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THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE

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ABSTRACT: For the past six years, hybrid warfare has been one of the focal points of military science research. The activities and role of law enforcement agencies are only considered as complementary in most studies, although the police force is the first line of defence when a hybrid attack occurs, and is of particular relevance to the management of the crisis. The study discusses the historical background of hybrid warfare, the difficulty of definition, its model, and the law enforcement-related elements within it. An analysis of what happened in Ukraine in 2014 illustrates the concepts. The paper also offers some conclusions and recommendations at the end.

KEYWORDS: hybrid warfare, police, non-linear warfare, Ukraine, Russia

PRELIMINARY

This paper focuses on the relationship between hybrid warfare and law enforcement. The complex operational environment emerging in the course of a hybrid challenge is one in which various security, law enforcement and public administration professionals must perform their tasks in a coordinated manner, almost daily. Numerous publications have already discussed hybrid warfare, so some aspects of the debate on the subject are covered in this paper. The activities and role of law enforcement agencies are only considered as supplementary in most studies, which is an error. In the course of a hybrid challenge law enforcement is one of the first lines of defence, and is likely to be of particular relevance in the management of the crisis.

The first part is a discussion of the definition of hybrid warfare and the development of this new crisis management model. The second part is an analysis of the events that took place in Ukraine in 2014. This case study is best suited to explore the role of law enforcement agencies, as this was the first time that a hybrid operation ran its full course, and achieved its strategic goal, the Russian annexation of Crimea. The third part identifies the tasks of law enforcement agencies and the capabilities they must have as a necessary condition for defending against a hybrid belligerent. I then summarize my conclusions and suggestions in the concluding section.

HYBRID WARFARE IN GENERAL

Hybrid warfare has become a hit topic in the last decade, not only in terms of scientific research, but also in the mainstream media. This new form of warfare became the focus of scientific and “less scientific” interest following Russia’s occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. However, it should be noted that there is no consensus in the international

literature on the concept or content of hybrid warfare. As Zoltán Somodi and Péter Álmos Kiss point out, there are four main categories of opinion on the subject.¹ According to the first group, hybrid warfare represents an entirely new strategy approach that is different from previous wars. The second group includes those who say that in the past some belligerents employed elements of hybrid warfare, but today they are applied in a fundamentally novel approach. Researchers in the third group believe that hybrid warfare is not a new strategy, nor does its analysis help understand the security environment of the 21st century. The fourth and last group is comprised of Russian military scientists, who view hybrid warfare as a strategy of the Western powers against Russia. This division is the best illustration of the lack of uniformity in the perception of hybrid warfare and, consequently, the difficulty of establishing an internationally agreed, uniform definition.

According to the concept adopted by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and enshrined in its capstone military doctrine: *“Hybrid threats. Hybrid threats occur where conventional, irregular and asymmetric threats are combined in the same time and space. Conflict could involve a range of transnational, state, group and individual participants operating globally and locally. Some conflicts may involve concurrent inter-communal violence, terrorism, cyberspace attacks, insurgency, pervasive criminality and widespread disorder. Adversaries may also choose a long-term strategy to avoid defeat rather than seeking victory, to try to outlast NATO’s will and determination. Countering such hybrid threats may require a broader approach, employing integrated capabilities some of which may be unconventional in nature.”*² Similarly, in the media, the concept of hybrid warfare is a common, coordinated application of regular and irregular military procedures. In reality the phenomenon shows a much more nuanced picture, and in order to examine the role of law enforcement forces in hybrid warfare, it is important to know how such conflicts develop, their most important stages, and the relationships between each element than the exact definition. First, however, let us examine the most important milestones in the development of hybrid war theory, as well as the related researchers and theoreticians.

Major William Nemeth (US Marine Corps) introduced the theory of hybrid warfare in his master’s thesis on the Russian–Chechen wars.³ Following Nemeth, Frank Hoffman⁴ first outlined the principles of flexible, simultaneous, coordinated use of conventional and irregular warfare as the basis for hybrid warfare, based on the successful tactics and operational principles of Hezbollah⁵ against the Israeli Defence Forces in Lebanon in 2006. With the exception of Hoffman and Nemeth, there are few Western scholars who studied this new form of warfare in greater depth before 2014.

To understand hybrid warfare, it is important to look at the development of Russian warfare principles, along which the system of procedures applied in Ukraine may have devel-

¹ Somodi Z. and Kiss, Á. P. “A hibrid hadviselés fogalmának értelmezése a nemzetközi szakirodalomban”. *Honvédségi Szemle* 147/6. 2019. 22–28. DOI: 10.35926/HSZ.2019.6.2.

² “NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine Edition E Version”. 1 February 2017. 2-11. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602225/doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf, Accessed on 23 November 2019.

³ Nemeth, W. J. “Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare”. Thesis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

⁴ Hoffman, F. *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

⁵ Lebanese Shia political and paramilitary organization.

oped. In his work on military science, which was first published in 1995,⁶ General Makmut Akhmetovich Gareev⁷ pointed out that technological advances are revolutionizing warfare both in terms of the destructive capacity of conventional weapons and the appearance of new combat methods. His work was further developed by General Vladimir Slipchenko,⁸ who described future wars as “contactless” conflicts. In his view, instead of the military dimension, the political and economic sphere is preferred, while the chances of a traditional military offensive are relatively low.

The most widely known Russian expert mentioned in the field of hybrid warfare is General Valeri Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. His 2013 article in the *Voenno-promishlenniy kurier journal*, “*The Value of Science Is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations*”⁹ was cited as the foundation of hybrid war. His paper and the principles it outlined – which are based on Slipchenko’s earlier work – began to be called hybrid warfare and the Gerasimov doctrine. I agree with János Tomolya,¹⁰ who states that a document of about 2,000 words cannot be considered as a complete military doctrine. It should also be noted that Gerasimov did not use the term hybrid warfare, referring to what he described as a new form of warfare or as a “new generation warfare”. Another name commonly used for hybrid warfare, in Russian relation, is the so-called non-linear warfare, which is not related to his name, but to Russian presidential adviser Vladimir Surkov, who used the term under his pseudonym, Nathan Dubovitsky.¹¹ However, it is remarkable that many analysts still see General Gerasimov’s article as the basis for hybrid warfare.

The naming and propagation of Gerasimov’s crisis management model as hybrid warfare is linked to Mark Galeotti.¹² The acclaimed Russia expert himself later realized¹³ that the choice of name was not the most fortunate and could have implications for the actual perception of the phenomenon and for choosing the right way to deal with the crisis. The 2014 Ukrainian crisis, which, although it erupted after the publication of the article, played an important role in the spread of Gerasimov’s concept of warfare, furthermore, it supports the theoretical approach described there.

A feature of the new form of warfare described by Gerasimov is that it does not involve an open, regular force as long as this move can be delayed. It is of paramount importance that the conflict remains below the threshold of war, and for this purpose paramilitary forces, civilian insurgents, as well as special operations forces, are employed clandestinely. A very

⁶ Gareev, M. A. *If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1998.

⁷ General of the Army of the Russian Federation, who was the President of the Russian Academy for Military Science until his death.

⁸ Mattson, P. A. “Russian operational art in the fifth period: Nordic and Arctic applications”. *Revista de Ciencias Militares* 1/1. 2013. 29–47.

⁹ Gerasimov, V. “‘Tsennost’ nauki v predvideniye’”. *Voenno-promishlenniy kurier*, 27 February 2013. <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>, Accessed on 26 November 2019.

¹⁰ Tomolya, J. “Az úgynevezett „Geraszimov-cikk” margójára”. *Hadtudomány* 28/3-4. 2018. 79–88. DOI: 10.17047/HADTUD.2018.28.3-4.79

¹¹ Rácz, A. *Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine, Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist*. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015. 37.

¹² Galeotti, M. “‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t”. *E-International Relations*. 16 April 2015. <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/hybrid-war-and-little-green-men-how-it-works-and-how-it-doesnt/>, Accessed on 4 May 2019.

¹³ Galeotti, M. “(Mis)Understanding Russia’s two ‘hybrid wars’”. *Critique and Humanism* 49/1. 2018. 17–28.

important complement to this is information warfare, waged through traditional and social media, and specific cyber operations. In the late stages of the conflict, regular forces also play a role, but mostly as a deterrent. However, the most relevant feature of such full-spectrum operations is real-time coordination and coherent, synchronized execution. When we examine the involvement of law enforcement agencies in non-linear warfare, the model described by General Gerasimov provides an excellent basis for understanding the strategy used by Russia. He outlined the phases of dealing with a crisis in six steps:

- The appearance of hidden contradictions.
- Tension generation / exacerbation.
- Steps leading to conflict / beginning of conflict.
- The crisis (crisis).
- Addressing the crisis.
- Restoration of peace, post-conflict settlement.¹⁴

Following Gerasimov's work, several Russian military experts have discussed this new type of warfare. Among them is the work of Sergei Chekinov and Sergei Bogdanov, who examined the subject in greater detail, supplementing and developing Gerasimov's ideas. The researchers emphasize the importance of using asymmetric procedures, political, economic, and information technology tools, and the need for these elements to operate within a coordinated, common leadership management system, which thus acts as a force multiplier.¹⁵

To further explore this topic, we need to examine the stages of Russian non-linear warfare, whose best description can be found in András Rác's work.¹⁶ Basically, full-spectrum hybrid warfare consists of three phases, each consisting of three sections:

Preparatory phase

The essence of this phase is for the attacker to map out the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the target country, which he then exploits through operations. Open violence has not yet taken place, with priority being given to political, economic and diplomatic means. The preparatory phase consists of three sections:

- Strategic preparation.
- Political preparation.
- Operational preparation.

Attack phase

The most important difference from the previous phase is that by this time there has been open, organized violence in the targeted country. The procedures used here can be distinguished from the attacker's traditional diplomatic and foreign policy actions, which is not the case in the first phase. The takeover of media and civilian infrastructure is gradually taking place, in parallel with the attack on the military and law enforcement command and

¹⁴ Deák, A. „Az orosz katonai gondolkodás átalakulása a 21. században az Oroszországi Föderáció hidegháborút követő katonai doktrínáinak tükrében”. PhD Thesis. Budapest: National Public Services University, 2018. 160. based on Figure

¹⁵ Rác. *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine...* 37.

¹⁶ Rác. *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine...* 57–70.

control systems of the targeted state. At this stage, it is important that regular forces (other than the special forces) are not yet active, but instead support operations as a deterrent force, generally outside the state border. On the international stage the attacker continues to deny its involvement in the conflict, thus maintaining the possibility of withdrawing its forces if the conflict escalates in the wrong direction. When central power is no longer able to maintain control of the state, communication and leadership systems are broken, the attacker offers society an alternative in the form of a force that is independent of the government. There are three sections of the offensive phase:

- Exacerbating the tensions.
- Ousting the central power from the target region.
- Establishing alternative political power.

Stabilization phase

The essence of the stabilization phase is that the situation at the end of the previous phase will be further consolidated by the attacker, legitimizing the power of the separatist forces and, if necessary, separating the area from the target country through the employment of regular forces and openly executed conventional operations. This phase may change significantly in order to achieve the strategic goal set previously. There are three sections of the stabilization phase:

- Political stabilization of the outcome.
- Separation of the captured territory from the targeted country.
- Lasting limitation of the strategic freedom of movement of the targeted country.

It can be seen that there is a considerable debate on hybrid warfare in the research community, particularly in terms of its name and precise definition. However, in terms of implementation, we can speak of a standardized procedure in the literature that provides an appropriate framework for analysing the central topic of the study.

CASE STUDY: UKRAINE 2014

Hybrid warfare elements have already appeared in some conflicts, such as the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947–48, or even in the Gulf Wars, but the best-known example of full-scale hybrid warfare is Russia's war in Ukraine in 2014. The Russian forces were the first to carry out operations in Crimea, the final outcome of which was the annexation of the area, or more precisely the "reannexation". Then they sought to achieve the same effect in the Russian-majority areas of eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk), but by that time the Ukrainian leadership was able to resist effectively. The conflict here has not been resolved since then, and it is likely that it will become a frozen conflict in the not too distant future. Due to the limitations of space, I cannot make an in-depth analysis, therefore I focus on the most important events and the situation and tasks of the law enforcement agencies. I carry out the analysis based on the hybrid model discussed in the previous chapter.

We need to go back to autumn 2013 to investigate the events in Ukraine. The country's then-president, Viktor Yanukovich, had been pursuing a pro-Russian policy over the previous three years, seeking to build a strong presidential power. In November 2013, Yanukovich rejected an agreement on an accession treaty with the European Union, which quickly escalated into a wave of demonstrations in Kiev. This series of riots, which almost drove the country into civil war, later became known as Euromaidan. It is difficult to say

whether the events of Euromaidan were part of the Russian strategy. According to the hybrid warfare model, these events were still in the preparatory phase. Russia's goal was to make Ukraine a "buffer" which would not commit itself to the West and would eventually join the "Eurasian Union" advocated by Russian President Vladimir Putin.¹⁷ For Russia, Yanukovich's policy proved to be the perfect tool. As the methods used at this stage of hybrid warfare are difficult to distinguish from the general foreign policy and diplomatic methods used at any given time, it is difficult to judge the depth and exact timing of the preparation of the Russian Federation. Euromaidan also came as a surprise to the Russian leadership, but they made a correct assessment of the situation and were able to exploit it to recapture Crimea and then eastern Ukraine.

Before examining the role of law enforcement forces in key events, it is useful to outline their key features before the crisis. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian internal affairs did not go through a process of modernisation. Until the 2014 conflicts, police remained unchanged despite attempts at reform. In this sense, we are talking about a deeply politicized organization built around a military structure whose primary task was to execute the directives, and protect those in power. The entire organization was permeated by corruption, which affected not only the traffic police, public order and criminal organizations, but also the senior leadership. Ministry of the Interior Affairs (MIA) and police leaders amassed huge fortunes from the money they received. At the executive level, police often achieved their goals through forced confessions, physical abuse, and crimes. All this was due to the lack of public control over the law enforcement agencies. As a result, the social support of the police was minimal before the crisis.¹⁸

The police officers responsible for general policing were unable to curb or control the events in Euromaidan, so they had a marginal role in hybrid warfare. However, we need to look at the Berkut,¹⁹ a law enforcement organization that played a cardinal role in the process. This unit was the best-trained and prepared riot police organization in the post-Soviet region. The 20-thousand strong (prior to 2014) unit's official duties included protecting public security, fighting organized crime, and providing riot police tasks. However, Berkut was the most politicized organization in the Ukrainian interior affairs system, with loyalty primarily to President Yanukovich. During the Euromaidan events, Berkut was responsible for the deaths of several people as, unlike before, the riot police fired into the crowd.²⁰ Thus, even before the crisis, the police were not in a position to curb such a series of protests and to develop effective resistance in the subsequent hybrid war. Moreover, it is relevant that the MIA's elite unit was closer to the President, thus indirectly to Russian interests than to the Ukrainian people.

Between January and February 2014, the situation escalated further. The protesters wanted to remove the president and demanded a return to the 2004 constitution, in which the executive power was much more limited. Hundreds of people lost their lives during the events. On 21st February 2014, a change of power took place and Oleksandr Turchinov became

¹⁷ Tálás P. "Három évvel az ukránjai hatalomátvétel után". *Nemzet és Biztonság* 10/1. 2017. 66.

¹⁸ Marat, E. "Ukraine's Public Enemy Number One: The Police". *Foreign Policy*, 24 January 2014. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/24/ukraines-public-enemy-number-one-the-police/>, Accessed on 27 December 2019.

¹⁹ Бєркyт – meaning Eagle, in the case of the organization, Golden Eagle.

²⁰ "Ólomsörétes löszelrel lőtték a tüntetőket a kijevi Majdanon". Origo, 4 October 2016. <https://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20161004-olomsoretos-loszerrel-lottek-a-tuntetoket-a-kijevi-majdanon-ismerte-el-aegy-ukran-rohamrendor.html>, Accessed on 27 December 2019.

Ukraine's acting head of state. On 23rd February, Yanukovych's situation became untenable and the president escaped to Russia from the demonstrations, and talked with Putin about a Russian intervention. Four days after assuming power, the new Ukrainian leadership dismantled Berkut for its actions during Euromaidan. The organization's duties have been taken over by the re-established Ukrainian National Guard on 13th March.²¹

At the time of the events in Euromaidan, the Kiev government was supported by the Crimean Autonomous Parliament. The Russian-majority population in Crimea also sympathized with Yanukovych and agreed with the withdrawal from the EU accession treaty.²² Putin issued an order to occupy Crimea on 20th February, prior to the Ukrainian takeover, thus bringing hybrid warfare into the attack phase. Russian troops first appeared in the operational area on 27th February, though their nationality could not be established at that time, as they arrived in Crimea without any identification patches or flags. Only soldiers referred to as "polite, green men" in the media later turned out to belong to Russian special forces. Conventional forces did not cross the border, but Moscow continued to conduct military exercises along it, also forcing the Ukrainian leadership and the international community to refrain from intervening. Law enforcement agencies were unable to intervene, and Berkut's Crimean units, as well as many pro-Russian police and soldiers, changed sides, and confronted the Ukrainian central government. Subsequently, the former riot police became part of the Russian law enforcement organization. The Russian Armed Forces occupied the Crimean Parliament and the regional government. Thereafter, a referendum (considered anti-democratic by the international community and recognized only by Russia) was held, followed by a declaration of independence. To close the attack phase, the new Crimean leadership sought admission to the Russian Federation on 17th March. The remaining Ukrainian forces were taken prisoner by the Russians without firing a shot. They were repatriated to Ukraine, but some units, like the Berkut, switched to the new leadership. These events were already part of the stabilization phase. Russia has annexed Crimea in a matter of weeks, without any real military action and serious Ukrainian countermeasures.²³

Pro-Russian demonstrations had been taking place in eastern Ukraine since November 2013, but only after the change of government in February did Russia want to take advantage of the rapid success in Crimea and continue its hybrid operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Like in Crimea, Russian special forces, together with pro-Russian protesters, carried out the primary actions. The seizures of public buildings began on 6th April 2014, and the Ukrainian administration and the law enforcement agencies collapsed in accordance with the timetable outlined above. By this time, however, the Ukrainian leadership had recovered, and launched regular counter-terrorist operations to fight the separatists. Like in Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk populations supported the Russian forces, but to a much lesser extent. Separatists eventually held a referendum in May (also considered illegitimate by the international community), and similarly to Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk became an independent "people's republic." The conflict in eastern Ukraine has not been resolved since then, and despite repeated ceasefires, fighting between separatists and Ukrainian forces intensifies from time to time.

²¹ "Feloszlatták a Berkutot Ukrajnában". VS.hu. 26 February 2014. <https://vs.hu/kozelet/osszes/feloszlattak-a-berkutot-ukrajnaban-0226#!s0>, Accessed on 20 December 2019.

²² "Решение ВР АРК No. 1477-6/13 'О политической ситуации'". 27 November 2013. <https://web.archive.org/web/20140329215707/http://www.rada.crimea.ua/act/11433>, Accessed on 28 December 2019.

²³ Rácz, A. "Oroszország hibrid háborúja Ukrajnában", *KKI-tanulmányok* 1. 2014. 8.

To sum up the role of the police forces in the events in Ukraine: they were unable to perform their task properly either before the crisis or during its escalation. This was due to the extent of corruption, the embeddedness of politics, and the fact that the majority of law enforcement forces in the areas concerned had a pro-Russian mentality. Berkut, which was designed to curb the riots, also served the interests of the Russian Federation. The strongest evidence of this is that the whole organization was integrated into the Russian law enforcement system after the crisis.

THE ROLE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEFENCE AGAINST HYBRID WARFARE

When examining the role of law enforcement agencies in the fight against hybrid warfare, the first thing we need to do is to identify the difficulties that a country, or possibly the international community, is facing. The first of these difficulties is legal regulation, both in the domestic and international legal environments. Part of the research community believes that the hybrid attacker is looking for a legal loophole in international law, the so-called legal “grey zone,” whereby he seeks to create a legal asymmetry so that his actions are not accountable by international law. In response, several international organizations have stated that existing international legal standards are applicable to the attacking party. NATO members stated in the final statement of the Warsaw Summit in 2017 that any hybrid attack on any NATO member state would be considered as an attack on the entire Alliance and would be subject to the principles of collective defence. This idea was also taken up by Council of Europe, in Resolution 2217.²⁴ Also, the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter is applicable to the member states of the United Nations (UN) in the event of a hybrid war.²⁵ The problem lies in the fact that it is very difficult to detect a hybrid attack because, as I have shown in the model, the tools used during the preparatory phase are difficult to distinguish from the diplomatic and foreign policy tools used in peacetime. The challenged state must have accurate and reliable evidence of a hybrid attack before it directs the conflict to the international stage.

This kind of confusion may also appear in domestic law, which can have a major impact on the work of law enforcement agencies and thus on the fight against hybrid warfare. Clarifying the scope for action against violent demonstrations can be critical, and countermeasures against hate speech should be reviewed. It may also be important to review and supplement certain special legal situations, because if the government of a state under attack fails to recognize a hybrid challenge in time, it is likely that certain acts will take place under the peacetime legal regime, during which the use of military forces is either severely curtailed or against the law. The first priority is that the legal options for defence against hybrid warfare need to be created well in advance, because their absence, even in the preparatory phase of an attack, can cause difficulties in organizing the countermeasures.²⁶

²⁴ Sari, A. “The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Takes on the Legal Challenges of Hybrid Warfare”. *Lawfare*, 23 May 2018. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/council-europes-parliamentary-assembly-takes-legal-challenges-hybrid-warfare>, Accessed on 27 December 2019.

²⁵ “UN Charter”. United Nations. 26 June 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>, Accessed on 20 November 2019.

²⁶ Rácz, A. “A hibrid hadviselés és az ellene való védekezés lehetőségei”. *Seregszemle XIV/2*. 2016. 13.

The next building block of defence is the fight against corruption. The actions must be systemic and effective. As we have seen in the case of Ukraine, organizations deeply infected with corruption may be ideal for a hybrid attacker. The elimination of corruption should extend to law enforcement agencies as well as military and intelligence agencies. Corruption has its physical and psychological components, but its impact is in four key areas that may be present in the state, including law enforcement. The first of these is the permissive effect, whereby corruption is what creates the ability to use other hybrid tools. Corruption allows an attacker to gain access to sensitive information, state secrets, extort defence documents, open “back doors,” and disable political opponents. The second area is the widening effect, whereby institutional corruption exacerbates existing weaknesses and deepen fissures. The third and most important area is the destructive effect. Corruption can undermine confidence in democratic institutions, leading to further weaknesses, the exploitation of which is the primary objective of the attacker. Finally, corruption can have a diversionary effect as it can distract attention from other actions of the hybrid attacking party and even divert resources from other important areas of defence.²⁷

The next area is intelligence and counter-intelligence. This concerns both intelligence agencies and the criminal intelligence activities of law enforcement organizations. The most important element of defence against hybrid warfare is the earliest identification of the attacker’s procedures. This can only be achieved by properly resourced, legitimate, democratically controlled, politically neutral intelligence, counter-intelligence and criminal intelligence organizations.²⁸ It should be noted that surveillance of own citizens is always a sensitive political and legal issue. Democratic states have to have severe regulations about these kinds of activities. The key to effective action depends on obtaining information and disseminating it to other competent authorities, for which a high level of intelligence work is essential.

Another important element of defence is that the law enforcement agency itself must be professionally trained and prepared. Not only against hybrid threats but also in terms of general policing. The organizational structure should reflect the differentiation between units designated for public security, criminal tasks and specialized police (counterterrorism, riot police) tasks. While the first two require a more service-type police, special tasks are best assigned to a paramilitary-type force. It is also important that civilian control over the law enforcement agencies be enforced and that the state acts firmly against any abuse. This will increase the societal appreciation of the police and other law enforcement agencies and create a bond of trust between citizens and police, which will harmoniously increase the state’s resistance to hybrid warfare.²⁹

Law enforcement agencies are usually the first line of defence against a hybrid attacker, so it is imperative that they have effective capabilities. The most relevant of these are the competencies of the units performing special law enforcement tasks. The state needs effective riot police capabilities, as an integral element of hybrid warfare is dissatisfaction and incitement within the target country. An outbreak of riots may require effective legal action

²⁷ “‘A Deadlier Peril’: The Role of Corruption in Hybrid Warfare: Information Note”. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project. March 2019. https://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/20190318-MCDC_CHW_Info_note_7.pdf, Accessed on 29 November 2019.

²⁸ Rácz. „A hibrid hadviselés...”. 13.

²⁹ Coffey, L. “How to Defeat Hybrid Warfare Before It Starts”. Defense One, 21 January 2019. <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/01/how-defeat-hybrid-warfare-it-starts/154296/>, Accessed on 5 December 2019.

against a violent mass, which may include the use of deadly force. In Ukraine, after the new government took over and dissolved Berkut, it lost this capability. As a result, occupying Crimea was a much easier task. Among the law enforcement capabilities, I highlight two areas, one is the fight against organized crime and the other is counter-terrorism. In the case of the former, criminal organizations can provide support to the attacking party's subversive, irregular, or special operations forces in the hope of financial gain, so their detection and containment is of paramount importance. Counter-terrorism capability is also a priority, as it is easy for an attacker to use violent non-state actors in hybrid operations that require the use of such forces. In the worst-case scenario, the defender's counter-terrorism units may be confronted by the attacker's special operations forces, which can lead to the escalation of violence.

One of the most important elements is to strengthen and, if necessary, redefine cooperation between professions in the field of defence. It is essential to build cooperation between law enforcement, military forces, and intelligence organizations based on genuine trust, information and knowledge sharing. To do this, new organizational cultures, learning methods, and collaboration channels need to be developed. Joint practices are also a crucial part of this kind of cooperation, where the participating organizations can learn about each other's procedures and methodologies.

Finally, good governance is the most important form of defence against hybrid warfare. This applies not only to law enforcement agencies but also to the state and society as a whole, the essence of which is to reduce the political, economic and social vulnerability to the enemy. The concept of good governance encompasses several areas that are the building blocks of a modern, democratic state, such as policies to reduce tensions, a credible, corruption-free political elite, transparent management of public funds, respect for minority rights, and freedom of the press.³⁰ Obviously, this is the hardest thing to do but if the public trusts the political system, these areas have a harmonized effect, which strengthens the state's resilience and reduces the likelihood of a hybrid attack.

CONCLUSIONS, SUGGESTIONS

My conclusions and suggestions regarding the law enforcement tasks in hybrid warfare are as follows:

- There is no internationally accepted definition of hybrid warfare. The research community is divided into several groups related to the study of the phenomenon. In the practical application of this new warfare and its theoretical foundations, there is a link between the work of Russian military scientists and the activities of the Russian Federation.
- The conceptualization and application of military, non-military, irregular, and regular elements represent a new, integrated level of warfare. The simultaneous operational application of these forces, tools, and methods and procedures covers the complex concept of hybrid warfare. States, federations, and international organizations must be prepared in a harmonized manner to meet the increase of the number of non-linear (hybrid) conflicts and to authentically provide relevant domestic and law enforcement responses in a pre-existing, codified national and international legal environment.

³⁰ Rác. „A hibrid hadviselés...” 12.

- In the Russian approach, asymmetric, indirect methods dominate in the early stages of non-linear (hybrid) warfare, with the use of paramilitary, civilian irregular forces. An essential element, parallel to the physical conflict, is the battle waged in the information space. This continues even after the threshold of war is reached and conventional (regular) forces are deployed.
- In Ukraine in 2014, Russia took advantage of the opportunity to conduct a full-spectrum hybrid warfare, which resulted in Crimea's becoming part of the Russian Federation again. Then it embarked on the same operation in eastern Ukraine, but the Ukrainian leadership's response prevented it from achieving its goal, creating a long, variable-intensity conflict. This frozen conflict is slowing Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, which is in Russia's interest. During the crisis, law enforcement forces played a central role in the development of events.
- The tasks of the police forces are differentiated in the defence against hybrid warfare. With the right legal framework in place, the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, both in law enforcement institutions and in other areas of governance, is crucial. Civil control over the police, a bond of trust with society, and a structural separation of tasks are essential to a well-functioning organization, and thus a guarantee of action against a hybrid attack. The most important capabilities that law enforcement agencies need are: riot police, organized crime units, and counterterrorism.
- The key to defence against a hybrid attacker is good governance. Good governance encompasses several areas of democracies whose coexistence strengthens the enhancement of state resilience, which could be the strongest weapon against an attacking country.

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