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FOREWORD

As Head of the Editorial Board, I am proud to present the latest special issue of our scientific journal, the Defence Review, an English language professional forum on military and security policy topics. Traditionally, the goal of these special issues of analyses is to show the significant intellectual diversity among the topics of security sciences, with many outstanding papers by military service members and civilian researchers from all over the world, with one final purpose: to make our world safer.

In the first section of this issue, our authors are focusing on the threats occurring in Europe. We need to be prepared to face challenges like terrorism. Following this spirit, *József Kis-Benedek* points on the European aspects of religion-based radicalisation. Thereafter, *Attila Kasznár* examines the connection between the current trends of terrorism and the sense of security. In her magnificent analysis, *Hanga Horváth-Sántha* gives the portraits of radicalised terrorists in Europe from the last two years, searching for “the dynamics, trigger factors and root causes of violent extremism”. Finally, *Fruzsina Simigh*, a research fellow of the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Centre, shows us the current Chinese approach to counter terrorism.

The participation of the Hungarian Defence Forces in peacekeeping operations in various conflict zones is a tradition that we are proud of. In order to fulfil our commitments to the highest standard, beside “Zrinyi 2026” modernization project, we also have to be aware of the actual operational environment in the conflict zones. This is why I recommend the analysis of *Rachael Rudolf* on the North Korean situation. *Ilias Kouskouvelis* and *István Harkai* elaborate on interesting questions on the powers competing for various parts of Africa. In their analysis, *Itai Reuveni* and *Josh Bacon* show us some interesting viewpoints on the NGO’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Considering the unstable situation, *Ákos Treszkai* examines the possible difficulties of a future international mission in Libya. And last, but not least in this section, *László Kelemen* presents the recent history of the Hungarian participation in EUTM-S.

The two final papers in this issue, by *Győző Csanádi* and *Éva Jakusné Harnos* indicate that various applied sciences like Linguistics and Information Science can also be very useful for military and security purposes.

Considering the wide-ranging content of this special issue, I am proud to present these papers and warmly welcome all our colleagues' future works on military science and security policy in order to enhance a more extensive professional discussion both at national and international levels.

Lieutenant General Zoltán Orosz
Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU Military Committees,
Chief of the Editorial Board

Col. (Ret.) József Kis-Benedek:

JIHADIST HOTBEDS AS POSSIBLE STARTING POINTS OF TERRORISM¹

ABSTRACT: One of the biggest challenges of our time is terrorism and its concomitant phenomena, such as radicalism and jihadism. The author analyses the causes and consequences of terrorism by presenting the relevant cases in some important countries. Reducing this topic only to some concrete countries is important because the causes of radicalism and jihadism are different and from time to time can change not only in a region, but in a single country as well. Radicalism and jihadism are in close connection with crisis areas. Besides the analysis of this topic, the study touches upon also the proposals to handle and solve this problem.

KEYWORDS: terrorism, jihadism, radicalism, foreign fighters, Middle East, Europe

INTRODUCTION

The terror-wave hitting the West in 2016 and 2017 had a significant impact on the elections and the policy of governments (e.g. The Netherlands, France and Germany). The causes that trigger the terrorist actions have not ceased to exist at all, and terrorists will certainly continue their activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Nigeria. This will entail further migration waves, and force many citizens to leave their home (IDPs – internally displaced persons). The terrorist organization – named as ISIS or DAESH – has proved its strong operative capability in Europe, and its members will remain active in Iraq, Syria, and in other countries as well for several years. This may modify the policy of governments in 2017 and ‘18 and not only in the countries where elections will be held.²

MIGRATION

The civil war will have been raging in Syria for eight years in March 2018. This devastating conflict has been reducing the country to ruins, deteriorating Syria’s relations with its neighbors, increasing the regional influence of Russia and Iran, and in addition, has severely tested the peacekeeping capability of the United Nations. As we could see in Afghanistan, if the combat activities come to an end, one combating side autonomously declares itself winner, nevertheless, the fighting or the revolt will continue. I am of the view that we have little chance to avoid such a scenario in Iraq and Syria.

¹ Revised English translation of Kis-Benedek, J. “Dzsihadista fészkek, mint a terrorizmus lehetséges kiindulópontjai”. *Hadtudomány* 27/1-2. 2017. 96–113.

² “TSG IntelBrief: North Africa’s Export-Import of Terror”. The Soufan Group. 23 February 2015. <http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-north-africas-export-import-of-terror/>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

Europe will have to cope with migration in 2018 too. The agreement concluded with Turkey in March 2016 has significantly reduced the number of illegal migrants arriving in Europe through the Balkan route. Since the tackling of the migration crisis represents a political trump card in the hands of European politicians, they cannot afford to neglect it. Even the sporadic terrorist attacks can exercise a very negative effect on the political situation, let alone an eventual significant terrorist attempt.

After the appearance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, many foreign fighters arrived from several countries. It is these fighters that constitute the core of the organization, in terms of combating personnel. They came mainly from Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, France, Great Britannia and Russia (primarily from Chechnya and Dagestan). Researches pursued during the past 2-3 years proved that part of terrorist fighters left their homes and moved into another area only within their own country, and another part of them went to a foreign state.³ Thus, we can make a difference between local and regional terrorist hotbeds. These hotbeds often have different features, but they have also a common denominator; their “personnel” are very radical extremists.

In this connection it is necessary to note that – after the Paris and Brussels attacks – the media was talking about Muslim ghettos that offer places for extremist hotbeds and bases, where unemployment is soaring, where policemen dare not enter, and radical orators and activists recruit future terrorists. This issue is studied primarily by the Soufani Group. It was Ali Soufani and Daniel Schoenfeld, who clearly proved that there are such hotbeds, nets inside the regions and settlements where ISIS can easily recruit fighters. However, the relevant studies also point out that – despite the intensive radicalization – the overwhelming part of Muslim citizens have not been radicalized yet and are not inclined to do so, even if they live under difficult circumstances.

The security vacuum after the Iraqi war, as well as the Syrian civil war, attracted many foreign fighters to the combat areas. Although the intensive presence of foreign fighters is a new phenomenon, we could witness it to a smaller extent in the past as well. Between 1980 and 2011, we could hear that there were about 10,000-30,000 foreign fighters in the Muslim countries.⁴ According to US intelligence sources, in 2015 foreign fighters arrived in Syria and Iraq from more than 100 countries, mainly from Muslim states.⁵ They were immediately involved in combat activities. The number of newly arrived foreign fighters cannot be determined, because their arrival is not continuous and their number always fluctuates. For example, in 2014 12,000 fighters arrived from 81 countries; and by December 2015 – according to the Soufan Group – 27,000-31,000 terrorists had come from 84 states.⁶ These data are identical with those published by the Americans. However, the number of new fighters in Syria and Iraq drastically diminished, thanks – among others – to the relevant

³ Besenyó J. “The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice”. *Strategic Impact* 60/3. 2016. 15–21. http://cssas.unap.ro/en/pdf_periodicals/si60.swf, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

⁴ Hegghammer, T. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters. Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”. *International Security* 35/3. 2010. 53–94. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

⁵ “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”. The Soufan Group. December 2015. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf, Accessed on 30 December 2016.

⁶ Barrett, R. “Foreign Fighters in Syria”. The Soufan Group. June 2, 2014. <http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/>, Accessed on 30 December 2016.

restrictive measures taken by western states, and due to the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, Libya became a new target country for extremist fighters.⁷

As I mentioned above, most foreign fighters were from North Africa and the Middle East, but for us it is necessary to note that about 5,000 of them arrived from Europe. This number does not represent a surprise at all, because the most numerous Muslim communities – apart from the Arab world – live in Europe. The Soviet successor states “provided” 4,700 militants, although President Putin is talking about 7,000 persons. From the Southeast Asian countries came 900, while from the Balkans 500 foreign fighters.

We would not be precise enough if we failed to clearly identify the following: inside a given country which are the towns, and inside the towns which are the districts or areas where jihadist hotbeds have emerged. In general, these hotbeds had come into existence much earlier than ISIS appeared on the scene. Such towns as Derna in Libya, Ben Guerdene and Kasserine in Tunisia or the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia had been jihadist nests for a long time, which provided fighters for conflicts among Muslim states.

Talking about the concrete countries, it is worth mentioning that out of the 5,000 European foreign fighters, 3,700 persons came from four countries only. It is Molenbeek District of Brussels, which “brought up” most terrorists and got into the focus of international attention, concerning the attacks committed in Paris and Brussels. If we analyze the recruitment places, we can notice that there are significant differences on the basis of social, ethnic, economic, and demographic circumstances of the given town or district. The motivations, grievances and several problems of a group or an individual can play a significant role in radicalization, and can induce persons to join a terrorist organization. Although ISIS and the Assad regime represent a strong attracting force, the recruits’ personal problems are more important motivations. We can notice a strengthening trend, according to which the presentation of personal examples and activities of charismatic leaders represents a strong motivation in the hands of recruiters, especially in Europe. Another prevailing trend is that those young Muslims who have a criminal record or a very uncertain future can be relatively easy to recruit. It is necessary to mention that the closed Muslim communities are especially preferred hunting-fields for recruiters.

COUNTRIES MOST HIT BY RADICALISM

In this part, I try to analyse those countries and areas inside the countries that have a great impact on radicalization.

Tunisia

It was Tunisia that “sent” most fighters to Iraq and Syria, and later to Libya as well. The official data are about 6,000, while the non-official ones talk about 7,000 foreign fighters. If we consider that the country has 11 million inhabitants, it is rather surprising that out of every one thousand Tunisians, 55 persons are followers of extremist organizations.

⁷ Strobel, W. and Stewart, Ph. “U.S. military softens claims on drop in Islamic State’s foreign fighters”. Reuters. 28 Apr 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-recruiting-idUSKCN0XP33K>, Accessed on 30 December 2016.

Nearly 1,500 fighters went to the Libyan ISIS and the al-Qaeda in Islam Maghreb and other radical groups.⁸ According to some estimates, half of the foreign fighters are Tunisian citizens.

At some time, the majority of Arabs fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets were Tunisians, thus this problem is not a new one. It is not surprising either that the “mother country” of the Tunisian Combat Group is Afghanistan. During the war in the Balkans, Tunisian jihadists fought also in Bosnia against the Serbs. Tunisian Ex-President Ben Ali took very serious measures against the radicals. However, this served only for strengthening radicalism. At the beginning of the Arab revolution, many extremists escaped from prisons, increasing the number of radicals. Among the reasons for radicalization, marginalization is worth mentioning, due partially to decentralization. After the revolution, an intensive political activity took place even outside the capital, which had not been the case before. Among the main reasons for radicalization were social exclusion and discrimination, rather than economic hardships. Compared to other fighters coming from different countries, a relatively large part of the Tunisian fighters were highly educated and graduated from high schools. This played a significant role in electing the ISIS leadership from among Tunisian extremists. In light of this, I think the view of the famous French professor Olivier Roy is quite understandable, who pointed out in several studies that European radicalism does not derive from Salafism or the Islamic Revolution or from the anger of Muslims against imperialism, but from the generational, political and cultural marginalization of the youth. These young men are fascinated by violence, and it is their disappointment about their future and the denial of the way of life represented by their parents that led them to take another course, different from traditional Islam.⁹ By contrast, another famous French Islam researcher Gilles Kepel asserts that jihadism can be understood only if we start from Islam. Jihadist terrorism starts from the Salafist standpoint, whose roots can be found in the Middle East, and it is this that led to a schism.¹⁰ I can accept both views, because they do not exclude each other, and this can be proved in several fields. In this connection, we cannot ignore the fact that in Europe the period of radicalization has been ever shorter.

It is important to note that the Tunisian foreign fighters do not originate from Tunisia as a whole, but from certain “contaminated” territories inside the country. Such a territory e.g. is the town of Ben Guardane, situated close to the Libyan border, which has been the center of smuggling networks and illegal arms dealers for years. At the same time, it seems to be the largest recruitment place for foreign fighters. All of the perpetrators of Tunisian terrorist attacks (Bardo Museum, Sousse Resort) lived in this town. If we examine the concrete causes, we can see that Ben Guardane can be found in the southern part of Tunisia, far from the northern touristic places; its development is extremely neglected by the government, it is characterized by poverty and unemployment; its citizens are practically isolated from Tunisian society.

⁸ Packer, G. “Exporting Jihad. The Arab Spring has given Tunisians the freedom to act on their unhappiness”. *The New Yorker*, 28 March 2016. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/28/tunisia-and-the-fall-after-the-arab-spring>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

⁹ Roy, O. “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste”. *Le Monde*, 24 Nov 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/24/le-djihadisme-une-revolte-generationnelle-et-nihiliste_4815992_3232.html, Accessed on 24 June 2016.

¹⁰ Dumas, C. “Gilles Kepel: <<Il faut écouter les prêches du vendredi>>”. *Libération*, 14 April 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2016/04/14/gilles-kepel-il-faut-ecouterles-preches-du-vendredi_1446225, Accessed on 8 May 2016.

Kasserine, situated alongside the Algerian border is another jihadist hotbed in Tunisia. The nearby border ensures for jihadists to maintain close contacts with their Algerian partners, and the mountainous Kabylia area offers excellent possibility for concealment. The Tunisian hotbed is not a new one, because the Tunisians actively participated in the Afghan war in the '80s. Today the main targets of recruitment are young men who are generally unemployed; in addition, recruiting activists have no difficulty in penetrating into the young Muslim communities.

The third known hotbed is Bizerte, located in the northern part of the country. Among the ISIS foreign fighters, about 11% is from Bizerte.¹¹ The inner core of radical groups consists primarily of those extremists who served their sentence in prisons before the 2011 revolution and later escaped to participate in the revolution.

Libya

Due to the lack of an efficiently working government, it is very difficult to determine the number of fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq. According to some estimates, this number is about 600, but we have to take into consideration also the fact that Libya not only "sends", but also "receives" extremist fighters. ISIS' Libyan centre is established in the town of Sirte, which was the native town of Qaddafi and the seat of his tribe.¹² ISIS has integrated in its ranks many soldiers of Qaddafi, similarly to Iraq, which "enlisted" Baath Party members.

Libya's modern history is determined by tribal relations, nationalism, and the possession of oil. When there was some change in religious field, it always happened in secrecy. From religious standpoint, Libya has always been rather homogeneous, with a strong Sunni denomination. As tribal relations are regarded, today it is necessary for us to judge them critically because the Libyan tribal system is no longer an old, traditional social structure, but rather some unity of social organizations. Religious radicalism appeared after the removal of Qaddafi, because this type of radicalism had been persecuted by the dictator. This can explain the fact that radical religious groups had pursued their activity mainly outside Libya previously. The relations between local inhabitants and ISIS were very contradictory. Most of them did not support the ISIS fighters, because they regarded them as Qaddafi's returning soldiers.

In 2014 ISIS got a foothold first in Derna, from where the foreign fighters mainly came. The town's extremists had a certain role both in the Afghan and the Iraqi wars. When experts analyzed al-Qaeda's activity in Iraq, it turned out that most of the suicide bombers had come from Libya, more exactly from Derna. The radicalization of this town's extremists was due also to the fact that in the '80s and '90s Qaddafi rigorously prohibited the activity of Islam extremists.

Egypt

According to the Egyptian government, 600 citizens joined ISIS, but foreign sources are talking about 1,000 men. After the ousting of President Mubarak, Islamist groups continuously

¹¹ "TSG IntelBrief: North Africa's Export-Import of Terror".

¹² "TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State's Expansion Strategy in Libya". The Soufan Group. 3 March 2016. <http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-states-expansion-strategy-in-libya/>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

posed a serious threat to the country's security. The best-known Islamist group is Ansar Bajt al Makdis in the Sinai Peninsula. The core of the organization consists of Bedouin tribes, which have been involved in smuggling for years. Their leader, Abu Osama al Masri made an oath of loyalty to Abu Bakr al Bagdadi, the leader of ISIS. The motive of recruitment is the strong dissatisfaction with the government's policy in this case too. The inhabitants in the Sinai Peninsula have not received any governmental support for developing their economy and infrastructure. The Sinai organization of ISIS, Wilayat Sinai, carried out (in 2015, 2016 and 2017) many terrorist attacks against police stations and military checkpoints. The largest attacks took place in July 2015, when the terrorists killed altogether 70 Egyptian soldiers, policemen, and health servants arriving at the scene. The deadliest attack took place in November 2017, when more than 305 people were killed after militants detonated bombs and opened fire in a crowded mosque in the Sinai Peninsula.¹³ The Egyptian authorities are unlikely to be able to completely eliminate the terrorist organization, which seems to be strengthening also today.

The basis of radicalization is the hostile relationship between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, which considers them as collaborators of Israel, qualifying them as "the fifth column". Many Bedouins have not got citizenship and thus do not do military service. The fact that the government practically neglected them and did not give them economic or financial support has created and strengthened black economy and market; including man- and drug-trafficking, and illegal arms trade. The Bedouin radicalization has been promoted by the recruitment activity of extremists who arrived from the Gaza Strip. First they recruited Bedouin fighters, and later on involved them in the leadership of some militant groups or inserted some of them into the Egyptian security organizations. Thus they were able to conduct successful terrorist attacks. This success was also due to the fact that many members of the Sinai terrorist groups had gained experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Syria, but a great number of fighters arrived also from Libya.

After the removal of President Morsi in 2013, a new "chapter" began in the life of radical organizations. They judged the ousting of Morsi completely illegal; thus they considered their activities as justified and legitimate. Although the two big terrorist organizations (Ansar Bayt al-Makdis and Wilayat Sinai), had some internal debates, they continued strengthening their ranks. Today we can confidently state that Wilayat Sinai constitutes a part of ISIS's global strategy and can even become its successor organization. It is true that Egypt and Israel make efforts to develop their anti-terrorist cooperation, which, however, cannot be considered to be really effective at all.

The Caucasus and the Former Soviet Republics

The North Caucasus has always been the citadel of Islam extremists and since the beginning of the Syrian civil war it has also been serving as a recruitment base. Political Islam and the nationalist feelings triggered two wars in Chechnya against Russia; therefore Chechnya represented a strong attractive force for foreign fighters. Local differences also gave an impulse to radicalization. In 2007, the jihadists established the Islamic Caucasus Emirate

¹³ Dahir, A. L. "State neglect and poverty in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula led to the nation's deadliest terror attack". Quartz. 25 November 2017. <https://qz.com/1138020/egypt-mosque-attack-isis-terrorists-suspected-in-sinai-peninsula-as-egypt-fails-to-curb-insurgency/>, Accessed on 7 January 2018.

with the aim to create an independent emirate against Russia and its supporters.¹⁴ It was this emirate that sent many fighters to Syria and Iraq or to Caucasus Wilayat. This region has been a militant territory for a long time. In North-Eastern Georgia, the Pankisi Gorge constitutes also a hotbed for radical Islam organizations. During the Chechen war, it served as a base for jihadists to support the war.

In the North Caucasus, it is Dagestan that is the most problematic country among the former Soviet republics. Dagestan has been “infected” by different clan systems, religious hostilities, crimes and Islam radicalism. In the beginning, it was Sufi Islam that prevailed, but in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Salafists gained ground. In 1999 the Russian armed forces prevented the establishment of the Dagestan Islamic Republic, but the extremists have not given up setting up an emirate yet. We can confirm that the decisive actions of the Russian armed forces curbed the radical endeavors, which is demonstrated by killing of the two significant leaders of the emirates (Abu Mukhamad and Abu Usman). At the same time, we cannot forget that the Caucasus Islamic State has made an oath of loyalty to ISIS.

In the Pankisi Gorge of Dagestan, the existence of Islam radical organizations is in close connection with ISIS’ activities in Iraq and Syria. The future of ISIS will have a significant impact on the activity of radical forces in the North Caucasus.

After the assassination of the Russian ambassador accredited to Ankara, the Russian authorities intensified their control over the Caucasian and Central-Asian Islam communities, and their imams. Turkey plays a key role in transit traffic; therefore – among others – we cannot expect the Russian-Turkish relations to tangibly deteriorate. Like in the case of Europe, foreign fighters make efforts to return to Russia as well, but the Russian law enforcement agencies are making their best to prevent extremists from “infecting” the country again.

Belgium

All of the Belgian foreign fighters who joined ISIS are from Brussels.¹⁵ The majority of them was either born in Molenbeek District or spent a long time there. The district is characterized by poverty, migrants, and unemployment which is the highest in Belgium. The capital has many Muslim inhabitants, but their number is quite different in the various districts. The migrants arrived primarily from North African and Middle Eastern countries.

If we talk about Brussels, we should not think of the capital in a narrow sense of the word. The city of Brussels consists of 19 districts; it is the most densely inhabited territory of Belgium, managed by 19 mayors and town councils. Brussels is practically a capital-region, which has two parts (as the whole country); Flanders – with its own language – and French Wallonia. Brussels’ region has its own administrative system with a chaotic network of several institutions, owing primarily to the different languages. If we want to draw a clear picture of Islam radicalization in the capital, we have to take into consideration this chaotic situation, which can be attributed – among others – also to the fact that the security services cannot smoothly cooperate with the local town councils, because they are subordinated also

¹⁴ “Mapping Militant Organizations: Caucasus Emirate”. Stanford University. 11 April 2014. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/255>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

¹⁵ Higgins, A. and De Freytas-Tamura, K. “A Brussels Mentor Who Taught ‘Gangster Islam’ to the Young and Angry”. *The New York Times*, 11 April 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/world/europe/a-brussels-mentor-who-taught-gangster-islam-to-the-young-and-angry.html>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

to local the authorities. In addition, the residences of future foreign fighters are in different districts and inside different Muslim communities. Most of them live in the old, former industrial, impoverished, mainly Muslim-populated north-western areas.

As in France, the integration level of Muslims is very low. The Muslims of Molenbeek practically have only very little chance to work their way to the top. Young Muslims very often cope with identity crisis. The above circumstances make the youth really attractive for charismatic recruiters. Among the Molenbeek recruiters, Khalid Zerkani (“Papa Noel”), who managed the largest recruitment network, was well-known throughout Europe. He is of Moroccan nationality, arrived in Brussels in 2002, and made intensive research work first of all among young Muslims with criminal records. He had an easy job as he looked for those young men who could not integrate into society, and he could convince them that what they had done or committed (even their criminal acts) were morally right and were in harmony with the Islam ideology, because they had done something against Belgian infidels. The money gained through minor crimes was used for buying air tickets. Out of the 300 recruited Belgian Muslims, at least 45 belonged to Zerkani’s recruiting network.¹⁶ However, the strength of his group was probably higher and considerably more dangerous than officially reported. It is enough to mention only one of its members, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a co-organizer of the 2015 Paris and the 2016 Brussels attacks. Salah Abdeslam and Najim Laachraoui, who were supposed to have produced the bombs for the attack on the Brussels airport, also belonged to this group. Zerkani was finally arrested by the Belgian authorities for his recruiting and radical activities. During the investigations it turned out that from the suspected terrorists at least 14 persons were from the Molenbeek-cell, 11 of them were of Moroccan origin, and all of them had criminal records.

I find it important to note that terrorists are very often friends or personally know each other. It was also the Belgian cell which illustrated that terrorist groups employed familiar people rather than complete outsiders.

Belgian Muslim fighters arrived in the area of operations from the whole country, but most of them came from the Islamic communities concentrated alongside the Brussels-Antwerp axis. Besides this concentration area, there are also other “contaminated” territories; the largest one is the region of Liège-Verviers. Liège is the fifth largest town of Belgium; if we consider the number of its Muslim inhabitants, it is among the 10 largest towns. From our topic’s standpoint, important places are also Charleroi, Genk, Namur and Ghent (and their surrounding areas). These data also indicate that it would be a mistaken idea to concentrate our attention only on Brussels and its Molenbeek District.

If we examine the Brussels-Antwerp axis, we cannot forget about the fact that it was this area where the neo-Salafist group of Belgium, the Shariah4Belgium was established. We have to take into consideration that this group was formed from the British al-Muhajiroun and the Islam4UK movements. The well-known missionaries Omar Bakri Muhammad and Anjem Choudary also participated in establishing these movements (see later in the next, British paragraph). These organizations were created to make the rights of Muslims acknowledged, and convert non-religious Muslims. They called on the Muslims to demonstrate a rebellious behavior against the ban on headscarf, by which the organizations obtained many Muslim sympathizers.

¹⁶ Ostaeyen, P. van. “A new statistical update on Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq”. 2 February 2016. <https://pieter-ervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2016/02/02/february-2016-a-new-statistical-update-on-belgian-fightersin-syria-and-iraq/>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

Sharia4Belgium – in addition to British sponsors – has built up close relations with the like-minded foreign organizations, e. g. with the Millatu Ibrahim in Germany, Forsane Alizza in France and Sharia4Holland. When these organizations established their international relations, the authorities evaluated them as some kind of rebels rather than security risk factors. However, later on, when these organizations took “too decisive” steps, the Belgian authorities arrested their leader Fouad Belkacem, which however, resulted in an irreversible radicalization of their followers. When the legal, open activity of the organizations was banned, the Syrian crisis offered them a new possibility for their activities; and many Islamists began travelling to Syria as foreign fighters. Sharia4Belgium alone sent 80 warriors to Syria. The decision of a court put the group on the list of terrorist organizations.¹⁷

Without getting into details, I would like to emphasize that – from the standpoint of the spread of Muslim extremism – the Belgian regions can be divided in sub-regions and towns. Alongside the already mentioned Brussels-Antwerp axis, inside Mechelen and Vilvoorde there are at least 13 active groups. It is a special feature of this territory that no foreign fighters went from here to Syria.¹⁸

We have to be very cautious while evaluating the opinion which decidedly asserts that the radical extremists come from among poor people. There are terrorists who do not conform to this assertion. For example, if we analyze the case of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who participated in the Paris attack and was the grandson of a Moroccan migrant arriving in Belgium as a miner, we can see that his father established a successful, profitable textile business and sent his oldest son to an elite school to bequeath him the textile shop later.¹⁹ In pursuing the house search, the police realized that the terrorist lived under very good financial circumstances in his villa with a swimming pool. This also underpins my view that we cannot treat everything alike, and generalization is a big mistake.

The European data prove that 90% of foreign fighters come from major towns or their surrounding areas.²⁰ However, as far as Liège and its vicinity are regarded, the case is different. It is rather the “traditions” that have a dominant role there, given the fact that this area had the greatest lignite quarries, which in the ‘60s attracted many Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers accounting for the large Muslim community.

Great Britain

The European jihadist ideology “attacked” on the first occasion in Great Britain well before 9/11. Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants operated numerous organizations in Europe in order to recruit followers and raise funds for terrorist groups. The European migration laws, framed in the ‘90s, made it possible for the imams persecuted in their countries to come to

¹⁷ Torfs, M. “Former Sharia4Belgium leader Belkacem gets 12 years”. Flandersnews. 11 February 2015. <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/News/1.2236417>, Accessed on 8 May 2016.

¹⁸ Eriksson, A. “Mechelen: the Belgian city with no foreign fighters”. Euobserver. 26 April 2016. <https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/133185>, Accessed on 8 May 2016.

¹⁹ Vlierden, G. van “Profile: Paris Attack Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud”. *CTC Sentinel* 8/11. 2015. 30–33. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/profile-paris-attack-ringleader-abdelhamid-abaaoud>, Accessed on 8 May 2016.

²⁰ Ginkel, B. van and Entenmann, E. (Eds.) “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. Profiles, Threats & Policies”. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. <https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles-threats-policies/>, Accessed on 3 August 2016.

Europe.²¹ Great Britain was in the vanguard of this process. By this mistaken step, the British brought many radical imams in Europe, but later they tried to get rid of them by framing new laws and regulations, including immediate expulsions as well. Such a prominent radical figure was (before 9/11) the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Masri, who moved in London in 1979 as an Afghan jihadist leader. He came to London after his Afghan activity and became the imam of the largest mosque, which was situated in the Finsbury Park. This mosque established relations between al-Qaeda and the persons recruited in London. Another charismatic leader was Omar Bakri Muhammad, who came from Syria in 1980 and immediately received asylum in England.²² Today, such mistakes are hard to believe, but at that time the British authorities were naive enough to grant political asylum to nearly everybody who was supposed to be persecuted in his country. Bakri had a “pupil”, Anjem Choudary, who had become the most influential ISIS recruiter by 2015, and had a significant role in sending 750 British fighters to Iraq and Syria.²³ He was a permanent “actor” in public media, thus he obtained great popularity among young Muslims.

Similarly to other European states, Great Britain has been facing a serious security risk: the return of ISIS foreign fighters. At the beginning, despite the activity of radical imams, the ultraconservative radical school did not spread in England. That was the case until 1988, when Salmon Rushdie published his book “The Satanic Verses”. The government of Margaret Thatcher – despite the request of moderate Muslims – did not ban the book, by reference to the freedom of speech. This encouraged the radicals, who began propagating that the British and the despotic Asian Muslims are enemies of Islam and concluded an alliance against Islam. During the Gulf War they harshly criticized the British government for its attitude and – during the Balkan war – for its failure to send troops to Bosnia in defense of Bosnian Muslims. They also condemned the British policy pursued in the wake of 9/11, especially the counter-terrorist cooperation of Great Britain with the USA.

Between 2000 and 2015, the British government approved numerous resolutions on the fight against terrorism. It extended the police’s sphere of action and made punishable even those who had documents that seemed to pose a threat to security. The Muslim community interpreted these anti-terrorist measures as steps intended to ostracize and marginalize Muslims, and violate their religious rights. Many Muslims in Britain are now susceptible to ISIS ideas, not only in London but also in Birmingham and Bradford. The British Muslims are from many countries, thus their organizations are very heterogeneous. Therefore, during its recruitment campaign, ISIS concentrates on “the common dominator”; on the dissatisfaction of Muslim youth.

The radicalization in Great Britain, based mainly on grievances, is the result of a long historic process and today has been influenced – to a great extent – by the activities of ISIS, the wars and conflicts in the Muslim world, as well as the foreign fighters who are returning in the country. We can certainly state that the British government programs elaborated against radicalization and terrorism have not produced the expected results yet.

²¹ Stewart, S. “Europe’s Chronic Jihadist Problem”. Stratfor. 5 April 2016. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/europes-chronic-jihadist-problem>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

²² Griffin, A. “Omar Bakri Muhammad: Islamist leader seeks return to UK, after being banned in wake of 7/7 praise”. *Independent*, 29 June 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/omar-bakri-muhammad-islamist-leader-seeks-return-to-uk-after-being-banned-in-wake-of-7-7-praise-9570963.html>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

²³ Anthony, A. “Anjem Choudary: the British extremist who backs the caliphate”. *The Guardian*, 7 September 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/07/anjem-choudary-islamic-state-isis>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

Western Balkans

The Western Balkans has been considered for a long time as home for Islam extremists, and it is no coincidence that 330 out of 850 persons who travelled to the operational areas from the region are Bosnians. Similarly to Chechnya, Bosnia also constituted a concentration area for foreign fighters.²⁴ As it happened in Chechnya, the foreign fighters arrived in Bosnia to participate in the war on the side of their Muslim brothers. It is but natural that the fighters brought the Salafist ideology with them as well. However, in 2010-11, the security forces began repelling the jihadist groups from the capital, which forced the extremists to withdraw to the small northern settlements where they enjoyed popular support. The withdrawn and a bit dispirited and dispersed Muslims were encouraged and driven together by imam Hussein "Bilal" Bosnic, who later even claimed for himself the role to supervise the practice of Muslim religious rights in Bosnia. With the emergence of ISIS, Bosnia became more and more a recruiting base. The principal motivations were; high unemployment level and the fact that young people had no promising perspective at all. In 2014 Bosnic was arrested, and in 2015 he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for having disseminated jihadist ideas. Nevertheless, the relations between the Bosnian jihadists and ISIS have remained active in practice, and the country continues to be a transit area for foreign fighters.

Some researchers do not agree with the opinion that there are jihadist hotbeds in the Western Balkans. According to Serbian researcher Florian Qehaja, today no jihadist hotbeds or conservative Islamic nets are in existence in the Western Balkans. Although there are some persons supporting Islamist ideology in the north-eastern part of BiH, in south-eastern Kosovo, north-western Macedonia, and south-western Serbia, there is no one place where Islamists are concentrated. The followers of conservative Islam are present in different numbers in the above places. Among those Muslims who practice their religion we can distinguish three groups: the first group is unprejudiced (liberal – most Muslims belong to this group), the second one is non-violent conservative, and the third group is violent conservative. The only difference between the last two groups is that one of them uses violence while the other does not do so. In BiH there are two conservative Islamist centers: Gornje Maoce and Osve. It is these two settlements that "sent" most foreign fighters to Iraq. Similar settlements are: Zenica-Doboj, Tuzla, Sarajevo and Una-Sana. The recruitment of fighters is pursued mainly on the Internet.

The number of mosques in Skopje (Macedonia) is higher than experts have previously determined. 146 persons went to Syria to fight there. It represented a difficulty for the authorities to make a distinction between the Macedonian and the Kosovo Muslims, owing to their family and friendly relations. In Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia, moderate and radical citizens are intensively blending. As regards radicals, I wish to mention only the following important settlements: Kacanik (Kosovo), Pogradec (Albania), Sijenica (Serbia). These are the places where most atrocities happened and from which most fighters went to Syria and Iraq.

In summary, I can state that the followers of conservative and extremist Islam endanger the secular system by labeling normal, moderately religious people as apostates. Many radicals are organized in small groups, in a heterogeneous environment, under the subordination of a radical imam. The rate of recruitment inside the conservative Muslim population is

²⁴ Besenyó J. "Low-cost attacks, unnoticeable plots? Overview on the economical character of current terrorism". *Strategic Impact* 62/1. 2017. 83–100. <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=531307>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

10-30%, but it has not been proved yet that all of the recruited men did really leave for the area of operations.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main catalysts of radicalism are: poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities, uncertain prospective, juvenile delinquency, illegal drugs, political and economic marginalization, and last but not least, ideological impacts. All these factors can strengthen and overlap each other, can prevail differently in different environments, and can create fertile soil for radicalism. In order to efficiently face radicalism, it is necessary for us to identify and treat their roots, study its history, as well as its connections and internal elements, in concert with the given, concrete environments where radicalism has appeared. Its historical analyses can creatively contribute to the clarification of its causes, and in this way we can see also the difference between the radicalism witnessed in the '60s and that of today. According to the already mentioned Olivier Roy, we have to disassociate ourselves from the false or mistaken viewpoints. Such a false viewpoint is e.g. that young Muslims or Islam as a religion in itself cannot be integrated into Western society or even into the current, modern world order. It is a similarly mistaken standpoint inherited from the colonial era that we must exclude Muslims from Western societies, at the same time, however, we cannot say either that the intervention of the West e.g. in the Middle East is the direct cause of jihadism. In reality, these are not the real causes of the violent, militant behavior demonstrated by young Muslims in Europe.²⁵

Today's jihadism is the third wave of jihadism, pursued by the second and third generations of western Muslim youth. It is about three closely linked events, practically about a continuous stream. The first was the 2004 revolt in France, which resulted in a conflict between third-generation Muslims and the French government. The second event took place in 2005, provoked by the call by Abu Musab al Sui for a global Muslim resistance; while the third one consisted of the communication and recruitment process on the Internet and YouTube.

The examples I described show that as regards the jihadist recruitment, there are differences among countries, regions, and even towns or districts. We have to get concrete information on all of them if we want to elaborate any counteractivity. We have to identify the specific grievances and complaints in each case and place. These concrete facts may be more important than the general causes (e.g. unemployment, poverty or incorrect governmental policy). I fully recognize and admit the significance of these general causes, but they in themselves do not necessary lead to radicalization. Therefore, it is instrumental for the relevant authorities to take into consideration the concrete factors, causes and grievances because this way they may be able of initiating an effective "counter-recruitment" program, making the work of Islamist recruiters much more difficult.

In implementing this program the authorities must contact and continuously maintain relations with those Muslim social strata that are against radicalism. They have to permanently counterbalance ISIS' strong media propaganda as well.

Through the examples mentioned in my study I proved that the Islamist recruiters (e.g. in Molenbeek and the remote villages of Bosnia or even in Great Britain) are very popular, and they had purposefully built a strong background for their work. They continuously rely

²⁵ Roy, O. "What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism? – A scientific perspective on the causes/circumstances of joining the scene". Bundeskriminalamt. 18 November 2015. <https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/AutumnConferences/2015/herbsttagung2015Roy.html>, Accessed on 23 May 2016.

on the already recruited Islamists. Naturally, it is very difficult for the authorities to penetrate into Islamic communities, generally divided into small, isolated groups, created on the basis of strong family ties and friendly relations. In summary, the authorities have to “attack” and deny exactly those arguments that are used by the recruiters.

It may be an important recommendation that in the fight against radicalism we have to avoid any political marginalization. The measures taken by counter-terrorist, security or military organizations cannot be carried out at the expense of the political dimension.²⁶ Exaggerated military actions can trigger further radicalization not only in the Middle East but in Europe as well. The jihadists, radical hotbeds in the Middle East, are the symptoms of current instability rather than its causes. The appearance of jihadist groups raises the need not only for a security solution, but for a political one as well.

I would like to emphasize also the role of prevention in a general sense. In some way we have to prevent the formation of such extremely closed communities, in which foreign radicals can also have a role.

Last, but not least, we would need a well-functioning, comprehensive, European counter-radicalization strategy which could include a de-radicalization program as well.

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²⁶ International Crisis Group. “Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State”. Alnap. 14 March 2016. <http://www.alnap.org/resource/22222>, Accessed on 2 January 2017.

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Maj. Attila Kasznár:

TERRORISM AS THE MAIN THREAT REGARDING MAJOR POWERS AND EUROPE

ABSTRACT: Based on current trends terrorism will be one of the most challenging security challenges in the future. The many-faced, variable appearance of terrorism creates a new environment in which the direction of the threat often becomes unpredictable, hereby reducing the general sense of security, even if the actual level of threat does not increase. The peaceful and sustainable social coexistence is based on optimizing the sense of security. The fight against terrorism is only part of this task, but based on current trends it can be predicted to be one of the most important segments.

KEYWORDS: terror, terrorism, major power, European Union

INTRODUCTION

“The most important actors of our time, the Non State Actors had become (terrorist groups, organized crime circles, and irregular armed groups).”¹ Present experience shows that the events of Postmodern Security Politics seem to be approving the fact that in the 21st century the major threat to countries and superpowers are not the classic dangers, but terrorism as part of Assymmetric Warfare². Terrorism - which is an unique strategy of violence, threatening with violence with intention mainly to cause fear and chaos thereby to achieve political goals or to remain in power. Terrorism summarized in one sentence: “violent, ruthless technique of intimidation.”³

As terrorism becomes more and more global, or in other words international, along with the change in methods and instruments used by terrorists, participants in counter-terrorism are challenged significantly. After the 9/11 attacks it became clear that the force, methods, and instruments used before had not been able to prevent the acts of international terrorism and the preparation of new actions. Consequently experts were urging the implementation of new, more efficient instruments and more successful strategies in the war on international terrorism. Warfare against fanatic suicide bombers challenges both soldiers and law enforcement agencies because not only the modus operandi of terrorism but the person and types of offenders got into focus. As it can be seen the services have always been ready to adapt to the newformed challenges and to acquire the facilities necessary to fend off those threats. Therefore, one of the requirements of successful actions is to update the acquired knowledge from time to time, exchange experience, reach conclusions, meanwhile “research

¹ Resperger I. “Az aszimmetrikus hadviselésre adható válaszok”. *Honvédségi Szemle* 145/1. 2017. 24–43.

² See in details Resperger I. “Az aszimmetrikus hadviselés és a terrorizmus jellemzői”. *Hadtudomány* 20/4. 2010. 68–77.

³ Boda J. “A terrorizmus rövid története és az ellene való fellépés lehetőségei”. *Rendvédelem-történeti Füzetek* 13/16. 2007. 46–51.

results have to be incorporated in government policy, military law enforcement and national security forces' training, and into the general training of the population.”⁴

The main topic of this study is how the complex system of superpowers and terrorism develops resulting in terrorism as the primary enemy. In parallel the modern threat context which influences Europe as a result of Post-modern terrorism, and transforms the continental security environment to a great extent, will be presented.

THE BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM BECOMING CHALLENGE NUMBER ONE

The community of countries being part of the Christian culture which regarded themselves protected from terrorist attacks, the ones under superpower interests and active participants of globalisation, got greatly shocked by the rapid, radical change in the dimension of security following the terrorist attacks against the twin towers in the USA on 11. 09. 2001. The historically significant attack against the United States of America was a cornerstone following the disintegration of the Bipolar world order as it had created a new concept of enemy. This momentum has substantiated terrorism to get ranked among the political definitions and today we can say that studies on “Terrorism agree that terrorism originally is a political phenomenon which is backed by structural and psychological factors as well.”⁵

As a result of the concept of enemy being found outside the formations of reflectible existence of national characteristics, the feeling of general lack of security of the population increased because that way the source of national monopoly of violence became unremarkable. In the new relation system the individual has no knowledge on by whom and when violence will be used. The emergence of insecurity at this level causes political, societal, cultural and economic or, in other words, general instability, which bears the dangers of forming anarchical conditions as the thesis of the state being the one and only legitimate user of the monopoly of violence.

This is the point where war on terrorism as a modern conflict takes asymmetric properties and it becomes clear that when the asymmetric struggle against terrorism ceased, new and more efficient than ever instruments had to be implemented to achieve success. In asymmetric warfare it is not necessarily the strength of army which is determinant.”⁶ Moreover it has to be noted that terrorism can not be defeated by “military, law enforcement and national security measures without transforming public awareness, and the easing of economical, social and cultural tensions.”⁷ It should not be forgotten, however, that the main sources of radicalism and then terrorism are plunging to the peripherals of society, modernization, social hopelessness and democracy.

Many studies discuss the question whether the main reasons of revolt and terrorism often overlap, which could be because the insignificant differences between the reasons of

⁴ Boda J. et. al. “A hadtudományi kutatási irányok, prioritások és témakörök”. *Államtudományi Műhelytanulmányok* 16. 2016. 3–19.

⁵ Gál I. L. “Új biztonságpolitikai kihívás a XXI. században: a terrorizmus finanszírozása”. *Szakmai Szemle* 8/1. 2012. 5–16.

⁶ Padányi J. “Az aszimmetrikus hadviselés során alkalmazandó eljárások, eszközök és módszerek”. *Hadtudomány* 25/1-2. 2015. 81–82.

⁷ Bács Z. Gy. “A radikalizáció és a terrorizmus kapcsolata, egyes formái, gondolatok a megelőzés lehetséges perspektíváiról”. *Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle* 5/1. 2017. 5–26.

revolt and those of rising terrorism. It is hard to define the real differences because defining terrorism fundamentally is not the job of law enforcement or military studies but it is rather political sciences' responsibility. This can be stated because in the end it is not the police, national security or military employees who classify an action as a terrorist operation, but politicians. This causes specific cases in which certain groups in certain countries get labeled as terrorist groups while they do not in other countries. However, we must not forget that international politics is being controlled and shaped by the countries' very own national and economic interests while the main actors of security policy dimension are exactly the very same nations. As a result, any given state's very own interest - usually even in correlation with terrorism - has a priority over the will to conform to given ideological perspectives. So it seems evident that international terrorism is being formed by global power relations and Great Power presence. We could say that modern terrorism can be interpreted as a radical solution for the challenges brought to life by the complex system of international relations, which has the fundamental doctrinal criteria summarized as follows:

- "Resistance is present on a large area. Their most important skill is the capability of manoeuvring
- It is a system not an organisation, or group
- Leadership covers purpose not controlling, no direct contact with operative units. No orders are given, statements and webpages are in use instead
- Not rooted in a combat zone as a location, the war zone has no boundaries
- The enemy have to feel they can be ambushed anywhere, at any time."⁸

The list above clearly indicates the need to increase the operational and structural complexity of international anti-terrorist operatives, which has to be flexible and asset-backed as it has to cope with the complexity and variable forms of appearance of terrorism. As a result, it is clear that it is necessary to develop and modernise the legal actions of the war on terror, its organisational and human resources, but these have to be adjusted to the level of terrorism being present in the given country. Also the fact should not be ignored, that "despite the ever rising success rate of counter-terrorism successes, a high level of threat has been lingering for years." The main reason is that terrorism is an ever-changing phenomenon, which generates new and new challenges. As a result it is a high priority to identify its expected trends. This task, however, is to be carried out with regard to a particular state, region, or other geographical unit along with taking into account the source and possibilities of terrorism by an in-depth analysis. At this point it is recommended to take a look on Europe's threat level by terrorism.

- The system of postmodern Europe's threat level by terrorism.
- Terrorist attacks in Europe happened since 2015 highlighted the new challenges and trends. The trends strengthening the appearance of terrorism on the continent issued by international experts mainly as follows:
 - The illegal immigration wave;
 - The failure of the integration of migrants;
 - Radicalisation of 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants;
 - Activation of warriors returning from abroad;

⁸ Kis-Benedek J. and Kenedli T. "A terrorfenyegetettség új tendenciái és lehetséges válaszleptések". *Szakmai Szemle* 11/1. 2015. 16–34.

- The surveillance/intelligence challenges of the fields;
- Violent intervention in order to facilitate the democratic process;
- The following steps in the context of a solution are essential;
- Treatment of the migrant communities' problems, monitoring their activities;
- Implementation of social integration, the eradication of parallel societies;
- Making the action of effective law enforcement agencies, the fight against terrorism more effective by coordinating the activities of these organizations;
- Implementing fast and effective information exchange among institutions;
- Making necessary legislative changes.

On the basis of the above points, the facts analysed at a pan-European level speak for themselves. As most of the World faces the problem of an increasing danger of acts by terrorist groups, it has become clear that in the future Europe can no longer be regarded protected either. During the past years and decades, the global security situation has greatly changed which has fundamentally shaped the continent's security image.

The constantly growing risk of terror roots in numerous complex factors which in combination result in an unusual and highly uncertain status. The active presence of terrorism has resulted in ever-changing security challenges in the European security to which institutions are not able to generate powerful responses, or even if they are, they do so only with difficulty and just partially. The steps taken in line with restoring security are mostly to manage already established conditions, meaning that the political and expert thinking ignores the intention to get prepared for forthcoming events in the future. This in turn can result in the European Union to react to the rapidly and greatly changing security challenges with a considerable delay. In the case of such a question this delay could demand not just considerable material and ideological damage, but numerous lives too.

Since November 2015, starting with the terrorist attacks in Paris, the continent's population have had to face vaguely new types of challenges in European security situation. It has to be noted however, that the mounting terror in Europe, and at the same time the outbursted ethnic-religious opposition can only be settled and reduced by extensively managing extremely complex political, economic and cultural problems as a whole. The current situation in Europe is very complex, with many decades of traditions, in many cases by perceived damage and really done harm, or short-term interest-controlled political and economic causes.

The primary source of the situation arising from untreated problems is still posed by second-generation migrants. It should be treated as a fact, that in the recent period of time the perpetrators of terrorist acts committed in Europe are second generation migrants. This is exactly that part of society, whose integration had failed many times despite any efforts. The lack of success, of course, cannot be considered a fluke, since there was no strong integration – integration, as opposed to assimilation, it must be stressed – program whatsoever to promote integration and which could have started the integration of people coming from a different cultural dimension in particular. Lacking such integration programmes persons who are not able to fit in and deal with social differences – lacking the necessary social toolset to be able to – get casted to the peripherals of society. Due to their being outcasts they could become easily radicalized, which distorts their personality to extreme levels. This manifests as a sociological coexistence process involving many stages, however, in most cases the outcome is a terrorist attack or a preparation of one.

The Western-European countries, primarily a minor part of their Muslim religious groups, are getting radicalized spectacularly meanwhile in the Central and Eastern European

states such shift cannot be detected or just to a minimum extent. It can be concluded that the first generation, which had arrived in Europe in hope for a better life, for employment reasons, is not at all or only minimally interested in radical ideas. However, in many cases the second generation is rootless and its members often rightfully regard themselves marginalised, misunderstood and outcasts. These young people looking for a fix point, without proper backup and support easily become targets of religious extremists who want to exploit and thrive on them being defenseless, helpless. As a result, their radicalization takes place which then leads to strong personality distortion regarding their ways of thinking letting Jihad and terrorism take the lead.

The whole picture becomes more shaded due to the fact that the current security crisis' general issue is the fighters returning from their war. Today it is a tendency that from Western-Europe a vast number of citizens travel to the war ravaged territories to participate in the combat there. Such travelling individuals' radicalization has been successful and they are not just susceptible but utmostly recipient towards extremist ideologies.

In general, decisive European experts say one of the most important problems is presented by fighters returning home because practically most of those returning have the intention to carry out a terrorist attack and only a small percentage of them is willing and open for cooperation. On the basis of European experience, not only the improvement of the current system of migration filters and reintegration has to be reformed, but is is also necessary to structure its major proportion to be able to prevent the returning terrorist fighters from carrying out attacks and radicalizing their environment.

Besides the new types of social problems radical changes occurring on the device side of terrorism should also be noted. Specifically, there is a new trend on the rise regarding the series of attacks in Europe in Nice, Berlin, Heidelberg, London, Stockholm, and Barcelona, amongst other attacks, in which the modus operandi of the terrorist is choosing a vehicle as the instrument of destruction. This type of attack, called a ramming attack during which the attacker rakes through groups of people, was not typical on the continent before. The emergence of new forms of attack, of course, cannot be regarded surprising, as it fits perfectly the formula, in which terrorists want to minimize both the costs and any possible deconspiracy factors they could encounter. The implementation of ramming attacks is the most potent form of this intent to be carried out, since the cost is negligible, the required participants' number is lower, and work is far less compared to the achievable destruction. However, it is likely that in future attacks the classic modus operandi and tools like bombs, firearms or various kind of fires will have determining roles too.⁹ It is a significant change that because of the change of targets, the methodology of committing such crimes had changed too, as terrorists seek to use devices that have more potent destruction power.

The history of terrorist acts committed in Europe shows that those were focused on getting attention, to spread terror and as Peter Talas said many times before "whilst the classic type of terrorism had a few self-restraining factors, postmodern terrorism has no limits in options of attacks."¹⁰ In other words, earlier in the attacks the desire of taking lives of a large number of people was completely missing or was present scarcely. With the series of

⁹ Besenyő J. "Inferno Terror: Forest Fires as the New Form of Terrorism". *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11 July 2017. <http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/fHaTbH5dyIpwKgr3dGmP/full>, Accessed on 23 Nov 2017.

¹⁰ Tálás P. "A nemzetközi terrorizmus és a szervezett bűnözés hatása a nemzetközi biztonságra és Magyarország biztonságára". <http://kisebbssegkutato.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/archive/904.pdf>, Accessed on 23 Nov 2017.

attacks in Paris in 2015, however, a new trend has emerged where the attackers primarily want to inflict as much damage as possible and to maximize the number of casualties.

A successful step against the newly emerging challenges, mainly against terrorism, is possible through complex actions at governmental and interational levels, implemented expansively, offensively and consciously. Countering terrorism is a system of tasks and operations during which only preventive actions are considered productively efficient because every terrorist attack that was carried out is considered a lost battle along with its moral, material, physical and human losses. Avoiding emergency in this case is only a partial duty of law enforcement, its success rate highly depends on the effectiveness of bureaucratic actions.

As indicated above, unveiling the complex and holistic system of methodology of such successful actions is not the objective of this study; however, it is possible to introduce subjective perceptions that are noted as of high importance. Primarily, the reduction of terrorist threats through combating mass migration can be an option with the use of frameworks which are results of international cooperation. The primary goal of action in this case, is to set up a set of practical measures to be able to keep the migrant masses at a manageable scale, which could be carried out by comprehensive international cooperation. Emitter countries could be marked as the field for primary operations, where a set of practical, welfare-enhancing actions should be implemented first by which the willingness of migrant masses to move could be reduced. In this case, the European law enforcement agencies and secret services should be directed primarily to help reducing the activities of terrorist groups operating as a migrational generator in the emitter countries.

The national security check – which is essential regarding the safety of Europe and the European Union – of those who wish to immigrate into the continent or the borders of Schengen zone can be connected to migration handling.¹¹ It is a pan-European interest to implement measures at a high and efficient level, because tracking the movement of individuals who got into the territory of the Union, and have the probability to bear the risk of terrorism or preventing further relations with radicalized groups means a lot more difficult task to achieve and by this has a higher security risk than making their entry impossible.

Another relation point is the fact that migration has been previously presented as mainly a risk posed by second-generation migrants to Europe in correlation with terror, therefore the most important thing to do is to enhance the social integration of those belonging to this group. It can be concluded that the lack of integration of the immigrant communities leads members down the road to radicalization. The primary method of dealing with the problems of integration would be implementing integrational actions. However, neither the European Community nor any country has been able so far to implement such action or achieve success therefore there is no good model. For the success it would be essential to work out the integration processes, to have political will, and to implement targeted and coordinated actions involving governments, with the active participation of civil society as well.

For the future survival of European societies it is an essential prerequisite in each country – in the absence of integration – to eliminate parallel societies. National character is in grave danger by the fact that factors threatening sovereignty are being present in the political system besides state structures. Especially destructive for the sovereign state power,

¹¹ Besenyó J. "Fences and Border Protection: The Question of Establishing Technical Barriers in Europe". *AARMS* 16/1. 2017. 77–87. http://uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/aarms-2017-1-07-besenyoy.original.pdf, Accessed on 23 Nov 2017.

almost endangering the existence of individual stateship, are the operating non-central assault forces, like sharia police.

In terms of counter-terrorism it is still important in case of an already integrated community to conduct its permanent surveillance to detect radicalisation, and in the current times and near future the task has an utmost importance. When establishing preventive national security programmes at domestic and international levels, the main principles have to be the balance of security and freedom in favour of defending the achievements of democracy.

SUMMARY

In conclusion we can state that counter-terrorism tasks are expected to largely increase in the future. Such expansion must also bring changes in the performance and – where it is reasonable – the structure of counter-terrorism institutions and services. Since it has been shown that continuous and rapid changes are taking place in the nature and activity of terrorist individuals and groups, these processes need to be largely adapted to counterterrorism. One of the most important tasks is also the social implementation of security-conscious way of thinking, especially in this new global environment stricken by increased terrorist activities.

On the basis of current trends terrorism will be one of the most challenging security challenges in the future. The many-faced, variable appearance of terrorism creates a new environment in which the direction of the threat often becomes unpredictable, hereby reducing the general sense of security, even if the actual level of threat does not increase. The peaceful and sustainable social coexistence is based on optimizing the sense of security. Only a part of this task is the fight against terrorism, but based on current trends it can be predicted to be one of the most important segments.

At the same time, particular importance should be ascribed to the fact that based on the rules of political science, the high dissatisfaction of the communities creates new social gaps which result in structural changes. Therefore social problems linked to the processes related to the appearance of terrorism in Europe can change the European political conditions ultimately and in some cases extremely.

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Hanga Horváth-Sántha:

RADICALIZATION INTO SALAFI JIHADISM: SOME PATTERNS AND PROFILES IN EUROPE 2015–2017¹

ABSTRACT: Understanding the dynamics, trigger factors and root causes of violent extremism leading to acts of terrorism has been subjected to vast research for the past decade. In this regard, the notion of radicalisation has been especially debated and contested by various researchers, leaving one sole ground to base all other theories upon: there is not one single pathway to terrorism, but there are many and the root causes vary heavily. Whilst radicalisation may occur among various ethnic and religious groups, this article will specifically focus on radicalisation processes leading to violence-promoting Islamist extremism (Salafi-Jihadism) in the European context and will be delimited to the examination of persons who have committed crimes of terrorism in Europe during the past two years. The reason for this rather slim scope is to examine whether the different types of acts of terrorism and the radicalisation processes behind (as far as they are known) differ from earlier experience with this type of violent extremism in European states with regard to the significantly shrunken time of the radicalisation process, the modus operandi, the selection of targets and the potentially different motives. The fact that some of the perpetrators entered Europe as asylum seekers and supposedly became radicalised on their way or upon arrival to the host society makes the issue even more delicate, however, so far they constitute a group neither to be underestimated, nor overestimated. The article attempts to increase the understanding of the phenomenon of violent radicalisation in the light of the recent Jihadist-inspired attacks. The analysis of the terrorist activities and the pathways of radicalisation contain important information also with regard to the question of how to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organisations. Here it has to be stated already in the beginning that not only do the underlying causes vary from individual to individual and that correlation in itself does not necessarily equal causation, but the field of research itself is a constantly growing and developing one and every piece of information may be important to be able to strengthen and enhance a fact-based preventative work. Considering that the article is based on open source information, the persons who have been convicted for having plotted crimes of terror will not fall under the analysis presented in the article.

KEYWORDS: jihadism, radicalisation, salafi

INTRODUCTION

In his ground-breaking paper from 2003 on why people join radical Islamist groups Quintan Wiktorowicz identified four key processes that would all increase the likelihood of a person to be drawn to radical Islamism and to – at a certain point – participate in its activities:

¹ The article was submitted in June 2017.

cognitive opening (i.e. being receptive to adopt new ideas and beliefs), religious seeking (seeking meaning within a religious framework), frame alignment (the narrative presented by the radicals “makes sense” and appears tempting to the seeker) and socialisation (the manner in which the religious education and activities are conducted facilitate indoctrination).² Analysing some of the profiles of the most recent terrorists who committed violent attacks justified by Jihadist ideology against civilians in Europe, it becomes clear that the radicalisation processes remain quite similar to the ones described by Wiktorowicz 14 years ago in the context of seeking answers to the question why persons from the Western societies are drawn to join the global radical Islamist movement called Al-Muhajiroun. The profiles examined in this article illustrate several or all of the above listed key processes leading to the execution of terrorist attacks in the name of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (hereinafter: ISIS), but with the worrisome difference that the radicalisation process of the perpetrators occurs in a manner even more difficult to detect for security and intelligence services.

Acts of terrorism committed by terror cells or lone actors such as the ones in London on June 5, in Manchester on May 26, Stockholm on April 7, in London on March 26, in Berlin on December 12 and in Nice on July 14 of last year seem to suggest not only a somewhat new way of carrying out attacks on European soil, but also a shift regarding the selected targets towards mass social events, such as concerts and markets. Attacks such as the mentioned ones will inevitably lead to large-scale public debates on freedom and security as well as to why the security services failed to disrupt the attacks, but the trends of the latter suggest that more attacks of this type – in some cases not even requiring any special skills or very detailed planning, not even an own vehicle or advanced explosive devices for that matter – are likely to occur, aggravating the possibility of surveillance and intelligence gathering necessary to prevent an attack. Yet, the possibility of more sophisticated attacks like the one in Manchester suggests that despite the shift towards simpler means there still exist the will and capacity to commit more coordinated and complicated attacks. Other factors, such as the accelerated radicalisation process, the existence or non-existence of well-established networks around the perpetrators acting on their own as well as the interaction and inspiration online also contribute to the aggravated reality security and intelligence agencies face in detecting potential acts of terrorism at an early stage.

VIOLENT RADICALISATION

Since the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 the concepts of “home-grown terrorism” and “radicalisation” have been present not only in terrorism research, but unfortunately also in the everyday lives of many European citizens. Similar to other terms within social science, the notion of radicalisation has been heavily debated in the field of research on terrorism. However, in order to be able to describe the phenomenon as accurately as possible the selection of a working definition is absolutely crucial. Many attempts have been made to find an exhaustive description, induced by scientific as well as policy-related interests, and some of them will be presented briefly in the chapter below.

As a first benchmark, it is important to note that the process of radicalisation may be violent or non-violent (cognitive), although both may equally threaten the social cohesion,

² Wiktorowicz, Q. “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam”. Paper presented at The Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference, Yale University, USA, 8-9 May 2004. <http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wiktorowicz.Joining-the-Cause.pdf>, Accessed on 5 June 2017.

integration and the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic or religious groups in a society.³ Cognitive radicalisation is often referred to as “the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a completely different belief system”,⁴ and violent radicalisation occurs with the additional step: the actual use of violence springing from the cognitive radicalism. In defining non-violent radicalisation another relevant broadening of the concept is brought forward by the Dutch intelligence and security service (AIVD), which defines it as “the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).” Supplemented by: “a person's (growing) willingness to pursue and/or support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or his encouraging others to do so”.⁵ The question of the triggering or catalysing factors to the additional step has been analysed by a variety of disciplines, but it becomes clear that radicalisation is a gradual process that occurs in a person's life with individual causal factors paving way for what some scholars call “cognitive opening”, resulting in the receptivity for accepting radical ideas and violent solutions.⁶

One of the most complete definitions is the one by Charles E. Allen, former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, who described radicalisation as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change”.⁷ Through this definition, Allen wished to – among other objectives – make clear the distinction between radicalisation and terrorism (as not all radicalisation may lead to acts of terrorism), yet also highlight the similarities regarding the social patterns in both cases. As early as 2007, Allen underscored the role of charismatic persons in the radicalisation process as well as the role of the Internet.⁸ As one of the hotbeds of radicalisation Allen mentions prisons, which, in the past couple of years have truly become one of the most significant places to radicalise and recruit new members to the Jihadist ideology in (Western-) European prisons.

The definition of violent radicalisation (as the terrorist attacks examined all demonstrate that the line between the cognitive and the violent radicalisation has been in place) used in this article will be most similar to the one cited above by Allen, the notion will entail the socio-psychological process through which an individual becomes susceptible to adapt a system of extremist views and beliefs and – eventually – becomes prone to use, support, or finance acts of violence as a method to reach political or ideological goals.

³ Velhuis, T. and Staun, J. “Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model”. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague. October 2009. https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.velhuis_and_staun.pdf, Accessed on 3 March 2017.

⁴ Vidino, L. and Brandon, J. “Countering Radicalization in Europe”. ICSR King's College. 2012. 9. <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf>, Accessed on 5 June 2017.

⁵ AIVD. “Background of jihad recruits in the Netherlands”. 2004. 13–14. <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2004/03/10/background-of-jihad-recruits-in-the-netherlands>, Accessed on 8 June 2017.

⁶ Wiktorowicz. “Joining the Cause...”.

⁷ Allen, Ch. E. “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland”. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 14 March 2007. <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/270.pdf>, Accessed on 5 June 2017.

⁸ Allen. “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland”.

THE IDEOLOGY JUSTIFYING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS

This chapter will briefly discuss some of the religiously inspired and ideological justifications through which militant Islamist organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS justify their use of violence against civilians. One of the justifications is the one of *jihad*, being one of the most heavily debated notions not only in contemporary terrorism research but also among the general public in the context of Jihadist-inspired attacks against the West. As a result of the lack of a clear hierarchy among the religious scholars today, jihad has been authorised by a wide range of religious leaders for a wide range of purposes,⁹ including resistance, liberation and terrorist organisations, to justify their causes and to recruit followers.¹⁰

Technically the word in itself means war in the way of God. In modern times, jihad can be pursued according to two different interpretations: either as the way of striving towards a good life in consistence with the faith (the greater *jihad*), or the way to struggle against the enemies of Islam (the lesser *jihad*) in a holy war.¹¹ The holy war in its turn can be either offensive, i.e. for the purpose of spreading the faith or expanding the (Muslim) state, or defensive, i.e. in response to attacks by invaders (such as the Crusaders around 900 years ago).¹² According to a majority of Islamic scholars it is incumbent to all Muslims to wage jihad against outside forces invading Muslim territories for the sake of protection of the faithful as well as for the survival of the global Muslim community (the *ummah*).¹³ In the terms of Islamic law, offensive jihad can only be declared by a legitimate religious-political authority while the defensive jihad needs no authorisation. The interpretation of *jihad* as a religious duty and moral obligation for every Muslim became prevalent during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when jihadis relied extensively on the works of medieval scholars such as Ibn Talmiyya and Ibn Nuhaas al-Demyati, trying to resurrect the idea of active participation in the defensive *jihad*, which was later extended by scholars linked to al-Qaeda to justify attacks against the United States.¹⁴ For this, however, it needed to be proven that the United States in fact is an occupying force, for which the American troops in Saudi Arabia (authorised by the Saudi King Fahd to repel Saddam Hussein) served as an argument. The defensive argument was further stressed by Osama bin Laden in an interview in 1998, in which he claimed that “[w]e ourselves are the target of killings, destruction, and atrocities. We are only defending ourselves. This is a defensive jihad. We want to defend our people and our land. That is why we say, if we don’t get security, the Americans, too, would not get security. This is the simple formula that even an American child can understand. Live and let live.”¹⁵

Hence, in the context of terrorist attacks against Western targets the interpretation of defensive holy war is the most commonly used, and violence against civilians is justified with a doctrine of “proportional response”, i.e. when the non-Muslims kill Muslim civilians it becomes permissible to attack their civilians in return.¹⁶ Among the conditions to

⁹ Miskel, J. F. “Terrorism”. In Birx, J. H. (ed), *21st Century Anthropology*. California: SAGE Publication, Inc, 2010, 1007–1015. 1011.

¹⁰ Esposito, J. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 24.

¹¹ Miskel. “Terrorism”. 1011.

¹² Miskel. “Terrorism”. 1011.

¹³ Wiktorowicz, Q. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28:2. 2005. 75–97. 83.

¹⁴ Wiktorowicz. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. 83–84.

¹⁵ As quoted in Esposito, J. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. 24.

¹⁶ Wiktorowicz. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. 89.

kill civilians the most cited conditions in the justification of al-Qaeda was that the enemy had killed Muslim civilian on purpose and that civilians had assisted the enemy in “deed, word or mind”.¹⁷

This type of argument is frequently used by ISIS as well: the alleged mistreatment of Muslims, where the non-military is seen as complicit and hence, legitimate targets for acts of violence. In the rhetoric of ISIS the term “Crusaders” is often used as an instrument to describe the West and its actions, revoking the above mentioned defensive war for the protection of Islam.¹⁸ The term is frequently used in their online propaganda magazine, public statements, videos, relentlessly aiming to maintain the “us-and-them” worldview, thereby portraying Islam as constantly being under threat and humiliation. As part of the defensive war against this proclaimed enemy the “crusade civilians” are seen as legitimate targets through association with the governments they elected,¹⁹ but also as part of the retaliation for “[t]heir planes do not distinguish between civilians and combatants, man or woman”.²⁰ Since 2016 – coinciding with the losses on the ground – the ISIS has specifically called upon attacks against civilian targets in Europe as well as in the United States. The late spokesperson Abu Muhammed al-Adnani (killed in an air strike in May 2016) proclaimed in the Turkish version of their magazine *Konstantiniyye* that “[b]lood has no value in the countries of the crusaders and that there are no innocents there”.²¹

The attack in May 2017 on the Manchester Arena horrified many as several of the victims were children, and yet it was not the first time that Islamist extremists targeted children.²² The justification of attacks against children is also to be found in the argument accentuated already by al-Qaeda, according to which tactics prohibited for Muslims become legitimate if the enemy uses the very same ones.²³ “It is allowed for Muslims to kill protected ones among unbelievers as an act of reciprocity. If the unbelievers have targeted Muslim women, children, and elderly, it is permissible for Muslims to respond in kind and kill those similar to those whom the unbelievers killed.”²⁴

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND?

Undoubtedly home-grown radicalisation and terrorism remain high on the security agenda of several European states,²⁵ especially considering the increased and continued recruitment

¹⁷ Wiktorowicz. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. 89.

¹⁸ Goutham, K. “ISIS and the Crusades”. Dartmouth University. 16 May 2016. <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/crusadememory/2016/05/16/isis-and-the-crusades/>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

¹⁹ Goutham. “ISIS and the Crusades”.

²⁰ Statement by Abu Muhammed al-Adnani in May 2016 calling for attacks on military and civilian targets in the West. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-idUSKCN0YCOOG>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

²¹ Bulut, U. “Islamic State Calls for Attacks on Civilians in Europe and America”. Clarion Project. 21 August 2016. <https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-calls-attacks-civilians-europe-and-america/>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

²² The most infamous of these attacks is the one on the school of Beslan in 2004. Other examples: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/23/us/manchester-terror-other-children-attacks-worldwide/index.html>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

²³ Wiktorowicz. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. 90.

²⁴ “Why we fight America”, Al-Qaeda spokesperson explains September 11, as quoted in Wiktorowicz. “A genealogy of Radical Islam”. 90

²⁵ Kis-Benedek, J. *Dzsihádzismus, radikalizmus, terrorizmus*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2016. 50.

of Muslim immigrants in Western countries by militant Islamist groups.²⁶ The deliberate targeting of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in mainly non-Muslim countries with their recruitment and propaganda both al-Qaeda affiliated organisations as well as ISIS are seeking to exploit the loss of identity, purpose, and values that may be prevalent among certain members of these groups. It is estimated that around 5,000 recruits from Europe and the United States have travelled to Syria or Iraq to fight for groups such as ISIS,²⁷ where the violent radicalisation may proceed further and where they potentially become equipped to carry out attacks in Europe. However, there must be a “dark number” of travellers to the aforementioned destinations who have not yet been detected.²⁸ Drawing so called foreign fighters is an increasingly important and essential component in ISIS’ military strategy, especially as the organisation is facing sustained pressure due to the air strikes in Iraq and Syria, as the foreign recruits tend to be more zealous than the local fighters and can thus contribute to the further radicalisation of the conflict.²⁹ Upon arrival the newcomers are put in different types of training camps where they receive both military as well as ideological training.³⁰ Due to the military training in the use of weapons and explosives, the combat experience, the prolonged ideological indoctrination as well as the potentially lower threshold towards the use of violence, the foreign fighters in most cases pose a serious threat to their country of departure.³¹ In the case where foreign fighters return with the intention of committing violent attacks in the Western world their experience can lead to more lethal attacks compared to those carried out by first-time domestic terrorists.³² Research on foreign fighters carried out by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague in 2016 based on open source information as well as questionnaires to 23 EU Member States indicated that an average of 30% had already returned to their country of departure.³³ According to an analysis by Hegghammer (2013) of Islamist attack plots in Western countries between 1990 and 2010, he found evidence for a ‘veteran effect’. Not only would the presence of a veteran (a domestic person with experience as a foreign fighter) increase the probability of an attack, but it would also double the chance that the attack would be lethal.³⁴ As the multiple

²⁶ “Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017”. Europol. 2017. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

²⁷ “Terrorism Situation...”. 12.

²⁸ „Terrorism Situation...”. 12.

²⁹ Gartenstein-Ross, D., Barr, N. and Moreng, B. “The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy”. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. March 2016. 13. <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf>, Accessed on 20 May 2017.

³⁰ Kis-Benedek, J. “Tendencies in the policy of the Islamic State”. *Defence Review* 144. Special issue 2016/1. 2016. 40–51. 50. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/58745/defence_review_2016-1..pdf#page=42, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

³¹ “Terrorism Situation...”. 14.

³² Yousoufzai, K. and Emmerling, F. “Explaining violent radicalization in Western Muslims: A four factor model”. *Journal of Terrorism Research* 1/1. February 2017. 68–80.

³³ Ginkel, B. van and Entenmann, E. (eds). “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union – Profiles, Threats & Policies”. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. April 2016. 3. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf, Accessed on 20 May 2017.

³⁴ Hegghammer, T. “Should I stay or Should I go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”. *American Political Science Review*. February 2013. http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_Should_I_stay_or_should_I_go.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 clearly demonstrated, all of the perpetrators identified so far had been foreign fighters and residents of the EU prior to joining ISIS.³⁵

Hence, the radicalisation process of persons with immigrant background born and raised in (Western) Europe joining militant Islamist groups has been subject to vast research in the past couple of years. One of the most important questions have been to what extent religion, identity and ideology (and the interplay thereof) have an impact on the process of accepting violence as legitimate means. And whether any of the mentioned factors play a particularly important role.

A study conducted in 2015 among 198 Muslims in the United States focusing on the role of cultural identity in the radicalisation process found that immigrants who could neither identify with culture, nor the heritage they were living in (a phenomenon the researchers called ‘*cultural homelessness*’) felt marginalised and insignificant.³⁶ The marginalisation resulted in a lack of sense of belonging, which could be exploited by groups affirming their self-worth and offering them a firm identity.³⁷ The study also found that the marginalisation in combination with experience of negative events such as discrimination, humiliation, or a loss of job could make things worse in a sense that the person in question would more easily find relief in radicalism, promising sense of belonging as well as a life purpose. Other research suggest that in times of stress of uncertainty there is a tendency to identify with the one part of the identity that is perceived to be under the fiercest threat or attack,³⁸ which may be an important factor in understanding the turn towards a violent and fundamentalist form of Islam among second and third generation immigrants in Western Europe. Considering the fact that the Muslim population in Europe is steadily growing and that Muslims in Europe at present are already much younger than the median for all Europeans,³⁹ there is an urgent need to discuss the question of identity as a prominent issue among Muslim communities in Europe, especially as the efforts to find a balance between a Western identity and a religious and/or ethnic identity inherited through the family may occasionally lead to an identity crisis.

PROFILES OF JIHADIST-INSPIRED TERRORISTS IN EUROPE 2015–2017

The following chapter will give a brief description and analysis of some of the most recent jihadist-inspired terrorist profiles having committed acts of terrorism in Europe during the past two years. The selection is mainly based on information available in online sources, as the biggest obstacle from a methodological point of view when describing radicalisation into violent extremism and terrorism is the lack of primary sources. The analysis of the terrorists’ background exposed some characteristics shared by all – as well as with other terrorists in other groups throughout the world. Common factors seem to be the question of identity and belonging, the seeking for higher purposes, the criminal lifestyle, earlier experiences with violence (and, hence, the relatively low threshold towards the use of violence), the full em-

³⁵ Gartenstein-Ross et al. “The Islamic State’s...”. 14.

³⁶ Lyons-Padilla, S. et al. “Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants”. *Behavioral Science & Policy*, 1(2). 2015. 1–12.

³⁷ Lyons-Padilla et al. „Belonging nowhere...”. 2.

³⁸ Maalouf, A. *On identity*. London: Random House, 2011.

³⁹ “5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe”. Pew Research Center. 19 July 2016. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

bracement of the ideology and justification as presented by ISIS leading to indoctrination and fearless hatred towards what is interpreted as “the enemy”. Several of the profiles underline how young men with a history of petty crime become increasingly violent – a behaviour that is later legitimised and further fuelled by jihadist ideology. Most of them were radicalised through social network or family members, confirming what scholars observed long ago, namely that the network channel remains one of the most important sources of recruitment.⁴⁰ Already in the analysis of the Madrid bombers in 2004 scholars wrote about the importance of interpersonal links among the persons in the jihadist milieu, also illustrated by the case of several of the profiles listed in this brief analysis.⁴¹

Brahim and Salah Abdeslam (Paris, 2015 November 13)

On November 13, 2015 several persons committed multiple attacks throughout eastern and northern Paris killing 131 and wounding 368 persons. The attacks took place on several geographical locations (Stade de France Soccer Stadium, Rue Bichat, Rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi, Rue de Charonne, the Comptoir Voltaire restaurant at Boulevard Voltaire and the Bataclan theatre) almost simultaneously and consisted of shootings, suicide bombings and a suicide hostage barricade. The modus operandi recalled the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, where Lashkar-e-Taiba hit multiple civilian targets with gunfire as well as suicide bombings almost simultaneously.⁴² Brahim Abdeslam was one of the gunmen in the 11th and 12th *arrondissements* in Paris and the one who blew himself up at the restaurant on Boulevard Voltaire, while Saleh Abdeslam escaped the attacks. Little is known as to his motives why he did not carry out his part of the mission. His suicide vest was later found in a trash can along with a cell phone. He managed to avoid law enforcement in the Molenbeek suburb of Brussels for almost four months, until getting caught by Belgian police in March 2016. Molenbeek has been held as one of the hotbeds of Jihadist radicalisation in Western Europe. With a population of almost 100,000 with 30 percent being of foreign nationality and 40 percent of foreign roots, it has functioned as an operational and logistical hub for the terrorist cells which carried out the attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016.⁴³ ISIS claimed responsibility in a video released after the attacks, announcing in French that “[a]s long as you keep bombing you will not live in peace. You will even fear travelling to your market.”

Brahim and Salah Abdeslam were French nationals of Moroccan origin growing up in Molenbeek. Salah Abdeslam had a history of criminal activity, and served time in prison for robbery in 2010 together with his childhood friend Abdelhamid Abaaoud (below). After the prison sentence he worked for Belgium’s public transportation system STIB-MIVB as a mechanic, a job from which he was fired from later. According to some sources he was discontinued from the job due to regular absence, but the woman he was briefly engaged to claimed it was due to criminal activity and a prison sentence.⁴⁴ A couple of months before

⁴⁰ Alonso, R. and Reinares, F. “Magreb immigrants becoming suicide terrorists: a case study on religious radicalisation processes in Spain”. In Pedahzur, A. (ed), *Root Causes of Suicidal Terrorism – The globalization of martyrdom*. New York: Routledge, 2006. 191.

⁴¹ Alonso and Reinares. „Magreb immigrants becoming...”. 191.

⁴² Nance, M. *Defeating ISIS: Who they are, how they fight, what they believe*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016. 140.

⁴³ Nance. *Defeating ISIS*... 145–146.

⁴⁴ “Salah Abdeslam’s Ex Fiancée Speaks Out”. *Flanders News*, 24 February 2016. <http://deredactie.be/cm/vrt-nieuws.english/News/1.2581476>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

the attack, a video footage of the two brothers showed a rather secular lifestyle: the two of them dancing, drinking and flirting with women at a nightclub and according to some of their friends they used to smoke hashish as well. Hence, the radicalisation process of the two brothers has puzzled scholars and analysts paving way for several theories. According to some the secular behaviour may be an example of *taqiyya*, or calculated pretence, when the “warrior” tries to melt in with the enemy to avoid detection.⁴⁵ In an interview with the Belgian broadcaster RTBF the elder brother of Brahim and Salah, Mohamed Abdeslam told the journalists that he had not apprehended any signs that may indicate radicalisation, rather he believed it to be a matter of manipulation. He stated though that Salah had begun to pray a couple of months prior to the attack and that he had stopped drinking alcohol, but claimed that these signs did not cause any particular reaction in the family.⁴⁶ Another theory was brought forward by Salah Abdeslam’s ex-fiancée who claimed that he was radicalised when his childhood friend Abaaoud went to Syria.

Since his arrest in March 2016 Salah Abdeslam has been silent and non-cooperative with the legal system, hence, exact details regarding his radicalisation process remain somewhat unknown. But following the patterns of other young men coming from similar background (second-generation immigrants growing up in a suburb with a large immigrant presence and with a history of crime, violence and unemployment) it becomes clear that there may have been a certain breeding ground for the radicalisation process. The prison sentence as well as a close friend travelling to the conflict zone in Syria to wage *jihad* may have further accelerated the process in a violent direction.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud

The dual Belgian-Moroccan citizen Abdelhamid Abaaoud is believed to have been the leader of the terrorist cell committing the attacks in Paris. He was a third-generation immigrant born in the Anderlecht neighbourhood of Brussels in Belgium and the eldest of six children.⁴⁷ He was enrolled in a prestigious Catholic school of Brussels but was expelled after one year due to disruptive behaviour and poor academic achievements.⁴⁸ Following the expulsion he joined local gangs of youngsters among several of the later co-perpetrators in the Paris attacks where to be found (including the Abdeslam brothers). Abaaoud had an early criminal record and was sentenced to prison several times for theft, violence and resisting police officers between 2006 and 2012.⁴⁹ He caught the eye of the Belgian security service in 2013 after a trip with six other young men to Syria, to which he later travelled several times. Probably in order to avoid Belgian security services Abaaoud faked his own

⁴⁵ Cottee, S. “Europe’s Joint-Smoking, Gay-Club Hopping Terrorists”. *Foreign Policy*, 13 April 2016. <http://foreign-policy.com/2016/04/13/the-joint-smoking-gay-club-hopping-terrorists-of-molenbeek-abdeslam-radicalization/>, Accessed on 15 June 2016.

⁴⁶ “Paris attacks: Abdeslam brothers ‘were manipulated, not radicalised’”. BBC, 22 November 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34895294>, Accessed on 5 June 2017.

⁴⁷ Vlierden, G. van “Profile: Paris Attack Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud”. *CTC Sentinel* 8/11. November/December 2015. 30. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CTCSentinel-Vol8Iss112.pdf>, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

⁴⁸ Vlierden. “Profile...”. 30.

⁴⁹ Vincent, E. “Ce que les services belges savaient d’Abdelhamid Abaaoud”. *Le Monde*, 20 November 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/20/abaaoud-ce-que-les-services-belges-savaient_4814101_4809495.html#ZUPuVud15TepHuOU.99, Accessed on 15 June 2017.

death and returned to Belgium (Verviers) in 2014, with the intent to coordinate an attack, which was foiled in January 2015. He managed to escape the police and returned to Syria, where he gave an interview to the *Dabiq* magazine, the online propaganda magazine of ISIS. The topics included how he had managed to get back to Europe, set up a safe house, obtain weapons and escape Western intelligence.⁵⁰

According to Abaaoud's father the radicalisation commenced while he was serving the last term in prison, however, the details remain unclear. What is known is that after prison, Abaaoud fell in the circles around a known veteran from the Afghan *jihād*, Khalid Zarkavi, recruiting persons in Molenbeek to the Syrian *jihād*.⁵¹ Abaaoud's background illustrates the story of a young troublemaker with an immigrant background involved in petty crime who at a young age had already displayed a disruptive and violent behaviour. This violent and deviant behaviour later became legitimised by the jihadist ideology espousing more violence as legitimate means, where Abaaoud could advance in the ranks and obtain capacity to coordinate sophisticated attacks.

Ibrahim and Khalid al-Bakraoui (Brussels, 22 March 2016)

On 22nd March 2016 three persons blew themselves up in Brussels, two at the departure hall of the Zaventem International Airport and one at the Maelbeek metro station at the city centre, killing 31 and injuring more than 270 persons. The persons were identified as the brothers Ibrahim and Khalid al-Bakraoui (29 and 27 years old) of Moroccan origin, born and raised in a working-class neighbourhood of Brussels (Laeken). Both brothers had an early criminal debut and long criminal records prior to the terrorist attack, Khalid had participated in carjacking at least four times, in an armed bank robbery in 2009, and Ibrahim had been the lookout at a robbery attempt in 2010 whereby he shot a policeman in the leg with a Kalashnikov. Ibrahim was sentenced to nine years in prison for attempted murder, but was released on parole after four years.⁵²

The case of the al-Bakraoui brothers is also interesting considering the fact that they committed the attack only three days after Saleh Abdeslam, the only known surviving terrorist from the Paris attacks in November 2015 (above). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, which was not the first of its kind in the Belgian capital. ISIS had attacked Brussels previously; in May 2015 a person linked to the terrorist organisation (Mehdi Nemmouche) killed four persons and injured several others in the Jewish Museum of Brussels. Some evidence seem to suggest that the al-Bakraoui brothers felt forced to act quickly after the capture of Abdeslam; police found a note in the bin of a laptop of the elder brother claiming that he felt he was hunted and "no longer safe" and feared "ending up in a cell like him" (Abdeslam).⁵³ When police raided the apartment of the al-Bakraoui brothers they discovered a makeshift bomb factory as there was 15 kg of explosives, 150 litres of acetone, 30 litres

⁵⁰ 7th issue of the *Dabiq* magazine.

⁵¹ Vlierden. "Profile...". 30.

⁵² "Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui: From Bank Robbers to Brussels Bombers". *The New York Times*, 24 March 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/europe/expanding-portraits-of-brussels-bombers-ibrahim-and-khalid-el-bakraoui.html>, Accessed on June 5 2017.

⁵³ Chisafis, A. "The men in a top floor who sowed terror in Brussels". *The Guardian*, 24 March 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/23/brussels-attacks-schaerbeek-flat-coordinated-atrocities-plotted-el-bakraoui>, Accessed on June 5 2017.

of hydrogen peroxide, detonators, a suitcase filled with screws and nails.⁵⁴ Both Bakraoui brothers are also believed to have been plotting another attack in which radioactive material would have been scattered over a populated area, including the kidnapping of a nuclear expert to build a dirty bomb.⁵⁵

The details of the radicalisation process are not fully known, however, the life stories are quite similar to the above mentioned profiles. Interestingly, the 14th edition of the Dabiq propaganda magazine released after the Brussels bombings had an entire section dedicated to the alleged dreams of Khalid al-Bakraoui. According to the article, he had three dreams leading to the execution of the attack, the first one during his imprisonment and the two others after the Paris attacks. In the dreams described the first is a wake-up call to become more religious and in the two latter ones a pathway to martyrdom appears, potentially suggesting that there may have been someone in his immediate surroundings picking up on these dreams and trying to encourage and further radicalise him.⁵⁶

Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel (Nice, 14 July 2016)

On Bastille Day 2016 a man drove a 19-tonne lorry into the crowds gathered to celebrate the French national holiday at the Promenad des Anglais in the Riviera city of Nice, killing 86 and injuring more than 450 others. The man was identified as Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a 31 year-old Tunisian with a French residence permit. He moved to France in 2005, and married a French-Tunisian cousin with whom he had three children. According to his father, Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was suffering from a mental illness causing him a nervous breakdown, and he had been to a psychiatrist as well as had received medical treatment prior to his move to France.⁵⁷ Neighbours described him as a loner with a history of violence, alcohol and drugs and who – after his divorce – according to François Molins, French prosecutor assigned to the case, also indulged a wild sex life including both men and women.⁵⁸

An interesting statement regarding his radicalisation process was made by the then French Minister of Interior Bernard Cazeneuve, who claimed that the perpetrator “appeared to have been radicalised very quickly”.⁵⁹ ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack saying that Lahouaiej-Bouhlel acted in response to its calls to target civilians in countries that are part of the international coalition against them.⁶⁰ According to the prosecutor and the police, Lahouaiej-Bouhlel had given expression to a recent interest in radical Islamism, searching the web for verses of the *Qur’an*, nasheeds (Arabic chants) with jihadist propaganda as well as videos of fatal traffic accidents, and articles on recent attacks (such as the one in the gay

⁵⁴ Chisafis. “The men in...”.

⁵⁵ Webb, E. and Sutton, R. “An Enduring Threat: Europe’s Islamist Networks Then and Now”. The Henry Jacksons Society, Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism. 2016. 9–10. <https://relayto.com/the-henry-jackson-society/92ha81N0>, Accessed on June 5 2017.

⁵⁶ “The dreams of a Brussels bomber”. The Bored Jihadi Blog. 1 April 2016. <http://boredjihadi.tumblr.com/post/142889314077/three-dreams-of-a-brussels-bomber>, Accessed on 14 June 2017.

⁵⁷ Chazan, D. “Bastille Day terrorist was radicalised within months and sent £84,000 to his Tunisian family days before attack”. *The Telegraph*, 17 July 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/16/bastille-day-terrorist-was-radicalised-within-months-and-sent-84/>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

⁵⁸ Chazan. “Bastille Day terrorist...”.

⁵⁹ Chazan. “Bastille Day terrorist...”.

⁶⁰ “Who was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel?”. BBC News. 19 July 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801763>, Accessed on 20 June 2017.

nightclub in Dallas, where a gunman who proclaimed allegiance to ISIS shot 49 persons).⁶¹ Investigators also found violent content related to militant Islamism and the flag of ISIS on his computer. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel had an earlier police record from the years between 2010 and 2016 for threatening behaviour, violence and petty theft.

The case of Lahouaiej-Bouhlel illustrates how mental illness can play a significant role in the radicalisation process. In his case, the history of violence and threatening behaviour, as well as the negative experience from the divorce, and the unemployment may have contributed to the search for alternative – and radical – solutions and new purposes. Considering what is known about the rather short period of time during which the radicalisation process occurred, and the fact that he was not known to the French authorities as a potentially violent Islamist, it becomes increasingly important to focus on awareness-raising measures regarding the early signals of potential transformations and a changed behaviour as were voiced – with hindsight – by neighbours and others in the perpetrator's immediate surroundings. Although the details on the true ideological and/or religious conviction of Lahouaiej-Bouhlel will probably remain unknown, it is important to bear in mind how the rhetoric of radical Islamist groups propagating violence as a legitimate solution may attract persons with psychological problems, seeking for alternatives to channel personal traumas, failures and frustration.

Anis Amri (Berlin, 2016 December 19)

On 19 December 2016 a man deliberately drove a hijacked truck into a Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, killing 12 persons and wounding 48. This was the first confirmed ISIS-inspired attack on German soil which resulted in fatalities.⁶² The perpetrator was identified as Anis Amri, a 24 year-old man of Tunisian origin, who had entered the country as an asylum seeker in 2015. Amri was one of nine children who according to his father grew up as a troublemaker, dropping out of school, living of occasional jobs, and eventually turning to alcohol and drugs.⁶³ Using the turmoil around the revolution in 2011 he escaped a prison sentence for having stolen a vehicle by fleeing the country and left for Italy. According to a spokesperson for the Italian state police, Amri entered the country without any ID and claimed to be a 16-year-old minor. Italian authorities ordered his deportation but the Tunisian authorities refused to accept the request referring to the lack of proper documentation. Nor did the Tunisian authorities respond to the request to send him travel documents. After having attacked a staff member of the refugee shelter and started a fire at the shelter Amis was – together with four other Tunisian asylum seekers – sentenced to four years in prison for damaging state property, assault and arson in 2011.⁶⁴ He was released in 2015 and left for Germany through Switzerland, where he applied for asylum. Between July and December 2015 Amri would register as an asylum seeker at least five times under different names and use altogether 14 identities while being in Germany.⁶⁵ The asylum application was denied

⁶¹ „Who was Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel?”

⁶² Heil, G. “The Berlin attack and the ‘Abu Wala’ Islamic State recruitment network”. *CTC Sentinel* 10/2. 2017. 1. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss228.pdf, Accessed on 20 February 2017.

⁶³ Heil. “The Berlin attack...”. 1.

⁶⁴ Heil. “The Berlin attack...”. 1.

⁶⁵ Heil. “The Berlin attack...”. 2.

and the deportation process had commenced but could not be completed due to the fact that Amri's identity could not be fully established.⁶⁶ According to German security officials Amri was on the radar of the German law enforcement authorities not only for having searched for a gun, but for being in contact with ISIS operatives abroad as well as radical Islamists in Germany, including a network recruiting for ISIS in Germany.⁶⁷ The network was organised around a Salafi preacher, an Iraqi national known as Abu Walaa, who together with four other suspects were arrested one month prior to the Christmas market attack. According to news sources Amri's name was mentioned several times in the 345-pages of investigation.⁶⁸ According to the investigative file, police informants had passed on information about the members of the network discussing to commit attacks, where one possible method mentioned was driving a truck full of gasoline into a crowd. The radicalisation process is believed to have commenced while he was in prison in Italy. According to a report for the Italian Committee for Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis (CASA), Amri was considered to be a dangerous person and the leader for the Islamists in prison. He had reportedly threatened and attacked staff members and threatened to decapitate a Christian inmate. During his stay in Germany he attended classes at "Madrasa Dortmund", a Qur'an school in Dortmund, which was where he first got in touch with the above mentioned Abu Walaa-network.

Through its affiliated Amaq news agency ISIS claimed to have inspired the attack and that Amri was a "soldier of the Islamic State" acting in response to the call for committing attacks in the West. For days after the attack Amaq released a video of Amri pledging allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowing to "slaughter crusaders who are shelling Muslims every day".

Anis Amri constitutes a so far fairly rare example of a person with a troublemaker background who entered the European Union as an asylum seeker who demonstrated violent behaviour already in the country where the asylum application was filed. The radicalisation most probably took place in the Italian prison, thus confirming the existing knowledge on prisons' being one of the most significant hotbeds for Jihadist recruitment in Europe. The almost immediate way into a like-minded group in another Member State of the EU (Germany) shows how these ties and networks function without borders. The case also illustrates one unfortunate consequence of the failure to return declined asylum seekers to their country of origin – especially of those who pose a security risk.

Khalid Masood (London, 22 March 2017)

On March 22 a man drove into pedestrians outside London's Palace of Westminster, resulting in four fatalities and more than 50 injured persons. The attacker was later identified as Khalid Masood, a 52 year-old man born in Kent. According to information from the Metropolitan Police he used numerous aliases throughout his life, but Khalid Masood was the name he took after having converted to Islam.⁶⁹ Masood had several convictions, the

⁶⁶ Berlinger, J. and Smith-Spark, L. "Berlin Christmas market attack suspect: Who was Anis Amri?". CNN. 23 December 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/22/europe/anis-amri-berlin-christmas-market/>, Accessed on 10 January 2017.

⁶⁷ Heil. "The Berlin attack...". 1.

⁶⁸ Berlinger and Smith-Spark. "Berlin Christmas market...".

⁶⁹ Casciani, D. "London attack: Who was Khalid Masood?". BBC. 26 March 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39373766>, Accessed on 15 April 2017.

earliest from the age of 18, when he was charged for criminal damage. Later he served several sentences in prison for a wide range of crimes, including grievous bodily harm, assault, and possession of an offensive weapon.⁷⁰ At one occasion he was involved in – among other troubles – a serious attack allegedly in a pub preceded by racist provocation, where he stabbed a man in the face, for which he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. After prison he moved away from his village, leaving wife and children behind, and started using steroids and cocaine. According to persons from his new environment, he had a bad temper and after another incident by which he stabbed another person in the face, he was sentenced to prison yet again. The time of the conversion to Islam is not known, but according to an interview with a childhood friend given to *The Independent* it took place sometime while he was incarcerated. This would be in line with the radicalisation patterns of several other known terrorists who at some point during their time in prison became susceptible to the violent Jihadist ideology offering redemption, status and new goals.⁷¹ In 2004 he married a Muslim woman of Pakistani descent and in the following year he wanted to take a position as English teacher at the General Authority of Civil Aviation in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.⁷² The travel to live in Saudi Arabia may be interpreted as a typical pattern of a convert who seeks opportunities to live and work in an Islamic country in order to fully embrace their new faith and way of life.⁷³ Masood moved back in the UK in 2010 and settled in Luton, well known for its links to militant Islamism. On March 22 he hired a car and drove into pedestrians killing four people.

Rakhmat Akilov (Stockholm, 7 April 2017)

In November 2014 the 39-year-old citizen from Uzbekistan applied for residence permit in Sweden but was denied in June 2016.⁷⁴ The Migration Court did not grant the leave to appeal and Akilov was to be deported, but went underground. The deportation order was sent to the police in February 2017. On April 7 Akilov stole a truck and drove into the largest shopping street in central Stockholm, the Swedish capital, killing four people and injuring 15 others. Akilov was arrested a couple of hours after the attack and later confessed guilty. According to information leaked from the interrogation, Akilov claimed to be a member of the Islamic State and that he was proud over his deeds.⁷⁵ The motive for his attack was supposedly “for what Sweden is doing to his country” (i.e. since the end of 2014 Sweden has participated in the international coalition against the Islamic State in accordance with a Government decision,

⁷⁰ Dearden, L. “Khalid Masood told friend ‘I want some f***ing blood, I want to kill someone’ before converting to Islam in prison”. *The Independent*, 25 March 2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/khalid-masood-adrian-elms-ajao-westminster-london-attacker-isis-prison-radicalisation-want-blood-a7650276.html>, Accessed on 15 April 2017.

⁷¹ Basra, R., Neumann, P. R. and Brunner, C. “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures”. ICSR King’s College London. 2016. <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures.pdf>, Accessed on 15 April 2017.

⁷² Casciani. “London attack...”

⁷³ Questions by converts on where to move to live under Islamic law are subjects to many discussions online, eg. <https://www.quora.com/If-I-want-to-move-to-a-Muslim-country-and-start-a-new-life-which-country-would-you-recommend>.

⁷⁴ Lundberg Andersson, H. and Syrén, M. “Rakhmat Akilov, 39, misstänks för attacken”. *Expressen*, 9 April 2017. <http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/rakhmat-akilov-39-misstanks-for-attacken/>, Accessed on 3 May 2017.

⁷⁵ Lundberg Andersson and Syrén. “Rakhmat Akilov...”

mainly through non-combatant military personnel supporting the Kurdish armed forces in northern Iraq) and furthermore he claimed to have received the order to carry out the attack directly from ISIS.⁷⁶ Little is yet known about Akilov's radicalisation process, however, the Swedish Security Service had investigated him previously in the framework of a counterterrorism investigation⁷⁷ and he was also known to the authorities for being a sympathiser of ISIS and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.⁷⁸ It is also known that he had links to an al-Qaeda affiliated group in Syria through a Russian-language social media site. The leader of the group is suspected of having ordered the above mentioned subway suicide bombing in St Petersburg only a couple of days before the Stockholm attack.⁷⁹ During a press conference a week after the Stockholm attack Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov claimed that Uzbekistan's security service had previously passed information on Akilov to partner countries in the West (without identifying the countries by name) and that Akilov was recruited by the Islamic State after he left the country in 2014.⁸⁰ An Uzbek security source claimed that Akilov had attempted to join ISIS, but was arrested on the Syrian-Turkish border and deported to Sweden in 2015. He moved to Turkey in 2012 after a divorce, leaving four children behind. Turkey is among the countries to which Uzbek nationals do not need a visa, and according to sources (i.e. Uzbek nationals living in Sweden) Akilov got in touch with radical Islamists in Turkey.⁸¹ According to the same sources in Sweden Akilov's religious knowledge was at a rather low level, and that he at a certain point started using drugs (mainly cocaine) in Sweden. The case of Akilov comprises a complex interplay between several important underlying causes: is the attack purely to be seen as an ideologically and politically motivated act of retaliation for the on-going situation in Syria, or is it rather to be interpreted as a desperate act for a refused asylum application interpreted through the lens of militant Islamism?

It also has to be noted that the suicide bomber who blew himself up in the subway of St Petersburg one week prior to the attack in Stockholm as well as the person bombing the Istanbul International Airport on New Year's Eve were also Uzbek citizens. Analysts and researchers claim that it is likely that radicalisation into violent Islamist extremism will continue to grow in Central Asia, mainly due to the following factors: societal deprivation combined with an opportunity to rebel used by extremists, a low level of religious knowledge and education combined with strong political views on the repression of Muslims, the exposure to violence, feelings of exclusion and alienation and all the mentioned factors combined with the question of religion.⁸²

⁷⁶ Lundberg Andersson and Syrén. "Rakhmat Akilov...".

⁷⁷ Ranstorp, M. and Gustafsson, L. "Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq – An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data". Swedish Defence University, Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies, 2017. 15. <https://www.fhs.se/documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/publikationer/2017/Swedish%20Foreign%20Fighters%20webb.pdf>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁷⁸ "Misstänkte terroristen Rakhmat Akilov kallar sig sprängexpert". Expressen, 9 April 2017. <http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/misstankte-terroristen-rakhmat-akilov-kallar-sig-sprangexpert/>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

⁷⁹ Ranstorp and Gustafsson. "Swedish Foreign Fighters...". 15.

⁸⁰ "Uzbekistan 'had warned West about Stockholm attack suspect'". Arab News, 15 April 2017. <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1084616/world>, Accessed on 3 May 2017.

⁸¹ "Uppgifter: Akilov efterlystes av Uzbekistan". Svenska Dagbladet, 12 April 2017. <https://www.svd.se/akilov-radikaliserades-innan-han-kom-till-sverige>, Accessed on 3 May 2017.

⁸² Heathershaw, J. and Montgomery D. W. "Why do Central Asians Join ISIS?". Exeter Central Asian Studies Network. 2015. <http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2015/07/17/isis/>, Accessed on 13 June 2017.

Salman Abedi (Manchester, 22 May 2017)

On the evening of May 22 an explosive device detonated after a concert in Manchester, one of the largest cities in the United Kingdom. The explosion caused 22 fatalities and dozens of injuries, making the attack the most deadly since the London bombings of 7 July 2005. The device was used as a suicide bomb and in the days following the attack Salman Abedi, a 22 year-old man of Libyan descent was named as the perpetrator. According to media sources available, Salman Abedi is the 22 year-old son of Libyan parents who fled from Muammar Gaddafi to the United Kingdom in the 1990s.⁸³ Abedi was born in 1994 as the second eldest child and grew up with his family in Manchester. Apparently, the majority of the family members moved back to Libya leaving Abedi and the elder brother behind. Abedi eventually dropped out from university and some neighbours claim to have noticed the young man becoming more devout and withdrawn.

Regarding the radicalisation process some experts claim that for a long time Abedi had been exposed to radical views from several parties in his immediate surrounding. The father had been a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a terrorist organisation that had pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and whose aim was to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi and replace his regime with a hard-line Islamic state.⁸⁴ After a failed plot, many of the persecuted members of the LIFG were granted asylum in the United Kingdom on the basis of “our enemy’s enemy is our friend”, as the United Kingdom was an opponent of the Gaddafi-regime.⁸⁵ Some of the Libyans granted asylum moved to Birmingham and Manchester which were both already home to large Arab communities. According to researchers many of the Muslims in Manchester attended the Didsbury mosque, the only Arab mosque in the region and run by the Muslim Brotherhood, thus preaching a fundamentalist form of Islam.⁸⁶ Abedi also attended the mosque; hence the radical views are suggested to have sprung both from his father as well as from the preaching in the mosque. After the family moved back to Libya, Abedi apparently shuttled back and forth between Manchester and Tripoli, not finding a sense of belonging in either country. In his attempt to find both an identity and a community he first joined a violent gang subculture and later embraced the views of ISIS. When and how the radicalisation process commenced remains somewhat unclear, but according to French intelligence sources, Abedi had recently visited Libya as well as Syria. An explanation to the radicalisation process was provided by his sister Jomana, who claimed that Abedi became radicalised when seeing images of the US-lead coalition’s air strikes in Syria. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, reducing the victims to “crusaders”, “polytheists” and “worshippers of the cross”.⁸⁷

The attack was perpetrated right at the main exit of the concert hall as people were leaving after the concert, showing that it is sufficient to select a strategic position in order

⁸³ “What we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi”. *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi/>, Accessed on 28 May 2017.

⁸⁴ Doward, J., Cobain, I., and Stephen, Q. “How Manchester bomber Salman Abedi was radicalised by his ties to Libya”. *The Guardian*, 28 May 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation>, Accessed on 28 May 2017.

⁸⁵ Doward et al. “How Manchester bomber...”.

⁸⁶ Doward et al. “How Manchester bomber...”.

⁸⁷ Maher, S. “Inside the minds of ISIS murderers”. *The New Statesman*, 28 May 2017. <http://www.newstatesman.com/world/2017/05/inside-minds-isis-murderers>, Accessed on 30 May 2017.

to cause mass casualties and the perpetrator does not even need to enter.⁸⁸ According to UK-based security experts, the chosen method is worrisome for several reasons. Unlike recent trends in the UK, where terrorist attacks have been carried out with knives or cars, the Manchester attack was carried out with a device requiring not only a certain level of technical expertise, but also a much higher degree of sophistication than the aforementioned selection of weapons.⁸⁹ Another implication that may signal a higher level of professionalism in the construction of the device is the information provided by Manchester Hospital staff to Jane's Terrorism and Intelligence Center (JTIC), stating that they were treating people with shrapnel wounds which may have been caused by nails, ball bearings or other metal objects.⁹⁰ It is still an important question in the on-going investigation whether Abedi acted alone or was part of a larger network.

The radicalisation process of Abedi illustrates how a breeding ground for violent acts may develop through family and the preaching of the mosque attended. From his background and certain life events it may be assumed that Abedi was most probably struggling to find a balance between his Libyan and British roots and heritage, and the absence of important (and moderate) role models supporting him in his efforts may have accelerated the process in the wrong direction.

CONCLUSIONS

Looking back on the past few years it becomes evident that the level of jihadist activity in Europe is on a historically high level.⁹¹ Though it is difficult to predict with certainty how the jihadi milieu and network will develop in the upcoming years, certain trends affecting the development are visible already. These are – as identified by Hegghammer in 2016 – the economic underachievement of a growing young Muslim population in Europe, the return of foreign fighters from conflict zones, continued armed conflicts in the Muslim world, and continued “operational freedom” on the Internet.⁹²

From the modus operandi and terrorist profiles briefly analysed above it is possible to draw the first and obvious conclusion that society will never be able to fully protect itself against such violent events. As the weaponisation of everyday life is neither desirable nor entirely feasible in practice, methods to combat the phenomenon must include a more effective and coherent preventative strategy. Furthermore, some conclusions suggest that we may face new patterns regarding the radicalisation processes as well as the selection of targets, while others confirm existing knowledge on – among others – hotbeds of radicalisation, the potential misuse of the irregular migratory flows towards Europe by persons with malicious intent, and how the Salafi-jihadist ideology continues to attract people with different backgrounds and with different personal motives and underlying psychosocial root causes to justify brutal acts of violence. However, the backgrounds of the perpetrators still show

⁸⁸ Newsome, B. “Manchester: The newest terrorism and the the future of terrorism”. Berkeley blog, 24 May 2017. <http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2017/05/24/manchester-the-newest-terrorism/>, Accessed on 28 May 2017.

⁸⁹ Acton, G. “Sophisticated weapon used in Manchester terror attack is ‘disturbing’, says security expert”. CNBC, 23 May 2017. <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/23/sophisticated-weapon-used-in-manchester-terror-attacks-is-disturbing-says-security-expert.html>, Accessed on 28 May 2017.

⁹⁰ Acton. „Sophisticated weapon...”.

⁹¹ Hegghammer, T. “The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View”. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10/6, 2016. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/566/html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁹² Hegghammer. “The Future of...”.

the common feature that the majority of the ones committing attacks in Europe in the name of the self-styled Islamic State are second-generation immigrants with a majority having a criminal past, yet repeatedly confirming the nexus between terrorism and criminality as well as the fact that ISIS is increasingly targeting persons with a criminal record. According to estimates by some researchers, around 50-80% of the Europeans in ISIS have a criminal record, which is significantly higher than in the case of al-Qaeda, where the same figures stand around 25%.⁹³ The listed profiles and the personal links between them also confirm the significance of social as well as family ties in the European radicalisation and recruitment of the Islamic State. Rather than being radicalised by entirely strangers – either physically or online – this pattern is consistent with the research suggesting the importance of close personal ties between the radicaliser and the radicalised.⁹⁴

Potential intelligence failures and a lack of political dedication to firmly address the breeding ground of Jihadist radicalisation have most often been subjects to public debates following the recent terrorist attack across Europe. However, the accelerated radicalisation processes behind the perpetrators' acts as well as the selection of rather simple means in carrying out the attacks pose a new challenge also for intelligence and security services which may face an intelligence and surveillance deficit while continuously being put to the test. Without physical or virtual contact with like-minded persons in a certain cell, or a drawn-out planning preceding an attack, it inevitably becomes increasingly difficult to prevent attacks. However, considering the fact that the majority of the perpetrators mentioned in the study were known to intelligence and security services, the question of why the attacks could not be prevented remains open. This is also true for the above listed two examples of persons entering as irregular migrants who in both cases were known as sympathisers of radical Islamism to the authorities. These gaps need to be identified and filled urgently.

At the same time, the number of plots thwarted is not to be forgotten or diminished either, although these are rarely the ones creating headlines in the media. According to the Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom, 13 plots have been thwarted since 2013, which means that police have disrupted a terrorist attack every four months.⁹⁵ Further statistics by Member States provided to Europol show that 718 people were arrested on suspicion of jihadist terrorism related offences during 2016, which is a 31-person increase compared to the previous year.⁹⁶

Considering the selection of targets there is an increase in the selection of mass social events (clubs and concerts) where a large number of people are found in a fairly uncontrolled area. The attack on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris in November 2015, the attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in June 2016 and the attack at the Manchester Area in May 2017, all fit into the jihadist strategy of targeting places of mass gathering and social events – which in the mentioned cases also represent integral parts of “Western culture”. While – according to some security analysts – it is still somewhat rare that cities other than capitals are being targeted due to the capitals' symbolic significance, the question remains

⁹³ Gaub, F. and Lisiecka, J. “The crime-terrorism nexus”. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017. 1. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf, Accessed on 5 June 2017.

⁹⁴ Soufan, A. and Schoenfeld, D. “Regional Hotbeds as Drivers of Radicalization”. In Varvelli, A. (ed), *Jihadist Hotbeds – Understanding Local Radicalization Processes*. Milano: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 2016. 29.

⁹⁵ Maher. “Inside the minds of ISIS murderers”.

⁹⁶ Europol. „Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017”. 22–23.

whether the selection of other geographical locations is a new phenomenon or a pattern here to stay. The Manchester attack represents yet another level of cruelty considering the fact that many of the concert-goers were children (and – as a consequence – several of the victims, too). The deliberate selection of children as targets may not be entirely new in the history of terrorism; we only need to go back a couple of years to 2004 in order to remember the massacre in Beslan, where Chechen terrorists took more than 1,100 hostages, including 777 children, but it is certainly entirely new in the European context. The fact that Salafi-jihadist ideology has its own justification even to why children are also to be considered as legitimate targets makes it even more important, not only for European policy makers but also for intelligence and security services, to understand the role of the ideological and religious arguments in the radicalisation process. Alarmism has never proved to be a feasible way, but neither has the disproportionate underestimation of a growing societal and security problem.

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Fruzsina Simigh:

COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

ABSTRACT: In the past years under President Xi Jinping, Chinese foreign policy gradually started to shift into a more proactive and assertive direction. Now it is toeing the line to accept its share as a great power to maintain global security on more than just the economic and business level. One aspect of this could be observed in the field of counter-terrorism. So far, Beijing has put special emphasis on the UN's leading role, and that China's main responsibilities lie primarily at home in Xinjiang, as well as on the importance of economic development in treating the "root causes" of terrorism. Next of these factors is the gradually militarizing Chinese approach through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, its military modernization, and the provisions of the 2016 Anti-Terrorism Law that finally gives – an albeit vague – definition of terrorism and some framework of future international counter-terrorism cooperation, arguing that at least in theory China hopes to build a counter-terrorism strategy "with Chinese characteristics".

KEYWORDS: China, terrorism, counter-terrorism

INTRODUCTION

As a great power with a growing global footprint, China had taken to pursue a more assertive type of diplomacy under President Xin Jinping, which includes the – albeit reluctant – willingness to shoulder its share of maintaining the security of the international system. It comes under increasing pressure both from home and abroad to prove its capabilities to protect its overseas interests, especially because with the spread of Chinese businesses and citizens there is a growing chance that they would become targets of terrorism, even though so far Beijing had tried to keep its distance from the political turmoil in the Middle East and third countries.

As a rule of thumb, China supports the leading role of the UN in international relations although it rarely takes any major initiatives. Furthermore, even in its propositions the focus is on intelligence sharing, providing financial aid, economic development, and stopping money laundering to terrorist organizations. So far, it had been opposed to the idea of military intervention of any kind. Another key element of the Chinese approach is the importance of the Uyghur discourse between Xinjiang and Beijing: China's actions are shaped by this issue, and undoubtedly, it prioritizes stability at home as opposed to anything the US-led fight on terrorism might strive to achieve in the Middle East or Afghanistan.

This article attempts to explore whether there is a unique approach to counterterrorism with "Chinese characteristics". For that I give a brief introduction on the Chinese understanding and view of international relations and global order, then I will move on to what kind of perceived or real terrorism threat China faces both at home and in the international arena. Afterwards, in order to decide whether there is a distinct Chinese approach to counter-

terrorism, I will summarize the key elements Beijing finds most important to fight terrorism, before going into more details on what exact measures China has recently taken to build up the necessary regional, military and legal capacities to support this struggle. I am going to argue that although China continuously criticizes the Western approach and has a general concept in mind for a different “multi-pronged” approach that is now supported by the new anti-terrorism law as well, it will take years to test in practice whether these vague ideas could achieve more than what the West could show so far. During my research I primarily relied on researches by international and Chinese scholars as well, alongside with various speeches of Chinese officials.

WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

When we are talking about China and its approach to global affairs – such as counter-terrorism in our case – we have to first understand what the major drives of Chinese foreign policy are. The most outstanding element is China’s hyper-sensitivity to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in other states’ internal affairs. On the one hand, this stems from the “Century of Humiliation” China had suffered starting from the 19th century and which it now hopes to forget through emerging as a great power. On the other hand, domestic stability – social, economic and political alike – is of utter importance for Beijing since it furthers economic growth, which also serves as a legitimizing factor of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.

In order to maintain this stability China set out to build a foreign policy with Chinese characteristics that is rooted in historical and cultural traditions while it can be also altered in accordance with the changes of the international environment. There is still an ongoing debate among experts on what it means exactly but Zhu describes it as a holistic approach that can coordinate country-specific characteristics within the spirit of common sense and pragmatism, while it still maintains the independence of Chinese foreign policy, and prioritizes Chinese interests.¹ However, as China strives to appear as a “responsible great power” it now has to contribute more to the international order than simply maintaining its own development,² and thus has to prove that it can protect its nationals, businesses, companies, investments, and interests overseas as well. At the same time, it also pledged to try and build a more equality-based, multipolar world that also implies a different level of responsibility on various actors.³ Despite all efforts China is still heavily reliant on imports, mostly in raw materials and energy and so it is essential to maintain a peaceful environment, the security of trade routes, and the trust in the government’s ability to protect Chinese overseas interests. To which there are many threats – insurgencies, civil wars, the generally volatile nature of countries which have major investments in oil, for example, (South Sudan, for example), and in this case, especially in recent years: terrorism.

¹ Zhu, L. “China and International System: Two-Way Socialization under the Logic of Practice”. In Zhao, J. and Chen, Z. (eds), *China and the International Society. China Foreign Affairs Review I*. Singapore: World Century. 2014. 19–54.

² Chen, D. “China Is No International Security Free Rider”. *The Diplomat*, 13 August 2014. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-is-no-international-security-free-rider/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

³ Zhu. “China and International System”. 42.

HOW CHINA VIEWS THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

So far China has been maintaining its non-intervention principle and its opposition and criticism of the Western militarized intervention approach to countering terrorism as a proverbial shield in the hopes that if the country stays out of the actual conflicts in the Middle East or Central Asia then Chinese interests would not be targeted by terrorist attacks. Beijing still somewhat holds out on this hope as it strives to create an alternative foreign policy that can avoid the pitfalls of the Western approach. However, it remains a big question whether it is possible not to attract the attention of terrorist organizations as Chinese interests, companies, citizens etc. spread across the globe. Therefore, Beijing is now far more inclined to invest in protecting its own interests at home and overseas alike.

China had started its anti-terrorism campaign long before the September 11 attacks on the US happened although it had been rather tight-lipped about it. Chinese officials began speaking of terrorist violence in the late 1990s, but their statements were carefully moderated,⁴ while they also highlighted that the threat of terrorism was present in China due to external factors. As Sun puts it “pressured by the terrorists, some nonviolent Xinjiang separatist groups are becoming increasingly radical in their actions”.⁵ While this element of the general narrative remained, after the 9/11 attacks China changed its attitude: officially, after the attacks the Chinese leaders offered their condolences and support for the United States, and expressed their willingness to cooperate against international terrorism.⁶ Meanwhile the government took its chance to reframe its dispute with the Uyghurs to make it part of the global war on terrorism, with special focus on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its alleged ties to Al Qaeda. This happened again a little later with the rise of the so called Islamic State (ISIS), to which at some point allegedly more than 300 Uyghurs joined in the Middle East to fight alongside with.

In the past years Beijing had gone out of its way to have the UN and the US State Department list ETIM as an international terrorist organization which eventually happened in 2002. There are several theories and opinions why it was so important for Beijing, and why the United States eventually complied. It is a generally shared opinion that both the USA and China wanted to assure the other’s support for their own counter-terrorism campaigns. However, when the time came China, similarly to many other countries, condemned the invasion of Iraq and gave no indication that it would like to join. Later, China’s nationalistic media started criticizing the US-led war on terror (occasionally to the point of suggesting the Western military intervention in the region was, at least partially, to be blamed for

⁴ Zhou, Z. “Media censorship of terrorism on Chinese soil only feeds the rumours”. South China Morning Post. 15 April 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1214554/media-censorship-terrorism-chinese-soil-only-feeds-rumours>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁵ Sun, D. “China and the Global Jihad Network”. *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 1/2. 2010. 196–207. Even just days before 9/11 Xinjiang’s Communist Party secretary stated that the destructive activities of “National separatist” and “religious extremists” would “never affect Xinjiang’s stability”. Cunningham, C. P. “Counter-terrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China and the Uyghurs”. *International Journal on World Peace* 29/3. 2012. 25–26.

⁶ Smith P. J. “China’s Economic and Political Rise: Implications for Global Terrorism and U.S.-China Cooperation”. *Studies in conflict and terrorism* 32. 2009. 627–645.

Islamist terrorism).⁷ Cunningham argues that the Chinese government way overstated its case against ETIM, perhaps in an effort to win support from the international community. It could have been also to equate its own struggles at home with that of the United States', but it is also important to understand that China has serious strategic interests in its Western region. He explains that the Chinese government acted with "ultra-caution" in the face of real or perceived threat of terrorism – which is not so out of the ordinary, although it still does not excuse human rights concerns rooted in the wide array of restrictive measures that were applied mostly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.⁸

On the international stage one of the most outstanding elements is the emphasis on how the global fight against terrorism should be conducted under UN leadership (thus eliminating a single country's serving its own national interests and intervening in other countries' internal affairs under the auspices of a counter-terrorism intervention). Furthermore, in his speech after the Paris attacks at the 2015 G20 summit Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also emphasised the need of international cooperation against terrorism to adhere to the "basic norms governing the international relations, (should) pool efforts, address both symptoms and root causes, and avoid double standards".⁹ In this latter case, China wants to see an internationally accepted and clear UN-approved definition of terrorism – one that would hopefully include its own issues with Uyghur separatist groups and would finally put an end to Western criticisms as well.¹⁰ The previous year at the UN Security Council's Summit on Terrorism Wang Yi had emphasised the same key points on how China imagines an international cooperation, but it was also obvious that even under UN coordination China would much prefer its contribution not to include military operations at all. Wang Yi said that UN leadership is the key to maintain unity in the international community, but it should also be matched with a multi-pronged approach that aims to treat both the „symptoms" and the „root causes" of terrorism in the fields of politics, security, economics, finances, intelligence and ideology.¹¹

Therefore, if we want to sum up how China sees the UN's role in the fight against terrorism: China makes a "tactical use of the UN in practice, and strategic in rhetoric".¹²

That leads us to another major point of how China views the necessary approach to terrorism, and that is through treating the "root causes" with economic and social development. Of course, it is important to consider that Beijing's understanding of these root causes stems

⁷ Duchatel, M. "Terror Overseas: Understanding China's Evolving Counter-terror strategy". European Council on Foreign Relations. 2016. http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/terror_overseas_understanding_chinas_evolution_counter_terror_strategy7160, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁸ Cunningham also points out though, that China started its „Strike hard" campaign in 1996 as a countrywide campaign against crime, but in Xinjiang, it took a turn to be directed specifically at Uyghur separatists ("Counter-terrorism in Xinjiang").

⁹ "Offer Chinese Solutions, Spread Chinese Confidence-Foreign Minister Wang Yi Talks about President Xi Jinping's Attendance at 10th G20 Summit and 23rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 19 November 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1317348.shtml, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹⁰ Tiezzi, S. "What Is China's Plan for Fighting Global Terrorism?". *The Diplomat*, 27 November 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-is-chinas-plan-for-fighting-global-terrorism/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹¹ "Working Together to Address the New Threat of Terrorism – Statement by Wang Yi At the UN Security Council Summit on Terrorism". Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office. 24 September 2014. <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zywjyjh/t1196288.htm>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹² Duchatel. "Terror Overseas...". 6.

from its own attempts to curb extremism, separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang. The main idea is that the stability granted by economic development, new job opportunities, and the (forceful) establishment of a national – Chinese – identity would help secure China's territorial integrity, border security, and would secure the energy supply both from Xinjiang and from Central Asia that is essential for the Communist Party to retain its power and control.¹³

CHINA'S TERRORISM PROBLEM – XINJIANG

We do not have the space to list here all the occasions on which China had claimed to be victim of a terrorist attack – usually committed by Uyghur extremists or separatists – but we still need to mention a few that served as a backdrop of China's first anti-terrorism law and the ever more established military capabilities that came with it.

In 2009 there were the Urumqi riots, which were blamed on Uyghur separatists; but then lately, “in contrast to earlier attacks, which had been aimed at government buildings and security forces in Xinjiang, [latter terrorist attacks] occurred in various locations in China, including Beijing, and were aimed at civilians.”¹⁴ In 2013 there was a suicide attack at the Tiananmen Gate; in 2014 at the Kunming train station 31 people were stabbed to death; and there were two explosive attacks in Urumqi. Then November 2015 was a month when it became even clearer that China should be very much concerned with global counter-terrorism efforts as well. One Chinese citizen was shot but survived the Paris attack at the Stade de France; three Chinese were killed in the Radisson Blu hotel attack in Mali; and ISIS announced that a Chinese hostage – Fan Jinghui – was executed, which was later confirmed by China's Foreign Ministry as well.¹⁵ Then in August 2016 a car rammed through the gates of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

President Xi affirmed that “long term stability of the autonomous region is vital to the whole country's reform, development and stability, as well as to national unity, ethnic harmony and national security”,¹⁶ especially as stability in Xinjiang ties in closely with many core interests of Beijing as well as to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xinjiang has significant oil, natural gas, gold, jade, precious metals, coal, cotton and petroleum reserves, China's nuclear test sites are located in the region, not to mention the fact that the new oil and gas pipelines would pass through Xinjiang from Central Asia. Moreover, the region is a key part of the China-Pakistan Corridor, as well as the corridor that is planned to pass through Central Asia as well.

Michael Clarke¹⁷ argues that Beijing is “instrumentalizing terrorism” in the realms of both domestic and foreign policy. While this rhetoric connects Xinjiang and Uyghur separatism to terrorism, and through that to the “global war on terror” (from home) the resulting hard-line

¹³ Simigh, F. “The Islamic State Adds a New Twist to China's Uyghur Problem”. *Defence Review* 144/Special Issue 2. 2016. 198. http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/61773/the_islamic_state_adds_a_new_twist_to_chinas_uyghur_problem.pdf, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹⁴ Propper, E. “The Islamic State: The Danger that China Would Rather Not Name”. In Yoram, S. and Einav, O. (eds.), *The Islamic State: How Viable is it?* Tel Aviv: INSS, 2016. 254.

¹⁵ Tiezzi. “What Is China's...?”

¹⁶ “Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the Politburo to further promote social stability and long-term peace and stability in Xinjiang” (in Chinese). CPC News. 26 May 2014. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c64094-25067153.html>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹⁷ Putz, C. et al. “The Islamic State in Asia”. *The Diplomat*, 17. 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-in-asia/>

repression of dissent in Xinjiang in turn is also connected with the rise of the Islamic State. Its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who called China an “oppressor” of Muslims (at the same level as Israel, India and the USA) in 2014, which was a significant difference compared to how Al Qaeda had refused to do that, and thus had disappointed ETIM extremist groups at the time. Then even Al Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri encouraged TIP (Turkestan Islamic Party) and Uyghurs in his video “Turkestan: Patience and Then Victory”, released in July 2016, to fight “the atheist occupier” of “East Turkestan”, and also urged his followers to wage jihad “in any corner of the world wherever they may be”.¹⁸ Then in March 2017 an ISIS propaganda video¹⁹ provided visual evidence of Uyghurs living and training in the territory of the Caliphate, for the first time.²⁰ Although based on open source information it is rather complicated to assure these claims starting with the number of Uyghurs present in the Middle East, whether they are from China or from other Central Asian countries, or which terrorist organization they are exactly aligned with.

However, despite Xi Jinping’s more pro-active and assertive approach to China’s foreign policy, Beijing is still reluctant to leave behind its non-interventionist attitude. Although in recent years it has stepped up its approach to and involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and in international counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, in the field of terrorism China is still reluctant to up the ante and participate in the international coalition against terrorism outside of its own borders. Except that, as Smith explains it, even though Beijing tries to stay away from military and political intervention in third countries, even its “business is business” approach cannot protect it from becoming a target of violence. In 2008 nine Chinese oil workers were kidnapped in Southern Kordofan State of Sudan, because the kidnappers, believed to be members of the local militia, claimed that the reason behind their action was that they wanted “Chinese companies to leave the region immediately because they work with the government”.²¹

On the one hand, Smith argues,²² China could hope so far to avoid making itself a similar target as the West, since “China’s foreign policy and global reach is far less “transformational””. Beijing, being only interested in the business side of relations, is also appealing and less threatening, especially as it has always promoted “win-win” cooperation and a mutually beneficial development. However, the argument goes, China’s rise is as much a result of globalisation as terrorism is a reaction to that phenomenon. It is obvious that globalisation created “winners”, such as China, and some that were left behind, and this latter group of countries or individuals could resent the rise of the countries such as China, especially if they feel forced into an inferior status in their own or the global markets.

With China’s growing energy dependency and thus growing interests and investments in the Middle East, the question is ever more pressing: how to penetrate these usually third-

¹⁸ Clarke, M. “After ISIS Threat, China May Have to Get off Sidelines in Middle East”. *Foreign Policy*. 3 March 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/03/after-isis-threat-china-may-have-to-get-off-sidelines-in-middle-east/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

¹⁹ Clarke. “After ISIS Threat...”; “ISIL video threatens China with 'rivers of bloodshed’”. *Al Jazeera*. 1 March 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/isil-video-threatens-china-rivers-bloodshed-170301103927503.html>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

²⁰ Blanchard, B. “Syria says up to 5,000 Chinese Uyghurs fighting in militant groups”. *Reuters*. 11 May 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-china/syria-says-up-to-5000-chinese-uyghurs-fighting-in-militant-groups-idUSKBN1840UP>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

²¹ Smith. “China’s Economic and Political Rise...”. 629.

²² Smith. “China’s Economic and Political Rise...”. 631.

world countries if even Beijing's business-is-business policy might not be enough to avoid making its citizens and companies a (not-yet-primary) target of terrorism. This question is further complicated if we consider that these countries are often unable to deal effectively with their own security threats, thus China might have to start measuring in its willingness how much it could push the limits of its own strictly business oriented foreign policy.

CHINESE RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

China, as a member of the UN Security Council and as a country with growing need to appear as a "responsible great power", is an active player in the UN, but it is still true that it rarely takes any kind of major initiatives. It is due to part of its own insecurities and lack of proper operational experience in the field of military, proper equipment, as well as the lack of determination to completely leave behind its non-intervention foreign policy principle. Furthermore, as we saw it earlier, all China's actions are primarily shaped by its Xinjiang dispute, which Beijing also wants to avoid becoming an internationalized issue. China rather prefers to solve its terrorism issues at home – now let us take a closer look at how it plans to do so.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

As it had been pointed out several times, next to calling for the UN's directing role, China often emphasizes the importance of resolving the "root causes" parallel with treating the symptoms of violence and terrorism. Beijing believes that with sufficient development the minorities will prosper, show less resistance – as it happened at the start of reform and opening up policy, when hoping for future personal enrichment people accepted for the time unequal development in China – and will have no reason to want to separate from the government and country that brought them into well-being. All in all, minorities should be "more integrated into the fortunes – both economic and political – of China."²³

On this account, and in hopes to lessen the developmental and wealth gap between its coastal and inner, Western regions, Beijing initiated a Great Western Development Strategy where enterprises were encouraged to "Go West", start investments, and bring manufacturing into the inner regions of the country. There were also new infrastructure projects, not separately from the BRI where two corridors would pass through Xinjinag, not to mention the oil and gas pipelines that connect the region with Central Asia.

Of course, due to the major influx of Han Chinese and their more favoured position compared to the Uyghurs even with similar level of education, and due to the religious and cultural restrictions, the Uyghurs feel their very identity threatened through the government-imposed restrictions on the education of imams, religious activities, wear of hijabs, and the campaigns against religious education. Clarke²⁴ argues that these could be reasons provided by Beijing itself, which worked as "push factors" along with the "pervasive security state" in

²³ Cunningham. "Counter-terrorism in Xinjiang...". 17.; Chunshan, M. "China's Communist Party: 3 Successes and 3 Challenges". *The Diplomat*, 28 October 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/chinas-communist-party-3-successes-and-3-challenges/>, Accessed on 29 October 2017.

²⁴ Clarke, M. „Does China have itself to blame for the trans-nationalisation of Uyghur terrorism?“. East Asia Forum. 30 March 2017. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/30/does-china-have-itself-to-blame-for-the-trans-nationalisation-of-uyghur-terrorism/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

Xinjiang that drove ETIM and TIP to gain foothold in the Middle East alongside Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front, or even ISIS.

MILITARIZATION OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM APPROACH

Since the 1980s national approach – led by the USA – had taken on a militaristic character to counter-terrorism, and even though it is not as intrusive as the US practice, China seems to have already embraced the need to have at least some aspects of its own approach to militarized counter-terrorism. We see this in the joint military exercises in the SCO (the so-called “Peace Missions”),²⁵ and on a bilateral basis with its neighbours, Tajikistan or Pakistan. These joint military exercises could provide the People’s Liberation Army with much needed extensive experience on the ground “in the types of conflicts that Chinese analysts believe are (and will remain) paramount in the twenty-first century, namely local insurgency-type conflicts, terrorism, and transnational crime” that would fit right in with the holistic approach to the modernization of the PLA.²⁶

With the growing ISIS threat to Chinese interests, experts started to argue that the time is close when China will have to get involved in the Middle East turmoil.²⁷ They argue that along with the ever-greater number of Uyghurs that are claimed to fight alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria²⁸ the solution cannot remain an ever-growing display of force and “anti-terror” rallies in major cities in Xinjiang.²⁹ Therefore the question becomes more and more urgent: how could China respond to this problem abroad as well, and whether it wants to or does not?

The PLA also started its own diplomatic role regarding counter-terrorism: Duchatel quotes that Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, expressed China’s “hopes to carry out intelligence cooperation with France on the issue of fighting terrorism.”³⁰ Furthermore, in February 2016 Chief of General Staff Fang Fenghui proposed the idea of a smaller scale anti-terror alliance of China, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan that reflects China’s concerns regarding ISIS’ potential rise in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the flexibility of “smaller groups”³¹ outside the SCO and without Russia, which would, however, concentrate on anti-terror cooperation and trust-building where all involved parties have the same stakes in the fight against terrorism, but do not strive to become a new regional organization like the SCO, or want to become a security organization.

²⁵ In 2014 for example during one of these Peace Missions in Chinese Inner Mongolia 7000 troops retook a city seized by terrorist organization with air power and armoured forces. Duchatel. “Terror Overseas...”. 7.

²⁶ Smith. “China’s Economic and Political Rise...”. 639.; “Xi stresses importance of national security”. China Daily. 15 April 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/15/content_17436440.htm, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

²⁷ Clarke. “After ipsis threat...”; Chunyang, j. “An analysis of the infiltration and expansion of the „islamic state” to china’s periphery” (in chinese). China institutes of contemporary international relations. 30 October 2016. [Http://www.Cicir.Ac.Cn/chinese/article_7757.Html](http://www.Cicir.Ac.Cn/chinese/article_7757.Html), accessed on 23 september 2017.

²⁸ For more on this issue and how it affects China’s possible involvement in the Middle East see: Simigh. “The Islamic State Adds a New Twist...”.

²⁹ “Xinjiang holds oath-taking rally to fight terrorism and tighten security”. Global Times. 17 February 2017. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1033548.shtml>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

³⁰ Duchatel. “Terror Overseas...”. 9.

³¹ Xingchun, L. “Smaller groups can better tackle terror”. Global Times. 7 April 2016. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/977634.shtml>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL ASIA

As Gallo puts it, at its core the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a “pragmatic convergence of interests”³² that places special emphasis on the security threats of the “three evil forces”. In 2001 Uzbekistan joined China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (the former Shanghai Five) and signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The six signatory parties of the Convention are “firmly convinced that terrorism, separatism and extremism (...) cannot be justified under any circumstances and that the perpetrators of such acts should be prosecuted under law”. According to Nagy³³ it is significant that the organization would list terrorism, separatism and (Islamist) extremism on the same page (in the same paragraph) as if they were on the same level of a security threat to the sovereignty of the member states.

“Central Asian countries have adopted a variety of strict counter-terrorism policies ranging from repressive surveillance measures to more lenient cooperation and control strategies”,³⁴ and these, with further bilateral repatriation agreements were also utilized by China to stop already radicalized Uyghurs from returning from the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier.³⁵

It is important to point out as well as an interesting detail, that in the changing security environment and with Chinese foreign policy growing more assertive and more aware of its own security issues, not to mention influence, Beijing has made a significant shift in its narrative towards Pakistan on the topic of terrorism. While in 2016 at the BRICS summit in Gao China had blocked India’s initiative to call Pakistan a hub of terrorism, this year, following US president Donald Trump’s denouncement of Pakistan, and after the BRICS summit in Xiamen, it was the first time that China agreed to condemn Pakistan-based terror groups like the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The resulting “BRICS declaration is momentous. It represents China’s capacity to shift its stance from one of perennial defence of Islamabad to one in which it may work towards ending Pakistan’s selective approach to combating terrorism”.³⁶

CHINA’S FIRST ANTI-TERRORISM ACT

Before this legal act, as Sun puts it, China lacked the strong legal basis to cooperate with other countries in counter-terrorism measures, while its paramilitary police also had limited authority for pre-emptive strikes or searching private property, and there had been no spe-

³² Gallo, E. “SCO not NATO’s foe”. East Asia Forum. 24 September 2017. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/09/24/sco-not-natos-foe/>, Accessed on 25 September 2017.

³³ Nagy, L. “A Sanghaji Együttműködési Szervezet” (The Shanghai Cooperation Organization). *Felderítő Szemle* 10/3-4. – 11/1. 2011–2012. 5–22. <http://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2011-3-4-2012-1.pdf>, Accessed on 24 March 2014.

³⁴ Smith. “China’s Economic and Political Rise...”. 634.

³⁵ Shah, F. “Costly Corridor. How China and Pakistan Could Remake Asia”. Foreign Affairs. 3 December 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-12-03/costly-corridor>, Accessed on 5 July 2016.

³⁶ Kumar, A. “China Pressuring Pakistan on Terrorism?” *The Diplomat*, 17 September 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/09/china-pressuring-pakistan-on-terrorism/>, Accessed on 18 September 2017. For more on the security threat on the BRI in Pakistan see: Simigh, F. “Security Challenges on the One Belt, One Road Initiative”. Geopolitika.hu. 20 March 2017. <http://www.geopolitika.hu/en/2017/03/20/security-challenges-of-one-belt-one-road-initiative/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

cial force to combat terrorism either.³⁷ According to Liu Yuejin, a senior counter-terrorism official at the Ministry of Public Security, “on the basis of the existing laws, the enactment of a special anti-terrorism law is both an immediate need of fighting terrorism and an international responsibility of our country”.³⁸ He also made it clear that the main goal of the counter-terrorism act was to promote international cooperation. In lieu of that China seeks to increase exchanges with foreign partners in the fields of intelligence sharing, judicial and law enforcement cooperation, and monitoring the financial operations of terrorist organizations. China also aims to modernise its legal system and improve transparency in order to legitimize its existing law-enforcement practices.³⁹ Clarke, on the other hand, points out that this also serves Beijing’s two top priorities, namely the security of the one-party state and the maintained stability of Xinjiang and through the latter the territorial unity of the country.⁴⁰

While the international focus was rather on the new act’s technological provisions (after debate over the first draft, the final version did not contain some of the most controversial demands made for the tech companies),⁴¹ China defended that the act in its latest and final form was the necessary “answer to the latest situation and [China’s] objective needs”. Furthermore, it was in line with other international precedents, and so the criticism of the Chinese act on this basis would be nothing more than another proof of the West’s using double standards against China.⁴² Zhou Zunyou, a counterterrorism expert at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law⁴³ had argued too, that this counter-terrorism law was necessary and timely as the previous experience and various, scattered definitions of terrorism had to be put in a legally binding, cohesive form that would also clearly delineate the competencies and responsibilities of the relevant organizations.

Responding to the debate on the previous two drafts and the following criticism,⁴⁴ the article, which defines what China interprets as “terrorism”, “terrorist organization”,

³⁷ Sun, “China and the Global Jihad Network”. 207.

³⁸ “Take measures to strike and prevent terrorist activities in accordance with the law - Interview with Liu Yuejin, Counter-Terrorism Commissioner of the Ministry of Public Security, on the hot issues of the Anti-Terrorism Law”. Xinhua. 26 February 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/26/c_1118174553.htm, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

³⁹ Duchatel. “Terror Overseas...”.

⁴⁰ Clarke, M. “Why China’s tough, new terrorism legislation could misfire”. CNN. 30 December 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/29/opinions/china-counter-terrorism-legislation-michael-clarke-opinion/index.html>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴¹ Although in the final law tech companies are still obliged to set up technical interfaces, and provide decryption or other technical support assistance to public security organs conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities in accordance with law (article 84); Tiezzi, S. “China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law”. *The Diplomat*, 29 December 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/chinas-new-anti-terrorism-law/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴² “Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on December 28, 2015”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1328340.shtml, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴³ Zhou, Z. “How China Defines Terrorism”. *The Diplomat*, 13 February 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/how-china-defines-terrorism/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴⁴ Ping, J. “Three points the “anti-terrorism law (draft)” is missing” (in Chinese). Caixin. 3 December 2014. <http://opinion.caixin.com/2014-12-03/100758386.html>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

and “terrorist”, was moved from Article 104 to Article 3 at the beginning of the Act. According to Article 3 the Anti-terrorism Act⁴⁵ interprets “terrorism” as

“propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods, such as violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve [their political], ideological, or other objectives”.

„Terrorist activity” is defined as *„activities that seriously harm society such as organizing, planning, preparing for, or carrying out any of the following conduct so as to cause injuries to persons, major property damage, damage to public facilities, or havoc in public order”.* Then there is an exhaustive list that is also considered terrorist activity: advocacy; organizing, leading, or participating in a terrorist organization; providing information, capital, funding, labour, technology, or any kind of assistance to terrorist organizations, activities or personnel. Despite this exhaustive list, the fifth point of Article 3 also includes “other terrorist activities” that leaves the definition up to interpretation in the future. Article 3 also defines “a terrorist organization” and “a terrorist.” Hence, a terrorist organization refers to a relatively stable criminal group, of at least three members, established for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities; a terrorist is either a member of a terrorist organization or a person who carries out terrorist activities.⁴⁶

From the final definition of what China understands as terrorism the term “thought” that had been present in the draft versions (as “any thought, speech or activity that...”) was removed. However, as Zhou points out, the term of “advocacy” (主张) that made it into the final definition (Article 3, Point 2) is vague enough to have both “thought” and “speech” included if the Chinese authorities are inclined to interpret it that way. It could be explained as a lack of understanding in legislative terms, that while with the crafting of the draft the legislature might have intended to include the spreading of terrorist propaganda, they failed to understand that it had already been included in the Act under the term terrorist “activity”.⁴⁷

Even after several changes this new Act became a topic of serious criticism from human rights groups, foreign governments, and companies alike for certain provisions, but most importantly because it was still deemed as too vague. Zhou provided a thorough analysis of both the first two drafts of the first Chinese counterterrorism Act,⁴⁸ and of the final Act he notes that even though it had made some obvious advances compared to the earlier drafts, Western media still found it “sweeping” and “tough”.⁴⁹ The final legislation that was drafted with president Xi Jinping’s “overall national security outlook” in mind, while still lacks certain aspects that would make it overly specific and to the point, according to Zhou,

⁴⁵ “People’s Republic of China Anti-Terrorism Law” (in Chinese). Xinhua. 27 December 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/27/c_128571798.htm; “Counter-Terrorism Law”. China Law Translate. 27 December 2015. <https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%E5%8F%8D%E6%81%90%E6%80%96%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E6%B3%95-%EF%BC%882015%EF%BC%89/?lang=en>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴⁶ Zhou. “How China...”.

⁴⁷ Zhou. “How China...”; Zhou, Z. “China’s Comprehensive Counter-terrorism Law”. *The Diplomat*, 23 January 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-comprehensive-counter-terrorism-law/>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴⁸ Zhou. “How China...”; Zhou, Z. “China’s Draft Counter-Terrorism Law”. *China Brief* 15/14. 2015. <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-draft-counter-terrorism-law/#.VbCtKbOqpBc>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.

⁴⁹ Zhou. “China’s Comprehensive...”.

it still could be considered “comprehensive” as its ten chapters deal with a wide variety of counter-terrorism issues.

The Act emphasises the role of prevention in education (Articles 17 and 29),⁵⁰ and for that cause telecommunications operators and internet service providers are obliged to use monitoring systems and suspicious (disclosed terrorist or extremist) content should be reported to public security agencies or to the relevant department (Article 19). Provisions also include a list of safety inspections for transported goods and long-distance travelling passengers, while temporary asset freezing is allowed if money-laundering or financing of terrorism is suspected (article 24).

The new legislation also requires local governments over city level to coordinate their counterterrorism actions with a national agency set up by this new Act, along with the National Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Centre (Article 43). The new Act also restricts the coverage of terrorist attacks and governmental responses.⁵¹ The new Act makes the already practiced restrictions legally enforceable, as it prohibits the detailed report of terrorist attacks that could lead to copycat attacks, and neither is the dissemination of “cruel or inhuman” images allowed (Article 63). Furthermore, only news media, with the approval of the leading institutions on counter-terrorism, would be allowed to publish any potentially revealing information on the response personnel, hostages, or counter-terrorist response itself (Article 63). However, this already severe restriction on sensitive issues could easily backfire on the long term, as Zhou points out in another, earlier article, since the limited information provided only fuels rumours and thus could hinder people’s ability to cooperate with the authorities.⁵²

Liu Yuejin, a senior counter-terrorism official at the Ministry of Public Security, made it clear that one of the main goals of the CT Act was to promote international cooperation.⁵³ Chapter VII allows this expansion in its anti-terror efforts on the basis on international treaties, the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The new intelligence centre, in addition to coordinating between Chinese government bodies, will also coordinate exchange of relevant information, cooperative enforcement, and monitoring of international funds (Article 69) primarily with neighbouring countries and regions. Furthermore, it also lays down the legal ground for the State Council Public Security Department and National Security Department “to assign people to leave the country on anti-terrorism missions” (Article 71). On the other hand, in the next paragraph it is also spelled out that the PLA and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Forces may do the same – under the approval of the Central Military Commission – and the provided approval is granted by the foreign country in question.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ In the case of Article 29 the responsibility of the communities is highlighted to „conduct aid and education of persons incited, coerced or enticed into participating in terrorist or extremist activities or persons who participated in terrorist or extremist activities but where the circumstances were minor and do not constitute a crime.”

⁵¹ Even though, as Tiezzi points out, the media coverage of sensitive issues like terrorism – especially in Xinjiang – were already difficult. She cites the case of a French journalist, whose visa renewal was blocked for criticizing China’s treatment of Uyghurs as part of its anti-terrorism crackdown („China to expel French journalist over Uyghur report”. *Al Jazeera*. 26 December 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/china-expel-french-journalist-uyghur-report-151226141810827.html>, Accessed on 23 September 2017.; Tiezzi. “China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law”.)

⁵² Zhou. “Media censorship of terrorism...”.

⁵³ Xinhua. “Take measures to strike and prevent terrorist...”.

⁵⁴ Tiezzi. “China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law”.

While Article 71, mentioned above, does set up the field for future overseas operations, Duchatel argues that it does so using a “purposefully vague” language. He claims that “Chinese military officers are evasive regarding the nature of the future missions, but note that the door is open for new approaches that involve them.” Regarding the actual future prospects, however, he considers the possibility that China will continue to do what it already does (joint-missions within the SCO and on a bilateral basis, having its Snow Leopard commandos stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan to protect the Chinese embassy staff) and will just do it better and with more efficiency. Another scenario could be that this Act sets the groundwork for the expansion of China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions or anti-piracy operations. Whatever China will decide in the future – and some still hope or expect it to turn to actual counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East⁵⁵ - experts agree that if military action will indeed be taken then it should be precisely targeted, limited in time, and supported by the host country – in result there should be no unilateral military interventions.⁵⁶

During the debate on the first and second drafts of the Chinese anti-terrorism Act, Zhou Zunyou summarised what the UN in its Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the EU in its Framework Decision of June 2, 2002 on Combating Terrorism, and the U.S. State Department in its annual country reports on terrorism to the U.S. Congress interprets as terrorism. Then he compared them to what the new Chinese draft Act understands about the core elements of terrorism.⁵⁷ He points out that the EU and UN definitions of terrorism include a rather specific list of what kind of violent acts they consider as terrorist violence. It is only the United States that requires political motivation behind that violence, unlike the other three, and it is also the US definition that considers not merely public or private targets but it finds necessary to include the distinction of the non-combatant status of the targets. Nevertheless, it still is the Chinese definition that is the broadest among the four Zhou compared, and it is also the most open for future interpretation.

It could be argued that the general vagueness of the definition is either due to inexperience in drafting a legal act like this (although Zhou had pointed out that it is only the first comprehensive, not the very first Act in China that touches on the subject of anti-terrorism). On the other hand, this vagueness, as expressed above, leaves many opportunities for future interpretation. While that comes with insecurities regarding the uphold of the rule of law, it could also mean that it would be more flexible for future challenges or new aspects for the security.

CONCLUSION

In order to consider involvement in a situation that a couple years ago China might have considered as either clearly a matter of internal or strictly regional affairs, a clear threat to Chinese national interests has to be involved. Even with the wide spread of these overseas interests in risk-packed zones like Central Asia or the Middle East, China still needs to carefully weigh the pros and cons of a possible intervention of any kind, as it would come

⁵⁵ Lin, C. „ISIS Caliphate meets China’s Silk Road Economic Belt”. rubincenter.org. 22 February 2015. <http://www.rubincenter.org/2015/02/isis-caliphate-meets-chinas-silk-road-economic-belt/>, Accessed on: 23 September 2017.

⁵⁶ Duchatel. “Terror Overseas...”. 7.

⁵⁷ Zhou. “How China Defines Terrorism”.

with breaking with such a fundamental element of China's foreign policy principles as the opposition to intervention in internal affairs. There are already indications in politics and academic debates alike that this move is inevitable if we consider the increasing participation in anti-piracy operations and peacekeeping missions, not to mention the legal framework the new anti-terror Act had laid down in 2016. With regard to the threat posed by ISIS, Chaziza also claims that the ISIS threat is a rare chance where any measure against it could improve China's position within the international community, and Beijing should be less worried about international criticism. Also, Beijing could improve its relations with the Middle East countries as well as with the US.

However, it is also clear that China is rather hesitant to take on such a large and initiative role. It has its own priorities: first and foremost the secured stability in China and in Xinjiang for political and economic reasons alike. In order to help with this China had passed its first anti-terrorism Act at the end of 2015, which finally clarifies what Beijing understands as terrorism. Even though that definition, and, for example, the chapter regarding international cooperation is rather vague, it is still a promising step forward to setting up a comprehensive groundwork for China's counter-terrorism strategy. Then, China's secondary priorities lie in its immediate neighbouring region – Central Asia. There China relies on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and bilateral agreements, and joint military exercises to ensure stability. Not to mention the fact that both Xinjiang and Central Asia play an important role in China's energy security, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Rhetorically China puts special emphasis on the importance of treating the root causes through economic and social development under UN leadership, while it also strives to eliminate what it calls the use of “double standards” by the West. For this reason, it prioritizes and endorses its own struggle against Uyghur terrorist groups – mostly ETIM and TIP. However, treating separatism, terrorism and extremism as the “three evils” on the same page and blurring the lines between these three, China may decrease the chances of meaningful cooperation in third countries, as it complicates the proper designation of the threat faced in those countries.⁵⁸

All that said, for the time being China is still rather inclined to take care of its problems first at home, and take advantage of the US taking the brunt of backlash for military intervention in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the meantime it gradually builds up its own military and legal capacities to step up when ultimately it becomes unavoidable. Until then Beijing has time to work out the details of its (inescapably China-centric) counter-terrorism strategy “with Chinese characteristics”.

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⁵⁸ Duchatel. “Terror Overseas...”. 11.

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Rachael M. Rudolf:

STRATEGIC CONTAINMENT: TRIANGULATING NORTH KOREA'S ASYMMETRIC PROVOCATIONS WITH A MULTILATERAL ELECTRONIC AND CYBER WARFARE CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

ABSTRACT: North Korea's asymmetric provocations complicate the security environment, thereby preventing the employment of alternative forms of conflict transformation and peacebuilding operations to facilitate peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Strategically containing those provocations by employing electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities may provide the opening needed to introduce a new, concerted, multilateral, multipronged strategic approach to transform the conflict dynamics, stabilize the regional and domestic environment, and facilitate peace. Part one of this article provides readers with a general overview of electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare (CW), cyberspace (CS), the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and North Korea's capabilities. Part two utilizes the information provided in part one to make the argument as to why a strategic EW/CW containment doctrine is needed, and outlines some of its parameters. Part three concludes that a EW/CW containment doctrine can only be one pillar of a new, concerted, multilateral, multipronged strategic approach to bringing lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula.

KEYWORDS: North Korea, South Korea, United States, China, Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons, containment, Asia-Pacific, Security

INTRODUCTION

North Korea's asymmetric provocations increase tensions within the Asia-Pacific region and prevent discussion on the employment of alternative forms of conflict transformation and peacebuilding operations to facilitate peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Two specific provocations this year have been the missile launches and the cyber-attacks. North Korea's advancing missile technology development, the potential for it to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead capable of reaching the territory of the U.S., and missile defense to prevent such an attack, however, have been of utmost concern to the United States.¹ Largely ignored and, arguably, of more immediate concern to the region is North Korea's ability to use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons² and the

¹ Mason, K. "Can the U.S. defend itself from a missile attack from North Korea?". *The Financial Times*, 30 June 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/3e2a5a24-5d41-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b>, Accessed on 1 July 2017.

² Graham, W. R. "North Korea Nuclear EMP Attack: An Existential Threat". 38 North. 2 June 2017. <http://www.38north.org/2017/06/wgraham060217/>, Accessed on 1 July 2017.

unpreparedness of the surrounding countries for their use in a future war. The present situation on the Korean Peninsula, therefore, is untenable.

Past policies employed by the U.S.³ and a doctrine of strategic coercion, as advocated by the Trump administration,⁴ are unlikely to produce positive results in the present situation. The U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, or Russia alone cannot contain North Korea and its intentional asymmetric provocations. It would, however, be possible for certain strategically significant state actors, such as the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, just to name a few, to contain North Korea through a strategic doctrine of electronic and cyber warfare containment, while other strategically significant state and non-state actors simultaneously worked on transforming the conflict environment and facilitating the conditions for domestic and regional stability so that the main conflict actors can work toward a peaceful resolution of the North Korean issue. A concerted, multipronged, strategic approach is warranted to bring about lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Part one provides readers with a general overview of electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare (CW), cyberspace (CS), the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and North Korea's capabilities. The general information provided on EW, CW, CS, the EMS, and EMP weapons were derived from a combination of sources ranging from the U.S. Army's newly released manual on Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations,⁵ the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Publications on Electronic Warfare⁶ and Cyberspace Operations,⁷ and expert studies.⁸ Information on North Korea's capabilities was derived from open-sources, expert studies,

³ Chanlett, E., Rinehart, I. E. and Nikitin, M. D. "North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation". Congressional Research Report. 2016. 1–28. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

⁴ Lall, R. R. "America favors strategic coercion over Pyongyang". The National. 19 April 2017. Opinion. <http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/america-favours-strategic-coercion-over-pyongyang>, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

⁵ U.S. Army. *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*. Headquarters: U.S. Department of the Army. 2017. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-12.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-13.1: Electronic Warfare*, 2007. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-12R: Cyber Operations*, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

⁸ See: Miller, C. R. "Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010". *Center for Strategy and Technology: Air War College, Air University*. 2010. 383–410. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/bugs_ch12.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Poisel, R. *Information Warfare and Electronic Warfare Systems*. Norwood, MA: Artech House, 2013. Scobell, A. and Sanford, J.M. *North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles*. U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdf/PUB771.pdf>, Accessed 29 June 2017. Vass, S. "Defense against electromagnetic pulse weapons". *AARMS*, 3/3. 2004. 443–457. <http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Volume3/Issue3/pdf/13vass.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Wilson, C. "High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High-Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments". *CRS Report for Congress*, 2008. 1–16. https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/files/Ebomb.pdf. Accessed on 29 June 2017.

and industry reports.⁹ Part two utilizes the information provided in section one to make the argument as to why a strategic EW/CW containment doctrine is necessary, and outlines some of its parameters. It should be noted that this article is intentionally designed to be brief and exploratory in nature. Finally, part three concludes that an EW/CW containment doctrine can only be one pillar of a new concerted, multilateral, multipronged strategic approach to bringing lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula.

AN OVERVIEW OF EW, CW, CYBERSPACE, THE EMS, AND EMP WEAPONS AND NORTH KOREA'S CAPABILITIES

EW and CW are not new to 21st century warfare. What is new, however, is their simultaneous integration into overarching hybrid warfare strategies and operational plans by state and non-state actors. Hybrid warfare can be characterized by a unique set of physical and psychological, kinetic and non-kinetic threats, employed by both state and non-state actors to meet their aims.¹⁰ North Korea's relationship to non-state actors involved in irregular warfare across the globe and its level of knowledge of EW and CW have raised security concerns for future stability within the Asia-Pacific region. A basic shared understanding of EW, CW, Cyberspace, EMS, and EMP weapons and North Korea's capabilities are, therefore, necessary.

Understanding the concepts:

EW, CW, cyberspace, the EMS, and EMP weapons

EW is understood to be the use of military action to gain superiority in cyberspace and over the EMS by synchronizing operations, attacks, support, and protection across a network through the use of electromagnetic and directed energy in an area of operations, which encompasses the military and civilian information, communication, and technology

⁹ See: Berkofsky, A. "North Korea's Military-What Do They Have, What do they Want?." *Instituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale* 161. 2013. http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/publicazioni/analisi_161_2013_0.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Bermudez, J. S. "Chapter 13: SIGINT, EW, and EIW in the Korean People's Army: An Overview of Development and Organization". In Mansourov, A. (ed), *Bytes and Bullets: Information Technology Revolution and National Security*. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005. 234–275. <http://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Chanlett, E. et al. "North Korea: U.S. Relations...". "HP Security Briefing Episode 16: Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea's cyber threat landscape". HP Security Research. 2014. https://community.hpe.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-security-blog/388/2/HPSR%20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Jun, J., LaFoy, S. and Sohn, E. *North Korea's Cyber Operations: Strategies and Responses*. Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017. Mansourov, A. "North Korea's Cyber Warfare and Challenges for the U.S.-ROK Alliance". *Korea Economic Institute of America: Academic Paper Series*, 2014. 1–17. http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_mansourov_final.pdf, Accessed on 29 June 2017.

¹⁰ Hoffman, F. G. "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges". *Joint Forces Quarterly* 52/1. 2009. 34–39.

infrastructures.¹¹ Superiority is understood as the degree to which an actor can manage the EMS to engage in either offensive or defensive operations.¹² Offensive and defensive operations include electronic attacks, electronic protection, and electronic support.¹³ Electronic attacks are the use of radiofrequency weapons, lasers or particle beams that use either electromagnetic or directed energy against electronic equipment to prevent or reduce the use of the EMS. Deception, intrusion, jamming, probing, and pulse are the most common types of electromagnetic attack actions. Electronic protection include actions undertaken to prevent jamming, such as frequency hopping; to protect equipment through hardening, masking, emission control, or resisting an attack; and, to destroy the jamming capabilities of an adversary with anti-radiation missiles.¹⁴ Electronic support actions include collecting intelligence on non-communications electromagnetic radiations; detecting, locating, identifying, and evaluating electromagnetic threats; and, protecting the EMS and networks in an operational area from an adversary's acquisition of information of value. EW operations and actions are separate from yet complimentary to CW operations.

CW is understood to be the use of cyber capabilities in cyberspace to carry out offensive and defensive operations and actions to attain superiority in an information environment.¹⁵ Cyber capabilities refer to devices, computer programs, and techniques used to create cyber effects. Cyberspace is a "global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers."¹⁶ Cyber actions include the defense and protection of information networks through cyberattacks and cyber security; and the detection of threats through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Cyberspace superiority is attained when an actor has a degree of dominance that either prohibits or restricts an adversary from interfering with an operation or warfare capabilities.¹⁷ The informational dimension connects cyberspace to the EMS.

The EMS is the transport medium connecting cyberspace operations and electronic warfare operations.¹⁸ It is defined as the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation.¹⁹ The management of the EMS is, therefore, critical to effectively employ capabilities and conduct

¹¹ U.S. Army, FM 3-12: *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*; Poisel. *Information Warfare and Electronic Warfare System*; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 6-01: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*, 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_01.pdf, Accessed on 30 June 2017. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-13.1: Electronic Warfare*; U.S. Army. *FMI 6-02.70 (FM 24-2): Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*. Headquarters: U.S. Department of the Army. 2006. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi6-02-70.pdf>, Accessed on 27 June 2017.

¹² U.S. Army, FM 3-12: *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*.

¹³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 6-01*.

¹⁴ Anderson, R. J. *Security Engineering*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2001, 560.; U.S. Army, *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*. 1–29.

¹⁵ U.S. Army, *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-12R: Cyber Operations*.

¹⁶ U.S. Army, *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*. 1–2; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-12R: Cyber Operations*.

¹⁷ U.S. Army, *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*. 1–3.

¹⁸ U.S. Army, *FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*.

¹⁹ U.S. Army. *FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities*. Headquarters: U.S. Department of the Army. 2014. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf>, Accessed on 29 June 2017. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 6-01: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*.

operations. Activities undertaken to manage the EMS include frequency assignment, host nation coordination, and establishment of policies for planning, management, and execution of operations. Spectrum management is critical for the use of EMP weapons, particularly because of their impact on both civilian and military infrastructures.

EMP is “an instantaneous, intense energy field that can overload or disrupt at a distance numerous electrical systems and high technology microcircuits, which are especially sensitive to power surges.”²⁰ Two of the most common weaponized forms of EMP are HEMP and HPM. HEMP is a High-altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulse that is released into the atmosphere through the power and radiation of a nuclear explosion for the purpose of damaging, disrupting, or destroying electronic equipment and communication systems. Its actual impact, however, depends on the design of the nuclear device, the altitude of the burst, and the degree of hardening of the equipment and systems operating both in civilian and military infrastructures. HPM is an instantaneous High-Powered Microwave electromagnetic energy pulse. It is created through special electronic equipment that transforms a chemical reaction or explosion into microwaves, which are damaging to electronic equipment and systems near the blast. Although the blast of a HPM device is smaller and more direct, it is more difficult to harden against; thus, civilian and military equipment and systems are more susceptible to damage, disruption, or destruction. In any future war on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is likely to use EMP weapons. HPM devices have the potential to alter the ground dynamics of any invasion—either by the North into the South or the South into the North.

North Korea’s capabilities

EW and CW have long been central to North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities. In the 20th century, Kim Jong Il said that EW is the “key to victory in modern warfare,”²¹ while Kim Jung Un highlighted the significance and power of CW in the 21st century.²² Unlike many countries who considered EW and CW as separate yet complimentary forms of warfare in the 20th century, North Korea adopted an approach in 1990 that coupled EW, CW and Information Warfare, which it called Electronic Warfare and Electronic Intelligence Warfare (EW/EIW). For the sake of consistency, EW/CW will continue to be used for EW/EIW. Today, North Korea’s EW/CW operational understanding is similar to the understanding of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations articulated in the U.S. Army’s 2017 Field Manual on Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. Its capabilities, however, do not parallel those of the U.S. Armed Forces.

North Korea’s EW/CW developments can be broken down into four periods of time — WWII-1960s, the 1960s-1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s.²³ In the first period, SIGINT, EW, and EIW were introduced in North Korea by the former Soviet Union in WWII. SIGINT was used in the Korean War. In the second period, education and curriculum development were introduced in North Korea’s civilian and military schools and universities; military personnel received specialized training in EW and SIGINT by the former Soviet Union and China; and, a small number of mainframe computers were acquired. By the end of the period, North Korea’s military schools and universities had specialized EW/SIGINT curricula, which

²⁰ Wilson. “High Altitude Electromagnetic ...”. 1.

²¹ Bermudez. “Chapter 13: SIGINT ...”. 5.

²² Mansourov. “North Korea’s Cyber Warfare...”. 1.

²³ Bermudez. “Chapter 13: SIGINT ...”. 5.

were taught by those who had been trained in the 1960s and 1970s. Schools were no longer that reliant on Chinese and Eastern European foreign instructors. In the third period there were five key developments. First, the military underwent some organizational changes; all branches, however minor, began incorporating EW/SIGINT capabilities and focusing R&D on weaponizing EW/CW. Second, new educational curricula were introduced across the civilian and military schools and universities for computer software and hardware development. Third, the Korean Computer Center was established to cultivate computer program and software development among civilians. Fourth, technological cooperation was facilitated between Korean R&D institutes and developing countries for importing computer software and hardware. Fifth, the communication and information infrastructures were updated and enlarged. By the end of the period (it is significant to note), all branches of the Korean Armed Forces had training in and focused on R&D to further develop each branch's informational, technological, and operational EW/CW capabilities; an Electronics Industry Ministry was created; and significant infrastructural developments were made to lay the foundation for the cyberspace developments in the last period. Cyberspace, CW, and the missile program were focused on in the last period.

In conclusion, North Korea's EW/CW capabilities may not be comparable to those of the U.S. armed forces but its knowledge appears to be far more advanced than what some expected. Poor information, communication, and technological infrastructural developments remain the largest stumbling blocks. Despite the challenges, its capabilities are likely to advance in the years to come, particularly as its main adversaries' civil and military information and technological dependencies grow. Imagine the chaos that would ensue with the use of a HEMP weapon in the region or the use of HPM devices in any ground war with the South. While military equipment and communication systems among the surrounding countries' armed forces are likely to withstand a potential HEMP attack (depending of course on the altitude and degree of hardening), civilian infrastructures would not be as resistant. Similarly, in a ground invasion, the use of HPM in South Korea would create social and economic chaos; thus, creating a factor not *per se* taken into consideration when assessing threats for strategy and operation plan design. North Korea has consistently strategized in terms of contemporary asymmetric warfare, while its adversaries continue to largely think in terms of and approach it with ideas rooted in conventional warfare capabilities. An asymmetric, strategic approach is needed most at the present to contain North Korea's asymmetric provocations.

STRATEGIC CONTAINMENT OF NORTH KOREA'S ASYMMETRIC PROVOCATION

North Korea's asymmetric provocations are perceived to be a threat to regional stability and international security, and a surgical strike, war, or regime change are not viable coercive policy options for the region or its actors. A coercive option that has not *per se* been tried is a multilateral containment strategy designed to use EW/CW capabilities over a sustained period, while other non-coercive measures are employed. The aim of such a strategy would be to contain North Korea's asymmetric provocative operations through disruption and/or limiting the effects of its actions.²⁴ The immediate asymmetric provocations of concern

²⁴ For example, during the Aramco cyberattack, Saudi Arabia shut down parts of the grid from which the computer network systems operated to contain the attack. Rudolph was living in Saudi Arabia at the time of the attack.

are its missile launches and cyberattacks. It would have to be multilateral because of the nature of the EMS and North Korea's information and communication networks; its history of changing the locations of where missiles are launched and use of frequency-hopping; and finally, its running of cyber operations from countries in the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle Eastern regions, as well as using IP addresses from countries in South America and global non-state actors to launch cyberattacks.

The nature of the EMS grid and EW/CW operations to be undertaken in a containment strategy would determine which actors are strategically significant. Despite the global positioning of the U.S. D.O.D Information Network and the nature of the South Korean and Japanese military networks, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan cannot sustain an EW/CW containment strategy on their own. Other regional actors, such as China, Russia, Iran, and Thailand (to name just four) would be strategically significant. North Korea is heavily dependent on China for its ICT infrastructure. Moreover, some cyber-attacks conducted by North Korean operatives originate in China and use Chinese software. A sustained EW/CW containment strategy is not possible, in our humble opinion, without China's participation. Russia, then the Soviet Union, provided much of the technological training and equipment in use. The participation of both in such a strategy might also mitigate some of the present regional tensions over the U.S. positioning of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.²⁵ Iran has aided North Korea with its missile development program. Thailand's Loxley Pacific has a history of working with North Korea on high-tech projects and a connection to the Star Venture Company. The Star Venture Company is responsible for North Korea's connection to the Internet. In addition to state actors, global state and non-state actors would also have to be considered and an assessment of their impact on containment operations conducted because of the relations they maintain with North Korea. The most notable non-state actor that has relations with North Korea and Iran, an EW/CW capability, and a global network is Hezbollah. Other insurgent and militant actors involved in arms trafficking, and non-insurgent actors involved in transnational organized crime who have significant political relations with licit actors in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America would be relevant not *per se* for actual EW/CW containment but for understanding potential asymmetric countermeasures by North Korea and its non-state allies.

Given the relevance of multiple sets of actors to the running of EW/CW containment operations, spectrum management would be extremely important yet also difficult. Spectrum management is defined as "the planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures."²⁶ The U.S. Army's Cyber Electromagnetic Activities manual and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Electromagnetic Management Operations manual highlight the difficulty in planning and executing spectrum management operations involving international state and non-actors.²⁷ Differences in policies and training, difficulties in system integration and information sharing, language and terminology barriers, and security restrictions preventing full disclosure are cited as specific hindrances. Within the context of North Korea, U.S. coordination with Japan and South Korea do not raise any red flags but coordination with other strategic actors

²⁵ They both oppose its positioning in South Korea because of the potential impact on their own military equipment and radar systems.

²⁶ U.S. Army. *FMI 6-02.70 (FM 24-2): Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*. 1-1.

²⁷ U.S. Army. *FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities*; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 6-01: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*.

such as China and Russia do. One can just imagine the national security debates in the U.S. over cooperating with them. Yet, it is coordination such and with China more specifically, which is necessary to make a sustained EW/CW containment strategy designed to curtail North Korea's cyber activities and missile launches a reality. The present situation is untenable and U.S. approaches thus far tried and proposed have had limited success. Perhaps then it is time for us to think and act with a hybrid warfare mindset when playing on a multilateral, multidimensional networked game board.

CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC CONTAINEMENT–EW/CW CONTAINMENT ONLY A PILLAR OF A MULTIPRONGED APPROACH

North Korea will continue developing its missile and nuclear programs while employing an asymmetric strategy and engaging in asymmetric provocations. Strategic containment doctrine employing EW/CW capabilities to triangulate and contain North Korea's asymmetric provocations is not sufficient alone. A multilateral and multipronged hybrid approach is needed, which incorporates both state and non-state actors and balances the symmetrical and asymmetric capabilities of the main actors so that a win-win solution can be attained. Past approaches tend to neglect the role of non-state actors. The non-state actors in mind are not the typical civil society actors, as they have long played a role in endeavors to implement non-coercive policies. It is rather those who have yet to be assessed and factored into the equation are the strategically significant, illicit actors which are central to North Korea's economic and political alliances and economic activities, and the state actors who are connected to and have relations with the global illicit and black economies. Transnational organized crime, criminal syndicates, and gangs in Asia, Africa, Europe, Central and South America, and the Middle East are relevant for thinking of alternative ways to contain North Korea's provocative asymmetric actions. A traditional multilateral approach will never work with a non-traditional, non-conformist state actor. We need to think creatively and outside of the box when developing a new, multilateral, multipronged hybrid approach to North Korea, particularly if the world is keen on facilitating stability on the Korean Peninsula.

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Ilias Kouskouvelis:

THE MENA REGION POWER COMPETITION AND THE CHALLENGES TO SECURITY

ABSTRACT: The paper presents the challenges to stability arising in the MENA region and having a possible impact on Western peace and security. It identifies the regional actors' efforts to maximize their power, Russia's revisionist efforts, China's ambitions, as well as the phenomena (or asymmetric threats) of migration and terrorism. The paper focuses on the competition of power and concludes that the strategic value of the region around the South Eastern Mediterranean has increased, that Western states should determine and coordinate their policies, and their institutions should increase their efforts and presence, cooperating, among others, with other pro-Western countries in the region.

KEYWORDS: China, Greece, EU, Iran, Israel, Libya, MENA, Middle East, migration, NATO, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, terrorism, Thucydides, Turkey, USA

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the short- and long-term challenges to Western security, appearing in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.¹ To do so I am going to present the policies of both regional and international actors, who, as they compete for power and hegemony in the region, endanger peace and stability. In my opinion the reasons of the current instability remain systemic, non-domestic, and in no case due to religious antagonisms. After all, in Syria, Iraq, or Libya, no-one is fighting over the issue who is the rightful successor to Prophet Mohammed, but over who is going to control, partially or totally, these three states.

This approach, focusing on power competition, is rather a traditional one. It distances itself, however, from the two dominant and often aphoristic tendencies that are usually adopted by some of the political literature and the press in order to understand these issues and analyse the events of this region. The first claims that the basic cause of what is happening in the region is a competition for energy resources (hydrocarbons), provided by the simplistic approach of geography to international politics, usually supported with maps and (often imaginary) plans for pipelines. The second approach focuses on intra- or inter-faith hate and clashes. It claims that the cause of the instability in the region is religion, appearing both as a competition between the two dominant Muslim denominations, Sunni and Shia Islam, and as an effort of some of their factions to wage a war against the infidels of the region and, more generally, of the West.

Obviously, in my perspective, both explanations are essentially inadequate as they focus on the partial and not the general, and ignore the everlasting efforts of peoples and states for

¹ The views expressed in this paper are strictly personal and not of any governmental institution or authority.

security and/or power maximization. One of the main instruments of achieving security is power, which can be used for pursuing a variety of other aims too, including regional or even global hegemony. Other goals, such as energy resources or religious purity, may be used for mobilization purposes by those seeking power, or may ensue the acquisition of power. This is not to mean that in some particular cases resources or religious faith (or ideology) may not be the driving force in domestic or international developments. Indeed, in a few cases just profit² or just religion could be the main factor explaining the behaviour of people³ and even of states.⁴ After all, did the 17th century wars in Europe take place because of religion, or because of the painful birth of the modern state and the modern international system?

Yet, even in the cases involving gains and faith, it is through power and conquest that the peoples and states are trying to achieve their goals. The analyst should be careful, however; because, eventually, the two approaches, pursued to their end, open the way to two rather dogmatic and thus vague understandings of international relations, which blur reality. The first is the Marxian approach, ultimately inducing everything to capitalist competition for profit. And the second is the “Clash of Civilizations” approach,⁵ inducing everything to cultural and religious conflicts, and somehow inviting a concept created as one among many readings of international reality to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Given the above, my approach and method of analysis for the needs of this paper cannot be based but on a power approach of international relations, and particularly on Offensive Realism,⁶ a paradigmatic proposal integrating assumptions of Classical and Structural Realism.⁷ John J. Mearsheimer maintains that in a condition of systemic anarchy, states, particularly great powers, seek security, meaning to protect “their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order”. States, however, having realized “that power is the key to their survival”, try to maximize it; thus, they are “relentlessly seeking power” and aiming at regional and even world hegemony.⁸ “Consequently, states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means – economic, diplomatic, and military – to shift the balance of power in their favour, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile”.⁹ States “look for opportunities to take advantage of one another” and “work to ensure that other

² One can think of the mercenaries or of colonial powers.

³ See, f. ex., those that Martin Wight, categorizes as the “revolutionary”, men ready to sacrifice and be sacrificed for maintaining the existing or creating a new world according to their views. Wight, M. *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. London: Holmes & Meier, 1992.

⁴ One can think of states such as France or the USSR, for a limited period of time after the respective revolutions, carrying the burden of exporting their ideology.

⁵ Huntington, S. P. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1997.

⁶ Mearsheimer, J. J. *The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 4. 21.

⁷ The term “Defensive” Realism has been coined and used by John S. Mearsheimer to describe Kenneth Waltz’s Structural Realism and in order to counter-distinguish his own “Offensive” Realism. Waltz has maintained that “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system”; states pursue their security through power, but they “cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue”; see Waltz, K. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979. 126.

⁸ Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy*. 21–22.

⁹ Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy*. 34.

states do not take advantage of them”; obviously what “they care about” is “relative power, not absolute power”.¹⁰


Next, I will first present the competition and the power maximization drives of the regional players, particularly those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Then, I will examine the revisionist behaviour of two international actors, namely, Russia, which reappeared and is trying to become a player anew in the region, and the slow but steady emergence, for the first time in history, of China. My analysis, third, will focus on two major issues, considered by many as asymmetric threats, having presently their roots in the region, migration and terrorism. Finally, I will draw my conclusions, which, simply summarized, suggest that the West, with its political and military institutions and together with the Western or pro-Western countries in the region, has an important role to assume and play in order to maintain stability and peace.

REGIONAL COMPETITION FOR POWER

Unfortunately, competition in the Middle East was and is a permanent condition. This is clearly demonstrated by the defence spending of the countries in the region, over the last thirty years after the end of both the Cold War and the conflicts with Israel, as presented in the annexed Tables 1,¹¹ 2, and 3.

Table 1

Military expenditure, in constant (2015) US\$ m., 1988-2016



Initially, after WWII and the creation of all the existing states, competition took place along the lines of the Cold War and, especially, among the Arab states, rallying against the State of Israel, and, progressively, those few countries in the region which were allying with or tolerating it. Then, after 1979, the changes in Iran changed the balance and the atmosphere in the Middle East; Iran's religious leadership provoked tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, the country went to war with Iraq, called for the destruction of Israel and the abolition of all pro-American Arab regimes.

¹⁰ Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy*. 36.

¹¹ All four tables presented in this paper are based on data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017". SIPRI. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

Table 2

Military expenditure, in constant (2015) US\$ m., 1988-2016





Table 3

Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2016



Things shifted again, however, after the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of any Soviet influence permitted the West to intervene in the Middle East twice; first in order to guarantee the existence of Kuwait (1991) and, second, in parallel with Afghanistan, to fight against Saddam Hussein's government, which at the time was considered as a sponsor of international terrorism. After this second war, the United States became the dominant and uncontested power in the entire Middle East. The only states not having relations with the West were Syria, and, for a limited period of time, Khadafy's Libya.

Recent events, however, started after the withdrawal of the US from Iraq, leaving an important power vacuum in the region. Moreover, Shiites, living mostly in the southeast of the country, dominated Iraq, and the Kurds came to control the northern part of it. Those who had been in power since the creation of the country and formed the majority of the population, the Sunni Muslims, were ousted. It is precisely these people and the middle level cadres in the armed forces and the public administration, living in the center of Iraq, which contributed to the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (IS).

In relative terms the takeover of power in Baghdad by Shiites was an important increase of power for Iran and a loss for Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States, Turkey, Israel, Jordan,

and, to a certain extent, for the West. This is why neighbouring states started getting involved first in Iraq, assisting directly or indirectly the IS, and next, when the conditions came to permit it, in Syria. Let us take a closer look to the policies of the regional actors, as they behaved in the very near past and as they are today.

Iran

After Khomeini's Islamic 'Revolution', Iran has primarily focused on its security, as it faced the enmity of the West and that of the Arab countries on its border (Iraq) and across the Gulf. Progressively, Iran started to form allies abroad, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and later Hamas in Israel, and progressively supported the Assad regime in Syria, especially after the end of the Cold War, when the latter was progressively and increasingly isolated. As a balancing tool, Iran has also supported and mobilized any Shiite groups anywhere, to its benefit especially in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Iran then passed to power maximization, contributing to strategic weapons proliferation. It has increased its defence spending, pursued the acquisition of short, medium, and long range ballistic missiles, and initiated a nuclear weapons program. With the deal to freeze its nuclear program, Iran sought to alleviate the hardships of the international embargo, taking into consideration, however, that its program is the most advanced among those in the Middle East. With the exception of Pakistan to the East and Israel to its West, Iran is closer to the nuclear option than any other close competitor in its neighbourhood.

Iran was successful in several other cases. First, it successfully supported the Shiite government of Iraq, fighting together with its forces and other pro-western actors against the IS. Thus Iran has a friendly neighbour and at the same time eliminated a major and dangerous force next to its border. Second, Iran has fought successfully alongside with Assad and the Russians in Syria. This gave it an increased say for the future of Syria, as it is testified by its participation, together with Russia and Turkey, in the Astana negotiations; through these talks and given the described situation in Iraq, Iran may successfully seek access for its products to the Mediterranean. The friendly relations with the Assad regime has also given Iran the opportunity to strengthen its friendly paramilitary formations in Syria and Lebanon and to arm them, according to Jerusalem's claims, so as to undertake attacks against Israel.¹²

Third, Iran has successfully provoked and conducted a proxy war in Yemen against Saudi Arabia's allies and interests. In fact, despite its war efforts and an almost pan-Arabic alliance, Saudi Arabia finds itself 'encircled' by Iran for the first time. And not only that! Fourth, most recently Iran has benefited from the Saudi Arabia-Qatar crisis, and further increased its influence in the Persian Gulf. If things do not change, given the Shiite populations within Saudi Arabia, Iran appears as having the tactical advantage over Saudi Arabia and, for the first time, across the Gulf. Last but not least, fifth, Iran played a decisive role in the conflict between Baghdad and Erbil. Its forces made an important contribution to the recapture of Kirkuk and the Kurdish backing off from the independence goal. Thus Iran not only demonstrated its military capabilities but also eliminated any strong centrifugal forces in its own Kurdish population.

¹² Ahronheim, A. "Israel may have struck the Syrian weapons facility before Hezbollah could take-over". The Jerusalem Post. 7 September 2017. <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-may-have-struck-the-Syrian-weapons-facility-before-Hezbollah-could-take-over-504469>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

Overall, Iran appears successful and strengthened in relation to its neighbours and competitors in the region. This is perhaps the main reason for the recent reaction of the current US administration, which was internationally related and critically commented only in relation with the freezing of Iran's nuclear program.¹³ Iran may have frozen or slowed down its nuclear program but it is not going to stop its power maximizing efforts in the Middle East; it is left to be seen whether it is going to turn its attention eastwards too.

Saudi Arabia

During and after the Cold War, Saudi Arabia was the privileged interlocutor of the U.S. and the West in the region. The Saudi Kingdom appeared as the basis of stability, both in the fields of security and energy. In the past, it faced Saddam Hussein and Iran; yet given its size, its technological and military might, and the support from the U.S., it may have felt secure.

Saudi Arabia, however, has also been involved in power maximization efforts. Besides its continuous financing of Muslim organizations abroad it has sustained an important military budget; in fact, it maintains the fourth or the fifth defence spending position around the world, after the U.S., Russia, China, and competes for the fourth position, depending on the year, with France.

Yet, in most of its recent policies, Saudi Arabia has been unsuccessful. It has been actively involved in the financing of the forces opposing the Assad regime, which were eventually defeated and Assad is still in power. Saudi Arabia has succeeded in forming an almost pan-Arabic coalition to deal with the Shiite surge in Yemen but the conflict is not over yet and Saudi Arabia can in no way claim victory. It has also tried to discipline Qatar and united most of the Gulf states against it, without, again, succeeding in ending the crisis, as Qatar continues some of its policies and rejects the Saudi settlement terms; moreover, it seems that this crisis has brought Qatar closer to Iran and to Turkey.

Finally, Saudi Arabia tried, unsuccessfully again, to block the Iranian nuclear agreement. What it succeeded, however, together and unofficially with Israel, is that the current U.S. administration, besides publicly reaffirming its support, changed its policy towards Iran. This, the formation of the coalition for Yemen, and the visit of the Saudi King in Moscow may appear as slight successes in a series of failed policies. Yet, Saudi Arabia remains a very important player in the region, which cannot be ignored by friends or competitors.

Turkey

Observing Turkey's past 50 years may easily lead to the conclusion that it follows a policy of maximizing its power. This is obvious in its defence spending, in its efforts to acquire the secrets of nuclear weapons, the development of a short range ballistic missile system, the acquisition of satellites, its plans to build a helicopter carrier, its intention to buy F-35 military aircraft from the U.S. and the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia.

But since the rise in power (2002) of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the leadership of the country's current President Erdoğan, Turkey has adopted a set of

¹³ Landler, M. and Sanger, D. E. "Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal, but Doesn't Scrap It". *The New York Times*, 13 October 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

policies aimed at rising to the status of a global power. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey could play a global role; he wrote about the objectives of Turkey's foreign policy:

These goals aim to build a strong and respectable Turkey that is able to make an original contribution to the world community. To achieve them, Turkey must make progress in all directions and in every field, take an interest in every issue related to global stability, and contribute accordingly. This collective effort will make Turkey a global actor of this century. Turkey's actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to it by its rich historical and geographic heritage,¹⁴ and by a profound consciousness of the importance of global stability and peace.¹⁵

Within this framework of this thinking, Turkey has also adopted policies expressing the neo-Ottoman ambitions of its leadership, whose major consequence was Turkey's turn towards the Middle East. Turkey progressively tried to appear as the leader of the region's Muslims (and even globally). More specifically, she first broke-up its ties with Israel and projected the image of the Palestinians' protector. Then, she welcomed the rise in power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and supported President Morsi for as long as the latter stayed in office.

Turkey, under Erdoğan, has reached towards Syria and Assad. Their relations have improved significantly with mutual visits at the highest level and to the point that in 2008 Turkey tried to mediate between Syria and Israel, and in 2009 between Syria and Iraq. As a matter of fact, in 2009, the three neighbouring countries met to resolve the issue of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In the same period of time, the commercial relations between Turkey and Syria were strengthened significantly, particularly after Turkey's condemnation of Israel's intervention in Gaza (December 2008). They went even further and in 2011 agreed that Turkey trains Syrian armed forces, which combined with Turkey's relations with Iran, raised questions within NATO. At the same time, Erdoğan and Assad agreed to jointly build a "friendship dam" on the border between Turkey and Syria.¹⁶

However, the 2011 political developments in Syria changed Turkey's attitude. Turkey not only froze its relations with Syria, criticized and tried to pressure Assad,¹⁷ but, given its bordering, became the country through which other states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, channelled weapons towards Assad's opposition. Turkey also became the transit country for all people, including those belonging to extremist organizations, who went to fight against Assad and who, eventually ended up fighting together with the IS and with Al-Nusra. It also became the reception country for all the Syrian regime's dignitaries who escaped and of those wounded in the fights. Moreover, with the purpose of increasing its influence within Syria in the post-Assad era, it opened its borders to Syrians, thus contributing to an increased flow of refugees later on.

As the war did not turn the way Turkey had expected, there was another change in its policy. Turkey stopped opposing Assad and focused its efforts in averting the creation

¹⁴ The "rich historical and geographic heritage" is the indirect reference to what Davutoğlu called the "strategic depth".

¹⁵ Davutoğlu, A. "Turkey's zero problems foreign policy". *Foreign Policy*, 20 May 2010. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

¹⁶ Kouskouvelis, I. "The Problem with Turkey's "Zero Problems". *Middle East Quarterly* 20/1. 2013. 51.

¹⁷ "Turkey imposes economic sanctions on Syria". BBC News. 30 November 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15959770>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

of an independent or even autonomous Kurdish region next to its border and within Syria. With this in mind, Turkey has even invaded Syria and has been maintaining its forces there to date.

These changes of Turkey's policy towards Syria have initially created a crisis in its relations with Russia, Syria's most important ally, which reached a climax when the Turkish Air Force downed a Russian military aircraft. Yet, after this crisis and Turkey's new change of policy – this time not opposing Assad – the two countries improved their relations and now follow a rather common path in Syria,¹⁸ with Russia condoning even Turkey's intrusion in Syria.¹⁹ Thus, Turkey was included in the Astana discussions on the future of Syria. Russia started preparations for building two nuclear power plants²⁰ and agreed to sell S-400 missiles²¹ to Turkey.

Under Erdoğan, Turkey's political and commercial relations with Iran remained almost undisturbed, even during the time when the West had imposed sanctions on the latter or while Turkey and Iran were supporting different sides on the Syrian battlefield. Recently, the two countries have aligned against the perspective of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.²²

However, these policies in the Middle East led to the distancing of Turkey from its traditional Western orientation. In addition to the problems with Israel, Turkey's relations with NATO member Greece have not improved; Turkey continued, for example, to violate the Hellenic airspace,²³ despite the fact that Greece had mitigated its opposition to Turkey's EU accession. Turkey, in addition to not ending the illegal occupation of the island, has created new problems with EU member Cyprus through attempting to block the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Ankara has never stopped harassing militarily both the Republic and the companies involved in these activities.²⁴

Turkey's relations with the US and the West in general became more tense and complicated after the July 2016 military coup attempt to overthrow Erdoğan. The latter first indirectly accused the previous US administration for instigating indirectly the coup. Tensions increased, however, with the new administration too, as Turkey opposed the arming of the Kurds in Syria (and in Iraq) by the US for fighting against the IS, and as she created problems to the operation of the NATO base in İnçirlic. Moreover, the continuous violations of human right in Turkey, the systematic persecution of politicians, journalists, and foreign nationals, as

¹⁸ Tol, G. and Vatanka, A. "Turkey's New Alliances". *Foreign Affairs*, 4 September 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017-09-04/turkeys-new-alliances>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

¹⁹ "Turkey announces start of Idlib operation". *Hurriyet Daily News*, 7 October 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-announces-start-of-idlib-operation-120494>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁰ "Turkey to hold first deep drilling for oil and gas in Med in 2018: Minister". *Hurriyet Daily News*, 11 October 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-hold-first-deep-drilling-for-oil-and-gas-in-med-in-2018-minister-120693>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²¹ "Russia receives down payment from Turkey on S-400 air defence systems". *Russia Today*, 29 September 2017. <https://www.rt.com/news/405023-russia-turkey-s400-systems/>, Accessed on October 30, 2017.

²² "KRG will pay the price, Erdoğan says over independence referendum". *Hurriyet Daily News*, 30 September 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/they-will-pay-the-price-erdogan-says-over-krigs-independence-referendum-120173>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²³ "2017 Aggregate Incidents' Data." Hellenic National Defence General Staff. <http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/violations-en/2015-01-27-12-57-42/5847-2017-aggregate-incidents-data.html>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁴ Kouskouvelis, I. "'Smart' leadership in a small state: The case of Cyprus". In Litsas S. and Tziampiris A. (eds). *The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Power and Politics*. London: Ashgate Publishing, 2015.

well as the involvement in the political processes within NATO and EU countries, such as Germany,²⁵ in combination with Erdoğan's rhetoric,²⁶ made things worse.

Turkey's attitude led to reactions from various governments and resulted in an almost complete freeze of Turkey's EU accession process.²⁷ It led governmental officials to warn Turkey, analysts to start questioning Turkey's membership²⁸ and its future within the Alliance,²⁹ and President Trump's former Chief Strategist in the White House to consider her as "more dangerous than Iran".³⁰

Turkey has not gains from its neo-Ottoman drive and her quest for regional hegemony. Instead, Turkey is facing economic problems, internal terrorism, and two Kurdish entities along its southern border. What is potentially destabilizing the region, however, is that Turkey has not changed its plans or ambitions. What is problematic for the West are Turkey's dealings with Russia and Iran, the polarization of her public opinion against the West, and the unpredictable behaviour of Erdoğan towards the US and European states. In other words, Turkey wants to become a global power, as it was announced by Davutoğlu years ago, and is trying to emancipate herself from the West, creating rifts within the Alliance's cohesion.

GLOBAL PLAYERS IN THE MENA REGION

It is certain that the international system is no longer at the unipolar moment as it was at the turn of the millennium. Despite this fact, it is also certain that the US is still the leading state in all aspects and by all measurable standards in the World, especially in terms of military power, as shown in Table 4.

Yet, the choices made by the U.S. (and other Western states) in the MENA region, and primarily the decision to withdraw its forces from Iraq, created a vacuum of power that other states of the region (that we have just examined) and outside of it, tried to fill. Among the latter are Russia and China, two states which aspire for a global role and have a different strategy in and purpose for their involvement in the MENA region.

²⁵ "Party founded by Turks in Germany uses Erdoğan posters in campaign". *Hurriyet Daily News*, 7 September 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/party-founded-by-turks-in-germany-uses-erdogan-posters-in-campaign.aspx?pageID=238&nID=117697&NewsCatID=351>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁶ "We don't need you: Erdoğan warns US". *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 12, 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-again-says-us-ambassador-bass-prompted-visa-crisis-120740>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁷ "Juncker: Turkey is taking giant strides away from EU". *Hurriyet Daily News*, September 13, 2017. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/juncker-turkey-is-taking-giant-strides-away-from-eu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=117904&NewsCatID=351>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁸ Cook, S. A. "The American Alliance With Turkey Was Built On a Myth". *Foreign Policy*, 12 October 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-american-alliance-with-turkey-was-built-on-a-myth/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

²⁹ Pierini, M. "Europe's Policy Options on Turkey". Carnegie Europe. 27 September 2017. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=73228&utm_source=rsemial&utm_medium=email&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVRoaVlq-YzNOMk0xWVdFeiIsInQiOiJldWtPSEsrWDNXRlFNaFp2TWtleDFVZGh4S4m4ZT1oydUNvYzV4bHJKS1BwbnJCckdFTzIzQm1NJSJGITWFJ2QWlpUFpSM2JkTzQ2WVJFY0pnUmlaMk9mVXZoaanFZRIVmSTQxT-WYIRmZvOHdrZnByQmFKREx0bkt6MldLWVdhOHNUbcJ9, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

³⁰ Barak D. "Steve Bannon: Turkey is more dangerous than Iran". *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 28 October 2017. <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1066421/steve-bannon-turkey-more-dangerous-iran>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.




Table 4: Comparison of US defence spending with other major states (2016) – in constant 2015 prices

Their policies in the MENA region may be considered as a challenge of strategic nature or importance as it may threaten the status quo of the entire region or may upset the existing regional and general balance of power to the detriment of the West. Russia is trying to reassert itself and China to become a player in the area for the first time in history.

The Bear reappears in warm waters

Today, Russia, taking advantage of the Syrian turmoil and trying to reassert itself in the Mediterranean and in the MENA region, presents a major strategic challenge for the West in the area. Russia first tried to reduce the pressure exercised against her after the invasion of Crimea by spoiling the Western efforts to overthrow Assad and its regime. In fact, Russia gambled both in the Crimean and the Syrian cases and, given the proximity of the former and the lack of a clear Western strategy and cohesion in the latter, appears internationally to have eventually won in both.

Russia provides support to the Assad regime and fights against the Islamic State (IS) as much as it was necessary for maintaining the regime. In exchange for this support, Russia maintains its naval facilities in Tartus, built an air base, and obtained a free pass to install in Syria anything suitable for its plans. Of particular interest are the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems deployed in Syria – clearly not necessary for the fight against the IS, which, as it is well known, does not fly any planes...! Moreover, Russia's collateral gain is the fact that it manages to keep religious extremists outside of its border and to obtain a possibility to have an indirect influence on the prices in the energy market.

Thus, Russia obtained anew a military and political presence in the region. It can shape the future of Syria, it can influence the Kurdish issue, and it can put pressure on Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Its presence in Syria gave Moscow the opportunity to come closer with Iran, supporting it in its quarrel over the nuclear deal with the West and, even holding common naval exercises in the Caspian Sea with it – letting aside their frictions over the Caspian energy resources.

This needs to be seen as complimentary to Russia's efforts for a political, economic, and military comeback in entire South Eastern Europe. In this region Russia has been supporting various political parties, and is using Orthodoxy (as in the past communism) and, occasionally, pan-Slavic ideas as ideological tools. Economically, Russia is trying to enter the markets of the countries in the region, through its major, Kremlin-run companies or through "independent" entrepreneurs. Given the economic situation and needs of these countries, and the lack of present alternatives, some of these efforts are successful; yet, in the military sector, the Russian efforts and initiatives appear to have a limited effect only.

Although Russia tries to rise internationally, her successes should not be exaggerated the way it is done by some of the public opinion in many Western countries. In fact, Russia annexed illegally Crimea and, more generally, has an obvious tactical advantage just outside her border. But it is right there, just along the border, that she has suffered a retreat, the loss of her influence in the rest of Ukraine; because in estimating gains and losses, one should take into account that once the whole of that country used to be part of Imperial Russia, not just of the Soviet Union. As a result of this observation, it follows that more should be done by the West in the area of public communication, stressing the contribution of the North Atlantic Alliance since 1949, and also the Alliance's overall defence spending, or even just that of the US, which is much higher compared with those of any other (revisionist) power.

As for Syria, the Russian presence depends on several premises: how long the Assad regime will hold, how long the Iranian factor will converge, and, for how long, if needed, Russia can sustain its forces abroad economically and militarily. Clearly, at this moment, Russia has no other ally in the region, and in this particular theatre she does not have the tactical advantage. Therefore, Russia is trying to exploit all opportunities that are offered by any player in the region, including NATO member Turkey. It is obvious that Russia supports Turkey on all issues that may provoke Turkey's Western allies and promotes its interests in every occasion and irrespectively of the Russian policies towards other players in the Middle East. Thus, one day Rosneft strikes a deal with (Iraqi) Kurdistan,³¹ whose independence Turkey opposes with all her forces, and a few days later President Putin meets with President Erdoğan in Ankara to discuss the region's agenda, including the Kurdish issue.³²

However, despite President Putin's efforts and his meetings with the leaders of countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the overall influence of Moscow in the MENA countries remains concentrated in Syria. Yet, one has to follow developments in Libya too, where the Russian diplomacy is trying to expand its influence.

The Dragon enters the scene

The second medium-term strategic challenge, if one takes into consideration what is happening in the Pacific and what was decided at the 19th National Congress of the Communist

³¹ "Russia's Rosneft Clinches Gas Pipeline Deal with Iraq's Kurdistan". *The New York Times*, 18 September 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/09/18/business/18reuters-kurdistan-rosneft.html>, Accessed on 20 September 2017.

³² Chulkovskaya, Y. "Putin, Erdogan emerge all smiles from Ankara meeting". *Al-Monitor*, 29 September 2017. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/erdogan-putin-turkey-russia-meeting-kurdistan.html>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

Party,³³ is presented by China. China has a different policy towards its neighbours in the Pacific, and a different policy, as a whole, towards the MENA,³⁴ the other African, and the European countries. Today, given a change of policy by the US, communist China appears even as the defender of free trade – a position which clearly favours its state interests.

Recently, China has adopted the “Belt and Road Initiative” towards Europe and the rest of the world. However, this is not just an initiative but a Grand Strategy, whose fruits are going to appear in the years to come. To implement this strategy, China has increased its relations with the Middle Eastern countries.³⁵ It has also increased its presence in Eastern³⁶ and Sub-Saharan Africa. China, indicatively, is the first or the second investor in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Niger; buys lands systematically and extensively, and in some of these countries it was/is a major weapons supplier. Ethiopia has become “Africa’s China”, and it is common knowledge that countries like Niger or Namibia (in the South) do not produce only oil, but also radioactive materials.

Perhaps, one may counter-argue, China does not appear as a major challenge in the MENA region. I must admit that it does not present an immediate military threat. Yet, the West and its security institutions need to observe and take under consideration China’s *modus operandi*, which is very much different from the Russian or the Western practices. China avoids direct or confrontational policies. China, for example, has quietly turned reefs in the South China Sea into artificial islands capable of hosting military planes. When freedom of aerial navigation is enforced in that Sea by US planes, China responds that it “always respects freedom of flight”.³⁷ And when its trade is threatened by US Administration decisions, China makes itself useful by offering to be a mediator with North Korea, to whose arsenal build-up Beijing has already contributed...

In the years to come, China will continue increasing its presence in the MENA region and in the EU, primarily through commercial transactions and investments and through the benign interactions in the areas of science and culture. Usually, China enters the scene, by offering advantageous commercial and investment deals to states and businesses, which the EU, the U.S., or Western corporations do not offer. This is the case, for example, with the “Cooperation between China and 16 Central and Eastern European Countries” (known as the “16+1” scheme). Yet, all this ‘peaceful’ and ‘cooperative’ approach needs to be assessed in the light of the important increases in defence spending, featuring China as the second spender worldwide, and her ambitions to become a global player.

³³ China shall “transform” the “people’s armed forces into world-class forces”. See: “Resolution on CPC Central Committee Report”. *China Daily*, 24 October 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/25/content_33675880.htm, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

³⁴ Pintér, M. G. “China in the MENA Region”. *Defence Review* 145/1. 2017. 241–258.

³⁵ For China’s role in the Middle East, see: Chaziza, M. “China and the Independent Kurdish State”. BESA Center. *Perspectives* 590. 18 September 2017. <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-independent-kurdistan/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017. Also: Yellinek, R. “Why Are Relations Tightening Between China and Turkey?” BESA Center. *Perspectives* 576. 1 September 2017. <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-turkey-relations/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

³⁶ Elazar, G. “China in the Red Sea: The Djibouti Naval Base and the Return of Admiral Zheng He”. BESA Center *Perspectives*. Paper No. 567. 23 August 2017. <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-red-sea-djibouti/>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

³⁷ “US warplanes fly over disputed South China Sea”. *Ahram online*. 7 July 2017. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/273199.aspx>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

China's strategy has not gone unnoticed by the two major EU member states, Germany and France, and the European Commission, at whose initiative certain measures have been taken. However, these measures do not address the main reason why it is so easy for China to strike such kind of agreements and increase its influence in Europe and its adjacent areas.

TRANS-BORDER PHENOMENA AND THE MENA REGION

In the recent years the MENA region has been directly linked, if not identified, in the eyes of the Western public opinion and of security planners, with two major phenomena. They are migration and the terrorist activities of political and radicalized Islam. They are phenomena transcending borders and for different reasons and purposes are or may become sources of instability, not just for the region, but for other areas around the world.

Migration

The phenomena of refugee and migration are a major challenge of our times and of those to come, and a major issue for three states adjacent to the region, namely Turkey, Greece, and Italy. Dealing with migration constitutes a huge political, economic, ethical and security challenge for all Western states, not just continental Europeans, as the reactions to migrants threaten political stability and, thus, indirectly, the West's cohesion. With hundreds of thousands of war and environmental refugees and of economic migrants knocking at its door, the West and, more particularly, Europe, appear to be uncomfortable, indecisive, politically divided, and old in their reflexes. Nationalistic and xenophobic feelings have surfaced, damaging Europe's unity, moral prestige and interests.

The refugee crisis and especially migration are of strategic importance. One should not forget that half of the 1.2 billion people living in Africa are under the age of 25. The migration phenomenon is of strategic importance also because of the basic causes triggering such movement of people, which is becoming a mass movement, are war, underdevelopment, and environmental changes, i.e., draught and intensive desertification.

It is widely accepted that the West has its share of responsibility for underdevelopment and for environmental change. Yet, those conflicts in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa pushing people to exodus are caused by regional actors' antagonisms and by non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, the IS and their affiliate groups in Africa. It is these antagonisms and, particularly, the non-state actors that have led to conflicts and have contributed to the failure of states, i.e., Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Obviously, the situation in Libya is different from that in Syria and Iraq. The West needs to clarify its policy towards this country and the two governments, and has to contribute to stabilization, defence capacity building, border control, and maritime security. These efforts need to be undertaken and implemented fast because Libya is the doorway to migration towards Italy. In these efforts, cooperation with neighbouring states, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and, to the South, Chad, needs to be sought; moreover, defence capacity building and maritime security have played and need to play a much more important role. For years now, Italy has been receiving the burden of migration waves from there, and needs all solidarity possible from EU and NATO member states.

Syria and Iraq are, however, the main source of the refugee wave, which reached its peak between 2014 and 2016. The primary receivers to the Northwest are Turkey, Greece, and, at the end of the road, Germany, receiving the biggest part of refugees in Europe. Turkey,

-serving its interests, has initially opened its borders and received the refugees; but once her policy changed, Turkey opened its western borders in order to put pressure on Greece and the EU and gain both politically and economically.

Greece, in particular, has witnessed the largest ever population movement in its recent history and, despite its dire economic situation, has assisted refugees rather successfully. This happened, to a large extent, thanks to the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF). The HAF contributed to the overall efforts with the construction and management of dozens of refugee facilities and dealt with tens of thousands of people across the country, demonstrating that the HAF is not in crisis. At the same time, the excessive illegal migration was dealt with as a potential source of individual security threats for the country, Europe and NATO, because it was not just connected to terrorism but was potentially able to unbalance other socio-economic equilibria. The HAF, in this unusual setting, strived, on the one hand, to transform civilian functions into military, and, on the other, turn military functions into civilian, in order to run successfully the refugee reception facilities. The lessons learned are undoubtedly valuable and ready to be shared with Greece's partners as best practices, and studied as a contribution to stability and security of the country and the region.

Terrorism

It seems that presently the flow of refugees from Iraq and Syria has diminished. Yet, the wars in Syria and in Iraq are not over. Nuclei of the IS forces are still putting up resistance, various warring parties in different areas of Iraq and Syria continue their armed struggle, and secessionist tendencies, together with the antagonistic involvement and the revisionist influences of Iran, Russia, and Turkey, threaten the unity of both countries. Thus, as this region has been, due primarily to the IS, the major field of breeding and exporting terrorism to neighbouring countries and to the West, continuing the fighting against terror prone groups, dealing with hybrid war tactics and persisting in stabilization efforts, poses another major challenge for Western countries.

Of course, in the medium term the IS appears to be territorially defeated. The risk of terrorism, however, is not eliminated, as extremist ideas are going to survive, and since many of those extremists fighting for the caliphate are citizens of EU member states – as they are of Russia and of many Balkan or Arab countries – and are going to return home. Many of them have already fled the Middle East and moved in Libya, sub-Saharan Africa, and even in the Philippines to continue their struggle. Therefore, intelligence and counter terrorism activities need to be stepped up, the relevant activities of European countries better coordinated, and diplomatic efforts intensified. Moreover, special emphasis should be given on how some states help terrorist groups or use terror methods against their opponents or even their citizens, and how to avoid this happening again in the future.

There is one more reason to focus on the link between some states and terrorism: that in the conflict of Syria we have witnessed the use of chemical weapons, in the form of state terrorism too. Nobody should forget that chemical weapons, despite their limited geographic impact, are still weapons of mass destruction. For many years, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile systems in the Middle East was a primary source of concerns. It was also thought that with the end of Saddam's regime in Iraq and with the agreement imposed on the Syrian regime, the risk of chemical weapons has been contained. However, reality is very much different, as it was demonstrated by their inhumane use some months ago, or by

the tendency to acquire strategic weapons by various states in the region, such as Turkey,³⁸ Iran,³⁹ or Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

On the basis on all the above presented challenges – to remind them: regional actors’ maximization behaviours, Russian and Chinese ambitions, migration, and terrorism – every citizen and decision maker, even the most sceptical one, should be convinced that the Western presence needs to be further increased in Syria and in the entire region. It is simply unnatural that no major Western power, for example, the U.S., or any other Western member of the UN Security Council, such as France or the U.K., sits at the negotiating table for the future of Syria. This needs to be understood by Russia and by regional powers, particularly by NATO member Turkey; it should be made clear through traditional diplomatic channels and, if necessary, through (military) diplomacy, available to and based on the might of Western economic and defence institutions. Moreover, the Western strategy on a variety of issues should be determined, crystallized, and implemented, including the position towards a number of countries, such as Russia, China, Iran, and even NATO member Turkey, and the Western diplomatic efforts should be better coordinated.

The situation demonstrated the importance of the region around the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore specific initiatives need to be taken. These initiatives may include: (a) the closer cooperation, but also the attainment of economies of scale between NATO and EU activities; (b) the closer cooperation with stable states in the region, such as Cyprus (an EU member), Israel, Jordan, and Egypt; and, (c), taking advantage of existing security networks, such as between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, or between Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt.

It is obvious that the importance of the Alliance’s southern flank has been critically enhanced even though its cohesion has been put under stress by a member state. It seems that the new environment needs to be further assessed, initiatives to be planned and implemented, and the situation pertaining to Alliance cohesion clarified, in one direction or another.

It is equally obvious that stepping up the operations of Western security institutions in the Eastern Mediterranean and around its shores requires engagement with the new tasks as well as defence budget increases. A long time ago, Thucydides⁴¹ first and Demosthenes⁴²

³⁸ World Nuclear Association. “Nuclear Power in Turkey”. 21 June 2017. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/turkey.aspx>, Accessed on 30 October 2017. Flood, R. “Turkey is trying to get an ATOMIC BOMB in secret weapons plan, warns expert”. *Sunday Express*, 8 August 2017. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/838694/Turkey-atomic-bomb-Recep-Tayyip-Erdo-an-nuclear-weapon-fears>, Accessed on 30 October 2017. Also: “Turkey test fires first domestically made ballistic missile”, *Middle East Eye*, 11 May 2017. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-test-fires-first-domestically-made-ballistic-missile-1395267736>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

³⁹ “Iran tests new ballistic missile hours after showing it off at military parade”. CNN. 24 September 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/23/middleeast/iran-ballistic-missile-test/index.html>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

⁴⁰ Dorsey, J. M. “Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Fuels Potential Nuclear Race”. *Huffington Post*, 5 April 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/saudi-iranian-rivalry-fuels-potential-nuclear-race_us_58e4dc7fe4b09dbd42f3dbf7, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

⁴¹ Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*: “war is won more with the mind and with plenty of money” (2.13.2); “war is fought less with weapons and more with money, which make weapons efficient” (1.83.2); and “gold and silver ... ensure the success in the war and in everything else” (6.34.2).

⁴² Demosthenes. *Olynthiac I*: “Money is needed, and without money nothing can be done that ought to be done” (1.20).

second stressed the importance of money in the conduct of military affairs, and particularly in war. In order to do that, the West needs to address a major challenge related to the Alliance cohesion. In fact, one of the greatest problems for the Athenians and their great political and military alliance, according to Thucydides, was not just the lack of leadership after the death of Pericles; it was the non-fulfilment of obligations and the allies' defection, even in a tight bipolar and warring international system as the one of that time.

Today, the international system is no longer bipolar, and the unipolar moment seems to have passed. Today, however, many feel secure, thanks to the efforts of their allies in the past. For many years also central and northern regions of Europe have been priority. This was and is still understandable and opportune. Yet, as it was shown, things have tremendously changed, and Greece, Italy, France or Spain – all of them across the MENA region – cannot be just the providers of security for the north, the centre or the east of Europe, because back then all was quiet in the Mediterranean region ... Members of the EU and particularly those of the North Atlantic Alliance need therefore to discuss the new strategic challenges on the basis of the compelling reality and on the basis of the conclusions reached at the Warsaw Summit.

All is no longer quiet in the region around the Mediterranean! The interests of many states within the Alliance are at stake. It is my assessment that the Alliance is moving in the direction of tackling the challenges of the southeast, and does what it knows and is best at: provide security for its member states and stability for the region to the benefit of all. At least this appears to be the intention out of the recent creation of NATO's "Strategic Direction South"⁴³ and out of the earlier creation of NRDC-GR.

Greece, at the crossroads of three continents, is ready to do her share and guarantee, as always, free and safe access to what I call the Mediterranean maritime highway. However, all the member states have to understand the strategic challenges of our times across the Mediterranean and in the MENA region, to act according to the common security interests, and get prepared. As Thucydides has advised more than 2,400 years ago: let's prepare actively as if we always had to deal with rivals who decide wisely; and we should not base our hopes in the mistakes they will make, but in the foresight for our own security [...]. for the prevailing is the one who is trained for the great needs (1.84.4).

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⁴³ "NATO Strategic Direction South officially opens". NATO SHAPE. 5 September 2017. <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2017/nato-strategic-direction-south-hub-officially-opens>, Accessed on 30 October 2017.

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Josh Bacon – Itai Reuveni¹:

THE NGO-TERRORISM CONNECTION: THE CASE OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

ABSTRACT: In the post 9/11 world, the issues of funding for terrorist organizations via Islamic charities and non-profits (as well as other sources) has received vast attention from global law enforcement and security agencies, as well as from scholars and other policy researchers. This paper attempts to shed light on a related but less explored phenomenon of Israeli, Palestinian, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that receive international government support and have ties to terrorist organizations. This financial support provides NGOs with legitimacy to continue operating despite their terror connections. As is the case globally, NGOs that operate in conflict zones are subject to certain additional challenges, particularly the siphoning of aid by terrorist groups that control these areas. As we will demonstrate, and case of the Arab-Israeli conflict highlights the issue of aid diversion by terrorist groups as well as NGOs having personnel ties to terrorist organizations, resulting in significant challenges for government donors wishing to promote human rights and provide humanitarian assistance in the region.

KEYWORDS: NGOs, Terrorism, Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights, Islamic Charities, Middle East, Europe

INTRODUCTION: NGOS, ARMED CONFLICT, AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The ongoing Middle East upheaval leading to the downfall of autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, followed by the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq has led to a global crisis not seen since the end of the Second World War. Millions of refugees of unprecedented numbers fleeing the conflict in Syria are crossing borders in an attempt to escape these civil wars.

The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, perhaps what some might consider to be a new type of global threat, has similarly created new and complex challenges for Europe and the US. These challenges include a dramatic increase in terrorist acts committed by “home-grown jihadists” or by ISIS fighters returning from Syria and Iraq in their home countries. The challenges of terrorism are magnified with the domestic political concerns of addressing the flow of refugees, social and religious conflict, and their economic ramifications.²

¹ The authors wish to thank Becca Wertman for her editorial help and Ariella Esterson for her research assistance. This article is part of series of terrorism related research papers, under the guidance of Prof. Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan University and the Institute for NGO Research.

² See for instance: Rettman, A. “EU reaction to Egypt coup: 'Awkward. Disturbing'”. *EU Observer*, 4 July 2013. <http://euobserver.com/foreign/120766>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

The US decision to “degrade and destroy” ISIS³ led to an ongoing Western military presence in Iraq and Syria. This effort is spearheaded by the US with other NATO countries taking part in cooperation with local forces.

The Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war began with an air campaign in support of the Assad regime on 2 October 2015, and intensified after the bombing of a Russian airliner on 30 October 2015.⁴ The Russian campaign has solidified Assad’s control over certain parts of the country and reportedly killed more than 2,000 civilians in its first six months.⁵ The Russian forces engaged in indiscriminate bombing of civilians, as well as apparent intentional bombings of hospitals, schools, and rescue workers.⁶

In response to the humanitarian crises caused by the Syrian civil war, a massive humanitarian relief effort is underway in Syria and Iraq, providing essential supplies to war stricken areas, as well as in neighbouring countries, which took in millions of refugees. Leading these activities are local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), funded by the US, European countries, and the UN.⁷

In 2014, a media report revealed that many of these various NGOs are directly or indirectly paying ISIS for permission to allow humanitarian supplies to reach their destination in areas under ISIS control. Some US officials questioned the wisdom of providing financial support to the terrorist organization, while at the same time using military means to destroy it.⁸

The exploitation of government-funded humanitarian aid by warring parties and/or terrorist groups in conflict areas is not a new phenomenon. Instead, we should understand the apparent influx in aid appropriation by terrorist groups in the context of the global post 9/11 “War on Terror” world order. Indeed, the use of Islamic charities and aid groups serving as conduits or sources of funding for terrorist activities has been highlighted in the past 15 years.

Humanitarian aid organizations constitute a largely unregulated industry. These NGOs often work in regions controlled by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, making their stated moral activities subject to corruption. In recent years, an increasing number of journalists and academics have reported on this challenging balance, including Linda Polman and David Rieff who have extensively published on the subject.⁹ Polman’s report exposes the ways in which global aid groups such as Oxfam and Trócaire (Ireland) and UN agencies that work in areas where there are African civil wars, such as Rwanda and the Congo, cooperate with leaders of terrorist groups in order to protect their operations and raise funds.

³ Hudson, D. “President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL’”. The White House. 10 September 2014. <https://web.archive.org/web/20170517002708/https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁴ MacFarquhar, N. and Thomas, M. “Russian Airliner Crashes in Egypt, Killing 224”. *New York Times*, 31 October 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/middleeast/russian-plane-crashes-in-egypt-sinai-peninsula.html>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁵ Graham-Harrison, E. “Russian airstrikes in Syria killed 2,000 civilians in six months”. *The Guardian*, 15 March 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/russian-airstrikes-in-syria-killed-2000-civilians-in-six-months>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁶ Chulov, M., Shaheen, K. and Graham-Harrison, E. “East Aleppo’s last hospital destroyed by airstrikes”. *The Guardian*, 19 November 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/aleppo-hospitals-knocked-out-airstrikes>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁷ Dettmer, J. “U.S. Humanitarian Aid Going to ISIS”. *The Daily Beast*, 20 October 2014. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/19/u-s-humanitarian-aid-going-to-isis.html>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁸ Dettmer. “U.S. Humanitarian Aid...”.

⁹ Reiff, D. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.; Polman, L. *The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?* New York: Picador, 2011.

¹⁰ Simply stated, regardless of whether a terrorist group controls the region or not, an NGO will do whatever it takes in order to fulfil its own goals.

Despite this initial research on the complexities of NGOs operating in zones controlled by terrorists, many gaps in the understanding of aid appropriation still exist. The links between NGOs and terror can be understood as a three-pronged problem: (1) NGOs overtly work with terrorist actors in order to fulfil their goals, (2) NGOs are set up or used by terrorist actors and serve as fronts for transferring funds under a legal guise to the terrorist group, (3) NGOs serve as the “political arms” of terrorist groups, providing them legitimacy vis a vis various regional and global actors.




Figure 1: *The three types of NGO ties to terrorist groups.*

This paper will compare the case of (2) with the little explored (3), in an effort to demonstrate how NGOs and terrorist links are both direct and indirect, and the challenges these actors pose for policy makers committed to combatting terrorism, on one hand, and at the same time desires to contribute to human rights and humanitarian organizations, on the other. The paper will analyse this phenomenon through the case study of NGOs with ties to terrorism in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE HISTORY OF NGOS AS POLITICAL ACTORS

International NGOs emerged in parallel to the development of the United Nations, and were designed to support the norms and institutions of the post-World War Two era, namely democracy, human rights, and economic development. In 1948, 69 NGOs had formal consultative status at the United Nations and in 2015 their number was over four thousand, with many emphasizing “universal human rights” in their mission statements.¹¹

Despite the term “non-governmental” in their names, NGOs often receive substantial support from governmental donors. These governmental funders have facilitated the growth of what is referred to as the “NGO industry,” aiding the organizations in exerting influence on the international stage. NGOs also receive significant amounts of private funding from philanthropists, foundations, and religious institutions (although these too often receive government funding and simply serve as a “pass-through” to NGOs). The scale of funding provided by both governmental and private donors results in many NGOs operating like bureaucratic enterprises. For instance, World Vision (which will be discussed in detail below) has a global annual budget of \$2.8 billion.

Another example is the EU’s primary democracy and human rights program, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). EIDHR grants €160 million annually

¹⁰ Polman, L. *War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times*. London: Penguin Books, 2011.

¹¹ “List of non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2014”. UN Economic and Social Council. 3 December 2014. <http://csonet.org/content/documents/E-2014-INF-5%20Issued.pdf>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

to 900 NGOs involved in 1,200 projects, and in over 100 countries.¹² Other European NGO funding frameworks include ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and EU delegations and missions located around the world, which each distribute millions of euros annually to civil society.

With this financial support, NGOs are able to exert considerable influence in the media, governmental policy frameworks, and in diplomatic and academic frameworks. The ability of NGOs to influence these bodies is a direct consequence of the widespread perception that NGOs embody core universal ethical values, and the claim to be politically neutral and non-partisan. The “halo-effect” enables these actors to operate with little public scrutiny, despite the many shortcomings that will be discussed. For example, in its mission statement Amnesty International declares that it is “independent of any political ideology, economic interest or religion,”¹³ and is therefore often perceived as such with little scrutiny.

Due to this perception, NGO officials – from both human rights and humanitarian aid groups – are often given further open access and freedom of movement in countries, including areas controlled by terrorist organizations. These officials cross borders in war zones as VIPs, at times in the company of their diplomatic sponsors.¹⁴

In parallel to this rapidly growing number of NGOs around the world, there is a separate yet at times overlapping world of Islamic NGOs and charities, funded through the charitable contributions (Zakat) of Muslims worldwide and by the governments of Muslim states (as well as Western states in some cases).¹⁵

These Islamic organizations work on various social issues, including education, religious services, healthcare, and more. Those with ties to specific Islamic movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) are considered an essential part of their Da’wa efforts (literally “invitation”) – proselytizing other Muslims to join their movements. In many cases, the organizations also serve as stages for political or religious indoctrination. They are viewed as important sources of power and legitimacy in Islamic movements.

Since the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the issue of financial support to terrorist organizations has received attention from global law enforcement and security agencies, as well as from scholars and other policy researchers. Over the past 15 years, there have been many discoveries of Islamic charities based in both Pakistan and the US serving as either unwitting or willing financiers of terrorist organizations.¹⁶ The issue of funding terrorism through charities (as well as through various other channels) is currently a major battle front in the global “war on terror.”

Israel is no exception to this battleground, and in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the State has blacklisted several Islamic charities due to their affiliation with Hamas or other terrorist organizations. In some cases, terrorist organizations infiltrated non-Islamic NGOs, as it allegedly took place in Gaza in the case of World Vision’s Gaza director Mohammad el-Halabi (explained in detail below).¹⁷

¹² “Compendium 2007–2010”. EIDHR. http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/EUAID_EIDHR_Compendium_LR_20110609.pdf, Accessed on 17 Jan 2016.

¹³ “Who we are”. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/>, Accessed on 13 July 2017.

¹⁴ See: Polman. *War Games...*

¹⁵ The obstacles to suppressing radical Islamic terrorist financing, 97.

¹⁶ Passive sponsors of terrorism, 119–120.

¹⁷ “Israel’s UN ambassador rejects request to release worker accused of aiding Hamas”. JNS. 25 August 2016. <http://www.jns.org/news-briefs/2016/8/25/israels-un-ambassador-rejects-request-to-release-worker-accused-of-aiding-amas#.V8VbzZh94dU=>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

In a less direct manner, the evidence shows that some prominent NGOs also act as political participants in these conflicts, acting on behalf of terrorist groups on the basis of ideological affinity. In this ideology, terrorism and violent “resistance” are considered to be legitimate, while anti-terror self-defence is a “war crime.”¹⁸ This type of NGO actors is in the primary focus of this paper.

NGOS, POST-COLONIAL IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM

In broad terms, the ideology of post-colonialism is based on the division of the world into “victims” and “aggressors,” with the empowerment of the former and the weakening of the latter as the path to peace and justice. Western capitalist society is identified with the aggressors, while Third World societies (the Global South), even including many dictatorships and terrorist movements, are automatically embraced as perennial victims. Post-colonial agendas are advanced through intense political advocacy in the name of “social justice,” and can even include the use of violence.

The centrality of post-colonial ideology in the NGO sphere is reflected in their publications and advocacy campaigns, which often demonstrate strong support for pre-defined victims.¹⁹ As such, the post-colonial ideologues claim justification for the use of violence, in the form of terror attacks, “resistance”, and heroic “armed struggle,” including attacks against civilian targets. In addition, the implementation of counter-terrorism by states and military forces to defend civilian populations from such attacks is systematically opposed and condemned in different soft-power platforms, such as the UN Human Rights Council, parliamentary bodies in Western democracies, and the media.

The ideological bias is also reflected in the fact that the activities of such NGOs are not universally distributed according to humanitarian needs, but reflect narrow political agendas. These organizations frequently attack Israel, while Hezbollah and Palestinian violations of human rights – including terrorism and internal violence – receive little attention from the NGO community, or are even justified by activists and officials.²⁰

The NGO “halo effect” explains the process by which allegations are generally accepted by the media and other actors without question. Groups which are perceived to promote moral principles are protected from investigation, and their claims are taken at face value. As academics studying this phenomenon have noted, “There is a widespread attitude that NGOs consist of altruistic people campaigning in the general public interest.”²¹

¹⁸ Steinberg, G. “Postcolonial Ideology and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”. In Bailer, B. (ed), *Israel – Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Vienna: Barumuller, 2009.

¹⁹ Steinberg. “Postcolonial Ideology...”

²⁰ “Examining Human Rights Watch in 2008: Double Standards and Post-Colonial Ideology”. NGO Monitor. 13 January 2009. http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/hrw_annual_report, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

²¹ Willetts, P. “Introduction”. In Willetts, P. (ed), *“The Conscience of the World”: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*. Washington D.C: Brookings University Press, 1996, 11.

ISLAMIC NGOS WITH TERRORIST LINKS IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The connection between terrorism and Islamic NGOs and charities in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is well known. In particular, a number of prominent cases have come to light in recent years. The organizations involved present themselves as carefully accounting for every dollar spent, yet, most often, neither these organizations nor their financial auditors can trace funds that are spent in war zones and areas controlled by terrorist groups.

For example, in December 2016, Israeli defence minister Avigdor Lieberman outlawed the Turkish NGO Kanadil for allegedly identifying “with Hamas and with the Muslim Brotherhood and in recent years... used as a main pipeline for funding projects by Hamas in Jerusalem.” Kanadil, which was allegedly operating educational and other projects in Jerusalem (its website has since been removed) was also “closely associated with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood,” through its director and numerous employees.²²

There are also cases in which NGOs and their staffs have been directly implicated in support for Hamas and other terrorist groups, such as the case of Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW). IRW has a vast documented history of supporting Hamas. On May 10, 2006, Iyaz Ali, a Pakistani-born British national, admitted to working for the NGO in order to transfer funds and assistance to various Hamas institutions and organizations, which had been banned in Israel.²³ He also admitted to working in Jordan and cooperating with local Hamas operatives. In 2006 the Israeli security forces arrested IRW’s Gaza project coordinator for links to the terrorist group.

In June, 2014, Israel’s Defence Minister signed a decree that banned Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) from operating in Israel and the West Bank, on the basis of its alleged role in funneling money to Hamas. According to news reports, the decision was made after the Israel Security General Security Service (Shin Bet), the coordinator for government activities in the territories (COGAT), and legal authorities provided incriminating information against IRW. The Shin Bet stated that the decision to ban IRW was “based on information that has been accumulated over years, that the fund is a central player in financing of Hamas... [and] on accumulated knowledge and experience in fighting terror and financing of terror organisations.”²⁴

Following these accusations of funding terror organizations, IRW submitted an incident report to the UK Charities Commission in June 2014 and began an internal audit.²⁵ The Commission issued no special advisory regarding donations to IRW; rather, a Charity Commission spokeswoman said that “it was satisfied that the charity was responding appropriately

²² “Defense minister outlaws Turkish group over Hamas allegations,” Times of Israel. 14 December 2016. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-minister-outlaws-turkish-group-over-hamas-allegations/>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

²³ “British national arrested for assisting Hamas.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29 May 2006. <http://embassies.gov.il/MFA/FOREIGNPOLICY/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/British%20national%20arrested%20for%20assisting%20Hamas%2029-May-2006.aspx>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

²⁴ Price, M. “Audit ‘clears Islamic Relief’ of terror funding claim”. BBC. 12 December 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-30443693>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

²⁵ Lazareva, I. and Bingham, J. “Islamic Relief turns down Gaza funds after Israeli ban”. *Telegraph*, 3 September 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11073602/Islamic-Relief-turns-down-Gaza-funds-after-Israeli-ban.html>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

to the incident.”²⁶ However, In January 2016, the UK-based bank HSBC announced that it was ending all links to IRW, “amid concerns that cash for aid could end up with terrorist groups abroad.”²⁷

IRW receives millions of Euros each year from European governments, such as the UK and Switzerland, the EU, Oxfam,²⁸ UNDP, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development,²⁹ and the UN.³⁰

World Vision similarly has a history of entanglements with terrorist groups and regimes. In the 1980s, the NGO was criticized for cooperating with the Ethiopian government while it was raising money for relief for the famine caused by the very same government.³¹

In August 2016, the head of World Vision’s operations in Gaza, Mohammad el-Halabi, was accused by Israel of diverting approximately 60 percent of World Vision’s Gaza budget to Hamas³² to build tunnels and fund other terrorist activity. The siphoned funds amounted to approximately \$50 million.³³ El-Halabi hijacked World Vision funds by creating humanitarian projects³⁴ and fictitious agricultural associations to act as a cover for the transfer of monies and materials to Hamas. El-Halabi had previously worked for the United Nations Development Agency (UNDP), before being accepted by World Vision.³⁵ His indictment stated that he had been trained and planted by Hamas for this task “creating fictitious humanitarian projects and doctoring inflated receipts in order to get the funds to Hamas.”³⁶

²⁶ Birkwood, S. “Islamic Relief stops taking DEC donations during internal investigation into allegations by Israel of links to Hamas”. Third Sector. 1 September 2014. <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/islamic-relief-stops-taking-dec-donations-during-internal-investigation-allegations-israel-links-hamas/governance/article/1310143>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

²⁷ “HSBC cuts ties with UK Islamic charity over 'terror' fears”. The Economic Times. 3 January 2016. http://articles.economicstimes.indiatimes.com/2016-01-03/news/69486378_1_hsbc-dfid-charity, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

²⁸ “Oxfam International”. NGO Monitor. 24 August 2014. <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/oxfam/>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

²⁹ “Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD)”. NGO Monitor. 13 May 2015. http://www.ngo-monitor.org/funder/catholic_agency_for_overseas_development_cafod_/, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

³⁰ “United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)”. NGO Monitor. 4 May 2016. http://www.ngo-monitor.org/funder/united_nations_office_for_the_coordination_of_humanitarian_affairs_ocha_/, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

³¹ Clay, J. W. “Ethiopian Famine and the Relief Agencies”. In Nichols, B. and Loescher, G. (eds), *The Moral Nation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, 239., cited by Van Zile, D. “World Vision: Strategies for Fund-Raising and Support for Hamas”. JCPA. 1 March 2015. <http://jcpa.org/article/world-vision-strategies-fund-raising-hamas/>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

³² “MFA Dir-Gen Gold’s letter following the arrest of the director of the Gaza branch of World Vision”. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 August 2016. <http://www.israelemb.org/washington/NewsAndEvents/Pages/MFA-Dir-Gen-Gold%E2%80%99s-letter-following-the-arrest-of-the-director-of-the-Gaza-branch-of-World-Vision-4-August-2016.aspx>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

³³ Goldenberg, T. and Cheslow, D. “Israel: World Vision manager in Gaza funneled money to Hamas”. *Business Insider*, <http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-israel-world-vision-manager-in-gaza-funneled-money-to-hamas-2016-8>. accessed on 31 July 2017.

³⁴ “Behind the Headlines: Hamas exploitation of World Vision in Gaza to support terrorism”. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 August 2016. <http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/israel.mfa.world.vision.docx>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

³⁵ Neuer, H. C. “The aid workers aiding Hamas”. UnWatch. 19 August 2016. <http://www.unwatch.org/un-watch-op-ed-jerusalem-report-aid-workers-aiding-hamas/>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

³⁶ Goldenberg and Cheslow. “Israel: World Vision manager...”.

The examples of IRW and World Vision are not unique. The Palestinian Relief and Development Fund (also known as Interpal) is a well-established UK charity (enjoying the support of prominent Labour politicians, including Jeremy Corbyn³⁷) and has been a principal organization hiding the flow of money to Hamas. It was designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organization by the United States in 2003, for its links to Hamas.³⁸ Furthermore, the US Treasury Department refers to Interpal as “the funding coordinator of Hamas.” A 2002 Israeli investigation found that each of Interpal’s ‘local partner’ charities within the Palestinian territories was “affiliated with Hamas or works on its behalf, not only with regard to humanitarian issues but as part of its terrorism-supporting apparatus.”³⁹ Interpal is also a member of the Union of Good, an internationally recognized network of charities that fund Hamas.⁴⁰

Despite this, Interpal was cleared by the UK Commission after a number of investigations, claiming that “the Commission was satisfied that the Charity had put in place a number of procedures to take account of and address the failings identified by the inquiry which required rectification.”⁴¹ The clearance allows the British government to provide funds to the organization.

The British government’s decision is, however, subject to ongoing criticism and debate. Following an April 2016 Interpal-funded event in Gaza which featured Palestinian children simulating terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and praising stabbing attacks, MPs demanded an additional investigation into the NGO’s activities. In response, the Charity Commission stated that it is “aware about concerns about the contents of this video” and that they “are assessing the material as a matter of priority before deciding what regulatory action may be required.”⁴²

Another member of the UK-based Union of Good, the Human Relief Foundation (HRF), was also banned for its ties to Hamas.⁴³ Additionally, HRF listed Qatar Charity as one of its “institutional supporters,” which was a group named by Osama bin-Laden as a financier of al-Qaeda.⁴⁴

³⁷ Wallis-Simmons, J. “Sickening footage of Palestinian children pretending to stab Jews exposes ‘festival of hate’ funded by Jeremy Corbyn’s pet charity as Labour anti-Semitism row deepens”. Daily Mail. 28 April 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3561337/As-Labour-anti-Semitism-row-deepens-revealed-Jeremy-Corbyn-s-pet-charity-funded-Palestinian-festival-hate-children-dressed-terrorists-acted-murdering-Jews.html>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

³⁸ “Interpal/The Palestinian Relief and Development Fund”. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 5 April 2016. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-charities_execorder_13224-i.aspx#interpal, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

³⁹ Westrop, S. “Supporting our Own Demise: Part 1”. Gatestone Institute. 7 January 2013. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3514/terror-finance>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

⁴⁰ “The Union of Good – Analysis and Mapping of Terror Funds Network”. Israeli Security Agency. https://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/coalition_en.pdf, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁴¹ “Inquiry Report: Palestinians Relief and Development Fund (Interpal)”. Charity Commission. 1 June 2012. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140505102719/http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/interpal_supplementary.pdf, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁴² Wallis-Simmons. “Sickening footage...”.

⁴³ “Defense Minister signs order banning Hamas-affiliated charitable organizations”. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 July 2008. <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=39861>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁴⁴ “Who We Are”. Human Relief Foundation. <http://web.archive.org/web/20151020065629/http://www.hrf.org.uk/who-we-are#5>. accessed on 1 August 2017.

Medical Aid for Palestinians is another British organization with ties to terrorist groups. The organization receives financial support from the European Union, the UK, Ireland, and others. In 2015, IRW provided MAP with funding. In the past, MAP has also transferred funds to the Al-Ihsan Charitable Society, *designated* by the US Treasury Department in 2005 as a “charitable front for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad . . . [Al-Ihsan] masquerades as a charity, while actually helping to finance Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s acts of terror against the Israeli people and other innocents.”⁴⁵

MAP also partnered with the Islah Charitable Society (ICS) and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), which have ties to Hamas and the PFLP respectively. ICS founder Jamal Muhammed Tawil is allegedly a member of Hamas and was arrested in 2002 for his role in planning bombing attacks against Israeli civilians.⁴⁶ According to two former Treasury Department terrorism experts, ICS has been used as a conduit for funneling money to Hamas for various purposes, including financial aid to the families of suicide bombers.⁴⁷

Similarly, the Turkish IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi) also poses as a humanitarian aid organization and was the central backer of the May 2010 flotilla to Gaza, where participants attacked Israeli naval commandoes. Several Israeli soldiers were wounded and 8 Turkish and one Turkish-American activists were killed during the incident. The IHH has been designated by Israel as an “unlawful association” in 2008 due to its membership in the Union of the Good. According to the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), during the 2002 Jenin counter-terrorist operation, the Union of the Good transferred money, via Hamas charities, to families of suicide bombers.⁴⁸ In 2012 it was officially classified as a “terrorist organization” by the Israeli Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, according to a paper published by the Danish Institute for International Studies, the Turkish authorities began investigating IHH in 1997, after receiving information that “leaders of IHH were purchasing automatic weapons from other regional Islamic militant groups.” A Turkish raid on the organization’s offices found weapons, explosives, and instructions for making IEDs.⁴⁹ The Danish researchers also cite the investigation into IHH by French counter-terrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere, which disclosed that IHH maintained contact with al-Qaeda in Milan and Algerian terrorists in Europe; recruited militants for fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan; and played a “central role” in the al-Qaida bomb plot targeting LAX airport.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Roy, S. *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector*. Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, 140.

⁴⁶ “Operation for the confiscation of terror funds-Background,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 February 2004. <https://israelforeignaffairs.com/2015/10/operation-for-the-confiscation-of-terror-funds-background/>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁴⁷ For a broader analysis of the connections between Islah Charitable Society, Jamal Tawil and Hamas, see Levitt, M. *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. Yale University Press, 2006. and Gurule, J. *Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism*. Northampton: Edwar Elgar Publishing, 2008.

⁴⁸ “IHH, which plays a central role in organizing the flotilla to the Gaza Strip, is a Turkish humanitarian relief fund with a radical Islamic anti-Western orientation”. ITIC. 27 May 2010. <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/18108>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁴⁹ Kohlmann, E. F. “The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and Financing,” *DIIS Working Paper 2006/7*. 10–11. http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/67462/DIIS_WP_2006_7.web.pdf, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁵⁰ Kohlmann. “The Role of Islamic Charities...” 10–11.

As these multiple and diverse examples demonstrate, the links between Islamic NGOs and terrorist groups are widespread and significant. In all likelihood, there are many more of such links that have yet to be uncovered.

POLITICAL NGOS AS A LEGITIMATE FRONT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS

In a different but parallel process, some (including non-Islamic) terror organizations have established “soft power” branches, creating or co-opting NGOs to serve as source for ideological and practical legitimacy, recruitment, and fundraising. Through the creation of civil society frameworks, these groups can freely operate and legally receive funds from donors, including governments.

The NGO ties to terrorist groups range from establishment and operation of NGOs by the organization itself to NGO officials and staffers being convicted of terrorism. Specifically, as it will be demonstrated in detail below, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) has a network of at least eight European-funded NGOs with various degrees of connections to it.⁵¹

Founded by George Habash in 1967, the PFLP is a secular Palestinian Marxist-Leninist organization, originally supported by the former Soviet Union and China. PFLP members have carried out numerous terrorist acts since its founding, being the first Palestinian organization to hijack planes in the 1960s and 1970s. Most notably, the group was responsible for the assassination of Israeli Minister of Tourism Rechavam Ze’evi in 2001, and its members joined the Baader-Meinhof Gang (a West German radical group) to hijack a Tel Aviv-bound Air France flight in 1976, landing it in Entebbe, Uganda. It is also responsible for suicide bombings in Israel, and its members took credit for the house invasion and murder of the Fogel family in 2011 and the massacre at a synagogue in Jerusalem’s Har Nof neighborhood in 2014. The PFLP is classified a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Canada, and Israel. Today, the organization reportedly receives support from the Syrian and Iranian governments.⁵²

The network of PFLP linked NGOs receiving funding from European governments and international frameworks includes Addameer, Al-Haq, Alternative Information Centre (AIC), Defence for Children International – Palestine (DCI-P), Health Work Committee (HWC), Stop the Wall, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC).⁵³ Government donors to these NGOs include the EU, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Ireland, UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and the United Nations.⁵⁴

Addameer, an official PFLP “affiliate” is led by two individuals with clear ties to the PFLP.⁵⁵ Khalida Jarrar, Addameer’s vice-chairperson, is a senior PFLP official.⁵⁶ On April 15, 2015 she was indicted for various offenses, including active membership in a terrorist

⁵¹ “The European-Funded NGO PFLP Network”. NGO Monitor. 14 November 2016. 1. <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PFLP-Report-English.pdf>, Accessed on 20 July 2017.

⁵² “The European-Funded NGO PFLP Network,” 1.

⁵³ “The European-Funded NGO PFLP Network,” 1.

⁵⁴ “The European-Funded NGO PFLP Network,” 1.

⁵⁵ “About”. Fatah Official Website. 2 December 2012. (Arabic) http://www.fatehorg.ps/index.php?action=show_page&ID=11455&lang=ar, Accessed on 29 March 2017.

⁵⁶ “Board & General Assembly”. Addameer. <http://www.addameer.org/about/board-general-assembly>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

organization and inciting violence through a call to kidnap Israeli soldiers.⁵⁷ Jarrar accepted a plea bargain and, according to reports, was convicted on “one count of belonging to an illegal organization and another of incitement.”⁵⁸ She received a 15-month prison sentence with an additional 10-month suspended sentence. Jarrar was released from prison on June 3, 2016.⁵⁹

Addameer’s chairperson and co-founder, Abdul-latif Ghaith, was banned by Israel from travelling internationally and from entering the West Bank from 2011 to 2015.⁶⁰ Abdul-latif Ghaith was described in an article posted by Miftah (another Palestinian NGO) as a representative of the PFLP.⁶¹ Several other staff members of Addameer have alleged ties to the PFLP, and some have been convicted for various offenses.

One of the most prominent Palestinian human rights NGOs, Al-Haq, is another example of an organization with ties to the PFLP. Al-Haq is a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Habitat International Coalition (HIC), and the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO).⁶²

Al-Haq’s general director, Shawan Jabarin, has alleged ties to the terrorist organization PFLP and has been denied exit visas by Israel and Jordan. According to a 1995 Israeli submission to the UN,⁶³ Jabarin was convicted in 1985 for recruiting members for the PFLP. He was also found guilty of arranging PFLP training outside Israel and was sentenced to 24-months imprisonment by Israeli courts, of which he served nine. In 1994, Jabarin was again arrested for alleged links and placed in administrative detention for six months.⁶⁴ An Israeli statement to the UN notes that he “had not discontinued his terrorist involvement and maintains his position in the leadership of the PFLP.”⁶⁵

In 2007, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected Jabarin’s appeal to go abroad stating that, *“The objections by security forces are all rooted in security concerns based on classified information, showing that the petitioner is a senior activist in the PFLP terrorist group.... the current petitioner is apparently acting as a manner of Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde, acting some of the time as the CEO of a human rights organization, and at other times*

⁵⁷ “An indictment against a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council”. Military Prosecution. 15 April 2015. (Hebrew)<http://www.law.idf.il/163-7238-he/Patzar.aspx>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

⁵⁸ Khoury, J. “Military Court Hands Palestinian Lawmaker Khalida Jarrar 15-month Jail Sentence”. Haaretz. 7 December 2015. <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.690481>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁵⁹ “Khalida Jarrar Solidarity Campaign: Free Khalida Jarrar!” Samidoun. 3 June 2016. <http://samidoun.net/khalidajarrar/>, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁶⁰ “Prisoner rights leader Abdul Latif Ghaith banned from entering the West Bank or leaving Palestine”. Samidoun. 4 October 2014. <http://samidoun.ca/2014/10/prisoner-rights-leader-abdul-latif-ghaith-banned-from-entering-the-west-bank-or-leaving-palestine/>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁶¹ “Starving for Justice”. MIFTAH. 7 July 2004. <http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=4181&CategoryId=11>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁶² “About Alhaq”. Al-Haq. <http://www.alhaq.org/about-al-haq/about-al-haq>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

⁶³ “Question Of The Human Rights Of All Persons Subjected To Any Form Of Detention Or Imprisonment”. United Nations, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. 18 November 1994. <http://web.archive.org/web/20090129205347/http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/85255db800470aa485255d8b004e349a/4f4e2d2311ab624485256c53006afa92!OpenDocument>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁶⁴ “Question Of The Human Rights...”.

⁶⁵ “Question Of The Human Rights...”.

as an activist in a terror organization which has not shied away from murder and attempted murder, which have nothing to do with rights.”⁶⁶

In 2009, Jabarin was again prohibited by the Israeli authorities from travelling abroad. Jabarin appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court which rejected his appeal, stating, “We found that the material pointing to the petitioner’s involvement in the activity of terrorist entities is concrete and reliable material. We also found that additional negative material concerning the petitioner has been added even after his previous petition was rejected.”⁶⁷

In addition to his role at Al-Haq, Shawan Jabarin is the Secretary General of International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and is on the Middle East Advisory Board of Human Rights Watch (HRW).⁶⁸

In an even more direct example, The Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) describes itself as a “non-profit organization by a group of volunteers and agronomists.”⁶⁹ It was founded in 1968 by members of PFLP⁷⁰ and is an official PFLP “affiliate.”⁷¹ USAID identifies UAWC as the “agricultural arm” of the PFLP.⁷²

UAWC clearly demonstrated its links to the PFLP by hosting “a solidarity day with the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Ahmed Saadat.”⁷³ The “solidarity day” featured Muhammad Bakri, executive director of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees in Gaza, and celebrated “the tenth anniversary of the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi” (an attack committed by the PFLP). The issue of foreign government funding (via World Vision Australia) to UAWC and its links to the PFLP was highlighted by the Israeli NGO Shurat HaDin, which submitted a report on the matter to the Australian government.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ “Unofficial translation by NGO Monitor”. NGO Monitor. 17 August 2016. http://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Jabarin-2007-decision-translation_NGO-Monitor-aug2016.pdf, Accessed on 31 July 2017.

⁶⁷ “Shawan Ghatab Abdallah Jabarin vs. IDF commander in the West Bank”. HCJ 1520/09. 10 March 2009. (Hebrew) http://www.ruling.co.il/%D7%91%D7%92%22%D7%A5-1520-09-%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%90%D7%9F-%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%91-%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%93%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%92%27%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A0-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%93-%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%97..._ce434187-a228-6fc9-6ae6-de025d3f4559, Accessed on 20 July 2017.

⁶⁸ “Shawan Jabarin Elected as Secretary General of FIDH”. Al-Haq. 29 August 2016. <http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/human-rights-defenders/1067-shawan-jabarin-elected-secretary-general-of-fidh>, Accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁶⁹ “About”. Union of Agricultural Work Committees. (Arabic) <http://uawc-pal.org/UAWCAbout>, Accessed on 29 March 2017.

⁷⁰ Robinson, G. E. *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1997..

⁷¹ “About”. Fatah Official Website. 2 December 2012.

⁷² “Palestinian Institutional Configurations in the West Bank and Gaza Under Four Autonomy Scenarios”. Democratic Institutions Support Project. May 1993. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY769.pdf, Accessed on 29 July 2017.

⁷³ “Union of Agricultural Work Committees in a day of solidarity with prisoners and farmers”. Sama News. 16 October 2010. (Arabic) <http://samanews.com/ar/post/78928/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

⁷⁴ “Alleged breach of anti-terror law by World Vision Australia”. Shurat HaDin. 29 March 2012. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/110665551/Alleged-breach-of-anti-terror-law-by-World-Vision-Australia-Detailed-Evidence>, Accessed on 30 July 2017.

While these NGO activists rarely committed violent acts of terrorism themselves, they serve an important role for terror organizations. Indeed, the mentioned NGOs provide a veneer of legitimacy for the PFLP, allowing it to influence both Palestinian society, through its public programs (in agriculture, health, etc.) and the global arena through the international activism of these NGOs.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The relations between Islamic NGOs and terrorist organizations are a well know issue. Governments, law enforcement agencies, and academics have recognized it as an essential battleground in the fight in countering terrorist activities and have accordingly given it much attention.

The case of clearly partisan and political NGOs, such as Al-Haq and Addameer, which have visible connections to terrorism, is more complex and less explored. This paper has attempted to shed light on the phenomenon of Israeli and Palestinian organizations that receive international government support and have ties to terrorist organizations. This financial support provides the NGOs with legitimacy to continue operating despite their terrorist connections. The fact that NGOs are headed by individuals with terrorist backgrounds, and/or individuals involved in supporting terrorist activities, as reflected in the “Jekyll and Hyde” comment of the Israeli High Court, does not appear to gain much attention from government donors.

The willingness of government funders to ignore these terrorist ties is either based on the premise that “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” or justified as a necessary evil – part of the cost of doing business in conflict zones. In addressing the Israeli charges against World Vision and other NGOs related to assisting Hamas, Michael Sfar, a prominent Israeli NGO activist and lawyer, declared: “Even the best-organised operations have no choice but to operate in a grey zone in Gaza.”⁷⁵ In other words, the objective of assisting poor people who live in a region controlled by terrorists, as in Gaza, is used to justify operating in “grey zones,” where funds and resources are regularly siphoned off and NGO officials also participate in terrorism.

Despite the apparent justification for these NGO ties, the decade and a half since September 2001 has demonstrated that ignoring the financing of those with direct or indirect ties to terrorism holds many perils. With the danger of global terrorism reaching new heights, it is imperative that mistakes not be repeated. European government funders must re-examine the funding for NGOs with PFLP ties, as well as of those with Hamas ties, if they do not want to be implicated in supporting, even indirectly, violent crimes.

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Lt. Col. (Ret.) László Kelemen:

HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA

ABSTRACT: This article outlines some political and military professional considerations behind Hungary's participation in foreign military missions, with a special view to the European Union Training Mission Somalia, and relying on personal experience of the author, gives an insight into the situation of individual soldiers.

KEYWORDS: European Union Training Mission Somalia, Hungarian Defence Forces, military missions, motivation

As part of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union (EU), the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM-S) was launched in April 2010 and its mandate has been extended several times since then.¹ Having trained thousands of members of the Somali military, now the mission performs its 5th mandate expiring on 31 December 2018. Until the end of 2013, the mission operated in Bihanga, Uganda, on a Ugandan army base and the training activities were supported by the Ugandan People's Defence Forces. During that period EUTM-S mostly provided basic training for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), junior officers, specialists and trainers. After moving to its current location, the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) zone, advising to the Somali military and defence leadership and mentoring trainers and training staffs were added to the mission mandate, and instead of basic training, the mission provided specialized training for various groups (courses on military administration, combat engineering, intelligence, company and battalion commander courses etc.). In line with the Somali security situation and the real needs of the army, the focus of the training shifted again in the middle of 2016, when the mission started its collective training program with the aim of setting up a new unit for the Somali army. In 2016 a pilot company course was launched, and during the 5th mandate the mission has the challenge to train three light infantry companies, three engineer platoons and three Somali training teams. Mentoring and advisory activities within the Somali security institutions (Ministry of Defence, General Staff) remain in the focus of the mission in the meantime².

The Mission Headquarters is located in a relatively safe zone guarded by the AMISOM³ around the MIA. Some security incidents occasionally did occur, however (mortar attacks against the zone, big explosions in the close vicinity, intrusion of armed fighters into the zone). EUTM-S supports the internationally recognized government and its military in Somalia, on which Al-Shabaab (AS), an Islamist militant group wages a civil war using

¹ See CFSP Decisions of the Council of the EU: 2010/96, 2010/197, 2011/483, 2013/44, 2015/441, 2016/2239.

² See these and more details in the "Factsheet on EUTM Somalia". European External Action Service. 17 July 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-somalia/10983/factsheet-on-eutm-somalia_en, Accessed on 20 August 2017.

³ AMISOM is the African Union Mission in Somalia fighting with Al Shabaab and other armed groups in support of the Somali government and its military.

terrorist methods. The targets of the AS are government officials, the Somali military, AMISOM and everyone who supports them in any way, including all international actors. Since training and advising activities take place mostly outside the protected airport zone, it puts a serious burden on the mission to ensure security of its staff when conducting their duties. The mandate of EUTM-S is strictly limited to training and advising, the mission and its members are not involved directly in the conflict or any combat activities in Somalia and their use of force is limited to self-defence.

THE MISSION COMPOSITION AND HUNGARIAN INVOLVEMENT

Italy is the lead nation in the mission. The Commander and more than 50 percent of the mission staff are Italians, including the entire security support element. Currently another 10 nations⁴ of the EU participate with various contingents. The second largest troop contributing nation is Spain, whereas France and Romania are only represented by one person. Serbia, as a third party, participates with a military medical team filling the Medical Advisor position and providing primary health care services (Role 1) for the mission.

Apart from some transitional periods, Hungary has been represented through a four-soldier contingent since the beginning⁵. (The current mission strength is 178.) Hungary provided one officer acting as the Legal Advisor (LEGAD) from April 2010 until March 2017. In April 2017 Hungary switched from the LEGAD position to the Aid the Camp (assistant to the Mission Commander) position. During the first mandate (10 Apr 2010 – 30 Jun 2011) three training NCOs, during the second mandate (1 Jul 2011 – 31 Dec 2012) two mentoring NCOs and one logistic NCO were provided. During the third mandate (1 Jan 2013 – 31 March 2015) Hungary started to withdraw the training/mentoring NCOs and since 1 June 2015 we have continuously filled the “Headquarters Squad” positions in the logistic section with three NCOs (during the fourth and fifth mandates, 1 April 2015 – 31 Dec 2016; and after 1 Dec 2017). The Hungarian positions at EUTM-S have always been coordinated with our international partners. Sending logistic NCOs instead of trainers/mentors was because of a mission request. Hungary initiated the withdrawal from the LEGAD position because we had difficulties in providing personnel for that.

NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The authorized strength of the effective military staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) is 24,410.⁶ Although the exact numbers are not published, the actual strength must be lower by several thousand, as we can conclude from statements of defence and military leaders and expert opinions⁷. In addition, as a new task, thousands of Hungarian soldiers participated in building a fence (Transitional Security Border Barrier) along the Serbian border in 2015

⁴ Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

⁵ Information provided by the Peace Support Operation Branch of Joint Force Command of the Hungarian Defence Forces and Kiss Álmos, P., Besenyő, J. and Resperger, I. *Országismertető. Szomália*. Székesfehérvár, 2010. <http://mek.oszk.hu/12900/12980/12980.pdf>, Accessed on 20 August 2017.

⁶ See National Assembly Resolution 35/2013. (V. 16.)

⁷ An article put the shortage in strength at 5 to 8 thousand. K. Kiss, G. “Több ezer ember hiányzik a seregből, mégsem toboroznak katonákat?”. *napi.hu*. 8 February 2016. http://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/tobb_ezer_ember_hianyzik_a_hadseregbol_megsem_toboroznak_katonakat.609643.html, Accessed on 20 August 2017.

and have performed guarding and other duties there for about two years to prevent illegal immigration. Despite these serious challenges, Hungary keeps providing around 1,000 soldiers at a given period for international crisis management operations as it has been done for a long period. Our priorities are the NATO missions in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, where approximately 60 percent of the Hungarian mission personnel serve. Strengthening our lead nation role in international operations, participation in high-intensity operations, deploying new capabilities and a more effective use of our resources are further priorities, as the HDF Branch Head responsible for international missions suggested⁸.

As one can see from the above, EUTM-S is not a priority among the international operations of the HDF. Why is Hungary still committed to participating in this mission? Under the Hungarian constitutional system, ‘the Government shall decide on the deployment of HDF troops based on the decision of the EU or the NATO, and shall forthwith report to the National Assembly on these decisions’⁹. The Government, accordingly, makes the primary decision authorizing Hungarian participation in a foreign mission and setting the maximum strength of troops, whereas the National Assembly (Parliament) has an opportunity to review this decision subsequently. These procedures took place upon the foundation of EUTM-S and on every occasion when its mandate was extended¹⁰. In its reports to the National Assembly, the Government identified the same reason for our participation. Most recently the report read, ‘... Our country supports the fulfilment of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and wishes to participate actively in the crisis management operations of the European Union not only in the European continent, but, expressing our solidarity, in a limited number, also in other continents. Further Hungarian military participation in the EUTM Somalia is in line with these aspirations.’¹¹ Besides this general political and security policy statement, a number of other arguments for the participation, and some against it were put forward in the parliamentary debate of the report concerning the Hungarian participation in EUTM-S.

The parliamentary debate took 54 minutes¹². As expected, except for one, all parties and Members of Parliament (MPs) participating in the debate supported the report, including the left wing opposition. The MPs of the ruling parties (FIDESZ, KDNP) mentioned among others that our international involvement is a means of the realization of Hungarian foreign policy and it strengthens Hungary’s position in the EU and the NATO. Hungary is commit-

⁸ See the lecture delivered by Head of Peace Support Operation Branch, Joint Force Command, HDF. Topor, I. ‘A Magyar Honvédség részvétele a nemzetközi béketámogató műveletekben’. 26 Sep 2016. Honvédség és Társadalom Baráti Kör Székesfehérvár. http://www.htbkszfvar.hu/weblap/wp-content/uploads/2016/nato_az_iskolatakaban/TOPOR-NATOISK.pdf. Accessed on 20 August 2017.

⁹ See Article 47 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.

¹⁰ See most recently the Government Resolution no. 1755/2016. (XII. 14) concerning the Further Hungarian Military Contribution to the Mission of the European Union Aimed at the Training of the Somalian Security Forces (EUTM Somalia) and the Report at note 11.

¹¹ See Report No. B/13683 submitted by the Government to the National Assembly in January 2017 on the Further Hungarian Military Contribution to the Mission of the European Union Aimed at the Training of the Somali Security Forces (EUTM Somalia).

¹² See minutes of the debate. ‘208. ülésnap (2017. 03. 21.) 23–46. felszólalás’. Hungarian National Assembly. http://www.parlament.hu/ulesnap-felszolalasai?p_auth=iihDz4V0&p_p_id=pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2&pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_pa irAction=%2Finternet%2Ffcpsql%2Fogy_naplo.naplo_fadat_aktus%3Fp_ckl%3D40%26p_uln%3D208%26p_felsz%3D23%26p_felszig%3D46%26p_aktus%3D17. Accessed on 20 August 2017.

ted to international peace and stability, and as all democratic states, it needs to fight against international threats and should contribute to the international efforts within means and capabilities. In the global world this directly improves our security and serves our national interests. Also, the knowledge and experience gained by the Hungarian troops in international operations is vital to the defence of our country. An MP of the main left wing opposition party (MSZP) shared these views acknowledging a consent among various Hungarian governments on the usefulness of the participation in international missions. The MPs and also the Parliamentary Secretary of State of the Defence Ministry agreed that a wide national support is required to our participation in foreign missions, including EUTM-S. What is the business of the Hungarian soldiers thousands of kilometres away from Hungary? – the Secretary recalled this frequently asked question. His conclusion was that because our soldiers act in the countries from which most migrants arrive, when they help restore law and order in those countries some time or other so that people can find their future and prosperity there, they also help Europe and Hungary keep belonging to the Europeans and to the Hungarians.

Although there was common principal consent in Hungarian politics concerning our involvement in international crisis management operations for 2 decades, and major political forces still do agree, many people find this involvement useless or against the national interests. A new, so-called radical right wing party (Jobbik) sharing this notion got into the National Assembly in 2010. They have been in opposition since then. During the previous parliamentary debate on the Government report¹³ concerning the participation of Hungary in EUTM-S in December 2015, they completely opposed our participation in any foreign military missions and voted against the report. Their speech-maker emphasized that all these international missions, whoever launched them (NATO, EU, UN), were unsuccessful and were part of the problem rather than the solution in the affected countries. In addition, these missions do serve economic and other interests of foreign great powers. Following its own national interests, Hungary should stay away from the skirmishes of those powers¹⁴. Notably, Jobbik took a more sophisticated position in the most recent debate on Hungarian participation in EUTM-S¹⁵: According to their speech-maker there are useful and unnecessary military missions, which are especially risky and serving foreign interests like the missions in Iraq or on the Sinai Peninsula. Concerning the Somalian mission, the speech-maker complained because, in the view of his party, there was not enough information available about the activities of the Hungarian soldiers serving there to judge the usefulness of our participation, especially in reducing migration. Therefore Jobbik abstained in the vote this time, instead of the complete rejection of the report.

Notably, all speakers of the above mentioned parliamentary debates appreciated the performance of Hungarian soldiers in EUTM-S and other international missions and thanked for their devotion and perseverance.

¹³ Report No. B/4580 submitted by the Government to the National Assembly in April 2015 on the Further Hungarian Military Contribution to the Mission of the European Union Aimed at the Training of the Somali Security Forces (EUTM Somalia).

¹⁴ See minutes of this debate. "123. ülésnap (2015. 12. 02.) 17–40. felszólalás". Hungarian National Assembly. http://www.parlament.hu/ulesnap-felszolalasai?p_auth=sxxafWbY&p_p_id=pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2&pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_9xd2Wc9jP4z8_paiAction=%2Finternet%2Fcpsql%2Fogy_naplo.naplo_fadat_aktus%3Fp_ckl%3D40%26p_uln%3D123%26p_felsz%3D17%26p_felszig%3D40%26p_aktus%3D3, Accessed on 20 August 2017.

¹⁵ See note 11.

THE SOLDIERS' PERSPECTIVE

Finally let us examine the issue from the point of view of the Hungarian military service members who participated in EUTM-S. As a Reserve Major, I served as the Legal Advisor of the mission for 2 years between March 2015 and March 2017¹⁶. My observations in this article emanate from that period. During that time altogether 11 NCOs served at the mission as heads or members of the Headquarters Squad, performing mainly logistic support tasks. As the Hungarian Senior National Representative, I had some insight also into their life and work¹⁷.

Hungarian soldiers normally perform 6 month duty tours in most international missions, including EUTM-S, however, an extension of the tour is possible upon request, especially when replacement to the soldier is not readily available. Although under the applicable legal regulations the foreign deployment of soldiers, with some restrictions, is allowed without consent, the law states that volunteers shall be preferred¹⁸. In practice almost all deployments are based on voluntary applications. To be selected for a foreign service, soldiers must meet a number of stringent requirements like medical fitness, general military skills, special professional requirements, foreign language requirements for individual positions, etc.

With regard to the conclusions of a survey¹⁹ (hereinafter referred to as the *Survey*) on the subject taken among Hungarian soldiers participating in various foreign missions, the motivations and the stress factors for Hungarian participants in EUTM-S could be outlined as follows.

The most important motivating factor for almost all mission participants, to include EUTM-S, is financial incentive. When serving in a foreign mission, Hungarian soldiers are entitled to their home pay, and in addition also to a “currency allowance”. Altogether their incomes can be 2-4 times higher in missions than at home. The currency allowance is fixed to the position filled at a mission and varies in dependence on the danger identification of the mission, and, to a less extent, to the climatic factors²⁰. Because EUTM-S is identified as a highly dangerous mission, soldiers there receive relatively high allowances.

¹⁶ A new voluntary reserve system largely based on retired soldiers was introduced in the HDF in 2012. Within that framework, “operational” reserve soldiers are allowed to apply for foreign service. This is especially useful for the HDF when there is no candidate available for a certain position from the active personnel, as it was in the case of the EUTM-S LEGAD position. Together with my predecessor, who was a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel, this position was filled by reserve officers between June 2014 and March 2017.

¹⁷ See my short reports with photos about the work of the Hungarian NCOs and the LEGAD published on the official Hungarian national defence website. Kelemen, L. “Magyar logisztikai csoport az EU Szomáliai missziójában”. honvedelem.hu. 10 November 2015. http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/53990_magyar_logisztikai_csoport_az_eu_szomaliai_missziojaban, Accessed on 20 August 2017. and Kelemen, L. “A szomáliai misszió jogi szemmel”. honvedelem.hu. 26 September 2016. <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/59456>, Accessed on 20 August 2017.

¹⁸ See A honvédek jogállásáról szóló 2012. évi CCV. törvény 202. § (Article 202 of the Act No CCV. on the Legal Status of the Members of the HDF).

¹⁹ Katona, T. “Misszió és motiváció: munkaérték preferenciák és a külszolgálatra motiváló tényezők kapcsolata a Magyar Honvédség állományában” [Deployment and Motivation: Workvalue Preferences and Factors within the Peacekeeping Operations at the Hungarian Defence forces]. *Honvédorvos* 62/1–2. 2010. 32.

²⁰ See some more details in the relevant decree and instruction of the Defence Minister [A békétámogató műveletekben részt vevő állomány részletes kategóriába sorolásáról szóló 58/2013. (IX. 20.) HM utasítás (Instruction of the Defence Minister no. 58/2013. (IX. 20.) on Detailed Classification of the Personnel Participating in Foreign Peace Support Operations)], A külföldön szolgálatot teljesítők egyes járandóságairól szóló 18/2013. (IX. 5.) HM rendelet. (Decree of the Defence Minister no 18/2013. (IX. 5.) on Some Emoluments of the Personnel Stationed Abroad.)

The *Survey* also identified a number of intellectual incentives like gaining new experience, challenges, professional development or learning English. Typically, the importance of these factors increased with the rank of the soldier. In my judgement, for the Hungarian members of EUTM-S professional development or challenges did not play a significant role, while some others, like independence, appreciation, practicing English and other positive effects of the international environment did.

From a professional point of view merely the LEGAD job was not especially challenging for me. Mostly I was engaged in creating the legal documents for cooperation of EUTM-S with other EU organizations (EU Delegation, EUCAP Somalia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and international partners (UNSOs²¹, AMISOM, etc) acting in the region, in negotiating with contractors extending services for the mission, and in providing legal advice to the Commander in many areas of the daily operation. After the initial few weeks many of these activities became routine. It was a challenge, however, that as the only LEGAD with the mission, I needed to act quite independently, even though some members of higher EU staffs could be reached for consultation or guidance. Doing this job I made some progress in the use of English legal and military terminology. My most remarkable task was the drafting of the new mission Rules of Engagement (ROE). The previous ROE were created in 2013 in Uganda. The new ROE needed to reflect the change of the location and the operational experience gained subsequently by the mission. The responsible EU bodies approved the submitted ROE request with some minor correction and the implementation of the new ROE started in December 2015.

The Hungarian NCOs in the HQ Squad provide some elements of logistic support. Their main task is transportation of the members of the mission and the visitors (including VIP delegations) from/to the nearby airport and to other locations within the airport zone on a daily basis. In addition they are in charge of cleaning and maintenance of the armoured cars they drive, manage stationery supply and office furniture, and liaise with the civilian contractors providing accommodation and catering for the mission. Again, these jobs in themselves are not especially challenging or demanding, but performing them in an international environment is a major motivating factor. The NCOs learned a new working and organizational culture with EUTM-S, where they enjoyed more freedom and independence than they normally do in their units. Therefore they were apparently happy to fill these individual assignments instead of belonging to a Hungarian unit stationed abroad. Of course, more freedom implies more responsibility. That did not pose any problem for the highly motivated Hungarian NCOs, whose manners, willingness and professionalism were widely appreciated both by their superiors and fellow mission members, which was another motivating factor for them. Learning English through practice is another advantage of an international environment. As a result of their position, the Hungarian NCOs needed to interact with most mission members, numerous local airport officials and market vendors. They gained a lot of interesting and valuable experience from these interactions. The NCOs were basically satisfied with their vehicles and the working and living conditions in the camp, and this motivated them further.

The *Survey* also looks through the potential stress factors for soldiers deployed abroad. The frequency of the identified factors varied depending on the level of danger in the mission and on whether Hungarian soldiers typically filled individual assignments or belonged to a Hungarian unit. In Afghanistan, unlike in other, more peaceful areas, death was the number

²¹ United Nations Support Office in Somalia.

one stress factor. Somalia is also a very dangerous country, especially for foreigners. Even if EUTM-S is not a combat mission, and even if its members are accommodated in a protected area, as mentioned, the mission compounds and the mission members could be exposed to attacks at any time, which permanently requires high awareness from them. Therefore death and injury is a major stress factor. It could be especially stressful that in case of an injury or serious illness, hospitalization of the mission members is only possible outside Somalia and evacuation could be both time consuming and hazardous.

In the *Survey* several soldiers mentioned rare or unknown diseases as stress factors. This concern may naturally arise when serving in Africa. EUTM-S, through its contractors, grants high hygienic standards concerning the accommodation, food supply, and others. Therefore, even though minor diarrhoea infections sometimes occurred, serious tropical diseases among the mission members are very scarce, if appear at all. The mission maintains Role 1 and Role 2 level medical treatment facilities to its members²², whereas hospitals in Nairobi, Kenya, may extend more progressive (Role 3 level) health care services for mission members, and EUTM-S can organize medical evacuation by air to these hospitals, when needed.

Family and other private life problems may unavoidably occur when family members live separated for a long period. In some missions this was the most frequently mentioned stress factor and it also appeared in the EUTM-S Hungarian contingent. Even if some problems cannot be or can only be solved with difficulty from a large distance, it is very helpful that during most of the time the mission provided excellent free internet access to its members, so they were able to have permanent connection to their families.

Conflict with superiors or fellow soldiers was a highly rated stress factor in KFOR and UNFICYP missions, according to the *Survey*. Hungarian soldiers had no conflicts with superiors at EUTM-S. Apart from some rare minor skirmishes, cohesion and comradeship in the Hungarian contingent was excellent and members of the contingent supported one another in many ways during my tenure. Most members of the mission are accommodated in two-bed container rooms. The lack of privacy, intimacy, and different habits of people may lead to conflicts in such a situation. Hungarian NCOs did not have any problems with that, however. (I felt discomfort at the accommodation because of the use of the air conditioning by my roommate. Due to this and to my extremely long stay with the mission, after 10 month I was allocated a single accommodation.)

The mission and its environment contribute to the reduction of stress in many ways. As well as the good internet connection, a well-equipped gym, a small bar and a pool are available at the mission compounds. Depending on the security situation, the members of

²² „[Role 1] includes the provision of primary health care, emergency treatment (resuscitation and stabilization) and preparation for transfer usually under the guidance of a medical officer. This capability is normally integral to a major land-based unit and also reflects the provision of medical support inherent to an afloat platform.” “[Role 2] includes the reception and sorting of patients as well as the ability to provide elements of damage control resuscitation and the treatment of casualties. This is bolstered by a wider range of medical and nursing interventions and enhanced laboratory and imaging facilities. In addition, this level of care will prepare patients for further transfer with a limited holding capacity to prepare casualties for onward evacuation or for return to duties.” (Definitions cited from internet page. “Levels of Medical Care”. medevacmatters. 16 February 2012. <https://medevacmatters.org/2012/02/16/medical-treatment-facilities-mtf/>, Accessed on 20 August 2017.) As mentioned, Role 1 services are provided by a Serbian military medical team, while integrated with them, a private contractor (Medical Support Solutions Ltd.) extends Role 2 services. Because dental care is not included in the EUTM-S medical treatment facilities, the mission members have access to UNSOS facilities for dental services.

the mission are allowed to move freely within the airport zone to do some minor shopping, to do sports or relax at the ocean beach. During a 6-month tour, mission service members are entitled to two 96-hour stay in a good quality apartment in Nairobi, Kenya free of charge and they can have access to flights operated by EU or UNSOS to get there.

The Hungarian participation in EUTM-S has been successful and useful: The individual soldiers gained valuable experience, the HDF gained a number of more experienced and better prepared soldiers, whereas the mission gained motivated personnel who could effectively contribute to its smooth operation. In addition, all this strengthens EU solidarity and Hungary's reputation within the community.

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1st Lt. Ákos Treszkai:

THE DIFFICULTIES OF A POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL MISSION IN LIBYA

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to review the situation in Libya, one of the most significant strategic issues for Europe. As a consequence of the Arab Spring, a civil war broke out against Moammar Kaddafi and his regime; NATO intervened to protect the civilians against Kaddafi's army. After Kaddafi's death, the European Community left Libya in a chaos. Presently, Libya is still an unresolved hotspot. Thousands of migrants leave Libya over the Mediterranean Sea heading for Europe. There are radical militias and uncontrolled armed groups all around the country. Organized crime, such as weapons smuggling and drug trafficking, is an undoubtedly profitable business in the region. Radical Islamist militias and Islamist fundamentalism are continuously gaining ground. The European Union is certainly responsible for the current situation in Libya. But besides those of the European Union, there are other geopolitical, financial and other interests involved, making solution difficult. The Libyan crisis is a tremendous issue for the European Union.

KEYWORDS: Libya, international mission, the crisis in Libya, Moammar Kaddafi, Arab Spring, Kaddafi's regime, armed groups, militias, Islamic State, mass migration, instability. NATO Operation Unified Protector

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays Libya is one of the most significant security challenges for Europe. This hotspot is right at the doorsteps of Europe. The shortest distance between the Libyan coasts and the Italian Island of Lampedusa is about 296 km on sea.¹ Before the Arab Spring, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the Maghreb region. After the civil war and Moammar Kaddafi's death, this country became a "powder keg".

Today the European Union is facing thousands of migrants², uncontrolled illegal drugs and weapons smuggling.³ The political chaos and anarchy are a breeding ground for extremist religious beliefs and terrorism. The European Union and the western world are just beginning to understand that they must make some political, economic and military efforts to stabilize Libya; Libya has strategic relevance for Europe.

¹ "Distance between Tripoli and Lampedusa". <http://www.distancefromto.net/between/Tripoli/Lampedusa>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

² "Thousands of migrants rescued off Libya". BBC. 30 August 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37216881>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

³ Burke, P. "Libya's criminal Economy of Arms, Drugs, People Shakes Prospects for Transition". United States Institute of Peace. 19 March 2014. <http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/libya-s-criminal-economy-of-arms-drugs-people-shakes-prospects-transition>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.



Source: Libya's strategic relevance for Europe⁴

LIBYA IN THE KADDAFI ERA

In the Kaddafi era, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the region and it was a vital partner both in security and energy issues. It played a significant role in the European energy supply and it helped the European Union to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. A shining example of this cooperation is the Greenstream pipeline linking Italy and Libya.⁵

The production of fossil fuels, such as oil and gas, make up 90 percent of Libyan economy. In 2004, 95 percent of the profit came from European oil export. In 2010, oil production was 1.8 million barrels a day. With these results, Libya was the 18th highest producing country in the world. Its most important export partners were Italy (31.6 percent), France (13 percent), China, (9.2 percent), Spain (9.1 percent) and Germany (8.4 percent)⁶

Another relevant issue for Europe is controlling migration. Between 1980 and 1990, there were many bloody and serious conflicts in the region, such as the civil war in Chad and in Sudan, and the crisis in the Western-Sahara. Thousands of hopeless refugees fled to escape these conflicts and wars, and start a new life in Europe.

It was not just conflicts and civil wars, but also economic decline and poverty which drove people to migration.⁷ In the 2000s, Kaddafi concluded an agreement with Italy and France on various Libyan interests so that in exchange he would stop African migrants who wanted to travel to the European Union over the Mediterranean Sea.⁸

Besides holding thousands of African migrants back, the Kaddafi Regime had another issue for the European Union: the fight against extremism and terrorism. As a dictator,

⁴ "Hundreds feared dead as boat capsizes off Libya coast". Al Jazeera. 20 April 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/report-hundreds-feared-dead-boat-capsizes-libya-150419074946551.html>, Accessed on 21 July 2017.

⁵ "New gas pipeline linking Libya to Italy opened". Alexander's Gas&Oil Connections. 8 October 2004. <http://www.gasandoil.com/news/europe/747d13a1666a36a2e86cf571bfbc0aad>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

⁶ Besenyő, J. and Marsai, V. *Országismertető: Líbia*. Székesfehérvár: MH Összhadmérési Parancsnokság, 2012. 27–29.

⁷ Marsai, V. "A líbiai helyzet és az európai nagysztratégia hiánya". *Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések* 3. 2014. 2.

⁸ Bredeloup, S. and Pliez, O. "The Libyan Migrant Corridor". European University Institute. 29 March 2011. 8–11. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16213/EUUS%20Immigration%20Systems%202011%20-%2003.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

Kaddafi fought against everyone who endangered his power. Although Libya is an Islamic country and 96.6% of the population are Sunni Muslims,⁹ Kaddafi still ruled a moderate Islamic country. He helped and sponsored guerrilla and terrorist groups all around the world, but he did his best against religious extremism and fundamentalism within Libya. He did not tolerate any political opposition including the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, during the Kaddafi regime only one terrorist attack happened in Libya between 2001 and 2011. In 2012, the number of attacks was 6. In 2013, this increased to 145. There were 201 incidents in 2014. Although the number decreased to 100 last year, it is still very high.¹⁰

THE ARAB SPRING AND THE FALL OF KADDAFI

There was stability before the so-called “Arab Spring”. The terms “Arab Spring” or “Arab Uprising” were first published in the western media in 2011. The entire political scene changed during that time in the Middle East.

According to the definition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, “the Arab Spring” was a “*wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressing political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces. For detailed coverage of the Arab Spring in individual countries, see Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syria Uprising of 2011–12.*”¹¹

This paper summarises only the North African events of the Arab Spring. There were demonstrations and conflicts in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Jordan as well, however, the events in the Middle East did not influence directly the processes in North Africa, specifically in Libya.

The process began with protests in Tunisia in December 2010. A 26 year old vendor selling fruits in the street sparked the events. He had some conflict with a police, he got fined and his goods were seized. Afterwards he set himself on fire thus committing suicide. Protests started to spread throughout the county. President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali attempted to use force against the protesters but in vain. People demonstrated against unemployment, widespread corruption, and demanded freedom of speech. As a consequence, President Ben Ali lost power and lost control of the military and police forces. He resigned from his political position on 14 January 2011. Due to those political changes, today secular Tunisians are concerned about the influence of ultra-conservative Islamists because their power is increasing.¹² Various Salafist and Jihadist movements, such as the Ansar al-Sharia, came into being because of the fall of the Ben Ali regime, and this process is especially gaining strength nowadays.¹³

⁹ “The World Factbook”. CIA. 21 January 2017. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

¹⁰ Yonah, A. “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2015”. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, 2016. 6–7. <http://potomac institute.org/images/TerrNASahel2015.pdf>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

¹¹ “Arab Spring, pro-democracy protests”. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

¹² “Tunisia Country Profile”. BBC. 22 January 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107241>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

¹³ Besenyő, J. and Prantner, Z. “Tunisia’s Security Concerns”. *AARMS volume 14 Issue 1*. 2015. 5–7.

In Egypt, the mass protests started on 25 January 2011 with the aim of forcing Hosni Mubarak to resign. Thousands of protesters occupied the central Tahrir Square in Cairo. The government blocked the social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, and also the mobile telephone networks. In the following days, the security forces used force and tear gas against the masses. Hundreds were injured and arrested.¹⁴ Despite the action of the security forces, the unrests continued. Just as Ben Ali in Tunisia, the Egyptian president also lost control over the military too. The military traditionally is one of the most influential pillars of the political power in Egypt because it has always played a significant role in modern Egyptian history.¹⁵ On 11 February 2011, Mubarak resigned, but then the Mubarak regime and the fundamentalist Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, won the elections together under the name of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The unrests continued; finally the military removed the FJP from power.¹⁶

In Libya, the mass protests started against Moammar Kaddafi on 15 February 2011 when the President of Egypt resigned. Kaddafi used force against the protesters as well.¹⁷ In Libya, these mass demonstrations escalated into a civil war. Upon Kaddafi's orders, the military intervened against the protesters and the civilians.

Libya was the first country in the Arab Spring where demonstrations and uprisings evolved into civil war. In March 2011, NATO forces launched Operation Unified Protector to intervene on the side of the opposition rebel movement¹⁸. As a result of NATO intervention, the armed opposition rebels took most of the country by August 2011. Finally, Kaddafi was killed on 20 October 2011.¹⁹

When the Libyan civil war erupted, nearly two thousand civilians got killed in the first month. The United Nations Security Council declared a "No-Fly Zone" over Libya to protect the civilians. France and Great Britain immediately took military action. Finally, the NATO Operation Unified Protector began on 31 March 2011. This was the first NATO Operation in history when NATO was at war with an independent Arab country. The aim of the operation was to provide protection for civilians from the sea and from the air.²⁰ The NATO operation was stopped on 31 October 2011.

According to the NATO Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats, 8,000 troops were involved in the mission in addition to 260 air assets and 21 naval assets. In the air mission, 26,500 sorties were flown, including 9,700 air strikes. Officially, 5,900 Libyan military

¹⁴ Shenker, J. "Bloody and bruised: the journalist caught in Egypt unrest". *The Guardian*, 27 January 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/27/egypt-riot-security-force-action>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

¹⁵ Besenyő, J. and Miletics, P. *Országismertető: Egyiptom*. 2. ed. Budapest: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, MH Képzési és Doktrinális Központ, MH Geoinformációs Szolgálat, 2014. 192–194.

¹⁶ Manfreda, P. "The Arab Spring Uprisings". ThoughtCo. 18 June 2016. <http://middleeast.about.com/od/human-rightsdemocracy/tp/Arab-Spring-Uprisings.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

¹⁷ Black, I. "Libya's day of rage met by bullets and loyalists". *The Guardian*, 17 February 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/libya-day-of-rage-unrest>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

¹⁸ "Operation Unified Protector: February-October 2011". NATO. NATO and Libya. 27 March 2012. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm>, Accessed on 22. January 2017.

¹⁹ "Muammar Gaddafi: How he died". BBC. 31 October 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15390980>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²⁰ Gaub, F. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing operation unified protector*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013.1–3.

targets were destroyed including 400 artillery assets and over 600 main battle tanks and armoured vehicles.²¹

The above data prove that without the international mission, the opposition rebels would not have been able to take most of Libya. It is also a fact that without international assistance, the rebel groups could not have overthrown the Kaddafi regime. After Kaddafi and his regime's downfall – the main reason for the ongoing Libyan crisis today – the international community did not give any assistance in securing and stabilising the ruined state.

More conflicts and crises erupted after Kaddafi's death among the former opposition groups, and anarchy still prevails in Libya.

The fourth country in North Africa where the Arab Spring hit was Morocco. On 21 February 2011, forty thousand protesters gathered in Rabat and in another 57 cities to demand greater social justice, reforms, and restricting King Mohammed IV's powers.²² The king responded to the demands with constitutional reforms and parliamentary elections.²³ Despite the demonstrations and clashes, the Arab Spring in Morocco was more peaceful than in other North African countries, compared to Tunisia or Egypt and in particular to Libya.

In summary: the Arab Spring caused sweeping changes in North Africa and in the Middle East. It was a chain-reaction which destabilized the region and significantly empowered the radical Islamist organizations all over North Africa and in the Middle East.

The civil war in Syria was the result of the Arab Spring and it caused critical political and security concerns for the European Union. Libya was the only country during the Arab Spring where the western world (the European Union with the support of the US) intervened in order to protect civilians.

Following the NATO operation, a peace reconstruction mission should have started.

There were no significant efforts to rebuild and restore Libya. After Kaddafi's death, the former opposition rebel groups lost the "common enemy" and the civil war continued.

After Kaddafi's death, the National Transitional Council (NTC) declared the freedom of the country. The NTC was supported by the people.

The infrastructure in Libya did not suffer irreparable damage in the civil war and under the NATO operation either.

Thus after Kaddafi's death, there was no common enemy anymore. The groups and militias participating in the civil war were divided. There were a lot of actors in the post-civil war Libya: Kaddafi's former military personnel who joined the rebel forces, revolutionary brigades, other militias as post-revolutionary brigades, and some armed groups consisting of students, workers, or ordinary civilians and even tribal fighters.

Some groups and militias were formed to fight against the Kaddafi's Regime as rebel forces and some other groups were established for security purposes. Such militias and groups had different capabilities, backgrounds, and combat experience, and had come from different parts of the country. Some of the militias committed ordinary crimes, some were involved in war and organized crime, while others had absolutely different backgrounds²⁴.

²¹ "Operation Unified Protector final mission stats". NATO. 02 November 2011. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²² Tremlett, G. "Morocco riots leave five deaths". *The Guardian*, 21 February 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/morocco-riots-five-dead>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²³ Manfreda, P. "The Arab Spring...".

²⁴ Chivvis, S. C. and Martini, J. *Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2014. 13–16.

The groups and militias had different interests so they were not able to unite. For example, the revolutionary brigades deeply involved in the fight against Kaddafi's Army had more combat experience and they had more and modern weapons as well.²⁵

Just as in other conflicts, these militias and armed groups did not lay down their weapons after the war and they did not disband. After the fall of the regime, a serious security and political vacuum evolved and the militias started to compete against each other. Most of the groups claimed to be the Guardians of the Revolution.²⁶

The National Transitional Council tried to register and integrate these militias and armed groups into the Ministry of Defence, in order to give legitimacy to many armed groups if they had become parts of the Libyan National Army.²⁷

It was a milestone in the procedure when on 11 September 2012, terrorists attacked the US consulate in Benghazi. As a result of the attack, three contracted security guards and the US ambassador were killed²⁸. This attack was a clear evidence of the chaos in Libya and showed the weakness of the government and pointed to the uncontrollable, legally, semi-legally, or illegally operating armed groups and militias which were involved in the act. The government was unable to disband these militias, and the government's weakness combined with the lack of international action helped to cause the outbreak of the second Libyan civil war.²⁹

The second Libyan civil war broke out due to the uncontrolled and independent militias. Those rival groups fought for power, territory, money, and some other interests.³⁰

The conflict erupted between the GNC and the House of Representatives (HoR), which was legally elected in the summer of 2014 and accepted by the international community. It was called the Libyan government. Its seat was in the eastern part of Libya, in Tobruk.

The rival government was the so-called General National Congress (GNC). The seat of the GNC was in the formal capital, Tripoli.

Between 2012 and 2014, the so-called General National Congress (GNC) was the official government, recognised by the international community. In 2014 the two political actors agreed to accept the results of the election. The GNC was called now the Islamic Government.

Despite the original agreement, the GNC did not accept the results of the election³¹.

²⁵ Kirkpatrick, D. D. "In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution". *The New York Times*, 01 November 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/africa/in-libya-the-fighting-may-outlast-the-revolution.html>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²⁶ Meo, N. "Libya: revolutionaries turn on each other as fears grow for law and order". *The Telegraph*. 31 October 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²⁷ Abuzaakouk, A. "America's Own War Criminal in Libya". *Huffington Post*. 08 August 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/americas-own-war-criminal-in-libya_us_57a851f4e4b034b258956cc6, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²⁸ "Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts". *CNN*. 12 December 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

²⁹ "Benghazi US Consulate attack: Timeline". *BBC*. 16 November 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19587068>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁰ Cruickshank, M. "Libya's Second Civil War: How did it come to this?" *Conflict News*. 05 December 2014. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150320232806/http://www.conflict-news.com/libyas-second-civil-war-how-did-it-come-to-this/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³¹ "The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset". *International Crisis Group*. 04 November 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-political-agreement-time-reset>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.


The HoR controls the eastern part of Libya. Its army is the revolutionary militia: the Libyan National Army, supported by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The rival Islamic government controls the western part of Libya, supported by Qatar, Sudan and Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood, Libya Dawn and other Islamist militias.

Besides two governments, there are more armed groups and militias, such as the Shura Council in Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), and the Libyan Provinces. The southwest and the desert areas are controlled by the Tuareg militias of Ghat. There are other local armed groups which control the Misrata district or Bani Walid, Tawergha.³²

There were new political developments in 2015: the so-called “Skhirat Agreement”³³. As a result of UN pressure, on 5 April 2016, the Islamist Government announced handing power over to a new integrated government, the so-called Government of National Accord.³⁴ They agreed to reunify the National Oil Corporation on 2 July 2016. According to plans, in January 2017, the main oil terminal was to restart and operate again³⁵. In the end, however, this unity did not happen, and both HoR and GNC still exist.

This cooperation is still very volatile; there are too many questions and many conflicting interests. It is not yet clear how this will operate in the future because there is no agreement on some issues. Furthermore, the problem with the other brigades, militias and armed groups is still unresolved.³⁶

According to the Libya Special Intelligence Report, in August 2016 the situation was the following:



(Source: *Territorial Control in Libya*)³⁷

³² Wehrey, F. and Lacher, W. "Libya's Legitimacy Crisis". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 06 October 2014. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/06/libya-s-legitimacy-crisis/hr9j>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³³ "The Libyan Political Agreement as signed on 17 December 2015". UNSMIL. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=fr>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁴ "Libya's Unity government leaders in Tripoli power bid". BBC. 31 March 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35929232>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁵ Sarrar, S. and Wardany, E. S. "Libyan Oil Port Said to Re-open as OPEC Nation Boosts Output". Bloomberg. 05 January 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-04/libya-oil-export-terminal-said-to-re-open-as-crude-output-rises>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁶ Elumami, A. "Libya's self-declared National Salvation government stepping down". Reuters. 05 April 2016. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-politics-idUKKCN0X22MD>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

³⁷ Berkowitz, O. "Libya Special Intelligence Report-Projections on Stabilization and the Challenges Ahead-August". August 2016. <http://www.max-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/pic1-current-territorial-control-in-Libya.jpg>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

The European Union plans to meet the challenges and solve the issues in the framework of an international mission. The radical Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State, expanded to the neighbourhood of Europe. Earlier the Islamic State, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operated far from Europe, but now they are only in some 300 km from the borders or the European Union.

Nowadays one of the most serious challenges is that members of terrorist or Islamist groups can mingle among migrants. Actually, it is impossible to identify someone among the thousands of migrants who does not have any documents. There is no way to check someone's background. In practice, there is little chance to find the radicals or terrorists among the thousands of migrants.³⁸

Another significant challenge for the European Union is illegal arms trafficking. During the chaos of the first civil war in Libya, large amounts of weapons, rifles, surface-to-air missiles and explosives were lost from the military bases and warehouses. Then they reappeared in other conflicts in Darfur, Central-African Republic, Nigeria or Mali. The proliferation of Libyan weapons has certain implications.

First, these weapons destabilized other regions and gave fuel to fire in other conflicts, where other international or European missions may operate, so those weapons endanger European soldiers and staffs as well. Secondly, the international community cannot build peace if every involved party has weapons. Thirdly, it is the only a question of time when those weapons, explosives, and detonators arrive in Europe and are used for criminal or terrorist purposes. Actually, large amounts of drugs arrive in Europe from North Africa. If drugs can be smuggled to Europe, so can weapons.

Chaos and the civil war, and in general all conflicts result in refugees. There are not only Sub-Saharan Africans who want to travel to Europe, but people from Libya too. If they have no chance for a normal life, they want to start a new one. Security aspects are not everything, but they are certainly necessary. There are economic and financial aspects as well. *“For most people with empty stomach democracy and dictatorship do not differ very much. Several changes would be vital for the establishment of secure North Africa, such as stabilizing the financial environment, reinforcing private sector vs. state ownership and increasing the integration of local industries into regional and international economy.”*³⁹

People need work in order to live a normal life, but without international assistance and help it is almost impossible. The European Union and the international community should put money and investment into the restarting of the country.

THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

In the outlined situation, the only solution for the stabilization in Libya seems to be an international mission.

The background and the necessity of the first NATO mission, Operation Unified Protector:

Winds of change blew in Libya in 2011. The Libyan people demanded changes. The Libyan tribes did not trust Kaddafi and his regime anymore. The Arab Spring was just more

³⁸ Marsai. “A libíai helyzet...”. 4.

³⁹ Besenyő, J. “Can the „Arab Spring” present a real threat to Europe?” *Strategic Impact* 1. 2014. 39.

fuel to the fire. Compared to Tunisia or Morocco, in Libya there was no chance for peaceful transition. Moammar Kaddafi was not open for any dialogue or cooperation. He did not want to resign or give up his power and position. When mass protests started, the Libyans systematically turned against Kaddafi and established their own unified opposition as the National Transitional Council.⁴⁰ Kaddafi's response to the Libyans' demands was aggression and violence. The protests turned into civil war.⁴¹

The European Union and the international community had two options. The first one is that the European powers let the "dictator" kill thousands of innocent civilians who wanted to remove him from power. This scenario caused serious ideological controversy to Europe and it is contradictory to European ideology and human rights which are fundamental for the European Union. Besides the ideological dispute, the European interest was to try to influence the processes and events in Libya. The other option was a military intervention with the aim of protecting civilians, overthrowing Kaddafi, assisting peaceful transition, and securing European interests in Libya. Finally, giving in to the pressure by Great Britain and France, NATO intervened and launched Operation Unified Protector. The European powers and NATO made a fatal mistake. After the fall of Kaddafi and the international intervention they left Libya in chaos and they did not assist in stabilizing the country, and they did not help Libyans to rebuild their country.⁴²

Operation Unified Protector was not the only international mission in connection with Libya. There was another NATO Operation in the Mediterranean Area: Operation Sea Guardian was a flexible maritime operation which was created at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The mission statement of the operation was "*to provide support to maritime situational awareness, to fight terrorism at sea and to contribute to maritime security capacity-building.*"⁴³ The first operation in the Mediterranean Sea was Operation Active Endeavour which was launched by NATO in response to the "9/11 2001 terror attack" in the United States. In the framework of Operation Active Endeavour NATO ships conducted patrols to detect terrorist activities at sea, such as weapon smugglings, and also to protect against other terrorist activity. Operation Active Endeavour ended in October 2016 and it was followed by Operation Sea Guardian.⁴⁴

The European Union was also involved in an international maritime mission, EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA. The aim of the mission was to respond to the migration issue. The core mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA was to disrupt the business model of trafficking in human beings, to fight against human trafficking networks, and to prevent more losses of life at sea. Its mandate was "*extended for training of the Libyan coastguards*

⁴⁰ "The National Transitional Council, Libya". NTC. 24 January 2017. <http://ntclibya.org/>, Accessed on 24. January 2017.

⁴¹ Sinjab, L. "Syria conflict: from peaceful protest to civil war". BBC. 15 March 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21797661>, Accessed on 24 January 2017.

⁴² Marsai, V. "A migrációs diskurzus margójára III.: A líbiai válság európai migráció tükrében". *Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések* 1. 2017. 2–3.

⁴³ "Operation Sea Guardian". NATO. 27 October 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm, Accessed on 27 January 2017.

⁴⁴ "Operation Active Endeavour". NATO. 27 October 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm, Accessed on 27 January 2017.

*and navy, furthermore contributing to the implementation of the UN arm embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya”.*⁴⁵

The most serious issue which the European Union had to face was the fact that it did not have the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA had no right to operate on Libyan waters and land therefore they were not able to take back the rescued migrants to Libya, and the ships participating in the operation had to carry the migrants to Europe. Practically, the European Maritime Operation was assisting the migrants to reach Europe and was also assisting the man-smuggling and human trafficking organizations because it was the EU ships which took the migrants into Europe instead of those of the human smugglers.⁴⁶

On 15 March 2015, the High Representative of the European External Action Service Federica Mogherini proposed to the 28 EU Member States that they consider sending soldiers and police to Libya to monitor the ceasefire, to protect airports, other critical infrastructure, and ships to help to enforce the arms embargo. According to the proposal, the EU should have considered sending military force and civilian teams to Libya. The military force was to protect the government and the police, and civilians were to help with fighting terrorism and restart the industry and the economy. The proposal was met with skepticism by the EU governments and it was not implemented.⁴⁷

The challenges of a potential and effective international mission are derived from the following factors:

The EU MS are sceptical about a new, potential EU mission which requires the request of the UN-backed Libyan Government – an independent legitimate country – as well as the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, where two countries with veto right, Russia and China, presumably would not support any international mission.

The potential veto from Russia and China has geopolitical reasons. A hotspot close to the European Union and mass migration may be beneficial for both of them because the Libyan crisis may result in political and economic tension within the European Union.⁴⁸

The Libyan Government has two undisputed reasons against any international intervention or mission.

First, the Libyans do not want any foreign or international force to be stationed in Libya.

Second, the Libyan Government does not want the European Union to deport the migrants back to Libya.

According to the International Organization of Migration – a UN Related Organisation – the migrant population in Libya is about 700,000 – 1,000,000. They come mostly from Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Syria, and Mali. These people are often victims of slavery, prostitution, and other abuses and harassments. As a consequence of such conditions,

⁴⁵ “EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA”. European External Action Service. 01 March 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/36/about-eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en Accessed on 27 January 2017.

⁴⁶ “Mediterranean crisis: UN welcomes EU measures on migrants, urges more comprehensive action”. UN News Centre. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50677#WKoeom_hDIU, Accessed on 27 January 2017.

⁴⁷ Croft, A. “EU proposal to send soldiers to Libya met scepticism”. Reuters. 15 March 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-security-eu-idUSL6N0WH0JU20150315>, Accessed on 27 January 2017.

⁴⁸ Marsai, V. “A migrációs diskurzus...”. 11–12.

a lot of people choose to take the dangerous journey to Europe. In 2016, 278,327 migrants arrived in Europe over the Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁹

On the one hand, mass migration is a profitable business for the Libyans, but on the other hand, it causes serious security and social problems for the country.

CONCLUSION

After the Arab Spring that later evolved into a civil war and Kaddafi's death, the former stable country in the vicinity of Europe turned into a conflict zone. Libya is a serious challenge for the European Union in political, security, and economic aspects. There are many security challenges in Libya, such as mass migration, the presence of militias and armed groups. Currently one government governs the country but radical Islamism and terrorist organizations and enormous amounts of illegal weapons and explosives cause further complications. These factors cannot be solved without international assistance.

Since this paper is just an overview of the situation, it cannot provide a solution for all problems of how to rebuild a new democratic country. It is a long-term project to unite all the different interests to create a single functioning body. It is certainly not possible without discussions with, the will and the permission of the legitimate Libyan Government.

The lack of political consensus in the European Union, the geopolitical interests of other powers and the Libyans' own interests block any international mission in Libya, but without an international mission, there is no hope for a stable country close to the southern border of Europe.

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⁴⁹ "Libya". International Organization for Migration. <https://www.iom.int/countries/libya>, Accessed on 28 January 2017.

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István Harkai:

THE CLASH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERESTS OF GREAT POWERS THROUGH THE GLASS OF WESTERN SAHARA

*ABSTRACT: During the survey of the hidden corner of Northwest Africa, the author attempted to introduce the case of Western Sahara, the people living in the conflict zone, the parties of the conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front, the roots of the conflict and the basics of humanitarian law, the human rights abuses and the living conditions in the refugee camps in Algeria in several other notes.¹ The impact of the principle *uti possidetis* on the relations and peace of African states was also demonstrated, and mentioned the initiatives of the United Nations in order to organise the referendum in Western Sahara within the framework of MINURSO.² The situation in the Eastern basin of the Atlantic Ocean is still unsettled, as a frozen conflict evolved. Meanwhile, most of the territory of Western Sahara is still under Moroccan occupation. This situation threatens the future of the Saharawi nation gives a chance the Polisario to continue the fight in a more radical way.³*

This essay introduces the clash between the rules and norms of international law and the practice and interest of the great powers, which follow the legal norms in accordance with double standards.

KEYWORDS: Western Sahara, Morocco, MINURSO, Polisario, France, United States, Spain, Siyar, sovereignty, statehood, natural resources, trade law, international law, European Court of Justice, International Court of Justice

COLLISION OF THE SIYAR AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW

In 1960 the General Assembly of the United Nations (hereinafter: General Assembly) adopted Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which was the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. This document declared that the colonial world order has to be demolished without hesitation as soon as possible.⁴ In 1963 the General Assembly declared, that Western Sahara has to be considered as a *non-*

¹ Harkai, I. "Humanitárius és emberi jogi jogsértések, valamint a menekültek helyzete Afrika utolsó „gyarmatán”". *Afrika Tanulmányok* 9/1. 2015. 55–72.

² Harkai, I. "Négy konfliktus – négy mandátum: A nyugat-szaharai, az angolai, a namíbiai és a közép-afrikai ENSZ békemissziók mandátumainak összehasonlító elemzése". *Szakmai Szemle* 13/3. 2015. 35–53.

³ Harkai, I. „Terrorfellegek Nyugat-Szahara felett?”. *Felderítő Szemle* 15/1. 2016. 58–66.

⁴ Valki, L. "A nemzetközi jog sajátosságai; A népek önrendelkezési joga; Az állam szuverenitása; Háború, erőszak, agresszió; Az erőszak és az önvédelem vitatott kérdései". In Kende, T. et al. (eds), *Nemzetközi jog*. Budapest: Complex Kiadó, 2014, 80.

self-governing-territory.⁵ This statement was relevant, as the province had been a Spanish colony since 1884. The Polisario Front was established in 1973 by a group of students who were determined to fight for the freedom of the Saharawi nation.⁶

Spain, as an administering power of a colony, was obliged by a General Assembly resolution adopted in 1966 to take steps in organizing the referendum⁷. Because the neighboring Morocco and Mauritania announced armed intervention in case the voters had voted for the independence of Western Sahara, the United Nations requested Spain to postpone the referendum until the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion in the case of Western Sahara.⁸ The question was whether Western Sahara was *terra nullius* – „no man’s land” – in the time of the Spanish colonisation, and if not, what the nature of the relationship between the Saharawies and the Moroccan sultan and Mauritania was.

It is interesting that the case gave chance to the International Court of Justice, to express its opinion in the question, whether it has jurisdiction over advisory opinions. It was necessary because Spain argued, that the International Court of Justice (hereinafter: Court) had jurisdiction over the case of Western Sahara.

In its answer the International Court of Justice confirmed the principle that the approval of Spain is not necessary, as the Court will formulate an advisory opinion demanded by the General Assembly. The approval of a country is only necessary in legally binding procedures, or in litigations.⁹

In its advisory opinion the Court also expressed that Western Sahara at the time of Spanish colonization was not *terra nullius*, as the chiefs had sovereignty over the local tribes, and the Spaniards got in contact with them, forcing them to recognise Spanish authority. If Rio de Oro was not a *terra nullius*, there had to be some kind of relations between the local population and the neighboring powers. The answer to this question from the Court perfectly and sharply highlights the conflict between the traditional Islamic International Law, the *Siyar*, and modern international law, dominated by the interests of the western powers.

In the second question, Morocco tried to prove the sovereignty of the Moroccan monarchs over the Southern tribes. The Court refused this point of view, and emphasized, that the Moroccan sovereignty was only titular, as the sultans neither collected tax from the permanently wandering tribes, nor made effort to maintain a stable administration, nor resisted the foreign occupation of Western Sahara.¹⁰

⁵ Epstein, P. “Behind closed doors: “Autonomous colonization” in post United Nations era – The case for Western Sahara”. *Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law* 15. 2009. 107.; UN General Assembly. „Report of the committee on information from non-self-governing territories, Annex III”. 1963. A/5514.

⁶ Besenyő, J. “A nyugat-szaharai konfliktus, az önállósodási küzdelem kezdete: a Nemzetközi Bíróság döntése és a „zöld menet””. *Kül-Világ* 6/2. 2009. 37–57.

⁷ “Questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara”. UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2229 (XXI). 20 December 1966.

⁸ Besenyő, J. “A nyugat-szaharai konfliktus...”. 111.

⁹ Kahan, R. “Building a protective wall around terrorists: How the International Court of Justice’s ruling in the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory made the world safer for terrorists and more dangerous for member states of the United Nations”. *Fordham International Law Journal* 28/3. 2004. 852–854.

¹⁰ “Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975”. International Court of Justice. 101. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=4&case=61&code=sa&p3=4>, Accessed on 22 November 2016.

Rabat was not void of legal ground, when it referred to the historical rights and religious ties, as traditional Islamic International Law consists of such formulas, which could prove the Moroccan claims in Western Sahara. Although the religious ties between the tribes and the nomads are indisputable, neither the practice of the International Court of Justice, nor modern international law recognises personal but territorial sovereignty.

That is why the Court did not accept a point of view which stated that subjects who belonged under the religious sovereignty of the Moroccan Sultan belong under his political sovereignty as well.

On the other hand, the Court did not contest the religious ties or even the alliance between the nomads and the Sultan, but there is no evidence, which proves, that the Saharawies did accept the authority of the Moroccan Sultan.¹¹

The *Siyar* was developed more than a thousand years ago. It served as a useful tool in defining and maintaining the relations between the unified *Islam Empire* and the rest of the world. According to its nature, it related more to the person of the monarch, than to territoriality.

This approach – considered archaic nowadays – is the main reason, why *Siyar* is unacceptable for modern international law, which considers the territorial authority as the most important factor.¹²

The “Islamic International Law” was created in the 8th century, when jurists worked out the legal rules regarding the relations between the Abbasid Caliphate and the non-Islamic world. This order rested upon the conception that the depositary of the sovereignty was the ruler of the empire and not the territory itself. Namely these two are the same. In this approach every territory where Muslims live belong to the Islamic State (*dar-ul-Islam*, the house of Islam). All those lands which are not Muslims belong to the *dar al-harb*, to the house of war. These lands were not considered as full states as in the world only a unitary Islamic state can exist. The principles of *Siyar* regulated the relationship of the above mentioned entities and Islam. These principles consisted of the law of war and peace, the treatment of prisoners, and the trade among Islamic and non-islamic states.¹³

The sovereignty-theory of *Siyar* is parallel with the above mentioned ruler-oriented approach. The depositary of the sovereignty is the ruler himself, he exercises such power which was assigned by God – he is representing the will of God –, so the authority of the caliph is only limited. In this person-centered theory, the nationality and culture of nations under the rule of the caliph was completely inessential until they were Muslims and recognized the reign of the caliph. People with other religions were also the subjects of the caliph if they lived in the empire of Islam. If they recognized the reign of the caliph, they enjoyed his protection. Muslims lived outside the empire under foreign power, considered as subjects of the caliph as well, which demonstrates well the irrelevance of territorial sovereignty.¹⁴

The primacy of Islamic Empire among states rests upon the assumption, that non-Muslim states have only a temporary capability to make contracts and enter into agreements with

¹¹ Dickson, C. and William, S. “The future of Islamic legal arguments in international boundary disputes between Islamic states”. *Washington and Lee Law Review* 55/2. 1998. 531.

¹² Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 532.

¹³ Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 536.

¹⁴ Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 537.

the Islamic Empire. Contracts concluded with them cannot be based on reciprocal and consonant will because only the empire of the true believers has full capacity to contract.¹⁵

As long as the undivided Islamic Empire existed, the *Siyar* functioned well. But the enormous empire – which extended from the Maghreb to the Arabian Peninsula – fell into parts due to the geographical distance, particular interests and cultural diversity. The new situation led the jurists to adopt the *Siyar* onto the divided and plural Islamic world in order to give an answer to the question, how the particular Islamic successor states can enter into relations with each other and the rest of the world.

The realist minority was defeated by orthodox scientists who ignored the fact that the Islamic world would have been fragmented if the successor states had recognised the religious supremacy of the caliph. During the Ottoman Empire, the religious and political supremacy reunited in the hand of the sultans. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire fell apart and the revision of the archaic *Siyar* became necessary again.¹⁶

To the question of how a foreign territory can fall under Islamic control, Islamic law gives the answer. The methods include military conquest, subjugation, voluntary submission and other relations based on contracts. The importance of the above mentioned issue resides in the question, who is the owner of the natural resources of a given territory? Islamic law makes difference between private ownership, communal property, and state-owned property depending on how the given territory fell under the rule of Islam.¹⁷

Territories gained by conquest are common property of the whole Muslim community, and they have to be administered by the leader of the community. It is because God is the only one who is responsible for conquering, and it would be inappropriate if only those could enjoy the benefits who took part in conquering it. Private individuals could gain only limited provision in these territories, mostly with the aim of cultivation and to collect its treasures and resources.¹⁸

If a territory surrenders willingly and converts to Islam, it has the right to keep the possession relations. In those lands which had successfully resisted the armed attempt of subjugation and then made a treaty with one of the states of the Muslim community, the possessions remained in the shape they were before the clash with Islam.¹⁹

If a land is barren, it is not lucrative, it is considered to be as a no man's land under Islamic law, also known as *terra nullius*. Hence, with occupation every Muslim could gain private ownership over it.²⁰ We could consider Western Sahara as a no man's land, if it was not populated by 10 thousand nomadic Berbers. Most of Western Sahara is a desert, therefore it is completely unsuitable for agricultural activities, moreover, the Saharawies themselves did not know how to husband the soil, so they used Subsaharan slaves to cultivate lands.²¹

These questions are interesting if we take into consideration the fact that the soil there hides natural resources. In Western Sahara phosphate is the most important mineral, besides that the Atlantic waters are rich in fishstock.²² Hereby it is important to note, that according

¹⁵ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 542–543.

¹⁶ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 538–539.

¹⁷ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 560.

¹⁸ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 562.

¹⁹ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 563.

²⁰ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 564.

²¹ Dickson and William. "The future of Islamic legal arguments...". 571–572.

²² Besenyő, J. "The society of the Saharawians". *AARMS* 7/4. 2008. 667–677. <http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Volume7/Issue4/pdf/08bese.pdf>, Accessed on 22 November 2016.

to the Law of the Sea, the coastal state has sovereignty even over the exclusive economic zone. So if the International Court of Justice accepted the arguments of Morocco in the case of Western Sahara, the Kingdom would be entitled to exploit all the natural resources due to the historical-religious ties, as the Islamic law allows the exploitation to the head of the Muslim community, who has to exercise this right in favour of the community.²³

Hence Morocco struggled to convince the International Court of Justice that in the light of the above mentioned, Rabat has every right to claim sovereignty over Western Sahara, because the Southern nomadic tribes were connected to the Sultan of Morocco with religious ties, moreover, they were allies of the monarch who is the descendant of the Prophet, thus it is irrelevant that the Sultan does not have political sovereignty over the Saharawies.²⁴

The Court did not recognize this point of view, because the Sultan did not exercise any kind of political authority in Western Sahara. Interestingly, and it was emphasized in the minority report of Judge Ammoun, the religious connection could be relevant as it was acknowledged in the cases of Ireland, Pakistan and Bangladesh.²⁵

WESTERN SAHARA STUCK IN LEGAL STATUS

If we follow the principles laid down in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, we have to see that Morocco unlawfully used force and conquered its Southern neighbor. Morocco did it under circumstances, which could be considered as a pending legal situation. Obviously it is an analogy, but this situation carries the possibility of a future entitlement. The Saharawies were definitely in such situation.

As a Spanish colony, they did not have self-government but they were entitled for self-determination.²⁶ Spain was obliged by the UN Resolution of 1966, which bound Madrid to make it possible to the Saharawies to exercise their right for self-determination, and to decide on a referendum whether they want to live under Spanish rule, or they want to be an independent state. First the colonizers were unwilling to organize the referendum, and later, in November 1975, following the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the „Green March”, they decided to evacuate Spanish Sahara.

Legally a quite interesting, multiplayer situation evolved. In accordance with international legal norms the colonizers were bound to let the Saharawies practice their right for self-determination. They postponed that, moreover, they ceded the territory in the Madrid Accords to Morocco and Mauritania, which two powers have occupied Spanish Sahara. The third party, the Saharawies, stuck in colonial status as until today, did not have the chance to declare sovereignty and self-determination recognized by international law and the international community.

As a result, we have to consider Morocco as a successor of Spain as a colonizing power, so the Saharawies are still in a pending legal status. The fact, that the United Nations established a peacekeeping mission and adopted a mandate – MINURSO – in order to organize the referendum, also proves this assumption.

²³ Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 566.

²⁴ Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 546–547.

²⁵ Dickson and William. “The future of Islamic legal arguments...”. 548.

²⁶ Besenyő, J. “The Occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania”. *TradeCraft Review* Special Issue. 2010. 76–94. http://knbsz.gov.hu/letoltes/szsz/2010_1_spec.pdf, Accessed on 22 November 2016.

Because the balance of forces won't change within a reasonable time, the only actor, which is able to represent the Saharawi interests is the Polisario Front, which was founded during the Spanish Colonial times, and created not only an administrative system and military forces, but declared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic as well.

In the long-lasting civil war, the Polisario was defeated by Morocco but its legitimation and political influence survived, moreover, some territories remained under Polisario control in the Eastern part of the country. On the other hand, those territories are unfit for high standard of life, settled lifestyle, and proper economic activities.

Therefore, de facto a Western Sahara exists, which fulfills all the requirements of statehood. The criteria of statehood were ascertained in the Treaty of Montevideo in 1933, these are as follows: 1.) permanent population; 2.) well defined and described territory; 3.) government; 4.) capability to enter into relations with foreign nations.²⁷

According to the survey of the Spanish authorities, in 1974 73,497 Saharawies lived in Spanish Sahara. In the absence of further requirements it is irrelevant how many people live in the state and it is also irrelevant, whether they are settled or nomadising.²⁸

The borders of Western Sahara were drawn in the colonial times so those are parallel with the borders of Spanish Sahara. 90% of the former lands of the Saharawies were occupied with most of the population and the economic centers, however, the Polisario controls a narrow sector in the East and South so the territorial claims are fulfilled.²⁹

While the local population struggled against the Moroccan occupation in a military way, they established their own political system with an elected popular assembly, cabinet, and bureaucracy, which command the military activities of the Polisario at the same time. This government is independent from any other authority, and it has the capability to represent the Saharawi nation at international level. The best proof of this statement is the fact that there are more than 60 states which have already recognized Western Sahara as an independent state. Moreover, the country and the Polisario are full members of the African Union.³⁰

EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN WESTERN SAHARA

In the previous two chapters the author attempted to underline, that Western Sahara is still in a colonial status under Moroccan occupation. In order to maintain the status quo, the international community gives a helping hand to Morocco. France consistently supports Morocco and balks every effort of the United Nations to settle the conflict or to extend the mandate of MINURSO with a monitoring system of human rights. Hence the reality is that the Moroccan occupation will be permanent, yet it will not approve or legalize the presence of the Moroccan army and the exploitation of natural resources. As an occupying power, the Moroccan government is not allowed to use the resources, minerals, and incomes of Western Sahara to satisfy and facilitate its own economic interests. What it could do legally is the usage of resources only to cover the expenses of the occupying forces and the public administration of the province.³¹

²⁷ Epstein. "Behind closed doors...". 119.

²⁸ Epstein. "Behind closed doors...".

²⁹ Besenyő, J. "Saharawi refugees in Algeria". *AARMS* 9/1. 2010. 67–78. <http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Volume9/Issue1/pdf/07.pdf>, Accessed on 22. November 2016.

³⁰ Besenyő, J. "Saharawi refugees in Algeria". 123.

³¹ Besenyő, J. "Saharawi refugees in Algeria". 134.

What really happens, the phosphate, oil and fishstock raised the interest of Western companies. Texaco, Pan American Hispano Oil, Standard Oil and Shell,³² the American Kerr McGee, and the TotalFinalElf oil syndicates are interested in the exploitation of crude oil.³³

It is indisputable that the investments in Western Sahara can be profitable if the political situation is stable and an unwanted guerrilla war does not disturb the business. Morocco can guarantee this, so Rabat is an attractive business partner. It is obvious that because of their political-economic interest the great powers close their eyes and pretend they do not know about the fact that Morocco used force to occupy a former colony. But the United Nations and the international law have a different point of view.

In 1974 within the United Nations, the member states adopted the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*. It says in paragraph 2, Article 16: „No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force.” This act is carried out mainly by Morocco through exploiting resources and selling them on the world market.³⁴

With the provisions of the abovementioned Charter, the *Charter of the United Nations*³⁵ declares in Article 73, that the exploitation or economic utilization of a non-selfgoverning territory could occur only with the consent of the local population. During the utilization, the administrative power has to ensure the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the local citizens.³⁶

If our previous conclusion is correct, namely an independent Western Saharan entity exists, which is exclusively allowed to exploit the resources of the soil and water, then the ambitions of the Polisario to ban the Moroccan products coming from the occupied zone from the European market may succeed.

The European Court of Justice adjudicated a decision which declared that the agricultural-trade agreement with Morocco cannot be applicable for those products which were produced in the occupied zone of Western Sahara.³⁷

Not only the European Union but Norway, a non-EU-member and a member of the European Economic Area, is also sanctioning vessels which are sailing under Norwegian flag and fishing in Western Saharan waters.³⁸

However, Morocco made a fisheries partnership agreement with the European Union in 2005. Under this agreement the member states of the EU were permitted fishing on Western Saharan waters.

³² Wilson, C. “Foreign Companies Plundering Western Saharan Resources: Who is Involved and What is Being Done to Stop This?” In Arts, K. and Pinto Leite, P. (eds), *International Law and the Question of Western Sahara*. Leiden: IPJET, 2007, 249.

³³ Epstein. “Behind closed doors...”. 135.

³⁴ Wilson. “Foreign Companies Plundering Western Saharan Resources...”. 251.

³⁵ “Charter of the United Nations”. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>, Accessed on 27 November 2016.

³⁶ Epstein. “Behind closed doors...”. 134.

³⁷ Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v Council of the European Union. Judgement of the General Court of 10 December 2015. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62012TJ0512> and Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario, 13 September 2016. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62016CC0104>, Accessed on 27 November 2016.

³⁸ Connet, D. “Western Sahara: Africa's last colony takes struggle for self-determination to European courts”. Independent. 23 January 2016. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/western-sahara-africas-last-colony-takes-struggle-for-self-determination-to-european-courts-a6830216.html>, Accessed on 10 April 2016.

Exactly 119 European fishing vessels are permitted to fish for fishstocks. Meanwhile, Morocco received 144 million Euros in exchange.³⁹ According to estimations 70-80% of fishstocks caught in the Atlantic Ocean come from the waters of Western Sahara. Among the European states it is Spain, which enjoys most of the advantages of the fishery agreement. Madrid received 80% of the Moroccan permissions.⁴⁰ Later the European Court of Justice revised this percentage.⁴¹ In order to protect the fishstocks, the Western Sahara Resources Watch established the „*Fishing Elsewhere*” Committee. In this organisation delegates from 21 states, NGO-s, politicians and experts are working together in order to put an end to the fishing activities of foreign powers in Western Saharan waters. They are also trying to force the parties of the fishing agreement to modify it.⁴²

Polsiario took dead steps to convince the Western companies doing business with Morocco to enter into agreement with them instead of Rabat. Although this approach would be lawful, it is far from the realities, as the government in exile has no influence, power and authority over the resources located in the occupied zone, which means, foreign companies will put aside their revulsion against Morocco and forget about the fact, that Rabat clearly keeps Western Sahara under unlawful occupation. If a company is more fastidious about the situation in the western corner of Africa, it will enter into an agreement with Morocco, where conditions that the exploitations will start only if the status of the contested territories are settled.⁴³

Phosphate is being mentioned in this essay several times. Western Sahara could be the second largest importer of this mineral, but it is not, because it is Morocco, which exploits and exports phosphate onto the world market. When the Spanish disclaimed their rights in the Madrid Accord in favour of Morocco and Mauritania, they wanted to arrange the issues of the phosphate-mining and the share from the profit. The agreeing parties decided that 65% of Spanish Fosbucraa company would be transferred to the Moroccan state while Madrid would keep the rest 35% for 25 years. After the occupation, 1,600 employees were made redundant and replaced by Moroccan citizens. The construction of the infrastructure of Bu Craa was carried out by American, German, French and Spanish companies. Furthermore, the French contracted on the water supply of the mines and Spain made the port of Huelva available for Moroccan phosphate cargo.⁴⁴ From El Ayun 3 million tons of Phosphate set sail while the total export of Morocco and Western Sahara reaches the 10 million tons. The biggest importer of phosphate is the United States, but Columbia Mexico, Venezuela, Australia, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and the Baltic states are also importing it from Morocco.⁴⁵

³⁹ Epstein. “Behind closed doors...”. 135.

⁴⁰ Steinbach, A. “The Western Sahara dispute: A case for the ECJ?”. *Columbia Journal of European Law* 18/3. 2012. 418.

⁴¹ Wilson. “Foreign Companies Plundering Western Saharan Resources...”. 262.

⁴² Wilson. “Foreign Companies Plundering Western Saharan Resources...”. 263.

⁴³ Wilson. “Foreign Companies Plundering Western Saharan Resources...”. 259.

⁴⁴ Hagen, E. “International Participation in the Phosphate Industry in Occupied Western Sahara: The Local Content and Global Participation”. In Arts, K. and Pinto Leite, P. (eds), *International Law and the Question of Western Sahara*. Leiden: IPJET, 2007, 269–270.

⁴⁵ Hagen. “International Participation in the Phosphate Industry...”. 270–271.

The disputed legal status of Western Sahara is more than relevant, if we look on it through the glass of the international trade law. The country of origin of a given product is not irrelevant as it is based on the principle of territoriality in accordance with the Trade Law. If a product comes from a contested territory, we can choose between two theories.

One is the *practical-trade approach*, and the other is the *political-sovereignty approach*, which latter one will not be described exhaustively.⁴⁶

The first approach can be detected in the practice of trade of the United States and France with Morocco. The USA-Moroccan free trade agreement is aimed only at the liberalization of the commerce, it does not mention that there is a contested territory under Moroccan authority. The fact, that Morocco has de facto sovereignty over Western Sahara, is completely fit for the interest of the undisturbed trade.⁴⁷

In its Point a), Paragraph 5, Article XXVI the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* mentions, that the provisions shall be applied to those territories, for which the administering power is responsible.⁴⁸ Morocco, as an occupying power, is certainly responsible for the improvement of administration, welfare of the population, and economy. The European Union adopted this practical point of view by accepting the fact that the economic and commercial life of Western Sahara is directed by Morocco. The trade agreement between the EU and the Kingdom does not mention the legal status of Western Sahara, it only says in Article 94., that the agreement shall be applied for the whole territory of Moroccan Kingdom. Furthermore, the provisions regarding the products of Morocco are applied to those which are coming from Western Sahara.⁴⁹

However, the EU is following the very same practice in the case of Taiwan. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is not recognized by most of the relevant powers in the world due to the diplomatic pressure of the People's Republic of China (mainland China). Yet, Taiwan is one of the most dynamic actor in the world economy, so the reality, in favour of the free trade, overshadows those sovereignty-theories which are soaked by political convictions.

ON THE GROUND OF REALITY – POSSIBLE FUTURE VISIONS

We saw how the international law and the solidarity of international community support Western Sahara and the Saharawies, who definitely are in the position to exercise their right to self-determination, but until now, they were encumbered in it. They acclaimed the Saharawy Arab Democratic Republic, which fulfils the requirements of statehood, but its sovereignty does not expand to the lands, which are under Moroccan occupation. Rabat will not withdraw its military, and no one will force to do that, at least it seems there is no state which would risk a military intervention in the region.

Morocco is protected by the General Assembly Declaration 2625 (XXV) *on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in*

⁴⁶ Hirsch, M. "Rules of origin as trade or foreign policy instruments? The European Union policy on products manufactured in the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip". *Fordham International Law Journal* 26/3. 2002. 574.

⁴⁷ Hirsch. "Rules of origin as trade or foreign policy instruments?". 577.

⁴⁸ Hirsch. "Rules of origin as trade or foreign policy instruments?". 578.

⁴⁹ Hirsch. "Rules of origin as trade or foreign policy instruments?". 579–580.

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁵⁰ In the light of the rules of this declaration, the states are prohibited to intervene in other states' relations, because every form of intervention is a possible threat to international peace and security.⁵¹

Beside Algeria, there is no state which directly intervened in the conflict between the Saharawies and Morocco. The Eastern neighbor of the Kingdom has supported the Polisario since the beginning and accommodated many Saharawy refugees. Meanwhile the biggest supporters of Morocco are France and the United States. Without them there is no agreement on the status of Western Sahara, because both of them have right of veto in the UN Security Council. France and the United States have kept the good relations since the second half of the 20th century. During this time Morocco proved, it is a good ally in the fight against communism and terrorism.⁵² The United States did not support an independent Western Sahara, because it feared that a new, Soviet-oriented entity would cause trouble in the Maghreb. This concern was based on the fact, that the Polisario had good relations with Cuba and Libya. Meanwhile Morocco was a reliable ally, Washington supported Rabat militarily (by sending weapons and advisors) and economically as well. In 2004 a free trade agreement was concluded, furthermore the Kingdom is one of the most important non-NATO-member military allies.⁵³

France hurries to show its gratitude for the Moroccan alliance, which gives good geopolitical and economic positions to France in the Maghreb. Due to the French diplomacy, the mandate of MINURSO was never enlarged with a human rights monitoring mechanism.⁵⁴ According to Paris, there is no need for a new failed state in Northwest Africa, which later could fall under Algerian influence destabilising Maghreb. Sometimes the French diplomacy goes too far. With bribery and blackmail persuaded African states – for example Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Togo, Republic of the Congo – to revoke the recognition of the Saharawy Arab Democratic Republic.⁵⁵

Good-neighborhood relations are strategically important for Spain as well, because Spanish companies invested a lot in Morocco, besides Spain is one of the biggest beneficiary of the fishing and phosphate mining.⁵⁶ It is almost a matter of life and death for Spain to secure the safety of the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla. This was the most important factor, why Spain conceded Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. On the other hand, Madrid emphasized: Spain will never recognize the sovereignty of Morocco and Mauritania over Western Sahara, they are considered only as administering powers.

⁵⁰ "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 2625 (XXV). Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". United Nations. UN A/RES/25/2625. <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm>, Accessed on 11 April 2016.

⁵¹ Epstein. "Behind closed doors...". 136.

⁵² Epstein. "Behind closed doors...". 136.

⁵³ Zoubir, Y. "Geopolitics and realpolitik as impediments to the resolution of conflict and violations of international law: The case of Western Sahara". In Arts, K. and Pinto Leite, P. (eds), *International Law and the Question of Western Sahara*. Leiden: IPJET, 2007, 291.

⁵⁴ Clarke, J. and Purvis, K. "Leaked cables: Morocco lobbied UN to turn blind eye to Western Sahara in 'House of Cards' operation". *The Guardian*, 17 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/17/leaked-cables-morocco-united-nations-western-sahara-house-of-cards>, Accessed on 27 November 2016.

⁵⁵ Zoubir. "Geopolitics and realpolitik...". 289.

⁵⁶ Epstein. "Behind closed doors...". 138.

In the Madrid Accords not only the previously mentioned administering rights but also the economic interests of the parties were settled. The two main issues were fishing and phosphate mining. After conceding Western Sahara, Morocco assured Spain the undisturbed right of fishing on Western Sahara waters.⁵⁷

All in all, the Spanish attitude is ambivalent. On one hand it is a serious security issue to maintain good relations with Morocco.

On the other hand, citizens of Spain are sympathetic with the Saharawies, and they do not sympathize with the Moroccans after the terrorist attacks in 2004, which were committed by Moroccan and Spanish citizens of Moroccan origin.⁵⁸

Because the Polisario will never ever defeat the Moroccan army and liberate Western Sahara and the great powers won't be involved in the conflict on the side of the Polisario, for the average Saharawies a compromise would be the best solution. Under this criteria Morocco would give territorial autonomy to Western Sahara within the Kingdom of Morocco. This would legitimize the Moroccan presence and it would make the referendum irrelevant. Postponing the referendum or making it irrelevant is a permanent part of the Moroccan conditions. If the referendum was organized, Moroccan citizens living in Western Sahara would vote, so the majority of the votes would be in favour of staying in the Kingdom. But it could be possible, that the population of Western Sahara would take advantage of the situation and choose to live in an independent and democratic Western Sahara instead of a half-dictatorship.⁵⁹

At the same time, such a step would establish a dangerous precedent. If the Saharawies accepted the narrow and mean offer, and the international community approved the new situation, they would acknowledge the territorial growth achieved by violence. This could be a great reference for Russia in the case of Crimea. For that matter, the autonomy offered by the Kingdom would be limited. According to the Moroccan constitution, the King has absolute authority in military and foreign affairs, religious issues and education.⁶⁰ This is unacceptable for the Polisario and was not supported by Algeria either, so the deadlock still exists.⁶¹

The tendencies of world politics show, that the small entities, if they have a huge amount of valuable natural resources, cannot compete with regional or global powers, due to their mere size (China, India, Russia, the United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Brazil) or economic capacity (the EU, United States, or China). States of the Third World inevitably have to decide whether they stay at the level of a nation-state or integrate into a bigger entity to represent their interests as members of a major political-economic-military union. This is the only way to expect to take them seriously. Regrettably, it is this new world order in which the *de facto* status of Western Sahara should be recognized and the conflict has to be settled somehow, even if all the legal factors act against it.

Once the Maghreb countries made an attempt towards regionalism. On 17th February 1989 Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia signed the agreement on the Arab Maghreb Union in Marrakesh. The aim was to facilitate the political and economic integration.

⁵⁷ Zoubir. "Geopolitics and realpolitik...". 293.

⁵⁸ Zoubir. "Geopolitics and realpolitik...". 294.

⁵⁹ Zoubir. "Geopolitics and realpolitik...". 286–287.

⁶⁰ Epstein. "Behind closed doors...". 139.

⁶¹ Zoubir. "Geopolitics and realpolitik...". 285.

If we look on the common traditional, cultural, religious and linguistic roots, we can see, this initiative would be successful.⁶²

Unfortunately, the Arab countries are divided not only in the Middle East but in Northwest Africa as well. The political conflicts are balking fruitful and effective co-operation. The case of Western Sahara is a spike under the nail of the Magreb countries because Algeria is one of the biggest supporters of the Saharawies. Furthermore, the Magreb states did not have a common opinion on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the Mauritanian-Senegalese border dispute, in which Senegal was supported by Morocco.

The variance of the forms of government should not be a problem, but the internal political relations and arrangements are. For example, Morocco reminds us of an absolute monarchy, on the other hand the Tunisian political system is more liberalized and open. Libya became a failed state after the revolution and civil war after 2011. Libya cannot be part of a new Maghreb Union until it resolves its political problems. The relations to the West are also different. Morocco and Tunisia maintain good relations with the Western powers, in Libya the Islamic State gained space, but before 2011, during the time of Gaddafi, the relations with the West were paradoxically good.⁶³

It is important to note that 27 years ago, when the Union was founded, the member states barely traded with each other.⁶⁴ If they established a fruitful co-operation, it would make their adaptation to the requirements of the global trade much easier. It would not be necessary to sign individual contracts with the EU or the USA, but they could enter into negotiations together as one single entity. All those rules adopted by the Maghreb Union, would be automatically applicable in all member states.

Unified actions and steps in the internal affairs would strengthen the internal ties, which would give a chance for catching up because all the Arabic countries are much weaker and more vulnerable than the Western states. It is true, that they are extremely rich in mineral resources, but the profit is realized only partly in the Arab countries, and even those limited profits concentrate in the hands of exclusive elite. They can influence the world market through the price of the oil, but the benefit which they receive in exchange is spent on Western and Asian luxury goods, machines, devices, which means, the funds return back to their origin, namely the developed countries. As a consequence of the global warming, desertification, and water-shortage, the states of the Fertile Crescent and North Africa will have to import not only industrial products, but also food and water, which are the most basic needs of their population. To ease this situation they have to settle their disputes and put an end to the civil wars and other internal and external conflicts immediately, then they have to step on the way of regionalization and launch a wide range of social, economic and political modernization. In spite all of this it seems, that the Maghreb Union will pass away, although it is the opposite which would be desirable.

⁶² McKeon, R. "The Arab Maghreb Union: Possibilities of Maghrebine political and economic unity, and enhanced trade in the world community". *Dickinson Journal of International Law* 10/2. 1992. 264.

⁶³ McKeon. "The Arab Maghreb Union...". 276–277.

⁶⁴ McKeon. "The Arab Maghreb Union...". 278.

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Lt. Col. Győző Csanádi:

SOME QUESTIONS OF MODELLING AND THE SIMULATION OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

ABSTRACT: Information management is a management process of taking advantage of the potential of the information provided by the right delivery in an organisation. In competitive environment, it may result in information superiority, and all systems can experience overall resource savings while having the right Information Management.

Although “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, some organisations like military ones cannot afford to make experiments with management processes, otherwise it is easy to pay dearly for a mistake with precious human lives. Modelling is a good tool to describe, understand, and develop a system. Simulation is an activity that gives the possibility to estimate the efficiency of an idea or a new system.

How is it possible to model and simulate an Information Management system? What is the environment like and what kind of factors must be taken into consideration? This paper raises questions about this problem. The author is doing a wider research about the possibilities of Information Management in the Hungarian Defence Forces, supported by information technology and the questions raised in this paper may constitute a significant part of it.

KEYWORDS: information management, information modelling

INTRODUCTION

Theodor Roszak gave voice to criticism about over-exaggerated rule of information in his book titled “The Cult of Information” in 1986. Although he considered only a kind of ‘suspicious’ neo-conservative conspiracy based on „Utilitarian”¹ movements, the so-called “Information Age” finally has come.² It is early to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new era but a citizen of the global village has to face similar challenges like being flooded by unnecessary and irrelevant information while having difficulties in finding important facts. Folders are full of redundant files and when somebody wants to find an important one, it takes time. Meanwhile, it is possible to arrange more and more state or legal issues online

¹ Utilitarianism, is a philosophical view. According to the theory, the ethical value of an act is only dependent on the expected consequences. Source: “Magyar Katolikus Lexikon”. (Hungarian Catholic Lexicon.) <http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/U/utilitarizmus.html>, Accessed on 9 December 2017. (Author’s synthesis and translation.) According to Roszak, the theory of information age is a tool to rule people and speed up the economy. In the book “The cult of information”, the author finds plenty of similarities between XIX century utilitarianism and the theory of modern “information age” such as ethical neutrality, scientific rigour, and the technocratic wish to rule people.

² Roszak, T. *Az információ kultusza (The cult of information)*. Budapest: Európa Kiadó, 1990, 266–300.

from the armchair. The world is in a rush and the postmodern man is bombarded with loads of information. The danger of the “big brother” effect is important to bear in mind as a hidden and continuous threat³, like system ECHELON⁴.

Anyway, the use of information is not a new idea or phenomenon, but the new technologies rely on information with dramatically growing percentage. These above mentioned, randomly snapped, postmodern negative feelings are based on erroneous information activities⁵, namely:

- over-flood with unnecessary information;
- shortage of important information;
- difficulties in finding relevant information;
- dissipation of resources.

This list is by no means complete. The mitigation of such disorders needs new points of views and new disciplines. If we allow the dethronement of information and pull it down from the mystic height to the level of objects that must be managed, it is possible to consider information as a resource.

To deliver all detailed definition of information is over the scope of this paper. What is more, at the moment a universal definition of information does not exist and it is unlikely that it will. The reason is simple, information as a phenomenon is so universal that every discipline has its own vision about its role and the way it works. Thus, all disciplines create different definitions about information. It does not mean that information itself is incomprehensive in appearance, however, universal things have the value of polymorphism. As for Information Management in various disciplines, the NATO definition can be used consistently:

Information is “any communications or representation of knowledge, such as facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audio-visual forms”⁶.

Concerning the possible management activities, the most important part of the definition is “in any medium or form” whatever the information is. It is paramount to bear in mind that all media and forms of information must be considered as subjects of Information Management even in the narrative form of information exchange.

Information Management (later occasionally referred to⁷ with abbreviation “IM”) itself is a “discipline that directs and supports the handling of information through its life-cycle ensuring that it becomes the right information in the right form and is of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organization”⁸ The main purpose of this system is to take advantage of the information provided by the potential of the right delivery. In competitive systems it may result in information superiority, and all systems can experience overall resource savings.

³ Pan out about in the Article, Négyesi, I. “Az információgyűjtés jövőképe” (“The future vision of the information collection”). *Hadtudományi Szemle* 1/3. 2008. 95–100.

⁴ ECHELON, a global observation system checking Intelsat satellites. More about the topic, see in the article by Négyesi, I. “A megfigyelés és információgyűjtés múltja, jelene és jövője” (“Past present and future of observation and information collection”). *Szakmai Szemle* 5/3. 2009. 35–50.

⁵ Information activity in this context means all activities that characteristically handles information in input and output.

⁶ Definition quoted from North Atlantic Council. “The primary directive on information management”. C-M(2008)0113, PDIM, Annex C. 1-C-1.

⁷ Although I try to avoid abbreviations, sometimes because of stylistic reason or shortage of space abbreviation „IM” will be used in this paper.

⁸ Definition quoted from C-M(2008)0113 (INV), PDIM, Annex 1. 1-C-2.

In other words, a properly working Information Management is able to decrease information disorders, and increase advantages that right and timely information delivery can generate. Information Management is not a magic wand and cannot solve all problems within abnormalities of information availability and flow.

Military environment is a special and dangerous milieu, with special needs. Obviously, this fact has several effects on the Information Management.

“A model is a physical, mathematical or otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon or process.”⁹ However, this definition is not comprehensive enough to describe all vernacular meanings. The original Latin verb “Modello” means “figure” or “mould”. An artist creates his artwork according to his sitter – called model. A good practice or a new tool can serve as a model of a new procedure or industrial product. The notion “model” on the one hand is an object to be copied, on the other hand the copy itself. The role of the model is different in the construction and the cognition procedure. When the core activity is cognition, the first is the real system or object and it will be created after the representation. When we construct or build things, first there is a “model” (mental or physical) and the real system or object will be created according to the model.¹⁰ In this situation the model represents a plan, or prototype.

The notion of simulation also depends on our point of view. “Simulation is a method for implementing a model over time.”¹¹ In another approach, the model is an embedded category of simulation, because simulation is a special model that describes and imitates the specific behaviour of a modelled system.

As it is mentioned above, the role of information is not a new thing so a basic or instinctive Information Management existed formerly. The novelty in these activities is the institutionalism and scientific foundations. Some nations and organizations have already realized the importance of a purposefully designed Information Management in all governmental institutions – including the defence sector – and some organizations have just started to establish their own version of Information Management. In this process the working examples can serve as models. However, if scientists wanted to analyse and understand existing and working Information Management, it is necessary to create analytic, structural, and functional models. In military environment, the experiments can take a heavy toll. That is why it is necessary to examine the possibility to create a simulation of new investments even for Information Management systems. The creation of different solutions for Information Management must be measured against usefulness and costs.

GENERAL MODEL OF A HUMAN ORGANISATION

Before the military environment is examined, it is necessary to have a look at the difficulties of modelling an overall Information Management. Information Management is a system or a

⁹ Definition quoted from US Department of Defence, Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Technology. “Modelling and Simulation (McS) Master Plan”. DoD 5000.59-P. October 1995. Appendix A, definitions and acronyms. A-6.

¹⁰ Summary and translation of the author from V. A. Bokarev’s book titled *Kibernetika és a hadügy (Cybernetics and defence)*. 138–139.

¹¹ Definition quoted from US Department of Defence, Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Technology. “Modelling and Simulation (McS) Master Plan”. DoD 5000.59-P. October 1995. Appendix A, definitions and acronyms. A-7.

process running in human organisation systems. The common value of human organizations is that this system is oriented towards a purpose and can be examined by the following five categories according to Churchman's system approach¹²:

- the total system *objectives* and, more specifically, the performance measures of the whole system;
- the system's *environment*: the fixed constraints;
- the *resources* of the system;
- the *components* of the system, their activities, goals and measures of performance;
- the *management* of the system.

The structure of an overall system can be described by the following structural model:




Figure 1: *The overall design of systems inspired¹³ by Seres, Gy. with the addendum of element „management” and management an indication of information connections represented by thick arrow. Created by the author.*

Checking figure 1, we can see that all of the Churchman categories can be found (marked by *characters in italic*) except components activities. This must be described with other descriptive language, for example with an activity diagram of UML¹⁴, or textual form.

The *environment* and *resources* are given to the system as input.

The environment can be sorted in various ways. One of them is the intentional relationship with the outspoken or hidden purpose of the system.

We can state that an environmental factor is *supportive* if the factor aims at promoting the system's purpose.

Neutral is the environmental factor if the aims of the factor are not in direct connection with the system's objectives although the factor has an effect on the system and its objectives. This effect can be positive (supportive) or negative (obstructive).

Environmental factors can be *obstructive* if there is a conflicting interest. This type of the environment is to hinder the objective of the specific system in various ways.

It is not always easy to classify a factor according to its intentions since some factors have hidden intentions and aims. Analysing the behaviour and the results of the system often reveals real but secret aims and purposes of a factor.

¹² Churchman, C. W. *The Systems Approach*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1968, 29–30.

¹³ Seres, Gy. "Bases of Military Modelling". 11 February 2011. 1. <http://drseres.com/ceepus/>, Accessed on 9 December 2017.

¹⁴ UML: Universal Modelling Language.

Usually the environment can be realized as

- requirements;
- conditions;
- influences;
- resources

The classification of the categories above is flexible concerning the intentions. For example, cooperative systems less often contain opposing environmental elements than competitive ones.

Requirements consist of legal regulations at various levels and requirements raised by organisations, and technical constraints coming from the necessity to co-operate with other technological platforms.

Conditions are static results of the supportive neutral and obstructive activities, such as acts of organisations and people, which Information Management must consider. Also, there is the overall moral situation that sets the strictness and the level of compulsion of the regulation. The higher the moral level, the less strict regulations must be applied except when the expected damage is high in case of omitted regulations. The user's resistance against new systems should also be considered as an obstructive condition. The availability of training facilities is also an environmental condition.

Influences are dynamic results of supportive neutral and obstructive activities. These are belligerent or criminal activities, or developments of technologies that may support the IM activities.

Objectives are descriptions of status and products that a system should produce as an output. The objective seriously depends on the environment.

Resources can vary in dependence on other environmental factors and the design of the system. Resources can be either material or abstract ones. Material resources are physical materials, energy, facilities, structures, or technology equipment. Abstract resources can be knowledge, information, or leader's willingness. The budget or monetary funds are abstract resources since money is an abstract phenomenon, but it is usual that budget is classified as a material resource.

Components are sub-systems or elements that produce an output in co-operation. Components can be realised as organisation, person, or technology¹⁵. The relation of organisation and person and technology is n:n:n, which means many organisations can have many people and technologies. One person can be a member of more than one organisations, technology can be used by various people in various organisations, etc. This freedom of relations can lead to a combinatorial explosion¹⁶ if it is necessary to describe all relations in a functional model.

Having a large number of functions makes the description difficult to perceive but the situation becomes even more complex if management is also considered. The management has its own procedures in order to control the whole system. In order to do this, it is necessary to build a two-way information channel among all other elements of the model, namely:

- Information exchange about environment (bi-directional channel).
- Information about the state of components is reasonably detailed and control information is given in order to orient the system in the direction of objective achievement.

¹⁵ Seres. "Bases of...".

¹⁶ Combinatorial explosion in this environment means a sudden increase in numbers of issues that over the limit of system processing capabilities.

- Information about output in order to have feedback. If necessary, it is important to control the output directly that needs control information.
- Finally, the management must be aware of objectives and if necessary, has to have the capability to change objectives – it means bi-directional but asymmetric information exchange.

All four bi-directional information channels transform management information.

Defining, requesting, and handling management information is the task of the management systems.

There are other types of information as well. These ones can be classified as input or output information. Information can appear in the input like raw material, while some components can produce information as a product. The aim of the Information Management is to manage all three kinds (management, input, and product) of information in a standard way as a core resource. Managing information means planning, organizing, and controlling in order to have optimal alignment of information with an optimal value and ensure the preservation of valuable information for further exploitation.

QUESTIONS OF THE OVERALL MODEL OF THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The overall model of Information management can be created with some customization and specification as follows:




Figure 2: Structural model of the Information Management System in general with the development and specification of figure 1. Created by the author.

The structural model of general Information Management is composed of three components:

Specialists are IM crew with dedication to the organisation or their post, with special training and tools and technologies to contribute to the work of Information Management.

Commissioned manning are people that have IM jobs as a secondary job (commission). These people have the necessary knowledge to represent the discipline in their official organisation and they have the mandate to articulate organisational needs. They may have technological tools and techniques to contribute to the work of Information Management. The level of knowledge or capabilities is not definitely lower than a specialist's expertise but the amount of the Information Management work in their organisational position does not allow employing them in a full-time position.

Techniques are all specific procedural knowledge, or tools with which Information Management activities can be accomplished or supported.

The environment of the IM model consists of ten key elements.

Legal environment encompasses all legal regulations that have an effect on the working Information Management. This system has a hierarchy and contains compulsory regulations that must be followed. Legal systems may contain supportive, neutral, or obstructive elements. If a legal rule provides for the establishment of Information Management, this fact must be considered as an abstract supportive resource.

Sociocultural environment determines the overall approach of manning, users and leaders. It has effects on the leadership and management. The sociocultural environment is one of the factors that affect the morale.

Parent organisation is the organisation that hosts Information Management and on which IM will have an effect. Parent organisation can be examined as a system: its objectives, environment, resources, components, and management. A parent organisation contains neutral factors, and it is paramount to consider the management since Information Management is a management process. The positive attitude and the leaders understanding IM are supportive abstract resources. Dismissive leaders belong to the obstructive factor.

Adjacent organisations can be cooperative, neutral, competitive, or obstructive. If an organisation is competitive, it does not mean automatically that it is obstructive. Competition can motivate development. This factor must be analysed as a system.

Communication and Information Systems (CIS) are among the most effective technological tools with which information activities are done. CIS is not part of the Information Management but can help or prevent the execution of information activities. The design of CIS must remain within the responsibility of CIS staff but Information Management must give orders and requirements to this environmental factor. The existence of obstructive CIS systems is a challenge, but *Information Security* is an independent discipline, which is not covered in this paper.

Registries are responsible for traditional documents, the role of registries is similar to that of CIS systems.

Users comprise a wider category than CIS users. In this context, users are people who are interested in information activities, and must follow Information Management regulations.

Budget is a dominant resource since it can easily be converted into other resources. There are budgetary resources not available for Information Management, but they can foster other important factors like CIS or training facilities. These budget elements are considered as neutral budget factors.

Facilities are capabilities that are necessary to have manning and technical equipment. The availability of this factor is a resource.

As the cumulative effect of all environmental factors, and according to the needs of Information Management system, the following *inputs* will feed the system:

Constrains are factors that limit IM, like legal rules about security, limitations coming from the parent or adjacent organisations, all actual rules that create a frame of the management.

Obstacles are objective, unchangeable situations that stop one or more components' operation.

Requests can be even orders to orient Information Management into a specific subject that a leader or requester considers important and specific information management actions may solve.

Specific *changes* are an important input for Information Management especially when a new structure of organisation, or some changes are in progress, because the new setup may require changes in the information flow.

Money is needed to cover expenses of manning, trainings, support material, maintenance of facilities and equipment under the financial responsibility of dedicated Information Management organisations.

The availability of *facilities* is important for organising meetings, trainings or all other activities that are necessary for manning.

Knowledge is the basis of success, it can be procured, or built up by a working system.

The *purpose* of an overall Information Management system is two-fold. The working of the system must deliver right information in the right form and adequate quality meanwhile it must ensure and promote optimal resource usage. These two necessities need different approaches, concentration on the result, and concentration on expenses.

Information Management can solve this task with the following outputs:

Regulations are normative rules, suggestions, or orders that IM as a discipline can prepare by properly trained manning with its organisation and techs. Regulation can be strategies, master plans, plans, annexes, suggestions, standards, procedural descriptions, manuals, or even oral or textual commands in order to keep the system on track. Regulations have long-term effects and usually set negative feedbacks in order to keep a chosen direction.

Capabilities are desirable abilities that can affect the environment in order to achieve aims.

Reactions are occasional activities or changes in order to react in an unexpected situation that regulations cannot prepare for.

QUESTIONS ABOUT MODELLING INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

Establishing Information Management in a military environment means other constraints must be considered. The final purpose of a military organisation is to successfully accomplish a military achievement in an armed adversary situation.

An armed conflict intentionally aims to annihilate one or more components or management of a specific military system. It is important to note that adversary or conflicting factors are much more than just enemy armed forces systems. In the case of a wrong operation, a military system can convert a neutral or even a friendly environmental factor into enemy, or vice versa. For example, people in an area of military operations can change their attitude, and “winning hearts and minds” is one of the key factors in the success of counter insurgency operations.

Concerning the intensity of adversaries, it is possible to divide military activities into two main types of operation and structure: peacetime establishment and wartime establishment. The difference between them is that wartime establishment participates in the armed conflict in harmony with available capabilities and is determined by harsh environment. Meanwhile, peacetime establishment means the preparation for an armed conflict.

The final measurement of properness is the success in an armed conflict. But in peacetime such an assessment becomes difficult because in this situation the measurements are based on estimations of capabilities. These are indirect procedures, for example using models and simulations deputizing precious or dangerous elements.

The model of the Information Management in peacetime establishment is quite similar to the overall IM model. The differences are in the environment specifications, and the objec-

tives affected by the peacetime establishment achievements (preparation) and the specific hierarchical leadership.

The components and the outputs are the same as in general Information Management, but to be accurate, all regulations have military style, which means the terminology should be in harmony with military phraseology.

Management can be specific, because to the contrary of other organisations, military organisations always have a hierarchical leadership. Thus, it is an important factor that the regulations must be signed at a reasonably high level in the hierarchy in order to ensure their effect on all subordinated organisations.

It has a rising importance to consider the belligerent cyber actions in the environment, especially as the cyber space is often busy with attacks even in peacetime. Although cyber defence is not the task of an Information Management, the system must be “aware” of such dangers.

Wartime establishment is different. During warfighting activities there is no way to play around a crucial factor like information, the organization and manning of Information Management are overshadowed, and the technology gets more emphasis. When an armed conflict commences, it is necessary to have mature and well-practiced methods, and technical solutions *integrated in the military procedures and equipment* and generally in the structure and working process of the military system. As a consequence, the wartime Information Management becomes a built-in logic into the military system rather than an independent organisation. However, dedicated specialists and also some extra positions are needed, but the system should be prepared to have *war-dynamics*, continuous changes, stand and survive *enemies’* kinetic and non-kinetic strikes. All burdens of the *battlefield* affect the physical and mental preparations and personal equipment as well as the necessary durability of technology. During fight, we cannot speak about procurements so the Information Management depends on either *National or Host Nation support*. In order to develop the system, experience will be available as *Lessons Learned* and it is important to frequently produce output Lessons Learned reports as well even about subjects that are not directly tied to Information Management.




Figure 3: Structural model of Military Information Management. Created by the author.

The main purpose of efficient military Information Management is to establish *information superiority*¹⁷. It can be realised by enlarged capabilities and enhanced reactions.

Among components, the importance of “Technology” and “Human” enlarges while the number of Information Management organisations is limited. During a war, only a narrow group of *specialists* are working on IM. The biggest change is in the environment, *weapons* and *warriors* become important constrains while Information Management becomes an applied tool subordinated to the *Information Operation (InfoOps)*.

The wartime establishment of the military system by nature depends on the enemy that is why the *survival* of the system becomes an objective.

The difficulty in case of military Information Management is also in the measurement of performance because the enemies are continuously striving to take advantage of surprise and they use all means to destroy or paralyse our systems. A new point of view in the war environment is the durability of friendly systems. One solution to improve durability is redundancy, which makes another difference between wartime and peacetime approaches. During peacetime, the optimal usage of resources is an objective while in armed conflicts it is the results and survival which are vital. It is not simple to make a model where the potential of components decreased by the effect of enemy weapons can change easily.

QUESTIONS OF SIMULATION IM IN ORDER TO TEST CONCEPTIONS

Perhaps it is not the best idea to test a new system or approach like Information Management in a military environment by creating a system without any evidences about a minimum efficiency. To reach a definite minimum capability right after the introduction of a system, it is necessary to analyse the estimated efficiency of the system. It was mentioned that Information Management is not a system without any ascendants. To measure the estimated advance of a systematised and organised Information Management, a preliminary condition of initiation is necessary. Information Management aims can be reached by diverse methods in various systems.

A successful simulation depends on the methodology and the accuracy of the effect calculations in the factors of the model. The measurement of performance is sometimes difficult to express in a numeric way because of the abstract nature of the factors and the indirect effects of outputs.

If the numeric quantification is not possible, it is a good solution to express relations and tendencies.

In the case of estimation, it is better than nothing to express subjective relations like “better – worse” or “more” – “less” or three- or more-level logical or textual evaluations or estimations:

three level estimations		
low	medium	high
decreasing	stable	increasing
worse	the same	better
less	the same	more

¹⁷ More about information superiority, see Munk, S. “Az információs fölényről” (“On information superiority”). *Hadtudomány* 11/3. 2001. 43–52.

As it was described above, Information Management is a product that creates management information since it is a management process in the form or language of regulations. This nature of the management makes this system similar to the legal systems because the product is an abstract, normative, mostly text-based order, plan, or description. There is research to support the formalisation of legal rules and regulations. One of the examples is the usage of logical programming languages like PROLOG. Also, there are research projects. Among others, in the Hungarian Budapest University of Technology and Economics at the Department of Automation and Applied Informatics, there is a project called “Jogsegéd”,¹⁸ aiming at developing the formalisation of law codes. The formalized logical description or object-oriented modelling can help to model the legal texts and create simulation in order to estimate effects. The commonly shared value of these projects is that this model has to interact with the environment as an effector, and systems must be modelled as well. Normally, the project can check possible contradictions with other modelled law codes. If somebody wants to simulate the effects on a specific organisation, such a structure must also be modelled with several possibilities of reactions. Consequently, the simulation must have a certain number of dimensions to ensure degrees of freedom, if some of the important dimensions are omitted, the simulation will produce false results. Therefore a possible reaction will not be taken into consideration since the possibility to happen is not provided. For example, if one simulation does not consider the user’s resistance against new software, it will never prove that even a whole project can fail because of the user’s negligence.

In order to have the minimum dimensions of reaction for the simulation, it is necessary to weigh the following dimensions:

awareness – unawareness is a dimension to estimate how big the probability is whether the regulation is received and processed. For estimation, it is important to examine the position in the structure and the state of existing information management channels because in the case of deeply subordinated units and narrow or noisy communication channels, it is possible that some components will not receive normative messages.

acceptance – negligence is the dimension of the components’ compliance, how specific rules and regulations it can follow. This parameter is a derivative of moral state, and users’ resistance against the specific rules.

flexibility – rigidity can measure the flexibility of accepted regulations. This value depends on the design, size, task and manning of a component.

speed of reaction is a dimension that can estimate the rate of reaction in time, may derive from all three dimensions above.

Looking at only the description and simulation of *management information channels*, it is difficult to describe or abstract the work of channels because it needs to describe information to be sent. When the model refers to any kind of information, it is not possible to refer to the specific content of information. The only possibility to describe the information is using meta-description like “this is information about this” and “this fact”, or “phenomenon”.

In management information, it is not possible to consider all potential meta-descriptions of information because of the stochastic nature of human organizations. There are always unpredicted appearances, thus it is necessary to consider information with unknown metadata. This situation can be solved by introducing the following category: “any other important

¹⁸ “Model-based handling of law” (“Modell alapú szabály-kezelés”), the short Hungarian description in the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Control Engineering and Services Department project description. Translated and summarized by author.

information about the status of this or that component”. This approach is similar to an old Roman custom that they dedicated a sanctuary to the not-yet-known goddess.

The possibility of potential combinational explosion was mentioned above if a model is too detailed and the minimum number of management information channels is calculated by the following formula:

$$C = \frac{(n+1)!}{2!(n-1)!}$$

In this formula¹⁹,

C=number of possible bi-directional management information channels

n=number of components

This calculation does not consider the information that appears as input and product. The existence of this kind of information depends on the design of the specific components. It is possible to measure the minimum amount of channels since each component has its own input and output. It is sure that either input or output opens minimum one unidirectional channel in order to receive information about input and output process.

The final proceeds of a system simulation is the test of its performance. To measure the performance of a simulated IM is really difficult since the aim of the information management is to foster the system’s performance by setting plans, directives and orders. The efficiency of a normative system is not easy to measure. Particularly, the measurement of information value, which comprises the main subject of the Information Management, is difficult as well. To assess whether any information is in a right quality and quantity in a right position needs multi-dimensional measurement. The quality criterion of the information is determined by the component. The description of information is in an abstract meta-formula.

The realization of Information management can be classified by three following notions (organisation, human, technology).

The Information Management organisation must not over-press or -stress the system. If a management system has too many resources and too much power while it is not controlled, it can easily convert itself to be art for art’s sake. It is pity if the Information Management system becomes a kind of “dictator” system instead of helping management and core processes. The estimate of the threshold depends on the socio-cultural environment and the design of the host organisations. This value can be expressed with a level of sufficient power.

The *human* component in other approaches can be a *resource*. “Human Factors may be defined as the technology concerned with the analysis and optimisation of the relationship between people and their activities by the integration of human sciences and systems engineering in systematic applications and working environment frameworks”²⁰ Concerning Information Management simulation, human factor is important but creating a human behaviour simulation is too ambitious. To measure and estimate human factor, it is necessary to express attitudes with a simple model possibly based on attitude research, measure level of training, moral status and percentage of manning.

Technology can be divided into two parts: procedural knowledge – know-how and technical equipment. The “know-how” can be modelled by the availability rate of user’s

¹⁹ Formula created by the author.

²⁰ Cacciabue, P. M. *Modelling and Simulation of Human Behaviour in System Control*. Berlin: Springer, 1998,2.

guides and important regulations. The technical equipment can be measured by the usage rate of automation.

To measure the performance of a specific variant, it is necessary to compare the result with the resources used in various ways.

A simulation proper model can have the capability to measure the possible achievement. Variants of the system design can be different according to five system categories:

- objectives;
- environment;
- resources;
- components;
- management.

The main aim in a military information system is the support of armed struggle with its capabilities. Information Management can support the system with a better delivery of information. In practice it means the elaboration of management capabilities and development of components' performance via the establishment of a better input distribution and product information. It is an obvious requirement for Information Systems to be as cost effective as it is possible.

In order to measure the improvement in management capabilities, we need to check the informational factors of management.

The management needs to be informed about all relevant statuses of the system in order to make decisions based on correct and timely information. This status information can be measured qualitatively and quantitatively.

The factors of the information quality are the following²¹:

- accuracy;
- relevance;
- timeliness;
- usability;
- completeness;
- safety;
- reliability;
- consistency.

All factors must have an own system to measure in the military environment. Making the specifications of measurement of information quality can be the subject of another research because it is out of the scope of this paper.

The quantitative measurement is the other face of the measurement of management information delivery. The quantitative measurement of information is well documented and elaborated by the followers of Shannon's school.

It is important to realise that the principle "the more the better" applies only with certain limitations. If the quantity reaches the processing capability threshold of the process, the rising flow of information decreases productivity. This limitation depends on the organizational components of design, manning (training, health and moral status) and technologies of information processes.

²¹ Munk, S. *Katonai informatika I.: A katonai informatikai alapjai (Military information technology I., basics of military information technology)*. Budapest: Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem Egyetemi Kiadó, 2003, 26.

Determining the capabilities of components needs experiments to make. The techniques of Queuing Theory are sufficient to estimate the possible information capacity of components.

Having the various parameters reviewed, it is high time to make suggestions how it is possible to make simulation of Information Management variants.

Concerning the high level of human factor that makes the modelled system stochastic, and the significant level of improbability, in order to measure specific components' behaviour it is recommended to make a stochastic mathematical model. The model has to have rate estimations with a specific time period.

Since the system is a process strictly controlled in a military organisation, it is not practical to make steps shorter than a workday. If the simulation is to measure longer periods, it can be a month. With regard to the high level of uncertainty in factors, longer-run deviation of the simulation will drastically increase as the time goes on.

SUMMARY

Our present era heavily depends on information. This fact determines our life and has an effect on human organisations as well. Military organisations are human organisations with a specific purpose and set environment. Information can fulfil three different roles in the aforementioned systems: it can be the subject of management information, can appear in input, and can be a product. Information Management is one of the management processes to foster the functioning of human organisations. Information management in military environment during peacetime is quite similar to IM solutions of other organisations with slightly different specifications coming from terminology and management processes. During wartime the emphasis is placed on built-in technologies and the survival will be part of the system objectives. This complex system is not easy to understand and describe, that is why proper modelling is necessary to be used.

If it is necessary to establish or elaborate Information Management in military environment, it is safe and cost-effective to create sufficient models and run a simulation in order to compare the efficiency of different designs or results of changes. Since in Information Management the human factor is strong and other components and environmental factors have a stochastic behaviour, it is really complicated to make numerical measurements of specific values. It is especially true when it is necessary to estimate the effects of normative rules of the main output of a working Information Management. That is why the simulation of the system must be based on a stochastic mathematical model that has estimated rates in time. In order to prepare this model and simulation, further research on some parameters need to be done.

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Éva Jakusné Harnos:

THE REPRESENTATION OF MIGRATION IN ONLINE ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS TEXTS

ABSTRACT: *The news consumers' perception of reality depends on the way and on the language in which the media cover the events. As it is known from strategic communication, business communication, and political discourse analysis, the choice of words and phrases determines what cognitive scenarios are triggered in the minds of the news consumers. These are culture dependent, deeply rooted in communities, and shape the attitudes of the public. The study summarises some typical features of the reports on global news websites at the peak of the migration crisis in Europe from mid-August, 2015 to late October, 2015, and points out the impact of the model of reality presented by the news texts on the political management of the crisis. The analysis also focuses on which aspects are covered extensively and which ones are dismissed as insignificant or ignored since these may provide possible clues to a better understanding of the background of the crisis.*

KEYWORDS: *cognitive scenarios, discourse analysis, implicit content, news texts, strategic communication*

THE NEWS ITEM AS A NARRATIVE

Studies on news texts find that the structure of a news item in the print media is partly or completely identical with that of a narrative.¹ Nevertheless, with the appearance of the interactive online newspapers and news websites the events are no longer described in single news texts with a closed structure, rather, in loosely structured, lengthy, soap-opera-like flows of news, which rewrite and recycle earlier news texts.

Seemingly, online news is not only up-to-date, but also up-to-minute. It imposes even tighter deadlines on the journalists' work, changing both the work methods and the product — the news text. News consumers have the impression that they are informed about events in real time. Correspondents deliver reports in video messages while they are standing on the location of the events, as if in front of the scenery. The people who are staying in the vicinity of the happening are invited to upload their own photos and video footage on the website of the online newspaper, while news consumers are writing comments. Apparently, news consumers get to know reality better than in the era of the conventional media. However, the devices of narration are still language, and visual information. As earlier, both offer opportunity for influencing the recipients of the messages, that is, for strategic communication or propaganda.

¹ For instance: Van Dijk, T. A. *News As Discourse*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., 1988.; McQuail, D. *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2000. Hungarian edition: *A tömegkommunikáció elmélete*. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2003.; Andok, M. *A hírek története*. Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2013.

Extensive sources are available for the study of news texts in social and political context as a result of the findings of the branch of applied linguistics termed political or critical discourse analysis. Its origins can be traced back as far as content analysis and propaganda analysis.² The analysis of news texts may be used to describe political interrelationships which can be detected in their implicit content but which are not stated explicitly.

The Internet homepages of BBC and of CNN devoted great attention to the surge of migration towards Europe from the spring of 2015 to October 2015, when the launch of Russian military operations in Syria was reported by the global media. When trying to analyse and interpret the events, the study of what information the two influential news producers covered with what linguistic devices may offer some clues. Taking the needs of the news consumer into consideration, the answers to the following questions should be searched for: 1. Who arrives in Europe? 2. Why do they set out? 3. What is their aim? 4. What is the policy of the European countries about them? It is worth investigating what conceptual framework was used when the phenomenon was reported on, what information was repeated a number of times and what was not covered; in addition, which techniques of persuasion were applied by the combination of news texts, photos, video footages, and user generated content.

Although I made statistics during the research of the texts, for example, concerning the frequency of the words *migrant* and *refugee*, qualitative analysis, that is, the detection of linguistic and visual manipulation were the priority.

MIGRANTS OR REFUGEES

It is known from business and political strategic communication, as well as the language of science, that, in order to describe new phenomena of reality, new concepts must be formed, consequently, new linguistic tools must be found or created to develop them and express them — for example, new words. The innovative concepts and words or phrases enter into mutual interaction, have an impact on our thinking and may assist the formulation of new problem solving concepts.³ If business or political actors fail to describe a new phenomenon with new linguistic tools and in an innovative conceptual frame, they fall into a communication trap, get confused and become paralysed.

Certain concepts recall a conceptual frame with so much power that elicits a whole narrative, a whole story. On 28 August, 2015, the following article appeared on the BBC homepage: *The battle over the words used to describe migrants*.⁴ The metaphor *battle* expresses the fight for the information space quite precisely. The article defined the concept of migrant and of refugee as follows:

“A refugee, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, ‘is any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality

² For example: George, A. L. *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1959.; Krippendorff, K. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oak, Ca.: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1980. Hungarian edition: *A tartalomlelemzés alapjai*. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 1995.; Fairclough, N. *Language and Power*. Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001.

³ Krippendorff, K. *Strategic Narratives and Competitive Advantage: Do Winners Speak Differently?* Abo: Abo Akademi University Press, 2014. 26–29.

⁴ Ruz, C. “The battle over the words used to describe migrants”. BBC News Magazine. 28 August 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34061097>, Accessed on 02 September 2015.

and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country’.”

The homepage of CNN displayed noticeable harmony with the BBC coverage of migration. On 11 September, 2015, it explained the same in the form of a narrative in the article entitled *Things to know about Europe’s migrant crisis at land and sea*:⁵

„A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her home country because of armed conflict or persecution. Syrians are a prime example.”

The narrative hidden in the word, more precisely, in the concept of *refugee* can be told as follows: someone is persecuted somewhere due to an armed conflict or the above mentioned reasons, they flee, they can no longer rely on their home country, for this reason, some other country has to admit them and protect them. One interviewee of the 28 August article of BBC,⁶ which was mentioned above, worded the behavioural constraint deriving from the conceptual frame as below:

“Refugee implies that we have an obligation to people,” says Betts. “It implies that we have to let them on to our territory and give them the chance to seek asylum.”

On the whole, the use of the word, that is, of the concept *refugee* imposed such a psychological constraint which resulted in the realization of the scenario which it had elicited, as required by the norms.

The definition of *migrant* in the mentioned 28 August article was the following:

A UN document suggests: “The term ‘migrant’... should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor.”

It was CNN again that helped to decode the narrative hidden in the word:

„A migrant is someone who chooses to resettle to another country in search of a better life. So, for example, those fleeing poverty in Nigeria, looking for work in Europe, would not have refugee status and would be considered migrants.”⁷

It can be seen that the narrative, or the retrieved and realized or, rather, self-realizing scenario differs from the series of events recalled by the concept of *refugee*: someone gets disappointed about their situation in a poor country, they decide to move on, trying to find a job and a better life; they leave their home country and apply for admission to another country. The target country judges their application either favourably or unfavourably, depending on its social and economic needs.

The explanation by CNN in the 11 September article was concluded as follows:

“The United Nations notes that both groups are present in Europe and at its shores. It’s safe to call all of them migrants because each is migrating, but many of them are also refugees.”

To sum up, the choice of the linguistic signs referring to certain concepts results in the development or activation of ‘self-fulfilling’ cognitive schemata, that is, scenarios. Studies prove that this can be exploited in the media and in political communication.⁸

⁵ Martinez, M. “Things to know about Europe’s migrant crisis at land and sea”. CNN. 28 August 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/28/world/things-to-know-europe-migrant-crisis-worlds-deadliest-border/index.html>, Accessed on 08 October 2015.

⁶ Ruz, C. “The battle over the words...”.

⁷ Martinez, M. “Things to know about...”.

⁸ Krippendorff. *Strategic Narratives and Competitive Advantage...* 34–35.; Nerlich, B. “The role of metaphor scenarios in disease management discourses: Foot and mouth disease and avian influenza”. In Handl, S. and Schmid, H-J. (eds), *Windows to the Mind*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 2011, 116–118.

In the period examined, on the BBC homepage the following statement could be read at the end of each article reporting on the European migration crisis:

“A note on terminology: The BBC uses the term migrant to refer to all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria, who are likely to be granted refugee status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments are likely to rule, are economic migrants.”

It will be proved below that the linguistic choice, i.e., lapsing from one word to the other and interchanging concepts provided grounds for the persuasion, the emotional manipulation of the news consumers.

THE MOTIVES OF MIGRATION ACCORDING TO THE NEWS

The recipients of news must have been searching for the causes of the migration surge. Consequently, the explanations offered by the news texts on the mentioned homepages should be examined. On 9 September, 2015, for example, the following headline could be read on the BBC homepage:

“Migrant crisis: How Middle East wars fuel the problem”⁹

The news text placed responsibility solely on the European Union, as if it had been the only organization which had a share in the wars.

“The new crisis is about refugees. The European Union is discovering, belatedly, that it is impossible to avoid the consequences of a range of wars and civil conflicts right next door.”

A headline of CNN on September 11:

“War has forced half of Syrians from their homes”¹⁰

The noun *war* is personified: *it has driven half of Syrians from their homes*. The warring parties, who actually perform acts of war, are concealed by this phrase. The following information could be found on the BBC homepage on 19 September, 2015:

“Many have fled the conflicts and abuses in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea. But there are also many economic migrants from the Balkans.”¹¹

The correspondent kept silent about the participants of the conflicts again. Nevertheless, on 6 October he named those who generated a possible new migration wave — without naming those who had sparked the conflict in Syria.

“Turkey says millions more refugees could flee the conflict in Syria due to Russian and Iranian involvement.”¹²

⁹ “Migrant crisis: How Middle East wars fuel the problem”. BBC News. 09 September 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193762>, Accessed on 08 October 2015.

¹⁰ Bixler, M. and Martinez, M. “War has forced half of Syrians from their homes”. CNN. 11 September 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/11/world/syria-refugee-crisis-when-war-displaces-half-a-country/index.html>, Accessed on 15 October 2015.

¹¹ “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”. BBC News. 09 October 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886>, Accessed on 15 October 2015.

¹² „Migrant crisis: EU plan offers more money for Turkey camps”. BBC News. 6 October 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34451660>, Accessed on 15 October 2015.

In an earlier article on 23 April (Migrant crisis: Who are Africa's people smugglers?)¹³ the BBC homepage quoted an interviewee who spoke about the restructuring of the market of African people smuggling:

“The Syrian migration flow changed the game as far as human smuggling was concerned in Sub-Saharan Africa, because the Syrians had more money to pay.”

As it can be seen from the above, all the explanation the reader got for the mass appearance of the migrants was that its causes had been wars and people smugglers. The news texts ignored the actual factors that generated the astonishing footage and statistics, similarly to the possible long-term consequences. No reference was made to the parties involved in the Syria war, and no reasons were stated why migration suddenly increased in the particular period of time. In the news reports, the destination of the migrants was presented as given information, as part of the shared background knowledge of the journalists and of the news consumers:

“[...] migrants bound for Germany. The route through Greece and the Balkans became very popular because Libya and the sea passage to Italy proved extremely risky.”¹⁴

MIGRATION AS A NATURAL DISASTER

On the basis of news texts, migration had been associated with the Mediterranean Sea and with countries of the Mediterranean as destinations until autumn 2015. When masses of migrants appeared on the Balkan and in Central Europe, the English language news reports used the discourse metaphor ‘migration is the same as natural waters flooding and forcing their way’ to describe the events. A discourse metaphor depicts a phenomenon for a community by projecting onto it another, known phenomenon. In this case, it described the mass of people through the movement and power of natural waters. Similarly to scenarios and conceptual frames, discourse metaphors impose a cognitive and narrative constraint concerning the event which is presented. Their dissemination in public talk is often the result of a pre-designed communication strategy.¹⁵ Just to mention a few examples of water related metaphors (all of them include my emphasis):

“Migrants have **poured** into Austria from Hungary, en route to southern Germany.”¹⁶

“Croatia has now said it is regulating **the flow** of migrants.”¹⁷

“He accused Germany of encouraging the **influx**.”¹⁸

“Since Hungary sealed off its border with Serbia there has been **a surge** of migrants entering Croatia.”¹⁹

“The **flow** shows no sign of easing, with crowds still **streaming** across Hungary’s border with Serbia. Officials in Germany say thousands more migrants are expected to arrive later.”²⁰

“[Europe is] **absorbing** refugees.”

¹³ “Migrant crisis: Who are Africa's people smugglers?”. BBC News. 23 April 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32381101>, Accessed on 12 October 2015.

¹⁴ “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

¹⁵ Nerlich, B. “The role of metaphor scenarios...”. 116–117.

¹⁶ „How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

¹⁷ „How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

¹⁸ „How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

¹⁹ „How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

²⁰ “Migrant crisis: Germany to release funds to help regions cope”. BBC News. 07 September 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34171161>, Accessed on 09 October 2015.

On September 1, this metaphoric image appeared in a headline:

“Migrant crisis: ‘**River of humanity**’ on Hungary border”²¹

and correspondent Nick Thorpe said it on the video report linked into the news text:

“[...]during the day I witnessed **a river of humanity** flowing”

The discourse metaphor of flood sets the frames of the narrative similarly to the way the concepts of *migrant* and *refugee* impose action in order to realise the scripts conceptually connected to them. As a flood is a natural disaster, it fits the method of concealing the actors who fuel wars and conflicts: it would be irrational to search for people who can be made responsible for natural disasters in human society or in human communities.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANCHORED CONCEPTUAL FRAMES OF THE NARRATIVE

Media attention turned to certain aspects of reality owing to the anchored frames and the elicited scenarios of the narrative, which entered into operation, while other aspects were completely concealed by the two news sources examined. It is particularly noticeable in the article entitled “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?” published on the BBC homepage on 19 September, 2015,²² a section of which is cited below with my emphasis:

“It became the focus of world attention when Hungarian riot police fired water cannon and tear gas at a big crowd of migrants at the border with Serbia on 16 September.

Hungarian officials said bottles and stones **had been thrown** at police, who were preventing the migrants from pouring through the new border fence.

There is widespread criticism of Hungary for its decision to build the razor-wire fence and prosecute migrants who enter illegally. Many fellow Europeans see the measures as a Draconian overreaction. But reports indicate that many Hungarians support the government’s tough stance.

Refugees have a right under international law to get protection and claim asylum. Pushing them back at the border violates that right, aid organisations point out.”

In the spirit of the note on terminology published on the BBC homepage and quoted above, the word *migrant* refers to the mixed group of both refugees and economic migrants. The correspondent lapsed from *migrants* to *refugees* without any explanation. The last comment insinuated the Hungarian authorities without justifying the term *refugees* with any reason. What is more, the journalist avoided including the agent in the sentence on throwing stones, which led to unnatural sentence structure and vague reference (...officials said bottles and stones **had been thrown**...). It seems that violent behaviour did not fit into the scenario elicited by the concept of *refugee*. At the same time, the news producer used the term *migrant* meeting the declared rules of ethical language use, then suddenly switched to *refugee* and created a negative image of the measures by the Hungarian authorities. In addition, the aid organisations mentioned were not named clearly.

In the period of time examined (early August to mid-October 2015) the leading news of BBC and CNN did not cover any unfavourable information about the migrants who stayed in Hungary or who appeared at its borders, but they did include unfavourable, often distorted, information and manipulative photos and video footages about the Hungarian authorities. Both

²¹ “Migrant crisis: ‘River of humanity’ on Hungary border”. BBC News. 01 September 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34112928>, Accessed on 10 October 2015.

²² “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”

BBC and CNN ignored the news report “Sky Finds ‘Handbook’ For EU-Bound Migrants” published on the Sky News homepage on 13 September.²³ That news story could have made a sensation because the Sky News correspondent had made an interview with a member of the organisation which allegedly had distributed the ‘handbook’ in Turkey. This person was reported to be living in Austria, and told the journalist that they had a network of more than a hundred people in North Africa and Europe. Nevertheless, it was not selected as leading news or as news for unknown reasons.

Another extract of the above mentioned article “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”²⁴ is worth analysing for its special devices of deception:

“Initially Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar said his small Alpine country **would stick to the Schengen free movement rules**. He said it would process asylum requests and not create a “corridor” for refugees to simply travel on to Austria.” (My emphasis.)

The statement of the Slovenian Prime Minister as quoted by BBC suggested that the Schengen rules of free movement applied not only to the EU citizens living in the Schengen area but also to the migrants. Contrary to this, on grounds of the theory of presuppositions in linguistic pragmatics, the second sentence can be interpreted only if it is assumed that there was another country which did not process asylum requests and created a ‘corridor’ so that the refugees could ‘simply travel on’. Consequently, both stopping the migrants and letting them on were disapproved and were against the rules.

The examples analysed above prove that the description, the narration of migration in the mentioned news texts was stylistically and linguistically as confused as uncertain and diverse the political assessment of the situation was in various countries. It is obvious from the language use of the news texts that communicative and political confusion were replaced by clearer and more coordinated communication and action in October. The word *refugee* gradually disappeared, and the word migrant was combined with adjectives. On 9 October, in the BBC article “Migrant crisis: EU considers faster deportations” the word *refugee* occurred only four times, but *asylum seeker* was also used four times.²⁵ Remarkably, the term *migrant* occurred eleven times, with the following adjectives: *illegal, irregular, unwanted*.

It marked the turning point of a media campaign of more than two months in autumn 2015. The campaign stirred strong emotions and seemed to be a well-designed information operation. What may have been the purpose of the coordinated strategic communication operation by BBC and CNN?

CONCLUSIONS

The total occupation of the information space was observable. In my view, the articles published on the front of the BBC and CNN homepages, the recommended links, the videos conveying manipulative images, footages, and comments by correspondents, as well as the series of photos disguised as Twitter or Facebook notes distracted the attention of the international public from the area of the Mediterranean. They targeted home recipients rather than global ones. This can be supported by the fact that, relying on their prejudice,

²³ Samuels, J. “Sky Finds ‘Handbook’ For EU-Bound Migrants”. Sky News. 13 September 2015. <http://news.sky.com/story/1551853/sky-finds-handbook-for-eu-bound-migrants>, Accessed on 13 September 2015.

²⁴ “How is the migrant crisis dividing EU countries?”.

²⁵ “Migrant crisis: EU considers faster deportations”. BBC News. 08 October 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34471858>, Accessed on 09 October 2015.

the news texts offered the simplest stereotypes when setting the agenda, such as the alleged 'democracy deficit' of the Central and Eastern European countries, the opposition between the old and new members of the EU, and the sad plight of the refugees or migrants. While the construction of the fence along the border of Hungary was criticised, very little coverage was provided on the fence at Calais or the incidents occurring there. The United Kingdom opted out of the planned refugee quotas of the EU, and the US did not respond to the suggestion of world quotas.

The media campaign gave the impression that the former foes had suddenly transformed into friends and advocates of the victims of the war in Syria, distancing themselves from their earlier deeds and even from their allies. In the era of the globalised media, when strategic communication intended for home public is received by foreign public and vice versa, media workers must have been aware of the hazard of sparking a conflict between the Muslim world and European countries with their irrational and emotionally overheated news reports.

During the coverage of the European migration crisis the causes that had sparked it were not mentioned, and neither was the part the UK and the USA played in the conflict. The re-tuning of the attitude to Syria may have been in the centre of the concerted effort: the transformation of the Syrian people from enemies into victims (of the Russian and Iranian intervention) by arousing sympathy. If the communication about Syria had been re-tuned, it would affect the positions at the possible peace negotiations. From that time on, Iran and Russia could have been made responsible for the situation in Syria, which could have an impact on the positions at the future peace talks.

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Bálint Somkuti:

LT. COL. SÁNDOR FÁBIÁN: IRREGULAR WARFARE. THE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGY FOR SMALL STATES

Wroclaw: Amazon Fulfilment, 2012. 349 p. ISBN 978-1508490524

As already told by the title the book, privately published in 2012, deals with a unique idea. Irregular warfare is usually seen as an auxiliary solution if used by state actors, but in this case the author promotes the idea as a clear nod to his tutor John Arquilla as a main course of action for small states. To support his argument the author defines different areas such as effectivity, budgetary reasons, as well as military ones for the creation of a “professional irregular defence force” (p. 8.). The first and emphasised starting point of the book is the classic idea that strategy, especially grand strategy, must focus on decreasing the social costs of warfare. The second initial assumption is that a weaker state is willing to risk everything in order to survive even through bringing the objective of the struggle to an irrational level. Judging from the above it is easy to see how ambitious goals the author set for his writing.

Surmising that by smaller states the author is likely but not exclusively to mean his native Hungary, the book discusses very shortly (pp. 33-35) how the term could be interpreted. Possible grand strategies for similar countries are discussed in detail, and between pages 36 and 53 there is a neat summary to be found about the possible four major defensive strategies such as: imitating bigger states’ military capabilities, forming of alliances, declaration of neutrality, and obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Yet as the author correctly points out most of these are either not available, or only through disproportionately huge efforts. Who would like to have a member in an alliance, which relies on other countries’ spending? Not to mention the fact that neutral states spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defence. Acquiring WMDs (and their means of delivery) requires serious technological and financial investments, not to mention the international communities’ obvious resistance, so we can agree with the author that most of these are not a viable solution for small states.

The major strength of the book is the presentation of irregular forces by state actors through case studies. (pp. 53-325.) The American war of independence, Boer wars, the lesser known struggles of the German colonial troops in German East Africa in WWI, the Yugoslav partisan war, the first Chechen-Russian war, or the second Lebanese war, all provide excellent background and arguments for the official use of irregular troops.

In the last part of the book the author summarizes the previous chapters and offers solutions for an irregular defensive grand strategy at official level. And this is the point where he definitely reaches the limits of the concept. Even though the author identifies and emphasizes (pp. 328-329.) the importance of political unity as a requirement for pre-planned territorial losses, or even the complete loss of sovereignty, the reviewer finds it hard to believe that any political player would risk a defence strategy which intentionally refrains from defending major parts or *horribile dictu* the whole country. If the plans of abandoning certain parts of society became known to the public or any whistleblowers, it would definitely mean the

political death for the supporting political parties. An operational or tactical, strictly military that is, retreat from certain areas is acceptable, but pre-planned surrendering of population and territories, not to mention sovereignty, is for sure beyond any real support. Not to mention the fact that reconquering is usually more difficult than defending. The problematic is posed by the third point as the physical battlefield is closely related to lightly equipped units and irregular warfare. In order to successfully employ guerrilla hit-and-run tactics against a superior foe, in the words of Clausewitz a “difficultly accessible” terrain is a must. Pripyat marshes, the dry Spanish meseta full of caves and hills, the hills in the former Yugoslavia, or the huge forests of the Baltics (see *Forest Brothers*) are ideal for such warfare. In Hungary such terrain features are almost non-existent or too small in size, so coming back to the previous point it is politically unacceptable to let the aggressor into the cities, among the civilians without a fight, thus enabling urban warfare and the granted huge number of civilian casualties and the whole sale destruction of built up areas.

On the other hand the reviewer regards the novel idea of promoting mobility at the expense of firepower an excellent concept. Not only is it in line with Hungarian military tradition, but also corresponds to recent experience. Classical prebuilt defence structures such as bases and barriers are easy targets for modern precision weapons. But forming light infantry units offers a number of advantages. Such units are easily formed even with limited resources, allowing a bigger portion of the population to receive at least basic military training. Using 4x4 vehicles, even technical, by (reservist) units would bring local support and low cost together for an increased deterrent military capability. Recent experience in Syria has led Russian forces to experience with a light infantry/professional irregular unit.¹ Of course for such deterrence a well trained and equipped traditional army is also a must. For irregular warfare local, reservist units with good local knowledge are probably the most suited, which are able to make a possible occupier’s life miserable. With General Spanocchi’s notion, written during the Cold War, neutral Austria laid out the contours of such concept. As its further development, the Iranian concept of passive resistance offers an even more sophisticated, decentralized system where the state’s functions are overtaken by an underground organization. Yet describing the principles of such an integrated, law enforcement/military, and civil service organization is way outside the scope of this current review.

Using an analogy from the animal world small states’ military doctrine should look like the approach of the African honey badger, also known as ratel. The small sized, distinctive black and silver furred predator is well known for its toughness, fearlessness, and creativity. Even though the average size of a ratel is only 80 cm and its weight is only 10-15 kg, thanks to its thick skin and ferocity even large predators like lions evade the badger. One story told in a 2011 National Geographic documentary a ratel has killed a 800 kg African buffalo, by bleeding him dry, while hanging on to his nose. One zoo specimen has escaped from his new place by cleverly using two tree branches, and returned to his old cage to take it back from the new residents – a lion couple. In the morning, the zoo crew found the heavily wounded, but still breathing ratel beside the lions. The fame of the ratel is characterized by the 2007 case from Basra, Iraq. Fake news was spread about the British forces stationing there, to have

¹ Marjanovic, M. “Russian Army forms a battalion equipped with technicals”. Checkpoint Asia. 13 August 2017. <http://www.checkpointasia.net/index.php/2017/08/13/russian-army-forms-a-battalion-equipped-with-technicals/>. Accessed on 15 Oct 2017.

released a man eating version of the native ratel to intimidate to population.² This approach is well represented in a recently published RAND report about the Baltic States' vulnerability to hybrid warfare *"If somebody without any military insignia commits terrorist attacks in your country you should shoot him . . . you should not allow them to enter."*³

In the reviewer's opinion a small state's defence concept must show the above resolve, toughness, and ferocity supporting the image that a possible aggressor has much more to lose than it could gain in a conflict.

To summarize the above, the reviewer recommends the book to all those who are professionally or otherwise interested in irregular warfare adding that certain parts, and observations require further research.

² "British blamed for Basra badgers". BBC. 12 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6295138.stm, Accessed on 18 June 2017.

³ Radin, A. "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses". RAND. 2017. 25. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf, Accessed on 10 July 2017.

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