

Hungarian Defence Review

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FOREWORD

FORCE MODERNIZATION CHALLENGES

NATO is approaching its 70th anniversary and as it is the case in such moments, we tend to stop and think, pondering what we have accomplished in the past and what the future holds.

Although we can be proud that Hungary is a member of the most enduring military Alliance, we also have to realize that the international defence community seems to struggle with how to organize, strategize, and act effectively in increasingly complex and emergent contexts, where the previous distinctions between war and peace are blurred beyond comprehension, and great-power competition is also on the rise.

‘Black swan’ events continue to shatter any illusion of stability or extension of normalcy and the Hungarian Defence Forces, as part of the Alliance, appear increasingly unable to deal with these problems using traditional planning and organizing methodologies alone.

This new and increasingly complex context requires new and noble approaches from policymakers, and military personnel alike. Even though the Zrínyi 2026 program provides sufficient resources to acquire and develop new and modern equipment, one thing is sure: during the force modernization process we will encounter a myriad challenges we have not experienced previously, and we will need better foresight supported by modern technology, agile processes, and a different leadership mind-set to solve these wicked problems.

In the *Hungarian Defence Review*, we fully realize these challenges and use the academic freedom, combined with military expertise to suggest response options to the changes in the hope that these ideas will be acted upon and the result will be new approaches to look for solutions.

The Hungarian Defence Forces has come to realize that the current force modernization is nothing short of a digital transformation and the force which was designed and optimized for traditional challenges, has to fulfil its obligation to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the country, but at the same time we have to build new capabilities as well to be effective on today’s VUCA battlefield.

Adaptation is certainly not new to the HDF, which has a long history, and has undergone several focus shifts before. Yet the tempo have changed the game recently, and driven by a new strategic focus, we have embarked on a very ambitious journey of organizational transformation of an unprecedented pace.

We are moving ahead at a pace rapid for a large and bureaucratic organization, however, adaptation and transformation has never been an easy process. Preparing for the future is increasingly difficult. There are no blueprints, rules or best practices anymore, and frequently an organization’s successful tools from yesterday actually work against it in discovering tomorrow’s challenges.

The centrepiece of this approach is a better equipped, responsive, and readily deployable defence force, which also possesses offset capabilities as well as traditional means to fight in various aspects of the modern battlefield. Thus, the Hungarian Defence Forces has to think and act like a network as well, and this requires institutional adaptation beyond what had previously been sufficient.

The Ministry of Defence has built an excellent relationship with the Ministry of Innovation and Technology as well as other organizations including both academia and industry, and we are leveraging these opportunities to develop new and novel approaches to secure our sustained competitive advantage.

It is clear, that the time for action is now, and we believe that the intellectual capital of the *Hungarian Defence Review* authors is a contribution to our national security.

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Maj. (Res.) Klára Fekete-Karydis:

THE TANGLED WEB OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND TERRORISM

ABSTRACT: Cryptocurrencies first appeared in 2009 and swept around the world in less than five years creating both crypto billionaires and new interfaces of illicit activities tasking government officials with the challenge of regulating a technology that was understood by but a few. Some governments choose the path of regulating the new asset class in terms of registration requirements, taxation as well as the extension of counter terrorism and anti money laundering measures on crypto currencies and related services while others choose to simply ban them. Along with the development of the blockchain and the spread of cryptocurrencies its use for illicit activities including the financing of international terrorism gained a new impetus as well. This article assesses the technological features of the blockchain, the security concerns constituted by the new asset class and the technology it is built upon, the international developments in terms of financial and legal regulation on cryptocurrencies and their trade. Finally, the paper elaborates some possible threats and challenges that have never been discussed yet, together with some recommendations towards their management.

KEYWORDS: cryptocurrency, blockchain, terrorism, hacking, regulation

INTRODUCTION

The first scientific research paper ‘Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency’ was published in 2011 by Reuben Grinberg in the *Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal*¹. The article focused on three topics, 1) competitive e-commerce environment, 2) sustainability in terms of the confidence of the users/consumers and the state authorities and 3) the legal issues regarding the right of initiating currencies and the regulations on securities. As the use of crypto assets expanded and their value increased to unforeseen heights, research became indispensable on all aspects of the revolutionary asset. The interest was not limited to technological questions as the legal status was yet to be determined and their economic power was beyond sight.

Security emerged as an essential focus point as well since the uncertainty around the above questions together with the core characteristics of the blockchain gave way to the illicit use of crypto assets, for instance financial crimes, like fraud or theft, organised crime, including money laundering, and most of all: terrorism. How these threats can be tackled is a multifaceted question also because the regulation of the crypto assets remains in state authority while its use is global, also, because the truth is that the development of crypto-

¹ Grinberg, R. “Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency”. *Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal* 4/1. 2012. 159–207. <http://bitcoinaffiliatelist.com/wp-content/uploads/bitcoin-by-reubengrinberg.pdf>, Accessed on 24 June 2018.

currencies is far ahead of the policies and the decisionmakers as Nakamoto² was ahead of academics who were unable to discover what came to him intuitively³.

THE EVOLUTION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

The domain name ‘bitcoin.org’ was registered on August 2008 and Bitcoin, the first and widely considered as the most preeminent⁴ cryptocurrency was officially released on January 2009⁵ in the form of an open source code. The identity of the developer remains unknown to date⁶ and he has not been heard of since April 2011⁷. It was designed as a peer-to-peer electronic cash system⁸. In other words, a decentralised digital currency with no single administrator or a central bank backing the transactions or actual bank accounts⁹ in use.

The idea of decentralisation of money has both its theoretical¹⁰ and ideological roots ranging from the Austrian school of economics to anarchism although the practical use of cryptocurrencies is centralised in a number of aspects¹¹. Hayek was the first economist to advocate the end of the era of central banks and an entirely free money market¹² in terms of production, distribution, administration and management. The libertarian idea of lifting the governmental control from currency was widely supported by the first, if not most of the owners and users of the cryptocurrencies. Thus, apart from the business-oriented interest there has been a philosophical pattern behind the use of cryptocurrencies since their initial release. Parallel to this, there is also a reverse ideology the reality of which cannot be foreseen yet precisely. What was revolutionary about cryptocurrencies and labelled as ‘fundamentally humanitarian’¹³ is essentially anti-establishment as the separation of the currency and the state undermines governments and disrupts institutions¹⁴. However, should cryptocurrencies

² The developer of Bitcoin, claiming to be a Japanese man by the name of Satoshi Nakamoto.

³ Bonneau, J. et al. “SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies”. *Proceedings 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy SP2015, 18-20 May 2015 San Jose, California, USA*. Washington DC: IEEE Computer Society, 2015. 104–121. <https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.14>, Accessed on 23 June 2018.

⁴ Bernard, Z. “Everything you need to know about Bitcoin, its mysterious origins, and the many alleged identities of its creator”. *Business Insider*, 2 December 2017. <https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-12>, Accessed on 22 June 2018.

⁵ Davis, J. “The Crypto-Currency: Bitcoin and its mysterious inventor”. *The New Yorker*, 10 October 2011. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/10/the-crypto-currency>, Accessed on 11 July 2018.

⁶ Nakamoto, S. “Satoshi Nakamoto’s Page”. P2P Foundation. <https://web.archive.org/web/20120529203623/http://p2pfoundation.ning.com/profile/SatoshiNakamoto>, Accessed on 29 June 2018.

⁷ S., L. “Who is Satoshi Nakamoto? The Economist explains”. *The Economist*, 2 November 2015. <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/11/02/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto>, Accessed on 29 June 2018.

⁸ Nakamoto, S. “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. 31 October 2008. <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>, Accessed on June 17 2018.

⁹ In the traditional sense of an account administered by a bank.

¹⁰ Virtual Currency Schemes: October 2012. Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2012. 22. <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf>, Accessed on 17 May 2018.

¹¹ Böhme, R. et al. “Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance”. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 29/2. 2015. 215., 219–222. <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.29.2.213>, Accessed on 21 July 2018.

¹² Hayek, F. A. *Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined*. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990.

¹³ Tourianski, J. “The Declaration of Bitcoin’s Independence”. https://archive.org/details/DECLARATION_201508, Accessed on 1 July 2018.

¹⁴ Golumbia, D. “Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism”. In Lovink, G., Tkacz, N. and De Vries, P. (eds), *Moneylab reader: an intervention in digital economy*. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2015, 117–131.

be accepted as legal currencies internationally, the core idea would fail as an ideology. The question is whether it is the philosophical thought driving the development and the trade or it was the very existence of the electronic cash that paved the way to the formation of a new form of anonym possession of money that cannot be controlled by central authorities and the parties to the transactions cannot or can hardly be tracked down due to the fundamental characteristics of the blockchain.

The mining of cryptocurrencies¹⁵ is permissionless, theoretically anyone can become a miner. In practice, however, there are but a few major miners since the activity is very expensive due to the heavy demand on electricity, the highly specialised hardware, and the so called consensus mechanism of the blockchain also referred to as ‘proof of work’, which can only be completed through a trial-and-error procedure meaning a large number of costly computations. As a result of the fierce competition, mining farms can only be profitable where there is access to cheap electricity. Most of the crypto mining farms are located¹⁶ in the USA, China and Russia augmented by a very few in countries such as Iceland or Switzerland¹⁷.

The largest markets of bitcoin are Japan (< 50%), the USA (> 25%) and the EU (< 5%). Bitcoin started a new era even though there were no new assets developed and introduced to the market in 2010–2011 and even 2012 saw but a slow pace of development. Ripple, one of the notable assets, appeared in 2013 along with a number of other still active cryptocurrencies launching an avalanche-like evolution in the following years.

Table 1: *Most prominent cryptocurrencies and their values*¹⁸

Ranking	Name	Market Cap (Billion USD)	Market Share (%)	Initiation
1.	Bitcoin	141.35	32.91	2009
2.	Ethereum	48.24	11.48	2015
3.	Ripple	18.08	1.37	2013
4.	Bitcoin Cash	14.40	4.20	2017
5.	EOS	7.72	4.50	2017
6.	Stellar Lumens	6.21	1.48	2014
7.	Litecoin	5.01	1.97	2011
8.	Cardano	4.44	0.57	2018
9.	IOTA	2.89	0.29	2016
10.	Tether	2.50	19.20	2015
11.	TRON	2.50	1.31	2017
12.	Monero	2.31	0.22	2014
13.	NEO	2.25	0.58	2014

¹⁵ Berentsen, A. and Schär, F. “A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Review 100/1. 2018. 5–7. <https://doi.org/10.20955/r.2018.1-16>, Accessed on 22 June 2018.

¹⁶ Daniels, P. “These are the largest Bitcoin mining farms in the world”. Digital Trends. 7 January 2018. <https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/largest-bitcoin-mining-farm/>, Accessed on 26 June 2018.

¹⁷ Magas, J. “Top Five Biggest Crypto Mining Areas: Which Farms Are Pushing Forward the New Gold Rush?”. 23 June 2018. <https://cointelegraph.com/news/top-five-biggest-crypto-mining-areas-which-farms-are-pushing-forward-the-new-gold-rush>, Accessed on 26 June 2018.

¹⁸ “CoinMarketCap”. <https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/>, Accessed on 18 July 2018.

Ranking	Name	Market Cap (Billion USD)	Market Share (%)	Initiation
14.	Dash	2.02	0.99	2014
15.	Ethereum Classic	1.77	1.32	2015
16.	NEM	1.65	0.58	2014
17.	VeChain	1.37	0.06	2018
18.	Tezos	1.32	0.02	2018
19.	Binance Coin	1.28	0.38	2017
20.	OmiseGo	1.01	0.26	2017

On May 2 2013 the first Crypto ATM was installed in San Diego, CA. In the same year, on August 20 the German Federal Ministry of Finance recognised Bitcoin as a form of private money and approved its use in both private and commercial sales while on December 5 the People's Bank of China¹⁹ banned crypto transactions for financial institutions after Thailand and before Denmark, Russia²⁰ and Indonesia took similar steps. On January 6 2015 Coinbase became the first regulated Bitcoin exchange in 25 US states with an ambitious plan of international expansion.²¹

Crypto assets experienced high volatility and exponential price appreciation in recent years. 2017 saw an explosion of the market and prices skyrocketed in the fourth quarter.

Early investors have seen immense profits as Bitcoin for instance peaked at nearly USD 20,000 at the end of 2017 compared to the value of less than a dollar after its initiation²². Currently there are nearly 2000 crypto assets traded with a total value of some USD 500 billion and in 2018 the first ever branded coin²³ appeared in the market. Even though the segment is not related to terrorism at all, the phenomenon itself does deserve attention from the regulatory authorities and intelligence agencies as well.




Figure 1: Timeline of Bitcoin Price²⁴

Source: 99 Bitcoins

¹⁹ The Chinese Central Bank.

²⁰ Pototsky, D. and Kuchma, A. "Russia Becomes the Second Country to Ban Bitcoin". *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, 5 February 2014. https://www.rbth.com/business/2014/02/05/russia_becomes_the_second_country_to_ban_bitcoin_33871.html, Accessed on 16 May 2018.

²¹ "Futurism". <https://futurism.com/images/the-entire-history-of-bitcoin-in-a-single-infographic/>, Accessed on 27 July 2018.

²² Its current value still exceeds 8,000 USD.

²³ Namely, Fashion TV's Fashion Coin Deluxe (Fashion Coin).

²⁴ "99 BITCOINS". <https://99bitcoins.com/price-chart-history/>, Accessed on 18 July 2018.

Alltogether, crypto assets represent significant value and their share in the internet-based merchandise is continuously growing. They are used in hundreds of thousands of transactions every day and can buy more than 3 million unique products ranging from toys and cosmetics through real estate to weapons and illegal drugs. Therefore, their role in the global markets and their share in financial transactions cannot be ignored. Instead, it is essential to regulate the transactions and ensure more efficient oversight, since the increase in trading volumes inherently brings the rise of the amounts that can be used to finance illicit activities that pose a threat on the society globally.

SECURITY CONCERNS

As the US Department of Homeland Security assumed, transnational crime and trafficking facilitate the movement of narcotics, people, funds, arms and other support to hostile actors including terrorist networks. Terrorists, proliferators and other criminal elements seek to take advantage of the increasingly globalized financial system to move money in support of their dangerous conduct.²⁵



Figure 2: *Global Merchandise in Cryptocurrencies*
Source: *coinmap.org*




Figure 3: *Merchandise in Cryptocurrencies in Hungary*
Source: *coinmap.org*

²⁵ US Department of Homeland Security. "Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic framework for a Secure Homeland". February 2010. 7–9. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf, Accessed on 27 July 2014.

Certain characteristics of the blockchain technology and the single crypto assets make them highly attractive for those willing to engage in illicit activities and avoid traceability. These features include 1) pseudo-anonymity, 2) low transaction costs, 3) fast transactions, 4) global reach in terms of national borders and sovereign currencies, 5) user friendly interfaces, 6) a continuously developing technology, 7) a line of obstacles for the authorities to track down and monitor transactions. Regulatory authorities, law enforcement as well as defence and intelligence officials are all concerned about the fact that the blockchain serves as a ground for transmitting monetary value outside the conventional channels that are properly if not overregulated.

One of the revolutionary characteristics of crypto assets namely pseudo-anonymity represents a major challenge for governments and state authorities responsible for taxation, public safety, criminal investigation and national security. The Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain technology for instance offer pseudo-anonymity while other crypto assets like Monero have anonymity-enhancing features. Blockchain does not require real names or addresses and the identity of the wallet holders is not public. The keys to use a wallet are known only and exclusively by their owners and once they are lost, the content of the wallet is lost forever. Consequently, it means that the given amount remains in the system but no-one can ever use it again. In the first case, once the real identity of the owner of a given wallet is revealed, all transactions related to the wallet can be traced and linked with the given entity²⁶. Since the ledger records every transaction and all transactions that were once recorded remain in the system forever, tracing them is unlimited in time and the sites that offer pseudonymity are also vulnerable to confidentiality breaches. The second case might be extremely appealing for those who try to avoid the attention of the authorities and to be under scrutiny. However, as it was proved by research, even Monero is vulnerable to publicly deanonymized transactions and its untraceability mechanism cannot provide perfect anonymity²⁷.

Illicit activities related to crypto assets are theft, the merchandise of illegal goods and money laundering. Potential threats to national security are the use of crypto assets to finance international terrorism including the conversion of cryptocurrencies to sovereign currencies, international organised crime with a special attention to the trade of illegal or dual use products and sanctioned states in relation with the trade of sanctioned products. Ransomware activities may fall into both of these categories depending on the aim of the actor.

While Russia and Venezuela took steps towards creating their very own cryptocurrencies, North Korea took advantage on ransomware activities. Ransomware attacks infect a computer or network encrypting its files in order to demand ransom paid in cryptocurrency to decrypt them. The most damaging ransomware attack in recent times was the so called WannaCry worm in late 2017. EUROPOL confirmed that the attack, which was linked with the North Korean government infected systems in more than 150 countries with an estimated overall damage of USD 8 billion worldwide. There are concerns amongst US cybersecurity firms that North Korea is also experimenting with other malware to gain financial assets.

The most notable criminal activities are constituted by the merchandise of illicit goods through the so-called Dark Web Markets. Silk Road, AlphaBay and Hansa Market are some

²⁶ Clifford, J. "Privacy on the blockchain". 17 Oct 2017. <https://hackernoon.com/privacy-on-the-blockchain-7549b50160ec>, Accessed on 16 July 2018.

²⁷ Möser, M., Soska, K., Heilman, E., Lee, K., Heffan, H., Srivastava, S., Hogan, K., Hennessey, J., Miller, A., Narayanan, A. and Christin, N. "An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain". *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 4/3. 2018. 143–163.

of those dark net marketplaces that the FBI²⁸, the DEA²⁹ and the European law enforcement agencies successfully closed down and captured their owners and operators. These highly anonym marketplaces traded different kinds of illegal products and services in cryptocurrencies, primarily narcotics, since online users were able to browse them anonymously and securely without any potential traffic monitoring.

The dark web is also being used to merchandise hacking services, pirated media content, fake licences and malicious software, malware necessary for theft³⁰. The first major theft took place in July 2011. A Bitcoin Forum member claimed that BTC 25,000 was stolen from his wallet which constituted nearly \$ 375,000 at the then exchange rate. More than 3 m Bitcoins have been lost or stolen so far and since Bitcoin (and crypto assets in general) were created of finite supply, some 14 percent of the already existing currency has been lost possibly forever.³¹ The biggest thefts included a heist in Japan worth USD 500 million amongst others ranging from USD 30 to 155 million.³² Altogether, cryptocurrencies of more than USD 1.7 billion of value have been stolen by hackers or gone missing due to security holes since 2012 causing distrust amongst investors from time to time towards the new asset class. Should the pace of theft continue at its present level the amount could reach as high as USD 4 billion by the end of 2018.^{33, 34} On the flipside, the blockchain also has cybersecurity applications that can fight cyberattacks such as data tampering or distributed denial of service. Thus, the decentralized approach to fighting theft and fraud is a crucial step towards making crypto assets a reliable financial instrument and form of payments³⁵ as hackers tend to attack cryptocurrencies all around the world.

According to a press release by Kiagus Ahmad Badaruddin, chairman of the Indonesian Financial Transactions Agency, Islamic militants based in the Middle East and related to the Islamic State have already used Bitcoin and online payment services like PayPal to fund terrorist activities in Indonesia.³⁶

²⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, USA

²⁹ Drug Enforcement Administration, USA

³⁰ US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, FBI New York Press Office, Attorney for the Southern District of New York. "Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Seizure of Additional \$28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator of 'Silk Road' Website". <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2013/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizure-of-additional-28-million-worth-of-bitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-owner-and-operator-of-silk-road-website>, Accessed on 08 June 2018.

³¹ Nova, A. "After \$500 million Japan cryptocurrency theft, here's how to keep yours secure". CNBC. 29 January 2018. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/29/after-500-million-japan-cryptocurrency-theft-heres-how-to-keep-yours-secure.html>, Accessed on 27 June 2018.

³² Tan, A. and Nakamura, Y. "Timeline: More Than \$1 Billion in Cryptocurrency Thefts Since September 2012". *Insurance Journal*, 22 June 2018. <https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/06/22/493047.htm>, Accessed on 27 June 2018.

³³ Murphy, I. "2018 Cryptocurrency thefts top \$1.7bn". *Enterprise Times*, 10 July 2018. <https://www.enterprise-times.co.uk/2018/07/10/2018-cryptocurrency-thefts-top-1-7bn/>, Accessed on 22 July 2018.

³⁴ "Top Cryptocurrency Theft Hacks: List Of Biggest Security Breaches?". <https://bitcoinexchangeuide.com/top-cryptocurrency-theft-hacks/>, Accessed on 27 August 2018.

³⁵ Dickson, B. "This company wants to stop hackers from stealing your cryptocurrency". The Next Web. 29 June 2018. <https://thenextweb.com/cryptocurrency/2018/06/29/this-company-wants-to-stop-hackers-from-stealing-your-cryptocurrency/>, Accessed on 27 August 2018.

³⁶ Yuniar, R. W. "Bitcoin, PayPal Used to Finance Terrorism, Indonesian Agency Says". *Wall Street Journal Online*, 10 January 2017. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-paypal-used-to-finance-terrorism-indonesian-agency-says-1483964198>, Accessed on 19 April 2018.

The international policy framework that was established in cooperation with the UN and sovereign national legislations created serious obstacles for the terrorist organisations in raising, transferring and using funds. Accordingly, the global counter-terrorism financing regime is more oriented towards the identification and the operations of terrorist groups at present than the rising threat of independent, lone wolf attacks. Cryptocurrencies offered a new platform to collect funds, to transfer them overseas as well as to convert them into sovereign currencies. Terrorist organisations can use cryptocurrencies to purchase illegal goods and dual-use products, to acquire weapons, and to pay foot soldiers and other affiliates around the world as well as to gather funds through transfers or theft. Opposite to cybercriminal networks, the use of cryptocurrencies is limited in financing international terrorism as regards to traditional terrorist activities causing casualties and other forms of physical destruction at present.

Crypto assets are normally used in technologically sophisticated activities where a rather developed telecommunications and financial infrastructure is a core requirement. Thus, there are two main groups of terrorist activities posing further and possibly more significant challenges in the future. One is evidently cyberterrorism including ransomware activities. The other is the growing interactions of terrorist cells and lone fighters in the developed countries due to a number of reasons. First, there is easy access to high-end financial and technological infrastructure, which is indispensable to initiate transactions in cryptocurrencies and to accept transfers. Second, the past two decades saw a trend of radicalisation amongst the second and third generation Muslims living in Europe or North America for instance. Amongst them, there can easily be ones who are highly educated in information and communications engineering, and are capable of operating and even creating the necessary systems, software and algorithms. Once the appropriate amounts are channeled to them, it is also possible for the less educated Western radicals to buy the services of skilled experts especially since IT and telecommunications engineering emerged as a key discipline and gained a prominent role in higher education ever since. Therefore, highly skilled IT and CT experts are available in the developed countries in large numbers. It is possible that the target person will never know for whom and to what end he is working for as it is also possible that one would support a cause for ideological reasons.

REGULATION OF CRYPTO ASSETS

9/11, the grave terrorist attack on the United States in 2001, marked a new era in the regulation on all activities that can be linked to terrorism including but not limited to money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Both the global banking sector and society became a subject to heavy regulations in terms of customer identification and transparency. However, the peer-to-peer transactions of the blockchain are independent from all regulated financial institutions. On December 6 2012 Bitcoin Central became the first crypto currency exchange licensed as a European Bank under the EU regulatory framework while FinCen, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the US Treasury Department first issued guidance on the applicability of existing regulations on (the use of) cryptocurrencies³⁷ in 2013.

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies: FIN-2013-G0001". 18 March 2013. <https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering>, Accessed on 18 June 2018.

After the initial resistance, also Russia, which is a very large market for crypto assets, legalized Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies in 2018, as it is the only way to regulate the new assets and their trade. The act aimed to enable the monitoring of cryptocurrencies while tracking them would largely contribute to the investigations of dubious financial operations.³⁸




Figure 4: *Dubious Operations. Shady Russian money flowing abroad in 2016 fell to the lowest since at least 1997*

Source: Bank of Russia

Taxation has already been introduced in many countries and in particular the USA, where self-declaration is required. Unsurprisingly, taxes are of high importance for investors, with cryptocurrencies generating about USD 70 billion in global tax revenue for 2017. Still, cryptocurrency taxation remains tumultuous. According to a survey, 31 percent of respondents said that they paid taxes on gains. However, the number of those technically obligated to pay taxes may be higher than those that report taxable gains. 82 percent of US respondents indicated that they could not understand their tax liability, while 62 percent of non-US respondents said the same thing. Such surveys lend credence to the idea that people – regulators included – genuinely have little to no clue about the legal and tax status of the entire, emergent asset class. It could be that the 20 percent difference between the US and non-US respondents signals that the US is lagging behind in acceptance in comparison to other countries.

The debate on the classification of cryptocurrencies covers a wide range of perceptions, of course, depending on the sources, as the view of its supporters is very different from that of the theorists and the authorities aiming to elaborate a regulation framework to it. The definitions vary from the terms ‘money transmission system’³⁹ or ‘non-voting liabilities of a distributed autonomous company’⁴⁰ through ‘security’, ‘commodity’⁴¹ all the way to the

³⁸ Pismennaya, E., Rudnitsky, J. and Kravchenko, S. “Russia Caves In on Bitcoin to Open Front on Money Laundering”. Bloomberg Online. 10 April 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-10/russia-caves-in-on-bitcoin-to-open-new-front-on-money-laundering>. Accessed on 28 June 2018.

³⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies...”

⁴⁰ Larimer, S. “Bitcoin and the Three Laws of Robotics”. Let’s Talk Bitcoin Network. 14 September 2013. <https://letstalkbitcoin.com/bitcoin-and-the-three-laws-of-robotics>. Accessed on 12 June 2018.

⁴¹ Internal Revenue Service and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission officials view XBTs as a commodity.

term ‘community currency’⁴². Some see the blockchain ledger bearing the characteristics of a bank with crypto assets as liabilities⁴³ in it while the European Central Bank does not recognise them as a currency⁴⁴. FinCen defines virtual currencies as a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all the attributes of a real currency and has no legal tender status in any jurisdiction.⁴⁵ The core of the present debate⁴⁶ is whether cryptocurrencies should be considered as securities or commodities. Considering all the aspects, however, they act more like a security than a commodity.

Uncertainty is, of course, natural due to their revolutionary and innovative nature and it does not seem to be decided whether cryptocurrencies should be regulated as part of a preexisting category, which might not be that easy⁴⁷, some sort of a hybrid asset, or as an entirely new asset class. The different actors e.g. users, stock holders, bankers, theoreticians, academics, government officials, politicians and financial experts all see a different aspect related to (the matter of regulations on) crypto assets which in turn is undermining the regulatory endeavours. Nevertheless, while failing to scrutinize crypto assets and their trade is not an option, it is indeed rather difficult for any government.⁴⁸ In a promising turn of events, G20 members are looking at an October deadline for setting up an anti-money-laundering standard on cryptocurrency. According to an issued statement, finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 member countries favor a strategy for “vigilant” monitoring of digital currencies. Member countries declared that ‘While crypto-assets do not at this point pose a global financial stability risk, we remain vigilant...We reiterate our March commitments related to the implementation of the FATF standards and we ask the FATF to clarify in October 2018 how its standards apply to crypto-assets.’⁴⁹

⁴² Blanc, J. and Fare, M. “Understanding the Role of Governments and Administrations in the Implementation of Community and Complementary Currencies”. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 84/1. 2013. 63–81.; Evans, C. W. “Coins for Causes”. Conscious Entrepreneurship Foundation. 13 July 2014. <http://consciousentrepreneurship.org/coins-for-causes/>, Accessed on 3 July 2018.; Owen, O. “Biafran Pound Notes”. *Africa* 79/4. 2009. 570–594.; Seyfang, G. and Pearson, R. “Time for Change: International Experience in Community Currencies”. *Development* 43/4. 2000. 56–60.

⁴³ Fama, E. “Banking in the Theory of Finance”. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 6/1. 1980. 39-57.

⁴⁴ Virtual Currency Schemes...; Lo, S. and Wang, J. C. “Bitcoin as Money?”. *Current Policy Perspectives* 14/4, 2014. 1–28. <https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2014/bitcoin-as-money.aspx>, Accessed on 17 May 2018.; Velde, F. R. “Bitcoin: A Primer”. *Chicago Fed Letter* 317. 2013. http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2013/december_317.cfm, Accessed on 17 May 2018.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies...”

⁴⁶ Mainly in the USA.

⁴⁷ Brito, J. and Castillo, A. *Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers*. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2013. 38.

⁴⁸ Brill, A. and Keene, L. “Cryptocurrencies: The Next generation of Terrorist Financing?”. *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 6/1. 2014. 7–30.

⁴⁹ G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors. “Communiqué”. 19–20 March 2018. https://g20.org/sites/default/files/media/communique_-_fmcgbg_march_2018.pdf, Accessed on 02 April 2018.

Table 2: *Global policies towards crypto assets*⁵⁰

AMERICAS	Legal Status	Policy	
		Exchanges	Regulation
USA	Not legal tender	Depends on the state	Classification is unclear whether it is a security or a commodity in the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The Internal Revenue Service does not consider it a currency. H.R. 6069 Bill on the Fight Illicit Networks and Detect Trafficking Act passed unanimously on June 25 2018 to help prevent the illicit use of cryptocurrencies including but not limited to Bitcoin, Monero, Dash, ZCash.
ASIA	Legal Status	Policy	
		Exchanges	Regulation
CHINA	Not legal tender	Not legal	Initial Coin Offerings are banned. Domestic cryptocurrency exchanges got shut down in 2017. Cryptocurrency mining continues with the Chinese authorities aiming to end it.
INDIA	Not legal tender	Legal	Taking steps towards the oversight and regulation of cryptocurrencies as well as the elimination of the use of crypto assets in financing illicit activities. Ready to take firm measures in order to eliminate cryptocurrencies from the payment system.
JAPAN	Legal tender	Legal	Consumers need to register with the Financial Services Authority. Theft and hacking is also a sensitive issue due to the global market share (almost 50%) of the country.
SINGAPORE	Not legal tender	Legal	Singapore is a hub of Initial Coin Offerings (two of the largest ICO offerings ever took place in the country). Investigating of the threats and risks is underway. The Monetary Authority of Singapore identified anonymity as a significant risk.
SOUTH KOREA	Not legal tender	Legal	Use of anonymous bank accounts for cryptocurrency trading is prohibited. Consumers need to register with the Financial Services Commission. XRP trading in Korean won prevails over other crypto assets traded in other currencies. Since the idea of shutting down cryptocurrency exchanges failed due to heavy public opposition the government decided to take firm actions against illicit and unethical activities related to the trading of crypto assets. Cryptocurrency futures are banned since 2017. Regulation on crypto assets is pending as consultations continue.

⁵⁰ Rooney, K. "Your guide to cryptocurrency regulations around the world and where they are headed". CNBC. 27 March 2018. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/27/a-complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-around-the-world.html>, Accessed on 29 June 2018.

EUROPE	Legal Status	Policy	
		Exchanges	Regulation
EU	Depends on the country	Depends on the country	Concerns about money laundering and the financing of illicit activities. Wallet providers as well as virtual exchanges should fall under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Monitoring of cryptocurrency markets continues. Regulations differ amongst member states. Joint French-German proposal is to be expected on the regulation of cryptocurrency markets.
SWITZERLAND	Legal tender	Legal	Consumers need to register with the Swiss Financial Supervisory Authority. Clear guidelines for Initial Coin Offerings laid down by the Financial Supervisory Authority. Bitcoin is seen as investment rather than a currency. Friendliest environment for blockchain and cryptocurrency wallet companies as well as related tech and advisory firms globally. Ten of the greatest Initial Coin Offerings took place in Switzerland.
UK	Not legal tender	Legal	Consumers need to register with the Financial Conduct Authority. Need to meet with anti-money laundering counter-terrorism standards. Viewed as a high-risk speculative product.
GLOBAL	Legal Status	Policy	
		Exchanges	Regulation
G 20	Depends on the country	Non-existent	Crypto asstes pose risks but should not be banned. The Financial Stability Board is to elaborate proposals.

CONCLUSIONS

When Security Tokens are done correctly, they don't skirt laws and regulations, they remove financial institutions and middlemen. Taxation has already been introduced in many countries and in particular the USA, where self-declaration is required. However, with more sunlight being directed at exchanges now, the logic will probably be in the very near future that taxes will be reported automatically on digital holdings via exchanges much the same way as it is the case for banks now. This might be instrumental in detecting and monitoring illicit activities even if anonymity is much rather sought in transactions than holdings.

While cryptocurrencies challenge governments and state authorities, they offer an opportunity for terrorist groups, organized crime as well as sanctioned states. The challenge regulators face is threefold: 1) to fully comprehend what needs and can be done in order to decrease and possibly eliminate the illicit use of the otherwise legitimate and beneficial instruments and assets, 2) to overcome the technological gap among the developers and hackers and the governmental experts and 3) to adopt new methods and approaches that might be necessary to succeed in order to implement the previous two. International cooperation is instrumental in the field of regulation, monitoring and data collection with a special emphasis on tracking wallet owners. This requires inter-agency and inter-state collaboration when aiming to prevent the misuse of cryptocurrencies for financing international terrorism.

When it comes to financing international terrorism, theft is both a challenge and an opportunity for terrorists. Every wallet holder, also those acquainted with terrorism are prone to theft. However, once terrorists obtain the necessary skills and technical equipment, they are also in the position to initiate ransomware activities and to hack other wallets and steal considerable amounts from other proprietors of crypto assets, which can be used to finance and commit terrorist acts globally. This is also true for any other legitimate and illicit activities related to crypto assets. Thus, the regulations on the trade of the specified technical equipment related to mining as well as monitoring of patterns of transactions might be useful to minimize risks of cross-border transfers of funds. It seems to be logical that with the rapid growth of the information & telecommunication industry and the proliferation of international terrorism, technological preparedness and financial solvency may intercept in the near future giving way to more diverse and sophisticated use of crypto assets by terrorists.

The blockchain technology itself is to be further analysed as well in order to explore ways it can be utilised by the armed forces. There are several areas where the defence industry can apply this technology should it be already existing products and processes or innovation and development. Blockchain can add value, for instance, where there is an opportunity to automate a process, where data collection and/or standardization is involved or mission-critical mobile connectivity can be applied. The most notable areas where blockchain can be utilised depending on the current trends are the development of autonomous vehicles, tracking, targeting and following devices and signal intelligence for instance.

The appearance of the first branded coin will probably set a whole new trend, and many other specified coins will be created. While most of them will be born by various industries (e.g. 'Farmer Coin' or 'Baby Coin') global or certain local or regional interest groups or basket of consumer goods (e.g. 'Alpine Coin' or 'Northern Fishermen's Coin'), terrorist organisations might also create their very own coins under cover. Therefore, a close monitoring of this segment of the market is strongly recommended as well.

Many traits and features of cryptocurrencies will continue to be assessed and discussed over time. However, the creation of a new asset class is not easy and never easily embraced by all, but it is certain that cryptocurrencies are here to stay.

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Lt. Col. Tamás Kender:

THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES

“...promises made in 2014 at the NATO summit and ratified in Warsaw in 2016, ‘to strengthen collective defence’, have not been met. They tell him that, its decision to deploy four battalions to the Baltic states and Eastern Poland, far from building a credible deterrence, NATO is erecting a Potemkin village”¹

ABSTRACT: *Although we have not realized it, the war has begun. Or, possibly it has just never ended. As some sceptics might say, there was but one World War with a not too long truce in between and since then only the ways have been changed. The West and the East have been fighting for regional hegemony, or even for the dominance over the World. Their century-long struggle for supremacy brought most of the countries from all continents into the same arena, sometimes even against their own will. So, as it seems, this fight is not over, there is just the shooting has not started, yet. However, the current conflict is somehow different. This new type of fight goes on at all possible levels and with all means of power (politics, economy, military but mostly information) and the recent scale, dynamics and types of the challenges have made our world of traditional rules and reactions obsolete. Nevertheless, in this competition the West seems to participate halfheartedly. The only question is how we want to win this fight without putting enough, if any effort in it.*

KEYWORDS: *deterrence, NATO contribution, enhanced Forward Presence, capabilities*

ARE WE PREPARED?

NATO is struggling. The organization is wrestling internally as reluctant member states do not seem to wish to contribute equally to the collective cause of standing up against the ever-growing external threat. Although all allies share the common understanding of the *ends*, they become more hesitant to agree on the *ways*, but their real foot-dragging starts when it comes to the *means*. Thus, while carrying out the three core tasks of NATO set out in the Strategic Concept² is undisputable, resourcing them remains an evergreen challenge. In order to gain the undivided support from their political principals, convincing has always been a part of the job of the military leadership. The recent drastic changes in the global security environment however, demanded some more determination. So, leading countries and NATO staff leaned in to get more attention to the cause.

First the persuasion was focused on demonizing the old adversary who appeared in a new robe a couple of years ago in Crimea, comprehensively employing conventional and

¹ Shireff, R. *War on Russia*. London: Coronet, 2016. 20.

² Collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. *The Alliance Strategic Concept, PO(2010) 0169*. 19 November 2010.

unconventional means, or in a “hybrid” way³. Still, today there are other not-too-new challenges dividing the Alliance with exploiting the members’ different understanding of risks and threats against their cohesion. The Russian power-plays draw our attention around the globe fast as they do multiple moves, like deploying forces in the High-North⁴, threatening the Baltics with massing forces for exercises⁵, and supporting the Assad regime in Syria⁶ simultaneously. However, besides these well-seen external actions, their indirect approach goes under our skin as they master information operations in order to influence and alter the political will in other countries⁷. NATO nations are concentrating on their own direct and most imminent difficulties in their regional and local area of interest. Therefore, while the Baltic states are facing Russian forces deployed annoyingly close to their borders, the Southern flank suffers from the migration crisis induced by the Syrian civil war, and the countries in the West must deal with fundamentalist terrorism, and all of these events are multiplied by fake news that target the mind of the population.

As it seems, NATO’s Center of Gravity, cohesion is also our weakness. The individual interests of the 29 nations made NATO indecisive, or just too slow when it comes to the common good. It is like in the old saying, when “everyone agrees on that someone should do something, but no one does anything”. The most common and single reason for that is generally coming from the financial thinking and internal politics. Thus, as a result, the nations are contributing to NATO, like the tailors in the tale who are offering new clothes to the emperor to wear, but without real material.

When the Russian president decides on launching a snap exercise with tens of thousands of troops in the Western district, in no time paratroopers fall off the sky and armored units move to their training area of operations⁸. While these divisions are not only ready to threaten North – Eastern Europe, but they are really doing so, NATO response was to decide on an enhanced NATO Response Force in Wales⁹ and on enhanced Forward Presence at the Warsaw summit.¹⁰ The first question that might come to mind is what the word enhanced means in this context; and second, why we need it.

³ Chivvis, C. S. “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ And What Can We Do About It: Testimony presented before the House of Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017”. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

⁴ “Russian Military Deploying Nearly 200 Troops to Arctic for Mystery Mission”. *Sputnik News*. May 20, 2017. <https://sputniknews.com/russia/201705201053811551-russian-troops-mystery-arctic-deployment/>, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

⁵ Smith, A. Bishop, M. W. and Kube, C. “Russia kicks off huge Zapad 2017 military exercises with Belarus”. *CNBC News*, 2 Augustus 2017. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-plans-huge-zapad-2017-military-exercises-belarus-n788741>, Accessed on 8 August 2017.

⁶ Rahman-Jones, I. “Why does Russia support Syria and President Assad?”. BBC. April 11, 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/39554171/why-does-russia-support-syria-and-president-assad>, Accessed on 11 June 2017.

⁷ Fisher, M. “Russia and the U.S. Election: What We Know and Don’t Know”. *The New York Times*, 12 December 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/world/europe/russia-trump-election-cia-fbi.html>, Accessed on 6 June 2017.

⁸ “High alert: Russia tests army’s readiness in massive snap exercise in West & South”. RT Web. 25 August 2016. <https://www.rt.com/news/357146-russia-snap-exercise-alert/>, Accessed on 13 April 2017.

⁹ “Boosting NATO’s presence in the East and South”. NATO. 10 September 2018. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en, Accessed on 13 October 2018.

¹⁰ “NATO Response Force (NRF)”. NATO. 16 January 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/pl/natohq/topics_49755.htm, Accessed on 13 April 2017.

In NATO's history there have been many ups and downs while new challenges were met. Once questioning even the necessity of its own existence after bringing the Soviet era down, then on the contrary, the enlargement of the Alliance with former Warsaw Pact countries which had a double effect. First, it increased the perception of their security and second, posed a threat to Russian interests. Thus, the new members enjoying the freshly acquired NATO umbrella started military reforms that in reality meant big defense budget-cuts and downsizing their forces, concentrating them on peacekeeping only. The harsh changes of the operational environment in the close neighborhood however, brought the attention to the Balkans and NATO had a purpose again: Peace Support Operations to keep problems out of the territory. The immediate response tools for crises, ARRC and AMF¹¹, have been used effectively, however, NATO could not deny a Russian task force securing the military airfield in Pristina, Kosovo. Hence the demanding operational challenges NATO trusted happy endings and continued on the path of Peace Support, and that thought was reinforced by the follow-on missions after the US-led coalition wars in Iraq, then Afghanistan were initiated by 9/11. War on terror brought NATO's focus away from Europe and the NRF concept was born, while member states continued cutting their defense budget and contribution to the far end of possibility.

Further increase of membership, however, reached the borders of Russia, which insolence annoyed the "sleeping bear". The promising new leader, who predicted getting rid of decadent elite and making Russia great again, achieved real internal political changes. Rising prices of oil indirectly helped¹² to increase economy and the slow development started bringing back the country to power that provides Russia with the tools for a much stronger foreign policy¹³.

This weird progress of restructuring and downsizing, while expanding in Europe versus the growing strength in Russia resulted that NATO could not and did not react effectively when the Ukrainian crisis was followed with a fast occupation and annexation of Crimea. Not having the credible power to deter or react, the World's international community, including NATO, could do no more but monitor and condemn the events.

Without having the nations' unified political will NATO Response Force (NRF) has never been fully deployed or employed and the Ukrainian crisis was not an exception either. Realizing the lack of real reaction capabilities, the NATO summit in Wales resulted revising collective defense plans, introducing the Readiness Action Plan process, with the enhanced NRF concept and the brigade size Very High Readiness Force within.¹⁴ But, what difference did that make? Even with increased readiness and power, forces still need a North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision to be deployed. That takes time, and time is what the Eastern flank does not have. Their nervousness demanded real actions and in Warsaw the nations decided on the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) concept, which is in a nutshell; deploying battalion task forces, or Battle Groups forward into the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland integrated into the local defense forces in order to show NATO's unified effort and deter any Russian aggression.¹⁵ So, what? One might ask. What can four battlegroups do

¹¹ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Allied Mobile Force

¹² As natural gas sales are affected by oil prices, the increasing brought billions to Russian economy.

¹³ Newnham, R. "Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia's energy resources as a foreign policy tool". *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2/2. 2011. 134–43. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651100011X>, Accessed on 21 May 2017.

¹⁴ "NATO Response Force (NRF)".

¹⁵ "Boosting NATO's presence in the East and South".

against divisions? Is that all NATO could offer in terms of collective defense? Or is it just a further escalation of the already developing crisis? Answering these questions might generate some more, but first we must get to the common understanding of definitions and terms.

WHAT IS DETERRENCE?

While there is a civilian way of understanding deterrence as: it is the inhibition of criminal behaviour by fear especially of punishment, there is the military description, where deterrence is the maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack, such as nuclear deterrence.¹⁶ Analyzing these two approaches we can find three common elements. The ends, the means, and the way.

So, the purpose is to prevent someone from doing something by punishment, and for that you threaten the other with power to create fear. In military power this means forces with strength, capabilities. Concluding Schelling's thoughts, one needs the power to hurt to set conditions for coercive bargain¹⁷. This is not possible without advertising real power. For this announcement one needs to introduce these capabilities using all possible means from the lowest to the highest level, such as Strategic Communication.

However, there is a fourth element that is still missing: the will. While the tools are there, the question is: are you ready to use them? Do you have it in you? In the past these elements were seen when the belligerent states were threatening each other by controlled explosions of nuclear warheads, or ballistic missiles tests. Until today though, we do not know if any of those countries were really ready to start a nuclear war risking that they would erase humankind – including themselves – from the face of the Earth. This fear of overkill from both sides prevented us to fight the Third World War. So, what has changed, if anything; and what makes the difference today?

The superfast development of technology has provided us not only with high-tech weapons and other gadgets of mass destruction but it has also changed the size and ratio of the battlefield dimensions. Technology shortened time for military actions, with that also increased the battlespace to be global, and fed us overwhelming real time information expanding the operational environment to the cyberspace. In this new era of the modern war, rules have also changed. Although rules of war were never exactly black and white, nowadays alongside the well-recognized combatants we must also deal with paramilitary and special units in the grey zone; moreover, temporarily armed civilians and insurgents; and those who fight without shooting any rifles, but just sit in front of a computer capable of damaging our infrastructure, life support system or our brain indirectly; and without detection, consequently retaliation. Do these latter ones kill anyone? If not in person but with their indirect action, they can, they do. So NATO recognized also cyber-attack as a possible casus belly for Article 5 actions. What do all these factors have to do with deterrence? Well, if we agree with Clausewitz, that in war a country must use all of its resources, capabilities or sum of available means to defeat the enemy,¹⁸ then imagine all of these above-mentioned capabilities advertised to deter the adversary.

¹⁶ *Webster II New Riverside University Dictionary*. Rolling Meadows, IL: The Riverside Publishing Company, 1984.

¹⁷ Schelling, T. C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, C. von. *On War*. Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997. 8.

But how do we know that deterrence was, is successful? Is it measurable? Actually, it is easy to say that until your adversary does not attack, deterrence works. During the Cold War the two sides deterred each other, neither attacked the other, so both of them achieved their goal. Thus, maintaining military power at the same level as your adversaries seems to be a solution. To make the other step down, however, one needs more than that. More armament on one side to imbalance the ratio provokes arms race, challenging the economy.¹⁹ It worked once, would it work again?

The recent wars cost the US billions of dollars, and the European nations also spent a lot on the aftermath, like sending troops and support to Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile rising oil and gas prices payed off for Putin to yank back Russian economy and with that military power to normal and above. First test of Russian power was in Georgia, when the so called first European war – since the II. World War – was launched in 2008. Then the new Gerasimov doctrine in Ukraine followed as the non-linear warfare was tested.²⁰ While Georgia was a “far-away” land, the Crimean action was on the doorstep of Europe, and the only response triggered was an embargo on Russia. Within NATO some members wanted immediate and harsh actions to be taken, on the other hand other countries are still hesitant because the European embargo caused as much, if not more detriment to them than Russia. Not to speak of those downsized, under-equipped and under-manned forces, which had been organized, trained and deployed rather for Peace Support, or Stabilization Operations. That means lack of heavy forces, decreased readiness and even not having their own air force, Baltic states today need NATO contribution to conduct Air Policing. So, building up credible forces from the ashes now is quite a challenge without increasing the numbers in strength and in budget in order to get back what had been wasted during the past decades. Thus, NATO sends troops to border countries to show unity and will.

The question seems to be obvious. How to deter Russia from further aggression without escalation? What makes this problem more difficult for NATO is to answer the how to deter the adversary, how to counter the new challenge of Hybrid threat.

(IN)CAPABILITIES

In this new era of war there are many challenges that NATO should understand and overcome. One of them is the ever-changing environment with its dimensions; another is the adversary and finally the need to see ourselves better. We already talked about the first two. Now the third and the most demanding challenge should be discussed.

In this power game everyone sees NATO as one actor, and as it is, of course it acts as a whole. However, it has 29 different voices, or more like 29 individual intentions depending on the nations’ political ambitions and interests. Thus, to make a decision, all of the nations should agree and vote with the same supporting yes, which is crucial in case of initiating Article 5, or Collective Defense operations. Understanding the differences of, or even variances among nations is a key for adversaries to exploit as a weakness. Therefore, our center

¹⁹ Tian, N., Fleurant, A., Wezeman, P. D. and Wezeman, S. T. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016”. Sipri Fact Sheet. April 2017. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf>, Accessed on 13 April 2017.

²⁰ “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War”. Moscow’s Shadows. 6 July 2017. <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>, Accessed on 13 December 2017.

of gravity, cohesion, is easy to undermine and the decision-making mechanism slows down or stops. But NATO is made of, and will be as good as its nations. However, the political rhetoric is not equal to military reality.

These differences are usually derived from history or recent internal political or economic problems. Most countries do not want to spend on defense until being attacked, and for that reason they think twice before giving support to one another. What is more, if that country is a “far away” land, the threat also looks minor. e.g. in the case of the Baltics, their problem might seem too unrealistic for farther European countries to spend extra coins on expeditionary capabilities. Although all members agreed on the increased NATO presence in the region, not every one of them wants to contribute with combat troops, equipment or even enablers. So, as a result, four strong nations²¹ took the lead and frameworked for battalion-size task forces having other states to contribute with sub-units and deployed to the North-Eastern part of Europe as enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) to show unity and resolve. Is it deterrence? I do not think that this size of formations, whatever capabilities they might have, is a real challenge to the divisions near the Baltic borders. However, that is not their purpose anyway. Is it an escalation? Regarding the fact that so far there has been no increased NATO presence in that area, the obvious answer is yes. Some might think it as a provocation, that needs answer, most probably increasing Russian presence. Here can we start a “chicken-or-egg” discussion, but it would not help to find the best solution if there is any.

PATTERNS OF THE NEW WORLD'S CONFLICTS

Those who read history, especially military history, can easily recognize the patterns since the beginning of human conflicts till this post-modern era of warfighting. However, knowing the past can also mislead us and we can come to the wrong assumptions. As in the euphoric post-Cold War times, Addington said perhaps it is reasonable to predict that in our near future armed conflicts will be regional, fought among and within lesser states, and with occasional U.N.-sanctioned interventions or interventions by regional organizations. While there has been a discussion on a standing military force under the control of the United Nations for repelling aggression and enforcing peace, for the foreseeable future international military interventions under U.N. auspices will probably be conducted by ad hoc collections of military forces, such as those that liberated Kuwait from Iraq in 1991²². Since this optimistic view thirty years have passed and we concluded that the UN might have lost its weight on this issue due to the fact, that within the Security Council the Cold War has not ended, yet. However, changing the term regional organization for NATO makes more sense, but also leads us to interventions instead of collective defense.

As Kissinger states, the UN Security Council – of compelling formal authority but deadlocked on the most important issues – is joined by regular summits of Atlantic leaders in NATO and the European Union, and as a result he sees that the nature and frequency of these meetings work against elaborations of long-range strategies.²³

Also, in Addington's opinion the UN and regional organizations will probably rely chiefly on the USA for major military interventions as long as there is a will and there are means to

²¹ US to Poland, Canada to Latvia, Germany to Lithuania and UK to Estonia

²² Addington, L. H. *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteen Century*. Second ed. Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1994. 325.

²³ Kissinger, H. *World Order*. London: Penguin Random House, 2015. 370.

serve in that capacity.²⁴ The sad fact is that this is as true today as it was in the 90's and as it seems, until the US provides the bulk of just about everything, the nations are not urged to improve their own capabilities.²⁵ He states, that perhaps the most encouraging pattern that seems to be emerging from a geopolitical point of view in the last decade of the 20th century, in the post-Cold War era, is a willingness of the great powers to seek accommodation with each other and even cooperate, at least occasionally, to repel international aggressions and promote the peaceful settlement of clashes among lesser states or factions.²⁶ And that we saw in Afghanistan and the Balkans, where peacekeepers tried to manage the conflicts, and in today's Syrian war, where this cooperation turned into competition and a secret war. Thus, we can agree that while the world continues to seek peaceful resolutions to the conditions that breed war, new patterns of war unfortunately continue to evolve.²⁷

EVOLUTION OF WARFIGHTING

The old saying, that history repeats itself is as true today as it was centuries ago. The problem is that any progress in war starts with unnecessary bloodshed and masses of casualties. The generals of the American civil war e.g. were and still are celebrated like rock stars, but no one mentions that there had been more lives lost in that conflict than in all of America's wars together. One reason for this is that the West Point graduates learnt and applied Napoleonic war tactics massing major attacks against modern weaponry. Thus, close formations marched and shot at each other with rifles that were more accurate at longer range than their predecessors half a century earlier. The same thinking caused the century's bloodiest battles of the Great War, when the foot soldiers charged in lines one after another against the deadliest weapons, trenched machine guns.

However, inventing and employing new tactics have always been prickly and taken time till being proven and approved. It should not surprise anyone either, that such revolutionary thinking was derived from pure survival instinct, and has always come from the soldiers on the field, not from the academy of high military science.

Besides, the new challenges usually meant that a new technology appeared on the battlefield that the soldiers were not ready for in any way, either mentally or technically. They had to improvise, adapt, and overcome²⁸, which meant inventing and employing new procedures that also affected each other. As advanced fire capabilities had maneuvers changed, new technical improvements followed, new command and control measures were adapted, and so on. Thus, understanding the evolution, we must realize that the warfighting functions have always been there, only they have been continuously interacted with and progressed.

For centuries, these changes were state-owned, as nations, although intermingling with the others, kept their military's progress on a national basis. Building coalitions, however, brought interoperability in the foreground and countries had to make compromises, and balance between national interest of power (security, economic etc.) and national interest

²⁴ Addington. *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteen Century*. 325.

²⁵ This attitude seems to be changing since the election of Donald Trump as US president, who urged NATO nations in the Brussels Summit 2018 to contribute more. However, real results might be able to be seen on the long run, not today.

²⁶ Addington. *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteen Century*. 325.

²⁷ Addington. *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteen Century*. 325.

²⁸ The unofficial mantra of the United States Marine Corps.

of survival. That meant and means sharing. When it comes to NATO, that collectiveness means sharing responsibility, sharing the burden of providing troops and sharing information. Having a look at the warfighting functions²⁹ we must realize however, that this distribution of will seems to have some discrepancies in practice.

First, we must understand the battlespace, as it is key to success in war. The operational environment keeps changing as its dimensions are rapidly widening, growing. The modern era's battlefield's most impressive dimension is information that influences all functions.

While the elements of command and control (C2) have always been there on the battlefield, one component of all, information flow evolved at light-speed, so fast that we call it real time information regardless the distance. Having information before the enemy is key to success, so this new dimension of the modern battlefield, Cyberspace has become strategically indispensable.³⁰ In today's conflicts commanders are not only obliged to but also obsessed with computer driven tools and procedures. They are used to giving orders by Microsoft Office Power Point Presentations (MS PPT) via Video Telephone Conference (VTC); utilizing the network for collecting Reports and Returns (R2), building databases for the Common Operational Picture (COP); and controlling complex weapon systems. This Network Centric Warfare (NCW), however demands qualified people rather than athletes, which drives us to change our standards of soldiering as soon as possible. As America's elite corps' commander general Neller³¹ during his speech at U.S. Naval Institute acknowledged, that it will take more than riflemen to win future wars. Growing the Marine Corps should not focus on adding infantry troops but instead on building up those high-tech capabilities to support those traditional Marines who are trained to fight at the tip of the spear³².

Within NATO Command Structure (NCS) C2 is and will always be a major challenge to overcome, as building, maintaining and expanding an up-to-date secure system costs a lot of time and resources. Within the Force Structure (NFS) and NATO led operations this problem is becoming more difficult, when nations using their own systems cannot or do not want to connect to the existing central command system or to each other³³. When NATO-led troops deploy to mission, their interoperability is, even if it is a decisive condition, still a standing issue to deal with.

The digitized battlefield brings us another challenge to overcome that we need shifting paradigm for. As computers took over control of every system that needs global network communication, the scale of users also increased, and external, or non-military actors are gaining access to it causing damage deliberately or accidentally. In this new era of information, when the non-kinetic actions have as much – if not more – effect as kinetic ones do on the battlefield and/or in the country, the entity of combatant, or non-combatant could also be questioned self-reliantly of status of war or peace. As a result of the recognized cyber threat NATO used countermeasures and also founded a Cyber Center of Excellence (CoE)

²⁹ "Command and control, intelligence, maneuver and fires, force protection, information operations (Info Ops), sustainability, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)". "Allied Joint Doctrine for the conduct of operations: AJP 03(B)". NATO. March 2011. 1–11.

³⁰ Kissinger. *World Order*. 346.

³¹ General Robert B. Neller is the 37th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

³² Schogol, J. "Every Marine a rifleman no more?". *Marine Corps Times*, 7 May 2017. <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/future-of-the-marine-corps>, Accessed on 16 May 2017.

³³ In NATO ISAF mission the Hungarian PRT requested US Blue Force Trackers in support of US troops operating in the PRT Area of Responsibility. Denying the request resulted extra time and difficulties when US troops tried to ask for assistance on other channels.

in Estonia. However, all steps NATO has done are defensive, and member nations have a different view of developing and employing offensive capabilities. So, while accusing the Russian Federation of active information operations, our counter-actions are exhausted in defensive measures.

Regarding intelligence, it is our common consideration that accessing, absorbing, understanding and using data faster than the adversary would make our decision cycle more effective, even decisive. In this world of information however, advanced technology provides us more, or let us say an overwhelming amount of data, that are either not relevant, false or contain malicious information that must be filtered, cleaned, and tailored to serve the need. Thus, the systems in service of intel community are different and dependent of the national, international organizations, who use (own) them. Because of the different interests, the systems are also different, and for their own protection cannot communicate with each other. If they do, sharing information is also an issue as nations do not share national intelligence with each other.

The consequence then is obvious. Intel collection in NATO is always subject to the nation's ability and willingness to share. Thus, for example finding, identifying and destroying hostile targets is a challenge for the system, including means and procedures from targeting to fires.

Although massive fire support capabilities, or fire power are still present on the battlefield, precise weaponry takes over as mankind is becoming more "humanistic" in war. These long-range missiles do ensure that their employers are able to destroy their target from a relatively safe location. Relatively, because their safety rests on also the enemy's capability to find and destroy them. The simple reason is that automated fire systems rely on high tech, and that could be also their vulnerability, and that leads us back to the command and control, or C4I2SR³⁴ systems with the lack of interoperability. In order to provide Joint Fire Support to the troops the structure needs fire assets, reconnaissance and C2 system, ammunition supply etc. In NATO however, different nations have different approach to identify their own requirements and some have built their capabilities on the hope of being supported by other partners of the Alliance occasionally. Some degraded their own amount of fire assets to light batteries of mortars and towed howitzers, have got rid of radars and/or reckon units risking that rebuilding these lost capabilities will cost more money and time than maintaining the existing ones. The problem is that these pieces of art hardly connect to each other without the required elements, and even NATO troops have a large number of assets not working as a system.

Also, when it comes to it, that becomes another question whether our traditional understanding of maneuver is still applicable or should be revised a bit. Although, there are still Army Corps, divisions, and brigades threatening each other, what we see today is that these intimidations are staying behind national borders fixing the adversary and the real war is going on at other levels and in different dimensions. Thus, when Russian troops without insignia and any identification of origin walked on the streets of Sebastopol, they took the key terrain without resistance, like Turkish janissaries took Buda in the 16th century.

By traditional understanding maneuver is when we achieve success by positioning our forces, or implementing our fires, or both, in a way that supports the highest effectiveness. Thus, by destroying its forces or threatening them with it, we do defeat the enemy. Therefore, using any means to make the enemy give up on the cheapest way is a maneuver. That means

³⁴ Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence and Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

what Russia did in Crimea was a well-prepared and decisive maneuver whether we like it or not. That also means that not only must NATO prepare for understanding the nature of this kind of maneuverist approach, but also be ready to utilize it. To defend against it, or employ it.

Recently NATO does not have a common understanding³⁵ of “Hybrid” war and it is still working on the comprehensive approach. Thus, we are still to stick to the good old way of massing troops forward, and relying on Strategic Communication, like a magic tool.

Moreover, another challenge is that NATO territory in collective defense has a wide area of different terrains with different weather features, including extreme conditions, we must also realize that maneuvering in the area also demands a wide spectrum of equipment applicable for given possibilities. Meaning, that when countries develop their defense systems, including all warfighting tools, their priority should be the adaptation for local and regional environment, rather than expeditionary. That, however trials the collectiveness, forasmuch as the forces to be sent to defend in different weather and terrain conditions they are set for need additional if not extraordinary preparations to be able to make their movement. Thus, maneuvering troops in a larger than tactical arena is a serious restraint for the nations.

Another challenge NATO must face is that downsizing forces meant losing capabilities. So, as river crossing used to be a priority in the past, today NATO has a very limited capability for that and has become more dependent of the static (national) infrastructure. On the other hand, laying mines is seriously restricted by the Ottawa-agreement, thus many NATO countries plant their mines against armor only if they have any in store. Engineers, the former pride of the Warsaw Pact, have become only shadow of their predecessors, and NATO combat support of mobility and counter-mobility capabilities also have serious limitations today.

The recent Peace Support Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a thoughtful effect on the nations and troops involved. The nations did not tolerate the losses of lives due to roadside attacks by Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), or ambushes by small arms fire so they demanded an increased level of protection for their soldiers. However, the new and better-protected equipment became heavier too. That means that these vehicles cannot move on as many types of roads as they used to earlier, and it also means that the soldiers they carry are becoming so addicted to their well-protected vehicle, that they will not want to get out of it anymore. The heavier the equipment becomes the more on sustainment it relies. This also goes for all electronic devices, gizmos, but most importantly for the soldier. He/she needs ammunition, water and food supplies, medical treatment etc. That highly affects – again – our mobility and maneuver capabilities. When in another country, all supplies are to be transported or provided by sea and air transportation or local, contracted suppliers, and none of them for free. Finally, we got back to the original problem of defense, its funding.

So, the Alliance suffered both the end of Cold War and the fast expansion. The early happiness of the coming “World Peace” and getting rid of military equipment left no choice but accepting new members without meeting the requirements.

In a nutshell, we can see that developing all areas of the combat functions are not only interdependable, but we also need a new mindset to utilize them. Sticking to the “national approach” and “not-sharing” assist the adversaries, ready to exploit and overcome.

³⁵ There is no existing NATO doctrine, or STANAG regarding Hybrid warfare.

CONCLUSION

We all live in a complex world, which is still shaking because of the sudden imbalance of the Post-Cold War era. Believing that the collapse of the Soviet empire brings everlasting peace to the globe was quite a utopistic dream. Today we see Russia regaining its strength, China going from regional to global actor, the EU struggling with internal power plays, and the US fighting for world dominance with more agility than ever. Global conflicts are fought comprehensively in every domain, often using and affecting the lesser states violently. As Kissinger concludes if the major powers come to practice foreign policies of manipulating a multiplicity of sub-sovereign units observing ambiguous and often violent rules of conduct, many based on extreme articulations of divergent cultural experiences, anarchy is certain.³⁶

Our Trans-Atlantic Alliance is also suffering from the consequences of this chaotic world and continuously adapts its strategy to the everchanging environment stating that NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all members by political and military means.³⁷ We tend to understand NATO as a primary military organization, with capabilities and tasks to fight. However, we should face the fact, that as NATO is a political alliance, its primary means are always political. Nevertheless, supporting political will and achieving strategic/global objectives military power is still a must have. Thus, the Alliance Strategic Concept describes the overarching strategy for NATO via three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. None of these can be conducted without military means.

To achieve the overall purpose dictated by strategy in 2017 SACEUR has identified priorities, such as: Ready and posture forces; Strengthen the Alliance and partners; Adapt to the strategic environment; Resilient service members.³⁸

In short, NATO needs to be a real political and military power capable of defeating the enemy – whoever it might be – and having this capability ready to use is the reality of deterrence.

By defeat I mean to win. For that the military power of the enemy must be destroyed, that is reduced to such a state that prevents them from continuing to wage the war. The country must be conquered or a new military force may be formed out of the country. The will of the enemy is to be subdued, that is its government and its allies must be forced into signing a peace, or force the people into submission.³⁹ To have competence for this, NATO needs changes. One is real commitment and contribution, instead of long term promises from the member states. Second is a paradigm shift in understanding and fighting a war. Third, standing, capable, and deployable forces without restriction to have reliability. The only problem with this utopistic thinking is that nations show no real commitment at all, they are just waiting for others to make it for them.

Therefore, the real quality at stake here is credibility. In this case credibility means the capability of winning, which I see currently missing. Thus, the ever-changing NATO, the recent ruler of the world follows fashion as its member states dictate, tailoring budget, organization, and forces to the end. The only result of this could be the risk that our (NATO's) recent and future potential adversaries will once realize that the emperor has no clothes.

³⁶ Kissinger. *World Order*. 368.

³⁷ The Alliance Strategic Concept.

³⁸ Kreutner, T. "Building Strategy for Alliance Land-Power". *Land Power Magazine* 3/1. 2017. 26.

³⁹ Clausewitz. *On War*. 5–6.

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Maj. Zoltán Somodi:

ANTISEMITISM AMONG WESTERN EUROPEAN MUSLIMS

ABSTRACT: Antisemitism is on the rise in Europe, which many experts call a “new antisemitism”, because its source is different from the traditional, racially motivated European antisemitism. The perpetrators are mostly young men of Muslim immigrant origin. This antisemitism has its roots in Islamic doctrine. The size of the communities where such views are present is growing because of immigration and higher fertility rate. Their level of integration into the host societies is not improving over time, on the contrary, each subsequent generation is distancing further from the host society, locked in self-reinforcing circle of separation and exclusion. The ever-growing and culturally increasingly separated Muslim communities are significantly more antisemitic than the rest of the rooted Western European populations, and a central topic of their anti-Jewish sentiment is the Middle East conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It is likely that this antisemitism will increase over time, and with the growing of this population, it will have an influence on state and indirectly EU policymaking in connection with the Middle East conflict. In this article three case studies will show the situation in France, the UK and Germany, countries with the three largest Jewish communities in the EU. The fourth would be Hungary, and the rest are significantly smaller, so this sample is appropriate to draw conclusions about the Western European situation.

KEYWORDS: antisemitism, Europe, integration, Muslims

DOCTRINE

It is a subject of debate whether the undeniable prevalence of antisemitic attitudes among Muslims is a result of the core teachings of Islam, or of entirely unrelated reasons. Some opinions recognize the presence of Muslim antisemitism, but they fail to find Islamic political doctrine at its source, instead, they blame it on the influence of European imperialism and Christianity.¹ According to this point of view, it was the Christian European colonial powers and missionaries, who injected their own antisemitic worldview into the innocent Muslim Middle East, which would otherwise have remained in its earlier state of tolerance and peaceful coexistence with Jews. They state that Islamic antisemitism has no religious roots by itself² – albeit they do not cite their doctrinal sources for such claims, and confuse historical experiences in various political circumstances with the doctrine of political Islam. Bassam Tibi argues that the first instances of Islamic antisemitism arose with

¹ Schulze, R. “Importierter Hass”. *Die Zeit*, 1 September 2016. <http://www.zeit.de/zeit-geschichte/2016/02/antisemitismus-juden-europa-islam-christentum-vertreibung>. Accessed on 18 January 2018.

² Wetzel, J. *Moderner Antisemitismus Unter Muslimen in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014. 5.

Sayeed Qutb, whose twisted worldview was centered around a Christian-Jewish world conspiracy against Islam.³

This would logically mean that the Christians, who had taught the Muslims to hate the Jews, all of a sudden became their best friends and secret allies. Now they are leading a common charge against the Muslims, who would otherwise never have started to hate Jews. All this without any deeper religious or ideological precedence, invented entirely in the late 20th century. This line of thought also assumes that Christian missionary activity and the few decades of Western European imperialism in the Levant region had a deeper antisemitic impact than the previous thirteen centuries of Islamic imperialism.

It might be true that *some topics* of European antisemitism, like the blood libel or the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and their dark occult conspiracy found their way to the Islamic world from the West. However, denying the indigenous religious roots and deep civilizational embeddedness of Islamic antisemitism would be close to ignorance. It is not the objective of this article to compare the level of antisemitism in the Islamic and the Western world. All forms of antisemitism are equally reprehensible, racially motivated or otherwise, even if it is mandated by the core tenets of a world religion. It must also be clarified at the beginning of the article what we mean by antisemitism. Here, just like at its conception, this word is exclusively used for hatred and discrimination against the Jews, and no other ethnic or linguistic group.

The religious scriptures of Islam, the Quran and the Sunna contain a substantial amount of antisemitic thoughts. The following incomplete list of examples will give proof of that.

Jews are the main enemies of the Muslims: “Strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou find the Jews and Pagans” (Quran 5:82).⁴

A Muslim must not take a Jew as a friend or ally: “O ye who believe! take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them [for friendship] is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust” (Quran 5:51).⁵

Jews hinder people in Allah’s way, commit usury and take other people’s wealth unjustly. Only the ones who become Muslims will be rewarded among them. “Wherefore for the iniquity of those who are Jews did We disallow to them the good things which had been made lawful for them and for their hindering many [people] from Allah’s way. And their taking usury though indeed they were forbidden it and their devouring the property of people falsely, and We have prepared for the unbelievers from among them a painful chastisement. But the firm in knowledge among them and the believers believe in what has been revealed to you and what was revealed before you, and those who keep up prayers and those who give the poor-rate and the believers in Allah and the last day, these it is whom We will give a mighty reward.” (Quran 4:160–62).⁶

Jews reject Muhammad, they are disobedient and defiant, so Allah curses some of them and turns them into apes and pigs: “Say: ‘O people of the Book! Do ye disapprove of us for no other reason than that we believe in Allah, and the revelation that hath come to us and

³ Tibi, B. “Der Importierte Hass”. *Die Zeit*, 6 February 2003. http://www.zeit.de/2003/07/Islamismus_neu/komplettansicht, Accessed on 18 January 2018.

⁴ Yusuf Ali, A. “The Quran”. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a2002.02.0004>, Accessed on 19 January 2018.

⁵ Yusuf Ali. “The Quran”.

⁶ Yusuf Ali. “The Quran”.

that which came before [us], and [perhaps] that most of you are rebellious and disobedient?' Say: 'Shall I point out to you something much worse than this, [as judged] by the treatment it received from Allah? those who incurred the curse of Allah and His wrath, those of whom some He transformed into apes and swine, those who worshipped evil; these are [many times] worse in rank, and far more astray from the even path!'" (Quran 5:59–60, but also 2:65 and 7:166).⁷

Muhammad said that the end of the world will come when even the trees will help the Muslims to find and kill Jews: "Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger as saying: The last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him; but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews" (Sahih Muslim 54:105).⁸

Muhammad said that Allah had transformed some Jews into rats: "Abu Huraira reported that Allah's Messenger said: A group of Bani Isra'il was lost. I do not know what happened to it, but I think [that it underwent a process of metamorphosis] and assumed the shape of rats".⁹

Muhammad said: "Kill any Jew that falls into your power".¹⁰

Muhammad attacked a hostile Jewish tribe, who broke their alliance with him. After defeating them, he ordered the execution of the captured males, and the enslavement of women and children. Muhammad and his child wife watched together as all the 7–800 Jewish men were slaughtered and their bodies were thrown into a ditch.¹¹

The most common topic of antisemitism in the Quran is the Jews' stubborn rejection of Allah's truth and Muhammad's prophethood. The hadith goes even further, and accuses the Jews of poisoning Muhammad. Jews are depicted as falsifiers, treacherous conspirators and usurpers, ignorant of the truth and killers of the final Prophet Muhammad. They are an "eternal enemy" of Islam, ever since the time of the Prophet, trying to destroy Islamic creed.¹² These labels do not originate from any Christian missionaries or colonizers. They are the perfect words of the only God of the Universe, and Muhammad, the supposedly perfect example for all of humankind.

HISTORY

Another debate is going on about the effect of Islamic political dominance over Jewish populations. One side claims that the inherent tolerance of Islam towards religious minorities, in particular towards Jews, led to unprecedented flourishing of their culture and science. The other position is that they were subjugated, sometimes persecuted, expelled or even slaughtered. Both statements can be true, but the most important question is the role of Islam in any of these outcomes. It is important because of the ever-growing religiosity

⁷ Yusuf Ali. "The Quran".

⁸ Sunnah.com. <https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/105>, Accessed on 19 January 2018.

⁹ Hadith Collection. <http://hadithcollection.com/sahihmuslim/170-Sahih%20Muslim%20Book%2042.%20Piety%20and%20Softening%20Of%20Hearts/15384-sahih-muslim-book-042-hadith-number-7135.html>, Accessed on 19 January 2018.

¹⁰ Guillaume, A. *The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004. 369.

¹¹ Guillaume. *The Life of Muhammad...* 461–68.

¹² Wistrich, R. S. *Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger*. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2002. 9–10.

among European Muslim populations, and the increasing role of Islam in their identity.¹³ Therefore, it is worth discussing some claims about Islam's role in the treatment of Jews in historic situations when they were under Islamic political authority.

A good example of such a situation is Muslim Spain in the Middle Ages. Before the Muslim invasion, Jews had already suffered under Catholic Visigoth rule, so they eagerly supported the Muslim attackers, and even secured captured cities. The Muslims, however, did not treat the Jews as allies, as it would have contradicted their sacred religious teachings, as discussed above. Muslim rulers referred to them as "servants". While it is true that their living conditions improved compared to Visigoth times, and some of them made a scientific or political career under Islamic authority, none of this meant that Islamic Spain was an example of tolerance and multicultural coexistence. Muslim masses resented the relative wealth and well-being of Jews, looked jealously at their political influence, education and urban lifestyle, which led to violence against them in the form of riots and pogroms. Eventually, under the religiously stricter Almohad dynasty, their influence declined significantly, and they had to seek refuge and a better life in the Christian kingdoms, contrary to the claim that their life conditions were much worse under Catholic rule.¹⁴ Over the centuries, Jews continued to migrate from the Islamic world to the Christian world, and by the end of the Islamic empire, the majority of the world's Jews lived in the West.¹⁵ We will see that the same resentment over the relative success of Jews compared to Muslims is rather widespread among contemporary Muslim immigrant communities in Europe.

The favoured status of Jews in Islamic Spain did not mean any kind of tolerance or attraction to religious pluralism, as those who want to compare this historical situation to modern European multiculturalism would like to portray it. Jews were used as a counterbalance against the Christian majority, in a similar way as Sunnis were used by the British mandate in Iraq, as the Spanish conquistadors used smaller tribes against the main rival Aztecs, or as Belgians used the Tutsi minority against other tribes in the Congo.¹⁶ This technique creates a supported minority that is dependent on the goodwill and backing of the rulers, which was the case with Jews under Islamic rule. The periods, when religious law was less strictly enforced, or entirely ignored, coincided with the economic and intellectual flourishing of Jewish communities, but circumstances could change rather quickly with deadly consequences.

The ulama has always criticized the lukewarm religiosity of those Muslim rulers, who disobeyed the sacred law and favoured Jews. A prominent Islamic scholar of al-Andalus, Abu ibn Ishaq wrote a satiric poem about the ruler of Granada, ripe with anti-Jewish sentiments. He calls them outcast dogs, lamenting why the ruler does not deal with these lowest of the low, as earlier pious rulers did, and he also uses the best-known antisemitic stereotypes, branding the Jews as usurpers and evil conspirators. Finally, he encourages the ruler to massacre the Jews without discrimination.¹⁷ These emirs used Jewish or Christian functionaries in their administration because they were more loyal to their person than to the ulama or

¹³ Adida, C. L., Laitin, D. D. and Valfort, M. *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. 123–36.

¹⁴ Fernández-Morera, D. *The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise: Muslims, Christians, and Jews Under Islamic Rule in Medieval Spain*. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2017. 177–79.

¹⁵ Lewis, B. *The Jews of Islam*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. 67.

¹⁶ Fernández-Morera. *The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise...* 178.

¹⁷ Lewis, B. *Islam in History: Ideas, Men, and Events in the Middle East*. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1973. 159–61.

the Muslim population.¹⁸ It was not a uniquely Islamic practice either. Christian kings of the same period also used Jewish functionaries in their courts, who were loyal to their person, for financial and other professional purposes.¹⁹

The main conclusion here is that the historical precedence of European coexistence between Jews and Muslims is not a good example of multicultural tolerance and peaceful convivencia. When Islamic religious teachings became more prevalent in the political domain, as under the devout Almoravids or Almohads, Jews faced persecution, expulsion or worse. In general, their status was that of a dhimmi, a subjugated infidel, a second-class citizen, who belongs to the People of the Book. A dhimmi accepts to live under the dominance of Islamic law, and pays a racket to be allowed to live under the “protection” of their Muslim overlords. We will also see that this is relevant even today, as a large proportion of Islamic antisemitism stems from the fact that Jews today are not dhimmies. Instead, they have their own state, carved out of once Muslim-owned land, where they are sovereign, militarily and technologically superior. This is unacceptable from doctrinal Islamic point of view.

GERMANY

Antisemitism is once again on the rise in Germany, despite the nation’s heavily burdened conscience after the Holocaust. It is also to be highlighted however, that the perpetrators of the best-published antisemitic rants are not indigenous German right-wing radicals, but Muslim immigrants. An angry mob of true believers was chanting anti-Jewish slogans and burning Israeli flags on a rally to protest Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Each year on Al-Quds day, an event initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini to be held on the last Friday of Ramadan, crowds march to condemn the Israeli “occupation” of Jerusalem. These marches are attended mainly by Shiites with an Iranian, Turkish or Iraqi background.²⁰ One could argue that anti-Israeli and antisemitic political sentiments are not the same thing, but in reality, they are very closely interwoven.

Antisemitism in Germany has three main sources: right wing radicals, left wing radicals and it also permeates the entire spectrum of Islamists.²¹ German authorities and scholars alike quickly emphasize the point that the greatest threat of antisemitism in Germany stems from the right-wing extremist political milieu and not from Muslims,²² but the facts do not seem to support this claim. In the annual report of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) the reader can find some handpicked incidents of antisemitism, racism and other hate crimes, grouped under the chapter committed to each of the above mentioned political extremist communities. These reports are to highlight the seriousness of these transgressions and to inform the reader about the nature of the incidents that had indeed occurred.

In the entire chapter of right-wing radicals, there are only three instances of antisemitic hate crime mentioned. On 7 October 2016 a party day of the SPD (Social Democratic Party

¹⁸ Fernández-Morera. *The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise...* 181.

¹⁹ Baer, Y. *History of the Jews in Christian Spain*. I. Skokie, IL: Varda Books, 2001. 65.

²⁰ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. 4 July 2016. <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2016>. 186–87, Accessed on 3 January 2018.

²¹ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 184.

²² Wetzel. *Moderner Antisemitismus Unter Muslimen in Deutschland*. 21.

of Germany) had to be cancelled because of a threat directed at them, saying “we will crush your Jewish skulls²³”. The neonazi group Europäische Aktion²⁴ lamented over the grim future of Europe under the yoke of “Jewish banks and media tzars” in its new year’s letter. Finally, one internet website, Altermedia Deutschland was banned for containing antisemitic and other racist material – this note does not elaborate further on the exact nature of the antisemitic content.²⁵

On the other hand, we find countless examples of violent and non-violent hate crime against asylum seekers, people of dark complexion and third world immigrants in general. There are detailed descriptions of these incidents in the report, like “on 18 September a right wing extremist hit a person of darker skin complex in the face, telling him racist slurs like ‘you brown pig’, ‘foreign piece of sh...’ and called him the derogatory term ‘Fugee’, derived from the word refugee.”²⁶ It is quite hard to imagine that in the German political milieu of Holocaust-guilt, where antisemitism is entirely discredited and punished by law, right-wing antisemitic incidents of the same nature would not have been included in the annual report of the security services.

It is also telling to look at the report’s estimation of the manpower behind each of these extremist political ideologies. The German security agency identified about 24 000 individuals as followers of the Islamist ideology, including several thousand active members of Middle Eastern militant organizations, like HAMAS and Hezbollah, and an unspecified number of supporters of the Islamic State.²⁷ The followership of right wing extremist movements is estimated to be 23,000, with approximately 12,000 potentially violent.²⁸ The report classifies Islamists to be either political or violent, but rightly acknowledges that the boundary between the two is “blurred”. Therefore, it seems to be justified to consider the two threats as approximately equal. There is a difference not to overlook however – Muslims currently constitute about 5–7 percent of Germany’s population. Some topics of antisemitic propaganda, for example the worldwide conspiracy of Jews, are shared between the two groups, however, this does not prove that Jew hatred itself would be taken over from right wing extremism into Islamism. Furthermore, a central theme of antisemitism is the Middle East conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.²⁹

Even though people from this conflict zone represent only a small minority of all Muslim immigrants in Europe, this topic continues to have a significant impact on the wider Muslim public opinion. After the level of violence increased in the Gaza strip in 2002–3 and in 2008–9, in both cases there was a significant increase in antisemitic incidents reported

²³ The targets were not necessarily Jews, but political opponents. Still, the wording used classifies the incident as antisemitism. Indeed, the vast majority of right wing radical violence in Germany today is directed against third world immigrants and political opponents, predominantly left wing radical groups. The redirection of hatred, violence, and attention in general, from Jews to more recent third world immigrants is a wider Western European phenomenon. Rudgard, O. “Rising anti-semitism in the UK fuelled by social media, report finds”. Telegraph, 23 April 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/23/rising-anti-semitism-uk-fuelled-social-media-report-finds/>, Accessed on 8 January 2018.

²⁴ This party, with the membership of about a hundred people, also wishes to re-establish “freedom of speech”, including the possibility of denying the Holocaust, which is an antisemitic hate crime in itself. But this is not an antisemitic “incident” per se, instead a continuous political aim. “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 88.

²⁵ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 51–63.

²⁶ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 48.

²⁷ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 160.

²⁸ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 40.

²⁹ “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016”. 181–87.

in Germany. Protests organized by mainstream Muslim organizations also attracted several other ones, even the outlawed Hizb ut-Tahrir, quickly mobilizing the entire Islamist political spectrum. On fashion products popular among German Muslim youth and in the lyrics of popular Muslim rappers, jokes about the Holocaust and slogans about the Gaza strip and the Israeli conflict intermingle with the propagation of the hijab, reading the Quran and reinforcing one's religiousness. In these messages, the common Muslim struggle for Palestine is a key element.³⁰

Antisemitism is an integral part of all those Islamist groupings, which define Islam not only as a religion, but also as a concept of society. For them, some scholars claim, religion is only a tool for a political end, and it is irrelevant, whether Muhammad agitated against Jews, or whether the Quran has antisemitic suras. They acknowledge the presence of a special "Islamicized" antisemitism, but blame it on the social exclusion and lower integrational status of Muslims, compared to that of Jews.³¹ The problem is that Islam is indeed not only a religion as we conceptualize it in our secular societies, but also a complete civilizational manual, a political ideology and a legal system. Since Muslim immigrant societies are more and more adherent to their religious and civilizational roots, these questions will be more and more relevant. Salafism is the most dynamically growing Islamist current in Germany.³² Salafists are the ones, who follow the sacred scripture and Muhammad's example to the letter.

UK

In the United Kingdom, far-right remains the largest antisemitic political group, but the far-left is also catching up by its sheer numbers³³ and its influence on British politics. The trend of redirecting right wing extremist violence from Jews to third world immigrants is also present in the UK, as it is in Germany.³⁴ However, there is one social group, the Muslims, who are markedly more antisemitic than the rest of the population. It is not right to contribute this entirely to the followership of "radical" or "Islamist" political ideas, because after the removal of the adherents of fundamentalist ideologies from the sample, the remaining Muslims still showed higher levels of antisemitism than the rest of the population.³⁵ Again, just like in Germany, the levels of anti-Israeli and antisemitic sentiments are both higher among Muslims, and they are also correlated, albeit not identical. Among those, who have no anti-Israel attitudes, only a minority has antisemitic attitudes, and the vast majority of those who have strong anti-Israel attitudes have at least one antisemitic attitude as well.

³⁰ Nordbruch, G. "Dreaming of a 'free Palestine'". Syddansk Universitet. May 2009. https://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Centre/C_Mellemoest/Videncenter/Nyheder/2009/090505GN.pdf, 2–8, Accessed on 6 January 2018.

³¹ Wetzel. *Moderner Antisemitismus Unter Muslimen in Deutschland*. 4–8.

³² "Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016". 183.

³³ It is very important to note here that this increase in sheer numbers can at least partially be attributed to a rapidly growing Muslim community, which overwhelmingly favours the political left in the current political spectrum. See Clement, B. "The British Election Study 2015: Religious affiliation and attitudes". *British Religion in Numbers*. 17 October 2014. <http://www.brin.ac.uk/2014/the-british-election-study-2015-religious-affiliation-and-attitudes/>, Accessed on 26. April 2018.

³⁴ Rudgard. "Rising anti-semitism in the UK fuelled by social media, report finds".

³⁵ Daisley, S. "Britain has an anti-Semitism problem. Here are the numbers that prove it". *Spectator*. 13 September 2017. <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/09/britain-has-an-anti-semitism-problem-and-now-we-have-the-numbers-to-prove-it/>, Accessed 8 January 2018.

The presence of such attitudes is two to four times higher among Muslims than among the general British population. Interestingly, and again pointing at the highly important and relevant role of religiosity, the least antisemitic segment of the Muslim population is the least religious ones, but even they are more antisemitic than non-Muslims.³⁶

Community Security Trust's annual reports show that the number of antisemitic incidents have a correlation with the flare-up periods of violence in the Middle East, particularly between Israel and the Palestinians. Past trigger events have been the Second Intifada in 2000, the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the outbreak of the Iraqi war in 2003, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and the Gaza conflict in 2009. The collected data also show, when these trigger events occur frequently, the increase in antisemitic incidents shows a gradual increase over the long term.³⁷ Since 2014, when a similar trigger event happened in the Gaza, for a consecutive three years, antisemitic incidents have been at a very high level, breaking the previous record of 2009, and then again the 2014 record in 2016. In those months, when the hostilities were at their highest level in the Middle East, the nature of antisemitic incidents also showed the pattern of political alignment, with significantly more incidents with anti-Israel, Islamic-related, or Islamist political motivation. Almost half of the incidents in June and July had direct or indirect connections with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.³⁸

The physical appearance of the perpetrators also differed significantly from the rest in those two months. Whites were 34 percent, South Asians 50 percent, Arabs or North Africans 12 percent, compared to 44 percent, 37 percent and 10 percent respectively.³⁹ The 2013 survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights showed that over a twelve-month period in the UK, only 33 percent of those victims, who could identify the offenders, said that they were someone with right wing extremist views. On the other hand, 56 percent said they held Islamist extremist views, and even more, 57 percent said the offender had left wing political views.⁴⁰ Again, as in the case of Germany, it should be stressed that Muslims make up 3–4 percent of UK population.

In 2015 and 2016 however, there were no such trigger events. The high number of the 2015 incidents might show that Jews were more anxious and vigilant because of the Jihadist attacks in France and Denmark against Jews. In earlier years, after trigger events were over, the number of reported incidents declined, but in 2015 they remained at a high level throughout the year.⁴¹ Furthermore, the 2016 survey showed a new record level, breaking the 2014 one, but in 2016 there was no trigger event in the Middle East, neither in Europe to cause higher anxiety. The explanation can be the prolonged effect of previous trigger events, Jihad attacks in Europe, the feeling of insecurity caused by them, and the “perceived climate

³⁶ Staetsky, L. D. “Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain: A study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel”. Institute for Jewish Policy Research. September 2017. 5–6. http://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR.2017.Antisemitism_in_contemporary_Great_Britain.pdf, Accessed on 8 January 2018.

³⁷ “Antisemitic Incidents Report 2014”. Community Security Trust. 2015. <https://cst.org.uk/docs/Incidents%20Report%202014.pdf>, 11, Accessed on 5 January 2018.

³⁸ “Antisemitic Incidents Report 2014”. 28–9.

³⁹ “Antisemitic Incidents Report 2014”. 7.

⁴⁰ “Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism”. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. November 2013. 27. <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/discrimination-and-hate-crime-against-jews-eu-member-states-experiences-and>, Accessed on 8 January 2018.

⁴¹ “Antisemitic Incidents Report 2016”. Community Security Trust. 2017. 4. <https://cst.org.uk/data/file/b/e/Incidents%20Report%202016.1486376547.pdf>, Accessed on 7 January 2018.

of increased racism and xenophobia in Britain following the EU referendum”.⁴² However, the first half of 2017 showed further increase. Eighty violent attacks were recorded against Jews, out of a total of 727. This is again a new record since the start of the surveys in 1984.⁴³

Another survey conducted by the Channel 4 television documentary “What British Muslims really think” also underlined that Muslims are significantly more antisemitic than the general population. This survey was criticized by some Muslims for being only conducted in areas where Muslims make up at least 20 percent of the population. This circumstance would make the poll inaccurate, because Muslims living in these areas are much less integrated into the society than elsewhere.⁴⁴ This is also part of the problem, namely that about 50 percent of the UK Muslim population live in areas, where they represent at least 20 percent of the local population. According to Shiraz Maher, this half is not integrated enough into UK society to have the same level of antisemitic attitudes.⁴⁵

FRANCE

The most serious problem among the three countries examined is in France. This country hosts the largest Jewish population in Europe, estimated at about 5–600,000, with half of them living around the Paris area. Their numbers have been steadily decreasing in the past years, because of emigration to Israel, with about 10 000 Jews moving there in 2015 alone.⁴⁶ Others have become “internal refugees”, which means they are moving from their former homes to more gentrified areas, where they are not harassed on a daily basis.⁴⁷ But from whom are these people fleeing? Some districts, formerly densely populated by Jews, like Sarcelles or Creteil, are now being abandoned for more “peaceful neighbourhoods”, where hardly any Muslims live. Places of everyday life, like public schools are also undergoing the same process of segregation for security reasons – most Jewish children have to attend private schools, because these are guarded by the police or the military, and they are now entirely missing from public schools of the banlieus, which a lot of Muslim children attend.⁴⁸

French antisemitism exists in all the previously mentioned political currents, far-right, far-left and Islamists, and it is also distinguished in Europe for its higher level of violence,

⁴² “Antisemitic Incidents Report 2016”. 4.

⁴³ Dearden, L. “Anti-Semitic attacks hit record high in UK amid warnings over rise of ‘hatred and anger’”. *Independent*, 26 July 2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/anti-semitic-hate-crime-attacks-british-jews-assaults-uk-incidents-record-high-cst-research-a7861721.html>, Accessed on 8 January 2018.

⁴⁴ JTA. “UK Muslims more anti-Semitic than general population, poll finds”. *The Times of Israel*, 13 April 2016. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/uk-muslims-more-anti-semitic-than-general-population-poll-finds/>, Accessed 8 January 2018.

⁴⁵ Brooks-Pollock, T. “What British Muslims really think about poll that asked: ‘What do British Muslims really think?’”. *Independent*, 12 April 2016. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-problem-with-that-poll-of-british-muslims-a6980411.html>, Accessed on 8 January 2018.

⁴⁶ Enstad, J. D. “Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005-2015”. HL-SENTERET. June 2016. 5. https://www.hlsenteret.no/publikasjoner/digitale-hefter/antisemittisk-vold-i-europa_engelsk_endelig-versjon.pdf, Accessed on 21 January 2018.

⁴⁷ Kern, S. “The Islamization of France in 2016”. Gatestone Institute. 17 January 2017. <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9791/france-islamization>, Accessed on 12 January 2018.

⁴⁸ Alfon, D. “Analysis: What’s Behind the Drop in anti-Semitic Incidents in France?”. *Haaretz*. 16 November 2017. <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/premium-1.822965?&ts=1515670536174>, Accessed on 1 January 2018.

including attacks, abductions and murder.⁴⁹ Differences should be highlighted though. According to the FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) survey, the highest percentage of victims who identified the perpetrators as “someone with a Muslim extremist view” is by far the highest in France, while at the same time “someone with a right-wing political view” is the lowest.⁵⁰ French Muslims are two to three times more antisemitic than the general French population. While there were no significant differences among them based on their age, education, or social status, religiosity was relevant here again. For example, with the statement “Jews have too much political power”, 19 percent of the French people agreed, and so did 51 percent of all Muslims. Among Muslims with no religious involvement, this number was 37, among believers 49, and among practicing believers 63 percent.⁵¹ Therefore, beyond the mandatory condemnation of right-wing political extremism, there is not much else to support the claim that these problems are equal, or that the seriousness of Islamic antisemitism should be denied. Research shows that young Muslim men stand out in statistics as perpetrators of violent antisemitic attacks not just in France but also in all of Western Europe. It is also shown that the level of religiosity matters – the more devout the person is, the more likely he/she is to have antisemitic attitudes.⁵²

Yet, even after acknowledging the problem of existing antisemitism among Muslims, its root causes are still debated. Among them are mentioned the “manipulation of the Palestinian cause, failure of integration into French society, radical preachers and the funding of mosques, and satellite television stations broadcasting a steady stream of anti-Semitic discourse”.⁵³ This list draws closer to reality, but fails to take the last step. Preachers preaching the same attitude towards Jews as Muhammad’s tradition and the Quran do, are not radical, they are just strictly following the core tenets of the religion. Realizing this publicly is very risky in today’s France, as the example of Jewish historian Georges Bensoussan shows. A Muslim lobby group and a French human rights organization sued him for hate speech after citing an Algerian sociologist, Smain Laacher. Laacher said that “it is a disgrace to maintain this taboo, namely that in Arab families in France and elsewhere everyone knows that anti-Semitism is spread with the mother’s milk”. Merely citing this sentence was enough for accusation of hate speech.⁵⁴

Another opinion points at the differences between the success of integration of Jews and Muslim. At the level of French society, Muslims look upon Jews jealously because of their relatively successful integration, and this is mirrored at global level with Arabs being oppressed by Jews everywhere. In the eyes of many North African Muslims, Palestine is the primary example of this cruelty. Back in their own countries, they knew Sephardic Jews, but the circumstances are reversed in Western Europe. Those, who used to be equal, or even inferior (dhimmies), are now superior. This sentiment also has its roots in the traditional sentiment of Muslims, which holds Christians and Jews impure, therefore inferior. The discrepancy

⁴⁹ Rodan-Benzaquen, S. “Muslim Anti-Semitism Threatens France’s Democracy”. *Newsweek*, 19 November 2017. <http://www.newsweek.com/muslim-anti-semitism-threatens-frances-democracy-716055>, Accessed on 12 January 2018.

⁵⁰ “Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States...” 27.

⁵¹ Reynié, D. and Rodan-Benzaquen, S. “Anti-Semitism in France: Facing Reality”. Huffington post. 18 November 2014. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dominique-reynie/antisemitism-in-france-fa_b_6178804.html, Accessed on 12 January 2018.

⁵² Enstad. “Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005-2015”. 25.

⁵³ Rodan-Benzaquen. “Muslim Anti-Semitism Threatens France’s Democracy”.

⁵⁴ Kern. “The Islamization of France in 2016”.

is caused by these inferiors becoming superior in terms of military and technology, as opposed to the old times when they respected Muslims, and were even subordinated to them.⁵⁵

It is true that, as in all other Western European countries, antisemitism in France is also closely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It does not only manifest in the perception of French Jews, 90 percent of whom answered that the Arab-Israeli conflict matters to their safety in France “a great deal” or “a fair amount”, but also in the number of antisemitic incidents over the period of ten years from 1990 to 2000, the year of the Second Intifada. The number of all incidents were: 372 in 1990, 143 in 1991, 94 in 1992, 156 in 1993, 120 in 1994, 86 in 1995, 90 in 1996, 85 in 1997, 74 in 1998, 60 in 1999, then 603 in 2000. The number of violent incidents showed a similar pattern: 20 in 1992, 14 in 1993, 11 in 1994, 2 in 1995, 1 in 1996, 3 in 1997, 1 in 1998, 9 in 1999, then 116 in 2000. At that time, after hundreds of cases of antisemitic intimidation, over sixty suspects were questioned by police, but only five were subject to legal procedures, for being far-right.⁵⁶ These numbers only increased over time (808 incidents in 2016), but they are not so closely connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict anymore – the problem is now more persistent.⁵⁷ With the perpetrators of most antisemitic attacks now being predominantly Muslim, the communal conflict between Jews and Muslims is extended “into the heart of Europe”.⁵⁸

Failure of integration into French society can also be a topic of a much wider debate to discuss here, but at the minimum we need to take a look at the research carried out by David Laitin, Claire Adida and Marie-Anne Valfort among French Muslims. Their selection of the sample population for the survey made it possible to exclude all other variables and focus only on religion. The Senegalese Serer and Jola immigrants meet all the necessary conditions of belonging to the same ethnic group, coming from the same country at the same time, and living under similar conditions at home and in France, regardless of their conversion to one faith or the other.⁵⁹ This research showed among other results that the reason for the large gap between the levels of integration of the two immigrant communities can be attributed to their religious background only⁶⁰. The discrimination they face has rational and irrational elements, and can be divided into three larger groups, religious norms, gender norms (very closely connected to religious norms), and mastery of language.⁶¹ Other than language, we

⁵⁵ Khosrokhavar, F. “Anti-Semitism of the Muslims in France: the case of the prisoners”. 8 November 2005. 3–5, 12. <https://stanford.edu/dept/france-stanford/Conferences/Islam/Khosrokhavar.pdf>, Accessed on 14 January 2018.

⁵⁶ Samuels, S, and Knobel, M. “Antisemitism 2002 in France: ‘Intifada’ Import or Domestic Malaise?”. Simon Wiesenthal Center. January 2002. 7–11. <http://www.wiesenthal.com/atf/ct/%7B4BBE989B-D21C-4116-BC6F-92CE75144F83%7D/antisemitismfrance.pdf>, Accessed on 10 January 2018.

⁵⁷ Rodan-Benzaquen. “Muslim Anti-Semitism Threatens France’s Democracy”.

⁵⁸ Suzan, B. and Dreyfus, J. “Muslims and Jews in France: Communal Conflict in a Secular State”. Brookings. 1 March 2004. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/muslim-and-jews-in-france-communal-conflict-in-a-secular-state/>, Accessed 12 January 2018.

⁵⁹ Adida, Laitin and Valfort. *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*. 32–3.

⁶⁰ Muslims not only separate from the host society more than other immigrants, but this situation does not improve over time. On the contrary, each subsequent generation will be less integrated. Muslims and the host population are locked in a sub-optimal discrimination equilibrium. Muslims’ separation from the majority is at least partially caused by rational and irrational discrimination, based on their religion. Muslims and the host society are acting towards each other negatively in mutually reinforcing ways, which causes further separation. This finding applies to other Western European Muslim communities as well. Adida, Laitin and Valfort. *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*. 121–25, 138–45.

⁶¹ Adida, Laitin and Valfort. *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*. 79.

see that the differences are in fact related to religion. It is quite interesting to note that this is the case even in France, home of secularism and *laïcité*, where one would think that religion does not matter at all.

This separation is what creates the *banlieus*, the problematic suburbs, or “no-go zones”, which Georges Bensoussan refers to as “lost territories”. Most antisemitic offenses are committed by young men of North African descent, who live in these suburbs, socially segregated from the rest of society.⁶² In such areas, where Muslim population is growing, Jewish inhabitants are moving out at a remarkable pace.⁶³ In Seine-Saint-Denis, Muslims account to about 40 percent of the population. According to police statistics, most antisemitic incidents around the Paris area take place in this suburb,⁶⁴ and in general, most of the incidents happen in areas where Jews and Muslims live in close proximity, typically in suburbs of major cities. Already around the time of the Second Intifada, Jews felt that the government was ignoring this problem because of the perceived voting power of the Muslim population.⁶⁵ As we shall see, this is a very well-founded consideration, and the situation is likely to worsen in the future.

DEMOGRAPHY

Currently, Europe has a Muslim population of about 26 million. The future growth of this population depends mostly on the level of immigration to Europe from Islamic heritage societies. Pew Research Center’s study projects three different scenarios, the first one with all Muslim immigration stopping completely, the second one where regular immigration continues for economic, educational and family reasons, but not asylum seeking, and the third scenario is where high immigration will continue as we saw in the years 2015 and 2016. In the first – obviously imaginary – scenario, Muslim population by 2050 would increase by 10 million to about 36 million exclusively because of demographic reasons, higher fertility and lower average age. Even in this scenario, France would face the biggest change, with its currently 9-percent Muslim population growing to about 13 percent.⁶⁶

In the second scenario, where only regular migration continues in the coming decades, but refugees do not arrive, the UK would have the largest Muslim population in Europe, since it has received more regular Muslim immigrants than any other country. It is unclear though, how the UK will regulate immigration after Brexit. Finally, in the third scenario, which is also unlikely to continue unchanged, Europe’s Muslim population would be about 75 million, or 14 percent of the continent’s population. Under this scenario, Germany and Sweden would be the most Islamized countries, with roughly 20 and 30 percent Muslims. Pew Research Center estimates the most realistic scenario to be between the second and third one, with an overall percentage of Muslims between 11 and 14 percent.⁶⁷

⁶² Khosrokhavar. “Anti-Semitism of the Muslims in France: the case of the prisoners”. 1.

⁶³ Meotti, G. “France: Muslims In, Jews Out”. Gatestone Institute. 15 November 2017. <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11311/france-muslims-jews>, Accessed on 11 January 2018.

⁶⁴ Alfon. “Analysis: What’s Behind the Drop in anti-Semitic Incidents in France?”.

⁶⁵ Samuels and Knobel. “Antisemitism 2002 in France...”. 2–3.

⁶⁶ Lipka, M. “Europe’s Muslim population will continue to grow – but how much depends on migration”. Pew Research Center. 4 December 2017. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/04/europes-muslim-population-will-continue-to-grow-but-how-much-depends-on-migration/>, Accessed on 25 January 2018.

⁶⁷ Lipka. “Europe’s Muslim population will continue to grow – but how much depends on migration”.

Not all European countries will equally experience such huge changes in their demographic situation. Even in the third scenario, it is estimated that the Central-Eastern European member states' Muslim population will remain well under 5 percent. If these states are able to stop all Islamic immigration to their territories, then this number will remain as low as 0,5 percent.




Figure 168: Muslims in the EU, Norway and Switzerland in 2050: zero migration scenario. Projected % of Muslims among total population in each country




Figure 269: Muslims in the EU, Norway and Switzerland in 2050: high migration scenario. Projected % of Muslims among total population in each country

68 “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population”. Pew Research Center. 29 November 2017. <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/>, Accessed on 14 January 2018.

69 “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population”.

Table 1: *The size of the European Muslim population in 2050 depends largely on the future of migration*

Estimated and projected Muslim population shares					
Country	2010 (%)	2016 (%)	2050 zero migration (%)	2050 medium migration (%)	2050 high migration (%)
Cyprus	25.3	25.4	25.5	26.6	28.3
Sweden	4.6	8.1	11.1	20.5	30.6
France	7.5	8.8	12.7	17.4	18.0
United Kingdom	4.7	6.3	9.7	16.7	17.2
Belgium	6.0	7.6	11.1	15.1	18.2
Norway	3.7	5.7	7.2	13.4	17.0
Netherlands	6.0	7.1	9.1	12.5	15.2
Italy	3.6	4.8	8.3	12.4	14.1
Denmark	4.0	5.4	7.6	11.9	16.0
Finland	1.2	2.7	4.2	11.4	15.0
Europe overall	3.8	4.9	7.4	11.2	14.0
Germany	4.1	6.1	8.7	10.8	19.7
Austria	5.4	6.9	9.3	10.6	19.9
Switzerland	4.9	6.1	8.2	10.3	12.9
Malta	0.2	2.6	3.2	9.3	16.2
Bulgaria	11.1	11.1	12.5	9.2	11.6
Greece	5.3	5.7	6.3	8.1	9.7
Spain	2.1	2.6	4.6	6.8	7.2
Luxembourg	2.3	3.2	3.4	6.7	9.9
Slovenia	3.6	3.8	4.3	5.0	5.2
Ireland	1.1	1.4	1.6	4.3	4.4
Portugal	0.3	0.4	0.5	2.5	2.5
Croatia	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.1
Hungary	0.1	0.4	0.4	1.3	4.5
Czech Republic	0.1	0.2	0.2	1.1	1.2
Estonia	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.0
Romania	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9
Slovakia	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.7
Latvia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
Lithuania	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2

Notes: In zero migration scenario, no migration of any kind takes place to or from Europe. In medium migration scenario, regular migration continues and refugee flows ease. In high migration scenario, 2014 to mid-2016 refugee inflow patterns continue in addition to regular migration. Estimates do not include those asylum seekers who are not expected to gain legal status to remain in Europe.

Source: Pew Research Center estimates and projections. See Methodology for details. "Europe's Growing Muslim Population"

CONCLUSIONS

The case studies of the three European countries with the largest Jewish population showed that antisemitism is on the rise, and there are three main groups that harbour antisemitic views: the far-right, the far-left, and Muslims. Several surveys gave proof that Muslims are significantly more antisemitic than the general population in each country. Research also showed that the level of antisemitism among Muslims correlated with the level of religiosity.⁷⁰ Islamic core doctrinal sources indeed contain a significant amount of antisemitism as shown in the first chapter. The analysis of the FRA survey and other sources showed that in each country, the flare-ups in the Middle East conflict served as trigger events for antisemitic incidents. This conflict is not the cause for violent attacks on Jews; rather it just provides an occasion for antisemitic violence for those people who are prone to violence and hate Jews anyway.⁷¹

Demographic tendencies in Europe predict that the percentage and the absolute number of Muslims will increase in the coming decades, with the most likely scenario forecasting the proportion of Muslims in Europe to be around 11–14 percent in 2050. This increase does not affect all countries evenly though – most of Central-Eastern Europe will remain almost entirely without any Muslim minority if they are able to restrict immigration to their territory. Laitin, Adida, and Valfort showed that the attachment to the ancestral culture and religious norms, and the importance of religion in the identity of Muslim immigrants is not decreasing, but increasing over time. The more generations these communities live among Christian heritage societies, the less and less they are integrated. The research also proved that this is not only a French phenomenon, but applies to all of Western Europe.

In Western democratic societies, the ultimate source of sovereignty are the people. As long as our political system functions on the foundation of equal rights and individual liberties, including the freedom of vote, the political will of an ever-growing Muslim minority will eventually find ways to surface at governmental level. Those, who fear that the governments of some Western European countries favour the voting power of their large Muslim populations over the small and decreasing Jewish communities, are entirely right. Muslim voting tendencies are not overly simple to predict. For example, it is not guaranteed that they will choose a right wing, a left wing, or even Islamist party, especially as a collective community. However, it can be predicted what they will *not* vote for. We can estimate from the research results presented in the article that they will *not* support a foreign policy which favours Israel. No Muslim-majority country voted against the UN resolution to condemn Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Even among the abstaining countries, we find only one country with a significant Muslim population, Bosnia and Herzegovina – because its delicately balanced presidential system requires all ethnic communities to agree on foreign policy matters, and the Serbs vetoed the other two party's attempt to support the UN resolution.⁷²

This growing Muslim population will certainly limit the freedom of action of those governments, which have to consider the vote of the Muslims at the next elections. Not only is it

⁷⁰ Reynié and Rodan-Benzaquen. "Anti-Semitism in France: Facing Reality".

⁷¹ Enstad. "Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005-2015". 24.

⁷² "Why Bosnia and Herzegovina did not vote against the US". TRT World. 21 December 2017. <https://www.trtworld.com/jerusalem/why-bosnia-and-herzegovina-did-not-vote-against-the-us-13509>, Accessed on 25 January 2018.

likely that Muslim antisemitism will get worse over time, but also that the already troubled and complicated foreign policy formulation of the EU regarding the Middle East will further slide towards the support of the Palestinians and abandoning Israel. This is likely to cause collisions with the United States, and might also become a further point of friction between the Eastern (V4) and Western European member states. Musu argues that there are three main shared interests between the US and Europe in the Middle East: the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the free flow of oil, and regional stability.⁷³ However, the Arab-Israeli conflict can have several outcomes, so while it is in everyone's interest to settle the conflict, it can be vastly divergent, how it will be settled. The free flow of oil and regional stability affects Europe much more than the US, mainly because of the difference in the availability of natural resources and geographic proximity. Therefore, there are also divergences in the strategic approach to the Middle Eastern conflict. One of the main causes of this is an extremely well-funded Israel-lobby, and a large Jewish community in the US, which is much more influential than the current Muslim interest groups. They are able to influence both the Congress and the President, who in turn cannot afford to neglect the Jewish electorate. On the other hand, Europe's long-established Jewish communities are far less numerous than their rapidly increasing Muslim electorates.⁷⁴

In the Eastern European countries, the Muslim voting power will still be at a negligible level in all of the projected demographic scenarios, so foreign policy regarding the Middle East will not be affected the same way as in Western Europe. Signs of this are already visible. While all Western European countries condemned Trump's move to recognize the capital of Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu invited the V4 leaders to Israel in 2018. As an example, the Hungarian government's intention to increase the EU support for Israel is not very likely to receive very much appreciation in the EU, where the most influential member states have large and ever-growing Muslim constituencies.

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⁷³ Musu, C. *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The quicksand of Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. 144–45.

⁷⁴ Musu. *European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process...* 146–48.

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Marcell György Pintér:

INFLUENCE OF THE MENA COUNTRIES IN CHINA

ABSTRACT: The Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)¹ region nowadays enjoys an increasing amount of attention from around the world, especially China. As a gateway between Europe, Asia, and Africa, this region is of utmost geopolitical importance. Despite being valuable assets to world economy, they themselves – as of recently, largely due to regional military conflicts, political strife, ethnic tensions, and religious division –, are unable to assert their own interests towards great powers, such as China, however, they are not lacking potential. With the gradual withdrawal of the traditional great powers from the region, the stage is set for others, mainly China.

Although China is silently dominating the region, without the co-operation of the MENA countries, Beijing would certainly not be able to gain a foothold of any sort there. As about 50 percent of China's oil imports stem from the Middle East, as the MENA region is in an important position for Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, and as the whole region offers a great and diverse market and plenty of room for investments, the Middle Eastern and North African countries are in a position to exploit their status of being valuable assets. They could grow from aspiring regional powers to great or even world powers should an agreement and eventual co-operation among them emerge.

KEYWORDS: MENA, China, Belt and Road, strategic resources, Hui Chinese, soft power, Uighurs, Xinjiang, terrorism

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

The Silk Road (207 BC – 1450s AD), stretching from China to the Levant and the Mediterranean, was made possible by, among others, Persian and Arab traders and merchants who transferred the goods from the oases of Xinjiang to Anatolia. It was, in fact, not a simple trade route, but a network thereof, with multiple routes on land and on sea as well. The significance of the overland routes was damaged by the disintegration and collapse of the Mongol Empire, and was ultimately eclipsed when safer maritime trade routes were discovered in the 15th century.

Islam is believed to have reached China during the Caliphate of 'Uthman ibn Affan (644 AD – 656 AD), who sent an embassy there in 651, a little less than 20 years after the death of the prophet Muhammad; however, it is still argued whether the head of the deputation, Sa'd

¹ The definition of the MENA region differs from researcher to researcher; countries can be included and excluded, however, the core territory that is always mentioned consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The greater MENA region can also comprise Afghanistan, Turkey, Sudan, and Western Sahara, and sometimes even more countries are included from Mauritania through Eritrea to Pakistan. In this paper, only the core region will be mentioned with the occasional addition of Turkey for its important role played in the region, but only where stated so.

ibn Abi Waqqas, the maternal uncle of the prophet, has ever been to Tang Dynasty China. Despite the debates, it is agreed that Muslim diplomats and merchants did indeed arrive in Tang China just a few decades after the Hijra (622).²

Arab and Persian merchants made up the majority of Muslim settlements in Northwest China. They played a great role in the transmission of trade goods along the Silk Road as well as the introduction and spread of Buddhism to China (from 148 AD onwards). Chang'an (today's Xi'an) was the first imperial city to officially house Muslim communities.

The battle of Talas (751) brought the Silk Road under Abbasid control, which effectively cut off Chinese influence in the region. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this did not sever the diplomatic relations between the two empires. On the contrary, it was the Arabs and Persians who helped China quell the rebellion of An-Lushan in 756, and some 50 years later the Abbasids and Chinese formed an alliance to repulse Tibetan attacks in Central Asia.

During the Ming Dynasty, some decades before the European Age of Discovery, the Chinese emperor (the Yongle Emperor) sent a eunuch of Muslim faith, Zheng He (1371–1435?), to lead several maritime missions with a grand fleet to assert the cultural and political hegemony of China, to establish imperial control over maritime trade routes, and to show the might of the fleet and thus to coerce countries into the Chinese tributary system, reaching as far as Persia, the Arabian Peninsula, and even East Africa. This shows that China had not always been closed to the outside world before the Europeans arrived there and had actively tried to project its power further and further. The next emperor (the Hongxi Emperor), however, discontinued the voyages and ordered every ship to be destroyed, as he deemed them highly unprofitable. In essence, this short period was the only time China regarded maritime presence to be of any worth to maintain – all until modern times –, and it is important to stress that it had happened just before the Europeans embarked on their ships and happened to discover and then subsequently colonise the New World.

The 19th century saw two notable Muslim rebellions against the Manchu Qing dynasty: the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873) which was an anti-discriminatory and anti-Qing uprising joined by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) which was a chiefly Hui Chinese (Muslim) ethnic and religious one. Both were quelled and retaliated ferociously, as millions died and were murdered during these two events.³ The leader of the latter, Du Wenxiu, is today regarded as a hero by the Chinese government.

Modern relations were re-established during the second half of the 20th century. China's main strategic partners in the (greater) MENA region are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. In terms of main trade partners, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are considered, with Iran achieving the fourth place.

Xi Jinping's 2013 initiative, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, alternatively the Belt and Road Initiative, the New Silk Road, or originally One Belt, One Road Initiative, aims to resurrect and expand the historical Silk Road mainly under Chinese control. This initiative proves highly important in China's ambitions, and is heavily reliant on the co-operation of the involved countries, thus increasing the importance of them, most notably the MENA Region.

² Lipman, J. N. *Familiar Strangers, a history of Muslims in Northwest China*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997.

³ Gernet, J. *A History of Chinese Civilization*. 2. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

As of 2016, China's GDP rose to USD 11,199.15 billion with USD 6,894.5/capita,⁴ while that of the MENA was USD 3,103.78 billion⁵ with about USD 7,211/capita. As for comparison, the United States attained USD 18,624.48 billion with USD 52,194.90/capita,⁶ while Russia's GDP sank to USD 1,283.20 billion with USD 11099.20/capita.⁷

China contributes to the Middle Eastern and North African countries' economy by investing in infrastructure and trading with them, buying resources from less developed, import-reliant countries, selling them products in return, or exchanging products with more developed, export-oriented countries. Machinery, electrical and other appliances, clothes, and articles of iron and steel are the most prominent products of import from China to the MENA countries, while oil, ores, raw materials, and vehicles are the most exported articles of the MENA countries towards China.⁸

Table 1: *All 19+1 MENA countries' total import and export value from/to China, unit in USD thousand (data from 2017 except for where stated otherwise)*⁹

MENA countries	sorted by sum of	
	total import from China	total export to China
Turkey	23,370,849	2,936,041
United Arab Emirates (2016)	22,424,487	3,662,749
Saudi Arabia	19,391,019	5,970,098
Iran (2016)	10,696,326	8,369,572
Israel	9,002,146	3,339,276
Iraq (2014)	10,506,358	no data
Algeria	8,317,844	691,612
Egypt	8,105,343	679,855
Qatar (2016)	3,320,172	4,485,834
Kuwait	5,499,611	499,670
Morocco	4,082,507	307,484
Jordan	2,764,407	163,560
Lebanon	1,718,352	422,740
Bahrain (2016)	1,429,744	534,645
Tunisia (2016)	1,819,971	28,836
Oman	1,179,721	536,067
Yemen (2015)	708,489	6,915

⁴ "China GDP". Trading Economics. 2016. <https://tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp>, Accessed on 6 June 2018.

⁵ "GDP: Asia". Trading Economics. 2016. <https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp?continent=asia>, Accessed on 6 June 2018.

⁶ "United States GDP". Trading Economics. 2016. <https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp>, Accessed on 6 June 2018.

⁷ "Russia GDP". Trading Economics. 2016. <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp>, Accessed on 6 June 2018.

⁸ "Trade Map". International Trade Centre. <http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx>, Accessed on 6 June 2018.

⁹ "Trade Map". International Trade Centre.

MENA countries	sorted by sum of	
	total import from China	total export to China
State of Palestine (2016)	382,679	61
Libya	no data since 2011	
Syria	no data since 2011	

As the above chart implies, the five main trade partners of China in the MENA region are Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. This shows a Middle Eastern dominance over MENA–China trade relations. Trade between China and the Middle East has been increasing ever since around the beginning of the second millennium. In 2004, the total trade between the Middle East (including Turkey) and China was about USD 43.5 billion, whereas this number in 2014 was approximately 313.5 billion, which translates into a more than 700 percent increase in 10 years. However, during the following two years, it dropped to about 211.6 billion.¹⁰

The US is increasingly reliant on its own oil deposits and thus imports increasingly less from the Middle East: in 2000, the Middle Eastern countries exported 2.5 million barrels of oil to the US; this number by 2011 decreased to 1.9 million, and predictions foresee that the amount will continue to decline,¹¹ virtually giving green light to China. However, just as the total trade between China and the Middle East, oil imports also suffered, dropping from about USD 120.7 billion in 2014 to about 55.9 billion in 2016, while China’s total imports of oil also diminished from approximately 228.2 billion to about 116.6 billion, which means a drop in its share of total oil exports to China from 53 to 48 percent for the Middle East.

China is the largest exporter of goods to the MENA region,¹² and became the largest investor in the Middle East in 2016 with investments worth USD 29.5 billion, making up 31.9 percent of total investments in the region, while the US only holds 13.3 percent.¹³ On the other hand, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, no Middle Eastern or North African country was among the top ten investors in China in 2016.¹⁴ The MENA countries could potentially invest more in China, however, currently the majority are in no position to become major investors in the far eastern country, as generally they cannot invest as much as they depend on foreign investments.

Chinese direct investment to the North African region represents around 15 percent of the total investment flows to the entirety of Africa. Chinese investments in this region

¹⁰ “Trade Map”. International Trade Centre.

¹¹ “The great well of China”. *The Economist*, 18 June 2015. <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21654655-oil-bringing-china-and-arab-world-closer-economically-politics-will>, Accessed on 6 April 2018.

¹² Hindy, L. “A Rising China Eyes the Middle East”. The Century Foundation. 6 April 2017. <https://tcf.org/content/report/rising-china-eyes-middle-east/?agreed=1>, Accessed on 19 June 2018.

¹³ “China is largest foreign investor in Middle East”. Middle East Monitor. 24 July 2017. <https://www.middleeast-monitor.com/20170724-china-is-largest-foreign-investor-in-middle-east/>, Accessed on 19 April 2018.

¹⁴ “News Release of National Assimilation of FDI from January to November 2016”. Foreign Investment Department of the Ministry of Commerce. 30 December 2016. http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_49_4473_0_7.html, Accessed on 19 June 2018.

have been directed towards oil and gas extraction, infrastructure, and as of late towards electronics, automotive, and textiles as well as the establishment of Special Economic Zones.¹⁵

GEOPOLITICS

The MENA region is in a unique situation of being not only a gateway between Europe, Asia, and Africa, thus rendering itself geopolitically quintessential for any state with military or economic world-power ambitions, but also the largest oil source in the world – this explains the US’s particular keenness to intervene and be present in the region with its own troops. The MENA and especially the Middle Eastern countries, although being neither currently nor in the foreseeable future in position to do so – except for some attempts at asserting interests at a larger, regional scale from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Turkey –, could use this situation to their advantage and turn the tables in their own favour. Perhaps as only a mere coincidence, the aforementioned three countries happen to be some if not the biggest partners and points of interests for China in the Middle East, being crucial either being oil-rich – like Saudi Arabia – or being located just in the right place – like Iran and Turkey – for China’s economically and geopolitically quite beneficial enterprise, namely the Belt and Road Initiative. If the project succeeds, the Middle East could become a major trade hub.

Interestingly enough, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, being the top five trade partners of China from the entirety of the MENA region, themselves pose the biggest threat to the stability of the Middle East with their rivalry – based on religion, ethnicities, politics, and by attempts on power projection – among each other. This greatly prevents them from being able to project their influence onto and efficiently assert their interests in China. This multipolar conflict also makes the assertion of interest in another theatre nearly impossible, limiting the line of sight to the Middle East.

The Chinese-and-Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), described as a possible future challenger to NATO,¹⁶ is now looking forward to welcoming post-sanctions Iran, and with Turkey having expressed its interest in joining the organisation, the situation is looking favourable for China. One could argue that having Iran in their ranks, thus implicitly siding with them over Saudi Arabia, would mean Riyadh withdrawing from the sphere of Chinese influence, however, India and Pakistan having joined together in 2017 demonstrates that the SCO is willing to deal with rivalry among their members,¹⁷ possibly fuelled by the aim to try to ease the situation and solve disputes with long history, thus asserting Chinese regional ambitions. However, this does not at all mean that the rivalry and power play demonstrated among these countries, stemming from conflicting national interests, are to peacefully cease anytime soon – if at all – thanks to their joining the same international organisation, which could be seen as nothing more than a mere diplomatic

¹⁵ Alden, C. and Clerx, F. A. “Chinese investment in North Africa should be viewed as an opportunity not a threat”. London School of Economics. 10 December 2012. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/74700/1/Africa%20at%20LSE%20%E2%80%93%20Chinese%20investment%20in%20North%20Africa%20should%20be%20viewed%20as%20an%20opportunity%20not%20a%20threat.pdf>, Accessed on 20 April 2018.

¹⁶ Darling, D. “Is the SCO Emerging as Eastern Counterweight to NATO?”. Real Clear Defense. 30 August 2015. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/31/is_the_sco_emerging_as_eastern_counterweight_to_nato_108426.html, Accessed on 23 February 2018.

¹⁷ Fulton, J. “China is trying to pull Middle East countries into its version of NATO”. *The Washington Post*, 21 June 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/21/how-china-is-shifting-toward-the-middle-east/?utm_term=.1d20d2ebf118, Accessed on 23 February 2018.

move in a long strategic game of politics. Still, while visibly being only a stepping-stone for China, as mentioned above, the MENA countries could get in position to assert their own interests by holding Beijing's back, simply supported by the fact that China needs them.

Nevertheless, this would require a certain level of co-operation, which, as of now, is highly unlikely to come about, especially in the conflict-ridden Middle East. Furthermore, any country trying to bring about some sort of ad hoc alliance with other MENA countries by initiating the blocking of Chinese interests would be doomed economically as the others would simply ignore or even side against them to win the favour of Beijing, exploiting the situation in their regional conflicts for their own benefit. Word of a pre-arranged alliance against China would also quickly end up in Chinese ears. Xi Jinping's 2016 trip to Riyadh and then, about a week later, to Tehran¹⁸ – a move that was not frowned upon by either country but would be considered bold if any other less important country had done it – proves the aforementioned general refusal to act among the MENA countries, because if two of the leading Middle Eastern countries do so, it gives way to the assumption that other countries in the MENA region would also simply conform to China's will.

The MENA region's countries do not seem to intervene in or stand up against Beijing's policies in Xinjiang, and it is understandable: they are reliant on maintaining good relations with Beijing, as any sort of political interference in China's affairs would essentially lead to a diplomatic fallout and thus to quasi self-inflicted economic damage. This could be countered by shifting dependence on other regional players, such as Turkey in case of North Africa,¹⁹ or Russia in case of the Middle East.²⁰

SOCIETY AND RELIGION

It is important to stress that the way of thinking in China is that of an empire. The ethnic composition is irrelevant; China has always been a multi-ethnic empire that was held together by massive "cultural" (political, scientific, diplomatic) and "populational" (military, economic) strength – in other words soft and hard power –, which is only today being rallied under the flag of the "Chinese as one" identity. The cultural entity that we call China has always been a stable one in the Far East, despite political struggles, periods of infightings, and wars. The acquirement of the imperial throne, rather than the integration or the destruction thereof, was always among the objectives of the nearby nomadic tribes, which they sometimes did successfully achieve (Mongolian Yuan and Manchu Qing Dynasties). The tribes that were pillaging Chinese villages, and even those that ruled over them, would be victims of sinicisation over time and are now all lost to the ages, except for the remaining Mongols and a handful of others. This is a natural process: the bigger (in this case cultural) entity engulfs and absorbs the smaller one – in other words, it was a China-centred "globalisation" on a regional

¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Xi Jinping Pays State Visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. s. a. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdstajyljxgsfw/, Accessed on 1 June 2018.

¹⁹ Besenyó, J. and Olah, P. "One of the new competitors in Africa: Turkey". *AARMS* 11/1. 2012. 135–48. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276278260_One_of_the_new_competitors_in_Africa_Turkey, Accessed on 19 June 2018.

²⁰ Sladden, J. et al. "Russian Strategy in the Middle East". RAND Corporation. 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236.pdf, Accessed on 19 June 2018.

scale. Muslims in general have not really attempted an actual overthrow, or coup d'état, of the system, in fact, they were mostly part of the “Middle Empire” just as the ethnic Chinese.

Xinjiang today is different, however, as Uighur revolts and independence movements arose relatively recently in the mid-20th century and are still actively lobbying – peacefully or otherwise – to this day for an independent East Turkestan. As a response to terror attacks, Uighurs had to have on them at all times a special card called “*bianmin* card” (literally “for the convenience of the people’ card”), which basically enabled Chinese authorities to effectively monitor Uighurs while other ethnicities did not receive such “attention”, but this card has since been repealed.²¹

Islam is welcome in China, as made clear by the government, and the Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese live in relatively undisturbed coexistence. This coexistence, however, is hardly something natural: Beijing is actively promulgating that the state comes before Allah, and mosques in China boast gold etchings that call upon the believers to love their country and their religion, strictly in this order. Moreover, since the Chinese system only allows one party to govern, that is the theoretically atheist Communist Party, Chinese patriotism and the support for the ruling party coalesced into one.²²

Nevertheless, this fusion is not an innovation in the several-thousand-year-old country: it has been in existence ever since Chinese history is recorded. Religions have always been allowed but never raised above the state itself, unlike in Europe, as religion has always been a rather personal matter in China, insignificant to the governance. As a multiethnic but basically monocultural empire, rather than a simple country with a single ethnic and religious identity, everything is integrated into and submitted to the state for it to function. Chinese patriotism is not only an explicit love for the country, it is also an implicit support for the Communist Party, and in Chinese state hierarchy, personal matters such as one’s religion may only come after state matters. China is the embodiment of not a communist country, but a multi-millennial collectivist empire. The state philosophy that defines how to govern the country is Confucian – which has not been completely eradicated yet, in spite of the end of imperial dynasties and “Communism”, which in reality has only been a means to gain legitimacy among the people, seize power, and keep the country together –, furthermore, religions such as Buddhism or Taoism have not only served a purpose in state administration – for instance, Buddhist temples conducted censuses –, but have also lived in synergy.

In possession of the above knowledge, one could deduce that Islam is unable to gain more space in China, as Beijing is more than eager to keep religious – and for that matter, each and every – group in line with and subservient to the central government. According to what the Syrian ambassador to China in 2017 said, 4-5,000 Chinese Uighurs may be fighting in various militant groups in Syria.²³ A study conducted in 2016 among volunteers of ISIS’ foreign fighters shows that the Uighur fighters are not seasoned jihadists or veterans of terrorist groups, but new recruits and volunteers, furthermore, given the harsh circumstances of the trip between Syria and Xinjiang, these Uighur fighters are more than likely to have

²¹ “The race card”. *The Economist*, 3 September 2016. <https://www.economist.com/news/china/21706327-leader-troubled-western-province-has-been-replaced-he-will-not-be-missed-its-ethnic>, Accessed on 9 March 2018.

²² “For Allah, China and Marx: theological mix for young imams”. *The Express Tribune*. 23 May 2016. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1108451/allah-china-marx-theological-mix-young-imams/>, Accessed on 9 February 2018.

²³ Blanchard, B. “Syria says up to 5,000 Chinese Uighurs fighting in militant groups”. *Reuters*. 11 May 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-china/syria-says-up-to-5000-chinese-uighurs-fighting-in-militant-groups-idUSKBN1840UP>, Accessed on 18 May 2018.

long-term plans fighting for the Islamic State.²⁴ China's view on terrorism in Xinjiang and the current treatment of the non-pro-Beijing Uighur population might be a driving force behind the motives of Uighurs joining the ranks of ISIS, possibly making the ISIS jihad also partly a fight for an independent East Turkestan in their mind.

OFFICIAL STANDPOINTS

Beijing's political stance on the Muslim world is somewhat bipolar and is a subject to constant change. The Chinese government openly speaks about protecting China's Muslim minority, which only makes up around 1.6% (approximately 23 million) of its current population. The reason behind this could be due to the fact that one of the regions mostly inhabited by Muslims is Xinjiang, where Uighur separatism is active; however, while these activities are labelled acts of terrorism and thus being repressed, the Hui Chinese that make up the majority in Xinjiang do not revolt against the government, and thus are being "favoured". Oases mostly populated by Hui Chinese and pro-Beijing Uighurs, for example Turpan, are being favoured and thus laws regulating Islamic teachings and the education in ethnic languages in schools in Xinjiang are not enforced upon them, unlike in oases like Kashgar where rebellious Uighurs live.²⁵ Tensions between Hui and Uighurs also exist due to the Hui disliking (and sometimes crushing) Uighur separatism, thus it is a conflict of political differences and not religious ones as both are Sunni; they live separately and attend different mosques. Beijing wants to prevent any kinds of separatism in Xinjiang lest it gains independence from China, while also maintaining good relations with Muslim countries, especially in the MENA region.

This could explain why the Chinese government acted as it did when Uighurs and Hui Chinese both protested against the ban and public burnings of a book in 1989: the Uighurs were imprisoned for vandalism whereas Hui Chinese protesters were let go unpunished.²⁶ Another interesting event was when in 2007, during the advent of the Year of the Pig, all kinds of depictions of pigs were banned from state-owned CCTV.²⁷ This was an interesting development in Chinese politics, especially from a historical standpoint: China has always been the "middle" of the world in every way – in Chinese, they even refer to China as the Middle Country –, and everyone else has been considered "barbarian", as in culturally – and not ethnically – not Chinese, even its allies and partners, resulting in interesting diplomatic anecdotes where the Chinese would not welcome an emissary unless they gave them a gift as a form of homage to show that they consider the Chinese superior to them, even if only symbolically. Banning a highly important cultural element in favour of the "barbarian" 1.6%, even if temporarily, is, without a doubt, strange and most likely a decision made solely with political and diplomatic consideration.

Regarding the Israeli situation, China – unlike, among others, Israel, the United States, and the European Union – does not acknowledge the terrorist nature of Hamas, and instead

²⁴ Rosenblatt, N. "All Jihad Is Local – What ISIS' Files Tell Us About Its Fighters". *New America*. 26 July 2016. <https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/ISIS-Files.pdf>, Accessed on 18 May 2018.

²⁵ United States, Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations and US, State Department (eds). *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2004*. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2005. 159–60.

²⁶ Gladney, D. C. *Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

²⁷ Lim, L. "Ban Thwarts 'Year of the Pig' Ads in China". *NPR*. 2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7213210>, Accessed on 9 February 2018.

sees it as a rightful political party that represents the Palestinian people.²⁸ The Sino-Israeli relations ameliorated over the past several decades, in spite of China trying to maintain good relations with both Palestine and Israel, as the Jewish state rose to one of China's biggest trade partners, and now China tries not to lose Israel, as Beijing cannot afford to. But this reliance is mutual: by the end of 2017, China rose to Israel's second biggest investor with the potential to soon overtake the US,²⁹ as well as the fastest growing source of tourists.³⁰

In 2012, Russia and China vetoed a UN resolution to intervene in the Syrian conflict, which garnered tremendous diplomatic outrage by the Arab League and western powers.³¹ In 2015, in response to the Charlie Hebdo shooting, the magazine was attacked by Chinese state-run media for publicly insulting Muhammad, arguing that limitation of freedom of speech is necessary, and also claiming that therefore it comes as no surprise that they were "paid back".³² Hui Muslim religious schools are autonomous and were run by a Hui Sufi leader who openly admitted attending an event where Osama Bin Laden, former leader of Al-Qaeda, also spoke.³³ In April 2017, the Islamic Association of China, run by the government, encouraged new mosques to be built in traditional Chinese architectural design, and to reject the "arabisation" and "desinicisation" of architecture, with its "excessive size and extravagance".³⁴

CONCLUSIONS

Despite its favourable geopolitical location, abundance in much needed resources, such as oil, and its manifold potential, the MENA region suffers from regional instability, which effectively prevents any kind of co-operation between the Middle Eastern and North African countries. Without such a co-operation, their capabilities of any sort of power projection and assertion of interests are severely hindered. Even if one or two countries stood up against China either politically or economically, it would not prompt the other countries to help, on the contrary, they would side with China in order to exploit the situation to their advantage.

The MENA countries are not dominantly present in investments in China or Chinese imports, nor politically, nor culturally. The Middle Eastern countries' current strategy is to turn a blind eye to what happens to the Muslim population in China in order to not sour Sino-MENA relations, which might be effective in the short run, but definitely is not in the long run.

²⁸ Zambelis, C. "China's Palestine Policy". *China Brief* 9/5. 2009. 9–12. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/cb_009_5_04.pdf?x87069, Accessed on 11 May 2018.

²⁹ Schindler, M. "Chinese Investors Flock to Israel for Unlikely Reasons". *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 December 2017. <https://www.jpost.com/Jpost-Tech/Chinese-investors-flock-to-Israel-for-unlikely-reasons-518600>, Accessed on 1 June 2018.

³⁰ Xiang, B. "China remains Israel's fastest growing source of tourists in 2017". Xinhuanet. 23 January 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/23/c_136918314.htm, Accessed on 1 June 2018.

³¹ Logan, J. and Worsnip, P. "Anger after Russia, China block U.N. action on Syria". Reuters. 5 February 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria/anger-after-russia-china-block-u-n-action-on-syria-idUSTRE80S08620120205>, Accessed on 19 April 2018.

³² "Xinwen ziyou yao you xiandu" ("Freedom of press needs to be limited"). Xinhuanet. 11 January 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-01/11/c_1113952852.htm, Accessed on 9 February 2018.

³³ Bovingdon, G. *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013.

³⁴ Leng, S. "Chinese mosques becoming too 'Arab': experts". Global Times. 20 April 2017. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1043274.shtml>, Accessed on 19 April 2018.

Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative appears to be a double-edged sword, as the project's possible future outcome for the MENA countries is still too vague and can only give way to assumption. It would most likely put the Middle East in particular into its focal point, increasing in importance and thus in political power, however, it might just integrate the region into China's area of uncontested power projection.

The MENA region first needs to consolidate its many on-going conflicts, be it religious, economic, or armed conflict, in order to be able to become a more-than-regional player in the world. Furthermore, it needs to be cautious as to not fully rely on one source of foreign capital and trade, involve more countries and possibly attempt to play them against each other, thus preventing or, at the very least, reducing the scale of further foreign exploitation, particularly the possibility of future Chinese exploitation, giving way to the establishment of a MENA-dominated MENA region, before being able to pivot to China.

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Márton Varga:

MALI: REBUILDING A COUNTRY FROM CIVIL WAR

ABSTRACT: Not for the very first time in its history, after the military coup and the rebellion in 2012, the situation of Mali has become uncertain. The country's position on the Fragile States Index¹ has gone through a major increase from the 76th place in 2011 to the 38th in 2013, and the 29th in 2016 out of a total of 178 countries. However, it was neither the coup nor the rebellion of the tribes that generated a crisis. Mali as part of the countries of the Sahel region had to face numerous challenges and these led to the outbreak of the crisis in 2012. Different peacekeeping missions of the European Union and the United Nations needed to deal with the root causes in order to stabilise the country and to bring long-term peace.

KEYWORDS: Mali, peacekeeping, United Nations, European Union, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUTM Mali, MINUSMA

THE SAHEL REGION AND MALI

Mali is one of the central states of the Sahel region, which divides North Africa from the Sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel region is one of the most deprived areas in the world with many risks, challenges, and conflicts. In the region, one can face all the negative effects of the climate change, water scarcity, food crises, demographic changes, radicalisation, terrorism, fragile governance and so on. As a complex region of crisis, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU) handle the region with special care.

As part of the Sahel region Mali bears all marks of the crisis zone. The country was a French colonial territory known as French Sudan from the 19th century. Following a long fight with local tribes, mainly with the Tuaregs, France was able to extend its power. They managed to occupy the city of Timbuktu in 1893, which had always been a key to ruling the northern region of the country. Due to the centralisation of the administration and the power structure along with the harsh treatment of the tribes, the first Tuareg uprising broke out in 1911. The consequences of the French colonial era are visible even up to this date.²

In Mali, the permanent conflicts between the tribes and the all-time governance are only part of the problems. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. Regarding the GDP per capita, in 2016 Mali was the 163th country out of 189.³ The population of Mali has been growing significantly, which, in other words, means a huge demographic challenge with the world's third highest fertility rate of 6 children per woman. But the country also has to face the problems of the health care system and the high level of child, infant and maternity

¹ "Fragile State Index". Fund for Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data/>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

² Klein, M. *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

³ Gregson, J. "The World's Richest and Poorest Countries". Global Finance. 13 February 2017. <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

mortality rate.⁴ The environmental changes, like desertification, also lead to serious dangers and an increasing number of refugees. Based on the latest data of the UN, there are more than 130,000 Malian refugees, from which more than 50,000 are internally displaced people.⁵

COUP, REBELLION, TERRORISM

There were several factors contributing to the disintegration of the Malian State and the process in which the government and the president lost their powers. The social and economic stress and the dissatisfaction with the government led to a coup. In the meantime, the northern tribes – mainly Tuareg ones – started a rebellion. Finally, the extremist and terrorist groups became stronger in the region.

There are numerous factors which led to the coup on 22 March 2012. Since 1992, Mali has held presidential elections every 5 years. After President Alpha Oumar Konaré finishing with his presidency in 2002 under the constitutional limit of presidential terms, Amadou Toumani Touré won the election. According to the international observers' opinion, the election was fair and free, but we need to see that the voter turnout was 38 percent (2,2 million voters) in the first and 30 percent (1,7 million voters) in the second round.⁶ The observers also detected serious systematic irregularities and an inadequate mechanism of transparency during the elections. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court annulled more than 540,000 votes in the first round, and more than 260,000 votes in the second round⁷. We also have to highlight that Konaré considered Touré to be his successor and made his best to help him to victory.

Touré's regime theoretically followed the principle of 'ruling by consensus' but practically, it seemed more like the president having an absolute power. He tried to keep peace in the northern territories by buying off the leaders of the northern tribes. The rule of law and judicial mechanisms were questionable, the court made its decisions in favour of the highest bidder. The international community's aids and the financial resources of the development funds were used ineffectively. There were territorial inequalities in the economic and infrastructural developments, thereby the regional differences kept growing. The educational system of the country was also in a terrible state.⁸

The reasons for the military coup were simple: there was dissatisfaction over the government that failed to serve the country's interests, the political leaders were considered to be netted by corruption, and democracy did not work with the politicians of the time. Following the coup, the legal force of the constitution was suspended and the National Committee for the Rectification of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE – Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l'État) was established. The junta and its leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, were forced by the ECOWAS

⁴ "The World Factbook". CIA. 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

⁵ "Mali Situation". UNHCR. 2018. <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/malisituation>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

⁶ "Election Guide". <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/133/>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

⁷ "Observing the 2002 Mali Presidential Elections: Final Report". The Carter Center. 2002. <https://www.cart-center.org/documents/1107.pdf>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

⁸ Lecocq, B. et al. "One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali: Extended Editors Cut". Universiteit Leiden. <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/lecocq-mann-et-al---one-hippo-8-blind-analysts-editors-cut.pdf>, Accessed on 23 April 2018.

(Economic Community of West African States) and the wider international community to transfer the power to the civilians, and to reinstate the constitution.⁹

That rebellion in 2012 was not the first one after the tribes had lost their freedom against the French colonisation in the 19th century. After an uprising in 1911, the first rebellion of the Tuaregs was between 1914 and 1917 and they wanted to gain independence for Azawad, known as the traditional home territory of Tuaregs.

After the end of the colonial ages, Mali, a newly established state, needed to solve the issue of the subsequent Tuareg rebellion. The inequalities between the northern and the southern territories of the country, the opposition of the nomad and not nomad tribes, the conflict between the Tuaregs and the government – with its socialist economic plans – were all driving the tribes into an uprising.¹⁰ The government decided to use military solutions to end the rebellion. The violent conflict forced thousands of the Tuaregs to move to Algeria and the neighbouring countries.

In the 1970s and 1980s, mainly due to a huge drought hitting the area, migration occurred not only within the territory of Mali, but in the whole region. Many Tuaregs left their homes, moved to the cities and gave up their semi-nomadic lifestyle. The government's promises also influenced migration, and a lot of people moved back to their home country. Unfortunately, many of them came back with military experience after leaving the service of the Islamic Legion of Muammar Gaddafi.¹¹ The futureless crowd was just growing, while the government did not perform well either. Finally, this general discontentment resulted in another revolt at the end of the 1980s.

The rebels learnt a lot about how to fight against the army and, at that time, they also had a lot of Soviet weapons and military equipment. Despite the general dissatisfaction, the rebels could not force all the Tuaregs to take part in the fight. At the same time, many Arabs, Berbers or Moors joined the fight. Harsh military interventions did not go off well in the past, and the international community also urged a peaceful solution. The conflict ended in the so-called Tamanrasset Accord (Accords de Tamanrasset) and the approval of the National Pact (Pacte National) in 1992.

The quiet times lasted until 2006, when a group of Tuaregs attacked military targets. President Amadou Toumani Toure, who played a key role in 1992 to reach peace in Mali, trying to find a peaceful resolution that time as well. Eventually, the opposing forces signed a new agreement in 2009, however, the minority who refused that agreement was defeated by military forces.

After the short summary of the history of the Tuareg rebellions, it can be stated that the conflict between the tribes and the all-time government seems to be endless and the leaders of the country made the same mistakes over and over again since the French colonisation. The peace processes and promises, the differences between the northern and southern regions, the political and societal integration of the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes could not bring enough changes after the rebellions, for solving the discontentment of the peripheral areas.¹²

⁹ Lecocq et al. "One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts..."

¹⁰ "Tuareg-Mali - 1962-1964". Global Security. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tuareg-mali-1962.htm>, Accessed on 6 October 2016.

¹¹ Westenfelder, F. "The Islamic Legion: Gaddafi's former Mercenaries". Soldiers of Misfortune. <http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/islamic-legion.htm>, Accessed on 6 October 2016.

¹² Besenyő, J. and Miletics, P. *Mali – Országismertető*. Budapest: Magyar Honvédség Geoinformációs Szolgálat, 2013.

The Arab spring and the political changes in the neighbouring countries, especially in Libya, had a major effect on the political stability of Mali. After the fall of Gaddafi, in 2011 the former Tuareg members of the Libyan army returned to the country with a notable number of weapons.¹³ At the beginning of 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA – Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad) started attacking and occupied the cities of Ménaka and Aguelhok. The rebels’ success was indirectly assisted by the coup since it was backed up by the terrorist groups.

In the peripheral areas these terrorist groups could benefit from the weakness of the state. On the one hand, they used the social insecurity to link with the local people.¹⁴ On the other hand, with the high corruption in the region, they could run their businesses without any difficulties. The Sahel region and Mali have been a key route of illegal trafficking for decades, which can be a major source of terrorists.

For example, AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) settled down in this region and has been running a very effective and profitable activity. AQIM was created from an originally Algerian group named GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) in 2007, when they united with Al-Qaeda. Their main activities are trafficking in illegal goods (e.g. drugs, arms, humans), kidnapping for ransom, or taxing goods of other traders. But at the same time, AQIM managed to infiltrate into local communities through trading with them, making partnerships, and members marrying local clans’ women.¹⁵ Thus, it was clearly the terrorist groups’ main interest in 2012 to maintain uncertainty in the northern territories.

It is not only AQIM, which joined the Tuaregs, but Ansar Dine, or the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) need to be mentioned as well.¹⁶ After the first results, the different objectives of the rebels and the terrorists became obvious. The Tuaregs wanted to liberate their ancient territory Azawad, which includes mainly the north of Mali. Ansar Dine wanted to rule the whole country, doing so in the name of Allah and being based on the Shari’a. AQIM wanted to keep up their businesses and to inhibit the establishment of a strong government capable of controlling the whole country.

In March 2012, the rebels only needed a few days to occupy the northern region’s biggest cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. The next months, the balance of power among rebel groups changed, and the Islamist groups marginalised the MNLA. In this way the Tuaregs lost their main motivation, and as it was most expected Ansar Dine took the lead of the rebellion.¹⁷

THE INTERVENTION

The international community, especially France, the USA and the UN could not reach consensus on the nature of the conflict in Mali since it was not clear whether the conflict

¹³ Besenyő, J. and Marsai, V. *Libia – Országismertető*. Székesfehérvár: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, 2012.

¹⁴ Varga, M. “Társadalmi biztonság a terrorizmus árnyékában”. *Hadtudomány* 27/1–2. 2017. 127–37. http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2017/2017_1-2/HT_2017_127-137.pdf.

¹⁵ Cooke, J. G. et al. *Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel*. Lanham, Washington: Rowman and Littlefield–Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160922_Sanderson_MilitancyArcInstabilitySahel_Web.pdf,

¹⁶ Cooke et al. *Militancy and the Arc of Instability*.

¹⁷ Marsai, V. “Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban: az Opération Serval háttere és eredménye”. *Nemzet és Biztonság* 6/1–2. 2013. 99–119.

is an act of terrorism, a civil war, or a state collapse issue.¹⁸ Moreover, it was hard for the international actors to make a decision about what kind of intervention is required, which actor has to intervene and when.

The UN was in favour of some kind of African interventional force, for example a mission led by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) which had already had missionary experience. The western countries and the EU had been under the influence of the former Libyan events. However, it was clear that ECOWAS did not have the necessary capabilities in the field of transportation, intelligence, armoured vehicles and aircraft, thus they would need help to fill these shortages.¹⁹ The situation was hard for everyone, because after the intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan, the western countries did not want to send combat units to Mali. The EU started to work out a mission plan, but its mandate in Mali would have been simply to train and support.²⁰ Due to the growing strength of the terrorist groups, the attitude started to change. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius highlighted that an Islamist change in Mali would not only be a problem for Mali and Africa but would also pose a threat to Europe.²¹ By this statement France defined the next steps and decided the later intervention.

On 20 December 2012, the UN implemented the Security Council Resolution 2085, wherein ECOWAS was given permission to start an operation in Mali called African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The mandate of AFISMA included the training of Malian troops, support for the army to retake and stabilise the northern territories, to increase security, and to defend the civilians and humanitarian organisations.²² At the beginning of 2013, the situation varied while the terrorists started a new offensive and occupied the cities of Konna and Mopti. From such a position, they were able to attack Ségou, an important city to reach the capital Bamako, and, more importantly, a city having one of the two most important airports where heavy aircraft are able to land. These actions changed the attitude and the opinion of the international community as AFISMA seemed to be deployable in the middle of 2013. President Traoré asked for immediate help from the UN and France.²³

President Hollande announced Operation Serval²⁴ on 11 January 2011. The main goals of that mission were firstly to stop the offensives of the terrorist groups and to ensure the protection of the southern country, secondly to destroy and disorganise the terrorists, thirdly to restore sovereignty and the territory of Mali and to preserve the state of Mali this way,

¹⁸ Charbonneau, B. "Intervention in Mali: building peace between peacekeeping and counter terrorism". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35/4. 2017. 415–31. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2017.1363383>,

¹⁹ Marsai. "Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban..."

²⁰ Lindsey, D. "Germany 'Will Not Be Able to Ignore EU's Call' to Mali". *Spiegel Online*, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-press-review-on-calls-for-eu-intervention-in-mali-a-863136.html>, Accessed on 1 May 2018.

²¹ Pham, J. P. "Mali: 'The Challenges of Mali'". AllAfrica. 2012. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201212041631.html>, Accessed on 1 May 2018.

²² United Nations Security Council. "Resolution Nr. 2085". 20 December 2012. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%20%282012%29, Accessed on 1 May 2018.

²³ "Mali asks for help from France as Islamist rebels push forward". *The Telegraph*, 2013. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9794871/Mali-asks-for-help-from-France-as-Islamist-rebels-push-forward.html>, Accessed on 1 May 2018.

²⁴ "Opération Serval (dossier actualisé)". Ministère des Armées. 2013. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/dossiers/operation-serval/operation-serval-dossier-actualise/presentation>, Accessed on 10 May 2018.

then to prepare the deployment of international forces; and finally, of course, to rescue hostages, especially the French.²⁵ As we can see, Operation Serval was not the instrument of a political solution, but it meant an essential assistance until other international actors could start their activities.²⁶

When the operation started, France did not have any forces in Mali, but they had them in the region, so they could easily mobilise forces to take part in the intervention. Soldiers of the foreign legion, both airborne and marine, arrived from Chad and Ivory Coast, and interventional forces came from France through Senegal. In the meantime, the bombing campaign started. France was supported in the field of logistics and transportation by the USA, Great-Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy, UAE, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark, and²⁷ in the field of surveillance, reconnaissance and special capabilities by Great Britain and the USA. The French intervention was very efficient and could achieve rapid success. Operation Serval ended in July 2014 and was replaced by Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism mission.²⁸

Operation Serval did not have the aim to build up a new political system, or to maintain security in Mali either, but to stop and crush the terrorists. At the same time, in order to rebuild the state of Mali, to train the Malian army, and to secure the region it was necessary for the international community to make further efforts.

THE UNITED NATIONS

On seeing that AFISMA, led by ECOWAS, was not able to contribute to sustainable peace in Mali, the UN decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The second step to be made towards a functioning state in Mali had to be the restoration of the political system and the reconstruction of the state itself. The UN, through Resolution 2100²⁹ and the establishment of MINUSMA, aimed to support the transitional authorities of Mali by all necessary means. The UN mission is also responsible to help the authorities to bring war criminals to justice and to promote and protect human rights.³⁰

In 2013, the UN decided that MINUSMA should consist of 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel. Currently, more than 15,000 people are working in the mission including civilians, volunteers, experts and the military and police personnel. The mission's approved annual budget between July 2017 and June 2018 was more than USD 1 billion.³¹

²⁵ "Compte rendu n° 74". Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées. 22 May 2013. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213074.asp#P7_246, Accessed on 10 May 2018.

²⁶ Charbonneau, B. "De Serval à Barkhane: Les problèmes de la guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel". *Les Temps Modernes* 72/2. 2017. 322–40.

²⁷ Besenyő and Miletics. *Mali*.

²⁸ "Opération Barkhane". Ministre des Armées. 2017. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/operations/sahel/dossier-de-presentation-de-l-operation-barkhane/operation-barkhane>, Accessed on 10 May 2018.

²⁹ United Nations Security Council. "Resolution Nr. 2100". 25 April 2013. https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pdf, Accessed on 11 May 2018.

³⁰ United Nations Security Council. "Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)". 2013. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10987.doc.htm>, Accessed on 11 May 2018.

³¹ "MINUSMA Fact Sheet". United Nations Peacekeeping. 2013. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>, Accessed on 12 May 2018.

With these numbers, MINUSMA is one of the biggest UN Missions.³²In addition, this is one of the most dangerous missions as well.³³

While looking for a long-term solution, the UN emphasises the importance of a regional approach. For this reason, the organisation has created the Integrated Strategy for the Sahel³⁴ and they are working continuously on it to find solutions to the root causes of the regional crisis.³⁵

To build a comprehensive approach does not only mean to follow a regional strategy. The UN, as it is seen from its practice specified as follows, tried to involve as many actors as possible. In Resolution 2100, the African Union, the European Union and ECOWAS are all mentioned as actors of the peace process. The UN also called upon the rebel groups to cooperate with the authorities and to cut off ties with the terrorists, especially with AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine. In 2014, the UN Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for the Sahel, who was responsible for coordinating the national, regional, and international cooperation.³⁶ In order to achieve greater efficiency, the UN merged the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel and the United Nations Office for West Africa, and also set up the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). The new office centralised the functions of the predecessors, and tightened cooperation among the states of the Sahel, West Africa and the international organisations.³⁷

For building lasting peace not only in Mali but in the entire Sahel, it is crucial that the countries of the region take part in this process too. At the end of 2014, five countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad) of the Sahel founded G5 Sahel. This group aimed to deepen cooperation in the fields of economy, development, good governance, democracy and security. Strong cooperation might play a major role in the relations of these countries, because of the interdependency among them.³⁸

THE EUROPEAN UNION

After the risks and dangers of the region were successfully identified, the European Union created its strategy for the Sahel by 2011. The so-called Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel³⁹ became the main framework to the EU and the member states for supporting

³² Mbamalu, S. "The largest and most expensive UN Peacekeeping Missions are in Africa". This is Africa. 2017. <https://thisisafrika.me/peacekeeping-missions-africa/>, Accessed on 12 May 2018.

³³ Sieff, K. "The world's most dangerous U. N. mission". *The Washington Post*, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.bbd69cf3a9b9, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁴ "United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel". United Nations. 2013. https://oses.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/united_nations_integrated_strategy_for_the_sahel_s-2013-354.pdf, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁵ "Revamped UN strategy aims to address root causes of Sahel crisis". UN. 2018. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1006191>, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁶ "Background". Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. <https://oses.unmissions.org/background>, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁷ "Background". United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. <https://unowas.unmissions.org/background>, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁸ "Le G5 Sahel". Secreteriat Permanent de G5 Sahel. 2015. <http://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/qui-sommes-nous/le-g5-sahel>, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

³⁹ "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel". European Union External Action Service. 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3947/strategy-security-and-development-sahel_en, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

security and development in the Sahel-Sahara region. In 2014, the range of the Sahel Strategy was expanded as besides Mali, Mauritania and Niger Chad and Burkina Faso also joined it.

In 2013, based on the request of Mali and UN Security Council Resolution 2085 the EU started their first mission in Mali. The EU military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) has been operating since 2013. After the strategic reviews of the mission in 2016 and 2018, its mandate was extended by the Council until 18 May 2020.⁴⁰ EUTM Mali does not take part in combat activities as their task is to train, advice, and educate the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF). At the end of the mission, the MaAF has to be able to maintain the territorial integrity of Mali, to reduce the threat of terrorist groups, and to protect the population.⁴¹ With the extended mandate from 2018, advice and training support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force will also be part of the mission.

After the request of Mali, on 19 March 2014 the Council of the European Union decided to establish a civil mission as well in Mali, called EUCAP Sahel Mali. The EU could build upon the similar ongoing civilian mission, EUCAP Sahel Niger. In this mission the EU is working together with Malian internal security forces (police, gendarmerie, national guards). The main objectives and tasks are to support these forces to be able to restore and maintain the constitutional and democratic order, and State authority and legitimacy in the whole country.⁴²

The EU is present not only in the region with EUTM Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Mali but it is also involved in other partnerships, for example with G5 Sahel, and the African Union. It is also one of the largest contributors of humanitarian aid to the Sahel. The EU is supporting the countries of the Sahel via the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.⁴³

CONCLUSIONS

As the end of this research is being approached, it is time to look at the findings of the study and some likely further development areas.

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the conflict in Mali is not only a problem for Mali itself, but also a threat to the neighbouring countries, therefore the region, and also to the European Union. After the interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya it became obvious, that we have to think in regional terms in every single case, because without such a regional approach, any intervention in any country will be a security threat to others. The intervention in Iraq affected Syria, or the fall of the regime in Libya influenced the security of Mali. From this point, it has been vital that the members of G5 Sahel realise the necessity of the cooperation.

⁴⁰ "EU training mission in Mali: Council extends mission for two years with broadened mandate to include support for G5 Sahel Joint Force". Council of the European Union. 2018. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/14/eu-training-mission-in-mali-council-extends-mission-for-two-years-with-broadened-mandate-to-include-support-for-g5-sahel-joint-force/>, Accessed on 19 May 2018.

⁴¹ "About Us". EUTM Mali. <http://eutmmali.eu/en/about-us/>, Accessed on 20 May 2018.

⁴² "Council Decision on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)". Council of the European Union. 19 March 2014. <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7465-2014-INIT/en/pdf>, Accessed on 20 May 2018.

⁴³ "The European Union and the Sahel: factsheet". European Union External Action Service. 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4099/The%20European%20Union%20and%20the%20Sahel,%20fact%20sheet, Accessed on 20 May 2018.

We can also state that the comprehensive approach is essential to find long-term solutions to conflicts. This study largely concerns with exploring the conflict in Mali, where we show that the different actors seek to share the tasks between each other and separate the actions with clear mandates. By examining the root causes of the conflict of Mali, it is difficult to arrive to a conclusion other than the regional approach that has to be strengthened. It can be also concluded that the cross-border tribal territories and the nomadic lifestyle, the activity of the terrorist groups, and the effects of environmental changes are all influencing the countries in the region.

Another very important experience we gained in 2012 is that the response capabilities of the international community are still inefficient. Despite the failures in former crises, the different strategies of the organisations or the countries or the principles, it took nearly one year for the international actors to make decisions, to start the intervention, and to try to stop the conflict. This allows the conclusion that the UN should regulate clearly and obviously what kind of conflicts grant the rights for the international community to intervene. It would be also desirable to establish the regional organisations' (e.g. NATO, EU, African Union) interventional capabilities and the decision-making processes wherewith they can solve conflicts in a fast and efficient way.

Five years after the intervention started, we still cannot declare that there is peace in Mali, however, the government and the Tuareg tribes signed a peace agreement (*Accord Pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali*⁴⁴) in 2015. Nowadays, Malian forces, the UN, the EU, and the French forces are working together with Tuareg tribes. Despite the international cooperation and territorial losses, the attacks by the terrorist groups are still continuous. The terrorists are trying to stir up violent conflicts among the tribes and maintain the opposition as long as they can.⁴⁵ It seems to be a long time until real peace reaches Mali. This is no small task, and it will challenge policy makers and executive forces alike.

This study does not pretend to provide the answer to this challenge, but it hopefully provides readers with a deeper understanding of the region, so that they can better address this issue.

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⁴⁴ “Accord pour la Paix et la réconciliation au Mali – Issu du processus d’Alger”. 2015. <http://maliactu.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ACCORD-POUR-LA-PAIX-ET-DE-RECONCILIATION-AU-MALI-1.pdf>, Accessed on 20 May 2018.

⁴⁵ Csurgó, D. “Dzsihadisták végeztek 40 civillel Maliban”. *Index*, April 29, 2018. https://index.hu/kulfold/2018/04/29/dzsihadistak_tamadas_mali/, Accessed on 20 May 2018.

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Zoltán Prantner–András Kocsor:

A CASE STUDY OF THE RIVALRY OF TERROR-ORGANIZATIONS: AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA VS. DAESH IN YEMEN¹

ABSTRACT: A sharp rivalry evolved in Yemen when Daesh gained foothold in the Arab country. Namely, Yemen was the stronghold of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for a long time and the most effective branch of the international al-Qaeda network got a new dangerous concurrent on its own territory. Daesh proved to be successful and raised its popularity among the local radicals due to its brutal campaign against Shias. However, it seems nowadays that AQAP would be the final winner in this deadly competition due to its strength, influence as well as its more flexible and adaptive strategy.

KEYWORDS: Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Daesh, terrorism

The second civil war, which has been raging across Yemen to this day, gave the followers of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS; ISIL; IS; Daesh) a long-awaited opportunity to gain a foothold in the chaos-stricken country. Although experts believe that the number of extremists could hardly be over a few hundred, attacks against the Zaydi Shia group of Houthis highly increased their influence in the region.

But their popularity and accomplishments threatened not only the integrity of the Arabian Peninsula but put the positions of a different terrorist group, putting al-Qaeda at risk. After separating their ways, the two organizations were forced to wage war against Yemen's regular troops, the Western powers, and now each other. In spite of al-Qaeda's several thousand fighters and significantly superior agency, Daesh's lesser establishment could prevail due to its more spectacular and bloody attacks. This raises the question, how the Islamic State could infiltrate Yemen, while it is still viewed as al-Qaeda's exclusive playground.

THE FOUNDING AND ACTIVITIES OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was founded in January 2009 by combining the Yemeni and Saudi wings of the international terrorist organization with the firm intention of stepping out of the region of Saudi Arabia and extend its operational area to the US sphere of influence. Over the years it proved to be one of the most active parts of the al-Qaeda network, and it has been associated with a large number of terror attacks and outrages in the aggregate. The first terror plot linked to al-Qaeda took place on 1 June, 2009 in Little Rock, Arkansas, USA, where Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe

¹ Revised and updated version of the article published originally as "Az al-Kaida és az ISIL rivalizálása Jemenben". *Mediterrán Világ* 33–34. 2015. 143–156.

after he converted to Islam) opened fire at a couple of soldiers waiting in front of a recruiting office.² In that same year, on December 25 Omar Faruk Abdulmutallab attached a bomb to his body and tried to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit mid air.³ The following year they attempted to carry out attacks against Western interests by planting explosives on various cargo planes. On 3 September 2010 a UPS flight crashed, 45 minutes after takeoff from Dubai International Airport. On 29 October two, 300-400-gram bombs were discovered by the security organizations of the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. Both of them were sent from Yemen and addressed to two different synagogues in Chicago.⁴ The next month, AQAP's new strategy, called 'Operation Hemorrhage', was published online. The concept was to abandon attempts on large and spectacular attacks. Instead, the "strategy of a thousand cuts" embraced smaller-scale actions against American interests in order to 'bleed the enemy to death' and keep it under constant pressure. Causing damage was not the main idea. The goal was to create panic in the masses, and to increase the already high security costs at the expense of the US economy even further.⁵

After the Arab Spring, in May 2011, terrorists took advantage of the riots and chaos in Yemen, and managed to occupy several strategically important territories in the Southern governorate of Abyan, and an Islamist Emirate was created in the region. Their spectacular sweep was the consequence of the internal anarchy in Yemen and the terrorists' more pragmatic point of view when they kept respect the local traditions, made allies with Sunni tribes as well as anti-Houthi and anti-Saleh groups. They also infiltrated local militias and embedded themselves in a political economy of smuggling and trade that spanned the various fighting factions. With the help of former commanders of the overthrown Saleh-regime, AQAP could easily gain possession of the capital of the governorate, Zinjibar which was quickly plundered and destroyed. However, successes proved to be temporary. Between May and June 2012, the government forces with the support of the tribal militias launched an offensive against the terrorists, in which they recaptured a few cities that had been heavily undermined before evacuation. Despite these smaller victories and the involvement of the US that was wider than ever the terrorist threat did not reduce. Although suffered many major hits, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was still able not only to make up for the losses, but – according to a message between Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri and Nasir Abdel Karim al-Wuhayshi, intercepted at the end of July 2013 – ambitiously planned to attack 19 US embassies across the Middle East.⁶ Most recently al-Qaeda claimed responsibility

² The assassin who killing a private in the attack and wounding another, later claimed that he was a member of al-Qaeda. Dao, J. "A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions". *The New York Times*, 16 February 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html?_r=0, Accessed on 8 December 2017.

³ The terrorist organization has claimed responsibility for the failed attack after admitting that the plastic explosive device also came from them. "Detroit terror attack: al-Qaeda regional group claims responsibility". *The Telegraph*, 28 December 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6901918/Detroit-terror-attack-al-Qaeda-regional-group-claims-responsibility.html>, Accessed on 8 December 2017.

⁴ "Yemen-based al Qaeda group claims responsibility for parcel bomb plot". CNN. 6 November 2010. <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/05/yemen.security.concern/>, Accessed on 8 December 2017.

⁵ "Yemen group vows small-scale attacks". CBC News. 21 November 2010. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-group-vows-small-scale-attacks-1.929698>, Accessed on 8 December 2017.

⁶ Gorman, S. "Al Qaeda Yemen Branch Plan Prompted U.S. Terror Alert". *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 August 2013. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323838204579001153325427902>, Accessed on 8 December 2017.

for the assault of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo where two French citizens of Algerian descent killed 12 civilians and wounded another 11.⁷

THE FORMING OF DAESH

The predecessor of the organization was founded by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 under the name of Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (meaning: Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Zarqawi's organization rapidly became one of the most active Islamist groups, which gained international fame by fighting against the coalition forces and suicide bombings often demanding local civilian victims. They even attracted the interest of Osama bin Laden, and in spite of many disagreements, Zarqawi swore allegiance to al-Qaeda after an eight-month negotiation in October 2004. After the official accession to the al-Qaeda the group was renamed to Tanzīm Qā'idat al-Jihād fī Bilād ar-Rāfidayn (TQJBR – Organization of Mesopotamian Jihadists), which unofficially was referred to as 'al-Qaeda in Iraq' for many years after that. After some time, because of ideological differences but mainly due to the deepening conflicts around the methods in use, al-Zarqawi tried to gain independence from the international al-Qaeda network and set up a rival organization. As a first step in January 2006, the TQJBR and five other local insurgent groups united and established the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). However, these efforts could not become a reality, because on 7 June 2006 Al-Zarqawi lost his life in a US air strike. His successor, the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri, to increase the number of Iraqis within the MSC, to unify the resistance and last but not least to raise awareness in the international Jihadist community, convinced even more rebel groups to join on 12th of October 2006. The next day the creation of Dawlat al-Irāq al-Islāmiyyah (Islamic State of Iraq) was announced and the leadership was given to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Nevertheless, contrary to prior expectations, the new organization did not live up to expectations. By 2010, they virtually lost every connection to the international al-Qaeda network, thousands of their members were imprisoned by the coalition forces, and the rest were hunted by local Sunni mercenaries. In April 2010, al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed during a joint US-Iraqi raid. The new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had to take over an organization that was undoubtedly on the edge of disintegration.⁸

The withdrawal of coalition forces has put an end to the terrorist organization's decline in December 2011. Through 2012, increasingly lenient security measures and the deepening Sunni-Shia conflict breathed new life into the group that took full advantage of the new situation. After the outbreak of civil war in Syria they extended their area of operation over the neighboring state. Al-Baghdadi created a new organization, the Jabhat al-Nusra (The Support Front) and quickly united the two groups, despite Ayman al-Zawahiri's aversions. Thus The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-Irāq wa-sh-Shām) was born. Al-Zawahiri refused this decision. He still viewed al-Nusra as the Syrian wing of al-Qaeda, and wanted to limit the Iraqi division agency exclusively to his homeland. Since al-Baghdadi dismissed this notion, and all attempts of reconciliation failed miserably,

⁷ Vick, K. "Al-Qaeda Group Claims Responsibility for Paris Terror Attack". *Time*, 9 January 2015. <http://time.com/3661650/charlie-hebdo-paris-terror-attack-al-qaeda/>, Accessed on 9 December 2017.

⁸ Zelin, A. Y. "The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement". *Research Notes – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 20. 2014. 1–11. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf, Accessed on 15 December 2017.

al-Zawahiri broke off all official relations with Daesh. After the announcement, the terrorist organization retained its name and continued to increase its influence in the two States involved.⁹

But the new name has been subject of controversy ever since, because the term Levant can refer not only to Syria, but in a broader sense to the Eastern Mediterranean regions between Anatolia and Egypt. All those who wanted to resolve this contradiction, use the expressions: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). But the argument was brought up that its abbreviation is a popular woman's name in the West and also the name of the Egyptian goddess of magic and fertility.¹⁰

On 29 June 2014, after occupying massive areas and gaining bigger and bigger influence in both Syria and Iraq, the group took up the more simplified name of "Islamic State" which, they use till today. They proclaimed the foundation of a new caliphate under the leadership of 'Caliph Ibrahim', and called on the Muslims worldwide to vow allegiance to the new state.¹¹

THE EMERGENCE AND ENERGIZATION OF THE 'ISLAMIC STATE' IN YEMEN

In response to the call of al-Baghdadi, many jihadist groups had assured him of their loyalty to the Islamic State worldwide. These terrorists were concentrated in the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. They were mainly veterans and volunteers of Daesh returning home in an increasing number from Iraqi and Syrian battlegrounds. Most of them had ties to al-Qaeda, however, with the decline of prestige of the international terrorist network, they turned to Daesh which offered more spectacular successes and achievements.¹²

The areas that had a unified leadership or at least a well functioning organization pledged allegiance to the terrorist network were declared as parts of the Islamic Caliphate. Regardless of geographic distance provinces were created in these regions, reassured of support if the terrorists operating there proposed a governor acceptable to Daesh, set up a Shura Council and an effective strategy to maintain, perhaps expand the area in question, and showed will-

⁹ "The Islamic State". Stanford University: Mapping Militant Organizations Project. 23 January 2015. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1>, Accessed on 15 December 2017.

¹⁰ Kalmár Z. "Az Iszlám Állam államszervezete". In Ferwagner Á., Garaczi I. and Kalmár Z. (eds), *Mediterrán Perspektívák*. Budapest: Stratégiai Kutatóintézet, 2015. 96.

¹¹ The choice of name and concept of the caliphate caused serious outrage around the world. The name "Islamic State" is consistently refused by the UN, many governments and most of the Muslim community. Instead, Arabic-speaking critics continues to use the acronym Daesh. But this is firmly rejected by the members of the terrorist organization, for a number of reasons. The main issue is that the abbreviation does not contain the term Islam. Plus the word can remind one of the terms 'Dahes' (meaning: someone who sows discord or worrying) and 'Da'es' (meaning: someone who crushes something underfoot or to suppress). Pizzi, M. "In declaring a caliphate, Islamic State draws a line in the sand". *Al-Jazeera America*, 30 June 2014. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/30/islamic-state-caliphate.html>, Accessed on 15 December 2017.; Randall, C. "Why does a simple word like Daesh disturb extremists so much?". *The National*, 18 October 2014. <http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-does-a-simple-word-like-daesh-disturb-extremists-so-much>, Accessed on 15 December 2017.

¹² These proclamations, however, meant merely verbal commitment, because these groups were only aiming for notoriety and recognizability in the eyes of the wider public. In fact, there was no actual working relationship between them and the Islamic State.

ingness to adapt the Islamic State's interpretation of Sharia law.¹³ In February 2015, Daesh has already brought 24 provinces under its control across Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen.¹⁴

The Islamic State started to infiltrate into Yemeni soil to exploit the deepening security void and the favourable sectarian dynamics after the Houthis, Zaydi Shia rebels occupied the capital and subsequently much of the country in 2014. The first jihadists pledged their allegiance to al-Baghdadi in September, which was accepted by the terrorist leader on 13 November.¹⁵ This time the Caliph announced the emergence of Wilayat al-Yemen and – according to reports and rumours – appointed a Saudi citizen, a certain Abu Bilal al-Harbi as its wali.¹⁶ Over the course of just a year Daesh managed to raise the number of its followers from 80 all the way up to nearly 300 who were mostly local volunteers in contrast to the high number of foreign fighters on the Syria–Iraqi front.¹⁷ Their successes in Iraq, Syria and Libya had an indisputable role in this rapid growth, not to mention an intensive recruitment campaign, financed by various, significant resources. According to Yemeni officials, the group was already present in the lowest estimate three provinces of the country's central and southern parts as early as January 2015. Seeing the efforts of Daesh, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula naturally tried to fix a bar against the rival terrorist organization, since it still considered Yemen as its own private turf. The rivalry for financial resources, weaponry, and volunteers, degenerated into armed clashes in December 2014 when the members of the two organizations fought each other in the eastern provinces of the country.¹⁸ However, steps taken to eliminate Daesh proved to be unsuccessful. The decline of al-Qaeda's authority became clear when several members of the Salafist militia, Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law) posted a message on Twitter, announcing their break-off from Ayman al-Zawahiri, and lining up behind the Islamic State.¹⁹ After the accession of his newest followers, al-Baghdadi set a number of goals, accommodated to the specific political and religious situation of Yemen, in addition to the already existing general governing principles. On the one hand, his directives also urged taking serious actions against Houthis who disbanded parliament on 7 February 2015, seized power, and launched a general offensive against the ousted president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his supporters. Then again, he also declared fight against

¹³ Masi, A. "How The ISIS Allegiance Application Process Works For Groups Joining The 'Caliphate', Like Boko Haram". *International Business Times*, 12 March 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.com/how-isis-allegiance-application-process-works-groups-joining-caliphate-boko-haram-1845560>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

¹⁴ Gambhir, H. "ISIS Global Intelligence Summary, 7 January–8 February 2015". Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/INTSUM_Summary_update.pdf, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

¹⁵ Cruickshank, P. "Al Qaeda in Yemen rebukes ISIS". CNN. 21 November 2014. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/meast/al-qaeda-yemen-isis/>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

¹⁶ Johnsen, G. D. "This Man is the Leader in ISIS's Recruiting War against Al-Qaeda in Yemen". BuzzFeed. 6 December 2015. https://www.buzzfeed.com/gregoryjohnsen/this-man-is-the-leader-in-isis-recruiting-war-against-al-qaer?utm_term=.ftGdNGoVP#.xw7mE5PZM, Accessed on 9 January 2018.

¹⁷ Aboudi, S. "In Yemen chaos, Islamic State grows to rival al Qaeda". Reuters. 30 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/us-yemen-security-islamicstate-insight-idUSKCN0PAIT920150630>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

¹⁸ Todd, B. "ISIS gaining ground in Yemen, competing with al Qaeda". CNN. 22 January 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/21/politics/isis-gaining-ground-in-yemen/>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

¹⁹ Al-Sayagh, M. "Al-Qaeda Supporters in Yemen 'Pledge Allegiance to Islamic State'". *Newsweek*, 11 February 2015. <http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-supporters-yemen-pledge-allegiance-islamic-state-306058>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

the central, generally secular regime, regarded as having abandoned and therefore betrayed Islam, and as cooperating with Sadi Arabia and the Western countries.

The first spectacular show of power of Daesh's Yemeni branch occurred on 3 March 2015, when 200 local volunteers of the terror-organization demonstrated on the street of al-Hawtah, capital of Lahij governorate, carrying signs, waving Daesh flags, and calling on residents to swear allegiance to the organization. They also distributed leaflets by the roadside, informing the Sunni inhabitants that they were about to fight the Houthis.²⁰ For proving their determination, four terrorists blew themselves up at two crowded Shi'a mosques in the capital on 20 March 2015. The incident demanded the lives of at least 142 people and wounded about 350.²¹ The buzz around these attacks and the southern offensive launched by the Houthis in late March encouraged more and more groups to continue the fight alongside Daesh, instead of al-Qaeda. In April, the founding of a Governorate between the cities of Taiz and Ibb was unofficially announced by the Daesh-friendly group Green Brigade. According to unconfirmed information, 22 activists of this very same group were responsible for the attack carried out against a Houthi convoy, and the killing of five militiamen near the city of Yarim.²² Two days later the formation of the 'Sana'a province' was officially announced on Twitter through a nine-minute video message, in which two dozen fully armed terrorists can be seen during training, somewhere in the desert close to the capital.²³ Their numbers and influence grew dramatically in a short time. There were at least eight known sub-wilayats active in Yemen as of 2015, and every sub-province was headed by a commander, known as the Emir, who had a deputy. The two headed a hierarchical military chain of command and conducted Daesh's military operations, namely frequently attacking military checkpoints by mortarfire or ambushing Houthi patrols, and customarily carried out abductions of members of the Yemeni army and its security forces, and of Houthi rebels. Some of the abducted soldiers and militants had been executed in a variety of barbaric ways, like beheading, shooting in the head, beating to death, shooting with mortar shells, detonating mortar shells attached to their bodies and having their heads crushed with rocks.²⁴ On 17 June, the beginning of the month of Ramadan, coordinated car-bomb assaults, similar to previous ones were committed against three Shia mosques, and a Houthi political office. Approximately 50 people were killed or wounded during the attacks.²⁵ Three days later, another bomb exploded near a Shia

²⁰ "The ISIS Branch in Yemen and Its Role in the Power Struggles". Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Center. 11 December 2016. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_21106/E_156_16_1336461923.pdf, Accessed on 5 January 2018.

²¹ "Death toll hits 142 from attacks in Yemen mosques". Al-Bawaba News. 20 March 2015. <http://www.albawaba.com/news/two-mosques-yemen-attacked-suicide-bombers-during-friday-prayers-many-injured-671470>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

²² O'Keefe, D. "2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: April 23". AEI's Critical Threats. 23 April 2015. <http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation-reports-april-23-2015>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

²³ "'We've arrived': ISIS wing in Yemen releases first video, threatens Houthis". RT, 25 April 2015. <https://www.rt.com/news/253029-isis-yemen-houthi-sanaa/>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

²⁴ Koontz, J. "Desknote: The Growing Threat of ISIS in Yemen". AEI's Critical Threats. 6 May 2015. <http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/koontz-desknote-growing-threat-isis-in-yemen-may-6-2015>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

²⁵ Ghobari, M. and Sukhtian, L. "Islamic State car bombs kill or injure 50 in Yemeni capital". Reuters. 18 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/18/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0OX0KQ20150618>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

place of worship, which claimed two lives and injured 16 others.²⁶ On June 28, two Houthi leaders and their families gathered to grieve one of their relatives, when a bomb went off. The action killed at least 28 people, including eight women.²⁷

The remarkable activity of Daesh motivated even more al-Qaeda-members to leave. Among the prominent sympathizers were senior commander of AQAP Mamoun Abdulhamid Hatem, who was killed in May 2015, and influential AQAP religious scholar Sheikh Abdul Majid bin Mahmoud al-Hitari al-Raymi. Probably the most controversial of all was the conversion of Jalal Baleedi al-Marqishi, who was killed in an American drone strike in Abyan Province, on 6 February 2016. One of the most prominent leaders within the circles of Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen, Baleidi gained his reputation by the capturing and slaughtering of several soldiers on leave in 2014. According to leaked tribal and military intelligence, he and many of his men joined al-Baghdadi due to the split in the ranks of Ansar al-Sharia at the end of June 2015, and quickly formed a training camp – the Sheikh Anas al-Nashwan camp – in the abandoned province of Hadhramaut, near the Saudi border.²⁸

THE ISLAMIC STATE’S SECRET OF SUCCESS IN YEMEN

The rapid forging ahead of Daesh was the consequence of multiple complex reasons and unfavorable circumstances. Perhaps the most important ones are the ruthless executions of imprisoned Yemeni soldiers and the increasingly frequent attacks on the Zaydi Shia Houthis. The al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was unable to organize and execute similar scaled actions during this period. This was because al-Qaeda placed emphasis on fighting against governmental forces and other armed groups all along trying to minimize civilian casualties. On the other hand, for the Yemeni branch of Islamic State it was considered not only natural, but also an upright requirement to polarize religious diversification, namely attacking and killing all of the Shias who were considered apostate citizens by the extremists. These methods were criticized by al-Qaeda on several occasions.²⁹ Despite the extreme brutality, in its propaganda Daesh could effectively exploit the results of unnecessary bloodshed, or the absence of it in the case of al-Qaeda, which aroused the interest of those susceptible to extremes and representing themselves as closer to the ideology of Salafi jihadist Islam by acting against the Houthi threat and “correcting” the measures taken by al-Qaeda. Accordingly, the above-mentioned aims portrayed AQAP as an organization which had strayed from the right path. It was accused of collaborating with the Hadi government and with foreign

²⁶ “ISIS Claims Deadly Car Bomb in Yemen’s Capital Targeting Houthi Rebels”. *The Huffington Post*, 20 June 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/20/isis-car-bomb-yemen_n_7627370.html, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

²⁷ “Islamic State bomb attack on Houthi rebel leaders in Yemen leaves 28 dead”. *The Guardian*, 30 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/islamic-state-bomb-attack-on-huthi-rebel-leaders-in-yemen-leaves-28-dead>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.

²⁸ Baleedi’s desertion was questioned in an interview with him, published in mid-August by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The terrorist leader discussed events of the past months and called on Sunni Muslims of Yemen to fight against the Houthis, which lies parallel to al-Qaeda’s position. The ‘Islamic State’, however, was not mentioned in the conversation. Al-Muslimi, F. “Extremism Grows in Yemen’s Civil War”. *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, 7 September 2015. <http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61210>, Accessed on 22 December 2017.

²⁹ Mora, E. “Report: ISIS in Yemen Trying to Steal Al-Qaeda’s Thunder”. *Breitbart*, 1 December 2015. <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/07/01/report-isis-in-yemen-trying-to-steal-al-qaedas-thunder/>, Accessed on 28 December 2017.

intelligence organizations, and of complacency and inaction, causing damage to the Sunni Muslims in Yemen and enabling the achievements of the Houthi rebels.

It was also worrying at the same time, that the recognition of the terrorist organization was becoming increasingly common not only among extremists, but among the more moderate too. In the Sunni-majority southern regions, many people rather accepted the authority of Daesh that was considered the lesser of two evils, than to live under the control of Shia Houthis. The strategy of deepening the religious feud between the Shia and the Sunni people have been successfully applied in Yemen, and just like in Iraq and Syria it proved to be particularly productive. In a country that was already very divided religiously and culturally, and had to face the consequences of the political vacuum left behind by the former leadership, more and more southerners, soldiers, or government officials who fled from the North would have preferred the protection of Daesh – that had proven itself multiple times – over al-Qaeda in the beginning, which continued to be more focused on winning the hearts and minds.³⁰

Another important component of Daesh's activities is the drone war carried out against al-Qaeda. The West in cooperation with the Yemeni cabinet has been waging war of unmanned aircraft on the identified terrorists for many years now, with more or less success. However, in the last few months, a decision made by the terrorists – a decision later proved to be a most unfortunate one – provided an especially important breakthrough in this field. As we previously mentioned several times, al-Qaeda wanted to bring down the Houthis, not by attacking the Shias in densely populated areas, but rather by the support of the fight against the Zaydi militia. For this reason, many activists have joined the warriors of the Sunni tribes, which in turn allowed the Saudi intelligence to collect up-to-date information about the group and the exact whereabouts of prominent terrorist leaders. Between January and April 2015, many of them were eliminated, including senior Shariah official Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari, ideologist and spokesman Ibrahim al-Rubaish, resident judge Mamoun Abdulhamid Hatem, and Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi who appeared in many of AQAP's propaganda videos and claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. In early June, even Naser al-Wuhayshi the supreme leader of the organization also fell victim to coalition attacks.³¹ This, of course, led to the weakening of al-Qaeda. The disasters AQAP suffered and the collapse of the command structure left even the most dedicated believers unsure. After all that, many more went over to Daesh, unsurprisingly.

Finally, we should mention the contradictory attitude of foreign countries towards the current conflict in Yemen. This is perhaps most clearly reflected by Washington's foreign policy, which provided support for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition's military intervention in Yemen. High-ranking military superiors and politicians, however, questioned the success and point of the operations against the Houthis from the beginning. In their arguments, they referred to the fact that, in terms of results, Houthis have been much more effective against terrorists, than the hundreds of drone strikes carried out in recent years, or the involvement of a significant number of military consultants in Yemen.³² Thus, Washington continues

³⁰ Salisbury, P. and Mohsen, A. "The Rise of the Islamic State in Yemen". *Vice News*, 20 December 2015. <https://news.vice.com/article/the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-in-yemen>, Accessed on 28 December 2017.

³¹ "Yemen al-Qaeda chief al-Wuhayshi killed in US strike". *BBC News*, 16 June 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33143259>, Accessed on 29 December 2017.

³² Perry, M. "US generals: Saudi intervention in Yemen 'a bad idea'". *Al-Jazeera America*, 17 April 2015. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/17/us-generals-think-saudi-strikes-in-yemen-a-bad-idea.html>, Accessed on 29 December 2017.

to carry out airstrikes on al-Qaeda members, while making drastic diplomatic attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia and its allies of ending military operations.³³ Nevertheless, the latter currently seems to be unacceptable to Riyadh, for the withdrawal of the Arab coalition forces from the second civil war in Yemen would very likely lead to the defeat of the forces loyal to President Hadi and the victory of Shia Houthis. This would mean the further strengthening of Iran in the region, which is something both Riyadh and the partnering Arab states would like to avoid. This serious conflict of interest after all threatens to lengthen the fighting, and the current situation would only benefit for the terrorists, Daesh and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula alike.

It should be also noted, that the Yemeni wings of Daesh, despite all of the aforementioned advantages and achievements, has very serious incompletenesses too. For example: the geographical distance and the fighting on the Iraqi–Syrian fronts significantly derogated the importance of the Daesh’s Yemeni branch. It followed that Daesh’s Yemeni militants received less attention and supplies. The latter could have been essential for effective sedentation in the country where the tribes were divided and the terrorists’ well-equipped enemies deployed modern weapons against them. Moreover, it seemed that the terrorist group did not have a fully developed strategy and, more importantly, lacked local allies. While al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was prepared to compromise with the willing tribes and communities in the fight against the common enemy, Daesh considered everyone who did not join, as enemy. This was shown most clearly in the phases of the terror-organization’s Aden-campaign.

Namely, while the terrorists’ targets were mainly Shia mosques and Houthi militants until the beginning of August 2015, the Yemeni operatives changed their strategy after the re-occupation of most of Aden. The latter was symbolized by the demolition of many Christian sacred places and the execution of an apostate agent. The third phase started in the end of September when the Yemeni government’s re-organisation began. The terrorists reacted to the changed circumstances by assuming the name of Wilayat Aden-Abyan for emphasizing the importance of their presence, determination and plans.³⁴ Maybe this was demonstrated the most conspicuously on 6 October 2015 in two seemingly separate incidences. While the attack carried out against a Shia mosque in Sana’a, claiming at least seven lives, stands in line with previously observed practices, the explosions that occurred on the same day in Aden were a new phenomenon in itself. In the latter case, the targets were the joint headquarters of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well the residence of the president and members of the Yemeni Cabinet the al-Qasr Hotel. This meant that the attack, killing 18 people, was targeting those who were considered the main opponents of the Shia Houthis.³⁵ This was followed by the assassination of Jaafar Mohammed Saad, Governor of Aden, on 8 December 2015 whose successor also became the terrorists’ target at least three times, in

³³ “United States Policy & Yemen’s Armed Conflict”. The Yemen Peace Project. 2015. <http://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/US-Policy-and-Yemens-Armed-Conflict.pdf>, Accessed on 29 December 2017.

³⁴ Zimmermann, K. and Diamon, J. “Challenging the Yemeni State: ISIS in Aden and al Mukalla”. The Critical Threats. 9 June 2016. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/challenging-the-yemeni-state-isis-in-aden-and-al-mukalla>, Accessed on 30 December 2017.

³⁵ Al-Batati, S. and Fahim, K. “ISIS Takes Responsibility for Bombings in Yemen”. *The New York Times*, 6 October 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/middleeast/yemen-aden-hotel-explosion.html>, Accessed on 30 December 2017.

a short period.³⁶ However, the terror group considerably lost face according to signs when it attacked the contending parties without differentiation at the same time. Its expansion balked and Daesh's Yemeni branch did not manage to control effectively only a single region nor to introduce their specific governmental institution and extreme Sharia interpretation, in contrast with Syria, Iraq or Libya.

Its attractivity also was diminished due to the fact that the salary of Daesh's volunteers, which had been several times higher than AQAP fighters' payment in the beginning, declined in the course of time. Moreover, tensions evolved between the local Yemeni militants and their Saudi originated leaders, and the local Daesh commanders rivaled with each other. Thanks to all of these factors, internal discontentment ruled over the organization just one year after the establishment of Daesh's Yemeni wing and some members who were disappointed in the policy of leadership left the terror-organization in the end of 2015.³⁷ However, it is important to emphasize that the reason of the latter mentioned events was not the decline of Daesh's prestige. Namely, most of the secessors questioned only the competency of local commanders and denied submission to their orders, but they remained faithful to their oath to al-Baghdadi at the same time.³⁸

Despite the crisis, Daesh's Yemeni wing remained active and regularly carried out bloody attacks in certain districts. For example, On 15 May 2016, Daesh militants committed a suicide attack that killed at least 31 police recruits in the port of Mukalla, which was under AQAP control until April 2016, when the Saudi-led coalition forced the terror-organization to give up the city.³⁹ More than a week later, on May 23 2016, more than 45 persons lost their lives in two similar attacks when one of the assassins rammed into a recruitment center with his car which was fully packed with explosives. At the same time, another suicide bomber got among the recruits who gathered in front of an army commander's house and blew himself up.⁴⁰ A similar attack was carried out against another military recruitment center of the port

³⁶ The terrorists also carried out many unsuccessful assassination attempt against Aden's Police Chief beside the new Governor. Al-Haj, A. "Suicide bombers targets police chief in Yemen's Aden, kills 7". *Daily Mail*, 17 January 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3403584/2-senior-security-officials-assassinated-Yemen.html>, Accessed on 30 December 2017.

³⁷ In the middle of December 2015, 101 local members of the terrororganization publicly called upon the relay of the inadequate governor in two letters before the secession from ISIL. About 30 men of them had defected to AQAP in early 2016, unhappy with the group's tactics and targeting of mosques and Muslim civilians. "ISIS Fails to Gain Much Traction in Yemen". *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 March 2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-fails-to-gain-much-traction-in-yemen-1459203675>, Accessed on 5 January 2018.; Zimmermann and Diamon. "Challenging the Yemeni State..."

³⁸ However, the protest against Abu Bilal al-Harbi's rule finally resulted the removal of the self-proclaimed emir. Abu Sulayman al-Adani became his successor who served previously as military commander for the group until March 2017. In October 2017, the US government managed to identify other key members of the terror-group like Nashwan al-Wali al-Yafi'i as the group's top financial official, or Khalid al-Marfadi, Radwan Muhammad Husayn Ali Qanan and Khalid Sa'id Ghabish al-Ubaydi as key military leaders. Roggio, B. "US military hits Islamic State in Yemen". *FDD's Long War Journal*, 27 October 2017. <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/us-military-hits-islamic-state-in-yemen.php>, Accessed on 29 December 2017.

³⁹ "Yemen conflict: IS suicide attack kills 31 police recruits". BBC News. 15 May 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36295616>, Accessed on 29 December 2017.

⁴⁰ Al-Haj, A. "Yemen Suicide Attacks Kill at least 45 Army Recruits". Associated Press. 23 May 2016. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cfc2c17587f742ea955ab9f36ca836f3/yemen-suicide-attacks-kill-least-45-army-recruits>, Accessed on 23 December 2017.; "ISIS Claims Deadly Attacks on Yemeni Recruits in Aden". Al Arabiya. 23 May 2016. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/05/23/Deadly-car-bomb-attack-hits-Yemen-s-Aden.html>, Accessed on 5 January 2018.

on 29 August 2016 killing more than 70.⁴¹ Moreover, the terrorists also carried out attacks against fortified military facilities next to so-called soft targets at the same time. For example, Wilayat al-Bayda carried out a suicide attack in Rada'a city with an explosive-packed vehicle. In the same month, it also launched a drone for documenting its fighting against Houthi and Saleh-party forces in the middle part of the country.⁴² In the following month, the fighters of Wilayat Aden-Abyan carried out a combined attack against a significant coalition military base in al-Burayaqah, timing it to the anniversary of the beginning of coalition's airstrikes. That time the terrorists used suicide attackers as well as small arms at the same time. On the basis of the above-mentioned events, we can conclude that we can not talk about the full roll-back of Daesh in Yemen despite the evolved ambivalent situation. Its local cells continually try for renewing their methods and the used equipment to sabotage the stabilization efforts of coalition forces'.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the events of recent months we can say that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains a major source of danger for the western interests in Yemen, despite the losses it suffered. In our opinion there are basically two options for al-Qaeda to regain its lost prestige and restore its swayed positions: increase the support for militias fighting Shia Houthis, and execute more intense and frequent attacks against western interests. Learning from the mistakes of the past years al-Qaeda has begun developing a more flexible and more recipient strategy. For example, after the rapid fall of the short-lived Abyan Emirate, the terrorist organization formed a considerably more tolerant policy towards locals, and refrains from introducing strict interpretations of Islamic law in areas under its control, for this would risk the further loss of potential supporters. Besides, the group was able to successfully fill up the political and security vacuum in some local communities, and even gained many allies among Sunni tribal militias in its war against Houthis due to the ongoing civil war, the humanitarian disaster as well as the collapse of the central government and the retreat of Yemeni armed forces. Therefore, while Daesh's proponents continued their fight in smaller, individual cells, the local branch of al-Qaeda was able to acquire significantly large regions, military bases, airports, and ports with a substantial arsenal of weaponry in the eastern Hadhramaut and al-Bayda provinces.

However, generally we can conclude that the major defeats of Daesh in Iraq and Syria do not mean the final victory over the terror-organization. It is still active and has not given up its efforts to realize its fundamental aims by brutal methods and tools. This statement is especially relevant when we examine the current Yemeni situation. Daesh's Yemeni wing intensified its activity in the autumn due to the separatist Southern Movement's growing popularity and claimed responsibility for the deadly VBIED attack against the Finance Ministry in Aden in November 2017. In the same month, they carried out several suicide blasts against the UAE-financed and -managed Security Belt Forces that mainly operate in Aden, as well as assassinated policemen and Yemeni Salafi imams who preached a more moderate form of

⁴¹ "Yemen: Death toll in ISIL's Aden bombing rises to 70". *Al-Jazeera*, 30 August 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/yemen-death-toll-isil-aden-bombing-rises-70-160830040441997.html>, Accessed on 5 January 2018.

⁴² Farrukh, M. "Yemen Situation Report". *The Critical Threats*. 3 Marc 2017. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/yemen-situation-report/2017-yemen-crisis-situation-report-march-3>, Accessed on 5 January 2018.

Islam. However, the current anarchic situation, which became more chaotic after the killing of Ali Abdullah Saleh on 04 December 2017, assumes that al-Qaeda can further increase its influence in the country while Islamic State may disappear from Yemen, because the latter could not put together a proper strategy suitable for the conditions in the Arabic country. We have to remark also that the latter will occur when the rout of Daesh became reality. We also have to emphasize that it means just the final defeat of a terror-organization and we can only guess about the further future of its members. The most probable option is that most of the former Daesh activists will return to AQAP's lines to continue their fundamental struggle against Shia and governmental forces. However, until that moment we cannot exclude the possibility that those Jihadist warriors who are fleeing Iraq and Syria now, will join their comrades in Yemen, which nowadays has become a safe haven for radical Sunni militants due to the current circumstances.

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Maj. Zoltán Somodi:

WHY MUSLIM INTEGRATION FAILS?

BOOK REVIEW

One of the fiercest political debates in the Western world, and especially in Europe, is on the integration of Muslim immigrant communities. Since the large-scale migratory wave of 2015–16, the debate has grown even more intense, and various affected states have been looking for workable solutions for this problem. Their policies can be grouped into two strategies, assimilationist and multicultural. The authors' rigorous field research conducted in 2009–10 among Senegalese immigrants in France offers an extremely close insight into the nature of religious discrimination and offers political recommendations to improve the situation. The research is groundbreaking in the sense that earlier it was only assumed, but not proven, that the reason for the discrimination against Muslims is their religion only. The authors also prove that there is a discriminatory equilibrium between the French and Muslim immigrants, where both sides behave negatively towards each other, in a mutually reinforcing vicious cycle.

The first chapter is an introductory outline of the research questions, the methodology and the conclusions. The authors seek the answer for the questions whether Islamophobia is indeed existent among the indigenous ethnic French population, whether it is indeed contributed to religion only, and no other confounding factors, such as region of origin or race. Is it entirely irrational or has rational components? In each case, different policies would be necessary to counter this discrimination.

Research confirms that Muslims are discriminated against because they are Muslims and this discrimination has both rational and irrational elements. This is the basis for the discriminatory equilibrium of negative behaviour towards each other, which is mutually reinforcing, and this situation does not improve over time, instead, each generation is less and less integrated. The research suggests that assimilationist strategies offer better outcomes than multiculturalist ones, but they are not sufficient alone. Both sides need to make sacrifices at micro, meso and macro levels to achieve an equilibrium shift.

Chapter two shows that there is discrimination against Muslims in the French labour market, and that it is attributed to their religion. Even though the host population is very secular, they discriminate along religious lines. The choice of the sample makes it possible to isolate the religious factor from other sources of discrimination. Serer and Joola communities migrated from Senegal to France in the 70s. These communities met Islam and Christianity at about the same time in the 19th century.

Research methodology used a voting game, a correspondence test, and an income survey. In the voting game, religious distance was the only factor that caused a significant difference in the likelihood of a candidate being elected as a leader. In the correspondence test, three equally qualified CVs, one with a French name, one with a Senegalese Christian name, and one with Senegalese Muslim name were sent to job advertisements. The CVs were different only in the religion of the applicant. The results showed that Muslims were discriminated against compared to native populations or Christian immigrants. It also showed that racial

discrimination did not reach statistical relevance, even with an attached photo to the CVs, but religious discrimination was significant. Income surveys conducted among Senegalese Christian and Muslim immigrants showed that this discrimination also translates into diverging living standards among the respective communities.

In chapter three, a deeper insight into the research strategy convincingly explains how the selection of the sample population meets the criteria of unbiased study. The sample contains both Muslims and Christians, they are from the same country and ethnic group, their original conversion to any of the two faiths did not correlate with any advantage in the country of origin, and they arrived at the same time and circumstances in France. The behaviour of rooted French – with four French grandparents all born inside France – was examined towards each of the Senegalese subgroups. All participants were recruited from the 19th District of Paris, the most multicultural environment available.

The sampling procedure outlined in chapter four shows how the authors countered the selection bias during the games, surveys and interviews of 2009 and 2010. In fact, the sampling was likely to produce a lower level of discrimination and mutual mistrust than it is in reality.

Chapter five describes the research protocols of each type of research tool applied in 2009 and 2010, and the exact methodology of the interviews, surveys and experimental games – simultaneous trust game, speed chatting game, voting game, dictator game and strategic dictator game. Supplementary research conducted in 2010, including more games – name game, beauty game, double strategic dictator game – helped to fine tune the results of 2009, and provide more accurate answers.

Chapter six answers the question “why is there religious discrimination in France?” and identifies a rational part in Islamophobia. It has three segments: religious norms, gender norms and mastery of French language. Firms rationally find it problematic that their Muslim workers proselytize or try to enforce the observation of religious holidays, fasting or prayer times in the workplace, thereby causing economic disadvantage to the firm and undermining esprit de corps by separating themselves during mealtimes. Gender norms are also significantly different among Muslims and Christians, as it is proven by empirical studies. Senegalese Muslim donors donated significantly more to men in the dictator game, while rooted French and Senegalese Christian donors donated more to women, and the two latter groups’ behaviour was statistically no different. Senegalese Christian behaviour converges to rooted French, whereas Muslim behaviour diverges. HR recruiters consistently refer to these attitudes as detrimental to their enterprises’ esprit de corps.

Chapter seven focuses on the non-rational segments of Islamophobia. The simultaneous trust game revealed that even though the rooted French players did not trust the Senegalese Christians more than the Senegalese Muslims, they still sent less returns to them, which proves that there is a purely taste-based aversion towards them among rooted French. The 2010 confirmatory name game tests also prove that this distaste is related only to the other party’s religion and not their race or foreignness. This discrimination can be ameliorated through socialization, as the speed chatting game proved. However, the level of altruism towards Senegalese Muslims decreased significantly as their number around the French increased. This effect was not observed in the case of co-religionist immigrants.

The book refers to a survey made among Serer and Jola immigrants asking whether they think that laïcité is an obstacle to religious liberty. The answers by Senegalese Muslim and Christian respondents did not differ significantly. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are also secular, and it would also be important to clarify what each respondent understands under laïcité. Similarly, the referred survey that would show that gender norm

differences between Muslims and Christians are exaggerated, only shows the attitude about the willingness to educate sons and daughters. Even if these attitudes are statistically similar, there are other aspects of difference in gender norms that are much more relevant when we talk about misogyny, like attitudes about divorce, inheritance, sexual freedom or roles in society.

Chapter eight describes the discriminatory equilibrium, which is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle of distrust between rooted French and Muslims whereby they act towards each other in mutually reinforcing negative ways: 1. Muslim immigrants display behaviours that feed into French racial, statistical discrimination against them in the labour market; 2. rooted French exhibit unprovoked taste-based discrimination against Muslims; 3. Muslims, perceiving more hostility in France, separate more from the host society than do their Christian counterparts. This discriminatory equilibrium does not improve over time, instead, each subsequent generation of Muslim immigrants is less integrated than the previous one, as the data of the research reveals.

Chapter nine provides proof that the findings uncovered in France, namely that Muslims integrate less successfully, and their separation increases over time spent in the host country, are not specific to France only, but they can be applied to Western Europe and the United States. The authors used the European Social Survey to prove this in the European context, and the Detroit Arab American Study in the United States context.

Chapter ten gives policy recommendations to find a way out of the discriminatory equilibrium. The recognition of the discriminatory equilibrium means that governments have to address both the rational and the non-rational elements of discrimination at the same time, which poses a serious challenge. The recommended policies are grouped into three levels, the individual (micro), societal institutions (meso), and state (macro).

At individual level they recommend the nudging theory, taking small steps in the desired direction to eradicate the problem. This can be achieved by broadcasting the non-rational elements of Islamophobia, thereby discrediting it, not only for the general public, but also in schools. Choosing not exclusively Muslim names for children might also decrease the chance that rooted French will discriminate against them based on a sign of Muslimness.


At meso level, the first step should be providing equal opportunities in the educational system. At the same time, diversity training programs should be conducted for management and recruiters, highlighting the economic advantage of eliminating discrimination, including the threat of penalizing a systematic recruitment behaviour favouring Christians. To this end, an institution should be established to monitor firms' recruitment procedures by using correspondence tests and audit studies.

A positive incentive could be the application of a "diversity compliant" label to firms whose workforce meets the diversity criteria, thereby displaying social responsibility. Merely the expression of religious conviction should not be punished, but forcing one's conviction on others must be restricted, just like using public places for worship, or the compromising of security or hygiene standards because of religious considerations. Noncompliance to these regulations should be a legitimate reason for one's removal from the workplace – thereby providing a nudge to shift the discriminatory equilibrium in relation to the rational part of Islamophobia. Other recommendations include the option of more flexible working hours, offering different meals at workplace restaurants, and allowing certain public national holidays to be taken out on other occasions, for example Eid al-Adha, or Pesach, the training of imams in France under the auspices of the French Council of the Muslim Religion (CFCM).

With regard to state level, the debate is between assimilationist and multiculturalist tendencies. According to the authors, multiculturalist policies increase the divergence in

cultural norms between Christian and Muslim minorities, whereas assimilationist policies reduce this gap. The policy tools recommended to nudge the discriminatory equilibrium are citizenship contracts, free language courses, and mandatory courses on national values.

This book is an essential read for anyone, who intends to formulate a well-founded opinion about the integration of Muslims in Europe. It is groundbreaking in the sense that the research methodology successfully isolated the religious effect as a reason for discrimination, and that the authors rightly hold both sides responsible for the discriminatory equilibrium, not just blame native European populations. The offered solutions may or may not work, as their results are yet to be seen, but the most important conclusion is that they only need to be applied in places where Muslim immigrant communities constitute a large enough segment of the population to raise such concerns. Countries where such communities do not exist yet can employ another simple and successful strategy, namely preserving the current cultural and ethnic cohesion of the workforce and the population in general.



Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, Marie-Anne Valfort: Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies

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Newspaper article

Last name, Initials. “Title of Article”. *Name of Newspaper*, Date. Section. Page.

Examples:

Footnote: Sefara, M. “Beast that instills only fear and loathing”. *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

Subsequent reference: Sefara. “Beast that instills...”. 14.

Reference list: Sefara, M. “Beast that instills only fear and loathing”. *The Sunday Independent*, 30 May 2010. Sunday Dispatches. 14.

Thesis

Last name, Initials. "Title of Thesis". Thesis presented for degree (stipulate in full). Name of university, year.

Examples:

Footnote: Jordaan, E. "South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making". Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005. 25.

Subsequent reference: Jordaan. "South African Defence since 1994..." 28.

Reference list: Jordaan, E. "South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making". Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the MMil in Military Sciences. Stellenbosch University, 2005.

Conference paper

Last name, Initials. "Title of Paper". Paper presented at Name of Conference, Place, Date

Examples:

Footnote: Heuser, B. "Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice". Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

Subsequent reference: Heuser. "Strategy Making..."

Reference list: Heuser, B. "Strategy Making: The Theory vs. the Practice". Paper presented at the First South African Conference on Strategic Theory, Stellenbosch, 11 June 2009.

For further information and examples, please visit http://www.chicagomanualof-style.org/tools_citationguide.html, http://support.ebsco.com/knowledge_base/detail.php?topic=996&id=7029&page=1

Submission Preparation Checklist

As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

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2. The submission file is in OpenOffice, Microsoft Word, RTF, or WordPerfect document file format.
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4. The text is single-spaced; uses a 12-point font; employs italics, rather than underlining (except with URL addresses); and all illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end.
5. The text adheres to the stylistic and bibliographic requirements outlined in the Author Guidelines, which is found in About the Journal.
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100 years of the Hungarian Air Force

Edited by István Törös

One hundred years ago, we said goodbye to our air-planes with the Black Cross emblem and hung up our pilot's leather jackets. We watched our dilapidated planes at airports and hangars with teary eyes, but proudly told our children about the air battles.

Ninety years ago, we began teaching our successors the craft of flying, excitedly reading the news about the secretly-formed postal and weather forecasting divisions, and we were delighted to walk around the newly-arrived English and Dutch planes.

Eighty years ago, we went to South Italy so that some of us could become the first fighter and bomber pilots. We were able to demonstrate what we learned in combat on the Eastern front and in the skies of our home country. We buried and were buried.

Seventy years ago, we left the lathes to become pilots, airplane mechanics, and military officers at the call of the Party. We looked up at our veteran training officers, who had won merit in battle, and did not understand why the black car came for them.

Sixty years ago, the best of us were able to exceed the speed of sound, and the new generation was trained to fly ever-evolving delta wing fighters. We learned Russian and practiced launching live rockets above the desert shooting range.

Fifty years ago, we painted red rings on our aircrafts, and we participated in helping Czechoslovakia as a comrade. We flew together with the fighters temporarily stationed in our country and enjoyed the benefits of the private KGST exchange program.


Forty years ago, we went back to school to learn about the variable-sweep wing fighters of Soviet military technology. We learned about the NATO airports, and we knew they were learning about ours. Cold war strategists played with fire.

Thirty years ago, the fighter pilot who entered outer space was chosen among us, while those who stayed on the ground could witness how their fellow pilots said goodbye to their vocation on command, with teary eyes and their heads hung low.

Twenty years ago, we received the best Russian fighter of the era, but we didn't know back then that the regime change would bring along a model change. We observed, worriedly, the slow vegetation of our rotary-wing and transport aircraft pilot comrades.

Ten years ago, we learned English - and since then, we have been flying to Sweden for live shootings and flying with our NATO partners in our fourth-generation fighters, identifying passenger planes on alarm, protecting the Hungarian, Slovenian, and Baltic airspaces.

And so, the story goes on...



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