philanthropist George Soros eerily echo those of Trump with the American plutarchs, proves a reliable friend to Trump remains an open question. For brief background, Mackey, R. “The Trump Supporter Running Hungary Is Building a Wall to Keep Muslims Out”. *The Intercept*. 3 September 2016. <https://theintercept.com/2016/09/02/trump-supporter-running-hungary-building-wall-keep-muslims/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017. Proving that any enemy of Putin and Orbán is an enemy of mine, Trump was not long on weighing in, Hibbs, H. “President Trump Declares George Soros as ‘National Security Threat’... Using Obama’s Executive Order”. *24USA*. 31 January 2017. <http://www.usatwentyfour.com/president-trump-declares-george-soros-national-security-threat-using-obamas-executive-order/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁸ Hasek, J. and Selver, P. *The Good Soldier Schweik*. Important Books, 2013. Rolling Stones. “Street Fighting Man”. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHugEELD8o8>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

BEGINNINGS

“I think there are many times when it would be most efficient to use nuclear weapons. However, the public opinion in this country and throughout the world throw up their hands in horror when you mention nuclear weapons just because of the propaganda that has been fed to them.”⁹

Gen. Curtis LeMay

The Cold War developed quickly, settling by the early 1950s into a pattern of hard polarity.¹⁰ Hopes that the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe would end died in Potsdam and Yalta, the American Red Scare began, McCarthyism was on the rise, and containment was the only element of American foreign policy. The American nuclear arsenal opened the Cold War as a monopoly and in the late 1950s still dwarfed that of the Soviet Union. So vast was the gap that Gen. LeMay assured American planners that Russia could be obliterated without the loss of a single American life.¹¹ While the Americans at the time greatly overestimated Soviet nuclear capabilities, the Kremlin was not so sanguine. The answer, adopted first under Khrushchev, was simple; strategic deception.¹² Empty bunkers were built like a shell game on a New York City street corner, opening occasionally to show waiting satellites a missile, or at least a reasonable dummy thereof. This presumably gave the Soviets space and time to build, but at the cost of committing them to a ruinous militarization process that their economy could not hope to support – a fact that was not lost on the Reagan Administration of the 1980s.

As Gen. LeMay lamented, propaganda was what the Soviets were good at and this is what they dispensed with a reasonable degree of success. Deception after all was practiced from the earliest days of Lenin’s rule, with the literature of the time filled with descriptions of Potemkin villages, model factories whose luxuries were disassembled and set up at the next factory on the itinerary of the latest group of western political tourists.¹³

Active Measures was at the heart of Soviet policy as it confronted the West in an era when nuclear war was much feared but increasingly unlikely to occur.¹⁴ It made a virtue of

⁹ Wilson, W. *Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013. 14. His suggestion of a nuclear solution to the nascent Cold War in 1948 is of interest in light of recent events. On his life, see Kozak, W. *Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay*. Regnery Publishing, 2011. Given the vast nuclear imbalance of the time, it was doable. Rosenberg, D. A. and Moore, W. B. "Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–55". *International Security* 6/3. 1981. 3–38.

¹⁰ Gaddis, J. L. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

¹¹ Brands, H. W. "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State". *The American Historical Review* 94/4. 1989. 982. n.32.

¹² Mihalka, M. "Soviet Strategic Deception, 1955–1981". *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 5/1. 1982. 40–93.

¹³ Harrison Salisbury, whose visits to Mao’s China were more credulous than his tours of the Soviet Union, points out that the Potemkin village concept employed by the Soviets had been practiced in tsarist Russia for over 200 years. Hollander, P. *Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society*. 4th ed. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 394–395.

¹⁴ The flashpoint of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought both sides as close to the brink as they would get. By then, the US could no longer plan for a scenario when they could absorb and survive a Soviet first strike and there was no taste in Washington for a first strike of their own, helped in no small part by the Soviet anti-nuclear Active Measures campaigns aimed at a nervous electorate who had been raised in the nuclear shadow. The move in nuclear policy from MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to Robert McNamara’s Flexible Response

weakness as the myriad political jokes of the era attested. Why do the Five Year Plans seek to catch up with the West but not to surpass it? So they won't see the holes in our clothes, was the knowing answer. If economic and military parity is beyond reach, deception is the only logical step.

Active Measures were the ultimate creature of the Soviet system.¹⁵ Its primary hallmark is univocality – every official voice saying the same thing in the same way. This was true both at times of crisis and on just another day at the bureaucratic salt mines, and it requires a level of coordination and discipline impossible in democratic countries.¹⁶ Its objectives were grandiose given the means at hand; to influence global discourse in favor of Soviet positions at the expense of the West. One of its practitioners in the 1980s, Gen. Oleg Kalugin minimized the impact of Active Measures, and in this he was certainly correct at the time:

None of these active measures had a determining effect on the outcome of the cold war, but they were a nuisance for the United States and played a role in our ongoing propaganda battle.¹⁷

But they formed a model that would be exploited brilliantly by the Putin regime at a time when the technology to marry ends to means does exist.

The beginnings of the Active Measures campaign was tentative at best, with pieces of what would become a centralized program parceled out to different parts of the intelligence apparatus. For example, the key disinformation (Дезинформация) component was tasked to the Information Committee (Комитет по Информации), a doomed marriage of the civilian KGB (Комитет Государственной Безопасности or Committee on State Security) and the military GRU (Главное Разведывательное Управление or Main Intelligence Agency -- shorthand for military intelligence) Foreign Intelligence Directorates from 1947-1951.¹⁸ Military and civilian agencies seldom cohabit well together, but the presence of the GRU in a mission for which it was ill suited suggests the importance of the nuclear imbalance in the Active Measures program.

By 1959, the KGB's First Chief Directorate, responsible for foreign intelligence, had seized control of the program, both centralizing it and devoting considerably greater resources to the effort. General Ivan Agayants took control of what had become known

¹⁴ (*cont.*) policy made nuclear war more strategically feasible but no less anathema to American planners. Waltz, K. N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities". *American Political Science Review* 84/3. 1990. 730–745. On the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Dobbs, M. *One Minute to Midnight*. Vintage, 2008.

¹⁵ For one of the best brief introductions to means, methods and intent, see Kux, D. "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment". *Parameters* 15/4. 1985. 19–28. For the best monograph on the subject, see Shultz, R. H. and Godson, R. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.

¹⁶ One example of crisis from the 1980s that comes to mind was the Soviet destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by a Soviet fighter in 1983. I was in Jakarta at the time and the airwaves were bombarded with a recorded message from Radio Moscow denying culpability played on an endless loop. On the case, Corcoran, F. "Kal 007 and the Evil Empire: Mediated Disaster and Forms of Rationalization". *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 3/3. 1986. 297–316.

¹⁷ Kalugin, O. and Montaigne, F. *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West*. St. Martin's Press, 1994. 103–104. Kalugin's view is echoed by more recent excavations of the KGB archives, Pechatnov, V. "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945–47". *Cold War History* 1/2. 2001. 1–27.

¹⁸ Holland, M. "The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya". *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19/1. 2006. 24. n. 20.

as Department D in the 1960s and the Active Measures campaign as we understand it today was well and truly born.¹⁹


STRUCTURE

Active Measures were difficult for the West to counter for a number of reasons, but first and foremost was their structure. They were by design and definition covert actions – actions not intended to be traced directly to their origin – but they skillfully mixed overt (white), mixed (gray) and covert (black) messages through a variety of channels designed to convey a single message. The process is neatly illustrated in the table below:²⁰

The Active measures campaigns, despite such notable successes as the anti-neutron bomb campaign during the Carter Administration of the 1970s, were of marginal impact during the Cold War in the West. They had more impact in the less developed countries of Africa and in the always conspiracy minded Middle East, but these successes were transient at best. This does not minimize the impressive breadth and persistence of the campaign which in retrospect was remarkable.

By the mid-1970s, the Active Measures campaign was reaching its zenith and after 1975 the integration of the white, gray and black strands had become virtually seamless.²¹ This was helped in no small amount by the western revulsion against the Vietnam War, the publication of the “Pentagon Papers” by Daniel Ellsberg and such tell all books as Phillip Agee’s anti-CIA epic *Inside the Company* which was published in 1975.²² For those of the age to remember the Vietnam era, popular disgust with America and all of its work did not originate with the election of Donald Trump. Rather, it is a cyclical process that is peculiarly American.

A Typology of Active Measures Themes, Messages & Techniques



¹⁹ Ibid., 5. Cf. for another interesting take, Abrams, S. "Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia". *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 15/1. 2016. 5–31.

²⁰ United States Information Agency. "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era 1988–1991". 1992. http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²¹ Holland. "The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya". 10.

²² "The Pentagon Papers," parts of which were published by the *New York Times*, are massive and may be had at the US National Archives, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>. Agee, P. *Inside the Company: Cia Diary*. American ed. New York: Stonehill, 1975. The book is available for download at <https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/inside-the-company-cia-diary-philip-agee.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

CAMPAIGNS

Active Measures campaigns were many and varied, but by the 1970s they had taken on the same deadening sameness that was the hallmark of Soviet life.²³ The process had been bureaucratized, the ideas stilted and the campaigns took on the flavor of factory work, which is what they were. Clearly, an assignment to Department D was a dire career message for all concerned.²⁴ But if creativity was at a minimum, breadth and ambition were not lacking. An August 1987 State Department the table of contents to a report on Soviet Active Measures suggests the scope of such operations:

- Chapter II. Soviet Religious Organizations as a Tool of Influence
- Chapter III. The Soviet Peace Committee
- Chapter IV. Recent Anti-American Forgeries
- Chapter V. The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign
- Chapter VI. Soviet Disinformation on Chemical and Biological Warfare
- Chapter VII. The Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures Campaign on Afghanistan
- Chapter X. Soviet Active Measures in the United States²⁵

Of these, several are of particular interest for what would follow in the Putin era as they illustrate not only the persistence of the Active Measures campaign, but also its ability to combine tools, means and modalities to interrelate campaigns (комбинация or the art of combinations). The earliest and perhaps most successful examples were the peace campaigns and the ecumenical religious front groups.

By the 1980s, the Soviets had achieved a near monopoly on the word 'peace' (мир).²⁶ There were peace committees in myriad countries, a well-meaning few of whom were not actually front groups. There were disarmament groups and anti-nuclear groups, just as there were local groups and international groups. What they had in common was a perception of the Soviet Union as champions of peace and the United States and its allies as war mongers of the first order.²⁷ The peace program combined neatly with the religious program whereby the officially atheist Soviet state and its Warsaw Pact allies deployed a small army of 'peace priests' – a ragtag collection of idealists, intelligence operators, and agents of influence who were able to infiltrate the ecumenical movements that were inevitable at the conclusion of a world war.

²³ Lest we forget what that meant, Aleksievich, S. *Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets*. London: Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2016. That it was better then says all that needs to be said of the Russia of today.

²⁴ Schoen and Lamb. *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*. 19.

²⁵ United States Department of State. *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda*. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1987. <http://jmw.typepad.com/files/state-department---a-report-on-active-measures-and-propaganda.pdf>, Accessed on 01 June 2017.

²⁶ For very considerable detail, see Barghoorn, F. C. *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*. Princeton University Press, 2015.

²⁷ For an interesting point of view, see Lynch, C. *Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics*. Cornell University Press, 2007.

The connection between peace and ecumenical religiosity was a natural fit for Soviet propaganda activities.²⁸ The program began in the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1947 as a riposte to the American announcement of the Truman Doctrine that pledged material and other aid to democratic nations, with particular reference to Greece and Turkey.²⁹ The resolution, "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War," singled out the US as an inciter of war, a spreader of lies, and a threat to Greece and Turkey as well as the entire world. Indeed, the resolution demanded that all forms of American style war propaganda should be criminalized in all UN member states. Specifically the Soviet resolution charged that:

- Reactionary circles in a number of countries, particularly in the United States, Greece and Turkey, were carrying on an organized campaign for war against the Soviet Union, using lies, slander and incitement to aggression;
- this war propaganda was designed to support US military preparations; and
- US monopolies and cartels, closely linked to the German trusts before the war and subsequently engaged in reestablishing their connections, were resisting attempts to outlaw the manufacture of atomic weapons and reduce armaments generally.³⁰

The resolution was passed in the General Assembly and the Soviets quickly followed with domestic legislation and an array of propaganda undertaken as part of a massive Active Measures campaign.

Peace and disarmament were of greatest Soviet concern in the late 1940s. The US nuclear monopoly made Soviet survival dependent entirely on isolating the voices that, like Gen. LeMay, counselled a swift and permanent nuclear resolution to the conflict between East and West. The lead role in forming a popular front of peace and disarmament groups fell to the World Peace Committee. It was formed in 1948 and renamed as the World Peace Council in 1949.

The WPC presented a fascinating problem for the West. On the one hand, the membership rolls of the WPC included the cream of Soviet literary and artistic circles, giving it a certain aura of star power which suggested the possibility for a greater degree of artistic freedom than was realistic in Stalinist Russia. On the other hand, the WPC was the same clumsy and stereotypically Stalinist organization as the First Directorate itself, speaking in the same phrases as those of the Soviet state. It was in short, a glittering collection of *apparatchiks* who worked through the same tired channels – national Communist Parties (CPs), long discredited front groups, and marginal agents of influence who publicized their efforts with the same wooden prose as Radio Moscow's deadening foreign language broadcasts. In short, their cause was palatable but they were not, discrediting the term 'peace' even among western intellectuals and religious leaders.³¹

Undaunted by Western suspicions, the WPC and the national CPs that served as its local cadre soon established an international network of peace councils, holding assemblies

²⁸ On ecumenism, Jonson, J. and Hjelm, N. A. *Wounded Visions: Unity, Justice and Peace in the World Church after 1968*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013. For a one stop read on the fundamentalist phenomenon, Marty, M. E., Appleby, R. S. and American Academy of Arts and Sciences. *Fundamentalisms Observed*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

²⁹ Gaddis, J. L. "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs* 52/2. 1974. 386–402.

³⁰ Hertzberg, D. *Moscow Campaigns against War Propaganda*. Washington, DC: Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1982. 6.

³¹ Carter, A. *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945*. Routledge, 2014. 33. By far the best available coverage of this history may be found in this source.

in Moscow and around the world, and endeavoring to attend the gatherings of peace and disarmament groups wherever they might be found.³² By the 1980s, the WPC had branches in an estimated 141 nations worldwide. Its methods in the United States were typical. In 1979 it formed the United States Peace Council (USPC), which closely coordinated with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). As late as 1985, the USPC letterhead reflected its affiliation with the WPC, making its claims of independence somewhat comical – especially given the presence of USPC figures at the WPC headquarters in Helsinki.³³

In common with Soviet fronts around the world, the USPC greatly over claimed its influence and activities, but in a 12 June 1982 memorandum, the primary goal of hiving as many like-minded fronts as possible was made clear:

It is important for us to join with others who are building local peace councils. The Peace Council plays a special role in the peace movement. It is the only peace organization which consistently links the struggle for peace with the struggle against US military intervention, and it takes principled positions with respect to anti-Soviet propaganda of the Reagan administration. Every new peace council which comes into existence improves the ideological health of the peace movement.³⁴

How slavishly pro-Soviet was the WPC? Little more need be noted than their endorsement, against all logic and common sense for a peace group, of the Soviet downing of the Korean airliner, KAL 007, in 1983.³⁵

The focus on peace and disarmament was supplemented by the religious outreach which may be the most ironic yet most successful aspect of the Active Measures campaign. The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) is the religious fun house mirror of the WPC, reflecting a call for peace in priestly cassock and the conservative black suits favored by dour Lutherans of the time. It was founded in 1958, headquartered in Prague, and led by the irrepressible Czech theologian Josef Hromádka. Hromádka was a fascinating figure. To cynics, he was a Lutheran pastor who had abandoned religious principles to lead the socialist good life – a passport and constant foreign travel, a seat at banquets around the world, hard currency and access to the Tuzex stores, where capitalist dreams were lived in Prague's gray socialist winters.³⁶ He maintained his membership in the WPC despite the perception that it was a Soviet front group.³⁷ His most sympathetic biographer, Doris Leroy, writes:

Professor Josef Hromádka was an ordained Czech Lutheran pastor, who had served also as chaplain during the First World War. Extensive theological studies saw him become

³² *Ibid.*, 75–77.

³³ United States Department of State. *Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns*. Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986. 26–27. The document is available at <http://jmw.typepad.com/files/state-department---a-report-on-the-substance-and-process-of-anti-us-disinformation-and-propaganda-campaigns.pdf>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁵ United States State Department. "Soviet Active Measures Christian Peace Conference". Washington, DC: United States State Department, 1985. 1.

³⁶ For a tongue in cheek history of the Tuzex dream, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r11pfJp00tM>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

³⁷ LeRoy, D. "Worker for Peace from Behind the Iron Curtain". In Deery, P. and Kimber, J. (eds), *Proceedings of the 14th Biennial Labour History Conference*. Melbourne: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 2015. 70–82. <https://labourhistorymelbourne.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/worker-for-peace-from-behind-the-iron-curtain-lh-proceedings2.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

a leading theologian in his own country, holding teaching positions at the Protestant Theological Faculty of the Charles University in Prague—from 1920 to 1966. During World War II he escaped to the United States where he held the position of visiting Professor, Theology, at Princeton Theological Seminary until 1946. He also was supportive of socialist ideology. On his return to Czechoslovakia after the war he became a member of an Action Committee for the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren set up in 1948 which welcomed the new communist government, anticipating that it would “preserve the deepest traditions of freedom and justice” in Czechoslovakia...Hromádka “advocated dialogue with the Marxists, arguing that the Marxist revolution was a revolt against unjust social orders, not against God”...³⁸

Hromádka paved the way for the creation of a front group focused on the ecumenical movement with his 1948 appearance at the first World Council of Churches conclave in Amsterdam. There and in subsequent WCC Assemblies religious battles were fought between the peace priests and their state sponsors and the American elites – good Protestants all – who were at the top echelons of the US foreign policy and intelligence establishments. The Dulles brothers, John Foster of State Department fame and Alan of the nascent Central Intelligence Agency waged these intellectual battles in impassioned articles and from the floor in Amsterdam, locking rhetorical horns with Hromádka and his fellow prelates from the Eastern churches over issues of peace and justice and the benign nature of religious life in the Soviet bloc.³⁹

The CPC conclaves were more overtly political affairs. Paul Stefanik, who visited Czechoslovakia fifteen times and attended several CPC Assemblies noted that such gatherings attracted “a strange group of well-wishers that included Kosygin, Castro, Honecker, and Arafat, through their representatives.”⁴⁰ Stefanik’s mordant observation on this anomaly:

Thus the gathering of Christians – mostly theologians – receiving greetings and “good wishes” from some who are bent on destroying them, and bitterly denouncing those whose role they do not comprehend.⁴¹

Yet like Hromádka’s Australian biographer Doris Leroy, Stefanik sees value in the group’s message if not always its messengers. That the CPC is a front group bothers him more than it does Leroy, but their published histories share a complexity that would be lost on the Americans during the Cold War. By the 1980s, the aged Hromádka had passed from the CPC scene, replaced by the Hungarian Bishop Károly Tóth.⁴² Tóth, a product of the socialist educational system was far more ideological than the worldlier Hromádka.⁴³ He

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Brash, A. A. *Amsterdam 1948, Being a Report on the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, August 22-September 4, 1948*. Christchurch. N.Z.: Presbyterian Bookroom, 1948.

⁴⁰ Stefanik, P. “The Christian Peace Conference – Propaganda?...Or Prophecy?” *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 5/3. 1985. 46.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Tóth’s admiration for Hromádka shines through in his homage to his mentor. Tóth, K. “The Heritage of JI Hromadka for the Prophetic Ministry of the Church in East and West, Today and Tomorrow”. *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 10/2. 1990. 26–33. <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1493&context=ree>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁴³ Welker, Á. “The Christian Peace Conference and Its Connections with the Communist State: The Case of Hungarian Churches in the Early 1960’s”. *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 20. 2013. 197–214.

too was a member of the Presidential Committee of the WPC, and under his leadership the two organizations became virtually indistinguishable.⁴⁴ In a December 1981 edition of the *World Marxist Review*, Tóth made his alignment clear:

For 23 years our Christian Peace Conference has been active in opposing the nuclear war threat and the arms race. . . . Acting on our religious convictions and in the name of Christian humanism we have joined the antiwar movement. Christianity teaches that life is a gift to the human being from above. To defend it, to uphold the right of people to life we are prepared to cooperate with all forces, regardless of their ideology and world view. I should like to accentuate the fact that the standpoints of Christians and Communists coincide on this question.⁴⁵

And:

The Christian Peace Conference is no mere pacifist organization; it is contributing by its specific activity toward maintaining peace and toward efforts for disarmament. That is why it fully supports L. Brezhnev's latest proposals, which are a significant step toward halting feverish armament and preventing the emergence of a world nuclear conflict. [CPG President Károly Tóth, *Rude Pravo*, March 26, 1982]⁴⁶

Under Hromádka's leadership, the CPC made some progress in the United States. Both Hromádka and Tóth made numerous visits to the US, but Tóth's outspoken Marxism played rather badly to the American market. Where in 1964 the VERY conservative American Baptist Foreign Mission Society was moved to send a delegate to the CPC's Prague Assembly,⁴⁷ the Tóth-led CPC of the 1980s was not viewed with such equanimity. The 1987 publication of a State Department report, "Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda" brought a very strong reaction in right wing American Christian circles.⁴⁸

This became very public when Dr. Robert McIntire, who at remarkable expense took out full page ads in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal*: "'86-'87 FBI Report Exposes Soviet's Sinister Use of Religion – Naming Names and Churches."⁴⁹ The article was accompanied by an editorial from Dr. McIntire whose title, quoting Hosea 4:6 was "My People are Destroyed for Lack of Knowledge." The denunciation was full throated if not always accurate. The report which the minister claims to have photocopied was actually from the State Department, not the FBI, while the organization which the editorial claims he led, the International Council of Churches, was neither international nor a council. It was a vehicle which Dr. McIntire created during an inspired sermon offered to the Bible Presbyterian Church of Charlotte (North Carolina) to oppose the World Council

⁴⁴ United States Department of State. Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns. 30.

⁴⁵ United States State Department. "Soviet Active Measures Christian Peace Conference". 2.

⁴⁶ United States State Department. "Soviet Active Measures Christian Peace Conference". 1.

⁴⁷ The move was criticized in remarkably temperate language by the American Baptist Convention which pointed out that Dr. Hromádka had stated that communism is compatible with Christianity, which is definitely not the position of the American Baptist Convention. "Prague Christian Peace Conference". <http://www.garbc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/prague-christian-peace-conference-1964.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁴⁸ United States. Department of State., "Soviet Influence Activities : A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda."

⁴⁹ "'86-'87 FBI Report Exposes Soviet's Sinister Use of Religion – Naming Names and Churches". *Wall Street Journal* 6 Jun 1988. 19.

of Churches on the occasion of their 1948 Amsterdam meeting in whose echoes he heard the definite hoof beats of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.⁵⁰

In the end, the CPC's original promise as an ecumenical vehicle to promote Soviet interests withered in the light of the western revelations about the Soviet Active Measures campaign and Bishop Tóth's preference for the Dialectic over the Gospels. So it was for the Active Measures campaign overall. It had high points certainly. The anti-neutron bomb campaign, perfectly summarized by the acute punk band the Dead Kennedys, was effective.

Efficiency and progress is ours once more

Now that we have the Neutron bomb

It's nice and quick and clean and gets things done

Away with excess enemy

But no less value to property

No sense in war but perfect sense at home [Dead Kennedy's, "Kill the Poor"]

Forgeries that purported to be Ku Klux Klan documents threatening non-white participants at the Los Angeles Olympics from which the Soviets had been excluded were not effective however. This series of racist cartoons that strongly resembled those of Tom Metzger's *WAR* (White Aryan Resistance) newspaper that featured racist portrayals of African-Americans, with the heading "Olympics for White's Only," were produced, replete with a generic KKK symbol that actually resembled none of the then extant Klan branches. The forgery prominently featured a monkey hanging from a noose with the sign "Hang the Niggers" on it. The document promised a warm reception in Los Angeles for non-Whites.⁵¹ It was obvious hackwork, and foreign hackwork at that, and failed to register any notice whatever.

The Active Measures campaigns dwindled and disappeared in the Gorbachev era. They returned with a vengeance under Vladimir Putin.⁵²

AND THIS IS NOW

*Well, are you involved in the murder and plunder side of things, or have you chosen to lead souls astray and make other people's prayers null and void by your very presence?*⁵³ [Older mujtahid to his students after Iranian Revolution]

On January 21, 2017 President Donald Trump desecrated by his very presence the room in the CIA's Langley headquarters that memorialized those who had fallen in the Cold War.⁵⁴ What followed was the circus that surrounds this American President; claims that all in the room had unanimously voted for him despite the national security professionals who had

⁵⁰ McIntire, C. "History of the ICCC". <http://www.iccc.org.sg/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017. McIntire actually journeyed to Amsterdam to deliver a document exhorting the Assembly to adopt the American fundamentalist reading of both scripture and ecumenism. He notes that the WCC declined to accept the document.

⁵¹ United States Department of State. *Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns*. 55.

⁵² The Active Measures Working Group takes credit for apprising Gorbachev of the program, noting he evinced particular disgust at the campaign to link US military research to the AIDS epidemic. Schoen and Lamb. *Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications*. 6.

⁵³ Mottahedeh, R. *The Mantle of the Prophet*. OneWorld Publications, 2014.

⁵⁴ Davis, J. H. and Rosenberg, M. "With False Claims, Trump Attacks Media on Turnout and Intelligence Rift". *New York Times*. 21 January 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/politics/trump-white-house-briefing-inauguration-crowd-size.html>, Accessed on 26 May 2017.

warned that he was a threat to American national security during the campaign, and claims that photographic evidence that few attended his inauguration in Washington was fake news.

The appearance drove home the vacuity of the Western claims of victory in the Cold War.⁵⁵ For those with more specialized knowledge, Russian involvement in the American presidential campaign was merely a tech savvy replay of the classic Active Measures campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. But it was the sight of Trump standing in the single sacred space at Langley⁵⁶ that most evokes the disgusted quote from the senior Shi'ite *ulammas* in the wake of the bloodbath that followed in the wake of the failure of the Iranian Revolution to reach its *thermidor*.

The rebirth of the Active Measures campaign under Putin was little noticed in the West. A few published acute analyses and warnings, but these had little effect in the United States⁵⁷ and were too late to impact the situations in places like the Ukraine and the Crimea.⁵⁸ Virtually every western country, and many that are more far afield, have been targeted by these information operations⁵⁹ which today are being analyzed in terms of information warfare or hybrid warfare.⁶⁰

The American election operation was a textbook operation. Russian military intelligence conducted a campaign of successful cyber-espionage. To add insult to injury, they even signed their work under such transparent false flags as Guccifer 2.0.⁶¹ The clumsiness of the attempts to false flag the operation were apparent from the beginning and were quickly attributed to the GRU who were always less than adroit at tradecraft – probably a primary reason that they

⁵⁵ For perhaps the most egregious example, Streusand, D. E., Bailey, N. A. and Marlo, F. H. *The Grand Strategy That Won the Cold War: Architecture of Triumph*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016. Fortunately for academics, our mistakes quickly go out of print, remembered only by ourselves.

⁵⁶ Eisenstatjan, Y. "The Shocking Affront of Donald Trump's C.I.A. Stunt". New York Times. 24 January 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/opinion/the-shocking-affront-of-donald-trumps-cia-stunt.html>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁵⁷ Abrams. "Beyond Propaganda..." And much earlier, United States Information Agency. "Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era 1988–1991." The USIA in its day was a collection of intellectuals and misfits who could not handle the spit and polish of the State Department, but whose ability to penetrate cultures and bring back pure intelligence gold that was rarely heeded by State or CIA was unmatched. George Bush III put an end to it in 2001. Cull, N. J. *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989–2001*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

⁵⁸ Karlsen, G. H. "Tools of Russian Influence: Information and Propaganda". In Matlary, J. H. and Heier, T. (eds), *Ukraine and Beyond*. Springer, 2016. 181–208. Seely, R. "Russia's New Warfare Tools and the Link to Soviet Active Measures." *Georgian Review*. 2015. <http://georgianreview.ge/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bob-pdf.pdf>. Pomerantsev, P. and Weiss, M. *The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money*. New York, NY: Institute of Modern Russia, 2014. http://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev_The_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf. Schreck, C. "Russian Tv Deserters Divulge Details on Kremlin's Ukraine 'Propaganda'". 2016. <http://www.rferl.org/a/russian-television-whistleblowers-kremlin-propaganda/27178109.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁵⁹ For example, Chodakiewicz, M. J. "Active Measures Gone Awry: Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–1992". *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24/3. 2011. 467–493.

⁶⁰ For a good introduction, see Kofman, M. and Rojansky, M. "A Closer Look at Russia's "Hybrid War"" *Kennan Cable* 1/7. 2015. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190090/5-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf>. The literature surrounding hybrid warfare is becoming alarmingly dense. Information warfare literature is more easily assimilated for those who are not defense intellectuals. For a fine introduction, Giles, K. "Handbook of Russian Information Warfare". NATO Defense College. 2016. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=995>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁶¹ See for example, Atherton, K. D. "Who Hacked the Democratic National Committee?" *Popular Science*. 25 July 2016. <http://www.popsoci.com/who-hacked-democratic-national-committee>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

were dropped from the Active Measures campaign in the 1950s. The technology is cutting edge, but the knuckle draggers always leave a trail that the blind could follow.

In an effort that may have been to redeem their reputations in the Russian intelligence community as much as to disinform the West, a Guccifer 2.0 was duly trotted out for the media. There was a day when such things took place in crowded rooms filled with international journalists all intent on questioning a defector or double agent who was presented as an honored guest of the state and was willing to answer carefully choreographed questions. But times have changed. The Guccifer 2.0 offered to the press was no Kim Philby in Moscow. Rather, it was a young girl presented as an independent Romanian hacker who gave an amusing on-line interview to the BBC.⁶² She emerged in the interview more as a brat needing a good spanking than a threat to American national security.

The data harvested was assessed, organized and disseminated through Julian Assange from his basement redoubt in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. Acting as a classic agent of influence, Assange fed the material into the American election cycle to discredit Hillary Clinton, who, to be fair, needed little help in this regard. She has always been embroiled in the sleaze surrounding Bill Clinton.⁶³

Russia and Vladimir Putin got not so much as a footnote of credit from either Assange or his once prestigious *WikiLeaks* organization for the material. Damaging material on Russia – busily engaged in the piecemeal reconstitution of the Soviet Empire, is nowhere to be seen from *WikiLeaks*.⁶⁴ This is classic Active Measures applied to the computer age. Meanwhile, Russia maintained covert contacts with the Trump administration in waiting, most notably with National Security Advisor Michael Flynn whose conversations with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak could no longer be denied.⁶⁵ Indeed, early in the campaign, the many and varied links between Trump's inner circle from his campaign manager

⁶² "Conversations with a hacker: What Guccifer 2.0 told me". BBC. 14 January 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-38610402>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁶³ Robbins, J. S. "Hillary Clinton revives hibernating '80s 'sleaze factor'". USA Today. 5 May 2015. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/05/05/sleaze-factor-2016-elections-hillary-clinton-column/26653627/v>, Accessed on 12 June 2017. This space in this issue would not permit even a partial list of articles in the right wing media tagged 'sleaze factor'.

⁶⁴ Miller, G. and Entous, A. "Declassified report says Putin 'ordered' effort to undermine faith in U.S. election and help Trump". Washington Post. 6 January 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/intelligence-chiefs-expected-in-new-york-to-brief-trump-on-russian-hacking/2017/01/06/5f591416-d41a-11e6-9cb0-54ab630851e8_story.html?utm_term=.943ec7862cbc&wpsrc=nl_headlines&wpmm=1, Accessed on 12 June 2017. On the typically tepid Obama reaction, Ryan, M., Nakashima, E. and DeYoung, K. "Obama Administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference". Washington Post. 29 December 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-announces-measures-to-punish-russia-for-2016-election-interference/2016/12/29/311db9d6-cdde-11e6-a87f-b917067331bb_story.html?utm_term=.80f7cfd6b0235&wpsrc=al_alert-COMBO-politics%252Bnation, Accessed on 12 June 2017. Russia for their part, did not deign to react, awaiting their boy to take power.

⁶⁵ "Top Trump Aide in Frequent Contact With Russia's Ambassador". New York Times. 13 January 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/01/13/us/politics/ap-us-trump-russia.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

Paul Manafort and Moscow were detailed in considerable detail.⁶⁶ For Manafort, the streets of Ukraine were truly paved with Russian gold.⁶⁷

After the election, the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence issued a comprehensive report detailing the outlines of the Russian operation to influence the American elections naming Vladimir Putin as personally responsible.⁶⁸ It does not include the penetration of key state online voting systems, with Florida and Arizona particular targets.⁶⁹

So...

WHAT NOW?

"I never said we should bomb them back to the Stone Age. I said we had the capability to do it. I want to save lives on both sides" Gen. Curtis LeMay⁷⁰

"What do we do now?" [Robert Redford upon being elected, "The Candidate"]⁷¹

With the dead words of Gen. LeMay and the prophetic words of "The Candidate," we have now come full circle. A Russian-influenced creature is in the White House, NATO in shambles, top offices filled with useful idiots and such as Breitbart ideologue Steve Bannon sitting atop the American national security structure.⁷² The question of what to do now becomes particularly acute. Before the election, when the issue was simply the revival of Active Measures whose primary impact was 'somewhere else', in the distant Ukraine or some other victim of geography as the Kremlin sets about the piecemeal reconstitution of its former Empire, it was a matter of policy recommendations. One of the best such lists comes from US Army Foreign Area Officer Steve Abrams.⁷³ But how to implement recommendations when the power you are seeking to contain holds sway over the top offices in your land? A Ukrainian or Crimean dilemma – indeed, the very conundrum faced in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1977.

It is a new and humbling position for the Americans. The last successful incursion onto American soil dates to the War of 1812 when the British put the US capital to the torch. In America, that event has long faded from either memory or history classes. So what to do indeed?

⁶⁶ Nakashima, E. and Miller, G. "U.S. counterintelligence officials are examining possible ties between Russia and Trump associates". Washington Post. 19 January 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-counterintelligence-officials-are-examining-possible-ties-between-russia-and-trump-associates/2017/01/19/7e10f31c-debd-11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html?utm_term=.27f7900987a9, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁶⁷ Wright, D. "Manafort named in Ukrainian probe into millions in secret cash". CNN. 15 August 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/15/politics/clinton-slams-trump-over-manafort-report/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁶⁸ "Background to "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent Us Elections": The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution". Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2017. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁶⁹ Groll, E. "Did Russia Really Hack U.S. Election Systems?" Foreign Policy. 30 August 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/30/did-russia-really-hack-u-s-election-systems/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷⁰ Reported in *The Washington Post*, 4 October 1968. A8. https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Curtis_LeMay, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷¹ Garber, M. "40 Years Later, Is The Candidate Still Satire?" The Atlantic. 23 September 2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/09/40-years-later-is-the-candidate-still-satire/501389/>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷² Thrush, G. and Haberman, M. "Bannon Is Given Security Role Usually Held for Generals". New York Times, 29 January 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/stephen-bannon-donald-trump-national-security-council.html>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷³ Abrams. "Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia". 27–31.

A beginning is to recognize what has happened and act accordingly. Interference in the American election, using an updated Active Measures campaign to elect an unregistered foreign agent is an act of war, and should be treated as such. The aggression is more mannered than that of the Ukraine or Crimea and less Hollywood than the Soviet invasion of “Red Dawn” fame. The combination of ignorance of all things foreign combined with the racism and xenophobia has brought the US to this impasse, and it will only be resolved in stages, like the layers of an onion, as the conflict on the American far right between the race warriors who populated the Trump campaign and the unreconstructed cold warriors who see Russia as unchanged from the communist days is already beginning.⁷⁴

War between nuclear powers was unthinkable after 1962, and so the conflict was conducted through proxies around the globe who were given access to carefully limited selection of the tools of war and allowed to pursue equally circumscribed regional objectives. In the globalized age of the internet, the war fighters’ palate is much fuller, with the ability to subject the other side to a technological Armageddon based on attacks on computer and other infrastructure now readily at hand. Can such a confrontation go nuclear? Throughout the campaign, Donald Trump broached the possibilities of nuclear solutions to problems privately and it may be that in his wake the barriers to nuclear confrontation are not as high as they once were.⁷⁵ Oh well. Elections have costs....

The process of peaceful removing a sitting president is complicated. The system worked after a fashion in the Watergate fiasco that saw President Nixon resign after an overwhelming election victory in 1973. But that was strictly an internal affair. Russian involvement means that the process that will inevitably bring down the Trump Administration will be less mannered. In 1973 it was a single sitting president and a bare handful of his cronies that were brought low. The American Constitution, the basis of law and governance in the US, did not foresee the installation of a quisling government acting in the interests of a hostile foreign power.

What is to come? A historian lacking historical precedents is hardly prescient, but Americans for generations have fallen back into Hollywood dreams, where a cornucopia of models awaits.⁷⁶ Rock music too has proven a lever which can move men to action. Which is why we began this examination; with “Red Dawn” which is as good a place to end as to begin. A song from the Doors opens both the film and the script from which the movie was shot. It is a very good place to close:

This is the end, beautiful friend
 This is the end, my only friend, the end
 Of our elaborate plans, the end
 Of everything that stands, the end
 No safety or surprise, the end
 I'll never look into your eyes, again

⁷⁴ On this aspect, see Kaplan, J. "Red Dawn Is Now: Race Vs. Nation and the American Election". *Terrorism & Political Violence* 29/3. 2017. 411–424.; and Idem. "America's Apocalyptic Literature of Revolution," *Politics and Religion* (forthcoming).

⁷⁵ Belvedere, M. J. "Trump asks why US can't use nukes". MSNBC. 3 August 2016. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/trump-asks-why-us-cant-use-nukes-msnbc-joe-scarborough-reports.html>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

⁷⁶ Ryan, M. and Kellner, D. *Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film*. Indiana University Press, 1990.

Can you picture what will be, so limitless and free
 Desperately in need, of some, stranger's hand
 In a, desperate land [The Doors, "The End"]

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János Matus:

A SUBJECTIVE SELECTION FROM FACTS AND IDEAS RELATED TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PRIOR TO BREXIT

ABSTRACT: The results of the British referendum last summer came as a surprise for many of us. Unanswered questions regarding the further development of the EU increased as a result. According to some even the future of the Union is doubtful. One may wonder if there were any warning signals in the EU-British relations which indicated the surprising outcome of the referendum. Is there any reasonable approach to this complex problem which may help to come closer to the understanding of what happened in the perception of the majority of British citizens about the EU? A short summary of the conflicts in the history of Europe may be helpful to understand the need for fundamental changes in Europe seven decades ago. An overview of theoretical concepts regarding the foundation of a peaceful Europe brings us closer to understanding the basic idea of European integration. And finally, the question whether the governments of member states and the institutions of the EU in Brussels pursued a wise policy, regarding the tempo and speed in building the community, begs answers as well. This paper aims at reviewing some facts, ideas and developments related to the three issues mentioned above.

KEYWORDS: balance of power, securitization, integration, security community, functionalism, neo-functionalism, pluralistic community, amalgamated community, federalism, Europe of nations

SECURITIZATION OF HISTORY

Jack Levy, an American political scientist, prepared a summary of the European wars between 1495 and 1945 and identified 114 wars in which great powers participated in one or both sides. Statistical data also revealed that France was the most frequent participant of those wars. It is of common knowledge that the victorious powers hold Germany responsible for the most destructive conflicts of all, the two world wars.¹

For centuries Great Britain used the balance of power politics as one of her most important foreign policy tools to influence the rivalry of the continental powers. A famous statement by Winston Churchill is a good characterisation of the balance of power politics pursued by the successive British governments: “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominant Power on the continent. ... We always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led”. Just before the Second World War Churchill characterised his attitude to military alliance as follows: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a

¹ Levy, J. S. *War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495–1975*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983. 88–91.

favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons”.² Lord Palmerstone, British foreign secretary in the first half of the 19th century, even though he was of the view that there was a natural affinity of democracies, once declared that “England has no permanent friends; she has only permanent interests”.³

For a long time the United States distanced itself from Europe. George Washington, the first president, at the end of his term in office warned his successors about the dangers of European conflicts and suggested that they should stay away from them. In 1823 the fifth president of the US, James Monroe further developed the concept by sending a warning to the European powers not to intervene into the internal affairs of the Western Hemisphere. Prior to the announcement of the “Monroe Doctrine” the president refused a British proposal regarding a joint Anglo-American opposition to a possible European intervention in Spain’s former American empire. According to the extended doctrine any attempt on the part of the European powers to impose their system on the Americas would be viewed as dangerous to peace and safety.⁴ The “Monroe Doctrine” remained in force – with the exception of the last two years of the First World War – until the beginning of the Second World War. After the war a lengthy debate in the Congress was followed by a decision by which the US committed itself to long term security cooperation with the Western European countries.⁵ At the same time the US expressed full support for close political, security and economic cooperation of the countries in the region.

Security has become a major issue of the European integration. The argument that Europe’s past must not be Europe’s future figured in speeches of European leaders especially on commemorative occasions. References to Europe’s history were strongly present in speeches of German politicians. In one of his major speeches in 2000, foreign minister Joschka Fischer said: “Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a European Federation for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to centuries of precarious balance of powers on this continent, which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions. ...A step backwards, even just standstill or contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU member states and of all those who want to become members; it would demand a fatal price above all of our people. This is particularly true for Germany and the Germans”.⁶

Jacques Chirac, the president of France, also took special opportunities to underline the importance of history in building a peaceful Europe. In a speech he characterized the Franco-German relations in the following way: “Germany, our neighbour, our adversary yesterday, our companion today. ...What France and Germany have experienced and undergone in history is unlike anything else. Better than any other nation, they grasp the

² Ziegler, D. W. *War, Peace and International Politics*. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1990. 203–204.

³ Walt, S. M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 33–34.

⁴ Valone, S. J. (ed) *Two Centuries of US Foreign Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995. 4–8. and 15–16.

⁵ The resolution initiated by Senators Vandenberg and Connally was adopted by the US Senate on June 11, 1948.

⁶ Buzan, B. and Waever, O. *Regions and Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 361–362

deep meaning of peace and of the European enterprise. They alone, by forcing the pace of things, could give the signal for a great coming together in Europe.⁷

In Great Britain the use of history was somewhat different from the way Germans and French argued in favour of integration. British foreign secretary Robin Cook wrote in an article during the Kosovo war in 1999: "There are now two Europes competing for the soul of our continent. One still follows the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. The other emerged fifty years ago from behind the shadow of the Second World War. Prime Minister Tony Blair in November 2000 in Zagreb said in a speech: "The 15 member states of the EU – countries that in the lifetime of my father were at war with one another – are now working in union, with 50 years of peace and prosperity behind us. And now, holding out the prospect of bringing the same peace and prosperity to the Eastern and Central European nations and even to the Balkan countries".⁸

Securitization of history has been clearly demonstrated by the leaders of the largest and most powerful members of the European Union, which are the ones who have had the most direct experience in traditional power politics and also suffered from the consequences of it. History as an object of securitization has been emphasized in the strongest way in the statements by German politicians. Mutual securitization of history by France and Germany has been confirmed by the quotations from speeches of politicians of the two countries. Great Britain securitized history and the European integration differently, which can be explained by the special balancing role she played in the European conflicts. She joined the European Economic Community later and the differences in fundamental issues soon surfaced.

THEORIES AND IDEAS ABOUT INTEGRATION

Two theoretical schools competed in the first half of the twentieth century regarding the explanation of behaviour of states and the relations among them. Political realism, the older concept and practice, had the view that international relations are conflictive by nature, wars are unavoidable, and states are the primary and dominant actors in them. In the international system security is the most important concern of states and military force is its principle guarantor. The concept and practice of the balance of power belongs to the political realist school. The First World War, the first global war, triggered sharp criticism of political realism and strengthened the position and influence of classical liberalism. Liberals rejected balance of power politics and the use of secret diplomacy in the relationship of states. They saw more chances of cooperation among states which can be promoted by international institution. Conflicts among states can be avoided because harmony of interests exists in their relationship. The first explanation of the liberal view of international relations and its implementation in international politics can be found in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.⁹

European developments in the 1920s and 1930s produced increasingly convincing arguments against the liberal concept and the political practice based on it. Edward H. Carr British historian criticized the liberal view of harmony of interests among states and opened the way for the emergence of a more articulate political realist explanation of international relations. The publication of his book "The Twenty Years' Crisis" in 1939 opened the first

⁷ Buzan and Waever. *Regions and Powers*. 362–363.

⁸ Buzan and Waever. *Regions and Powers*. 363.

⁹ Wilson, W. "The Fourteen Points". In Williams, Ph., Goldstein, D. and Shafritz, J. (eds), *Classic Readings of International Relations*. London: Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, 1999. 23–26.

major debate between the liberal-utopian and the realist understanding of world politics. Carr considered political realism as a more correct and efficient approach to international relations, but didn't discard utopia completely since he viewed it as a means and way to promote changes in international relations. He suggested that any political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.¹⁰ In the subsequent years and decades these two approaches influenced the explanation of international relations at theoretical level. In practical terms governments followed foreign policies characterized by a mixture of suggestions of both theories. East-West rivalry and especially the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War reflected dominantly political realist views regarding international relations. Even if in other regions of the world ideological conflict was not as intense as in Soviet – American relations, political realism had stronger influence than liberalism almost everywhere. Western Europe was an exception. Due to the lessons of history Western European countries decided to begin an unchartered course, which some experts characterized as common adventure to the unknown future.

After the Second World War liberal thoughts regarding international relations survived and emerged in different ideas of integration. Securitization of the past and the lessons learned from history influenced the evolution of liberal ideas and policies in Western Europe. One of the frequently quoted representatives of integration theorists was David Mitrany, a British political scientist, who belonged to the *functionalist school* of integration theories. Mitrany suggested that a peaceful international order can be achieved through cooperation among functional areas of different countries. He opposed the use of old formal /constitutional/ ways, because they would constitute impediments to the creation of a working international system. Links among societies of different countries and the development of habits of cooperation would be more efficient. In practical terms it meant, that the solid foundation of peaceful international relations could be laid down in people to people contacts. Mitrany also expressed an important warning: "The problem of our generation, put very broadly, is how to weld together the common interests of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each. ... We have already suggested that not all interests are common to all, and that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree."¹¹ The first example of functionalist links between Western European countries was the European Coal and Steel Community.

American political scientist Karl Deutsch, one of the representatives of the *transactionalist school* of international relations, studied the formation of political community among nations. He came to the conclusion that the minimum condition for the existence of international political community was the community he called *security community*. In theory he identified two kinds of political communities: first, pluralistic; second, amalgamated/ united. Pluralistic political community can be a security community which is politically fragmented. United political community can be a federation of states or a nation state with central government. European integration started with the creation of a security community. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 were the most important steps in this process.

¹⁰ Carr, E. H. "The Realist Critique and the Limitations of Realism". In Williams, Ph., Goldstein, D. and Shafritz, J. (eds), *Classic Readings of International Relations*. London: Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, 1999. 39–43.

¹¹ Mitrany, D. "The Functionalist Alternative". In Williams, Ph., Goldstein, D. and Shafritz, J. (eds), *Classic Readings of International Relations*. London: Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, 1999. 312–313.

Karl Deutsch also invested intellectual capital in the identification of possible stages of integration. According to his model the evolution of modern nation-states can be the example for the development of an international political community, or the emergence of united security communities. At the first stage functional links, such as trade, migration, services, military and security cooperation are established. At the second stage, due to the mutual benefits of collaboration the intensity and the scope of transactions increase. The third stage would be characterized by the generation of socio-psychological processes that lead to the assimilation of peoples and their integration into larger communities. Communication, personal connections and learning about each other is crucial in this process. The fourth stage of integration would be the emergence of one political community via assimilation of a number of smaller political communities. The fifth stage is the conclusion of the integration process with the creation of institutions which would represent and protect the identity and interests of the international political community. This would be the final stage of the emergence of a *united security community*.¹²

In Karl Deutsch's view peaceful change in international relations has its origin in the perception and identification of people. That is why sentimental change precedes institutional change, social assimilation and community formation precedes political amalgamation. Other integration theorists criticized Deutsch for his neglect of international institutions and the emphasis on social change as the primary source of political change.

Deutsch's contemporary, Ernst Haas also an American political scientist followed the footsteps of David Mitrany and called his theory neo-functionalism. In opposition to Deutsch, Haas believed that international institutions have the primary role in the process of integration because they are the ones who can encourage shift in cultural orientation and political loyalties of people thus contributing to political unification. Haas' intention was to give political dynamism to the process of integration by putting emphasis on the role of international institutions. The neo-functional theory assumed that with the spread of functional links and with the extension of the range of international activities more and more functions will be performed under international authorities. Inclusion of new functional areas sets into motion political processes that generate demand for further steps. National governments shall face a dilemma of surrendering additional autonomy or risking the achievements the community has attained so far. The neo-functional theory assumed that political pressure will grow on governments to move towards greater unification. Haas described integration as an intense political process. In this process numerous political actors, while pursuing their own interests put pressure on one another to move toward policies that are collectively and also individually beneficial. In this continuous game of bargaining there would always be governments who are reluctant to give up additional elements of sovereignty, while others would resist risking the previously achieved level of integration. When Western European integration slowed down in the 1970s, theorists lost their enthusiasm regarding further research on the problems of integration. But the dilemma of setting priorities right – whether social or political, emotional or institutional changes have priority – remained with the governments and bureaucrats in international institutions.¹³

¹² Puchala, D. T. "The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations". In Williams, Ph., Goldstein, D. and Shafritz, J. (eds), *Classic Readings of International Relations*. London: Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, 1999. 314–318.

¹³ Puchala. "The Integration Theorists...". 319-322.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, well known representatives of the American neo-liberalist school of international relations theory, introduced the term “*transgovernmentalism*” in connection with everyday operations of international institutions in general. With growing interdependence governments have become more sensitive to foreign developments, which might impact political, economic and social conditions of national societies. In order to explain a more refined and more articulate approach to international realm they identified two types of transgovernmental behaviour, which they thought to be valid for the European integration as well.

First, transgovernmental policy coordination takes place when working level officials of different government bureaucracies communicate informally among themselves. At working levels, in face-to-face situations government officials often convey more information than on higher levels of governments. As working level meetings become regularized, and the sense of collegiality gradually develops on the basis of common profession, a transnational reference group begins to emerge. Second, transgovernmental coalition building takes place when lower level units of national governments attempt to involve lower level units of other governments or transgovernmental institutions to influence the decision making process of their own government. Professional experts in national governments opt for transgovernmental coalitions when they are not able to get high level support for the solution of an internationally recognized problem which requires urgent actions. History of multilateral diplomacy recorded a number of cases from the period of the Cold War in connection with arms control and environmental issues.¹⁴

STAGES OF INTEGRATION AND GREAT BRITAIN

Since the late 1940s European construction has emerged under the mix of liberal ideas of international relation theory and political strategies conceived by French and German politicians. It would not be easy to identify which of the two components of the mix has been more influential throughout the whole process of integration. One of the principle architects of the European integration, Jean Monnet, was a neoliberal institutionalist with a strong sense of realism. He emphasized the importance of institutions in the solution of common problems. His method of negotiations was characterized by a great deal of informality and the use of political and psychological approach. Monnet’s basic idea was to unite people and not to form a coalition of states. This political objective was a fundamental deviation from the traditional balance of power politics pursued by European states for centuries.¹⁵ In this sense he clearly distanced himself from the traditional political realist theory and practice.

The close connection between Mitrany’s functional theory and one of the major practical steps of European integration is demonstrated by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. In this sense functionalism as an idea, as a product of the theory of international relation can be considered the principal driving force in relation to political strategy. In the subsequent years the relationship between theories and strategic steps

¹⁴ Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”. *World Politics* XXVII/1. 1974. 44–48.

¹⁵ Mazzucelli, C. *France and Germany at Maastricht*. New York: Garland Publishing, 1997. 23–26.

in relation to integration seems to be changed and the concepts about integration became the theoretical generalisation of practical steps, which took the primary role. Deutsch's theory about the tempo of community building reflected the strategic plan of Monnet concerning the timetable of the practical implementation of ideas driving integration. Haas' neo-functional theory in fact, constitutes the theoretical generalisation of Monnet's suggestion regarding the role of international institutions as forums of common decision making with a view of solving common problems.

In the 1950s and 1960s both in strategic plans and international relation theories a vision took shape about five stages of European integration:

- establishment of functional links among member countries
- increase in scope and intensity of transactions among societies
- generation of socio-psychological processes that lead to assimilation of people and their integration into larger communities
- emergence of one political community via assimilation of a number of smaller political communities
- finally, the process of integration concludes with the creation of institutions, which would represent and protect the identity and interest of the international political community. This would be the final stage of the emergence of a united security community.

Countries which go through these five stages of integration would form a federal state. However, at the moment there is a great deal of uncertainty about the stage where the member states of the European Union stand. For sure, substantial progress has been achieved on stages one and two with the establishment of functional links and expansion and intensification of all kinds of cooperation. Assimilation of people and community formation has been less successful so far. Though central institutions of the EU, such as the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission issued directives, passed laws with the assumption that progress had been made on stages three, four and five, it remained questionable whether national societies were able to follow the tempo of common actions by the governments. In addition to uncertainties at the level of societies discord among governments has increased recently. Disagreement has been growing, regarding the new risks in the international environment, above all the mass movement of people to Europe from conflict ridden regions of the world. While the successful securitisation of history gave a huge impetus to integration in the 1950s, attempts at common securitisation of new security risks and challenges failed so far. Different perceptions of threats, diverse needs of exertion of identity and sovereignty emerged as an impediment to common securitisation of new risks in the second decade of the twenty first century.

Great Britain did not join the initial phase of integration for a number of reasons. Though the British Empire suffered a heavy blow in the two world wars, there were hopes to preserve special links with the Commonwealth, with which Great Britain had preferential trade relations and did not want to risk those important economic ties. There might be some other explanations for the British disinterest in European integration. One of them was the comparably better shape of the British economy right after the war. In 1945 the GDP per capita in Great Britain was about 90 per cent higher than the average for the six founding members of the European Economic Community. By 1961 Great Britain realised that economic cooperation inside the Commonwealth was losing competitiveness and the Conservative Government initiated negotiations for membership with the European Communities. By that time the difference in per capita GDP between Great Britain and

the EEC countries dropped to 10 per cent. After long and difficult negotiations, De Gaulle, the French President, vetoed British membership.¹⁶

The gap between GDP per capita between EEC countries and Great Britain narrowed further. It stood at 6 per cent by 1967 and the Labour Government applied for membership, but failed again due to the veto of President De Gaulle. Finally, after De Gaulle was out of presidency, in 1969 Great Britain applied for membership for the third time at the initiative of the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath. The new French President, George Pompidou offered support this time and Great Britain joined the EEC in 1973. At the beginning of British membership the average per capita GDP in the six EEC member states was 7 per cent higher than in Great Britain.¹⁷

The membership remained controversial both between the Conservative and the Labour parties and also within the parties. The Labour Government initiated a referendum in 1975 and 67 per cent of the population was in favour. This outcome of the referendum did not change the principal division between those who wanted to maintain closer relationship with Europe and those who did not. In 1983 the left wing of the Labour Party led by Tony Benn and Michael Foot promised the withdrawal from the EEC in a manifesto which led to the split of the Party.¹⁸ In 1988 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher explained the conservative view on the EEC in a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges. She emphasized that the best way of building a successful European Community is the willing and active cooperation of independent and sovereign states. She warned that suppression of nationhood and concentration of power at the centre of European conglomerate would be highly damaging. She identified the encouragement of enterprise as the most important priority of community policies and warned against the danger of distraction by utopian goals. In her introductory remark she warned the audience: "If you believe some of the things said and written about my views on Europe, it must seem rather like inviting Genghis Khan to speak about the virtues of peaceful coexistence."¹⁹

Prime Minister Thatcher's critical views on the EEC were softened somewhat by her successor John Major, who finally signed the Maastricht Treaty and accepted the idea of political integration. However, the preservation of sovereignty of the British Parliament remained a matter of constant worry. After 1997 the Labour Government with Prime Minister Tony Blair took significant steps (St. Malo Agreement on common defence, signing of the social chapter) which brought Britain closer to the EU. He also considered joining the euro zone seriously but Chancellor Gordon Brown convinced him not to do so. In 2011 the debate on EU's budget led to a British veto by Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and relations took a downward turn again. In 2013 David Cameron announced the referendum which took place on June 23rd 2016. Results of the vote with 72.2 per cent turnout were: 51.9 per cent to leave, 48.1 per cent to remain in the EU.²⁰

¹⁶ Campos, N. and Coricelli, F. "Why did Britain join the EU? A new insight from economic history". VOX. 3 February 2015. <http://voxeu.org/article/britain-s-eu-membership-new-insight-economic-history>, Accessed on 12 April 2017.

¹⁷ Campos and Coricelli. "Why did Britain join the EU? A new insight from economy history".

¹⁸ Wilson, S. "Britain and the EU: A long and rocky relationship". BBC. 1 April 2014. www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-265151129, Accessed on 12 April 2017.

¹⁹ Thatcher, M. "Speech to the College of Europe: 'The Bruges Speech'". 20 September 1988. www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332, Accessed on 12 April 2017.

²⁰ "UK votes to leave the EU". BBC. www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results, Accessed on 17 April 2017.

CONCLUSION

European integration has been an adventure to the unknown future. Securitisation of the history was a fundamental motive for theoreticians and politicians who laid down the foundations of this complex process and construction. Integration theorists conceived five stages of integration which follow each other in a logical sequence from the establishment of functional links up to the creation of a political union, practically the federation of European states. The first two stages, the establishment of functional links and the expansion of voluntary interactions by willing states happened easily and in a comparatively short time. Stages three and four, the evolution of the sense of community at the level of national societies with the involvement of more and more countries proved to be a much more complicated and difficult task. With the enlargement of the EU this task has become even more difficult. Two important questions need to be posed here. First, have the national governments informed and educated their population properly to become part of this community? Second, have the institutions of the EU followed the evolution of the community carefully and have they raised the awareness of the people of what was happening in the EU? The answers to these questions would probably differ substantially country by country.

A British political scientist, professor Vernon Bogdanov said in one of his lectures: “Europe has been a toxic issue in British politics, and it has caused divisions, unlike most issues, it has caused divisions not only between the parties, divisions which perhaps could have been handled, but also deep divisions within the parties. The fundamental question is this: is Britain part of Europe? Geographically of course, the answer is yes, but what is the political answer? For much of British history the answer is no.”²¹ According to professor Bogdanov Great Britain has always had a limited commitment to the European integration because her historical experience has been totally different from that of the Continental powers. Evolution of the British political system took more than three centuries and the adaptation of that system to the system of the EU proved more difficult than the adaptation of other member states, first of all the founding states.²² That was the fundamental reason why the idea of a federal European state has been unanimously rejected in Great Britain.

One of the reasons of why Great Britain did not join European integration at the beginning was her special relationship with former colonies. During four centuries Great Britain invested a lot of money in the building of the Empire and consequently enjoyed the benefits of cheap agricultural import which was crucial for food supply. The Empire disappeared but the Commonwealth survived the past decades and the revitalisation of former political and economic ties can be an obvious option for Great Britain after BREXIT. Beyond the Commonwealth new opportunities could be discovered in other regions of the world. It is highly probable that the US – British relationship will become more important for both countries in the future.

The British exit is not the only unexpected challenge for the EU. Disagreement on new security risks has emerged in the past few years. It would be desirable for the remaining member states to come to agreement regarding the secularization of those new risks. Securitisation of history of the 1950s can be a useful precedent to follow.

²¹ Bogdanov, V. “Britain and the Continent”. Lecture at Gresham College on 17 September 2013. 1–2. <https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lecture/transcript/download/britain-and-the-continent/>, Accessed on 19 April 2017.

²² Bogdanov. “Britain and the Continent”. 7–10.

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Péter Marton¹– Péter Wagner:

HUNGARY'S PARTNERING IN FOREIGN MILITARY MISSIONS: A DIFFERENT KIND OF REGIONALISM

ABSTRACT: This article looks at Hungary's partnerships with other countries in the context of foreign military missions, with a focus on the post-1999 period, i.e. the period since Hungary's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is interested primarily in the motives that may explain partner choice as well as the derivative benefits sought through collaboration of this kind. In particular, the authors are seeking signs if a kind of regionalism (interpreted loosely as a preference of regional partners) may be evident here.

KEYWORDS: Hungarian Defence Forces, Hungary, Germany, military missions, partnering

Shedding light on how bilateral relations and partnerships in the framework of military missions mutually inform each other, may illuminate noteworthy aspects of a country's foreign policy behaviour – revealing how in its civilian and military diplomacy it seeks to establish cooperation in the realm of „semi-hard” interests: a realm of affairs beyond territorial defence but one that nevertheless holds implications for security and thus involves prospectively more significant stakes than routine interactions in other fields.

Naturally, it takes two to tango, and in advance of our inquiry we expect that the initiation of ties of this kind may lie with either or both of the partners involved. It will be important therefore to study motives not only on the side of Hungary but on the side of its counterparts as well.

As we will show in our study, as a result of this overview, it is wrong to expect that an interest in good-neighbourly relations may take precedence over the specific demands of military missions. Taking account of this does nevertheless leave room on occasions for the preference of regional partners.

HUNGARY'S CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY MISSIONS AS A NATO MEMBER STATE

It is often pointed out that post-1999 Hungary attached a clear priority to NATO missions (to some extent to the detriment of UN peacekeeping participation),² with a presence in all of NATO's foreign military missions since then (with the exception of the one in Libya). NATO occupied this priority position already before 1999 in fact, and this largely explains Hungary's noteworthy contribution to the Alliance's efforts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Membership in the Alliance was sought for the sake of a fundamental security guarantee: as a kind of insurance policy against contingencies considered increasingly improbable.

¹ In preparing this study, Péter Marton was supported by the New Program of National Excellence of the Ministry of Human Capacities, Hungary.

² Besenyő J. „Az afrikai műveletek története 1989-től napjainkig”. In Besenyő J. (ed.), *Magyar békefenntartók Afrikában*. Budapest: Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat, 2013. 7–8.

A low-threat security environment and the reassurance of NATO membership then combined to cause a continuous decrease in defence spending relative to GDP up until very recently. Throughout its membership years Hungary was criticised at times for not doing enough in terms of military modernisation (e.g. the procurement of new assets). For this it found a way to compensate in the field of NATO's foreign military missions where this may be marginally more important to the alliance. This helped to some extent to alleviate pressure by allies to spend more on defence (this behaviour is not unique among NATO members).

Just as other Central and Eastern European countries Hungary also attaches the highest priority to military missions, including missions outside the framework of NATO (by coalitions of the willing), that the United States considers important to its – and the Alliance's – security. As Marton and Eichler show³ in a study of the behaviour of the countries of the region in the context of the Iraqi, Afghan and Libyan missions, CEE countries are most inclined to participate (firstly) if the United States is the overall lead nation of a coalition, (secondly) if the U.S. shows high appreciation of ally perseverance in a given context, and (only thirdly) if the mission concerned is considered morally or strategically justified.

FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY

In order to develop a basic understanding as well as hypotheses regarding the key motives and the benefits sought by Hungary in partnering with particular nations in the context of foreign military missions, we provide a process-tracing overview of where, in what fields, and with whom Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) have worked in the post-1999 period. We are interested in offering more thereby than a mere chronology of the various commitments undertaken and the list of countries that were partners. To this end we will include contextual references to likely, or at the least plausible, reasons for what might have made a particular partner nation seek Hungary's assistance – or, vice versa: what might have made Hungary seek the assistance of, or the opportunity to work together with, a particular ally.

We will do this, with due regard to (1) the overall state of the bilateral relations concerned, (2) any noticeable element of direct reciprocity/transactionality in or related to the partnership concerned, (3) wider defence cooperation at the time with the country concerned, and (4) any contextual or long-term consideration openly voiced by Hungarian and partner-country officials of note at the time.

A conceptual issue related to this is what counts as a partnership of interest to us. To shed light on the related complications through a specific example: if an Icelandic and a Hungarian military officer find themselves working as colleagues at the Headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2010, should it be registered as partnership between the two countries concerned (and all the other countries who had officers there at the same time, i.e. practically all of the members of the coalition)? In a sense there is partnership as a result but we are primarily interested in cases where (i) Hungary is involved at unit-level (e.g. with a whole company or battalion), and (ii) collaboration exists not purely in an institutional context but due to political decision(s) whose motives are consequently interesting to investigate.

³ Marton, P. and Eichler, J. "Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO's non-European missions." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46/3. 2013. 361.

Given that presence in a military mission constitutes more or less direct partnership with the host country (e.g. with Afghanistan in the case of ISAF), but one of a fundamentally different nature, we exclude partnerships with host countries from our inquiry. Another set of partnerships we shall ignore in the framework of the present study are those relationships generated by the dynamics of the mission concerned: e.g. between countries succeeding each other in a particular role in a given area of operations, cooperating in a transition process.⁴ The „bottom-up” impact of this at the higher levels of the relationship is certainly interesting, but in the present study we are investigating the „top-down” impact of decisions at higher levels on partner choice in military missions.

As to the timeframe: although we are interested in the post-2001 period, we need to pay attention to partnerships originating from prior to 1999, and these will also be included in our overview – the article will be structured accordingly.

Following this, we test the validity of the assumptions developed. These will serve to inform a case study of the evolution and record of Hungary’s partnership with Germany in foreign military missions that shall be interesting to compare with the trajectory and experiences of similar German-Polish ties.⁵

HUNGARY’S INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN MILITARY MISSIONS FROM PRIOR TO 1999

From the times preceding Hungary’s 1999 accession to NATO, three missions deserve attention in particular: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hungary has been involved in Cyprus since 1993, and was a part of the Sinai and Bosnia missions starting in 1995 – the former lasting up to 2015, the latter ending in 2004. In terms of the kind of partnerships of interest to us (see above), especially the cases of Cyprus and Bosnia deserve attention here.

In the case of Cyprus, Hungary is present with a contingent in Sector 4 of the Buffer Zone, together, at the time of writing this, with Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine (Ukrainian officers took over their position from Croatian observers in this mission). That this is a regional grouping of countries is relevant, and in particular the Hungarian-Slovak collaboration in the framework of UNFICYP is often emphasized by officials and commentators alike.⁶

⁴ On such grounds, the Netherlands would otherwise be of interest as Hungary took over its areas of responsibility, both in the case of the Sinai peacekeeping mission and in Baghlan province in Afghanistan (in the latter case in leading the Baghlan Provincial Reconstruction Team, or Baghlan PRT). New Zealand (NZ) may also deserve mention as a stakeholder of Hungary’s performance in Baghlan province: the NZ leadership complained several times over the years about the Hungarian PRT’s performance because of the freedom enjoyed by insurgents in areas of Baghlan in their view created a kind of negative spill-over effect in neighbouring Bamiyan province which was NZ troops’ area of responsibility at the time. In fact, the case is complicated to assess as the kind of combat patrols demanded by the NZ leadership were beyond the official mandate of the Hungarian PRT.

⁵ A similarly key relationship, the one with the United States, falls outside the scope of the present study given that it in many ways is the source of much of what Hungary is involved in overall, and that it would thus require a study of its own.

⁶ Szenes, Z. "A békefenntartás hatása a magyar haderőre." *Hadtudomány*, 3/1. 2006. 3–14. http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhht/hadtudomany/2006/3/2006_3_1.html, Accessed on 5 May 2016.

Hungarian-Slovak joint operations, under Slovakian command, began here in June 2001.⁷ Prior to this, the area of operations was under Austrian command, and the Austrian battalion that deployed here had operated jointly together with a Hungarian and a Slovenian contingent since 1995 – Austria and Slovenia then concluded their role in the area in 2000–2001.⁸

Hungary deployed a unit of combat engineers to the Bosnia mission from 1995 to 2002 under the Allied Rapid Reaction Force HQ (HQ ARRC), as „Theatre Troops” unassigned to a particular regional Multi-National Division (MND).⁹ Having said this, the troops in question operated from their base out of Okučani in Croatia, mostly in the southeast, and participated in the reconstruction of railways, bridges and in landscaping tasks primarily there.¹⁰ The most memorable of these was perhaps the country’s contribution to the rebuilding of Mostar’s famous Old Bridge. Hungarian divers recovered stone elements of the destroyed bridge from the riverbed underneath.

Although Hungary’s contribution in this case may be explained with reference to the quest for NATO membership at the time, and also to Hungary’s direct interest in the stabilisation of its southern neighbourhood in the wake of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the partnership motive emerges in the context of cooperation with Italy in particular. Once Hungarian combat engineers were withdrawn, a 200-strong unit was then joined to the Italian-led Multinational Special Unit (MSU), prepared primarily for possible Crime and Riot Control (CRC) tasks.¹¹

The partnership in these contexts with Austria, Slovakia and Italy, respectively, may be explained partly with reference to proximity (in Austria’s and Slovakia’s cases by their being neighbouring countries), and a shared interest in the stabilisation of the Balkans region. This process of cooperation was also structured, however, by NATO: Hungary, as a non-NATO partner nation, was assigned to the southern command of the Alliance (Allied Forces Southern Europe, AF SOUTH). This arrangement remained in place up till NATO’s reorganisation of its command structure in 2004, well into the period of Hungary’s membership in the Alliance. Thereafter Hungary belonged to the area of responsibility of the Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy (JFC Naples).¹²

Austria also played a key role in setting up regional cooperation in the framework of peace support operations. Notably, at least a part of the territory of the countries involved in this had at once belonged to the Habsburg/Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the initiative can be seen as forming part of Austria’s general relationship-building efforts in its traditional zone of interest in Central Europe. As Schmidl notes:

⁷ "Nem holiday misszió: a török-görög ütközőzónát felügyelik a magyar békefenntartók". Ma.hu. 15 June 2011. http://www.ma.hu/kulfold/99393/Nem_holiday_misszio_a_torokgorog_utkozozonat_felugyelik_a_magyar_bekefenntartok, Accessed on 4 May 2016.; "Az Egyesült Nemzetek Ciprusi Békefenntartó Erő". MH Békétámogató Kiképző Központ (Hungarian Defence Forces Peace Support Training Center). <http://www.pstc.hu/rovatok/felkeszitesek/bekemuvelet/unficyp/unficypl/>, Accessed on 6 May 2016.

⁸ Wagner, P. "A ciprusi ENSZ misszió (UNFICYP)". In Szenes, Z. (ed.), *Válságkezelés és békefenntartás az ENSZ-ben*. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2014. 75–95.

⁹ "Peacekeeping in Bosnia". CNN. 1 July 2002. <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/07/01/bosnia.peacekeeping.mission/index.html>, Accessed on 8 May 2016.

¹⁰ "Az IFOR- és az SFOR-misszió Bosznia-Hercegovinában". Hotdog.hu. 8 January 2007. <http://www.hotdog.hu/hadilap/erdekessegek/az-ifor-es-az-sfor-misszio-bosznia-hercegovinaban>, Accessed on 7 May 2016.

¹¹ Zsifko, M. "Hungarian detachment joins MSU". *SFOR Informer*#172, August 2004. <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/172/p11a/t02p11a.htm>, Accessed on 5 May 2016.

¹² The Revised Military Structure. NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples. <https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/19-the-revised-military-structure>, Accessed on 6 May 2016.

„The 1990s ... saw a move to integrate contingents from neighboring countries into Austrian battalions deployed abroad. This began with a Hungarian platoon, then a company, and later a Slovenian platoon in Cyprus, and was followed by Slovak, then Croat companies in Syria, and Swiss, Slovak and German elements in Kosovo. This was part of Austria's post-Cold War neighborhood policy and helped some of the neighboring countries to start participating in peace operations. Austria also contributed trainers, especially to Germany when that country embarked on increased participation in international operations. This was also the rationale behind Austria's catalytic role in the establishment of the Central European Nations' Co-operation in Peace Support (CENCOOP) mechanism in 1998, which included Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.”¹³

In the case of Slovakia, a fellow Visegrad Group country, political cooperation is extensive even though at times it has to navigate the complications of the legacy of history (given that Slovakia's territory was formerly part of the Hungarian-dominated part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that it has a significant ethnic Hungarian minority). The Hungarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) regularly refers to cooperation with Slovakia on its website as „an especially good example” of „consolidating allied relations with neighbouring countries and their militaries”.¹⁴ On Slovakia's part, official statements reflect a similar approach. In 2010 a joint Slovak-Hungarian military award was established, tellingly named „Good Neighbourhood and Understanding.” Members of the Slovak-Hungarian UNFICYP contingent were then presented with the award.¹⁵

The momentary state of these bilateral relationships seems not to have had much relevance with a view to the above. It may be pointed out that in the period of time when Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi's premiership in 2001-2006 and Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán's leadership (1998-2002) overlapped, there was a higher degree of amicability in high-level diplomacy between the two countries, and that under Robert Fico's first premiership in Slovakia (2006-2010) there was some strain in Hungarian-Slovakian relations over Fico's inclusion of nationalist parties in his governing coalition. This, however, did not interfere with military-to-military cooperation in the latter case.

At the same time there is wider defence cooperation not only with Slovakia but also with Italy, regardless of who leads the government of the day in the two countries. From the MSU contribution in Bosnia this extended to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission as well. Furthermore, since 2004, Italy and Hungary patrol Slovenia's airspace together and jointly perform Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duties there.¹⁶

HUNGARY'S INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN MILITARY MISSIONS POST-1999

In the period starting in 1999, in the wake of Hungary's accession to NATO, the Kosovo Force mission in Kosovo, participation in stabilisation operations in Iraq in the US-led coa-

¹³ Schmidl, E. A. "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Austria". ProvidingforPeacekeeping.org. <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-austria/>, Accessed on 6 May 2016.

¹⁴ Galambos, S. "A békét őrzik Cipruson". Honvedelem.hu. 18 September 2013. <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/40049>, Accessed on 2 May 2016.

¹⁵ "General Bulik: Proud of Slovak-Hungarian Cooperation Within Cyprus Mission". Slovak Centre London. 26 March 2010. <http://www.slovenskecentrum.sk/en/news/read/7032/general-bulik-proud-of-slovak-hungarian-cooperation-within-cyprus-mission>, Accessed 4 May 2016.

¹⁶ "Slovenia Eyes Hungarian Fighters". BBC. 28 November 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3247920.stm>, Accessed on 6 May 2016.

lition of the willing, and the deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team and various other elements to Afghanistan (in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan, or ISAF) stand out as significant commitments.

Just as previously, in its areas of operations, Hungary worked closely together with particular countries. In Kosovo, it joined the Italian-led Multinational Task Force West (MNTF-W) together with Spain, Slovenia and Romania, while deploying a battalion separately under the KFOR HQ. In Iraq, a Hungarian logistic battalion was part of the Multinational Division Central-South, under Polish command. This division had over twenty contributing nations, including unconventional partner countries such as Honduras and El Salvador but at the same time many Central and Eastern European countries were also present there, namely, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Just as in the case of Iraq, in Afghanistan, starting from 2006, Hungary had to rely extensively on direct partnership with the United States at many levels.¹⁷ Yet, even here, it is possible to point to a group of countries apart from the US with which it worked closely together.

Hungary was the lead nation in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan province where it had support from Croatian military police, a Montenegrin contingent of about 40 troops, and, for a time, a handful of visiting Slovak military officers in its ranks. Hungary also relied for logistical support, and due to its sheer political and military weight, on Germany in the wider framework of ISAF's Regional Command-North. U.S. and German troops, together with Afghan security forces, played a crucial role in taking on an intensifying insurgency in areas of Baghlan province after 2008.

Even without further analysis it can thus be concluded, including on the basis of the previous section (about the pre-1999 period), that a kind of regionalism *seems* to play a role in the choice of partners. Neighbouring Central and Eastern European countries as well as non-neighbouring countries of the region figure prominently among Hungary's close associates in foreign military missions.

In this respect, the post-2001 period has only reinforced a tendency that pre-dates the country's accession to NATO. Looking deeper beyond the surface will, however, reveal in the case of Germany that the close cooperation seen in Afghanistan was partly an accidental result of decisions brought with a view to different calculations. This may shed light on the otherwise perplexing phenomenon that the regionalism in question manifests itself independently of the existing regional diplomatic-political frameworks that the countries concerned are involved in.

Hungary's primary point of reference in this regard is the Visegrad Group – consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – yet cooperation in military missions with Poland and the Czech Republic has remained mostly limited and indirect up till recently.¹⁸ The Central European Initiative on the other hand includes a total of eighteen countries, counting in its ranks Italy as well (but not Germany). It is a much broader framework of cooperation than the circle of countries with which Hungary is typically involved in close

¹⁷ With reference to aid from the United States to the Baghlan PRT's operations and, starting from 2009, assistance received in the framework of the US-Hungarian-Afghan joint OMLT (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team), and the joint operations of Hungarian special forces with their U.S. counterparts in Wardak province. On the subject, see in more detail: Marton, P. and Wagner, P. "The Hungarian military in the War on Terror". *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 10/2. 2014. 107–122.

¹⁸ This is changing with the newly set up Visegrad Battle Group, and the planned rotational presence in the Baltic area as part of NATO's eastern-periphery reinforcement measures.

cooperation in military missions. Formal regional cooperation mechanisms are thus found not to be strongly related to cooperation with partners in military missions.

HUNGARY'S PARTNERSHIP WITH GERMANY

A foundation of German-Hungarian relations after the transition from socialism was the role that Hungary played in Germany's re-unification by opening its borders, i.e. the „Iron Curtain,” to East German refugees who wanted to go West (in September 1989). This had an impact in terms of military-to-military cooperation as well: first and foremost in the form of the transfer of some of the East German National People's Army's assets and equipment to the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) – including tanks, artillery pieces, helicopters, air defence systems, spare parts of various kinds, etc. It may be noteworthy that Poland at the time was the beneficiary of similar transfers. Due to Germany's generally cautious foreign policy posture and its concerns related to the instability and the crisis in the Balkans, Berlin also adopted a policy of not providing „lethal military aid” or what it saw as combat weapons systems to Hungary and other countries in the region. Even so, the military transfers that took place were sizable, and amounted in total to 5,300 tons of various kinds of equipment, spare parts, and a total of 433 pieces of assets (military hardware).¹⁹

In the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, senior German and Hungarian officers continued to meet. However, once Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were issued the invitation to join NATO, it became clear that Hungary would work under Italian command, as noted above (under JFC-Naples). Political ties remained strong with Germany but military cooperation in this context took a different form. It was in the field of military medical cooperation that a significant connection developed in the years that followed.

Contributing to military missions in this area has always been a convenient and cost-effective solution to Hungarian governments. Military medical teams can be deployed comparatively fast, and they can provide in-theatre for the Hungarian contingent's needs as well. Moreover, contributions of this kind often constitute a quasi-niche area within military coalitions.

The first military medical team was sent by the HDF to Saudi Arabia in 1991, joining the Gulf War coalition against Iraq. Although the international forces did not suffer a large number of casualties in the war, a particularly grave incident did require the involvement of the Hungarian doctors concerned. An Iraqi SCUD missile hit a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Tending to the over 150 persons who were wounded, Hungarian military medical personnel were there among others. This left a very good impression in US counterparts who helped establish a connection with the German military related to this. That is how significant cooperation started in this field. Hungary then joined international crisis manage-

¹⁹ The source of these data, as well as a good overview: Hettyey A. "Magyar-német katonai kapcsolatok az Antall-kormány időszakában, különös tekintettel az NVA-fegyverszállítás kérdésére". *Seregszemle* XIII/4. 2015. 118–119. The policy stemmed partly from domestic political reasons. An unauthorised arms deal (involving the sale of 15 Leopard tanks) with Turkey cost the German Minister of Defence at the time, Gerhard Stoltenberg, his job as it erupted into a scandal, resulting in calls for stronger restrictions on arms transfers. Germany was also looking to avoid the impression that it was making an exception out of Hungary, seeking similarly strong or even stronger ties with Poland and the Czech Republic. Hettyey. "Magyar-német katonai kapcsolatok...". 118–119.

ment operations in Albania in the spring of 1999 again with a military medical team, and the same contribution was offered in Afghanistan after 2001. In the latter case, Hungarian involvement began in April 2003. Hungarian doctors worked under German command at the main military hospital in Kabul. This development is crucial as in June 2003, after a bus carrying German troops was attacked in Kabul, with many killed and wounded in the bombing, Hungarian medical personnel were the first to arrive on the scene, starting triage and evacuation procedures there. The rest of the Hungarian team did a similarly good job at the military hospital. Their professionalism left a legacy of respect and good will that helped cooperation across a broader spectrum eventually, in northern Afghanistan (during which the cooperation continued in Kabul as well).²⁰ Directly related to military medical cooperation is the support by Germany to Hungary's application to host the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine (MILMED CoE), resulting in a positive decision in 2009 – clearly, Berlin's weight played a role in convincing other Alliance members to agree to the choice of Hungary in this case. MILMED CoE is now led on a three-year rotational basis by German and Hungarian military medical officers.²¹

Broader cooperation began in the framework of ISAF after 2006. Hungary's PRT was launched that year (this task, along with the area of operations, was inherited from The Netherlands) in the area of Regional Command-North (RC-N), led by Germany.

Importantly, Hungary's decision to move to Baghlan province rather than eastern Afghanistan came largely unrelated to the existing good will between the German and Hungarian militaries.²² Once that decision was made, however, Hungarian Defence Forces benefited from the availability of the partnership to a great extent. Germany lent its logistical support helping to maintain an air link between Budapest and Mazar-i-Sharif which Hungary itself was not capable of providing with the regularity that was demanded. The Bundeswehr also provided kevlar helmets once the security situation deteriorated in Baghlan (after 2008), improving the operational security of HDF troops. Although ISAF as well as the Bundeswehr itself have voiced criticism of the Hungarian PRT's decreasing level of activity in this context, the military-to-military dimension of the cooperation was unaffected. That the Hungarian PRT had several commanders who had earlier on received training at the *Bundeswehr Führungsakademie* probably helped in this respect. They had a good command of German, and had close personal ties from these times with some of their officer counterparts (some of them their former classmates) in the German contingent. It also needs to be noted, however, that in the last years of the ISAF mission there were several occasions when tensions appeared in the military relationship between the two countries. As already mentioned, once the insurgency strengthened in Baghlan province (after 2008), German and US partners were somewhat dissatisfied with the Hungarian leadership's reluctance to take part in counterinsurgency (COIN) tasks.

Subsequently, following the deaths of two Hungarian soldiers in an insurgent ambush in June and August 2010, the Hungarian leadership began contemplating a withdrawal from Baghlan province (a withdrawal thus affecting about 50 percent of Hungary's involvement

²⁰ Telephone interview with Lt. Gen. (Ret.) László Svéd, the Surgeon General of the Hungarian Defence Forces between 1991 and 2006. Budapest, 13 May 2016.

²¹ The CoE has eight participating countries as of 2016, besides Germany and Hungary: Great Britain, France and Italy are also members, among others.

²² A fact-finding mission examined various options, including, initially, the possibility of deploying to Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan, under U.S. command.

in Afghanistan at the time). This was received with disdain by the US and Germany after they have suffered casualties in operations in Baghlan province themselves. Eventually the Hungarian Ministry of Defence backtracked from this direction, sensing the disapproval. Two years later a similar series of developments was repeated, however, the Hungarian leadership attempted to bring forth the scheduled end of the Hungarian PRT's operations by six months, without giving prior notification to the German command in RC-N. This again resulted in disapproval from all major partners, including Germany, and eventually this plan was abandoned as well, with the last rotation of the Hungarian PRT fully serving its mandate, as planned.²³

IN CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT REGIONALISMS IN DIPLOMACY AND IN FOREIGN MILITARY MISSIONS

The key strategic calculus for Hungary in favour of investing in bilateral military relationships after the transition from socialism was two-fold. These efforts were partly in preparation for accession to NATO, and partly out of a desire to enhance cooperation with neighbouring countries. The two goals were interrelated: the West expected Central-Eastern European countries to settle their disputes and it was especially keen on getting Hungary to create a stable framework for its relationship with those of its neighbours that had a significant ethnic Hungarian minority (vis-à-vis Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia/Serbia). These factors contributed to a wide array of initiatives in the period concerned.

Under the Socialist government of 1994-1998 the HDF started to cooperate with the Italian and Slovenian armed forces to create a brigade-sized unit of the Multinational Land Forces (MLF) where each of the participating nations contributed one battalion. Full operational readiness was reached by 2002, and the MLF was deployed in the framework of KFOR from 2005.²⁴

After years of preparations, the Defence Ministers of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine signed a Letter of Intent to establish a multinational engineer battalion in January 1999. It took another five years until the formal setting up of the "Tisza Battalion". The main responsibility of the latter is to participate in disaster relief operations in the vicinity of the Tisza River.²⁵ Although this multinational battalion held military exercises annually since 2002, it was never activated during the floods on the Tisza.

The case of the bi-national Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion is rather similar to that of the Tisza Battalion. Established in 1998, the unit held annual training exercises but has never been deployed.

These initiatives reflect a wider regional trend whereby many similar frameworks of cooperation and even joint units were created but were never put to use in practice, in the second half of the 1990s. For instance, Romania has also established a peacekeeping battalion

²³ Wagner P. "Unable to adapt: The Hungarian PRT in Baghlan". In Bernhard Chiari (ed.), *From Venus to Mars: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experiences in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*. Berlin: Rombach Verlag, 2014. 195–209.

²⁴ Papp, Gy. "The Military Engagement of Multinational Units in the Interest of European Security and Capability Enhancement". *Hadmérnök* III/1. 2008. 156–164.

²⁵ The Tisza River springs from the Carpathian Mountains in Ukraine and flows through Romania, Slovakia and Hungary before entering the Danube in Serbia. Devastating floods have occurred regularly on the river – providing the *raison d'être* of the Battalion itself and the multinational cooperation related to the river in general.

together with Bulgaria. For comparison, Poland, for its part, had bi-national peacekeeping battalions with Lithuania, Ukraine and the Czech Republic.²⁶

After the turn of the Millennium, further initiatives were born, often parallel to each other, and thus ending up as being each other's rivals to a certain extent. The Visegrad framework which had for a long time not been applied in the practice of military cooperation, does by now have a military dimension. In 2007, an agreement was reached that in the first half of 2016 a Visegrad Battle Group (BG) shall be ready to provide an EU stand-by force. Since then, cooperation related to the establishment of the Battle Group has progressed on schedule. The BG itself is now a reality but there have also been more frequent exercises between the four countries, and they have started planning jointly for the common development of their capability set.

In 2010, at Austria's initiative, the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) was born, with the participation of Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This mechanism of cooperation has so far focused on capability development in certain specific areas (special forces training and Counter-IED²⁷ capability). The grouping has also had several rounds of high-level political coordination meetings. A peculiarity of this initiative is that Austria is not a member of the Alliance, and that Poland and Italy, two countries with more significant military weight in the region, are not part of this cooperation.

Following the establishment of the CEDC, however, in 2012 a Defence Cooperation Initiative was launched by Italy to complement the existing MLF format (of Italy, Slovenia, and Hungary) with contributions from Austria and Croatia, upon the latter countries' decision to participate. In the Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian EU Battle Group (slated to stand by in 2017) Austria and Croatia will consequently also take part.

In the end, the initiatives overviewed here matter in the context of foreign military missions only insofar as they may be suitable or "well-fitting" force elements. Without this "fit-good" factor, key partnerships will form according to different patterns in the future as well, determined by the actual needs of missions and the actual organisational structure of the NATO Alliance. Paraphrasing former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld: "the mission must determine the partnerships on the ground, not vice versa." To which we might add: "in the framework of larger coalitions," as that is usually the context in which these partnerships have to function.

As we have shown, this does nevertheless leave room for an expression of the preference of regional working partners – on the one hand. On the other, the existing good will in the regional relationship matrix can be the basis of actually meaningful practical cooperation in military missions – as we have seen this happen in the case of northern Afghanistan between Hungary and Germany.

For a comparison as to German-Polish relations: the 2014 agreement between Poland and Germany to swap battalions is an encouraging sign of cooperation between the two countries, but the commitment to make strides for increased compatibility in various ways (be it through integrating more Leopard tanks in Polish armoured units, or joint naval monitoring operations in the Baltic Sea) may be even more important to bring about lasting and strategically meaningful results, that may manifest in actual military missions.

²⁶ Latawski, P. "Bilateral and Multilateral Peacekeeping Units in Central and Eastern Europe". In Stuart Gordon and Francis Toase (eds.), *Aspects of Peacekeeping*. London: Frank Cass, 2001. 68–70.

²⁷ IED stands for "Improvised Explosive Device".

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Nóra Pákozdi – György Nógrádi:

RADICAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE BALKAN

ABSTRACT: The disintegration of Yugoslavia left ponderously operating small states behind. During the process of disintegration, radical movements of the Balkans were given a boost, which is – in addition to several influencing factors – one of the direct causes of the recent radicalization. Among the Balkan countries,¹ the most affected ones are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, but radicalism also influences the society and administration of Albania, Macedonia and Serbia. The (mainly) Muslim communities' extremism posed a complex problem before the current wave of immigration, many operating groups in the Balkans built up close links with Middle-Eastern fundamentalist organizations (mostly with Al-Qaeda and ISIS), and organized criminal and terrorist acts in Europe as a forward base of the fundamentalist centers. A new global threat is the recruitment and travel of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, to the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations' training camps, besides the uncontrolled influx and the blending of possible fighters among the operating European groups also poses a huge risk. This process is significantly easier, as the foreign recruiters only have to keep in touch with the local centers' leaders, who can provide a constant supply of human force and equipment. Thereby, the radical Muslim communities' empowerment and isolation are not only a daily threat in Western Europe (especially Belgium and France), but also might lead to the destabilization and radicalization of the Balkans. The analysis shows examples of the Western Balkans' fundamentalism by countries, localizes villages and towns with fundamentalist majority, and outlines the influence of the centers' ideologies.

KEYWORDS: Balkan, terrorism, organized crime, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Nusra Front, Wahhabism

MARKS OF THE YUGOSLAVIAN CRISIS – CURRENT STATE OF THE BALKANS

The current problems of the Balkans are preceded by the emerged local Muslim common ideology and the rules of its created society during the Balkan crisis. On the side of the Bosnian army, about 1,800 "Mujahedeen" – from the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Africa – fought together with the already powerful Muslim units² in the Balkan clashes. Individuals from the Middle East – mostly from Iran – were later backed with financial and material assistance, which reached the Balkans through Islamic humanitarian and aid

¹ Note: In the study, under the word "Balkan" we analyze Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. It should be added that Kosovo's statehood is disputed, however, its separation from Serbia plays an important role in the analysis, therefore, we mention it as a separate unit.

² Scott, P. D. "Bosnia, Kosovo, and Now Libya: The Human Costs of Washington's On-Going Collusion with Terrorists". *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 9/31. 2011. <http://apjjf.org/2011/9/31/Peter-Dale-Scott/3578/article.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

organizations, individual donations,³ and through a variety of economic transactions.⁴ The radical groups consolidated local connections, eased administration – which was favorable for the recruitment efforts – moreover, a concentration process began by which several Muslim-majority settlements began to strengthen. In the Balkans the high rate of Muslim ethnic life – torn by severe hostile attitude – is still not reassured, confrontation based on religious and social differences can be found in every state. Kosovo, where the clashes between Serbs and Albanians present an everyday threat, is a good illustration. The radical communities – typically in Bosnia – are gradually breaking away from the central administration and set up an individual administrative system in the purchased and governed areas and regions.

Taking advantage of the administrative system's weaknesses, radical religious and political leaders can have direct control of over a number of settlements. In some places, villages also operate training camps and building a strong community among Muslims, which may facilitate the assimilation and blending-in of radical migrants as well.⁵ Direct maritime connections and the widespread use of modern gadgets further facilitate contact with the Middle-Eastern countries.⁶

These cities are not only an excellent forward base, but serve as an emergency reserve, an active training camp and contact area of radical groups, which is highly important for the Middle-Eastern centers. Successful recruitment is taking place in communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, where about 300-330 people⁷, in Albania roughly 200 people⁸ had intentions to travel to Syria and Iraq. Sources reported only 12 people from Macedonia.⁹ The rhetoric of local terrorist organizations and loyal imams assists in the recruitment of fresh militants, but the spread of radical ideologies is also available in more direct forms such as in bookstores and online propaganda sites.¹⁰

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The majority of the combatants arriving in Syria from the Balkans have citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By reason of the mentioned effect of the Bosnian war, radicalized units

³ O'Neill, B. "The Bosnian connection", *The Guardian*. 6 July 2007. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-free/2007/jul/06/thebosnianconnection>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴ Besenyő J. et al. *Az Iszlám Állam - Terrorizmus 2.0; Történet, ideológia, propaganda*. Budapest: Kossuth kiadó, 2016.

⁵ Besenyő J. "Can the „Arab Spring” present a real threat to Europe?". *Strategic Impact* 50/1. 2014. 32–44. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/241476196/Can-the-Arab-Spring-present-a-real-threat-to-Europe>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶ Hill, P. and Wight, E. "ISIS set up stronghold in the heart of Europe as terrorists secretly buy land near an isolated village". *Mirror*. 22 July 2015. <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-set-up-stronghold-heart-6094785>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷ McHugh, J. "ISIS In Europe? Islamist Extremists Buying Land In Bosnia Herzegovina: Amid Islamic State Terror Fears: Report". *IB Times*. 21 Jan 2016. <http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-europe-islamist-extremists-buying-land-bosnia-herzegovina-amid-islamic-state-2274284>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸ Freeman, C. "Inside Kacanik, Kosovo's jihadist capital". *The Telegraph*. 23 August 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/11818659/Inside-Kacanik-Kosovos-jihadist-capital.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁹ Shtuni, A. "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria". *Combating Terrorism Center*. 30 April 2015. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ethnic-albanian-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-and-syria>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁰ Bardos, G. N. "Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation". *World Affairs Journal* Sep/Oct 2014. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/jihad-balkans-next-generation>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

who are supporting terrorist groups more or less actively (but in most cases with determined ideological background) can be found in several settlements. Forty percent of the Bosnian society is Muslim¹¹ with numerous Wahhabists and Salafists.

Wahhabism, which is widespread in the Middle East and in the Balkans, is one of the Islam's fundamental movements with the point of returning to the "conventional" validation of the "ancient" doctrines of Quran, to the most radical interpretations of Sunni Islam.¹² Although the birthplace and the center of the fundamental doctrines is Saudi Arabia, Wahhabist imams are present in a lot of regions of the Balkan. Wahhabist centers can be found in the Balkans, for example, in settlements called Serici, Zeljezno, Polje Pojska, Mehurici, Bocinja, Travnik, Gornja Maoca, Grmusa, Velika Kladusa, and Debeljak.¹³ The radical Islamist organization called 'Poziv u Raj' (Invitation to Heaven)¹⁴ – founded in 2010 – tries to get supporters from Bosnia and Herzegovina with intense online propaganda and using posters and billboards in Sarajevo as well as in other cities such as Bihac, Sanski Most, Maglaj, Zenica, Travnik, Tuzla and Tesanj.¹⁵ According to information from the Balkan Insight, Wahhabist training camps are operating – among others – in villages Bocinja, Mehurici, Travnik, Gluha Bukovica, Pogo Relica and Osve.¹⁶

One of the most affected settlements is Gornja Maoca, since its lands are being bought by Muslims who are in connection with radical organizations. The village lives almost isolated and serves as an adequate nest for fanatics. In February 2010, Bosnian police seized weapons in the village within 'Operation Lights' and arrested a few radicals who had connection to Wahhabism.¹⁷ Since 2014, the State Investigation and Protection Agency in Bosnia has been invigilating the village and within 'Operation Damask' several raids have been organized.¹⁸ During these raids they captured numerous Wahhabists, supporting the Islamic State.¹⁹ The combatants leaving Bosnia came mostly from Gornja Maoca or from the other center called Osve. Their primary recruiter was Nusret Sulejman Imamovic, the Sunni leader of the village who is currently fighting in Al-Nusra's Syrian units.²⁰ Besides,

¹¹ "CIA World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina". CIA. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹² Choksy, C. E. B. and Choksy, J. K. "The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad". *World Affairs Journal* May/June 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹³ Michaletos, I. "An outlook of radical Islamism in Bosnia". *Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe*. 21 March 2011. <http://www.rimse.gr/2011/03/an-outlook-of-radical-islamism-in.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁴ Mantzikos, I. "An Outlook of Radical Islamism in Bosnia". *Modern Diplomacy*. 19 May 2013. http://modern diplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=127:an-outlook-of-radical-islamism-in-bosnia, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁵ Michaletos, I. "An outlook of radical Islamism in Bosnia". 25 Sep 2010. <http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/693>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁶ Dzidic, D. "Bosnia's Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam". *Balkan Insight*. 13 May 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-s-wartime-legacy-fuels-radical-islam>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁷ "Discussion/Proposal – Bosnia/CT – Pantaloone Jihad -- Wahhabi Loan Wolf Attacks US Embassy". *Wikileaks*. 2013. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1844321_discussion-proposal-bosnia-ct-pantaloone-jihad-wahhabi-loan.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁸ "Bosnia and Herzegovina: 8 Suspected IS Fighters Plead Not Guilty". *OCCRP*. 24 Aug 2015. <https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/4323-bosnia-and-herzegovina-8-suspected-is-fighters-plead-not-guilty>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

¹⁹ Teodorovic, M. and Synovitz, R. "Balkan Militants Join Syria's Rebel Cause". 8 June 2013. <http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-balkan-militants-join-rebel-cause/25011213.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

²⁰ "Designations of Foreign Terrorist Fighters". *US Department of State*. 2014. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232067.htm>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

Husein Bilal Bosnic also operated here, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in 2015 because of recruitment.²¹

The 23 year old Mevlid Jašarević also lived in that village – and was born in the Serb Novi Pazar and attacked the Embassy of The United States in Sarajevo with an AK-47 rifle on 28 October 2011.²² Two partners of the perpetrator, Dino Pecenkovic and Munib Ahmetšpahić were also residents of Maoca.²³ In 2012 Jašarević was sentenced to eighteen years of prison.

The village of Osve is also strongly linked to radicalism and operates in affiliation with the Islamic State and Al-Nusra front. The followers of Wahhabist doctrines arrived to the village gradually, today the flag of the Islamic State and wall paintings are widely spread. The ones who go to Syria are recruited in Osve furthermore there is a training center, and as in Maoca, several mosques operate in the village. According to the Mirror news site approximately 12 people have been trained in Osve who are currently taking part in the fights in Syria. Dzevad Galijasević, a terrorism expert says that Harun Mehicević who is a Wahhabist orator has his own territories in the village.²⁴ In July 2013 the Bosnian national television reported that Emrah Fojniva who was an associate of Mevlid Jašarević in the attack against the Embassy of the United States lived in Osve.²⁵ The local Wahhabist community has been led by Izet Hadžić since 2011, the village had 300 inhabitants at that time but since then that number has decreased, mainly because the people went to training camps.²⁶

It is possible to find Wahhabist bonds in several districts and suburbs of Sarajevo, too. On 22 December 2015 in Rajlovac – one of the suburbs of Sarajevo – authorities arrested fifteen people who – according to the evidence of the police – were planning a terror attack on New Year's Eve. According to the research of the Balkan Insight, among them, eleven people had direct connection with ISIS.²⁷

In one of Sarajevo's districts, Sokolje, police made requisition in December 2015, as they had been informed that members of Wahhabist communities were storing weapons and were able to deliver them to Europe.²⁸ We can find links from Sokolje in the background of a bomb attack in Sarajevo in 2010 as well. Haris Causević and Naser Palislamović, residents of Sokolje attacked the police station in Bugojno with a bomb hidden in a car. After

²¹ Spaić, I. "Bosnia: Salafist Leader Gets Seven Years for Recruiting Boys to Islamic State". Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. 6 Nov 2015. <https://www.occrp.org/en/blog/4579-bilal-bosnic-salafist-leader-gets-seven-years-for-recruiting-boys-to-islamic-state>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

²² "Discussion/Proposal – Bosnia/CT – Pantaloon Jihad – Wahhabi Loan Wolf Attacks US Embassy".

²³ "Bosnian US embassy attack suspect linked by Facebook to former mujahidin leader". Wikileaks. 2013. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/75/751669_egypt-croatia-bosnia-serbia-bosnian-us-embassy-attack.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

²⁴ Hill, and Wight. "ISIS set up stronghold in the heart of Europe as terrorists secretly buy land near an isolated village".

²⁵ Lanktree, G. "Isis in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Why are Islamic State extremists buying up land in Osve village?". IBT Times. 21 July 2015. <http://www.ibttimes.co.uk/isis-bosnia-herzegovina-why-are-islamic-state-extremists-buying-land-osve-village-511731> Accessed on 28 March 2016.

²⁶ „Kupuju zemlju u maglaju: Ratnici Islamske države dolaze u BiH?” Dnevni Avaz. 25 May 2015. <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/179549/kupuju-zemlju-u-maglaju-ratnici-islamske-drzave-dolaze-u-bih?url=clanak/179549/kupuju-zemlju-u-maglaju-ratnici-islamske-drzave-dolaze-u-bih>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

²⁷ Džidić. "Bosnia's Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam".

²⁸ McHugh. "ISIS In Europe? Islamist Extremists Buying Land In Bosnia Herzegovina: Amid Islamic State Terror Fears: Report".

committing the attack, Palislamovic went to his Wahhabist friends Emin Osmanagic, Nedzad Kesko and Haris Spago to look for shelter. Police captured all of the four perpetrators.²⁹

King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo gives home for the center of the recruitment, which building's operation is sponsored by Saudi Arabia.³⁰ The principal imam of the mosque is Sulejman Bugari, an Albanian religious leader from Kosovo, who has significant role in the spread of radicalism in the Balkans³¹, according to the evaluation of Stratfor as well.³² Nezim Halilovic Mureris was an imam here who spread the radical ideas in the community similarly to Bugari.³³

Alongside Gornje Maoca and Osve Wahhabist/Salafist mosques appeared in Tuzla and Maglaj as well and in accordance with this trend, the society of the towns experiences radicalization.³⁴ In Maglaj more actions were organized by radical groups, all of them were assumed by the Wahhabist community. Several members of the 7th Muslim Brigade – founded in 1993 – operated and lived here, for whom Bosnia and Herzegovina guaranteed citizenship³⁵ after taking part in the wars between 1992-95. In spite of the fact, that it was proven that they were connected to terrorist groups³⁶ and that during the Bosnian war they helped with implementing their actions on the Balkans.³⁷

In January 2016 the Bosnian police arrested six people in Velika Kladusa, who were presumably trying to join the Islamic State. The raid took place after they captured 23 year-old Senad Kostac, resident of Velika Kladusa who travelled to Turkey through Montenegro in order to join a training camp and then take part in combat. Among the requisition flags of the Islamic State, handgrenades and other weapons were found. One month before the police action in the city they arrested one person, Mirel Karajic, within 'Operation Damask',³⁸

²⁹ "BBC Monitoring Alert: Bosnia-Herzegovina". Wikileaks. 2010. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/81/819635_bbc-monitoring-alert-bosnia-herzegovina-.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁰ Mayr, W. "The Prophet's Fifth Column: Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo". Spiegel Online. 25 Feb 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-prophet-s-fifth-column-islamists-gain-ground-in-sarajevo-a-609660.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³¹ Bardos, G. N. "Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation".

³² "Balkan Training Camps Pose a New Attack Threat". Stratfor. 2 April 2005. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/balkan-training-camps-pose-new-attack-threat>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³³ "Bosnia: Wahhabism threatens traditional bosnian Islam". Wikileaks. 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07SARAJEVO650_a.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁴ Borge, J. "Isis targets vulnerable Bosnia for recruitment and attack". The Guardian. 25 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/isis-targets-vulnerable-bosnia-for-recruitment-and-attack>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁵ "Overview of 20 members of the 7th Muslim Brigade "El-Mujahid" of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina who received Bosnia & Herzegovinan citizenship". Radical Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe. 28 Dec 2011. <http://www.rimse.gr/2011/12/overview-of-20-members-of-7th-muslim.html> Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁶ Schindler, J. R. *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, al-Qa'ida, and the rise of global jihad*. St. Paul: Zenith Imprint, 2007. <https://goo.gl/A4HHr1>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁷ "Re: USE ME - Re: FOR COMMENT - BALKANS - Special Report: Militancy in the Former Yugoslavia". Wikileaks. 2013. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/18/1819657_re-use-me-re-for-comment-balkans-special-report-militancy-in.html Accessed on 28 March 2016.

³⁸ Dragoljovic, M. "Radical islamist from BiH still jeopardise stability". 22 Jan 2016. <http://www.balkaneu.com/radical-islamist-bih-jeopardise-stability/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

who has been trained in a territory governed by ISIS, wanted to take part in the New Years' terror attack in Bosnia and also took part in recruitment.³⁹

There is an open question, what kind of further steps should be granted in the EU application procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the current stated security situation, the high level of radicalism and the emerging threats, which could be connected to local terror cells.

SERBIA

In Serbia remarkable conflicts are noticeable behind the ethnic fault lines. There are deep antagonisms between the Bosnian and Albanian Muslims. Many young people, Bosnian and Kosovo Albanians, continue their studies in the Middle East (mostly in Saudi Arabia), and they often arrive home with the aim to spread their thoughts gained abroad as representatives of radical ideologies of Wahhabism. As I mentioned before, Muslim mercenaries had already appeared in the Bosnian war on the side of UCK between 1992 and 1995. Later many of them stayed in the Balkans. Although the majority does not represent a current security threat, the radical, fundamentalist group's propaganda deeply concerns the Serbian Muslim communities.

Serbian Muslims form a relative – in some places absolute – majority in two parts of the country. In province Sandzak bordering Montenegro (to be more specific in Tuti, Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Prijepolje) Bosnian Muslims are a majority comparing to representatives of other religious and ethnic groups. The leader of the Muslim communities in province Sandzak is Mufti Muammer Zukorlić,⁴⁰ who not only has important role in the religious life but also takes part in politics. Since 2007, the mufti has shown direct resistance against the members of Wahhabist and other radical communities who already have tried to take over the lead of the local mosque several times, up to this point unsuccessfully.⁴¹ Muammer Zukorlić emphasizes to make relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina tighter and to hold the moderate Muslim population together. In Serbia, the center of the Muslim community is in Novi Pazar, just as the groups of the followers of Wahhabist doctrines so the radicalization in the town has been noticeable since the 1990's.⁴²

Al-Qaeda has an influence on the spread of local Wahhabist doctrines as well as ISIS, they control the permanent recruitment and grant base for planning violent attacks toward West-Europe. Mevlid Jasarevic, who attacked the Embassy of the U.S. in Sarajevo with a rifle, was a member of the local Wahhabist community, and came from Novi Pazar. The man had gotten into a conflict with western interests before, the outcome of which was that together with Fatmir Muratovic⁴³ they were arrested in 2010 by the Serbian police, after

³⁹ Toe, R. "Bosnia Arrests Six ISIS Suspects, Seizes Weapons". *Balkan Insight*. 12 Jan 2016. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-police-arrests-6-islamists-connected-with-is-01-11-2016>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴⁰ "Muamer Zukorlić". *Al Jazeera Balkans*. 19 April 2012. <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/muamer-zukorlic>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴¹ Dedic, M. "Wahhabis in Sandzak Collaborate With Secret Service in Belgrade, At Whose Behest They Cause Incidents". *Wikileaks*. 3 Nov 2011. <https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/emailid/749544> Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴² Michaletos, I. "Balkan jihadists in Syria". 3 Oct 2013. <http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/2362>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴³ Also a radical member of the Wahhabist community.

they had attacked Ambassador Mary Warlick with a knife.⁴⁴ The number of members of the Wahhabist group in Novi Pazar has been continuously rising since 1999, and the situation is getting worse because of the flow of the fundamentalists, trained in recruitment and mediation. On the migration route through the Balkans they help the locals accountable deliver the recruited men to training camps in Syria and Iraq. Radicals of Novi Pazar have influence on the everyday life of the town, in spring 2002 for example, they encouraged local university students not to acknowledge or follow Christian traditions and after they distracted the concert of Balkanija referring to its devil side.⁴⁵

In the town of Raška next to Novi Pazar Wahhabists already accomplished terror attacks in 2007. Police arrested fifteen people because of the preparation of terror attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. According to sources, the arrested ones had close relations with radical Bosnian „mentors” and centers built in Bosnia.⁴⁶

In 2007 during a similar police raid in Tmava they arrested twenty Wahhabists (for example Mirsad Prenti, Fuad Hodi, Vahid Vejselovi and Senad Vejselovi) who took part in the preparations of the terror attacks in Bosnia as well. Moreover, Tmava police eliminated a big amount of weapon supply and a military camp under the control of the Wahhabists.⁴⁷ According to the research of Balkanalysis, they found supplies from Kosovo which leads the experts to the conclusion that the Albanians in Kosovo (among others) might support the Serb fundamentalists in exchange for the kindle of antiserbism.⁴⁸

The Albanian Muslims who are living in the southern parts of the country became a majority near Presevo, Bujanovac and Medveda. Ninety percent of the population is Muslim in the mentioned region.⁴⁹ In the southern part of the country, two Muslim communities are operating currently, Council of the Islamic Community/CIC and the Islamic Community of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac/ICPMB. Their members cannot be mentioned as radicals.⁵⁰ It signifies a problem to the Serbian government that the Albanian Muslim population is supported and supports the community in Kosovo, both in the aspect of political pressure⁵¹ and – as we could see in the case of weapons in Tmava – by financial and material means. According to police data, the radical Wahhabist doctrines do not present a direct threat, but

⁴⁴ Sotirovic, V. B. “Making Balkan Caliphate: The Wahhabies – A New Danger for the Balkan and European Security”. *Oriental Review*. 31 Dec 2014. <http://orientalreview.org/2014/12/31/making-balkan-caliphate-the-wahhabies-a-new-danger-for-the-balkan-and-european-security/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴⁵ Kotochevski, M. “Wahhabism in the Balkans: Islamic threat or threat to the Islam”. *Security Dialogues* 4/1. 2013. 13–14. <http://sd.fzf.ukim.edu.mk/pdf/Bezbednosni%20dijalozi%20Vol.4%20No%201%202013.pdf>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴⁶ Sotirovic. “Making Balkan Caliphate: The Wahhabies – A New Danger for the Balkan and European Security”.

⁴⁷ Dedic. “Wahhabis in Sandzak Collaborate With Secret Service in Belgrade, At Whose Behest They Cause Incidents”.

⁴⁸ “Slovenian Intelligence Confirms Kosovo Link to Sandzak Arrests”. *Balkananalysis*. 12 April 2007. <http://www.balkananalysis.com/blog/2007/04/19/slovenian-intelligence-confirms-kosovo-link-to-sandzak-arrests/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁴⁹ 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2012. <http://media.popis2011.stat.rs/2012/Nacionalna%20pripadnost-Ethnicity.pdf> Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵⁰ “Serbia: Presevo valley Islamic community retains Kosovo ties”. *Wikileaks*. 12 June 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BELGRADE507_a.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵¹ Peci, E. “Kosovo Demands 'Reciprocal Rights' for Serbian Albanians”. *Balkan Insight*. 6 June 2013. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-parliament-approves-resolution-for-presevo-valley>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

since the hostile environment and the low level of acceptance, fundamentalist doctrines could spread more easily among the Albanian Muslims, so Muslim communities in the southern part require the particular attention of the security forces.

KOSOVO

Hundreds of Mujahedeen – having come both from abroad and from the locals – took part in the clashes between Serb forces and Muslim-majority Kosovo Albanians' armed groups.

The results, which are associated with the significant social restructuring of the still reigning conflict, are already visible: a dominant Muslim community gathered in the territory of Kosovo and there are also individuals proven to follow radical ideologies. After Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo was the origin country of the second largest amount of foreign mujahedeen in the Islamic State forces.⁵² According to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies analysis published in 2015, 232 people were proven fighting with the Islamic State, which is thirty percent of the total number of foreign fighters. The economic and political disadvantages of which Kosovo is struggling to recover further complicated the position of the law enforcers.⁵³ The situation of education and labor market creates hopelessness among young people, so they turn away from politics and strengthen the link with religion, although they consider the spread of radical ideas the second most serious problem after organized crime.⁵⁴

The NATO and EU forces stationed in Kosovo possess the antipathy of radical Wahhabist groups. This is proved by the fact that the Wahhabist unit operating Mitrovica (about 15 people, mostly Albanians in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina) tried to attack the nearby bases on several occasions.⁵⁵ In order to prevent the spread of fundamentalism and the similar actions, Agim Bahtiri, mayor of Mitrovica, said in a statement in 2016 that the leadership is going to take some serious steps in districts of Kosovo to counter religious extremism. Bahtiri plans to launch a project to help young people learn what extremism and radicalism means.⁵⁶ The radical group of Mitrovica is reportedly linked to the central unit operating in Novi Pazar, where the supply and training are also provided.⁵⁷

Besides Mitrovica, Pec (Peji) settlements should also be mentioned, where many Islamic State fighters have strong connections. It can be said that in the town – and across Kosovo as well – not only the radical Wahhabist, but the Albanian Muslim, anti-Serbian population's actions are a threat. The Kosovo Police detained two persons on 16 March 2016, due to financial assistance to Albanian extremist groups which should have facilitated the joining procedure to the Islamic State. One of those arrested was Fatos Rizvanolli, a car dealership

⁵² Besenyő J. "Not the invention of ISIS: Terrorists among immigrants". *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues* 5/1. 2015. 5–20. [http://jssidoi.org/dok/JOURNAL%20OF%20SECURITY%20AND%20SUSTAINABILITY%20ISSUES/2015%20Vol%205%20No%201%20SEPTEMBER/1%20Journal%20of%20Security%20and%20Sustainability%20Issues%20Nr_5_1_1%20\(2\).pdf](http://jssidoi.org/dok/JOURNAL%20OF%20SECURITY%20AND%20SUSTAINABILITY%20ISSUES/2015%20Vol%205%20No%201%20SEPTEMBER/1%20Journal%20of%20Security%20and%20Sustainability%20Issues%20Nr_5_1_1%20(2).pdf) Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵³ Kursani, S. Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens' involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2015. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Report_inquiring_into_the_causes_and_consequences_of_Kosovo_citizens%27_involvement_as_foreign_fighters_in_Syria_and_Iraq_307708.pdf, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 14., 17.

⁵⁵ Kotochevski, M. "Wahhabism in the Balkans: Islamic threat or threat to the Islam". 11–23.

⁵⁶ Gecaj, K. "Deradikaliziminis me komunat". Zeri. 14 March 2016. <http://zeri.info/aktuale/80489/deradikaliziminis-me-komunat/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵⁷ "Slovenian Intelligence Confirms Kosovo Link to Sandzak Arrests".

owner in Peci, who – according to the newspaper – organized the fundamentalists' journey from Kosovo to Syria.⁵⁸

Arfan Qaeder Bhatti, head of the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan visited the town, moreover, Princ Dobroski was also a resident, who became 'famous' after the planning and undertaking the attack on the Israeli and US embassies in Oslo and because of his role in the Albanian mafia.⁵⁹

In addition to the aforementioned, a primary recruiting and collecting point is Kacanik. From 2012 until 2015, the Telegraph has stated that a total of 24 residents traveled to Syria in order to fight with the radicals.⁶⁰ In the South-Kosovan town's mosque, 25-year-old Lavdrim Muhaxheri was a frequent visitor. In his early years, he took part in NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, then suddenly he seceded in 2012, and decided to join the Islamic State. He left the country and sent several recruiting messages to Syria in Albanian language, and invited the Kosovo Albanians to join the jihad.⁶¹ He drew media attention when in July 2014 he beheaded a young man in a video, explaining: he did the same what the Kosovo Liberation Army / KLA would do with the spies. Also Kacanik was the hometown of 41-year-old Hetem Dema, who later joined to the forces of the Al-Nusra Front.⁶²

Most of the emigrants had ties for a long time with Pristina, the capital as well. The first Kosovan killed in Syria (died in 2012 during fighting), Naman Demolli lived in Pristina.⁶³ Mohammad al-Arnaout, a local journalist, said the recruitment took place mainly in the "Makowitz" and "Mitrovica" mosques.⁶⁴ Petar Cvetkovic, head of the Serbian Military and National Security Service (VBA) claimed: Instead of Serbia, it is likely that the domestically unstable Kosovo and Metohija region will be more a favorable destination for radical individuals in the future⁶⁵ Regarding the future of Kosovo, we need to trust in KFOR, who stabilize the security situation and enhance the rule of democratic relations in cooperation with the local law enforcement units.

ALBANIA

Balkan wars generated a huge influx of foreign Muslims to Albania, too. The immigrants later survived ethnic and religious conflicts, persecution of Albanians in Bosnia and Kosovo and the dynamic radicalization of religion, where Wahhabist and other fundamentalist ideologies gained ground. While considering the security of the country, we have to mention, that the particular threat is primarily the Albanian organized crime, but the Muslim country is also the focus point of the supporters of radical ideologies and terrorist organizations.

⁵⁸ "Biznesmeni që financoi terrorizmin". Klankosova. 17 Mar 2016. <http://klankosova.tv/biznesmeni-qe-financoi-terrorizmin/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁵⁹ "Slovenian Intelligence Confirms Kosovo Link to Sandzak Arrests".

⁶⁰ Freeman, C. "Inside Kacanik, Kosovo's jihadist capital".

⁶¹ "The List established and maintained by the 1267/1989/2253 Committee". UN. <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/1267.pdf>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶² Paraszczyk, J. "Report Finds Alarming Outflow Of Kosovars To Islamic State". <http://serbianna.com/blogs/michaletos/archives/1656>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶³ Harraz, A. "Who are the Kosovar fighters in Syria?". Al Jazeera. 11 Feb 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/kosovar-fighters-syria-isil-iraq-kosovo-160211060736871.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶⁴ Bardos, G. N. "Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation".

⁶⁵ "VBA: Islamisti na Kosovu pretnja po bezbednost". 2016. <http://www.alo.rs/vba-islamisti-na-kosovu-pretnja-po-bezbednost/38410>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

Although, at present, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the most frequent sending countries of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, the fundamentalist ideology can be easily found among the Albanian radical mosques' visitors. According to an analysis of the Counter-Terrorism Center at West Point in 2012, five hundred ethnic Albanians fought with the Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front.⁶⁶

In 2014, according to Balkan Insight data, further ninety people traveled to the training camps of the terrorist organizations.⁶⁷

It poses a huge difficulty that many of the economic and educational development projects in the country were launched by Saudi Arabian assistance. These initiatives were implemented by the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJCRKC), which was repeatedly linked to Al-Qaeda and the radical Wahhabist ideology.⁶⁸ In addition to the education provided by the local imams, foreign – mostly Middle Eastern-based organizations⁶⁹ welcome students for different scholarships⁷⁰, during which a very high chance of radicalization can be seen. This is proven by the fact that the police arrested Imam Genci Abdurrahim Balla and his partner Bujar Hysain 2014, who had been in Saudi Arabia⁷¹ and having returned home began recruiting in Albania, moreover, they openly supported the Islamic State ideology, and stored and manufactured weapons as well.⁷²

Albanian radicalization centers are located in the central parts of the country, around Tirana, Elbasan, Pogradec and Librazhd. Albania considers EU accession as priority; thereby particular attention is paid to the fight against terrorism and organized crime on international levels. The surveillance, intelligence and police forces seek to cut back the ongoing radicalization. For example, in 2014, when the city's two main mosques were under police raid⁷³, nine persons (including the aforementioned Bujar Hysa) were arrested. The Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes condemned the nine persons for recruiting approximately seventy people and supporting terrorist organizations' operation and propaganda.⁷⁴ Among others, they recruited 23-year-old Ervin Hasanaj, who was able to arrange his journey to the Syrian accession through the mosque in Tirana.⁷⁵ Shkëlzen Dumani also came from Tirana,

⁶⁶ Shtuni. "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria".

⁶⁷ Likmeta, B. "Arrested Albanian Imams Praise Charlie Hebdo Attack". Balkan Insight. 26 Jan 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/arrested-albanian-imams-support-attack-on-charlie-hebdo>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶⁸ Blumi, I. *Political Islam among the Albanians: Are the Taliban coming to the Balkans?*. 2nd Ed. Prishtina: KIPRED, 2005. http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Political_Islam_Among_the_Albanians_-_Are_the_Taliban_coming_to_the_Balkans_137060.pdf, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁶⁹ For example the World Assembly of Muslim Youth

⁷⁰ Finnegan, W. "The Countdown: The disputed region gears up to declare independence". *The New Yorker*, 15 Oct 2007. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/10/15/the-countdown-2>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷¹ Shtuni. "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria".

⁷² Likmeta. "Arrested Albanian Imams Praise Charlie Hebdo Attack".

⁷³ Spahiu, E. "Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State". *Terrorism Monitor* 13/10. 2015. 3–5. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43917&no_cache=1, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷⁴ "Prosecution Office sent to trial the group of recruiters for conflicts in the Middle East". Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes. 2014. http://www.pp.gov.al/web/Prosecution_Office_sent_to_trial_the_group_of_recruiters_for_conflicts_in_the_Middle_East_760_2.php#VvbXAdLhCM8, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷⁵ Bogdani, A. "ISIS Killed Albanian Jihadist Who Wanted Out". Balkan Insight. 22 May 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/isis-killed-albanian-jihadist-who-wanted-out>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

who illegally abducted his two children (a six- and a nine-year-old) in 2014 then joined the battle in Syria and were killed during operation.⁷⁶

During the current migrant wave and economic difficulties a growing audience is to be reached and more people might be convinced to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and other radical groups by the propaganda launched in Albanian language. Many times the propaganda is built on the “common” Wahhabist ideological basis and the importance of the rise of the “Balkan traditional Islamism”. These messages are currently being held at a low level but the occasionally flaring fundamentalism should grow by the radicalization of the international situation, which can easily threaten the fragile stability of the Balkan region.

MACEDONIA

The spread of fundamentalist doctrines in Macedonia is a significant problem for the country. Wahhabists possess growing amount of supporters, which was further increased by the significant proportion of migrants who arrived in Macedonia. The basis of the radical supporters is mostly among Albanian population, but the Bosnian Muslims of Macedonia and local Muslim communities also pose a threat. Additionally, the radical organization, named Tarikat, which bases its ideology also on the fundamentalist interpretation of Koran is highly active both in Macedonia and Montenegro.⁷⁷

Radical Wahhabist doctrines are spread in the Skopje region (Tanushevci, Brest, Malino Malo and Arachinovo) and in the areas bordering Kosovo (Kumanovo, Tetovo and Gostivar), but they also have an impact on some of the larger towns (Struga, Debar, Kichevo, Radovish, Prilep, Resen and Ohrid).⁷⁸ The main recruiting centers in Skopje are the Yaya Pasha⁷⁹ and the Isa Beg mosques⁸⁰, but thanks to modern recruitment methods of the radical organizations (web ads, Facebook) the problem is delocalized. In August 2001 in Gazi Baba district, the armed forces killed 19 people and nine people were arrested due to their links to the Islamic State and weapons stocks for the supply of the terrorist organization.⁸¹

The Macedonian police forces had an armed conflict in 2001 in Slupchane, where – after the local imam’s call – the operating Mujahedeen groups decided to activate. As a result, the police force observed mobilization in Nikushtak, Grushino and Arachinovo villages.⁸²

⁷⁶ Bogdani, A. "ISIS Holding Albanian Children ‘Hostage’ in Syria". *Balkan Insight*. 4 Jan 2016. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/isis-holding-albanian-children-hostage-in-syria-01-04-2016>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷⁷ Guskova, E. “Islamic State Coming to Balkans (II) (Not All Immigrants are Asylum Seekers)”. *Strategic Culture Foundation*. 10 July 2015. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/07/10/islamic-state-coming-to-balkans-ii.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁷⁸ Kotochevski. “Wahhabism in the Balkans: Islamic threat or threat to the Islam”.

⁷⁹ Kotochevski. “Wahhabism in the Balkans: Islamic threat or threat to the Islam”.

⁸⁰ Geteva, K. "Imams Support Reis". *Wikileaks*. 2010. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/11/1175852_re-os-macedonia-8-3-skopje-imams-back-macedonia-islamic.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸¹ Marusic, S. J. “Macedonia Arrests Nine ISIS Suspects”. *Balkan Insight*. 7 Aug 2015. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-arrests-nine-isis-suspects-08-07-2015>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸² Petrovski, P. “Testimonials: 2001”. Toronto: Risto Stefov Publications, 2015. http://www.macedonianhistory.ca/Stefov_Risto/Testimonials%20-%202001%20-%20eBook.pdf, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

The Albanian paramilitary troops launched less powerful attacks against the Macedonian security forces, who responded with the available weapons at a similar level (using small arms and light artillery).⁸³

In 2004, French expert Claude Moniquet stated, that a total of one hundred fundamentalists live and operate (recruit, train and maintain contact) in Macedonia.⁸⁴ Kenneth Morrison revealed five times more, who said some 550 radicals were identified in 2001 and 2002 alone. According to Kotovchevski's data, in 2001, about a hundred Mujahedeens were stationed in Lipkovo, 40 in Otlja, 35-40 in Matejcheben, 50-60 in the „center“ in Tetovo.⁸⁵

Although police forces are able to keep control of the situation, the radical groups do not pose an immediate danger; however, the number of immigrants may increase the amount of radical ideas' followers as well as provide material support and continue the delivery of ideology and terrorists to Western Europe. The situation in Macedonia due to the uncontrolled influx of people is significant security threat, which is not enlightened by the reigning Wahhabist doctrines and the persistent propaganda of imams, either.

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro's geographic location makes its security situation very difficult, since the threat of the influx of radical ideologies and persons who are aiming to reach the Adriatic Sea are present from three main directions. The Muslim groups have already begun to build their small communities in the 1990s. The number of followers is still limited (comparing to the Orthodox), only 18 per cent of the Montenegrin people identified themselves as Muslims.

Due to the proximity of Novi Pazar, Muslim majority lives in the Montenegrin part of Sandzak province 'Bijelo Polje' and the northern bordering cities of Kosovo and Albania (Plav and Rozaje). According to data from Podgorica, the radical Muslim groups operating in Plav considered themselves the followers of "traditional Islam", however, based on the interpretation of the Koran and practiced style, they followed the Wahhabist ideology. The group's leader was Sead Jasavic who studied at universities in Saudi Arabia and arriving to Montenegro he started recruiting.⁸⁶

The southern part of Bar County, bordering the Adriatic Sea, has also a Muslim-majority. In Podgorica, only four percent follows Islam religion.⁸⁷ Among them only 100 Wahhabists were recorded in 2007 by the National Security Agency of Montenegro.⁸⁸ Wahhabist centers can mostly be found in areas, bordering Kosovo and Serbia.

⁸³ Dimitras, P. "Daily briefing from Macedonian press about Macedonian crisis". Euro-Balkan, Institute on Macedonian Crisis. 2015. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/organizations/eurobalkan/br_10_05_01.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸⁴ Deliso, C. "Fissures in Balkan Islam". The Christian Science Monitor. 14 Feb 2006. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0214/p06s02-woeu.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸⁵ Morrison, K. "Wahhabism in the Balkans". Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008. http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/50179/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/70c664de-0b1c-4ec2-9eb7-4158e38e87a0/en/2008_March_Wahabism.pdf, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸⁶ "Radical Islam in Montenegro". Wikileaks. 2009. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09PODGORICA171_a.html, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸⁷ "Population of Montenegro by sex, type of settlement, ethnicity, religion and mother tongue, per municipalities". Monstat. 12 July 2011. <http://www.monstat.org/userfiles/file/popis2011/saopstenje/saopstenje%281%29.pdf>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁸⁸ Morrison. "Wahhabism in the Balkans".

Even though the only limited demonstrations indicate the presence of radicalism, the Montenegrin police forces permanently monitor the functioning of the potential fundamentalist groups.⁸⁹ They are working in close collaboration with religious leader, Rifat Fejzić, who has a serious influence on political life, so that the Muslim groups are represented at decision-making levels. In his statement Rifat Fejzić highlights the extremist doctrines condemnation and calls for a moderate practice of religious believers.⁹⁰

BULGARIA

Similarly to other states in the Balkans, Bulgaria is also affected by the growth of radical ideology. The current centers maintain close contacts with the Middle Eastern organizations, but the police forces are able to mitigate the threat posed by extremism. Thus Bulgaria is not among the prior Balkan terrorist centers.

In Bulgaria, the main center is the town of Pazardjik, or in the narrowest sense the Ebu Bekir mosque, where in November 2014 the police arrested a local imam Ahmed Moussa and his twenty partners. Moussa was charged with disseminating propaganda of the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood and the technical-material support of fundamentalist (Salafist). Ahmed Moussa was originally Christian, converted to the Salafist religion in the mid-1990s in Sumitsa, Bulgaria.⁹¹ In July 2015, the armed forces raised additional charges against 14 people in the near Plovdiv, Asenovgrad and Startsev because of the active support of the Islamic State ideology.⁹²

One-sixth of the country's population is Muslim, up to now the country had no significant ethnic conflicts or extremist movements.⁹³ However, the migration and the tendency through which – with strong support of Middle Eastern investors – about a hundred and fifty new mosques were built since the 1990s, intertwined with the difficult labor market situation can lead to problems in the future.⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

Processes following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the mid-1990s Balkan crisis have given opportunity to the Mujahideens – and the accompanying ideologies – from the Middle East, to reach the unstable area of Balkans. The number of followers gradually increased, to which the lack of education and the hard situation of workers contributed as well.

⁸⁹ Morrison. "Wahhabism in the Balkans".

⁹⁰ Aldis, A. and Herd, G. *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies For Counter-Terrorism*. Routledge, 2006. <https://goo.gl/IaZvFN>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁹¹ Stoilova, Z. "The Roma and the Radicals: Bulgaria's Alleged ISIS Support Base". *Balkan Insight*. 11 Jan 2016. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-roma-and-the-radicals-bulgaria-s-alleged-isis-support-base-01-10-2016-1>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁹² „Окръжна прокуратура-Пазарджик предаде 14 лица на съд за проповядване на омраза на религиозна основа и за пропаганда за война” (Okrzchna Prokuratura Pazardzhik predade 14 lica na svi za propaganda za vojna). Pazardzhik Regional Prosecution Office. 2 July 2015. <http://www.prb.bg/bg/oppazardzhik/news/pressobsheniya/okrzchna-prokuratura-pazardzhik-predade-14-lica-n-2/>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁹³ Toshkov, V. "Radical Islam on rise in Balkans, raising fears of security threat to Europe". *Fox News*. 18 Sep 2010. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/18/radical-islam-rise-balkans-raising-fears-security-threat-europe.html>, Accessed on 28 March 2016.

⁹⁴ Besenyő J. "The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice". *Strategic Impact* 60/3. 2016. 15–21. http://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si60.swf, Accessed on 7 Jan 2017.

In many areas, thanks to the assistance provided by Middle-Eastern donors, Muslim communities had the opportunity to gain experience abroad, through which a number of moderate Muslims shifted to the extreme (especially Wahhabist and Salafist) doctrines, a radical interpretation of the Koran. Their teachings also gained followers among the local communities, and they built up a growing network of connections, while in several regions, followers of the fundamentalist ideology outgrew the amount of moderate Muslims.

The Balkan's Muslim leaders stress the importance of preventing radicalization and fundamentalist doctrines, but Wahhabist and Salafist groups keep the moderate Islamic centers' operation – and the state organization as a whole – under constant pressure. The politically or economically unstable areas further complicated the situation in the region, which is currently experiencing an influx of refugees, during which radicalized individuals can access local centers directly without any administration. Thereby they can provide a new boost to the local followers' work to continue fundamentalism and jihad.

The most involved states are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, but the analysis shows that radical Islamism can be found in other states of the Western Balkans, too. The departure of recruited people to Syria and Iraq pose a continuous threat, as well as the uncontrolled influx and blending in of radicalized peoples in the originally Muslim villages, which support fundamentalist ideology. Local imams and persons engaged in recruitment are in constant communication with the terrorist organizations in the Middle East and its branches. According to their needs, constant supply is provided in the form of material support or pre-qualified fighters. A serious problem is that recruiting is not only linked to the local mosques, but to the most modern techniques, with which even for the latest techniques of the police forces is hard to fight. The armed national defense units hold the terrorist hubs under constant surveillance, and seek to arrest or eliminate the fundamentalists, in order to avoid further radicalization.

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Daniela Dincao:

THE LAST COLONY OF AFRICA

ABSTRACT: In 1974 Spanish Sahara was a colony ready to hold a referendum in order to let people's right to self-determination be expressed; in 1975 a United Nations Mission and an advisory opinion of International Court reaffirmed this right, but a war broke out. In 1991 the UN managed to establish the order and instituted the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (in French: Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental - MINURSO). A Settlement Plan which included the organization for a referendum leading to the independence of Western Sahara or its annexation to the Kingdom of Morocco was accepted by both the parties. Nowadays, with no referendum held the tension is growing. From the point of view of international law Morocco is an occupying power, with precise duties and no rights on the natural resources of the country that it is occupying, nevertheless Morocco acts as if the integration of Western Sahara with its own national territories was absolutely lawful. No state in the world has recognized Morocco's presence in Western Sahara as a licit fact, but many countries signed economic and commercial treaties with Rabat. These treaties involve the Sahrawis' natural resources, but not this people's interests which should be paramount.

KEYWORDS: Western Sahara, Sahrawi people, Polisario, MINURSO, Self-determination, Referendum in Western Sahara

THE DECOLONIZATION AND THE WAR

The first Article of United Nations' Charter points out peace and security as the primary aims of the organization. To these ends, prevention and removal of threats to peace and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples are central questions¹. Therefore when Spain entered the organization in 1955, it had to declare its possessions outside its national territories. In accordance with the principles of the Charter and the ones of resolutions 1514 and 1541 of the General Assembly (1960), in 1963 Western Sahara was enlisted as a non-self-governing territory. In 1965 the General Assembly signed the first resolution in which:

“Urgently requests the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish

¹ Charter of UN, CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES, ART. 1: *“The Purposes of the United Nations are:*

1. *To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take affective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace [...]*
2. *To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace...”*

Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories.”²

The question of Ifni was solved in 1968, while Spanish Sahara had to wait until 1974 when a census was concluded in order to hold a referendum decided for the first semester of 1975. The referendum was postponed because of Morocco and Mauritania’s assertions. The two neighbouring countries in fact declared to have ancient linkages with these territories and so a right on them. With Resolution 3292 the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:

“I. “Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (*terra nullius*)?”

If the answer to the first question is in negative,

II. “*What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?*”³”

On 16th October 1975 the Court affirmed:

I. “*The information furnished to the Court shows (a) that at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them; (b) that Spain did not proceed upon the basis that it was establishing its sovereignty over *terrae nullius*: thus in his Order of 26 December 1884 the King of Spain proclaimed that he was taking the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes.*

The Court therefore gives a negative answer to Question I.”

II. “[...] *the Court finds that neither the internal nor the international acts relied upon by Morocco indicate the existence at the relevant period of either the existence or the international recognition of legal ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Moroccan State. [...] They do, however, provide indications that a legal tie of allegiance existed at the relevant period between the Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic peoples of the territory, through Tekna caids of the Noun region, and they show that the Sultan displayed, and was recognized by other States to possess, some authority or influence with respect to those tribes [...] The Mauritanian entity therefore did not have the character of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the several emirates or tribes which comprised it. The Court concludes that at the time of’ colonization by Spain there did not exist between the territory of Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity any tie of sovereignty, or of allegiance of tribes, or of simple inclusion in the same legal entity*”⁴.

Nevertheless, on the same date Hassan II, the king of Morocco, announced the holding of a peace march on Western Sahara’s territories and on 6th November what is known as the Green March was held.⁵ Thousands of civil people (about 300,000) escorted by thousands of soldiers passed the borders. Immediately the Security Council intervened in the question and issued Resolution 380 in which “*deplores the holding of the march [and] calls upon Morocco*

² “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/2072 (1965)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

³ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/3292 (1974)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

⁴ “Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975”. International Court of Justice. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6197.pdf>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

⁵ Besenyő, J. “The Occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania”. *Tradecraft Review*, 2010, Special Issue, 76–94. http://knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2010_1_spec.pdf, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

*immediately to withdraw from the Territory of Western Sahara all the participants in the march*⁶ so after three days, on 9th November the March was withdrawn. It can be considered as a serious breach of the obligations under peremptory norms of the international law as all the members of UN “*shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations*”⁷ (Art. 2 par.4 UN Charter).

According to General Assembly Resolution 3314, signed on 14th December, 1974 an aggression is:

*“The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof”*⁸.

Western Sahara was not a State, it was a colony under Spain’s administration, but this does not change the fact that the Green March, and above all, the following events constituted a violation of international law, in fact resolution 1514 (1960) affirmed:

*“All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.”*⁹

On 14th of November 1975 the duties and the rights of the Spanish government were ceded to Morocco and Mauritania by Spain itself signing the Treaty of Madrid. However, this treaty is not legal. States are allowed to cede territories on which they possess sovereignty but Spain, as an administering power, did not possess this right. Moreover, in accordance with the UN Charter, an administering power can decide to renounce its rights and duties on a non-self-governing territory, but in this case only the Organization of the United Nations “*shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements*”¹⁰ (art. 75) giving the rights and duty of an Administering Power to another subject of the international law. Anyhow, this move does not affect the sovereignty of a territory which continues belonging to a people. Anyhow, the Treaty proposed itself to respect people’s right to self-determination but it proposed to do it by consulting Jemaa, (an assembly imposed by Francisco Franco’s government to Western Sahara in order to represent Sahrawi people). This Assembly could not express the people’s will because it had never been elected, and it was not free from external influence (being created by Spain), moreover, how could it have been a democratic organism, if it was created by a dictator of a colonial power? So it could not decide to emerge as a sovereign independent State, or to associate or integrate with another one freely, without outside interference through a democratic process as issued in Resolution 1541 (1960).¹¹ Moreover, the real Jemaa had never been consulted: it

⁶ “Security Council Resolution: S/RES/380 (1975)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

⁷ Charter of UN, CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES, ART. 2

⁸ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/3314 (1974)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

⁹ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/1514 (1960)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

¹⁰ Charter of UN, CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM, ART. 75

¹¹ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/1541 (1960)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

was dissolved by its members in person and Polisario, (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro).

The Polisario Front was a nationalist organization born under Spanish domination in 1973, it was very popular among Sahrawis, and since 1976 it has been the only representative of Sahrawi people, recognized by the international community too. During the war that broke out after the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion, the Polisario Front organized the escape of the civil population and led the SPLA (Sahrawi People's Liberation Army or Elps in Spanish, *Ejército de Liberación Popular Saharaui*), against the better equipped armies of Mauritania and (especially) of Morocco. The two neighbouring countries' armies had good and modern equipment which included for example Boeing Vertol Ch-47, Northrop F-5, Mirage F1 and napalm bombs¹², while SPLA counted on arms as howitzers and Surface-to-Air-Missiles. Despite this the knowledge of the territory and the *ghazi* (an attack technique similar to *guerrilla warfare* which consists of focused and accurate little raids against precise targets) SPLA was able to weaken the Moroccan army and to defeat Mauritania, the weakest enemy afflicted also by internal conflicts. Mauritania withdrew in 1979 while the war between Morocco and Polisario continued. Only in 1991 the UN managed to establish order and instituted MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. A Settlement Plan which includes the conditions of the cease-fire (which began on 6th September 1991) and the organization for a referendum leading to the independence of Western Sahara or its annexation with the Kingdom of Morocco was accepted by both of the parties.

Nowadays, with no referendum held, the tension is growing. Sahrawi people still live divided between occupied territories under Morocco's authority and freed territories under SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), instituted by Polisario on 26th February 1976. These liberated territories are actually inhabited by only 20,000 – 30,000 nomads, the rest of the population have lived in refugees camps in the desert of Hamada, in Algeria for 40 years. Polisario transferred the fleeing population here because of the war and the continuous attacks hold by Morocco even against civil people, civil camps and civil hospitals. By now Sahrawis are still living here because of various problems, first of all: mines, hidden in these territories from the years of the war and whose map was never released by Morocco.

WHY MOROCCAN PRESENCE IN WESTERN SAHARA IS AN OCCUPATION

On the 5th of March 2016, Ban Ki-Moon was the first Secretary General who visited Sahrawi people in the refugee camp since 1998, and Bir Lehlou, in the liberated territories. In an official speech he affirmed:

“What really moved and, even, saddened me was the anger. Many people expressed their anger - people who for more than forty years have lived in the harshest conditions and who feel their plight and their cause have been forgotten by the world. Understandably, they are angry. I have assured the representatives of youth that the United Nations will do much more. First of all, to resume face-to-face dialogue and, at the same time, provide support to all refugees and people here. The humanitarian conditions are very dire and we have to work to provide education for young people and we have to provide food, water, sanitation

¹² Baccalini, V. *Un popolo canta lulei. La guerra di liberazione del Sahara Occidentale* (People sing “lulei”. The liberation war of Western Sahara). Milan: Ottaviano, 1980. 95–113.

and livelihood [support] to all these people. So [the] United Nations will do much more with the international community”¹³.

During his journey Ban Ki Moon used the term “occupation” to describe the presence of Moroccan government and soldiers and people in Western Sahara territories. This assertion provoked the fury of Rabat, which reacted with expelling part of the civilian staffers of MINURSO. Secretary General’s official Spokesman, Stephane Dujarric, referring to the Secretary General’s use of this term, told al-Jazeera: “His use of the word was not planned, nor was it deliberate. It was a spontaneous, personal reaction. We regret the misunderstandings and consequences that this personal expression of solicitude provoked”.

But actually the presence of Morocco is an occupation, not only according to the definition of this term in itself:

“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised” (art.42 Hague Convention of 1907)¹⁴

but also because so had been recognized by the General Assembly since 1979 when this term was used for the first time in Resolution 34/37 in which the General Assembly:

*“Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco”*¹⁵.

WHAT DOES THE OCCUPATION ENTAIL

The rights and duties of Occupying Powers can be found in the Geneva Conventions, ratified by Morocco in 1956. For example, the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that an Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population permitting also the free passage of impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, for the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing¹⁶.

Moreover, the resolution on *Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories*,¹⁷ (reaffirming peoples’ right to self-determination as well as their right to enjoyment of their natural resources and their right to dispose of those resources) states that any economic or other activity that has a negative impact on the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and on the exercise of their right to self-determination is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. To this end the resolution affirms the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in collaboration with the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

¹³ “Ban Ki-Moon’s speeches: Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs_Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Algiers (Algeria), 06 March 2011”. UN News Centre. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

¹⁴ Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907, from the International Committee of the Red Cross. <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

¹⁵ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/34/37 (1979)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

¹⁶ “Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949”. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

¹⁷ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/52/72 (1997)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

but invites also all Governments and organizations to take all possible measures to ensure the permanent sovereignty of these peoples over their natural resources, considering that:

*“the damaging exploitation and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of those Territories”*¹⁸.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN SAHARA

Western Sahara is a region rich in natural resources: first of all phosphate mines (discovered in 1960s) and fish products, in fact the coastal waters of Western Sahara are among the richest in the world. Moreover, Western Sahara can boast mineral resources as iron, vanadium, uranium, natural gas and oil. Also sand is an important resource imported by islands like the nearby Canary Islands. Nevertheless the exploitation of these resources should be impossible until the resolution of the question on Western Sahara both because of Polisario and other organization's objection¹⁹, and because of some obligations imposed by international law (as explained below). Instead phosphate mines and fish products are profusely used by Morocco, which also signs various treaties with different foreign Countries and organizations.

In 2002 Hans Corell, Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs reminds in his Letter to the President of the Security Council:

“In the resolutions adopted under the item “Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in territories under Colonial Domination”, the General Assembly reiterated that “the exploitation and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of these Territories” and that “any administering Power that deprives the colonial people of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of their legitimate rights over their natural resources... violates the solemn obligations it has assumed under the Charter of the United Nations” (GA res. 48/46 of 10 December 1992 and 49/40 of 9 December 1994) [...] The principle of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources” as the right of peoples and nations to use and dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the interest of their national development and well-being, was established in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. It has since been reaffirmed in the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in subsequent General Assembly resolutions, most notably, resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order”, and Resolution 3281 (XXIX) containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. While the legal nature of the core principle of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources”, as a corollary to the principle of territorial sovereignty or the right of self-determination, is indisputably part of customary international law, its exact legal scope and implications are still debatable. In the present context, the question is whether the principle of “permanent sovereignty” prohibits any activities related to natural resources undertaken by an administering Power (cf. para. 8 above) in a Non-Self-Governing Territory, or only

¹⁸ “General Assembly Resolution: A/RES/52/72 (1997)”.

¹⁹ Besenyó J. “Economy of Western Sahara”. *TradeCraft Review*, 7/Special Issue. 2011. 115–125.

those which are undertaken in disregard of the needs, interests and benefits of the people of that territory”²⁰.

About this last question it may be interesting to remind of the concerns expressed by the Committee on Development of European Union which has strict relations with Morocco under the aegis of the Union for the Mediterranean organization. In the opinion of 2011 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of a Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco the Committee affirms that despite the EU’s investments Moroccan fishing industry has been prevented from generating added value and that only 170 jobs for Moroccan nationals have been created, moreover:

“The state of the fish stocks is alarming. All stocks are fully- or overexploited except the sardine stock off Western Sahara [...] A significant source of controversy concerns the inclusion of fishing in the waters off Western Sahara. Under international law, Western Sahara currently has the status on a Non-Self-Governing Territory[...] Morocco is the de facto administrator but has never been accepted as the official administering power by the UN. According to the 2002 opinion by the UN Legal Counsel Hans Corell, any exploration or exploitation activities in Western Sahara can only proceed if they are to the benefit of, and according to, the wishes of the people of Western Sahara. [...] After many requests from the Commission about benefits to the “local population”, Morocco responded on 13 December 2010 with a PowerPoint document on the outcome of some investment programmes divided into 4 different regions - the “South” includes the Western Sahara as well as other territory. The document does not show whether the people of Western Sahara have benefitted socio-economically from the agreement. Although the document claims that jobs are created in all areas, it is highly likely that the agreement mainly benefits Moroccan settlers, transferred into occupied territory in violation of Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention of 1949. Regrettably, the document does not support any EU conclusion on benefits for either the local population or for the Sahrawi people.

The document fails entirely to address the second prerequisite, whether the agreement has been concluded in accordance of the wishes of the people of Western Sahara”²¹.

This document is just one of the many examples of the official documents which reiterate the illicit occupation of Western Sahara and prove the perpetuation of illicit actions of natural resources’ exploitation against the Sahrawis’ will and benefit in violation of the international law. Despite these assertions no relevant actions have taken place; an exception could be possibly considered the recent nullification (December 10, 2016) of the deal between the EU and Morocco, covering trade in agricultural and fishery products by the European Court of Justice because of the illicit inclusion of Western Sahara products. Nevertheless, soon after

²⁰ Corell, H. “Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council”. <http://www.arso.org/Olaeng.pdf>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

²¹ “European Union Committee on Development opinion of 2011 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of a Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco”. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0394&language=HR#title3>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

the sentence the Council of EU appealed to the Court of Justice and Morocco suspended its cooperation with the EU for several months so that no conclusions about it can be drawn yet.

WHY A REFERENDUM

The need of holding a referendum in Western Sahara was expressed by the UN dozen of times (A/RES/2229, A/RES/2354, A/RES/2428, A/RES/2591, A/RES/2711, A/RES/2983, A/RES/3162, A/RES/3292...) and it was established by the cease-fire agreement of 90s :

“23. In conformity with OAU resolution AHG/Res.104 (XIX) and General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 40/50, a referendum will be organized in Western Sahara to enable people to decide their own future freely and democratically”²².

Nevertheless, not only MINURSO was able to conclude a census only in 2005, but since then no referendum was held. Moreover, in 2002 Morocco had appealed every voter rejected by the Identification Commission and in 2004 it had rejected the Baker Plan II refusing the option of independence in a future referendum. Nevertheless, nowadays a referendum is still the only proper juridical institution by which people can express their will and their right to self-determination democratically and freely.

HOW AN INDEPENDENT STATE COULD RISE AFTER 40 YEARS

More than forty years passed from the beginning of the war and 16 years have passed since its end, nevertheless, the possibility for Sahrawi people to have themselves recognized under an independent State is not impossible. This State exists and it is SADR, a State of law, representative, with a sovereignty; a state which has international relations with about 70 States acting as SADR and with all the states of the world through Polisario representatives. A state with a territory, in fact even not considering the territories under occupation, SADR has under its jurisdiction about 50 000 km². SADR has a good administration structure based on committees and assemblies, a health and an education system which lack only of means and instruments, but which do not lack of qualified staff. Moreover, if a referendum is held and if people chose the option of an independent state, SADR would have access to rich natural resources as phosphates, fish, sand... (that have been exploited by Morocco for years) which could provide a base for a flourishing economic system.

RECENT EVENTS

After the UN Secretary General's visit to the Polisario Front in 2016, Morocco expelled 84 international civilian staffers of the MINURSO, so as the Secretary General explains in its latest report:

“Only 28 international civilian staff members remain in Laayoune, while 25 are performing limited functions from Las Palmas. On 21 March, MINURSO redeployed all three of its liaison officers from Dakhla to the Awsard team site at the request of Morocco”²³.

²² “Secretary General Report: S/21360”. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

²³ “Secretary General Report: S/2016/355”. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_355.pdf, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

On 28th April 2016 the Security Council adopted the Resolution 2285, it decided to “extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2017” and “Regretting that MINURSO’s ability to fully carry out its mandate has been affected as the majority of its civilian component, including political personnel, cannot perform their duties within MINURSO’s area of operations”²⁴

the Security Council:

“Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to adhere fully to those agreements”²⁵.

Despite this in August 2016, because of the Moroccan attempt to build a road to the Mauritania border in the Southern part of Western Sahara, both the Polisario Front and Moroccan forces committed violations of the ceasefire agreement. After Secretary-General António Guterres’ interventions, in February 2017 the forces of both parties were withdrawn. Nevertheless, the tensions are still in the air: in March Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara Christopher Ross offered his resignation and he was declared *persona non grata* by the Kingdom of Morocco. Even the re-accession of Morocco to the African Union²⁶ on 31st January does not seem to have enhanced any particular improvements in the question of Western Sahara.

Concerning the Human rights, about which for example an Amnesty International’s inquiry published in 2015 (*Shadow of impunity. Torture in Morocco and Western Sahara*) reported 173 cases of alleged torture and other ill-treatment which had taken place between 2010 and 2014 in 17 locations across Morocco and Western Sahara, in its last Resolution²⁷ the Security Council just stresses:

“the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law”²⁸.

The need for an impartial human rights monitor is particularly urgent not only because of impunity for past abuses and violations in the area but especially because of the recent breaches of the ceasefire in the past year and the growing political tensions.

However, MINURSO is still the only UN’s mission with no task concerning Human rights.

CONCLUSIONS

Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa, is the largest and the most populated Non-Self-Governing Territory in the world. The question of Western Sahara appears clear from the point of view of the international law, but the concrete facts make the situation so complicated that nowadays Sahrawis’ struggle for self-determination appears hopeless. Morocco’s presence in these territories has been lasting for more than 40 years, Rabat has solid relations

²⁴ “Security Council Resolution: S/RES/2285 (2016)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

²⁵ “Security Council Resolution: S/RES/2285 (2016)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

²⁶ Morocco had left the African Union in 1984 when it was joined by SADR.

²⁷ “Security Council Resolution: S/RES/2285 (2016)”. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>, Accessed on 24 Apr 2017.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

to powerful countries, it has an important political and economic status in the region, and Western Sahara's territories contribute to this status. Moreover, it is absolutely necessary to keep in mind that the war in Western Sahara played a central role in building the Moroccan national unity and in legitimizing the winning forces of the revolution which had brought Morocco to independence in 1956. Considering this fact, any new peace plan should not only allow the holding of a referendum in the region, which includes the possibility of the establishment of two independence states, (as it was issued in the Settlement Plan of the 90s), but it should also take into consideration a political and economic transitional period for both states (in case the independence option won).

Nowadays the tension and the anger are growing and the risk of a new war is tangible. If a war broke out, the Sahrawi people would probably lose it. But if a war broke out, the international community would lose it too, showing its inability to respect and make respected the constituent principles of the United Nations and of the international law. The question of Western Sahara is a question about people. It does not concern just phosphate mining and fishing resources. The question of Western Sahara concerns men, women and children, divided families and their rights as human beings. A fair referendum has to be held not in order to give the territories of Western Sahara to Morocco or to SADR but in order to respect the people's rights and will. People have the right to decide about their own future. Because of this, any plans which do not take into consideration a referendum would be dubiously acceptable. It is important in this question, as in any others which concern human beings, not to choose the easiest way, but the way of justice, and justice calls for peoples' right to self-determination.

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Lt. Col. Endre Szénási:

SYRIA: ANOTHER DIRTY PIPELINE WAR

ABSTRACT: *The war in Syria is motivated by intentions mostly excluded from official policies. It is all about great power rivalry, mainly between the US and Russia, but countries around Syria are also deeply involved. The main goal of the US is to replace Russian allies with that of the US: the war in Syria is an example of that. Replacing Assad's power with no matter how radical jihadists aligned mainly with Saudi Arabia, and ultimately with the US could have allowed building a pipeline through Syria to Europe, supplying gas from US allies in the Middle East, when – as a result – Russia could be kicked out of the European gas market to the maximum extent possible. A Syrian government, firmly aligned with Russia, makes such plans impossible. Unlike the US, Russia is not interested in installing a gas pipeline from the Middle East through Syria to Europe since the project would lower European dependency on Russian gas. However, if such a project strengthens Russia's allies in the Middle East, Russia will be most likely to support it, as she did before the civil war in Syria.*

These pipelines are multibillion-dollar projects and they provide far more than enough reasons to wage wars and destroy countries, causing enormous human suffering. Since an entire country – that is Syria in our case – was destroyed because various parties of the conflict attempted to pursue their own interests in order to build their own preferred pipelines, most parties of the conflict lied to their public and even the risk of a new world war was raised, I consider pipeline wars dirty in nature.

KEYWORDS: *energy policy, natural gas, pipelines, military intervention, Al-Qaeda, Al Nusra, ISIS, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Soviet Union, US, West, Europe, Middle East*

“The evidence is clear and convincing: U.S. President Barack Obama, against advice and warnings from his top military officers, pursued a policy to protect the fundamentalist-Sunni organization, Al Qaeda in Syria (called «Al-Nusra» there), and to arm them, so as to overthrow Bashar al-Assad and replace Assad's secular government with a Sharia-law, fundamentalist-Sunni, government, which would be allied with the fundamentalist-Sunni Saud family – the deadly enemies of Iran, Assad's Syria, and Russia. (Both Iran and Assad's Syria are allied with Russia.) Obama and the Saudis wanted the replacement of Assad with jihadists for different reasons: Obama's goal was to terminate and replace yet another ruler who is allied with Russia; but the Saudis' goal was to terminate and replace Shia-Islam by the Saudis' own fundamentalist Sunni form of Islam.”¹

¹ Zuesse, E. “Officials: Obama Prioritized Defeating Assad Above Defeating Jihadists”. Strategic Culture. 8 December 2016. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/12/08/officials-obama-prioritized-defeating-assad-above-defeating-jihadists.html>, Accessed on 7 January 2016.

INTRODUCTION

The war in Syria is motivated by intentions mostly excluded from official policies. It is all about great power rivalry, mainly between the US and Russia, but countries around Syria are also deeply involved.

The main goal of the US is to replace Russian allies with that of the US: Syria is an example of that. Replacing the Assad regime with no matter how radical jihadists aligned with Saudi Arabia, and ultimately with the US could have allowed building a pipeline through Syria to Europe, supplying gas from US allies in the Middle East, when – as a result – Russia could be kicked out of the European gas market to the maximum extent possible. A Syrian government, firmly aligned with Russia, makes such plans impossible. Unlike the US, Russia is not interested in installing a gas pipeline from the Middle East through Syria to Europe since the project would lower European dependency on Russian gas. However, if such a project strengthens Russia's allies in the Middle East, Russia will most likely support it, as she did before the civil war in Syria. These pipelines are multi-billion dollar projects and they provide far more than enough reasons to wage wars and destroy countries, causing enormous human suffering.

THE THREE “LAYERS” OF EXPLANATIONS OF THE SYRIA WAR

There are at least three “layers” of explanations of the war in Syria. “Layers” are not scientifically strict categories. There can be more or less layers in conflicts to aid analysis and label conflicting interests of different magnitude. Finding further layers might complicate the analysis so there is a degree of generalisation and simplification when we refer to “layers”.

We start the analysis from the “surface” when arguments are provided by mainstream politicians and mass media for “public consumption”. This “layer” is not necessarily a compilation of lies and half-truths, but it is mostly silent about the real reasons of the war in Syria. On its own this layer does not allow understanding why great powers interfere in the case of one conflict and why they do not interfere in another, when the very same arguments would support intervention, i.e. human rights violations, actions of dictatorships etc.

There is a second, “deeper layer” which refers to various interests of alliances that reveal a lot of the significant reasons of war. However, when analysing this “layer” we are still not at the “core” reasons of military interference.

The third “layer” is the “deepest layer”: it reveals the real nature and extent of the conflicts leading to wars. In the case of Syria it is a conflict around the variants of a multi-billion dollar natural gas pipeline project.

“Layer” No. 1. – Official explanations for public consumption: democracy vs. dictatorship, civilian liberties, human rights, war crimes, saving human lives, no-fly zone, terrorism, chemical weapons, barrel bombs etc.

An average Western or Russian citizen mostly finds official explanations of the Syria war. In the West it is commonplace for politicians or mainstream media to suggest, that the Assad regime is evil, it brutally oppresses its own people, and that is the reason why the civil war broke out in Syria. Western mainstream also suggests, that Assad barrel-bombed his

people,² and also used chemical weapons against the population. On the other hand, those who rose up against Assad are freedom-loving people, some sort of democratic forces, who might be called “moderate opposition”.

Other rebels might be called “opposition” hiding or masking the true nature of these forces concerning their beliefs and probable way of life in Syria if such “opposition” force gets to power. Of course, there is ISIS in Syria and denying that fact would have been foolish when shaping official Western explanations for the public. ISIS is obviously something negative in official Western policy explanations for the public, however in the Western mainstream it was omitted (at least until the rise of president-elect, later US president Trump, whose policies towards Russia and Syria and are yet to be tested)

In Russia the main official explanation for going to war in Syria is fight against terrorism,³ mainly against ISIS and all sorts of other terrorist groups, including Russian citizens fighting against the Assad regime, who can once return to Russia to commit terrorist acts. The official Russian explanations suggest that all forms of terrorism must be eliminated in Syria because this is the best way to prevent terrorist acts on Russian soil and it is also for the benefit of humankind. Russian leaders also stress that the Russian military intervention in Syria is based on the official request of the legitimate Syrian government; therefore, it is absolutely legitimate according to international law. It is also emphasised that Russia liberates Syrian people from oppression by jihadist groups, provides humanitarian aid that is a noble task etc.

Since the core of the Russian official public reasoning to go to war in Syria is fight against terrorism, Western policy makers made sure to challenge such reasoning. Russia has been accused countless time of fighting Syrian “opposition”, rather than “terrorists” who kill virtually all opponents they can, including Christians.⁴ This argument obscures the nature of the main character of Syrian opposition groups that is neither democratic, nor moderate. Not even in Middle Eastern terms. Even the sometimes relatively sober Western mainstream media – such as the BBC – acknowledges that the so-called “moderate opposition” has become a minority in Syria, since these people have either been killed or radicalised during the years of civil war: *“The armed rebellion has evolved significantly since its inception. Secular moderates are now outnumbered by Islamists and jihadists, whose brutal tactics have caused global outrage.”*⁵

The problem is aggravated by the fact that the Russians could not come to any agreement when attempting to separate jihadist terrorists and truly moderate opposition forces in Syria. The parties blamed each-other for this failure and analysts could interpret it in entirely different ways.

² Tawfic, A. “As long as Assad’s barrel bomb blitz continues, Syrians will flee in droves, US and coalition navies could enforce a no-bombing zone easily and without boots on the ground”. The Telegraph. 10 October 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11882038/As-long-as-Assads-barrel-bomb-blitz-continues-Syrians-will-flee-in-droves.html>, Accessed on 20 January 2016.

³ Orosz Z. „Helikopterek alkalmazása a terrorizmus elleni harcban”. *Hadtudományi Szemle*, 1/3. 2008. 28–33. http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00003/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2008_3_028-033.pdf, Accessed on 14 March 2016.

⁴ Besenyő J. and Gömöri, R. “Christians in Syria and the civil war”. In *Panorama of global security environment 2014* CENAA, 2015. 219–230.

⁵ Rodgers, L. et al. “Syria: The story of the conflict”. BBC. 10 October 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>, Accessed on 10 January 2016.

Russian analysts suggest that the US itself is funding, training, supplying jihadist terrorists in Syria as reported by Russian media^{6,7,8} and other, including Western sources.^{9,10} ¹¹ Therefore pinpointing “their boys” on the battle map would go against US interests. Such logic puts the US policy makers in a very difficult position. They cannot say, that all or the overwhelming majority of the forces in Syria opposing Assad are surely not terrorists (with the exception of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and a few other terrorist groups) in which case US intelligence has no idea where they hide. The US can also not admit – without losing face – that the overwhelming majority of the “opposition” are jihadist terrorists, and therefore we should mark the entire territory of opposition on the map of Syria as enemy terrorist forces, awaiting Russian bombardment.

Former US president Jimmy Carter is a very good counter-example of the official US approach to Russia and the Syria war during the Obama administration. He promised to provide his accurate map of Syrian forces to the Russians and suggested, that if the Russians hit the wrong targets, that would be his fault (!):, *Former President Jimmy Carter said ... that he provided maps of Islamic State positions in Syria to the Russian embassy in Washington, a move apparently at odds with the Obama administration's official policy of not cooperating with Russia in the Syrian war... “I sent [Putin] a message Thursday and asked him if he wanted a copy of our map so he could bomb accurately in Syria, and then on Friday, the Russian embassy in Atlanta – I mean in Washington, called down and told me they would like very much to have the map,” Carter said at his Sunday school class in Georgia, according to a video of his remarks first aired by NBC News. “So in the future, if Russia doesn't bomb the right places, you'll know it's not Putin's fault but it's my fault,” he added as the audience laughed.*¹²

The US proposal of a “no-flight zone” in Syria could have become an official policy if Hillary Clinton won the presidential elections. Hillary Clinton is known as a politician that supports the idea of installing a “no-flight zone” in Syria. Such a policy fails to recognise, that it would definitely not get Russian support in the UN Security Council since Russia would veto it. A Russian veto in the UN Security Council would make the imposition of

⁶ “Weapons can end up with terrorists now US military aid restrictions to Syria lifted – Kremlin”. Russia Today. 9 December 2016. <https://www.rt.com/news/369746-weapons-terrorists-supplies-obama/>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

⁷ “US knows weapons sent to Syrian rebels end up with terrorists’ – German journo to RT”. Russia Today. 27 September 2016. <https://www.rt.com/news/360865-us-arms-terrorists-syria/>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

⁸ “US to supply terrorists with tanks and missiles”. Pravda Report. 9 December 2016. <http://www.pravdareport.com/video/09-12-2016/136381-usa-0/>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

⁹ Harris, M. “US using Israel, Saudi Arabia as conduit in Syria war: Analyst”. Press TV. 12 October 2016. <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/10/12/488715/Syria-US-Israel-Saudi-Arabia-Daesh-Aleppo-Syrian-troops>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

¹⁰ “Moon of Alabama: Syrian-Russian Offensive against Terrorists in Aleppo. US Supplies Advanced Weapons to Al Qaeda, A Few Links On Syria”. Global Research. 29 September 2016. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/syrian-russian-offensive-against-terrorists-in-aleppo-us-supplies-advanced-weapons-to-al-qaeda/5548430>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

¹¹ “Russia, Turkey: US supporting Syria ‘terrorist’ groups. Turkish president lashes out at US-led forces as Russia says new Washington defence policy would empower ‘jihadists’”. Al Jazeera. 28 December 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/russia-turkey-syria-161228050019245.html>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

¹² Wisner, D. “Jimmy Carter offers help for Russia's bombing campaign in Syria”. Fox News. October 21, 2015. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/10/21/jimmy-carter-offers-help-for-russias-bombing-campaign-in-syria/>, Accessed on 24 October 2015.

a “no-flight zone” illegal in accordance with international law. The reason of the Russian veto would be that imposition of a possible “no-flight zone” in Syria would block Russian and/or Syrian Air Force activities; thereby the Russians would shoot themselves in the leg if agreeing with such a policy.

Only forces opposing Assad would benefit from such a “no-flight zone” since they are shielded from Russian and Syrian aerial reconnaissance and bombardment. They do not have an air force at all, so their military capabilities are unaffected by the restrictions of a “no-flight zone”. Clinton might suggest that the main policy goal of her “no-flight zone” is to save civil lives but that is an unacceptably high price for cornering Russia and ultimately bringing the world ever closer to an all-out war with Russia. Such a war would most probably be World War III, including massive strikes with nuclear weapons.

If Clinton’s policy is forced on Russia, it would corner Moscow in a way where there are no solutions without losing face. If a “no-flight zone” is successfully imposed on Russia that would change the outcome of the Syria war, since bulk of the Russian military capabilities intended to be used during the war would be paralysed. It would also be a precedent of Russian weakness and readiness to capitulate to Western diktats in any wars Russia might fight in the future. The message would suggest that the West only needs to impose a “no-flight zone” (i.e. in Syria), or a “no-go zone”(i.e. in Eastern Ukraine, where the separatists do not have an air force, and the Russian Air Force is not deployed either for political reasons), or both a “no-flight zone” and a “no-go zone” (i.e. Crimea, which would be entirely paralysed if Russia complies) and Russia would capitulate. It is obvious that no great powers could ever agree to such diktats, especially if the given superpower – the US – has military capabilities similar to that of Russia, including a powerful arsenal of nuclear strike capabilities.

Another Russian policy option would be to ignore the “no-flight zone”. In this case, the US would have to make a difficult decision. One option would be to ignore Russian actions. In this case it would be a humiliation of the US, since their imposition of the “no-flight zone” is reduced something non-existent. Another policy option would be to shoot down Russian aircraft entering the “no-flight zone”. That would be an act of war and would lead to a major war between the US and Russia. Such a major war is in no one’s interest, since it would endanger the mere survival of humankind. Luckily, US president Trump is well aware of the dangers of such insane and illegal policies, and therefore we might avoid a major war between the US and Russia during his presidency.

“Layer” No. 2. – Conflict between alliances

Alliances are formed between great powers and countries in the region, including Syria. There are many alliances between different countries that are irrelevant for us this time, we need to focus on alliances that include either the US, or Russia. It is quite difficult to label alliances between the US and Saudi Arabia or Qatar clearly official or unofficial. The same logic applies to alliances between Russia, Iraq and Iran. Syria is clearly aligned with Russia, even according to the US or Russian mainstream. Alliances serve multiple purposes that are difficult to list. They provide business opportunities, allow access to military bases, etc. In case of Syria, the Russians have a history of very good relations with the Assad family,

dated back to Soviet times. Russia has military bases^{13, 14, 15, 16, 17} in Syria that are important for them since they provide access to region.

“Layer” No. 3. – The core – the multi-billion dollar gas pipeline business

There are two major natural gas pipeline project plans that turned out to be historically important not only for Syria, but for the US, Russia, Europe without even mentioning the source countries of Middle Eastern gas. There is a US-backed and a Russia-backed project aiming to supply Europe with natural gas but these projects have different source countries and their planned routes are also different. The US-backed pipeline project is planned to supply natural gas from Qatar through Saudi Arabia and Syria to Turkey and ultimately to Europe. The Russia-backed pipeline route is planned to supply natural gas from Iran through Iraq and Syria, then ultimately to Europe. As we can observe there is one thing in common: both gas supply pipeline routes cross Syria (Annex 1). Here comes the conflict.

The US-backed gas pipeline project supports businesses of US allies. Similarly the Russia-backed pipeline project supports businesses of Russian allies. The US pipeline project has an enormous strategic relevance once operational, since it opens up Middle Eastern gas supply to Europe in quantities that allow to lower European dependence on Russian gas. Once built, it would certainly compete with Russian gas prices, driving the prices of Russian gas lower. It would also bring an end to the quasi gas monopoly of Russia in Europe by serving gas supply diversification. It is a strategic interest of the US to weaken all rival states, including Russia. Since a great percentage of Russian state incomes come from energy exports, especially gas exports to Europe,¹⁸ such a gas pipeline supplying Middle Eastern gas to Europe is of historic relevance concerning the income of the Russian state, therefore the entire Russian development.

It is obvious, that Russia would lose bargaining power towards her European customers once the US-backed gas pipeline project is accomplished and the quasi-monopolistic status of Russian gas supply would become an issue of the past. For such reasons, Russia opposes the accomplishment of the US-backed pipeline to Europe.

¹³ “Russia Needs 2nd Syrian Airbase to ‘Enhance the Effectiveness’ of Combat Mission”. Sputnik News. 2 October 2016. <https://sputniknews.com/world/201610021045916425-russia-syria-hmeymim-airbase/>, Accessed on 17 November 2016.

¹⁴ “Russia opening second military airbase in Syria”. Business Insider. December 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-opening-second-military-airbase-in-syria-2015-12>, Accessed on 17 November 2016.

¹⁵ Kretsul, R. “Are Russia and the U.S. building military bases in Syria? The global media are increasingly reporting that the U.S. and Russia are building military bases in Syria”. Russia Beyond The Headlines. 26 January 2016. http://rbth.com/international/2016/01/26/are-russia-and-the-us-building-military-bases-in-syria_562379, Accessed on 17 November 2016.

¹⁶ “Russia has no plans to create new airbase near Syria’s Al Qamishli”. Russia Beyond The Headlines. 25 January 2016. http://rbth.com/news/2016/01/25/russia-has-no-plans-to-create-new-airbase-near-syrias-al-qamishli_562103, Accessed on 17 November 2016.

¹⁷ Durden, T. “Presenting The Russian Naval Base In Tartus, Syria, Or Good Luck UN Security Council”. Zerohedge. 4 February 2012. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/presenting-russian-naval-base-tartus-syria-or-good-luck-un-security-council>, Accessed on 17 November 2016.

¹⁸ Ambrose, J. “Gazprom’s gas sales to Europe soar by a third”. The Telegraph. 30 August 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/08/30/gazproms-gas-sales-to-europe-soar-by-a-third/>, Accessed on 5 January 2017.

The US-Russia pipeline struggle is not a new phenomenon in history. A very similar conflict occurred during the classic Cold War. Before we get into further details of the 21st-century conflict, it is worth to analyse the historical background, since it is all about natural gas supply to Europe by pipelines and the key parties involved are mostly the same: Europe, the US and the Soviet Union where the leading party was undoubtedly Russia. The gas supply cooperation between Europe and the Soviet Union (ultimately Russia) was managed with no conflicts despite the Cold War era. Whenever a problem occurred with the gas transportation that was due to purely technical and not political reasons. The technical problems of the pipeline system were urgently repaired and the business did not suffer. Such cooperation between Europe and the Soviet Union was born and functioned despite the US efforts to derail this cooperation from the very beginning.

During the beginning of the Reagan administration in the 1980's, the US campaigned against the planned construction of the natural gas pipeline called Yamal, that later provided gas to Europe. The quarrel was tough. There were countless meetings between the US and European leaders when the US attempted to convince the Europeans not to construct the pipeline and claimed that there were more reliable suppliers of natural gas than the contemporary Soviet Union. One example of the alternative sources recommended by the US was the gigantic Troll gas field in Norway.¹⁹

It is remarkable that during the classic Cold War with the notorious Iron Curtain and the antagonistic opposition between the Western world and the Soviet Union the gas pipeline business went smoothly and the US was the unsuccessful spoiler of such cooperation. It is also interesting, that the contradictions between the two poles appeared far larger than today since there were two, entirely different social systems, and despite the fact that the pipeline wars and supply disruption were on the rise after the demise of the Soviet Union. History repeats itself since the US appears to be the unsuccessful spoiler in case of the Syria war where the attempt to kick Russia out of the Russian-European gas supply business fails entirely. The failure of the US to manage a natural gas pipeline supply route from the Middle East to Europe is comparable to the failure of the Regan administration to derail the European-Soviet natural gas pipeline business.

In the case of Syria in the 21st Century, before the civil war, the power of the alliances in the region was demonstrated by the decision of President Assad concerning the fate of the US-backed pipeline project plan. The Syrian president refused to support the US backed project, supporting the interests of his greatest and most powerful ally: Russia. This act made the US, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (initially Turkey as well) a deadly enemy of Assad. Now we get a glimpse why US president Obama and other Western leaders hand in hand with Western mainstream media insisted so many times that "Assad must go": "*The United States is prepared to work with any nation, including Russia and Iran, to resolve the conflict. But we must recognize that there cannot be, after so much bloodshed, so much carnage, a return to the pre-war status quo.*"²⁰ From the Western point of view: yes, "Assad must go" since not only did he ruin a lucrative multi-billion-dollar business of the US and her allies, but he

¹⁹ Wendt, A. "Reagan's warning was on the mark". Financial Times. 2 May 2014. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4382e8ee-ca3f-11e3-8a31-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XHJQCINe>, Accessed on 2 January 2016.

²⁰ "Remarks by President Obama to the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York". The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 13 October 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-united-nations-general-assembly>, Accessed on 20 February 2016.

also spoiled the effort countering Russia in economic terms and also made the wrong move if we consider energy supply diversity of Europe, ultimately European energy security. The bottom line is: “Assad must go” because he is a reliable Russian ally.

In the case of the Russia-backed gas pipeline project the situation is a little bit more complex. Russia does not want a gas pipeline project connecting the Middle East with Europe, since that reduces Europe’s gas dependence on Russia. However, if such a pipeline project is ever realised, it should connect Russian allies from the Middle East with Europe. In this case setting the gas prices and determining of the quantities supplied to Europe could be orchestrated predominantly on the basis of Russian interests, leaving room for lucrative business to Russian allies. One might suggest that it is a cartel but this appears to be the likely reality once the Russia-backed pipeline might be built.

*“Turkey attempted to persuade Syrian President Bashar Assad to reject the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline and to work with the proposed Qatari-Turkish pipeline, which would ultimately satisfy Turkey and the Gulf Arab nations’ quest for dominance over gas supplies, who are the United State’s allies. But after Assad refused Turkey’s proposal, Turkey and its allies became the major architects to start Syria’s “civil war.” ... The Memorandum of Understanding for the Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline was signed in July, 2012 – just as Syria’s civil war was spreading to Damascus and Aleppo. In July 2013, leaders from Syria, Iran, and Iraq met to sign a preliminary agreement on the pipeline with the hopes of finalizing the deal by the end of the year. This pipeline would by-pass Turkey. The plan by Assad to support the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline plan was a “direct slap in the face” to Qatar’s plans to build a pipeline through Syria ... In July, 2013, Russia rejected a Saudi proposal to abandon Syria’s president, Bashar Assad, in return for a huge arms deal and a pledge to boost Russian influence in the Arab world. ...The Saudi prince also reassured Putin that “whatever regime comes after” Assad, it will be “completely” in the Saudis’ hands and will not sign any agreement allowing any Gulf country to transport its gas across Syria to Europe and compete with Russian gas exports ... Putin rejected the Saudi Arabian proposal. When this happened, Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia then let the Russians know that the only option left in Syria was military action. So, why did Russia reject the proposal to partner with Saudi Arabia? Asked about the Putin-Bandar meeting, a Syrian politician said: “Saudi Arabia thinks that politics is a simple matter of buying people or countries. It doesn’t understand that Russia is a major power and that this is not how it determines its policy. Syria and Russia have had close ties for over half a century in all fields and it’s not Saudi money that will change this fact”.*²¹

Similarly “deadly sins” that Assad “committed” were also done by the former Libyan dictator, Col. Muammar Gaddafi when he nationalised private energy industry of his country, hurting the private interests of Western energy companies. Once Gaddafi came to power, Libya became a flourishing country with one of the highest living standards and social security in comparison to the countries in the region. Gaddafi was brutally tortured and murdered in a war supported by the US and Western powers under the pretext of protecting Libyan civilians against the “regime”. Since Western protection of civilians was “accomplished” by bringing the Gaddafi “regime” down, the country descended into civil war, chaos and could not recover ever since. The fall of Gaddafi is also a major reason of the illegal, massive

²¹ “The Roots of the War in Syria”. Syrian Free Press. 27 October 2015. <https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2015/10/27/war-for-pipelines/>, Accessed on 20 January 2016.

immigration wave to Europe, which erupted in 2015, since Libya no longer stops the flow of migrants crossing its borders.

The fate of the oil rich Iraq of Saddam Hussein was quite similar to that of Libya under Gaddafi. Saddam got to war with Iran and he was a very good US ally at that time, since the oil and gas rich Iran was one of the greatest enemies declared by the US. Once he invaded Kuwait, he did the wrong thing hurting US interests. The US invaded Iraq, but left Saddam in power because his rule was needed to counter Iran. Later on, based on false pretexts such as “possession of weapons of mass destruction” posing a threat to the US and her allies, and alleged links to Al-Qaeda, the US invaded Iraq again and got rid of Saddam. Weapons of mass destruction were not found after years of systematic search, and Al-Qaeda links were proved to be non-existent. Later on, a new pretext appeared on the US side suggesting that the US “liberated” the country from dictatorship and “brought democracy” to the Iraqi people. Iraq descended into endless civil war and destruction, and – instead of democracy – ISIS was born.

WHY PIPELINE WARS ARE DIRTY? AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF SYRIA

The pipeline projects mentioned in this article – one from Soviet times during the classic Cold War, the others planned to cross contemporary Syria – are multibillion-dollar projects and they provide far more than enough reasons to wage wars and destroy countries, causing enormous human suffering. In case of the Cold War, a war in literal terms between the West and the Soviet Union was not “on the table”: the natural gas pipeline project was a great example of economic cooperation on the basis of stability, mutual respect of each-others interests and building a smoothly running business despite all differences. The interference of the US – which was an integral part of the Western world (as she is today) – was an interference of a third party. One might suggest that the US interference was driven by legitimate security concerns but history proved that these concerns were unjustified until the end of the Cold War in its classic term. The US itself risked nothing when referring to security concerns since all the potential risks and benefits were taken by Europe and the Soviet Union. The US was not dependent on Russian gas supply in this project and that justifies the labelling of the US as an outsider. The US was a deadly enemy of the former Soviet Union attempting to block, derail all forms of cooperation that would strengthen both the Soviet Union and Europe even though the latter was part of the Western system. This attitude was destructive and failed as history proved it. This is why my overall evaluation of the role of the US at that time concerning natural gas pipeline cooperation is negative. The US attitude could even be called dirty if we realise, that without a European gas business with the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, Europe would have definitely suffered from shortage of natural gas. Keep in mind that gas pipelines connecting Europe and the Middle East are still under planning or development (Annex 2). Europe is still dependent on the Russian natural gas supply that delayed but did not stop the depletion of Europe’s own conventional, natural gas fields. If we keep in mind these facts, US interference in the natural gas business was retrospectively a “dirty policy”, even though it was not a “dirty pipeline war” in literal terms of war.

In the case of Syria it is obviously not merely a “war of pipeline plans”, discussed by politicians and experts, but a serious war in literal terms. Since (a) an entire country was destroyed because various parties of the conflict attempted to pursue their own interests in order to build their own preferred pipelines, (b) most parties of the conflict lied to their public

and (c) even the risk of a new world war between Russia and the US was risen: I consider this pipeline war “dirty” in nature. Even though this pipeline war is labelled “dirty”, the roles of the various parties show significant differences in ethical terms.

I would abstain this time from an analysis to determine whether the contemporary US – a key party in this pipeline war – is a genuine and benevolent bourgeois democracy or not. However, it can be safely concluded that the US has indeed extremely problematic allies deeply affecting the Syria war. The most problematic US ally is definitely Saudi Arabia. Without getting into too many details of how virtually all pillars of a contemporary Western-style democracy are entirely absent in Saudi Arabia – suppression of women, child-marriages, public beheadings, stoning to death, cutting off hands as a punishment, financing, training, and arming the most brutal types of international terrorism, including ISIS and Al-Qaeda jihadist fighters etc. – there is an unfortunate silence concerning this on the side of official mainstream US policy makers, most of whom officially raise no concerns about their ally. To make it even worse, the US supports Sunni radicals and meanwhile opposes Shia, when the overwhelming majority of Islamist terrorists around the world are Sunni, not Shia.²²

Saudi Arabia is a traditional ally of the US and most probably has the most significant *direct* role in the Syria war. The US does not only have extremely problematic allies, but US policy makers made very “problematic” decisions when directly supporting such allies during the Syria war, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In light of this, US criticisms of the “authoritarian regime” of Vladimir Putin are not credible. There are problems concerning human rights in Russia – like in many other countries of the world – but at a different scale in comparison to Saudi Arabia. Those who criticize Russia, must demonstrate a good example themselves. In this case, when we are talking about the alliance of the US and Saudi Arabia, the US fails to provide a good example. The US demonstrates, the *there is no dictatorship dirty enough to disqualify itself from becoming a US ally, once US interests drive the lone superpower to form alliances. Such alliances are clearly not based on values*, as often claimed by US mainstream (when claims are made in a generalised way, not even mentioning Saudi Arabia). It proves the lack of value-based policymaking on the side of Washington, at least in case of Saudi Arabia (Qatar, Chile and other dictatorships).

Such realities discredit US involvement in the Syria war, when the “sins” of the “Assad regime” against the Syrian people are emphasised by mainstream politicians and media. Since I have no knowledge of any existing *genuine* “Muslim democracy” at all (including the relatively secular Turkey, or Tunisia), it leads to a conclusion that that there are either some forms of dictatorships in the Muslim world, or instability, chaos and bloodshed. This is precisely what happened during the so called “Arab Spring” – which was praised by mainstream Western politicians and policy makers (at least at the beginning) and now it appears that the dictatorships that were overthrown were still the “lesser evil” in terms of human suffering, than the chaos and destruction of the “liberation”, resulting in endless sectarian violence. Syria was flourishing and liveable before the long lasting civil war, ignited and supported mostly by several foreign powers. The power of Mr. Assad is secular. The Saudis and ultimately

²² Zuesse, E. “Trump Team Targets Iran”. Strategic Culture. 13 January 2017. <http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/01/13/trump-team-targets-iran.html>, Accessed on 13 January 2017.

the US – when insisting that “Assad must go”^{23, 24, 25} – in fact support Sunni style Sharia law in Syria. US policies drive Syria to become a puppet regime of Saudi Arabia, ultimately the US herself. Such a US policy is deeply cynical and unacceptable, especially if we refer to the foundations of traditional “Western values” as the basis of the settlement in Syria.

The facts and arguments – that provide a glimpse of the undemocratic and destructive nature of US policies – suggest that the Syria war is a “dirty pipeline war”, at least from the perspective of US and Saudi policies.

Russian intentions are of a different kind. When Russia claims that she supports a secular government (based upon the official request of that government) and she fights terrorists, Russia is right. The so-called “moderate opposition” of President Assad is a fiction, not promising reconciliation and national unity. From this point of view, the “dirty pipeline war” is not symmetric at all.

Russia fights radical jihadists, no matter what we call them: Al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, “opposition” etc. For those, who are sceptical concerning a prosperous and ultimately stable future of Syria under President Assad, in alliance with Russia and Iran, I would suggest they should see the masses celebrating the liberation and Christmas in Aleppo. I would also suggest the evaluation of the UN reaction when Palmyra – full of historic sites and treasures – was liberated from the jihadists – or the future reaction of the UN when Palmyra would be retaken again by Syrian government forces.^{26, 27, 28} Both Syrian government and Russian sources claim, that the jihadist retaking of the once liberated Palmyra was a result of a deliberate US retaliation. The US-led coalition postponed striking jihadist forces allowing them to regroup, concentrate manpower and weaponry to retake Palmyra. The jihadist success was a big surprise and it was achieved despite heavy Russian bombings of the advancing jihadist forces. Syrian government and Russian sources also claim that the jihadist radicals were fully aware of the plans of the US-led coalition in advance. Otherwise, they could not have attacked Palmyra with forces capable to retake the city.

Unlike the jihadist terrorists of ISIS, who deliberately destroy any cultural heritage, including monuments contradicting to their fundamentalist beliefs²⁹ in Palmyra and anywhere

²³ Hijab, R. “There’s hope for Syria: but first, Assad must go”. The Telegraph. 7 September 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/07/theres-hope-for-syria---but-first-assad-must-go/>, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁴ Wintour, P. “Boris Johnson says Assad must go if Syrians’ suffering is to end, New foreign secretary takes stance ahead of international talks that differs from December column asserting UK could not ‘be picky’ about its allies”. The Guardian. 19 July 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/boris-johnson-bashar-al-assad-must-go-if-syrians-suffering-to-end>, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁵ Chollet, D. “Assad must go, but regime change is not the answer”. The Washington Post. 29 September 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/09/29/assad-must-go-but-regime-change-is-not-the-answer/?utm_term=.790faa740ed2, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁶ McKirdy, E. and Dewan, A. “Reports: ISIS retakes ancient Syrian city of Palmyra”. CNN. 12 December 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/12/middleeast/palmyra-syria-isis-russia/>, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁷ Shaheen, K. “Islamic State retakes historic city of Palmyra. Isis-affiliated news channel claims victory for jihadi fighters after intense fighting prompts Syrian military to withdraw”. The Guardian. 11 December 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/islamic-state-retakes-palmyra-syria>, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁸ Solomon, E. “Isis retakes ancient Syrian city of Palmyra: Loss for Assad’s forces will raise questions about limitations of air strikes”. The Financial Times. 12 December 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/be2ede50-c054-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354>, Accessed on 16 January 2017.

²⁹ Such as portrayal of faces, proof of cultures different to radical Islam existed in the Middle East etc.

under their control, the government of President Assad aims to preserve these treasures of history. The Syrian government supports archaeology research and wants to benefit from tourism to historic sites. Western mainstream politicians and media never congratulated, nor celebrated Russia or Assad for liberating Palmyra, that shows the deeply destructive, cynical, manipulated, and partial nature of the contemporary Western establishment. Similar reactions are expected, when the second liberation of Palmyra would take place.

Syria under the rule of the secular government of President Assad – with the aid of Russia and Iran – would be a better place to live in comparison to an unending civil war, or the rise to power of a Saudi Sunni puppet regime under Sharia law, supported by the US. From this point of view the “dirty pipeline war” is far from being “equally dirty”, if we consider the roles of the key parties involved.

IN BIG POLITICS AND WAR IN SYRIA ENDLESS PATIENCE IS REQUIRED – THE ISRAELI ATTACKS

Israel bombed Syrian Arab Army targets several times in Syria. Sometimes targets were hit from outside of Syrian airspace (i.e. from Lebanon), sometimes after Israeli jets entered Syrian airspace. *“The air force of ... Israel ... hit al-Mezzeh military airport west of Damascus just after midnight (on 13 January 2017 – the auth.). Several missiles were fired from the Lake Tiberias area and landed in the surroundings of al-Mezzeh airport at 12:25 after midnight, causing a fire to erupt. A military source said the new Israeli attack came in support of the terrorist organizations ’to raise their morale’.*

The General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces has warned ... Israel ... of the repercussions of this ’flagrant attack’, said the source. The Command pledged to continue its war on terrorism ’until eliminating it and cutting off the arms supporting it’, the source added. Al-Mezzeh military airport came under a similar Israeli attack on December 7 of last year, where several ground-to-ground missiles were fired from inside the occupied Palestinian territories to the west of Tall Abu al-Nada (hill).”³⁰

Bombing military targets of the government of another country without a United Nations Security Council Resolution (Mandate) or upon the request of the targeted Syrian government (the latter is absurd) are classic acts of aggression and war, unless there is a justifiable case of self-defence. There are multiple UNSC Resolutions condemning ISIS in Iraq and Syria, also Al-Nusra Front in Syria etc.³¹ but there is no resolution that allows the destruction of the Armed Forces of the Syrian government.

The official position of Israel concerning the latest incident is quite similar to that of possessing nuclear weapons: *“Israel neither confirms nor denies involvement in striking targets inside Syria. Asked about Friday’s incident, an Israeli military spokeswoman said: We don’t comment on reports of this kind.”*³² The interpretation of such statements could

³⁰ “Lone Bear: Friday morning: in support of terrorist gangs, Israeli jets bomb Mezzeh [Syrian military airport west-Damascus]”. Syrian Free Press. 13 January 2017. <https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2017/01/13/friday-morning-in-support-of-terrorist-gangs-israeli-jets-bomb-mezzeh-syrian-military-airport-west-damascus/>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

³¹ “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2107: adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting, on 15 August 2014”. 2014. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/UNSCR-Res-2170.pdf>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

³² Al-Khalidi, S. “Syrian army says Israel fires rockets at airbase near Damascus”. Reuters. 13 January 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-airport-idUSKBN14W35J>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

be the following: “Yes, we did it, and we are not shy to deny it, but we do not want to talk about it at all.” Why? Because the actions of Israel are clearly not in compliance with international law and a possible explanation referring to self-defence would be very difficult and would raise a lot of other questions. Similar Israeli logic applies to the possession nuclear weapons that has been neither denied, nor confirmed by official Israeli sources ever since they acquired nuclear weapons.

Given the technological level of the Israeli Air Force, its electronic warfare capabilities, etc. it is highly unlikely that the Syrian government is capable of destroying Israeli jets. However, Russia is most likely technically capable to shoot down Israeli jets with no problems, especially so since the presence of the newest and most powerful Russian S-400 air defence assets.³³³⁴

This raises the question whether Russia is in a position to interfere and stop Israel from bombing Syrian government targets. We need to keep in mind that Israeli bombing is far from having a chance to alter the outcome of the Syrian war, especially since the heavy Russian military involvement. In other words, the Israeli bombardment is limited in nature and even though it is most likely that Russia is technically capable to shoot down Israeli jets, the political and economic price of that would most likely to be far higher than what Russia wants to pay.

In case Russia shoots down Israeli jets, US president, Donald Trump would come under enormous pressure. The bulk of the US and other Western establishments would make an “uproar” that a “Russian aggression” resulted in “war against Israel”, which “has the right of self-defence” and “has the right to exist” etc. The “uproar” of the Western establishment could be more intense than in the aftermath of the alleged Russian hacking of the Democratic Party, including presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, thus allegedly contributing to the election victory of Donald Trump. Various voices suggesting that a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine would allow peace³⁵ would weaken in favour of anti-Russian hysteria, warmongering, pledges to support Israel, and retaliation. Russia would most likely lose the momentum of the new US president, Donald Trump who intends to normalise relations and possibly lift the economic sanctions against Russia. These arguments explain why Israel can get away after such airstrikes unpunished.

CONCLUSIONS

The war in Syria is motivated by intentions mostly excluded from official policies, since they are designed for public consumption and public delusion. It is not desirable for the Western political elite to officially admit the truth that *“Yes, we are going to war to destroy an entire country because that country is an ally of our rival, Russia and they want to build a natural gas pipeline which contradicts our plans. You people, the taxpayers would pay the costs of our military adventures. Human suffering through years and the destruction of most of the*

³³ ‘Главком ВКС РФ: С поставкой С-400 Россия сразу навела порядок в воздушном пространстве Сирии’. Russia Today. 27 December 2015. <https://russian.rt.com/article/139106>, Accessed on 1 January 2016.

³⁴ ‘США и их союзники обеспокоены тем, что российские С-400 могут покрыть всю территорию Сирии’. Russia Today. 26 November 2015. <https://russian.rt.com/article/132770>, Accessed on 1 January 2016.

³⁵ Irish, J. and Wroughton, L. “At Paris meeting, major powers to warn Trump over Middle East peace”. Reuters. 15 January 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-france-idUSKBN14Y0SD>, Accessed on 15 January 2017.

Syrian infrastructure does not matter: it would be the problem of the country that we destroy" etc. Such arguments – once officially admitted – would provoke outrage and withdrawal of public support from any government, who might argue this way.

The pipeline wars are all about great-power rivalry, mainly between the US and Russia, but countries around Syria are also deeply involved. In our case in Syria, the main goal of the US is to replace a Russian ally with that of the US.

Replacing Assad's power with no matter how radical jihadists firmly aligned with Saudi-Arabia (and ultimately with the US) – that would install a Sunni dictatorship in Syria based on Sharia law – could have allowed to build a pipeline through Syria to Europe, providing natural gas from US allies in the Middle East. As a result, European dependency on Russian gas would be reduced.

The potential extent of the Russian natural gas market loss in Europe depends on several factors. It depends on the amount and the price of the natural gas supplied from the Middle East. Since the infrastructure to supply gas from Russia to Europe is already built and the gas supply from the Middle East would definitely need new infrastructure investments, the degree to which Europe would abandon already existing infrastructure allowing Russian supply – as long as it can be justified by politics and also forces of the market – is yet unknown.

If Europe might entirely get rid of Russian gas supply that would contradict supply diversification. Such a development would be unwelcome, since the dependency on Russia would be replaced with another dependency on the Middle East.

Russia would suffer in economic terms if the European gas market might become unavailable. However, it would cause only temporary problems, because there are many countries in the world that are eager to buy Russian gas.

The Syrian government – firmly aligned with Russia – makes US-backed pipeline plans crossing Syria impossible, since Assad enjoys a wide range of Russian support. This includes political, economic and military support when Russia acts as a truly great power, a real "heavy weight". The liberation of Aleppo proves this conclusion, since it marks the de facto victory of Mr. Assad and ultimately Russia.

Unlike the US, Russia is not interested in installing a natural gas pipeline from the Middle East through Syria to Europe since the project would lower the European dependency on Russian gas. However, if such a project strengthens Russia's allies in the Middle East, Russia will be most likely to support it, as she did before the civil war in Syria.

Natural gas pipelines are multibillion-dollar projects and they provide far more than enough reasons to wage wars and destroy countries, causing enormous human suffering. An entire country – that is Syria in our case – was mostly destroyed because of various parties of the conflict, which attempted to pursue their own interests in order to build their own preferred pipelines.

Since most parties of the conflict lied to their public and even the risk of a new world war was raised, I consider pipeline wars dirty in nature. Had Hillary Clinton been elected as the next president of the US, the danger of a major war between the US and Russia would have become higher than at any other time since the dissolution of the USSR.

Pipeline wars are not equally dirty if we consider the true motivations and actions of the major players involved in the wars.

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
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
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Annex 1 Alternative, planned pipeline projects, aimed to supply Middle Eastern gas to Europe, through Syria³⁶



Annex 2 Europe – Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline Map³⁷

³⁶ Source: <https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2015/10/27/war-for-pipelines/> (Accessed on 15 January 2016)

³⁷ Source: <http://www.mappery.com/map-of/Europe-Proposed-Natural-Gas-Pipelines-Map> (Accessed on 16 January 2017)

Zdzisław Śliwa – Marcin Górniewicz¹:

THE SELECTED ASEAN NATIONS' MILITARY CAPABILITIES FACING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES

ABSTRACT: The security situation in Asia in the South and East China Seas marine areas is influencing the stability of the whole continent. Security fragility is causing military build-up and Chinese military development maritime claims are major factors causing concerns of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. It is complicated by an uncertain future toward US commitment in Asia. The paper is focused on military capabilities of ASEAN nations which are directly involved into South China Sea maritime disputes: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. They are developing their military potentials due to threat assessment, security situation and within their resources. The paper is not analysing PLA capabilities but is referring to them. Moreover, Taiwan is not discussed as the focus is on ASEAN countries.

KEYWORDS: ASEAN, South China Sea, Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, maritime disputes

INTRODUCTION

The security situation in Asia, especially in relation to the South and East China Seas, has its influence on the overall situation there in many domains. Especially security followed by military build-up has an influence on the relations among nations there. Among them China in obviously the major factor as the nation is not only a regional power but it is extending its global ambitions along with capabilities to play such the role. The country is also forwarding security related ideas: the conceptual one “anti-access/area denial” and the territorial one “two island chains”. Those are enhanced by economic and partially security ideas: “String of Pearls” and “One Belt, One Road”². The maritime disputes in the South China Sea are the present-day concern for countries grouped in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and there is a danger that the complex approach by Beijing will influence each of them individually and the organization as the whole. It is complicated by an uncertain future of the US commitment causing investments into military capabilities.

The paper is focused on analysing military capabilities of ASEAN nations which are directly involved in the South China Sea maritime disputes. They are developing their military potentials due to their threat assessment, security situation, and within available but limited budget which is requiring a clear establishment of priorities. The nations to consider are Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The paper emphasizes the quantity and quality of current status of armed forces and main factors toward modernization of military capabilities. The main research question is: What is the efficiency of selected nations' military capabilities in the specific environment in the South China Sea? The paper is not analysing

¹ Opinions expressed by the author are his own views and they do not reflect in any way the official policy or position of the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland.

² Also known as: *The Belt and Road* or *The Silk Road Economic Belt* and the *21st-century Maritime Silk Road*.

specifically PLA³ capabilities but is referring to them in conclusions. Moreover, Taiwan is not discussed as the focus is on ASEAN countries. The study includes the following factors: level of military forces (quantity and quality of military forces, level of training and battlefield experience); abilities of using paramilitary and civilian resources in military operation. The paper is based on available open and official sources and during the preparation of the study theoretical research methods were adopted including analysis, synthesis and comparison.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN RELATION TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BASIN

The US presidential election in November 2016 generated some concerns for the Asian security especially as the expectation was that Donald Trump would not win and there will be just minor adjustment of ongoing US Asian pivot. However, according to The Diplomat the result of the election is that “U.S. allies and partners in the region may no longer be able to count on the kinds of the reassurance about Washington’s security commitment that they have grown used to” and the newly elected president “will instil a much greater sense of uncertainty – even anxiety – in U.S. allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region.”⁴ Such concerns are a challenge for major US allies, Japan, South Korea and especially dangerous for small nations because those, when searching for security guarantees, were looking for balancing options. So, they were considering an alliance with the US as a dominant power “to avoid domination by stronger powers”⁵, and in that context it was related to a threat coming from too strong influences posed by regional countries like China or India.

Among the smaller countries belonging to ASEAN (see the fig. 1) many are considering rising China as a possible threat for their security. The nations usually had no common voice avoiding challenging Beijing and they were even preventing each other from making

Fig. 1. The member nations of the Association of South-east Asian Nations.

Source: “Asean on the cusp of greatness”. *Business Circle*, 5 May 2015. <http://www.businesscircle.com.my/asean-on-the-cusp-of-greatness/>, Accessed on 23 November 2016.



³ PLA - The Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

⁴ Tatsumi, Y. “Trump Wins: Implications for US Allies and Partners in Asia”. *The Diplomat*. 09 November 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/trump-wins-implications-for-us-allies-and-partners-in-asia/>, Accessed on 22 November 2016.

⁵ Read about theories: Walt, S. M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power“. *International Security* 9/4. 1985. 3–43.

joint statements related to Chinese policy in the South China Sea as it happened in 2012 during ASEAN summit. Currently there is a change in such attitude as presented by the joint communiqué released by the foreign ministers of the ASEAN member nations during the organisational forum in Myanmar in August 2014. The language was tougher: “we urged all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint and avoid actions which would complicate the situation and undermine peace, stability, and security in the South China Sea and to settle disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.”⁶

The countries’ fragility in many domains including economy is complicating the organisation’s situation as it is not a collective security body. The growing power of leading Asian nations is causing them to make decisions about future as they “do not want to be bullied just because we’re small.”⁷ They have also many internal issues as economic stagnation, political instability, social unrest, and growing crime, which make them very vulnerable and susceptible to external influences. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism and religious radicalism are influencing all domains of national existence and they are rather anti-West in nature. There are also many bilateral disagreements within ASEAN causing cooperation more complicated and being a factor to be used to disunite the organization in making any common effort to improve the situation of the South East Asia in general.

The territorial disputes on the South China Sea are a major source of hostilities with the focus on Spratly Islands (table 1) and Paracel Islands as China is continually presenting decisive approach in relation to its rights there.⁸ The islands have economic and military importance allowing using them for deploying air force and navy assets. It is already ongoing e.g. on Woody Island within the Paracel Islands, as the newly constructed runway could be used by PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to “enhance Woody Island’s utility as a military base from which to project power in the South China Sea”.⁹

Table 1. *Islands occupied by respective countries within Spratly Islands.*

No.	Country	No of occupied islands	Number of troops, installations
1	China	7	260, a few helicopter landing pads
2	the Philippines	8	480, air strip (1300m.)
3	Vietnam	24	600, air strip (600 m.)
4	Malaysia	3	70, air strip (600 m.)
5	Taiwan	1	100, helicopter landing pad

Source: Z. Śliwa, *Maritime disputes in East Asia and Pacific region– stormy waves of international relations, Security and Defence Quarterly No 1(6) 2015, the National Defense University, Warsaw, March 2015, p. 123.*

⁶ Hardy, J. “Analysis: ASEAN finds voice over South China Sea dispute”. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. 14 August 2014. [http://www.janes.com/article/42006/analysis-asean-finds-voice-over-south-china-sea-dispute?utm_campaign=\[PMP\]_PC6110_E14%20DF%20NL%20SECURITY%2008_19_2014_DW_Deployment&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua](http://www.janes.com/article/42006/analysis-asean-finds-voice-over-south-china-sea-dispute?utm_campaign=[PMP]_PC6110_E14%20DF%20NL%20SECURITY%2008_19_2014_DW_Deployment&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua), Accessed on 24 November 2016.

⁷ Hardy. “Analysis: ASEAN finds voice over South China Sea dispute”.

⁸ For details about maritime territorial disputes in East Asia read: Dolven, B., Kan, S. A. and Manyin, M. E. “Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress”. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service. 30 January 2013. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42930.pdf>, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

⁹ Hardy, J. “China expands runway, harbour at Woody Island”. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. 24 August 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/42538/china-expands-runway-harbour-at-woody-island?utm_campaign=%5bPMP%5d_mpc6110_E14%20DF%20NL%20SECUIRTY%2009_02_2014_DW_Deployment&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua, Accessed on 24 November 2016.

There are also incidents in the South China Sea airspace, which is linked with US Navy patrols and reconnaissance missions to monitor the status of Chinese island base construction. The flights are occurring in the vicinity of the Hainan Island, which is an important PLA Navy (PLAN) Submarine Base, including basing strategic nuclear submarines. The South China Sea disputes are involving the ASEAN nations namely Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam and to a lesser extent Brunei – ASEAN-4. All of them are concerned about a possibility of an open conflict and those nations are investing into their armed forces. Nevertheless, they are fully aware that left alone none of them is capable to face the overwhelming power of the PLA. Recognizing the fragility of the situation and respecting “twin visions of peace and prosperity” it guides “ASEAN and China to exercise self-restraint, refrain from the use of force, undertake practical maritime cooperation, and promote peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.”¹⁰ It is important to notify that the South China Sea’s disputes are not the only hot spot in East Asia as there are a few more as presented in fig. 2. Those are involving almost all the nations in the region including Russia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The last three countries are US allies having bilateral security arrangements related to collective defence, ambiguities with Beijing, and building their military potential for uncertain future.



Fig. 2. Maritime disputes in the East Asia and Pacific.

Source: prepared based on: “East Asia Political map 2011”. University of Texas Libraries, Austin 2011. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-780028873-asia_east_pol-2011.jpg. Accessed on 23 November 2016.

The ASEAN nations still have not been unified in their common approach toward Beijing especially as it tries to engage them on bilateral base to exploit it for their own purposes. Nevertheless, “progress on the bilateral front does not undermine, deny, or contradict any multi-lateral or international framework, but rather creates new opportunities to bring those organizations and platforms into the talks and to incorporate them into bilaterally accepted decisions”.¹¹ The complicated situation supports the improvement of relations with Washington by those smaller actors and initiation of attempts to unify efforts. For ASEAN-4 nations enhancement of military capabilities is a challenge as of economy and also political factors but it is necessary to increase their territorial integrity and capabilities to face claims within the South China Sea.

¹⁰ “Fact Sheet on ASEAN Community 2015”. The ASEAN Secretariat Community Relations Division (CRD). December 2015. 2. <http://asean.org/resource/fact-sheets>, Accessed on 24 November 2016.

¹¹ Sprangler, M. “Rebalancing the Rebalance”. *Parameters* 44/2. 2014. 20.

THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF SELECTED ASEAN NATIONS

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces

Brunei Darussalam is a small country located on the northern coast of the island of Borneo, bordering Malaysia. The territory is divided into two separate areas. The terrain is mostly flat, except mountains on the south and marshlands on the east; its 75% is covered by rainforests, which favours defenders.¹² The beaches are sandy, suitable for amphibious operations. It can be assumed that the area is conducive to defence using asymmetric and hybrid methods including guerrilla warfare and sabotage actions. Brunei has a specific political system in Southeast Asia, because it is a constitutional monarchy in the form of Sultanate. Executive power is exercised by the government, headed by the Sultan, and the legislative power is exercised by the sultan himself. It is worth noting that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was crowned in August 1968¹³ and serves as prime minister, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs and trade, defence minister and foreign minister.¹⁴ The Legislative Council has an advisory role, and legal restrictions to the power of the Sultan as head of state are symbolic. In fact, the Sultan of Brunei has almost unlimited power, which makes this system closer to a constitutional absolute monarchy rather than a constitutional monarchy with a number of restrictions for the role of the ruler.¹⁵ It is worth noting that the royal family has ruled Brunei continuously for six centuries. This model of governance is conducive to the development of the armed forces, where all the important decisions, including the purchase of weapons, depend on the ruler, which reduces and shortens the decision-making process.

Brunei regained independence from Britain on 1 January 1984, so training system and military equipment are similar to the British model, especially as armed forces have continued training in close cooperation with the troops of the United Kingdom and Singapore. Military equipment comes from US and Europe (mainly from UK). Brunei troops took part in numerous humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations, but there is a lack of combat experience. It can be assumed that a policy of defence of Brunei is mainly based on close military cooperation with the United Kingdom, Singapore and with the United States.¹⁶ The cooperation is enhanced thanks to the oil and gas fields in Brunei as an 'ally' in the eyes of London and Washington. This alliance is the cornerstone of the defence concept.

¹² Engbers, P. "Forest cover of Borneo and Brunei". Panaga Natural History Society. Nov 2010. https://www.bsp.com.bn/panagaclub/pnhs/Focus_On_Forests.html, Accessed on 23 November 2016.

¹³ "Brunei country profile". BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12990058>, Accessed on 23 November 2016.

¹⁴ "Brunei Darussalam". Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw. http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/inne_kontynenty/azja_i_pacyfik/stosunki_dwustronne_azja_pacyfik/brunei__darussalam;jsessionid=CC02DC42BF92E13041F4E69F4E13951F.cms2, Accessed on 23 November 2016.

¹⁵ "Brunei Darussalam: Constitution and politics". The Common Wealth. <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/brunei-darussalam/constitution-politics>, Accessed on 23 November 2016.

¹⁶ (...) *the current era of U.S.-Brunei relations began in 1984 when Brunei became fully independent from the United Kingdom and the United States and Brunei established diplomatic relations. A memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation was signed in 1994. In 2011, Brunei and the United States held an inaugural Senior Officials Dialogue, creating a new forum for high-level coordination and communication. The most recent iteration of this dialogue was a High-level Officials Meeting in London in November 2015 which covered issues including trade, security, human rights, defense, regional cooperation, and academic exchanges. "US relations with Brunei". US Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm>, Accessed on 24 November 2016.*

Table 2. *Manpower and major equipment of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces.*

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
ARMY (Ground Forces)		
4,900 active duty	Light Tanks – 20	Scorpion (16 to be upgraded)
700 reserve	APC (Wheel)	45VAB
	ARTY	MOR 81mm – 24
	ARV	2 Samson
NAVY		
1,000 active duty	Patrol and coastal combatants – 12	Corvettes – 4; Patrol cruiser and boats – 8
	Amphibious/Landing Craft – 4	Landing Craft Utility – 4
AIR FORCE		
1,100 active duty	Transport Aircraft – 1 (7 trainer aircraft)	Transport – 1 (CN-235M); Trainer – 7 (PC-7; Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; UH-60)
	Multirole helicopters - 18	Bell 212; Bell 214 SAR; Bo-105; S-70i Black Hawk
PARAMILITARY		
2,250	Gurkha Reserve Unit – 400-500 troops	Light aircraft – 5 (2 BN-2 Islander, 3 Lancair 320)
	Royal Brunei Police – 1750 troops	10 Patrol and coastal combatants: 3 Bendaru; 7 PDB-type
FOREIGN FORCES		
3 trg	Singapore	1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma
550	Great Britain	1 Gurkha bn; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with 3 hel

AIFV – Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, *APC* – Armoured Personal Carrier; *UAV* – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, *ARV* – Armed Response Vehicle, *Recce* – Reconnaissance

Source: *The Military Balance 2016*; *Global Firepower Military Ranks 2016*, “Air Force readies to go digital”. *Bangkok Post*, 11 Feb 2016. <http://www.bangkokpost.com/archive/air-force-readies-to-go-digital/859956>, “Navy to build B5.5bn missile-equipped patrol vessel”. *Bangkok Post*, 29 Feb 2016. <http://www.bangkokpost.com/archive/news/880568>, “Brunei gives four Black Hawks as present to Malaysia”. <http://airheadsftf.com/2015/01/23/brunei-gives-four-black-hawks-as-present-to-malaysi>, Accessed on 23 October 2016.

The Brunei armed forces are quite small (see table 2) and also unsuited for defence its territory. The Army gained some experience during humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations, but only as part of the multinational forces.¹⁷ The Army do not exercise regularly; it has a limited number of obsolete light weaponry. Their combat capabilities are degrading and they are not able to execute operations independently or to fight within combined joint operations with armies from other nations. Actually, the Air Force does not have any combat

¹⁷ Early, E. “Bilateral Training in Brunei Preps Forces for Global Humanitarian Ops”. *America’s Navy*. 8 November 2009. http://www.navy.mil/Submit/display.asp?story_id=47553, Accessed on 25 November 2016.; “USS Freedom Visits Brunei, Prepares for Operation Damayan”. *America’s Navy*. 18 Nov 2013. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=77724, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

aircraft (there are plans to order 8 FA-50s in the future¹⁸) and there is only a limited number of transport helicopters allocated (including modern UH-60 Black Hawks). Brunei does not have basic capabilities as air defence system and reserve training do not exist, moreover, paramilitary organizations are ordinary police with inadequate value during a conflict.

The country is relying on strategic allies so Washington is developing common relations with Brunei and as a result the Sultanate's soldiers started to be involved in joint military exercises and training programs with the United States.¹⁹ Furthermore, since 2011 there have been some plans to purchase military equipment from regional US allies e.g. South Korea. In March 2016 information was published that Brunei raised its defence budget by about 4.7 percent to 564 million Brunei dollars (408 million US dollars) for the next fiscal year: 2016-2017.²⁰ This significant change shows that the Sultan of Brunei changed the approach to defence strategy, which probably is a result of establishing closer relationship with the US and as of perception of threats coming from China's policy in the South China Sea. It is possible to assume that Washington took steps to progressively strengthen the mutual ties with this country. The greatest guarantees of the security of the Sultanate are still natural resources ensuring external support. The second reason of US support is Brunei's membership in ASEAN and its geographical location: on the one hand it is close to the Spratly Islands and also bordering unpredictable Malaysia, which is important for Washington. Since 2016 this second reason has become more important for Obama and the Trump Administration, because it is hard to predict the policy of the new president of the Philippines.

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces without the support of the strategic allies of the country (US, UK, Singapore) do not have capabilities to protect national territory. Land and air forces use old and non-effective equipment. Furthermore, troops do not have real battlefield experience (for example, opposite to Burma soldiers). Only Special Forces like the Gurkhas have real combat value but those are limited in number when compared to real needs. With the support of the Gurkhas the Brunei's army can conduct protracted guerrilla operations in the south (mountains) and east (marshland) part of country.

Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF)

The country was "one of the drivers behind the creation of ASEAN in 1967"²¹ looking for common efforts to increase the security of the whole region. It was also rather cautious to challenge China although it was clear that their islands disputes will not be abandoned. The main reason for the balancing option was connected with possible profits coming from economic development and possible profits when cooperating with Beijing. However, following the growing pressure from China to control the Spratly Islands and continuous development of military related infrastructure Malaysia verified such a course of action and it started to invest into security by developing security relations and building military capabilities. It

¹⁸ Pryce, P. "Bolstering Brunei's Defences: A Small State's Strategic Guidance and Procurement". <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=20316>, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

¹⁹ "US relations with Brunei".

²⁰ Parameswaran, P. "What's Behind Brunei's New Defense Budget for 2016?". *The Diplomat*. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/whats-behind-bruneis-new-defense-budget-for-2016/>, Accessed on 24 November 2016.

²¹ Chang, F. K. "Comparative Southeast Asian Military Modernization: 1". *The ASAN Forum*. 1 October 2014. <http://www.theasanforum.org/comparative-southeast-asian-military-modernization-1/>, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

was based on the requirement to preserve national maritime interests. The decisions were accelerated by the Chinese warships' naval and amphibious exercise near Malaysia-claimed James Shoal in March 2013, which continued in February 2014. It was definitely among factors showing the real threat of losing the disputed islands in the long-term as of lack of capabilities to deny such the claims. Defence budget in 2014 was USD4.92bn and was decreased to USD4.74bn in 2015 as an effect of the lower GDP. The estimated budget for 2016 is to be reduced again²². Its support faces conventionally understood security and also unconventional ones, such as radical movements and even natural disasters, where the armed forces provide support to civil authorities. Other challenges are related to "piracy, smuggling, kidnapping, terrorism, illegal fishing, and encroachments by regional neighbours like Indonesia and the Philippines."²³ Recognizing its own vulnerabilities Malaysia proposed the creation "of an ASEAN militaries Ready Group on HADR, a dedicated force comprising of specialists grouped under a single banner, which has found support in the ASEAN member states."²⁴ Since 1971 Malaysia has been maintaining international cooperation within the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) along with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The FPDA has never been tested but it is "an effective conflict management tool and has contributed, directly and indirectly, towards MAF's development and enhancement of its professionalism."²⁵

Among services especially navy and air force has caught an attention of the leadership as for now. Navy capabilities to protect extensive coastline started to be increased from 2010 as the country has increased the number of its principal surface combatants up to 12 vessels and as for now it possesses 10 frigates and 4 corvettes. It is organized into three Regional Commands: Kuantan (East Coast); Kinabalu (Borneo) and Langkawi (West Coast). Navy modernization is based on the plan to acquire New Gowind-class corvettes which are designed for operation in littoral waters and will be equipped for anti-submarine warfare, anti-ship missile, and medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) assets. It is part of the SGPV (Second Generation Patrol Vessel) - LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) program.²⁶ The navy also acquired two French diesel-electric attack submarines 'Scorpene' in 2009 located in the naval base at Sepanggar Bay. The navy is supported by a large number of patrol boats belonging also to Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and Marine Police. The amphibious capabilities are underpinned by the possession of landing crafts which could be of value to conduct missions involving marines and Special Forces in relations to a variety of big islands and small islets. The capabilities to react to a threat are to be enhanced by intent to create a coastal-surveillance system as it is to increase the capabilities of offshore surveillance, to monitor sea lines of communications and coastal defence. The challenge is related to the ability of BHIC shipyard in Lumut to deliver the required vessels on the agreed time.

²² *The Military Balance 2016*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016. 271; 116:1, 211–306, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567.

²³ Parameswaran. "What Does Malaysia's New Defense Budget for 2016 Mean?". *The Diplomat*. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-does-malaysias-new-defense-budget-for-2016-mean/>, Accessed on 24 October 2016.

²⁴ "ASEAN Security Outlook 2015". ASEAN. 2015. 49. <http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ASEAN-SECURITY-OUTLOOK-2015.pdf>, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁶ "Royal Malaysian Navy future Gowind SGPV-LCS program update with Boustead Heavy Industries". *Navy Recognition*. 25 April 2014. <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/naval-exhibitions/dsa-2014/1768-royal-malaysian-navy-future-gowind-sgpv-lcs-program-update-with-boustead-heavy-industries.html>, Accessed on 25 November 2016.

Table. 3. *Manpower and major equipment of the Malaysian Armed Forces.*

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
ARMY		
80,000 active duty	Main battle tank - 48	PT-91M Twardy
50,000 reserve	Light tank - 21	Scorpion-90
	Recce – est. 296	Variety of types
	AIFV - 90	31 ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13 ACV300 Adnan AGL; 46 AV8 Gempita IFV25 being delivered
	APC - 787	Tracked – 265; wheeled - 522
	Artillery - 424	Towed – 134 (105 and 155 mm); MLR – 36; mortar 254
	Helicopters - 10	Transport - AW109
	Air defence - 67	SAM – 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); toed guns 35 and 40 mm– 52, variety of MANPADS
	Amphibious - 165	Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)
NAVY		
14,000 active duty	Submarines - 2	Tunku Abdul Rahman (FRA Scorpene) with 6 single 533mm TT with WASS Black Shark HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
1,000 reserve	Frigates - 10	
	Patrol and coastal combatants - 37	Corvettes - 4; patrol boats - 33
	Mine warfare - 4	Mahamiru (ITA Lerici)
	Landing craft - 115	
160 active duty	Naval aviation Helicopters - 12	Anti-submarine warfare Super Lynx 300 – 6; multirole AS555 Fennec – 6
AIR FORCE		
15,000 active duty	Aircraft - 67	Fighter – 21 (F-5E/F Tiger II; 8 MiG-29N/UB/NUB); fighter/ground attack – 26 (F/A-18D Hornet; Su-30MKM); tanker – 4; transport - 33
600 reserve	Helicopters - 62	Multirole – 17 (SA316 Alouette III); transport 45
PARAMILITARY		
est. 24,600 servicemen	Police General Operations Force	
est. 4,500 servicemen	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency	Controls 5 Maritime Regions, patrol and costal combatants boats – 191
est. 2,100 servicemen	Marine Police	Patrol and costal combatants boats - 132
	Police Air Unit	Transport aircraft (17) and helicopters (2)

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
est. 24,600 reservists	People's Volunteer Corps	some 17,500 armed

AIFV – Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, *APC* – Armoured Personal Carrier; *MLR* – Multiple Rocket Launcher.

Source: *The Military Balance 2016*, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, London 9 February 2016, Chapter Six: Asia pp. 271 – 274; 116:1, 211-306, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567.

The Air Force is facing a challenge related to aging fleet of aircraft being currently in service. Air force includes one air operation headquarter, two air divisions, one training and a one logistics command. It has also one Integrated Area Defence Systems headquarter. The country possesses both US- and Russian-made aircraft requiring separate logistics which makes sustainment costlier. In order to achieve the desired level of aircraft in full operational capability the number of sorties was limited. The MiG-29N/UB/NUBs and F/A-18Ds are from the 1990s and are requiring replacement to ensure the effective defence of the large airspace. The acquisition of Su-30MKMs allowed the establishment of one fighter/ground attack squadron but it not a solution of problems for limiting air force capabilities to support land forces and navy in conducting joint operations. Further limitations are caused by reduced pilot training as they have only 60 flight hours per year. The country is also short of airborne early warning and control aircraft and air-to-air refuelling capabilities possessing four KC-130H ‘Hercules’ which is not enough to extend the range of aircraft and increase the number of sorties.

The major capabilities are represented by the Army as it has some 80,000 troops and some 50,000 reservists. The forces are divided into two military districts as of geography and into four area commands, which are the equivalents of divisions. The Army is composed mainly of light forces as there are only one tank regiment and one mechanized infantry brigade. Consequently, the light forces approach is linked with terrain and vast areas covered by jungle requiring specifically organized, equipped, and trained troops to operate there. The equipment has been procured some years ago and it is requiring modernization to meet more challenging requirements to defend effectively but there is no direct threat against the Malaysian mainland so decisions are postponed. Major shortcomings are related to air defence assets, there is a lack of attack helicopters and the limited number of army transport helicopters makes the support by the Air Force inevitable. The Army has a large number of assault crafts and those could be used for operations along the coastline and for the protection of the possessed Spratly islands but the cooperation with the naval and air forces is necessary within joint efforts. For amphibious and airborne operations Special Forces will be mainly used. Those are composed of the Special Service Group and the elite 10th Parachute Brigade being a part of Rapid Deployment Force. RAND report estimated that the Army “can move a rapid-deployment force and three airmobile battalions to the Spratlys with a combination of C-130s and amphibious craft under navy escort.”²⁷

The Malaysian armed forces are focused on acquisition of modern weapon system for all the service with priority for the Navy and the Air Force. There is an urgent need

²⁷ Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A., and Neu, C. R. “ASEAN Defense Policies and Expenditures”. In *The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China*. RAND Corporation, 2001. 51.

for the delivery of new platforms to replace older ones and to upgrade existing weapons systems as those are aging, every year limiting the units ready to be employed in combat. The modernization is affected by “the country’s economic slowdown and the government’s prioritization of domestic spending continued to restrict efforts to develop the maritime and air capabilities that the armed forces’ leadership saw as a necessary response to China.”²⁸ The military budget shortage is causing modernization programs to be delayed or cancelled influencing overall capabilities of each service and ability to conduct any major joint operation. Nevertheless, it is expected that “the budget level will not affect the acquisition of equipment critical to boosting the country’s aerial and maritime capabilities, including six Second Generation Patrol Vessel – Littoral Combat Ship (SGPV-LCS) vessels, Starstreak ground-based air-defence missile systems, and the Airbus A400M Atlas transport aircraft.”²⁹ The incoming decisions within the 11th Malaysia Plan 2016 – 2020 will show the future of the Malaysian Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The military forces of the Philippines are projected to solve internal conflicts and manage crisis situations, especially to fight Muslim insurgents in the south of country. Until the withdrawal of the US forces from the Philippines, the national government’s policy was strictly connected with Washington’s policy in this area. Since 2011, when clashes with China in South China Sea area started, the government of Benigno Aquino III has focused on creating stronger military capability in the disputed area. Unfortunately the defence budget was too low to meet those ambitious plans.³⁰ The situation evolved on 10 May 2016, when Maverick Rodrigo Duterte won the election³¹ as he has threatened to end the long term security cooperation with the US and to seek closer relations with China. During his visit in Japan he said that he wanted the American troops to leave the Philippines in next two years.³²

According to *Military Balance 2016* the Philippines military forces count 125,000 soldiers and they are supported by paramilitary organizations and significant amount of reservists (see details in table 4). The country is divided into five areas and one National Capital Region Command. The Army is armed with a limited number of Scorpion light tanks and heavy vehicles comparable to light tanks and some Armoured Personal Carriers. Fire power is ensured by some 254 artillery assets with calibres ranging from 75 to 155 mm. The Navy has just one frigate, a number of patrol and coastal combatant craft supported by logistic and support ships. The amphibious capabilities are enabled by the possession of landing ships and landing crafts. The Navy can use also airplanes and helicopters but with transport capabilities only. The Philippines Navy has a quite large component of Marines:

²⁸ *The Military Balance 2016*. 212-213; 116:1, 211-306, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567

²⁹ Parameswaran, “What Does Malaysia’s New Defense Budget for 2016 Mean?”

³⁰ *The Military Balance 2014*. London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 2014. 273–275.

³¹ “Philippines election: Maverick Rodrigo Duterte wins presidency”. BBC. 10 May 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36253612>, Accessed on 24 October 2016.

³² Parameswaran, P. “Will Duterte end the US-Philippine military alliance?”. *The Diplomat*. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/will-duterte-end-the-us-philippine-military-alliance/>, Accessed on 29 October 2016.

8,300 with their own four amphibious and one combat support CSSs which are important assets when considering specific coastline and islands' disputes.³³

Fig. 3. *Geographical location of the Philippines*

Source: "Evidence of Change in Philippine Culture and History". http://www.oocities.org/gex_brb/pagetwo.html, Accessed on 29 October 2016.

The advantage is a quite large component of Special Forces, including Marines, as those could conduct effective jungle operations against criminal groups or partisans, and also against conventional enemy. The support could be provided by the Philippine National Police and a paramilitary organization can be organized based on units of civil population and create quite large resistance movement at the rear of the enemy forces. If a large scale conflict should happen, Philippine Special Forces could be deployed to provide the force protection of bases and logistic centres used by Allied forces (e.g. US) located on the South China Sea islands. The map in fig. 3. shows the geography and topography of individual islands. This way, it is possible to observe the geographical conditions favouring the defence.

Table. 4. *Manpower and major equipment of the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP).*

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
ARMY		
86,000 active duty	Light tank - 7	Scorpion
100,000 reserve	AIFV – 36	2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV
	APC – 299	Tracked – 76: 6 ACV300; 70 M113; wheeled - 223: 77 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba
	Artillery – 254>	Towed – 214: 105mm 204 M101/M102/M-26/M-56; 155mm 10 M114/M-68, Mortars – 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30
	Light aircraft – 4	1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 3 Cessna 170/172/P206A
	UAV – 1	Medium Blue Horizon
	ARV – 3	ACV-300; Samson; M578
NAVY		
24,000 active duty	Frigate – 1	Rajah Humabon (ex-US Cannon) with 3x76mm gun

³³ "U.S. Significantly Boosts Military Funding for SE Asia". Voice of America. 26 August 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/hagel-se-asia-corrected/1737438.html>, Accessed on 27 October 2016., "Philippine Defense Reform (PDR)". [globalsecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/pdr.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/pdr.htm), Accessed on 27 October 2016., "DND and AFP: Transforming while Performing". Armed forces of the Philippines. <https://web.archive.org/web/20060128011809/http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php>, Accessed on 27 October 2016.

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
15,000 reserve	Patrol and Coastal Combatants – 68	
	Amphibious – 37	Landing ships – 5, landing craft – 32:
	Light Aircrafts – 6	4 BN-2A Defender; 2 Cessna 177 Cardinal
	Helicopters – 13	Medium - 4; Light – 9
8,300 Marines	Amphibious – 4	AAV 59: 4 LVTH-6+; 55 LVTP-7, ARTY 31+ TOWED 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26, MOR 107mm M30
	Combat support – 1	1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn)
	APC (Wheel) – 42	19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV-300
	ARTY – 31>	TOWED 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26, MOR 107mm M30
Naval Special Operation Group	Combat and Combat Service Support Units (14 units)	1 SEAL unit, 1 diving unit, 10 naval spec ops unit 1 special boat unit, combat service support, 1 EOD unit
AIR FORCE		
15,000 active duty	Aircraft – 42	Fighter – 25, transport – 14, Surveillance and Special Mission – 3; (plus 56 trainer aircraft)
16,000 reserve	Helicopters - 123	Multirole – 96 (AW-109E, MD-520MG, W-3A, W-3A, UH-1H/HP/D, 412EP-CUH), Ambulance – 18 (S-76A, 205A), VIP transport – 9 (412EP/HP, S-70A-5)
PARAMILITARY		
40,500	Philippine National Police	Light aircraft – 5 (2 BN-2 Islander, 3 Lancair 320)
50,000	Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	

AIFV – Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, APC – Armoured Personal Carrier; UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, ARV – Armed Response Vehicle

Source: *The Military Balance 2016; Global Firepower Military Ranks 2016; “Philippine Marine Force Recon”*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xuU3edg6b0>, Accessed on 29 October 2016.

The landform is not favourable for classic attack because of numerous islands, lagoons, creeks, shallows, undulating terrain and jungle. It is almost impossible for larger warships to operate between islands and only limited (as of jungle cover) air support will be available. As major cities, including capital, are located in the north part of Luzon Island the access to that part is limited. There are many straits between the jungle-covered shores of the island, and sea and land could be mined easily and make every attack very costly. This is why the Philippines is a great “naval base” to control the surrounding waters. Compared to China, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam or even Thailand, the Philippines military forces are similar to military police forces. They are using quite old equipment and possibly they even do not have enough capabilities to protect their own territory against stronger opposing forces. Their military forces are able to fight organized crimes groups or Muslim insurgents, but still lack key combat elements to conduct joint operations in the long term. However, Phil-

ippine forces can support their allies when those are to conduct operations in the region. Both the land forces and the navy are prepared to protect the country and deploy soldiers between islands but they are more suitable for guerrilla warfare than classic, conventional defence, and definitely they are not prepared to any offensive operations. Their advantage is the good knowledge of the terrain and support of local population. But special operations units could conduct limited attacks against the disputed islands and mainland as they are trained similarly to the US Special Forces.

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)

Vietnam is a very specific country in South-East Asia. It has very long military tradition, and great empires like the US, UK, France or China were not able to control it. It is also a communist state and the ruling political party shares power with army. The economic growth of Vietnam supported the modernization of the armed forces during last decades. Historically, Vietnam was usually opposite to China and the US but the situation changed lately when Hanoi started to develop cooperation with Washington, being under pressure by the growing power of Beijing. Currently Hanoi is more open for international cooperation, including military domain, and it is investing more both in defensive and offensive capabilities. The focus is on enhancing the power of its national naval and air forces. This is a response to the necessity to protect national territorial integrity by adopting such concepts as Washington's 'preventive attack' and Beijing 'active defence'. It is impossible for Hanoi to counterbalance the Chinese power without cooperation with international partners as the probability to deter China is growing. The disputes involving Vietnam's partners in ASEAN could help Hanoi to create a powerful opposition to face Beijing's demands³⁴; fig. 4 illustrates the complexity of claims, including Vietnam's expectations.




Fig. 4. *Spratly and Paracel islands claims.*

Source: ABC News, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-12/south-china-sea-hague-to-hand-down-ruling-on-un-case/7587656>, Accessed on 11 November 2016.

PAVN military counts 482,000 troops in three services and paramilitary organizations (see details in table 5). To enhance combat power the armed forces conduct large reserve training programs which could ensure that as many as 5,000,000 troops are to be ready to fight if Vietnam should be attacked by external enemy. The territory is divided into eight military districts (including the capital). The army is divided into four Corps Headquarters

³⁴ Military History Institute of Vietnam. *Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002., Chandler, D. P. *A history of Cambodia*. Sydney: Westview Press; Allen & Unwin; Boulder, 1992.

and it has two mechanized infantry divisions and twenty three light infantry divisions six???, one Special Forces unit and a variety of battalions and regiments. Those are supported by combat support and combat service support units. The army possesses a significant number of main battle tanks and light tanks but those are rather older versions of Russian equipment. Similar situation is related to infantry combat vehicles. The advantage of land forces is the number of artillery assets as those could deliver desired fire support.³⁵

The Vietnamese Navy has only four tactical ‘Kilo-class’ submarines (two under construction), seven frigates (two under construction and four in plans) and a variety of patrol and coastal combatant craft including eleven corvettes. Among them submarines and ‘Gepard’ frigates are modern and their constant modernization is one of the priorities. The Navy has also mine countermeasures and amphibious capabilities.



Fig. 5. Vietnam's Naval Regions

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_Naval_Regions.jpg Accessed on 05 December 2016.

The main combat power of the Air Force is based on four fighter regiments and four fighter-bomber regiments. There are also two transport regiments and two attack/transport helicopter regiments.³⁶ The numbers are reasonable but the aircraft are older generation assets and are unable to conduct effective operations against a more developed Air Force, like that of China.

³⁵ *The Military Balance 2016*. 296–298.

³⁶ “Vietnam Military Strength”. Global Fire Power. http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=vietnam, Accessed on 24 October 2016.

Table 5. *Manpower and major equipment of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).*

Manpower	Main equipment	Remarks
ARMY (Ground Forces)		
412,000 active duty	Main Battle Tanks - 1,270	70 T-62; 350 Type-59; 850 T-54/T-55; (45 T-34 in store)
5,000,000 reserve	Light tanks – 620	300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-6
	RECCE – 100	BRDM-1/BRDM-2
	AIFV – 300	BMP-1/BMP-2
	APC – 1,380	Track: 280: 200 M113 (to be upgraded); 80 Type-63 Wheel: 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-50/BTR-60/BTR-152
	Artillery – 3,040>	Self-propelled 30+, towed 2,300, MRL 710+, mortars
NAVY		
40,000 active duty	Submarines (tactical) – 6	4 SSK: Hanoi (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT; 2 SSI: Yugo† (DPRK)
	Frigate – 2	2 Dinh Tien Hoang
	Patrol and Coastal Combatants – 71	Corvettes – 6; patrol boats - 65
	Mine Warfare/Mine Countermeasures – 13	
	Amphibious – 38	Landing Ships 8, landing Craft 30
	Logistic and support – 30	
27,000 Naval Infantry	Aircraft – 6	Light DHC-6-400 Twin Otter
	Helicopter – 14	10 ASW 10 Ka-28 Helix A; 4 TPT
AIR FORCE		
15,000 active duty	Aircraft –307	Fighter – 73 (MiG-21bis Fishbed L; MiG-21UM Mongol B); fighter-bombers – 73 (Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter; Su-27SK/Su-27UBK; Su-30MK2); transport – apx. 141 (Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza);
16,000 reserve	Helicopters - 180	Multirole – apx. 120 (Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171; Mi-24 Hind), Transport – apx. 60 (Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza)

AIFV – Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, *APC* – Armoured Personal Carrier; *UAV* - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, *ARV* – Armed Response Vehicle, *RECCE* – Reconnaissance

Source: *The Military Balance 2016*; *Global Firepower Military Ranks 2016*; “Vietnam Military Strength”. *Global Fire Power*. http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=vietnam; Accessed on 24 October 2016.

In general, the Vietnamese Armed Forces are huge in members but they have obsolete equipment; however, as history presented in the specific climate and geographical conditions that could be used to challenge a stronger and more modern enemy. Furthermore, those forces are capable enough to face any small nation in the region. As for Vietnam, it is considering

the development of its Navy as submarines are able to detect and destroy enemy vessels and are usable in the case of maritime disputes. The advantage in general is very high number of quite well trained reservists and for any enemy it is a factor to be taken into consideration. The Air Force is possibly to weakest point in the Vietnamese defence system but according to Vietnam War experience it is proved that a stronger enemy can take control over the air-space but it does not mean that the enemy will win the war. In the case of an external attack Vietnam's armed forces will probably start massive partisan movement skilfully exploiting geographic features. It is worth to highlight that Vietnam's military forces are not prepared to attack other countries, but they are well prepared to defend their own territory. This is one of the main reasons why Vietnam is developing its navy to be ready to face a possible maritime conflict with China.

CONCLUSIONS

The general trend of ASEAN-4, and in general in Asia, is to increase navies and air forces' capabilities to extend force projection as those capabilities are of critical importance to protect national interests in the South China Sea. Each state described above has its own specific strategy of using defence capabilities to fight against military threats. Brunei is the weakest state because of the limited quantity and poor quality of its current military equipment, and the lack of proper training of reserves. It cannot defend itself in the case of a major attack and has limited options to create an effective guerrilla movement in case of occupation. The Philippines shifted lately toward US support to deter a military aggression. It focused its limited funds on developing ground forces as those are easier to develop in short time and they are required to fight internal threats. The Philippines has one of the weakest military forces in the whole of East-Asia, and in fact they are more prepared for guerrilla type warfare than for a conventional conflict. Manila is able to create a mass partisan movement in the case of the occupation of the country. Malaysia has a reliable number of troops but must consider replacement of their obsolete equipment, and the development of combat support capabilities. It possesses a large number of assault crafts to defend coastline and to react in the case of claims for Spratly Islands, by employing Special Forces within amphibious and airborne operations. The limitation is poor coverage by air force and support by navy as there is a lack of joint abilities. Vietnam is focusing its efforts on border protection, especially the coastal waters, and is prepared for defence. Vietnam has a massive territorial defence system based on a large number of reservists but limited by obsolete but still operational equipment. It is aware of the fact that the advantage is extremely difficult terrain and tough climate, which are very helpful to balance the combat power of much more powerful, modern and numerous enemies. The most capable service in Vietnam is navy, but without modern ground and air forces any joint operations are impossible, both defensive and offensive. None of these ASEAN-4 countries have capabilities to conduct modern joint operations and they are not prepared to conduct combined operations uniting their capabilities. Also, offensive capabilities are very limited along with a shortage of force projection assets enabling quick and decisive reaction in the case of an assertive approach of any pretender. Vietnam has just initiated the transformation of the current defence nature of its military forces into defensive-offensive ones. Similarly to other nations, especially Malaysia and the Philippines are considering the modernization of armed forces but the processes are relatively slow and some programs are questionable.




Fig. 6. *Military expenditures in Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam 2010 – 2014 (millions, USD)*

Source: “Analyzing Southeast Asia’s Military Expenditures”. *cogitASIA*. 7 May 2015. <http://cogitasia.com/analyzing-southeast-asias-military-expenditures/> Accessed on 24 November 2016.

The Chinese ambitions are accelerating an arms race in relation to ASEAN-4 involved into islands disputes. The PLA budget reaching some USD146bn in 2015 is showing the scale of differences as total budget of all the ASEAN-4 reached less than USD12bn. The increase was visible in years 2010-2014 (see fig. 5) but lately it was slower, only the Philippines and Vietnam produced an increase between 2014 and 2015. Brunei noticed a decrease but some 5% growth is expected in 2016-2017 compared to Malaysia with a downgrading trend. Also Japanese growing involvement into regional affairs, defence spending (41bn in 2015) and change of constitution allowing the use of the military abroad were noticed.

The nations are looking for other options to enhance security and still balancing option is favourable. An example of cooperation is the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the US and the Philippines, signed on 28 April 2014 as it “*provides a legal framework for the increased rotational presence of US armed forces in the Philippines. The precise details of when, how many, what types and the location of this rotational presence will be worked out in the future. This may well prove to be a test case of the ability of the US to rebalance its forces in Southeast Asia.*”³⁷ The agreement could be seen by Beijing as the deterrent tool in relations to the South China Sea’s disputes as neither Manila nor any other ASEAN nation is strong enough to face alone any escalation of the situation. What is also of critical importance is that ASEAN as an organisation is not capable to support it militarily. The armed forces’ build-up is in general going on in South East Asia, fuelled by maritime disputes, and it caused a 17% rise of arms sales in the last 5 years. The major contributors are China and India but Japan is also speeding up such processes, being involved in the East China Sea disputes. The ASEAN nations are unable to compete in that rivalry and they are observing closely the situation in the US after the elections, and the interactions among major regional powers. This process is supported by promoting organisational and national interests using international forums. Especially the development of capabilities like power projection, amphibious and expeditionary capabilities, which are not purely defensive in

³⁷ For details of the EDCA read: Thayer, C. “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement”. *The Diplomat*. 2 May 2014. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>, Accessed on 24 November 2016.

nature, are recognized as a threat, because they could be easily used to solve the disputes over the islands by implementing joint air – sea warfare concept. It is obvious that without a strong, modern foreign support these countries are unable to compete militarily with China over the disputed islands. In the future they could even revise their approach toward security by considering bandwagoning option as a security guarantee, which could make China the winner in the South China Sea maritime area.

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Csaba Barnabás Horváth:

CHINA'S RISE AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

ABSTRACT: The following paper attempts to give an overview on how the rise of China, and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia seem to affect each other. The paper will take a one-by-one overview of each and every ASEAN member state and see what China's rise mean regarding their own individual strategic interests, and at the end makes an attempt to draw a conclusion of this overview. The main findings of the paper are that the individual interests of the countries of Southeast Asia are likely to prevent the ASEAN to form a regional security bloc or a united front against China, especially that some of these countries even view the growing influence of China as a positive development. At the same time, several key countries of the group in contrary view China as a threat, and seem to be eager to stand up to it with US assistance, so it is also unlikely that the ASEAN as a whole would become the sphere of influence of China. The conclusion of the paper is that the most likely scenario is that the region, amidst growing economic integration, will end up in strategically separating to a group of pro-China, and to another group of pro-US countries, albeit possibly by no formal arrangements. A certain geographical distinction also seems to coincide with this.

KEYWORDS: China, geopolitics, ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

Amidst the Sino-USA rivalry becoming the rivalry of the two strongest powers on the planet, the strategic significance of Southeast Asia is ever increasing. On most of its borders China is facing nuclear powers, and countries with great power identity on their own, and buffer states between them and China. This means Japan and nuclear armed North Korea in the northeast, Russia, and its buffer state Mongolia in the north, India, its buffer states Nepal and Bhutan, and nuclear armed Pakistan in the southwest. There are only two regions adjacent to China, that consist of small countries: five former Soviet republics of Central Asia in the west, and Southeast Asia, the ten ASEAN countries in the south. This paper will take a view of the geopolitics of the latter. Southeast Asia, lying between China, India, Japan, Australia and the US-controlled Pacific Ocean, is likely to be one of the major scenes of the US-China strategic rivalry in the upcoming decades.

This paper attempts to give an overview on the ASEAN countries in the scope of their strategic position in the geopolitics of the region, as well as their traditional and present attitude towards the rise of China, that can also be either sympathetic or hostile depending on their strategic position and interests. As we will see, some of the ASEAN member states are in strategic positions where the assertiveness of China can be tolerable, or even welcomed, as it often impairs their traditional regional strategic opponents, as in the case of Cambodia and to some degree Laos, or helps them to ease disadvantages caused by strained relations between the given country and the USA, as in the case of Myanmar and to some degree Malaysia. On the other hand we will see countries that feel their territorial integrity under

threat by the rise of China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and to some degree Indonesia. And then, last but not least, we will see countries taking a neutral stand and balancing between the attitudes of these two described groups, such as Thailand (with more pro-China undertones) and Singapore (with more pro-US undertones).

It also has to be taken into consideration that this interaction is taking place in the broader context of the USA-China rivalry. In respect of the strategic position of the countries in question, an important factor about this rivalry is the asymmetry between the military capabilities of the USA and China in the region. While China is slowly but steadily becoming the hegemonic military power of the region, the USA is still maintaining its naval superiority, which makes countries of Mainland Southeast Asia, especially those sharing direct borders with China, more vulnerable to Chinese strategic pressure and less suitable for US military assistance, while island nations of Maritime Southeast Asia are less vulnerable to Chinese strategic pressure, and more suitable for US military assistance.

Another general issue that we must take into consideration is the most controversial issue between ASEAN and China, the South China Sea dispute. The dispute is mainly over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These two archipelagos mostly consist of mere sandbanks and shoals. Since maritime boundaries were not properly delineated in the previous decades, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all claim parts of these islands, with China, Vietnam and the Philippines having the most extensive territorial claims. The islands themselves are mostly tiny, but they lie along strategic sea lanes and also extensive maritime economic zones are adjacent to them. In the past decade an odd competition was going on, with the claimant countries occupying one uninhabited shoal after another, resulting by now in a mosaic of islands controlled by different countries. Recently China is causing controversy by artificially expanding shoals under its control, and setting up airfields and alleged military bases on them. Out of the claimant states, Vietnam and the Philippines show a more assertive stand against China. This caused the issue to become a proxy-theatre for the ongoing great power rivalry between China and the network of US-led alliances, with the USA and some of its major allies granting their support to the Philippines and Vietnam.

OVERVIEW OF THE TEN INDIVIDUAL ASEAN COUNTRIES

After this brief introduction, we can start our overview of the countries in question: Laos is one of the least populous and least wealthy countries of Southeast Asia, and the only landlocked nation in the region. Why we still start our overview with it, and what gives its strategic significance is its location. It shares long boundaries with China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. Both for Thailand and Vietnam, obtaining influence over Laos in their history meant a safe buffer zone, and Laos in hostile hands meant strategic vulnerability. The most recent example for how important the strategic location of Laos can be from the Vietnam War. The South Vietnamese and their American allies blocked passage through the short border between the two Vietnams. The North Vietnamese however, managed to detour these defence lines by obtaining access to roads in Laos, and building the network of the Ho Chi Minh trail there, enabling them to infiltrate and wage attacks all along the extensive boundary between South Vietnam and Laos. It also enabled them to extend the communist insurgency to Cambodia and wage attacks on South Vietnam from that country as well. The Americans did recognize the strategic importance of Laos after a while, and did extend the

war to Laos and Cambodia, but by the time they did so, it was already too late.¹ Later, after the unification of Vietnam, Vietnamese occupation of both Laos and Cambodia provided a convenient buffer zone for pro-Soviet Vietnam against pro-USA Thailand. Vietnamese forces held Laos under occupation until the early 1990s, and the country had been virtually a satellite of Vietnam until then. Vietnam pulled out its forces in the early 1990s, but maintained a special relationship with Laos for the next two decades.² This however, started to change recently. Laos refused to back Vietnam in the South China Sea dispute in 2016, when it rejected the international tribunal ruling that condemned China.³ Laos also reached an agreement with China over the construction of a rail line linking China and Thailand through its own territory, detouring Vietnam due to strained Sino-Vietnamese relations.⁴ These events show Laos moving away from its old big brother, Vietnam, and strengthening relations with China. Should China gain access to Laotian territory would put both Vietnam and Thailand into extremely vulnerable positions facing China. With much of its history for the past 200 years being a battleground between Vietnam and Thailand, an alliance with China raising its positions against both of those would in fact be a rational choice for Laos, and recent events of rapprochement with China seem to show such a consideration on behalf of the Laotian government.

Cambodia, the southern neighbour of Laos, is with little doubt that Southeast Asian country that in fact has the strongest interests to pursue pro-Chinese policies, and even alignment with China. The rump state of the once mighty Khmer Empire gradually decreased to a faction of its former territory through the last millennium under the pressure of its more assertive neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, both taking territory from it bit by bit, in conflict after conflict. Cambodia has a history of attempting to balance Thai and Vietnamese pressure by aligning itself with more distant powers, in most cases with China, but even the arrival of French colonization in the late 19th century meant a halt for Thai and Vietnamese advance, and therefore salvation for Cambodia.⁵ A recent, but bizarre example for this otherwise perfectly rational trend was the alliance between the People's Republic of China, and the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime. Cambodia continued its China-leaning foreign policy after the end of the Vietnamese occupation, and under the premiership of Hun Sen. With border clashes occurring with Thailand as recently as the 2010s, and the memory of Vietnamese occupation being still relatively recent, an alliance with China can seem to be a practical guarantee for the sovereignty of Cambodia, especially given the fact that the USA would be highly unwilling to play such a role, since it views both Thailand and increasingly Vietnam as strategic allies too. The present Cambodian administration of Hun Sen is indeed pursuing rather pro-Chinese foreign policy, and Cambodia refused to back Vietnam and

¹ Kissinger, H. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 620–702.

² Savada, A. M. *Laos, a country study*. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1995.

³ Krishnamoorthy, N. “Laos backs China over South China Sea dispute, rejects Hague ruling”. *International Business Times*. 15 July 2016. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/laos-backs-china-over-south-china-sea-dispute-rejects-hague-ruling-1570737>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

⁴ Ku, S. “China's Rising Influence in Laos”. *The Diplomat*. 3 March 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rising-influence-in-laos/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

⁵ Chandler, D. P. *A history of Cambodia*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. 20.

the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute, even refusing to join a proposed ASEAN joint statement over the issue.⁶

What makes Vietnam, the eastern neighbour of Laos and Cambodia, and the immediate southern neighbour of China along the South China Sea coast, somewhat odd among the countries of Southeast Asia, is that while on the one hand, it is the one that is culturally the closest to China, sharing the same Confucian civilization, and its old monarchy running a structure of administration that followed the example of the Chinese imperial system, on the other hand, Vietnam is the state most staunchly standing up against China when it comes to the issues of sovereignty. This odd combination, of course, comes from the history of Vietnam. Being annexed by China for centuries in the early period of its history, it did adapt Confucian civilization, but the Vietnamese ethnicity managed to avoid assimilation by the Han Chinese, and reached independence by a successful struggle. Lacking major natural barriers along its northern border, it is geopolitically vulnerable for invasions from China, and did in fact attract a series of them, but managed to fend them off all. Successfully struggling for independence, and later successfully repelling repeated Chinese invasions, Vietnam built up a militaristic tradition of its own, enabling it to maintain one of the strongest armed forces in Southeast Asia up until this day. Ironically, this constant state of existential threat, posed from the north by China, resulted in Vietnam's building up such a unique military structure that enabled it to appear as perhaps the most assertive power in Southeast Asia along its southern borders. It did pursue a dynamic and seemingly unstoppable territorial expansion towards the south on the expense of the fallen Kingdom of Champa at first, once mighty Cambodia after that, and resulting collision with the Thai at the end, and reaching as far as sporadic actions on the Malayan Peninsula in certain historical periods.⁷ Although Vietnam was forced to accept the status of a vassal of China a few times, it was always eager to defend its internal sovereignty, and did continue its expansive attitude on its southern border. In fact, the Vietnam War can be interpreted as an organic continuation of this strategic position of Vietnam, with the invasion of Laos and Cambodia as a continuation of its expansion in Southeast Asia, and its successful stand against China in 1979 as the most recent example of similar episodes. Ever since the 1970s, the main orientation of contemporary Vietnamese foreign and security policy has been to secure its sovereignty against China, and seek international alliances that pose a guarantee for it, no matter whether if it means aligning with the Soviet Union (as in the 1980s) with the USA (since the 2010s) or with India (throughout the last decades, but intensifying recently⁸). The location of Vietnam makes it vulnerable for any attack from China, but what gives it a geographical advantage is that south of Hanoi, most of the country forms a narrow strip of land along the coastline between the mountains and the sea. Thus any Chinese army invading Vietnam would soon find itself having to pass through a series of narrow choke points being able to be easily blocked by the otherwise outnumbered Vietnamese. In geography, the weak point of Vietnam is Laos and Cambodia. While regarding any invasion that moves along the north-south corridor

⁶ "ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement". Reuters. 26 July 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinesea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

⁷ Wong, D. T. K. "Vietnam-Champa Relations and the Malay-Islam Regional Network in the 17th–19th Centuries". *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia* 5. 2004. <https://kyotoreview.org/issue-5/vietnam-champa-relations-and-the-malay-islam-regional-network-in-the-17th-19th-centuries/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

⁸ Sarma, S. "India-Vietnam relations after Modi's visit". *The Diplomat*. 5 September 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/india-vietnam-relations-after-modis-visit/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

within Vietnam itself, the form of the country as a narrow strip of land along the coast is an advantage, it becomes an extreme weakness if the invader uses Laotian and Cambodian soil as the base of its operations, enabled to reach virtually any given target in Vietnam with a short range attack along the extensive boundary that it shares with these two countries. During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese did recognize the strategic significance of Laos and Cambodia when organizing the Ho Chi Minh trail on the soil of these countries to wage attacks on South Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese and their American allies failed to recognize and prevent this until it was way too late.⁹ In the present situation what gives the new context for the significance of Laos and Cambodia is that both countries, led by their own best geopolitical interests, are forging increasingly strong ties with China. If this rapprochement reaches a point where they provide access for Chinese troops to their territory in case of a Sino-Vietnamese conflict, that would leave Vietnam utterly defenceless among such circumstances, with no other chance than bringing back the tradition of accepting the status of a vassal of China while securing its internal sovereignty, something that among present circumstances would mean Finlandization. (This expression is referring to the policy of Finland during the Cold War, that based on the combination of while it eagerly defended its internal sovereignty, and maintained a formidable military to defend it as a last resort, at the same time it gave its agreement to not to participate in any strategic alliance that the Soviet union would find hostile, and also agreed – at least in theory – that it would show armed resistance in case any such alliance tried to land troops on its territory.) Therefore Vietnam is likely to be able to fend off the strategic pressure of China as long as China can only use its own soil for any potential military build-up against Vietnam, but becomes defenceless as soon as China gains access to the facilities of Cambodia and Laos.

Thailand, the western neighbour of Laos and Cambodia plays a perplexing role in Southeast Asia regarding the rise of China. On the one hand, it is a declared “major non-NATO ally” of the USA, and has been such throughout the entire Cold War. On the other hand, it is highly reluctant to interpret its alliance with the USA as a commitment to take part in efforts aiming to contain China, and in this aspect pursues a rather non-aligned course when it comes to the Sino-US rivalry, and in fact is among the more China-friendly states of Southeast Asia. How come such a combination can exist? In fact, if we take a look at the specific role of the strategic alliance between Thailand and the USA, we can see that contrary to what we may think, it never really resulted in any major actions or efforts by Thailand against the PRC throughout the entire Cold War. It rather meant USA assistance for Thailand fighting communist guerillas on its own soil, Thai assistance for the USA during the Vietnam War, but hardly ever against China itself. In fact, throughout the 1980s, when the informal Sino-US strategic partnership opened the way for it, Thailand and China extensively cooperated in the containment of Vietnamese influence in Mainland Southeast Asia, and in the assistance for anti-Vietnamese insurgents in Cambodia. The cooperation, and to a certain extent coincidence in geopolitical interests between China and Thailand goes back for centuries. As much as Burma and Vietnam, Thailand was also a vassal of the Qing Empire. Its situation was, however, very much different from that of the other two. Thailand did not really share a direct border with China. They shared a transitional frontier zone of Shan tribal states occupying the impassable mountainous terrain between them (in what is today northern Laos and northeast Myanmar), but this formed a natural frontier

⁹ Kissinger. *Diplomacy*. 620–702.

strong enough to make sure, China will not pose such an existential threat to Thailand, as it did to Vietnam, with repeated direct invasions. Even the border between China and Burma is more passable, and was in fact passed more often by armies, than the mountainous region between northern Thailand and China. On the other hand, the countries with which Thailand did in fact have major direct conflicts were Burma and Vietnam (with Burma a.k.a. Myanmar being its nemesis for centuries).¹⁰ It was, in fact, beneficial for Thailand when the Chinese strategic pressure somewhat contained Burmese and Vietnamese ambitions. Today, unlike Vietnam or the Philippines, Thailand has no direct territorial disputes with China. So far, Thailand seems to value the economic benefits that cooperation with China provides, and its traditional amity with China more, than it fears a general Chinese hegemony in the region, and then the supposed ASEAN solidarity with Vietnam and the Philippines. In general, Thailand took a neutral stand on the South China Sea Dispute so far.¹¹ The issue of Cambodia and Laos is also strategically crucial regarding the future of the strategic role of Thailand, albeit not exactly to such a degree as for Vietnam. If the Chinese military ever gets access to the territories of Laos and Cambodia, the strategic position of Thailand also becomes vulnerable from China to such a degree, where it would have hardly any other option than Finlandization. While its geography makes it somewhat less vulnerable in such a scenario, than Vietnam, it also seems to be so far less willing to resist Finlandization than Vietnam. Given the hostile relations and sentiments between Thailand and Myanmar, the only strategic mistake with which China could alienate Thailand would be a one-sided support for Myanmar in a hypothetical major conflict between the two countries. China, however, seems to be absolutely wise enough to avoid such a mistake, and its initiatives in the region, such as the One Belt One Road concept are rather promoting the reconciliation between Myanmar and Thailand.

Myanmar, a.k.a. Burma is the country that has been the main ally of China in Southeast Asia in recent decades. During the Qing period, Burma was a vassal of the Qing Empire likewise the other countries of Mainland Southeast Asia. The country shared a history of mutual hostilities with Thailand for centuries. After the Chinese Civil War, defeated Guomindang troops retreated to Burmese territory being active in the north-eastern frontier of the country for years to come, causing considerable unrest there. The country has also been plagued with conflicts between the Burmese, the core ethnicity of Myanmar, living mainly in the central basin of the country, and the smaller ethnic groups living along the mountainous frontier lands surrounding the central Basin. This resulted in Myanmar's becoming the single country with the largest number of separatist armed groups on its soil in the entire world in certain years. Since the military coup in 1962, Myanmar has pursued a distinct social model, the so called "Burmese way to socialism". This, along with the brutal crackdown on the so called 8888 uprising in 1988, led to increasing international isolation of the country. Amidst this increasing international isolation, China's willingness to give assistance to Myanmar meant relief for the country regarding its economy and foreign policy.¹²

¹⁰ Chutintharanon, S. and Tun, T. *On Both Sides of the Tenasserim Range: History of Siamese Burmese Relations*. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, 1995.

¹¹ "Thailand Hopes South China Sea dispute ends through joint efforts". *The Nation* (Thailand). 12 July 2016. <http://www.asianews.network/content/thailand-hopes-south-china-sea-dispute-ends-through-joint-efforts-22477>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

¹² Ganessan, N. "Myanmar-China relations: interlocking interests but independent output". *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12/1. 2011. 95-111.

Myanmar's taking a pro-China stand resulted in Chinese investors' playing the main role at the rich natural gas fields of the country. Myanmar also became one of the earliest scenes of Chinese transport infrastructural investment, even before the Belt and Road Initiative had been formally announced, and is about to become a main beneficiary of the Initiative as the route connecting Southwest China to Bangladesh and Northeast India, the Calcutta-Hong Kong line is running through it. Since the beginning of its democratic transition in 2010, Myanmar did somewhat open up towards the western world as well as towards India, but its pro-China stand remains firm.¹³

The Philippines has traditionally been the most pro-USA country in Southeast Asia. The history of the Philippines resulted in a cultural character of the country that is very unusual in the region. The country became a colony of Spain in the 16th century, and more than three centuries of Spanish rule gave its culture a distinctly Latin-like character with the Roman Catholic Church being the dominant denomination in the country, and Baroque historical architecture and Spanish names being widespread. To make things even more complicated, as a Spanish colony, the Philippines was governed from Mexico, as part of that viceroyalty. During the 16th-17th-18th centuries, Manila was the hub of trading Latin-American silver for precious Chinese handcrafted goods, such as silk, porcelain, and lacquer furniture between Spanish and Chinese merchants. Latin American silver was transported from Acapulco by the Manila Galleons, that took the Chinese luxury goods on their way back to that Mexican port, while Chinese merchants were bringing their goods from, and taking the acquired silver to Canton, and the port cities of Guangdong and Fujian provinces.¹⁴ Later, at the end of the 19th century, as a result of the Spanish-American War, the Philippines became a possession of the USA, and remained such until 1946. This gave the Philippines a distinct cultural character that has much in common with Latin-America, and gives the sense of a close kinship with the USA. The Philippine-American relations remained close, however, after achieving independence as well. A security pact between the USA and the Philippines was signed in 1951, and has remained in effect up until today. The USA maintained military bases in the Philippines until 1992, and to give new frameworks to the American-Philippine security cooperation, a Visiting Forces Agreement was reached in 1999, and an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014, technically still providing access for the USA to use the facilities of the Philippines in its operations in the region. The Philippines also enhanced its embeddedness into the network of US-led alliances by signing a security pact with Australia in 2007, and with Japan (as the first Southeast Asian country to do so) in 2016.¹⁵ This trend of pro-US alignment is supported by two geopolitical factors as well: The Philippines' involvement in the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands with China, and the location of the country as an island nation. The dispute over the Spratly Islands means a feud that puts the Philippines and China as opponents by default. The location of the Philippines as an island nation makes it a practically ideal partner for security cooperation with the USA against China. Since hundreds of kilometres of open sea separates the Philippines from China, the only way China could carry out a major invasion against the country could be by

¹³ Lee, L. "Myanmar's transition to democracy: new opportunities or obstacles for India?". *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 36/2. 2014. 290–316.

¹⁴ Legarda, B. "Two and a half centuries of the galleon trade". *Philippine Studies* 3/4. 1995. 345–372.

¹⁵ Tatsumi Y. "Why Japan's defence deal with the Philippines is unique". *The Diplomat*. 10 March 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-japans-defence-deal-with-the-philippines-is-unique/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

an amphibious operation, that could most likely be successfully repelled by the naval superiority of the USA, especially considering the fact that the USA could also rely on assistance by Japan and Australia, given the respective security agreements that these countries have with the Philippines. It is important to note, that while the USA does not intervene in the South China Sea, the issue of uninhabited shoals claimed by the Philippines and occupied by China is absolutely different from what a Chinese invasion on the Philippines – one of its key strategic allies – would mean. The fact that the USA is not intervening on the South China Sea islands, does not mean that it would not intervene in case of a Chinese assault on the Philippines. A recent development regarding the country is that in 2016 the election of Rodrigo Duterte brought along an unexpected and sudden change in the decades-long foreign policy orientation. Duterte made statements about switching sides and aligning with Beijing, but as of the date of the submission of this paper, he hasn't withdrawn from the Philippines' security agreements with the USA.¹⁶ This new shift in the Philippines' foreign policy is highly uncertain, since decades, if not centuries of not only political, but also cultural and even social orientation would have to be changed, and it is not yet clear how serious Duterte is on this issue. Crucial details are still to be clarified for this sudden turn: Is Duterte willing to withdraw from the security agreements with the USA? In case of really aligning itself with China, would the Philippines renounce all its claims on the South China Sea? As the Philippines lacks a formidable navy, who will take care of the external maritime security of the country, which the USA did until now? Will the Philippines build up a navy suitable for a regional middle power on its own? Does it have the resources for that? If it does not, will it ask for any Chinese assistance? Wouldn't such a situation endanger the sovereignty of the country? How would the overwhelmingly pro-US Philippine population react to such practical issues? As of now, the outcome and extent of Duterte's new doctrine is still to be seen, and it is still too early to re-categorize the Philippines from the pro-US countries of the region to the pro-China group. It is rather likely that it will follow the example of Myanmar from the opposite side, where the country's opening towards the USA and India after 2010 did not question the country's overall pro-China position, because that position rests on deep structural factors within the country, so the opening merely meant a certain degree of foreign policy diversification.

In the case of Malaysia, the main paradox is the contrast between the country's rather China-friendly foreign policy, and the internal tensions between the ethnic Chinese minority and the ethnic Malays majority. On the one hand, a fragile interethnic peace and balance is maintained in the ethnically divided country between the three most numerous ethnic groups, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. The Chinese and the Indians composed close to half of the country's population upon independence, but their proportion has decreased to about one third by today. Besides issues around political representation, tensions also rose due to the fact that upon independence, the Malay population was mostly agrarian, while the business sector was dominated by the Chinese, and the case is still nor very far from this today. The Malaysian government implemented policies favouring Malays, interpreted as affirmative action policies by some and as discrimination by others, and practices that lead to the Chinese and Indian communities slowly but steadily losing ground. On the other hand, the country has been pursuing an increasingly non-aligned and rather China-friendly

¹⁶ "Duterte aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost". Reuters. 20 October 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

foreign policy ever since the times of Mahathir Mohamad.¹⁷ As a reason behind this, we can point out the often anti-Western rhetoric and ideological concepts of Mahathir, but what practically made it possible for such an approach to end up in pro-Chinese policies is the geopolitics of Malaysia as well: Malaysia is a participant in the South China Sea dispute, but only regarding a very little number of islands and shoals, and its policy on the issue is rather trying to avoid confrontation with China, unlike what Vietnam and the Philippines are doing.¹⁸ In the last one hundred or so years Malaysia (or the Malayan states before its formation) had much more issues of conflict with Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, than they had with China, and last but not least, China is in a relatively safe distance away from Malaysia, thus not posing such an imminent threat, as it does for Vietnam or the Philippines. So, having issues and neighbours of greater concern than China, it became a practical attitude for Malaysia, to seek Beijing's friendship.

In the case of Singapore, again we can see a seemingly confusing combination. While a solid majority of the city-state's population, and most members of its political elite are ethnic Chinese, relations between Singapore and China were most of the time rather restraint. The simple explanation for this is the strong ties that Singapore maintained, and to a certain degree still maintains, with Taiwan. The political character of the Singaporean leadership was characterized by a hard line anti-communist stand from the very beginning, and a natural consequence of this was to maintain strong ties with Taiwan, where training of the Singaporean army still takes place in part.¹⁹ Since the start of the Chinese reforms in the late 1970s, relations between Singapore and China gradually improved. As of now, Singapore is also following a rather non-aligned line in its foreign policy, aiming to balance between great powers present in the region. So, regarding the Sino-US rivalry, Singapore takes a rather neutral stand, including being neutral over the South China Sea dispute, but with rather more pro-US undertones as the country has a Strategic Framework Agreement²⁰ with the USA, and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Australia, the main South-Pacific strategic ally of the USA.²¹ This attitude is also supported by the fact that the main security concerns of Singapore since gaining independence have been mainly Malaysia, and to a lesser degree, Indonesia. Singapore became independent from Malaysia in 1965, in an unusual way: Instead of the usual scenario of a former nation achieving independence through a successful struggle against a larger one, in this case, Singapore was virtually expelled from Malaysia. Ever since then, the country's strategic vulnerability as a city state divided from Malaysia by nothing but a narrow and shallow sea inlet, has caused a general sense of looming threat by nearby Malaysia. This resulted in Singapore being right now perhaps the only city-state that built a formidable military, in many ways, one of the strongest in Southeast Asia. The

¹⁷ Saravanamuttu, J. *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2016.

¹⁸ Jennings, R. "Why Malaysia Stays Quiet About Its Claims In The South China Sea." *Forbes*. 2 June 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why-malaysia-stays-quiet-about-its-claims-in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/#1e9c20a81beb>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

¹⁹ "Singapore military ties now a 'threat'". *Taipei Times*. 23 April 2002. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/04/23/0000133008>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

²⁰ "Factsheet: The Strategic Framework Agreement". Singapore Government, Ministry of Defence. 12 July 2005. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/12jul05_fs.html, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

²¹ Australia – Singapore Military Training Initiative. <http://www.defence.gov.au/Initiatives/ASMTI/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

agreements and cooperation between Singapore and Taiwan, and between Singapore and Australia in a great part focus on the training of the Singaporean military, as it lacks proper training grounds on its own soil. So as we can summarize the case of Singapore, its Chinese cultural ties combined with its anti-communist commitment resulted in Singapore building close ties with Taiwan during the Cold War, and this factor put a difficult heritage on the present day relations between Singapore and China.

Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, thus the country in the region that, given its population of more than 250 million inhabitants, its territory of close to 2 million square kilometres with an additional 3 million square kilometres of territorial waters, abundant natural resources, and its strategically advantageous location as an island nation, has theoretically the greatest chance to potentially become a middle power on its own right in the long run. Historically, Indonesian culture had stronger ties with the Indian subcontinent, than with China. Becoming predominantly Muslim during the 15th-16th centuries, it has a culture characteristically different from that of China or Mainland Southeast Asia.²² This is somewhat balanced by the presence of an ethnic Chinese community that is small in percentage but influential in the economy of the country, and has been present there ever since the 15th century. Since achieving independence, the history of Indonesian foreign policy can be divided into three main eras. The first, the hard line anti-colonialist, anti-western foreign policy of President Sukarno meant close cooperation with Cold War China, an attitude of unilateralism in Southeast Asia, and armed conflicts with pro-US Malaysia, Australia, and in Western New Guinea also with the local Dutch colonial authority and local pro-independence forces. After the fall of Sukarno, power was taken over by Suharto, and the establishment of ASEAN, all occurring in 1967, this generated a radical turn. At global level Indonesia switched sides in the Cold War, and became a key ally of the USA. This resulted in hostile relations with China, and at the same time also in taking an active and leading role in ASEAN, as a pro-western and anti-communist regional bloc during the Cold War.²³ The relations with China slightly improved during the 1980s, after the start of the Chinese reforms and that of the informal Sino-US strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union, and at regional level against Vietnam, thus improving relations with China, no longer questioning the pro-US stand of ASEAN in the Cold War context. The third, the present era of Indonesian foreign policy seems to have taken its shape by 2004, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Suharto regime. With the end of the Cold War, the original purpose of ASEAN as a regional alliance uniting the pro-US countries of the region during the Cold War changed into a framework of regional integration focusing less on ideological and security issues, and more on economic integration, also giving admission to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. At the same time, from being somewhat of an ally of the USA in the 1980s, China once again became the main opponent of American influence in the region, but at the same time became the economic powerhouse of the area. In this new context, Indonesia is following a foreign policy where it is cautiously balancing in a way that it keeps maintaining its military cooperation with the USA and at the same time is eager to build fruitful economic relations with China, while defending its sovereignty against Chinese assertiveness as we could see during the naval clashes in 2016, at the same time still pursuing its leading role

²² Reid, A. *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999. 1–37.

²³ Weinstein, F. B. *Indonesian foreign policy and the dilemma of dependence: from Sukarno to Soeharto*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007.

within ASEAN, aiming to mediate between China, Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea Dispute, giving some moral support to these two fellow ASEAN countries. Considering all these characteristics of present day Indonesian foreign policy, we can conclude that in the Sino-US relations Indonesia can be sorted among the more pro-US countries with more willingness to stand up against China. On this scale, Indonesia can be seen as being more assertive to China than Thailand but less than Vietnam and the Philippines. The naval incident that occurred in 2016 between Indonesia and China near the Natuna islands,²⁴ and the policies of President Jokowi suggests a rather pro-US shift and an attitude of standing up to China in the policies of Indonesia.²⁵ This is also supported by the strategic factors that are given by the fact that Indonesia, as an island nation, is among those countries where, given the naval superiority of the USA, American assistance would for almost sure be sufficient to fend off a Chinese invasion (not to mention the prospect of further assistance in such a case from Australia and/or Japan).

The smallest among the ASEAN countries is the tiny sultanate of Brunei. The country along the northern coast of Borneo was a much larger state before the European colonization, and included virtually all of what is now Malaysian Borneo, but shrank to a fraction of its former size by the early 20th century. Unlike Singapore, Brunei does not have a population of millions, only slightly more than 400,000 inhabitants, and it also lacks a formidable military. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, Brunei accepted China's offer to joint exploration of oil and gas resources on that part of the sea that Brunei claims as its own, thus Brunei de facto accepted the Chinese claims on the South China Sea, therefore we can also include Brunei among the rather pro-Chinese states of the region, together with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Myanmar.²⁶

CONCLUSION

Finishing this overview, we can conclude that basically the ASEAN countries seem to lack the sufficient coherence to form a united front against China, with many of them are taking an increasingly pro-China stand, and some of them being more concerned over issues with their fellow ASEAN neighbours, than over those with China. ASEAN did try to make efforts to form a united front against China in the South China Sea debate, but as we could see in the individual descriptions above, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and Brunei in evaded to take part in such a front in one way or another, and Myanmar is following an openly pro-China policy. It seems the individual interests of the participating countries do not make it possible for ASEAN to form a united front against China. While for the interests of some countries in the region the rise of China can certainly be seen as a strategic peril, such as in the case of Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, for others, like Malaysia and Myanmar it is rather as an opportunity, and for some, like Laos and Cambodia, even as a blessing.

²⁴ Supriyanto, R. A. "Breaking the Silence: Indonesia Vs. China in the Natuna Islands". *The Diplomat*. 23 March 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/breaking-the-silence-indonesia-vs-china-in-the-natuna-islands/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

²⁵ Panda, A. "South China Sea: Indonesian Military Stages Massive Natuna Sea Exercise". *The Diplomat*. 8 October 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/south-china-sea-indonesian-military-stages-massive-natuna-sea-exercise/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

²⁶ Pereira, C. "Brunei Silenced on South China Sea Claims". *Asia Sentinel*. 30 April 2016. <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/brunei-silenced-south-china-sea-claims/>, Accessed on 26 January 2017.

As events and policies in Southeast Asia are taking place in the context of the ongoing Sino-US great power rivalry, the difference in the existing military capabilities are making a spontaneous distinction between Mainland and Maritime Southeast Asia. On one hand, the military build-up of China makes it increasingly unlikely for any Southeast Asian army to be able to stop a Chinese ground offensive. On the other hand, in terms of air and sea power, China is still relatively weak when it comes to the prospect of amphibious operations. The USA still maintains a naval superiority, its close ally and regional opponent of China, Japan is also building up a world class navy as part of its remilitarization. This means that the US naval superiority still seems to be able to repel any Chinese amphibious operation against any island nation in East and Southeast Asia, and this case is even stronger with the prospect of Japanese assistance. Thus we are heading towards an asymmetric situation, where on the one hand, countries of Mainland Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly vulnerable to Chinese land power, while the island nations of Maritime Southeast Asia can, with great confidence, potentially still rely on US naval superiority to repel any Chinese invasion on sea.

If we want to categorize the ASEAN countries along the division of being rather pro-China, or rather anti-China, then we can include Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Myanmar in the pro-China group, while Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam in the anti-China group, with Thailand and Singapore being in between the two as a sort of non-aligned states. What this means for the future is the likely lack of a united ASEAN security bloc, and the main dividing line a great part seem to coincide with the geopolitical distinction between Mainland Southeast Asia and Maritime Southeast Asia, and the American concept of the First Island Chain. Two of the three rather anti-China states, Indonesia and the Philippines are at the same time the two island-nations of Southeast Asia. Their location makes them suitable to successfully secure their sovereignty against Chinese strategic pressure with US assistance given the continuing naval superiority of the US, and also taking into consideration the fact that Japanese assistance on behalf of the USA is also becoming an increasingly real possibility, that would add another world class navy to the picture thus making the case of Indonesia and the Philippines even stronger. This would mean a pro-US anti-China de facto alliance virtually involving all countries of the First Island Chain from Japan through Taiwan (de facto) and the Philippines to Indonesia, also having the capability to block almost every single choke point between the South and East China Seas, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, thus practically enclosing the Chinese navy to the littoral seas. Mainland Southeast Asia is a way different story, however. As China's military capabilities keep expanding, it seems less and less likely that the USA would be able and willing to halt a Chinese ground invasion on any Mainland Southeast Asian country. It is plausible of course, that the USA would intervene in a naval conflict between China and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, but a Chinese ground invasion on Vietnam would be a completely different story. Also even if the USA was willing to assist Vietnam in case of such a Chinese ground invasion where China would only use its own soil as the base of its operations, this would not be a guarantee that the USA would also be willing to help in case China also used Laotian and Cambodian soil for its operations. Here we come to the next issue that makes containment in Mainland Southeast Asia an unlikely option: As we have discussed before, as soon as China gains access to the use of the territory of Laos and Cambodia for its operations, the strategic position of Vietnam becomes utterly defenceless, and standing up to China will no longer be an option. But how could the USA prevent China from gaining such an access? Given the history of its relations both to Thailand and Vietnam, it is in the best interest of Cambodia to build an alliance with China, so as for Cambodia, we can conclude that a military alliance with China is

not a question of if, but a question of when. And Laos is the key country in such a sense that it can provide a possible direct land link between China and Cambodia. So the main question is whether the USA is willing and able to prevent China from getting access to the territory of Laos. China can obtain such an access in two possible ways: courtship or strategic pressure. If the case is courtship, and Laos willingly accepts it, then there is not much that the USA (or for that matter Vietnam) can do. Invading Laos while China stands behind would not really be an option. If the Laotian leadership is unwilling to accept courtship, and China attempts to extort submission of Laos by strategic pressure, then that theoretically leaves more room for manoeuvre for the US, since in this case, it could intervene on behalf of the legitimate government of the country. But would such an intervention be possible in practice? The armed forces of Laos are small and weak to the point of insignificance. The country shares a long, direct land border with China, so theoretically, Chinese ground troops can enter the country simply rolling over the border. The US naval superiority that can defend island nations of the First Island Chain is of no use here. At the same time Laos is also a landlocked country, which means that the USA cannot simply ship supplies and troops directly there, only through Thai, Cambodian or Vietnamese territory, if any of these countries is to give access. We can immediately exclude Cambodia given its pro-China stand, and such involvement by Thailand is also highly unlikely given the fact that it was keen to maintain good relations with China even as a US ally during the Cold War. So the only option for the USA to help Laos repelling Chinese strategic pressure is to aid it in the frames of an alliance with Vietnam. So, what we get as the necessary condition to help Laos in fending off Chinese strategic pressure if it is willing to do so, is an American-Vietnamese alliance, going to war with China on Laotian soil. How is plausible such a scenario? As for Vietnam, such a scenario would mean that it would also have to face a Chinese invasion itself. So this would mean the USA waging a major ground war with China in both Vietnam and Laos. But this happens only if the USA does chose to get engaged in the conflict, because otherwise China would not attack Vietnam, and given the Chinese foreign policy tradition of making high efforts to avoid open violence if possible, even in Laos, China's gaining access by extortion would likely happen through negotiations, without one single gunshot. This means that in such a situation a US military involvement would not mean an intervention into an already ongoing Sino-Laotian war, but would rather mean starting a major Sino-Laotian-Vietnamese ground war in a situation where up until then, whatever is going on, it is likely to happen without one single gunshot. At this point the willingness of the USA to take such a step seems to be highly unlikely, and even the willingness of Vietnam to get involved can be doubtful. And we also have to emphasize that even such a theoretical possibility is only there if both Chinese courtship and diplomatic extortion in Laos fail, and Laos itself is asking for US military assistance and is willing to face a war with China. If, either due to a genuine conviction by courtship or due to a costs-and-benefits consideration of the Chinese diplomatic pressure, Laos is unwilling to go to war with China and refuses US and Vietnamese assistance, not even such a theoretical possibility will exist. It rather seems that the USA and Vietnam in fact lost the capability of preventing Laos from becoming under Chinese influence when Vietnam pulled out its troops from the country in the early 1990s.

So to summarize for Mainland Southeast Asia: We can conclude that Laos is the key to the region. As soon as the Chinese military gains access to the territory of Laos to use it for Chinese operations, then even without any real military attack this would represent such a strategic position for China in the region that from that point military confrontation with China would cease to be an option for both Vietnam and Thailand, and they would have no other

option, than Finlandization. With Myanmar and Cambodia already being pro-Chinese, this as a result would mean Chinese hegemony over the entire of Mainland Southeast Asia. In short, from an American strategic point of view, if Laos falls, entire Mainland Southeast Asia falls. We can also see, however, that if China decides to seriously pursue strategic access to Laotian territory, then it is highly unlikely that the USA will have the sufficient tools and means to prevent this from happening. This means overall, that the question of China bringing Mainland Southeast Asia under its hegemony seems to be not a question of if, but rather of when.

On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that Maritime Southeast Asia and in a broader sense, the countries of the First Island Chain (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia) are a whole different story. Since the USA naval superiority will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, and Japan and Taiwan are maintaining formidable navies likely able to pose a major if not impassable obstacle for any Chinese amphibious operation against them, and with the prospect of Japan's navy assisting the USA in Southeast Asia becoming more likely than ever before, as well as the increasing possibility of Australian and perhaps even Indian assistance to the USA with defending Indonesia or the Philippines against a Chinese amphibious invasion, it seems likely that the USA and its allies may be able to relatively easily secure Maritime Southeast Asia against China as long as these countries are willing to accept such assistance. The expected spread of Anti-Access-Area-Denial systems is a factor that seems to only further confirm this distinction between Maritime Southeast Asia and Mainland Southeast Asia. If China deploys A2AD systems on its territory along the South China Sea, this would further impair the USA's capability to assist the countries of Mainland Southeast Asia, as this could prevent its navy reaching there but it does not make any easier for any Chinese amphibious operation to reach the territory of Indonesia or the Philippines (or Taiwan and Japan for that matter). Once A2AD systems become abundant, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan may also deploy such systems on their own territories (or the USA can arm them with such) preventing the Chinese navy from reaching these countries. So while the potential deployment of A2AD systems on Chinese soil can prevent the US navy reaching China and Mainland Southeast Asia, at the same time, the potential deployment of A2AD systems in Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan can prevent the Chinese navy from reaching the territories of these countries, and in general to pass through the First Island Chain. Thus, several factors, such as geographic location, cultural affiliation, popular amity and enmity, strategic interests of individual countries, asymmetry between Chinese and US military capabilities, and even the prospect of the advent of A2AD systems point towards the same potential outcome of the present situation: Chinese hegemony over Mainland Southeast Asia sooner or later, but at the same time, a continuing US alignment of Maritime Southeast Asia and countries of the First Island Chain.

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Marcell György Pintér:

CHINA IN THE MENA REGION

ABSTRACT: With China's economy and influence being on the rise, the global status quo is changing. Overcoming past colonialist exploitation, China itself is becoming a colonialist state, as it is more and more apparent in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region. As the United States and other countries lose ground, Chinese investors gain a firm position. China's new One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, the modern resurgence of the Silk Road, aims to expand China's overall influence over Eurasia, Oceania, and Africa, replacing the US economically. However, China's intent is solely economic and relies on stability that is ensured by US troops and UN peacekeepers. The MENA region in particular – consisting of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen – is of great importance to China, as it holds the world's largest oil deposit, and is mostly still underdeveloped, giving way to lucrative investment opportunities for China.

As China's presence and influence in the MENA region is increasing, so does the importance of communication: More and more Chinese learn Arabic and vice versa, and more and more universities offer place for foreign students. Furthermore, attitude and openness towards the Chinese has also started to improve.

Although current Chinese interests remain within the boundaries of economy, further increased presence in the field of peacekeeping and the fight against terrorism in the future is possible, as the stability China's economic interests rely on are becoming more and more uncertain, one reason being the Chinese domestic economy itself.

KEYWORDS: China, MENA, OBOR, One China policy, Western Sahara, strategic resources, effects on world economy, peacekeeping, soft power.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

The first noteworthy and perhaps the best known trade network, the Silk Road – including both seaborne and overland trade routes – between the Han dynasty (207 BC – 220 AD) China and the Roman Empire, including parts of the Middle East and Egypt, was established in approximately 115 BC, and its importance lasted around the 1450s when safer sea routes were discovered.

Before the 1980's, the presence of the People's Republic of China in the Middle East and Africa was nowhere near that of today. During the Cold War, China was mostly passive towards the Middle East. It was viewed as problematic and not worth the effort, moreover, China did not have the experience necessary to deal with the Middle East to the extent it had for East Asia or the US.¹

¹ Medeiros, E. S. *China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 160–161. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

The People's Republic of China's normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Middle East and North Africa started in 1956 with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, followed by Algeria, Iraq, and Morocco in 1958, Tunisia in 1964, Iran, Kuwait, and Lebanon in 1971, Jordan in 1977, Libya and Oman in 1978, the United Arab Emirates in 1984, Qatar in 1988, Bahrain in 1989, Saudi Arabia in 1990, and Israel in 1992.^{2,3,4,5}

Today, China's three strategic partners in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to recognise it, and for decades, Beijing maintained the strongest ties with Cairo in the Middle East – up until the Iraqi-Iranian war in the 1980's, when China became the major supplier of arms and military equipment to Iraq (and as a matter of fact, Iran as well); from then on, oil-rich Iraq replaced Egypt. After and as a consequence of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia took over the role of China's most important Middle Eastern partner. Being the last Arab country to recognise the communist government, Saudi Arabia, after 1957, and especially after the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution in China, immensely disliked the actions the People's Republic of China committed against its Muslim minority, the Uighurs in Xinjiang in particular. However, China signing an arms deal with Saudi Arabia turned the tide in Sino-Saudi relations, paving the road for full diplomatic relations in 1990.⁶

The Silk Road's modern reincarnation, the Chinese-proposed "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative, aims to resurrect and further expand it to connect the whole of Eurasia, East Africa (which can be later extended to the whole of Africa), and parts of Oceania both on land and sea.⁷ This initiative proves the ever so steady increase of Chinese influence in the world, and the arguably plausible goal of replacing the US as a new economic superpower, described as "the Chinese dream of the Chinese nation's great revival".⁸ This new ambition-imbued phrase is originated from Xi Jinping, and since he took the office of general secretary of the Communist Party of China, it quickly became the official embodiment of Chinese national identity.⁹

² Data for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. – "African Member States". China Internet Information Center. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183389.htm>, Accessed on 4 April 2017.

³ Data for Yemen. – "China-Yemen relations". China.org.cn. 21 September 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/video/225354.htm>, Accessed on 4 April 2017.

⁴ Data for Iraq. – "Bilateral Relations between China and Iraq". Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Iraq. 11 April 2013. <http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/zygxgk/>, Accessed on 4 April 2017.

⁵ Scobell, A. and Nader, A. *China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016. 4. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1229/RAND_RR1229.pdf, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

⁶ Ma, H. and Chang, I-w. J. "China's Strategic Middle Eastern Languages". Middle East Research and Information Project. 2014. <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer270/chinas-strategic-middle-eastern-languages>, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

⁷ Lin, H. "'Yidai yilu' zou ru mitu" ("One Belt, One Road' going astray"). <http://forum.hkej.com/print/130698>, Accessed on 27 March 2017.

⁸ Lin, H. "'Yidai yilu' zou ru mitu".

⁹ "Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream: The vision of China's new president should serve his people, not a nationalist state". *The Economist*. 4 May 2013. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping>, Accessed on 27 March 2017.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

With an ever so high GDP of 11,007.72 billion USD in 2015, which is eight times more than that of Russia, three times more than that of the whole MENA region, and which vies with that of the whole Euro Area,¹⁰ and an official defence budget of 151.5 billion USD in 2017,¹¹ which is more than that of the MENA countries combined (which was more than 135 billion USD in 2014¹²), China is in a favourable position to maintain and assert its interests in the MENA region with a relative ease, although Russia also tries to gain a foothold in Africa. If China succeeds in realising its One Belt, One Road initiative, it may gain direct access to 86.55% of the total world population, an incredibly vast market.

The reason behind Beijing's attention to this region is manifold. On the one hand, one could argue that the decreasing popularity and thus also decreasing influence of the US in the region implies that others may attempt to secure their "share" as well, hence China's and Russia's increasing presence; however, it is not at all due to mere fortune – China is actively imitating (or trying to imitate) US institutions with the intention of superseding them.¹³ On the other hand, it is not of China's direct interest that the US withdrew from the region totally, as the US maintains relative order and stability in most of the MENA region, helping business and exempting China to a certain extent from this task. On a further note, the MENA region also serves as the gateway towards Europe and the rest of Africa, making this particular region geopolitically exceptionally essential for China's One Belt, One Road project.

Even more so when considering the huge oil and other resource deposits.¹⁴ The MENA region – being rich in resources and still mostly underdeveloped – provides perfect ground for the more developed countries and their interests. In 2004, Chinese state-owned firm Sinopec reached an agreement that granted them a concession for both exploring and producing natural gas in the Empty Quarter – the largest contiguous desert as well as one of, if not the, most oil-rich site in the world –, from which process US firms were particularly excluded.¹⁵

In terms of nuclear energy, after China was contracted to build two nuclear power plants in Iran – whose greatest investor, trade partner, and buyer of oil is China, largely due to the sanctions imposed against it¹⁶ –, Russia is working towards taking over from China the role of the provider of nuclear energy in the MENA region: agreements on the building

¹⁰ "China GDP". Trading Economics. 2015. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp>, Accessed on 21 March 2017.

¹¹ "What does China really spend on its military?". Center for Strategic & International Studies. 2017. <http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/>, Accessed on 21 March 2017.

¹² Abbas, T. et al. "Middle East & North Africa Regional Results". Transparency International Defence & Security. 2015. <https://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/GI-MENA-Regional-Results-web.pdf> (p.2), Accessed on 31 March 2017.

¹³ Heilmann, S. et al. "China's Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order". Mercator Institute for China Studies. 18 October 2014. http://blog.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf, Accessed on 5 May 2017.

¹⁴ "Mapping Africa's natural resources". Al Jazeera. 28 October 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/10/mapping-africa-natural-resources-161020075811145.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2017.

¹⁵ Ma and Chang. "China's Strategic Middle Eastern Languages".

¹⁶ Champion, M. "Iran Is Stuck With China to Finance Its Oil Dreams". Bloomberg. 12 October 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/tired-of-china-s-grip-iran-confronts-a-harsh-oil-market-reality>, Accessed on 1 June 2017.

of nuclear power plants in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey by Russia were reached as of March 2017.¹⁷

	MENA Countries Sorted by Sum of			
	Import from China		Export to China	
	Top 3 Product	Value (USD)	Top 3 Product	Value (USD)
United Arab Emirates (2014)	Electrical machinery	18,233,019	Vehicles	1,236,703
	Machinery	10,118,133	Plastics	742,547
	Clothes	1,292,663	Machinery	187,664
Saudi Arabia	Electrical machinery	6,034,645	Organic chemicals	3,810,312
	Machinery	4,883,803	Plastics	1,359,389
	Clothes	1,235,896	Vehicles	149,983
Oman (2016)	Machinery	269,499	Oil	10,143,419
	Electrical machinery	195,663	Organic chemicals	403,660
	Articles of iron and steel	148,440	Aluminium	35,360
Iraq (2014)	Articles of iron and steel	6,077,522	no data	
	Railway locomotives	915,563		
	Machinery	692,164		
Qatar	Machinery	956,021	Oil	4,380,982
	Electrical machinery	802,785	Plastics	503,440
	Vehicles	213,885	Vehicles	140,273
Algeria	Electrical machinery	2,049,165	Oil	552,365
	Machinery	1,935,816	Cork	1,955
	Vehicles	879,926	Raw hides and leather	1,938
Israel	Electrical machinery	886,177	Electrical machinery	1,748,293
	Machinery	626,364	Optical apparatus	417,640
	Organic chemicals	437,041	Fertilisers	346,438
Egypt	Electrical machinery	2,068,597	Oil	278,082
	Machinery	1,245,143	Stone, cement	56,605
	Clothes	777,004	Salt, sulphur, lime	19,258
Kuwait (2016)	Electrical machinery	1,320,907	Organic chemicals	251,677
	Machinery	798,191	Plastics	196,244
	Articles of iron and steel	523,713	Vehicles	32,286

¹⁷ “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries”. World Nuclear Association. March 2017. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx>, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

	MENA Countries Sorted by Sum of			
	Import from China		Export to China	
	Top 3 Product	Value (USD)	Top 3 Product	Value (USD)
Morocco	Electrical machinery	654,206	Ores	108,563
	Machinery	507,102	Copper	52,087
	Coffee, tea, spices	196,172	Fertilisers	15,833
Jordan	Electrical machinery	549,993	Fertilisers	205,824
	Machinery	360,241	Clothes	2,491
	Articles of iron and steel	214,373	Machinery	1,976
Lebanon (2014)	Articles of iron and steel	519,210	Copper	6,318
	Machinery	334,248	Aluminium	2,561
	Electrical machinery	328,407	Plastics	1,845
Tunisia	Electrical machinery	644,528	Plastics	10,977
	Machinery	314,907	Electrical machinery	3,771
	Vehicles	70,930	Machinery	2,410
Bahrain	Electrical machinery	372,585	Organic chemicals	14,690
	Machinery	295,307	Vehicles	8,703
	Furniture	68,408	Machinery	7,064
Yemen	Electrical machinery	131,166	Machinery	2,349
	Machinery	67,574	Plastics	1,138
	Prep. of vegetables and fruits	55,359	Vegetables	1,012
State of Palestine	Electrical machinery	65,376	negligible*	
	Machinery	40,434		
	Ceramics	23,189		
Iran	no data since 2011			
Libya	no data since 2011			
Syria	no data since 2011			

* State of Palestine's total export value as of 2015 reached a negligible amount of 1 USD in "soap" category. – "Trade Map". International Trade Centre. [http://www.trademap.org/\(X\(1\)S\(arr5ktfvmt1dg33fxwpw1za\)\)/tradestat/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|275||156||TOTAL||2|1|1|2|2|1|1|1|1](http://www.trademap.org/(X(1)S(arr5ktfvmt1dg33fxwpw1za))/tradestat/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|275||156||TOTAL||2|1|1|2|2|1|1|1|1), Accessed on 12 April 2017.

1st figure – *All 19 MENA Countries' Top 3 Import and Export Products from/to China (data from 2015 except for where stated otherwise).*¹⁸

As seen in the foregoing table, the MENA region is of quite significant economic importance for China. Tendencies show that the value of trade in the region is steadily increasing every year, pointing towards China's increasing influence in the region.

¹⁸ "Trade Map". International Trade Centre. <http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx>, Accessed on 12 April 2017.

Similarly to the One Belt, One Road project, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – proposed by China in 2013 and launched in 2014 – has the objective of supporting the building of infrastructure in countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This initiative – as of 2016 – involves 35 regional, 17 non-regional, 7 prospective regional, and 11 prospective non-regional member states.¹⁹ Both approaches aim at asserting Chinese interests, economic ones in particular, one directly and the other indirectly. This may seem self-contradictory, however, as the objective being stability in the region through economic investments inherently requires stability for the investments to be successful.²⁰

A destabilised Middle East and North Africa is an economic loss for China. In contrast to Chinese efforts to secure islands and thus marine territory of strategic value near its coastline, it attempts to avoid conflicts between trade partner countries with as much care and foresight as it is politically possible, as opposed to many Western countries. Within the boundaries of this matter, political statements, official visits, investments, and even contribution to peacekeeping are considered. In the event of the economically harmful destabilisation of this region or an either-or situation, China might be forced to break its own policies and intervene directly.

As for tourism, following the events of the Arab Spring, the number of tourists decreased remarkably in the region. In Egypt, for example, tourism makes up a significant part of the Egyptian GDP – 9.2% in 2014, which declined over time to 7.2% in 2016,²¹ following the Russian plane crash of 31st October 2015 in the Sinai Peninsula, after which the influx of Russian tourists to Egypt plummeted by 97.7% due to official suspension of Egyptian flights,²² and overall tourism dropped to 68.4%, causing a loss of 3 billion USD to the sector.²³ This loss in European – because of current terror attacks – as well as Russian tourists now seems to be patched by the increase of Chinese tourists – in 2016, about 180,000 Chinese visited Egypt, a 55.8% increase from 2015.²⁴

In the wake of the Arab Spring, which was unintentionally augmented by a massive drought and wheat shortage in China, thus doubling the prices of it, which eventually made the likelihood of protests, civil unrests, riots, military coup d'états, and civil wars increase in wheat-importing countries in the Middle East and North Africa,²⁵ it is increasingly important to see the correlations in the world and think accordingly. China is a country that

¹⁹ “Members and Prospective Members of the Bank”. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 10 February 2017. <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html>, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

²⁰ Su, A. “Let’s not talk politics”: China builds Middle East ties through business”. Al Jazeera America. 20 February 2016. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/2/20/china-middle-east-business-politics.html>, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

²¹ “Egypt: Travel & Tourism Total Contribution to GDP”. Knoema. <https://knoema.com/atlas/Egypt/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-Total-Contribution-to-GDP/Total-Contribution-to-GDP-percent-share>, Accessed on 15 May 2017.

²² “Rusia tu’alliq rihlatiha al-jawwia ila Misr” (“Russia suspends flights to Egypt”). Al Jazeera. 6 November 2015. goo.gl/kmCdF7, Accessed on 12 May 2017.

²³ “Rusia tawjiah suf’at li-s-siaha al-misria... watudammir makasib ‘Misi’” (“Russia slaps Egyptian tourism... and the gains of Messi”). Araby21. 25 February 2017. goo.gl/70xpJ9, Accessed on 12 May 2017.

²⁴ Aleem, A. “Egypt hopes Chinese visitors can make up for Russian tourism decline”. Al-Monitor. 6 March 2017. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/egypt-tourism-decline-russia-china.html>, Accessed on 12 May 2017.

²⁵ Sternberg, T. “Chinese drought, bread and the Arab Spring”. *Applied Geography* 34. 2012. 519–524. https://www.homeworkmarket.com/sites/default/files/qx/16/02/27/02/20160228203325sternberg_2014_chinese_drought__bread_and_the_arab_spring_1_.pdf, Accessed on 12 April 2017.

by itself, having more than one fifth of total world population, is able to affect the whole world in terms of economy.

	Import Value (USD, approx.)	Population	Import Value / Person (USD)
USA	2 307 950 000 000	321 773 631	7 172.59
China	1 681 950 000 000	1 376 048 943	1 222.30
Germany	1 050 020 000 000	80 688 545	13 013.25

2nd figure – Top 3 Importer Countries with Import Value, Population, and Import Value per Person (data from 2015).

As of 2015, the world's three biggest importers were the US with 2,307.95 billion USD, China with 1,681.95 billion USD, and Germany with 1,050.02 billion USD;²⁶ as a comparison, these countries have a population of 321,773,631 (US),²⁷ 1,376,048,943 (China),²⁸ and 80,688,545 (Germany).²⁹ This can be calculated into 7,172.59 USD per person in the US, 1,222.3 USD per person in China, and 13,013.25 USD per person in Germany. This chart implies the fragile nature of globalised world economy, as China by itself has its potential to cause famine, civil wars, and economic crises unintentionally, should China decide to increase its welfare or should another drought happen there. A sudden increase in import of something, and China may leave half the world in lack thereof, making a surge in prices, dearth, and discontent. An unexpected decrease in exports may force producers and exporters to China to go bankrupt.

As China is the world's largest pork importer with more than a quarter of global trade in 2017,³⁰ if, for instance, China repositioned its priorities and decreased the production of pork while also keeping its needs of it eventually increasing its import, it would cause perceptible difficulties in the world economy not only in the field of pork, but also in other areas, because when more pork is needed, more pigs must be bred, that requires more food for them, which leads to more fields being sown with food for pigs rather than for human consumption, eventually leading to increased grain prices, more people being unable to afford basic types of food, and possibly civil unrests. Furthermore, if – or rather when – China decides to exploit its potential to further increase welfare in the country by increasing wages – which would lead to China losing its role of being a low-wage economic powerhouse –, imports may eventually increase siphoning enormous amounts of products from other parts of the world, which would possibly lead to some sorts of effects mentioned above.

²⁶ "Leading import countries worldwide in 2015". Statista. 2015. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268184/leading-import-countries-worldwide/>, Accessed on 3 April 2017.

²⁷ "U.S. Population". Worldometers. <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/>, Accessed on 3 April 2017.

²⁸ "China Population". Worldometers. <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/>, Accessed on 3 April 2017.

²⁹ "Germany Population". Worldometers. <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/germany-population/>, Accessed on 3 April 2017.

³⁰ "Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade". United States Department of Agriculture. April 2017. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/livestock_poultry.pdf, Accessed on 3 April 2017.

GEOPOLITICS

With the decline of American and Russian influences in the region, China has the opportunity and readiness to fill in the gap. This can be proven best by the above mentioned “Chinese dream” and the One Belt, One Road initiative, which is a challenger to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, either of which has the US as their focal point.³¹

From all the areas of the One Belt, One Road project, however, the MENA region may be China’s greater focus in particular. By “obtaining” the area bit by bit through strategic investments, contribution to peacekeeping, and maintaining influence, China potentially aims to secure natural resources vital to the future of or not abundant in China.³² As Africa is still politically and ethnically unstable – due to the negligent way borders were drawn – space for silent political and economic positioning is given.

Even though the involvement of US troops in the MENA region is good for Chinese business as it provides stability, China’s security and interests may be perceived as jeopardised in its periphery in the long run.³³ The MENA region, in terms of oil, for instance, is the most important region to China: as of 2014, Kuwait (3%), the United Arab Emirates (4%), Iran (9%), Iraq (9%), Oman (10%), and Saudi Arabia (16%) made up 51% of China’s total crude oil imports,³⁴ and China may not want to have the Middle Eastern valve closed. Because China’s current interests dictate peace seeking and maintenance in order to realise its mercantile prospects, an event of “protecting interests” through military means is highly unlikely.

The current Chinese way of asserting interests, as mentioned above, is not through military or physical might, but rather through economy and also culture. As Western culture – that of Europe and later the US – reached every corner of the world, so does China want to spread its own, hoping to take its turn in shaping the world to its “liking” and interests.

In the region of North Africa and the Middle East, there is plenty of economic extremes: Qatar, for instance, is the world’s wealthiest country in terms of GDP per capita, while Yemen ranks only 194th; Bahrain achieves the 18th place in the world in terms of economic freedom, whilst Iran is only the 171st; Jordan has 1 million barrels of proven oil reserves – Saudi Arabia possesses 265 billion barrels.³⁵ Economic extremes mean economic opportunities, which China aims to take advantage of and exploit fully. Underdeveloped countries mostly export resources while importing products; they require investment to develop, which is a benefit for the region in the short-to-mid run, while being a long-term benefit for the investor as well. Developing areas are also in need of further financial support as well as mixed trade of resources and products, and well-developed countries mainly require resources and export their products. China’s potential lies in the ability to fulfil the needs of all three types

³¹ “Our bulldozers, our rules: China’s foreign policy could reshape a good part of the world economy”. *The Economist*. 2 June 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-reshape-good-part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules>, Accessed on 27 March 2017.

³² Basov, V. “China is burning through its natural resources”. *Mining.com*. 26 April 2015. <http://www.mining.com/china-burning-natural-resources/>, Accessed on 16 May 2017.

³³ Scobell and Nader. “China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon”. 2.

³⁴ “Breakdown of China’s crude oil imports in 2014, by source country”. *Statista*. 2014. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-imports-by-country/>, Accessed 5 May 2017.

³⁵ “2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Middle East”. *The Heritage Foundation*. 2017. <http://index.heritage.org/military/2017/assessments/operating-environment/middle-east/>, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

of countries in the MENA region and is ready to dominate the North African and Middle Eastern markets.

SOCIETY

Although the presence of Chinese capital may be beneficial for the MENA region's development, the modern technique of non-direct colonisation through economy might not be well received by the locals in the long run, as it is perceivable in South America and Africa – in 2011 in Zambia, for example, workers' unrest arose over low wages, bad treatment, and poor safety conditions.³⁶ In 2012, also in Zambia, a Chinese supervisor was killed and another seriously injured over a pay dispute.³⁷

For mutual benefit, reciprocal acceptance of one another's culture is required – language learning is one way of achieving it. Due to new prospects in the MENA region, it is more and more promoted in China that students learn Arabic, as it has also been the case with South America and Spanish before, even though it will most likely not exceed the popularity of English, Japanese, Korean, French or German. Historically, the first language of the Middle East to be studied extensively in China was Arabic.³⁸ Today, the three strategic partners of China in the greater MENA region are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey – it comes as no surprise, therefore, that the biggest Middle Eastern language programmes in China are Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.³⁹

In 1978, 20 academic students from North Africa and 15 from the Middle East studied in China.⁴⁰ Since then, the number of Arab students studying in China has been increasing drastically: in 2012, this number exceeded 10,000, a 70% rise since 2010.⁴¹ Saudi Arabia, for example, sponsored 1,500 students studying in Chinese universities,⁴² while this number in 2009 was only 400.⁴³

The One Belt, One Road initiative has established 500 Confucius Institutes – Chinese cultural institutes – in the world by 2017,⁴⁴ and aims to maintain a total number of 1,000 by 2020.⁴⁵ Established institutes in the MENA region – total of 15 – include one in Bahrain,

³⁶ Hotter, A. "Zambia's Sata Faces Test of Mining Mettle". The Wall Street Journal. 20 October 2011. <https://blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/10/20/zambia%e2%80%99s-sata-faces-test-of-mining-mettle/>, Accessed on 24 April 2017.

³⁷ "Zambian miners kill Chinese supervisor and injure another in pay dispute". The Guardian. 5 August 2012. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/05/zambian-miners-kill-chinese-supervisor>, Accessed on 12 May 2017.

³⁸ Ma and Chang. "China's Strategic Middle Eastern Languages".

³⁹ Ma and Chang. "China's Strategic Middle Eastern Languages".

⁴⁰ Kanet, R. E. "Soviet Policy toward the Developing World: The Role of Economic Assistance and Trade". Strategic Studies Institute. 1980. [goo.gl/zel9Ej](http://go.gl/zel9Ej), Accessed on 18 April 2017.

⁴¹ Du, Y. "Qunian alabo guojia zai Zhongguo liuxuesheng da yiwan duo ren" ("Last year's Arab students in China exceed ten thousand"). Science and Technology Daily. 16 September 2013. http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2013-09/16/content_224422.htm?div=-1, Accessed on 28 April 2017.

⁴² Olimat, M. S. *China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring*. London: Routledge, 2012. 145.

⁴³ "Alabo xuesheng lai Hua liuxue fangxingwei'ai" ("Arab students studying in China are on the rise"). Xinhuanet. 10 July 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2009-07/10/content_11688205.htm, Accessed on 28 April 2017.

⁴⁴ "About Confucius Institutes". Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban). http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm, Accessed on 28 April 2017.

⁴⁵ Pan, L. "Confucius Institute: Promoting language, culture and friendliness". Xihuanet. 2 October 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm, Accessed on 28 April 2017.

two in Egypt, two in Iran, two in Israel, two in Jordan, one in Lebanon, three in Morocco, and two in the United Arab Emirates.⁴⁶

The teaching of Chinese language and culture in universities of the Middle East and North Africa is relatively new, but is present. For instance, in Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, the teaching of Chinese had been fully established by 2001, and the university also provides Islamic studies in Chinese, from which the first students to receive a degree graduated in 2006.⁴⁷

Given China's westward ambitions and the relatively big Muslim population in the country, the Chinese government set as an objective to increase the number of speakers of Arabic in China, and as of 2005, the number of Chinese universities teaching Arabic reached 44. Furthermore, there are around 200 Islamic schools that teach Arabic, graduating 4,000 students a year, as well as 100,000 people studying the language in mosques.⁴⁸ However, China's Communist Party took a stance against religious extremism while also trying to "sinicise" its ethnic and religious minorities, largely affecting its Muslim minority, which effect is further increased by growing anti-Islam sentiment on the internet.⁴⁹

A survey about China in the Arab world, conducted in 2015, shows that China is the new "preferred" superpower among Arabs, arguably because it is in their eyes what the United States was a century ago: one to send businessmen instead of viceroys as colonialist Europe did.⁵⁰ For the question "If there is only one superpower in the world, which country do you want it to be?", China was the most preferred country, achieving better results (40%) than Saudi Arabia, Germany, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and other countries (combined 60%).⁵¹ For another question, which reads "Ideally, if you could study in any of the following countries, where would you go?", China was also the most favoured destination – the same results were attained with another question concerning living there.⁵² This shows that China, despite almost solely being an economic – and in the future, plausibly also a military – superpower on the rise, is also fully deemed as such culturally. Furthermore, whereas about 60% believed that China is a sincere friend of their country, 25% questioned the genuine nature of Sino-Arab relations, and no one denied it.⁵³

It is no mere coincidence that China is gaining a firm position in the MENA region, as the autocatalytic nature of power, if, for instance, achieved through economy rather than

⁴⁶ "About Confucius Institutes".

⁴⁷ "At-ta'rif biqism al-lugha as-sinia" ("The introduction of the Chinese language department"). Al Azhar University. http://www.azhar.edu.eg/bfac/lang_cairo/02_11_01.html, Accessed on 2 May 2017.

⁴⁸ Al-Maliki, A. "44 jami'a sinia ta'allama tullabaha al-lugha al-'arabia" ("44 Chinese universities teach Arabic"). *The New Arab*. 5 January 2015. goo.gl/Oo7aly, Accessed on 2 May 2017.

⁴⁹ "China's Communist Party hardens rhetoric on Islam". Al Jazeera. 12 March 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/china-communist-party-hardens-rhetoric-islam-170312171857797.html>, Accessed on 1 June 2017.

⁵⁰ Alterman, J. B. "China's Soft Power in the Middle East". In McGiffert, C. (ed.), *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: competition and cooperation in the developing world, a report of CSIS smart power initiative*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009. 70. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090310_chinesesoftpower__chap5.pdf, Accessed on 28 April 2017.

⁵¹ Gao, S. "China's Soft Power in the Arab World through Higher Educational Exchange". Thesis. Wellesley College, 2015. 38–39. <http://repository.wellesley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=thesiscollection>, Accessed on 25 April 2017.

⁵² Gao, S. "China's Soft Power in the Arab World through Higher Educational Exchange". 36–38.

⁵³ Gao, S. "China's Soft Power in the Arab World through Higher Educational Exchange". 39–40.

military, also affects a general affection towards the country in question, which reinforces cultural spread, which further reinforces the status of the country.

Nevertheless, students returning from abroad are often prone to being influenced or employed – often without the knowing of the person in question – as an agent by the foreign country. The survey detailed above also concludes that students returning from China gave a higher rating of China than before going there to study.⁵⁴ Confucius Institutes have also been subject of controversy, given their rapid expansion and the fact that teachers and funding are directed from China, and concerns quickly arose over ideological influence, industrial and military espionage,⁵⁵ surveillance of Chinese abroad, and undermining Taiwanese influence.⁵⁶

OFFICIAL STANDPOINTS

In order to maintain and protect Chinese investments and business in the MENA region, China's government is forced to address terrorism as a security issue and take part in global peacekeeping. Currently, China is the second largest supporter of UN peacekeeping in terms of financial contribution (10.29% in 2016),⁵⁷ and it is the largest contributor with 8,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping standby force, one fifth of the total of 40,000 peacekeepers sent by 50 nations (as of 2015), while also pledging 100 million USD to the standby force of the African Union as well as 1 billion USD to the establishment of the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.⁵⁸ China deploys hard-to-source yet essential enabler troops – namely medical teams, engineers, and logisticians, whose cost to train and maintain is higher, and who are usually hard to find in developing countries – that, along with the scarcity of potential peacekeeping troops – according to some estimates, only around 210,000 troops –, makes China's contribution to peacekeeping vital and indispensable.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, China's foreign policies suggest that it tries to avoid intervening in conflicts and rather remain passive as much as possible. As non-interventionist as China can be, its vision on terrorism differs from the radical American “war on terror”, yet it does not necessarily affect its readiness to lend military aid, provided the country in question requests it. However, countries like Iraq have openly asked for China's aid, yet they were given only promises of personnel training and other sorts of support.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ Gao, S. “China's Soft Power in the Arab World through Higher Educational Exchange”. 31–32.

⁵⁵ Pierrebourg, F. de and Juneau-Katsuya, M. *Nest of Spies: The Startling Truth About Foreign Agents At Work Within Canada's Borders*. Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2010. 160–162.

⁵⁶ Starr, D. “Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes”. *European Journal of Education* 44/1. 2009. 65–82. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-3435.2008.01371.x/full>, Accessed 28 April 2017.

⁵⁷ “Financing peacekeeping”. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml>, Accessed on 31 March 2017.

⁵⁸ Fung, C. J. “China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping”. United States Institute of Peace. 26 July 2016. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping>, Accessed on 28 March 2017.

⁵⁹ Fung, C. J.: “China's Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping”.

⁶⁰ Tiezzi, S. “What Is China's Plan for Fighting Global Terrorism?”. *The Diplomat*. 27 November 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-is-chinas-plan-for-fighting-global-terrorism/>, Accessed on 28 March 2017.

As it does not recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a sovereign state – being de facto occupied by Morocco –, nor does it support the concept of self-determination,⁶¹ in order to appear consistent with its own policies, Beijing might not lend direct political or military support to the Sahrawi cause of independence either, as a Chinese-supported independent Western Sahara may jeopardise the “One China policy” and may lead to the legitimisation and recognition of Taiwan – and perhaps also Tibet – as a sovereign state, which China has been reluctant to do since the end of the Chinese civil war.⁶² Nevertheless, the Sino-Algerian relations in comparison overshadow Morocco’s goals of gaining China’s support for the Western Saharan topic: As a supporter of Western Saharan independence, Algeria’s trade relations with China exceed that of Morocco more than three times in value.⁶³

In regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even though China recognised Israel, it has unequivocally supported the Palestinian cause ever since the end of the Chinese Civil War. This support, however, decreased in intensity when new leadership succeeded in the Chinese Communist Party in 1978,⁶⁴ after which militant groups were no longer supported by China and dialogue between the two sides was encouraged. Following the Palestinian declaration of independence, China recognised Palestine in 1988⁶⁵ and established full diplomatic relations with it afterwards. Further taking of sides in the conflict is implausible due to Beijing’s current non-interventionist foreign policy.

The MENA region’s situation, taking into account the decrease of regional influence of the US, illuminates two possible future courses: Sino-Russian co-operation and Sino-Russian competition. One of the examples of the former includes the commitment of troops to UN peacekeeping.

	Total Commitment to Peacekeeping Missions with		
	Police	Military Personnel	Military Experts
USA	28	32	8
Russia	40	5	54
China	184	2,348	33

3rd figure – *Total US, Russian, and Chinese Contribution of Police, Military Personnel, and Military Experts to UN Peacekeeping Missions (as of 28th February 2017).*⁶⁶

As displayed in the table, the US committed 32 troops, 28 police, and 8 military experts as opposed to Russia’s contribution of 5 troops, 40 police, and 54 military experts, while

⁶¹ Bennis, S. “The Morocco-China partnership and its impact on Western Sahara”. *The New Arab*. 19 May 2016. <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/5/19/the-morocco-china-partnership-and-its-impact-on-western-sahara>, Accessed on 28 March 2017.

⁶² The leaders and around two million supporters of the anti-communist nationalist Kuomintang – ruling party of the Republic of China –, fleeing from the lost civil war, fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949, and ever since then, the Republic of China has existed as a de facto sovereign state in Taiwan.

⁶³ Bennis. “The Morocco-China partnership and its impact on Western Sahara”.

⁶⁴ “China-Palestine relations; China-Israel relations”. *On the Road to Jerusalem*. <https://ontheroadtojerusalem.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/china-palestine-and-china-israc3a81-relations4.pdf>, Accessed on 4 April 2017.

⁶⁵ “China-Palestine relations; China-Israel relations”.

⁶⁶ “Troop and police contributors”. United Nations. 28 February 2017. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

China's commitment was 2,348 troops, 184 police, and 33 military experts in total. Their distribution to UN peacekeeping missions in the MENA region are as follows:

	Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions from		
	USA	Russia	China
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	--	16 experts	12 experts
Afghanistan (UNAMA)	--	--	1 policeman
Iraq (UNAMI)	--	--	--
Israel–Syria (UNDOF)	--	--	--
Israel—Lebanon (UNIFIL)	--	--	418 personnel
Middle East (UNTSO)	2 experts	4 experts	4 experts

4th figure – US, Russian, and Chinese Contribution per UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East and North Africa (as of 28th February 2017).⁶⁷

The table seen above displays all three country's contribution per UN peacekeeping mission. Firstly, it shows that China is present in the Middle East as well as North Africa not only economically, but also with peacekeeping, contributing to the regional stability needed for Chinese investments to succeed. Secondly, it is also apparent that the US involvement in peacekeeping in the MENA region is somewhat lacking compared to the other two countries, however, its logistical and technical contribution as well as its non-UN military involvement, both in military personnel and equipment – carriers, fighter jets, etc. –, are still significant (all numbers are approximated⁶⁸):

- 15,000 personnel in Kuwait,
- 10,000 of personnel in Qatar,⁶⁹
- 7,000 personnel in Bahrain,
- 5,000 personnel in the United Arab Emirates,
- 5,000 personnel in Iraq (officially below the cap of 3,870),⁷⁰
- 1,500 personnel in Jordan,
- 400 personnel in Saudi Arabia,⁷¹
- 200 personnel in Oman.

Another example is the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), an international organisation founded in January 1958 in Cairo, which incorporates 91 member states that are among others China, Russia, and the majority of the MENA region – except for Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, and the United Arab

⁶⁷ "UN Mission's Contributions by Country". United Nations. 28 February 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2017/feb17_5.pdf, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

⁶⁸ "2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Middle East".

⁶⁹ "US Military Presence in Qatar. All What You Need to Know About 'Al Udeid' Airbase". South Front. 31 March 2016. <https://southfront.org/us-military-presence-in-qatar-al-udeid-airbase/>, Accessed on 24 April 2017.

⁷⁰ Ryan, M. "The U.S. military has a lot more people in Iraq than it has been saying". The Washington Post. 21 March 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/21/the-u-s-military-has-a-lot-more-people-in-iraq-than-it-has-been-saying/?utm_term=.5f6f3e8f6b45, Accessed on 10 April 2017.

⁷¹ Burkeman, O. "America signals withdrawal of troops from Saudi Arabia". The Guardian. 30 April 2003. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/30/usa.iraq>, Accessed on 24 April 2017.

Emirates.⁷² This initiative promulgates national liberation and solidarity in Africa and Asia as well as human rights. Its last congress took place in 20th October 2016 in Rabat, Morocco under the slogan “together against terrorism”.⁷³ This joint platform is an opportunity of Sino-Russian co-operation as well as a means of possible confidence-building in terms of future Africa policies between the two countries. Beijing also seems to support Russia in Syria, as it was obvious during the vote of the Russian-proposed draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council.⁷⁴ For an example of the course of competition in the MENA region is, apart from their vying for economic dominance in each country separately, China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. This equivocal situation is present possibly because China is not interested in committing its military to fighting in the Middle East. What it tries to do instead is let other countries secure the area while reaping the economic benefits losing as little resources as possible.

CONCLUSIONS

It is of global interest that China maintains its great power status and global engagement in order to keep world balance in terms of both security and economic stability. In the instance of it fully joining the global effort of fighting terrorism, China’s potential contribution may well outweigh any other country’s endeavour, allowing it to take the lead in global peacekeeping and security, which is somewhat unlikely considering Beijing’s passive, non-interventionist approach of dealing with foreign affairs and conflicts to fully protect its economic interests. This also forecasts the improbability of standing for one side in conflicts arising between two or more nations, as with, among others, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As for independence struggles, for instance in Western Sahara, China evidently does not support the idea of self-determination, as it would raise questions about its own One China policy.

Imitating US institutions, China may be able to complete its planned One Belt, One Road initiative, and fully utilise it to supersede the “former” superpower and take over its sphere of influence, gaining access to 86.55% of the total population as a market. Being an enormous country both in terms of cultivable land and population, China may be – and has already been, in the case of the Arab Spring – able to both directly and indirectly affect the world’s economy resulting in economic instability, thereby being able to indirectly cause political instability in the form of protests, unrests, civil wars, military coup d’états, etc., merely through changes in domestic economic policies, unforeseeable droughts, and policies concerning Chinese welfare.

For China the Middle Eastern and North African region is of particular interest for its immense oil reserves, economic extremes, relatively underdeveloped states, and for the geographical fact that it connects Asia with Europe and Africa.

China’s soft power, particularly through cultural institutes and the fact that more and more Middle Eastern and North African universities teach Chinese, as well as economic

⁷² “Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization”. Union of International Associations. <https://www.uia.org/s/or/en/1100062827>, Accessed on 7 April 2017.

⁷³ “Report on the Activities of the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization in 2016”. Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization. 2016. http://www.aapsorg.org/images/issue/reports/ReportEn_2016.pdf, Accessed on 7 April 2017.

⁷⁴ “7785th meeting”. United Nations Security Council. 8 October 2016. 12. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF969B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7785.pdf, Accessed on 7 April 2017.

achievements provide China with an increasing number of supporters in the MENA region. Surveys show that the opinion about China is favourable, the majority of people deem China to be the next or already the current superpower, and more and more Arab students want to go to study in China.

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Nóra Pákozdi – Marcell György Pintér:

REVIEW OF “DEFEATING JIHAD: THE WINNABLE WAR”

Written by Dr. Sebastian Gorka and published by Regnery Publishing on 11th April 2016, the premise of the book is that Jihad can be viewed and analysed with a way of thinking predominant during the Cold War, and defeated accordingly. The topic of the book is highly relevant, as it offers solutions to a world-wide threat that is increasingly problematic and that has grown to be the most popular concern of the world today.

Gorka’s book aims at presenting the history and present of Jihadism as well as finding a means to defeat the threat. The measures offered are relevant and may be effective. The recommendations proposed seem viable. It is widely accepted by experts that the problem exists and is of importance, however, the ideas of appropriate solutions differ. The structure of the book is logically built, and can be followed easily. Nevertheless, there are some minor errors with and misinterpretations of historical facts, which lead to the establishment of false assumptions and conclusions, and one major one that may undermine the whole analysis. When analysing the matter, the book uses a Cold War era approach – particularly with two documents made in that era, the “Long Telegram” by George Kennan, and the NSC-68 –, which, according to the author, even though relying on old and perhaps outdated terminology, can be utilised today as well. Even though it offers solutions, the target group is not the American government but the American people, and for this, it must be evaluated as such: a book for public consumption.

The book was clearly written for an American audience, as it contains recent events of acts of terrorism conducted in the US – and these events regain attention frequently, as a means to move the readers emotionally – and uses them to emphasise and draw attention to the points being made in the book. The book also handles the global problem of terrorism from an American point of view. There are often reoccurring lines, and it frequently returns to previous topics, such as the 9/11 terror attack – presumably for rhetoric purposes.

Despite the modern stereotypes and recommendations against using Cold War strategies, the book tries to prove them wrong by proposing a list of viable measures to take. Among these, the proposal to speak freely and honestly to be able to identify and defeat the enemy as well as the informing and involvement of the population are wise measures to take. Bringing the fight to an ideological front against an enemy also utilising ideological weapons is also to be considered. However, the connection made between the USSR and ISIS is fundamentally flawed by suggesting that Jihadism is just as much a totalitarian regime as the Soviet Union was, as the USSR aspired to extend the borders of socialism/communism to eventually cover the whole world, while terrorism aims at “purging the impure”. Minor errors include factual errors, misinterpretations, and exaggerations, and they lead to false and erroneous conclusions being drawn, affecting solutions proposed.

Unfortunately, there are not many unbiased, reasonable, or neutral reviews on the book. The majority of the reviews speak highly of it, some go as far as calling it a “masterpiece”, however, the book is far from that level of perfection. These reviews tend to be unreliable sources unfamiliar with the subject matter, and praise the book only because of its straightforward nature – which tells much more of actual American politics rather than the book itself. Therefore, for them to claim that the book is enlightening and helpful to understand

the situation makes their reviews questionable. Clearly, the author of the book is a scholar accepted by one side and questioned by the other, and is surrounded by controversies, however, the book should be viewed devoid of political bias. Gorka and this book are the manifestation of recent changes in US politics. Gorka, being born in the United Kingdom to Hungarian parents while also being an American, represents a not solely but chiefly American way of thinking in the current US government as a deputy assistant to the current president.

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Abbreviations and acronyms should be given in full when they occur for the first time and the abbreviation/acronym should be given in parentheses. Acronyms such as ECOWAS and HIV/AIDS should be written in caps. Do not use full stops in acronyms, for example USA., RSA., UN. Avoid the use of abbreviations/acronyms in headings. Please note, that acronyms and abbreviations that are well known and in daily use in one professional discipline or in one particular region of the world may be completely unknown in another.

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Start all bulleted lists with capital letters. Semicolons are required between bullets and a full stop after the last item in the list.

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Table, graph, map and figure captions should be placed at the bottom. When reproducing data from a diagram or table, or when copying the entire table or diagram, it should be referenced by means of a footnote.

Dates

Use the format appropriate for the version of English selected for the paper.

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Indicate the hierarchy of levels, preferably not more than two. Use capitalization, numbering and font (boldface, italics) to distinguish between levels.

Italicisation

Use italics for the titles of books, periodicals and newspapers.

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Given names should be mentioned in bibliographical notes and reference list only by initials.

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Numbers from one to ten are written out, except dates, page numbers, percentages, etc. Use a comma as the thousands separator, for example 1,000, and a period for decimals, for example percent. The term 'percent' is to be used in text, while the symbol (%) should be used in tables, graphs, etc.

Quotations

Use double quotation marks for quotations. Long quotations (40 words or more) are usually indented and blocked, without quotation marks. Do not use italics in these indented paragraphs. Use square brackets to indicate authors' insertions and changes to the original. Additional emphases are noted as [my italics/emphasis]. Omitted text is indicated by an ellipsis in square brackets [...]

STYLE OF REFERENCE

Defence Review is using Chicago Manual of Style for citing other publications as below:

Archival references

Archival depot, library or museum followed by the collection, group of documents or papers.

Examples:

Footnote and reference list: Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Chief of the General Staff (hereafter CGS) 607, CGS/3/2/1Vol. 1, CGS Adjutant General (hereafter AG), 6 June 1952.

Subsequent reference to this archival group can be made as follows: DOD Archives, CGS/3/2/1Vol. 1, CGS-AG, 6 June 1952.

Journal article

Last name, Initials. "Title of Article". *Journal Title* Vol./Nr. Year. pages.

Examples:

Footnote: Scholtz, L. "The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola, 1987–1988". *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 38/1. 2010. 79.

Subsequent reference: Scholtz. "The South African Strategic...". 80.

Reference list: Scholtz, L. "The South African Strategic and Operational Objectives in Angola, 1987–1988". *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 38/1. 2010. 77–113.

Book

Last name, Initials. *Title of Book*. Place of publication: Publisher, Year.

Examples:

Footnote: Gray, C. S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 56.

Subsequent reference: Gray. *Modern Strategy*. 62.

Reference list: Gray, C.S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Two or more authors:

Examples:

Footnote: Ward, G. C. and Burns, K. *The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945* New York: Knopf, 2007. 52.

Subsequent reference: Ward and Burns. *The War...* 85.

Reference list: Ward, G. C. and Burns, K. *The War: An Intimate History, 1941–1945*. New York: Knopf, 2007

For four or more authors, list all of the authors in the bibliography; in the note, list only the first author, followed by *et al.*

Chapter

Last name, Initials. "Title of Chapter". In Last name, Initials and Last name, Initials (eds), *Title of Book*. Place of publication: Publisher, Year, pages.

Examples:

Footnote: Kiras, J. "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency". In Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J. and Gray, C.S. (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 189.

Subsequent reference: Kiras. "Irregular Warfare...". 200.

Reference list: Kiras, J. "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency". In Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J. and Gray, C. S. (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 185–207.

Internet document

Last name, Initials. "Title of Document". Site Owner. Date. URL, Accessed on Date.

Examples:

Footnote: Engelbrecht, L. "Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost". defenceWeb. 28 October 2009. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379, Accessed on 3 June 2010.

Subsequent reference: Engelbrecht. "Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost".

Reference list: Engelbrecht, L. "Analysts Welcome Defence Budget Boost". defenceWeb. 28 October 2009. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4918&Itemid=379, Accessed on 3 June 2010.

Newspaper article

Last name, Initials. "Title of Article". *Name of Newspaper*, Date. Section. Page.

Examples:

Footnote: Sefara, M. "Beast that instills only fear and loathing". *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

Subsequent reference: Sefara. "Beast that instills...". 14.

Reference list: Sefara, M. "Beast that instills only fear and loathing". *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

Thesis

Last name, Initials. "Title of Thesis". Thesis presented for degree (stipulate in full). Name of university, year.

Examples:

Footnote: Jordaan, E. "South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making". Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005. 25.

Subsequent reference: Jordaan. "South African Defence since 1994..." 28.

Reference list: Jordaan, E. "South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making".

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005.

Conference paper

Last name, Initials. "Title of Paper". Paper presented at Name of Conference, Place, Date

Examples:

Footnote: Heuser, B. "Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice". Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

Subsequent reference: Heuser. "Strategy Making..."

Reference list: Heuser, B. "Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice". Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

For further information and examples, please visit http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html, http://support.ebsco.com/knowledge_base/detail.php?topic=996&id=7029&page=1

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